Yablo, "Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism" - Part 1 of 3 We begin the show - and the series - with the paper that maps the whole territory of fictionalism. You find yourself saying things you don't believe: that there's a prime number between 2 and 4, that the average family has 2.3 children, that a certain excuse was just a figure of speech. The sentences look committed to numbers, averages, figures even though these are things you may not think exist at all. Quine's Word and Object gave the catalogue of escape routes; Yablo thinks there's a different path entirely, and it runs through make-believe. In Part 1, Solomon and Clementine set up what Yablo calls The Predicament, lay out Quine's three official options, and start to spell out the route that turns "useful fiction" from a hand-wavey thing into a real position. No prior fictionalism understanding needed for this episode; we build the machinery from the ground up. This is a close reading across three parts, so you come away actually understanding the argument, not just its headline. Read along if you like: Stephen Yablo, "Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (2001), pp. 72-102 - freely available on Yablo's MIT page. [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.] New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show - see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself). Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast
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Transcript
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This is a restricted domain production. Deep breath. Here we go. Solomon, quick thing before we start. I finally counted, and the number of decent objections to fictionalism in the literature is roughly four. The rest are the same duck quacking. Hold your horses. I don't have horses. No. And yet you understood me instantly, and you did not for one moment take me to be committed to your owning horses. Now say your own sentence back to yourself. the number of decent objections
is roughly four. Do you believe in numbers? Ask me on a weekday and I'm a nominalist. There are objections, there are no numbers. And yet the sentence you just uttered could not be true unless something existed to be that number. You said a thing committed to numbers while not believing in numbers, which puts you squarely in what today's paper calls the predicament. Capital T, capital P. Okay, but that can't actually be a predicament, can it? Everyone talks like this constantly.
Physicists, accountants, nominalist philosophers at the pub. Everyone does. And one very great philosopher looked at everyone doing it and called it, and I am giving you his exact words here, philosophical double talk, which would repudiate an ontology while simultaneously enjoying its benefits. Oof. It's Quine, isn't it? Quine. Word and Object, 1960. And the paper we are reading today is one long, winding, occasionally explosive attempt to answer that accusation. Stephen Yablo,
Go Figure! A Path Through Fictionalism, published in Midwest Studies in Philosophy in 2001. Welcome to Everything Whatsoever, the show that quantifies over absolutely everything, one paper at a time. I'm Solomon Osei, and with me, as ever, is Clementine Ramsey. Hello. I'm the restriction on his domain, and here's the arrangement if you're new. He
has lived with today's paper for years. I met it this morning. By the end, we've both read it, and so have you. And the paper in question, as you have just heard, is Yablo's Go Figure, a three -part walk, of which this is part one. Now, I had just handed you the title. Go figure, as in the exasperated shrug, and also, presumably, go figure, imperative verb, figuration. The title
is doing both jobs at once, yes, and hold on to that, because doing two jobs at once with one string of words turns out to be rather the point of the whole paper. And I should confess something. The horses. That is not my joke. That is Yablo's own first footnote. He says, roughly, that when I tell you to hold your horses I am not committing myself on the question of whether you have any. And he adds a refinement I want to read almost exactly, because it will matter enormously later. We don't think the propriety
of our stance depends on the belief, even if we have it. Wait, say that again slower. The predicament. First pass. We utter sentences that could not be true unless so -and -sos existed, and we do not believe so -and -sos exist. The predicament, footnote one, refinement. Even if we do happen to believe in the so -and -sos, we don't think the rightness of our utterance depends on that belief. You might believe in numbers on Sundays, your arithmetic does not care. That's a genuinely odd observation. Filed.
Okay, so what does Quine say we're allowed to do if double talk is off the table? Quine offers a menu, three items, in word and object. Option one, show the commitment can be paraphrased away. His own example is chances. Talk of chances can be traded for respectable talk. Option two, stop uttering the problematic sentences. That is what he does with glints. There are no glints. Stop saying there are. Go without. Option three, give up your resistance and accept the things. That
is Quine on sets. He needed them for science. So, with a heavy heart, sets exist. Paraphrase, abstain or capitulate. Paraphrase, abstain or capitulate. And anyone who wants a fourth thing, anyone who wants to keep talking while withholding belief, gets the double talk speech. Right, and here's what's already bothering me, because I've read the first page and nothing else, which is apparently how we're doing this show. How does Quine know the menu is complete? That's not an argument, that's a headwaiter with three tables. That is precisely Yablo's opening move, and you
have paraphrased it more rudely than he does, but he does something better than complain. He catches Quine at a fourth table. Quine himself, in print, admits that he goes on using words like attribute, meaning, idea, long after casting doubt on their supposed objects, and, this is the crucial bit, without even sketching a paraphrase. His word, he persists. Hang on. Quine, the double -talk guy, repudiates an ontology of meanings and attributes while simultaneously enjoying its benefits. He does. His excuse is that he
does not talk this way when speaking in full scientific seriousness, when limining, as he puts it, the true and ultimate structure of reality. Yablo's reply is a single lovely sentence, which I will paraphrase. How can it excuse an activity to say that you don't do it all the time? Quine talks the loose way most of the time, so the question stands, now aimed at Quine himself. How do you get away with it when the commitment cannot be paraphrased away? I want to be annoyed on principle here, and I sort of am. You spend
a career building the sternest ontological conscience in the discipline, you moralise at everyone, deplore, he says deplore, and your own everyday speech is exempt because you've got your fingers crossed behind your back? That's not a double standard, that's a... No, it is exactly a double standard. It is, and Quine even calls it that, the doctrine of the double standard. He speaks of a grading of austerity. One may object to a dubious term at the crucial points of theory while condoning it in casual or heuristic connections where less profundity is professed. You're being
terribly serene about this. You realise you're narrating a crime scene like it's a garden tour. A little outrage, Professor. The man built the courtroom and won't stand trial in it. You are right, and it is worth pausing on why you are right, because I have read this passage so many times I have stopped being amazed by it. Say it back to me, remind me why it is strange. Because the deplore quote isn't a side remark, it's the enforcement mechanism for the whole menu. The menu only binds if the alternative is disgrace,
and the chief enforcer is quietly running a fourth option out the back, which means the fourth option is not fringe, it's load -bearing for Quine. Good. Now with the outrage duly registered, let us do the careful thing, because Yablo does... and it matters. There are two quines in the texts, and they say different things about this loose talk. The first quine, Yablo calls him the apologist, says the loose talk is false, but excusably false, because it never claimed to be limiting ultimate structure, overcommitted in everyday contexts,
and that's all right. So on the apologist reading, when I say the number of objections is four, I'm just wrong, but forgivably wrong, like being late to something that doesn't matter. That is the apologist. But Diablo points out there must be more, because Quine does not actually think he found us false. He thinks he found us muddled. ordinary speech is unclear our commitments cannot simply be read off what we say that is why canonical notation exists to bring speech and commitment back into line your commitments in uttering a
messy ordinary sentence are the commitments of the canonical sentence you would be content to put in its place this is the second quine the hermeneutic quine and diablo thinks he is clearly the dominant one hermeneutic meaning The question is how to interpret what we were already saying, not whether to excuse it. Just so. Apologetic Quine thinks glint talk is false but excused. Hermeneutic Quine thinks it may not be false at all, though so far we have no explanation of how that could be. Because on the face of it, if I say there is an X in the closet and
nothing is an X, I have misstated the facts, haven't I? Well, depends how you said it, surely. If you say it reading a bedtime story, no. And there is Quine again, ahead of us. His example is exactly a bedtime story. The parent telling the Cinderella tale is no more committed to admitting a fairy godmother and a pumpkin coach into his ontology than to admitting the story as true, failing to share the commitments of your own discourse by, his phrase, taking an attitude of frivolity. Fine, but Cinderella is easy. Nobody's
confused about Cinderella. The interesting question is whether frivolity, or something like it, stretches to talk that isn't obviously feigned. To arithmetic. To, hang on, does Quine ever hint at that? Hints only, but pointed ones. Belief attribution is for Quine an essentially dramatic idiom. The subjunctive conditional involves, his words, a dramatic projection. We feign belief in the antecedent and see how convincing we then find the consequent. And he speaks of the deliberate myths of the infinitesimal and the frictionless
plane. His picture in these cases resembles his picture of fairy tales. Keep the element of drama in mind and hold your tongue when the mood turns scientific. So the fourth menu item was in Quine's own kitchen the whole time. Yablo makes it official. Option four. The sentences are advanced in a fictional or make -believe spirit, and someone whose sentences are committed to so -and -so's need not share the commitment, if that is the spirit of the advancing. Call it fictionalism. Now, a word on the shape of what's coming, because
this paper is built like very few papers are. Go on then. It is a ladder. The title says A Path Through Fictionalism, and it means it. Yablo lines up version after version of fictionalism, and each version exists because the one before it broke. Not survey broke, broke at a specific joint, which the next version is machined to repair. There are five stations, roughly. If I tell you their names now, half of them will sound like nonsense syllables, so I won't. What I will tell you is the rule of the road. At every
station, we ask what advancing in a fictional spirit actually amounts to, and we watch whether the answer survives. And I take it some of them don't survive in interesting ways. One of them fails so interestingly that the failure has its own name in the literature, and we will get there when we get there. Station one, the instrumentalist fictionalist. Here is the whole doctrine. We make as if. We make as if we are asserting that S or believing that S, or receiving the news that S. And we do it assuming we have a reason
at all, because it serves some larger purpose. It simplifies the theory. It shortens the proofs. That's it? Make as if because useful? That is it. And that is the definition. An instrumentalist is a fictionalist who stops there. No story about what we are really doing when we make as if, or why that would be sensible. Yablo's example is Hartree Field in his 1980 book, Science Without Numbers. Field has us quasi -asserting mathematical claims because doing so shortens our proofs about
concrete things. And Field does not say, so far as Yablo knows, that quasi -asserting S is really asserting some other thing. Okay, I have problems. Can I have problems? The paper has three. Let us see if yours are the papers. Problem. When I say two plus three is five, that does not feel like theatre. It feels like I mean something, and I'd fight you about it. If I'm not sincerely asserting that the number two plus the number three is the number five, fine, no numbers. I
am still sincerely asserting something. What is it? The instrumentalist just shrugs? The instrumentalist shrugs. That is Yablo's first problem, and he gives it the name that will run the length of the paper, the problem of real content. There is something I really mean, something I am trying to communicate, and instrumentalism has no candidate for it. And then presumably correctness rides along behind, because 2 plus 3 is 5 is correct, and 2 plus 3 is 6 is incorrect, and if there's no real content, there's nothing for correct
to mean. Intuitively, my utterance is correct exactly when the real content, whatever it is, is true. Correct if and only if the real content is true. That is problem two, the problem of correctness. And you have stated the connection between the two problems in almost exactly the paper's words. The third problem you already quacked at before the show started. That would be the duck. The duck. Quine and Putnam's objection. It quacks like a duck, so it is a duck. You say you do not believe these sentences, but that
is not how you act. You put them forward. You get angry when people deny them. You gather evidence. You check proofs. At the very least, you owe an account of how all of this falls short of belief. And notice you can't answer the duck without answering real content first, because the answer you'd want to give is, of course I carry on like a believer. I am a believer. I believe the real contents of the sentences you hear me utter. When people deny that the number of apostles is 12, they're not weighing in on the existence of numbers. They're saying something about how many apostles there were, which I think
is really the case. Naturally, I get cross. That is verbatim the account Diablo says one would like to give. So the shape of Station One is, instrumentalism is not so much refuted as revealed to be an IOU. Everything hangs on filling in the real content. And Diablo notes that some fictionalists do fill it in. Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 1980. And I am going to flatten van Fraassen slightly here, deliberately, because we need only his silhouette. He says the scientist who advances a theory is not asserting
its truth, she is displaying the theory and claiming certain virtues for it, empirical adequacy chiefly. So the quasi -assertion of the theory is at the same time a real assertion, namely that the theory has the virtues. Which makes Van Frassen not an instrumentalist. He has a story about what you're really saying. Field, interestingly, later comes round to the same shape of story in the introduction to realism, mathematics and modality. Quasi -asserting that 2 plus 3 is 5 becomes really asserting that according to standard mathematics,
2 plus 3 is 5. Ah. So the real content of a mathematical claim is a claim about the mathematical story. S becomes. The story endorses S. Station 2. Yablo calls it metafictionalism, and the schema is exactly yours. Every fictionalist has some condition, call it C, that makes an utterance correct. Van Frassen, S is correct if it belongs to a theory with the virtues. Later Field, S is correct if it follows from standard math. The metafictionalist
says that in making as if to assert S, what you really assert is that C holds of S. The real content concerns a sentence and its property of being a good thing to say. Hence meta. And this fixes real content and correctness at a stroke. And the duck too, presumably. I act like a believer because I am one. I believe the meta content. It's tidy. It's suspiciously tidy. What breaks? Three things break, and the first is modal. Tell me, could 2 plus 3 have failed to
be 5? No. Necessary if anything is. A priori if anything is. Now, could it have failed to be the case that, according to standard math, 2 plus 3 is 5? Hmm. Yes? Standard math is a human artefact. It could have developed differently. It's certainly not a priori that it turned out the way it did. Oh, that's nasty. Yablo's example, I'm guessing, is something suitably Baroque? Everywhere continuous, nowhere differentiable functions. It is not a priori that standard math
came to contain them. Yet that there are such functions is precisely the kind of thing mathematicians take themselves to know a priori. If the real content of the mathematician's claim were the metacontent, her knowledge would have the wrong modal shape entirely. So the metacontent is contingent, an a posteriori where the mathematics is necessary, an a priori. That's one. What's two? Two is about what we care about. Yablo's example is grim and chosen to be the number of starving people is large and rising. That is a matter of real concern.
But if metafictionalism is right, what I really assert, and so presumably what I deplore, is that the number is large according to standard math, and nobody deplores the content of standard math. To deplore that would be to deplore, among other things, part of a mathematical story. Because my concern is about people. Which is also, that's the third one arriving, isn't it? Phenomenology. When I say the number of starving people is large, I do not feel myself to be talking. even a little bit, about a story. Yablo's comparison, and it
is the hinge of the entire paper, so I want it said carefully. The sentence, the number of apostles is twelve, is no more about a story than snow is white is about the rules of English. Oh. Oh, that's good. Because I am relying on the rules of English when I say snow is white. The rules are what make my noise a way of saying that snow is white. But relying on the rules is one thing. Talking about them is another. Say the next sentence. You can see it from there. When I say the number of apostles is 12, I'm relying on the number
fiction the same way. The fiction is what makes my utterance a way of saying something, something about apostles. The fiction is the, it's the channel, not the message. It's how I say it, not what I say. Yablo's words. The fiction, like the rules of English, functions as medium and not message. You have just written Station 3 before I could introduce it, and you haven't read the section. It is called object fictionalism, and what you've reinvented is its soul. What remains is only its machinery. So let us build
the machinery, slowly, because it is the most technical passage in the paper, and because the machinery is exactly where the trouble will later get in. Signpost received. Hood up. Start with English, not numbers. The rules of English tell us which sentences are true under which worldly conditions. Yablo introduces a notation. If a condition k is sufficient by the rules lights for the truth of sentence s, write r raised to the k is greater than or equal to s. If k is necessary, r to the k is less than or equal to
s. And if k is exactly what it takes, sufficient and necessary, then r to the k equals s. The rules raise to the power of the worldly condition yield the sentence. So the rules are a base, the condition is an exponent, the sentence is the result. Which means, hang on, if r to the k equals s, then k is what you get by taking a logarithm, k is log, base, the rules of English, of s. And that logarithm has a name, the literal content of s. The literal content of a sentence
is the exponent, the worldly condition, to which the rules must be raised to obtain the sentence. Log base r of s. Now the move. The role we just gave the rules r is precisely the role we want the fiction f to play. The real content of a number sentence is not that the sentence is true according to the fiction. The real content is the circumstance k that makes it true according to the fiction. The fiction itself taken for granted. Real content of s equals log base f of s. Wait. Wait, wait, wait. Before you go on,
I want to object. because I think you've just smuggled the story back in. Log base f of s mentions f. The fiction is sitting right there in the formula. How is real content of s equals log base f of s any different from the metafictionalist real content of s equals f endorses s? Both of them define my content in terms of the fiction. It's metafictionalism in a fake moustache. It is not, and the notation was chosen to show you exactly why it is not. Tell me, what is log base 3 of 9? It's 2, obviously. Is three any part
of two? Is the number two somehow about the base three, contaminated by it, constituted by it? Well, no. Two is just two. Three is what you consulted to find it. Oh, I see it. The formula for locating the content mentions the fiction. The content located doesn't contain the fiction. The base isn't in the exponent. Fine. That was confused, and I want it on the record that the logarithm actually earned its keep there. I assumed it was decoration. On the record, and let the corrected version be the one we carry, the fiction
figures in the recipe for the content, never in the content. Metafictionalism puts the story inside what you say. Object fictionalism uses the story to fix what you say, and what you say is about the world. Now let us cash it. What is in the number fiction? Yablo sketches it. Whenever there are some e -things, there is an entity, their number, measuring them cardinality -wise. Five e -things, the entity is five. A million, it is one million. And he footnotes, honestly, that there will of course be more to the fiction than this. And parallel fictions
elsewhere. Possible worlds talk. Whenever something is possible, there's a world where it happens. Property talk. Wherever there are q -things, there's q -ness. So run the logarithms. What worldly circumstance makes it true in the number fiction that the number of e -things is n, simply that there are n e -things? What makes it true in the world's fiction that there is a world where h, that h is possible? What makes it true in the property fiction that x has q -ness, that x is q? Those circumstances are the real contents, and if the real content is what one really asserts,
then quasi -asserting that the number of e -things is n is really asserting that there are n e -things. You give voice to the real truth by making as if to assert the fictional truth it enables. Let me play the whole station back and you tell me where I fall off. There's a fiction of numbers, running quietly in the background like grammar. The fiction is rigged so that what's true in it tracks what's true in the world. The story says the moons of Mars have the number two exactly when, out here, there are two moons. So when I mouth the fictional truth, I'm using the story as a lens. What I really assert, and really believe,
is the worldly condition on the far side of it. Twelve apostles. Many starving people. No mention of the story in the message, any more than Snow is White mentions grammar. You do not fall off anywhere, now watch it pay its debts, because this is the satisfying part. Phenomenology and concern, when we say the number of starving people is large and rising, the real content is that there were so many yesterday, more today, more tomorrow. Facts about people, not stories, and exactly the sort of fact it makes sense to feel concern about. Debt paid. And the duck is paid
by the same coin. I carry on like a believer because I believe the real contents, and when you deny them you're denying facts about apostles and moons, so of course I'm cross, which leaves the modal problem. 2 plus 3 is 5, necessary and a priori. How does that come out? Beautifully, and this is worth a full minute. What makes it true in the number story that 2 plus 3 is 5? If the story has the expected shape, the worldly fact that if there are two F things and three G things, and no F is a G, then there are five
things that are F or G. Now write that as a sentence of pure first -order logic. Numerical quantifiers define the way Frege taught us. Exactly two F things, meaning there's an X and a Y, distinct, both F, and no F besides them. Do that, and the real content of 2 plus 3 is 5 is revealed to be a logical truth. Yablo points to Field's 1980 book for the details. So no wonder arithmetic strikes us as necessary and a priori. At the level of what we're really saying it is, it's logic. The necessity was never about eternal
objects. It was the necessity of if 2 and 3, then 5, barring overlap. Every objection on the board is paid. Real content. The worldly condition. Correctness. Real content obtains. The duck, you are a believer. Modality, logical truth. Concern, it was always about the people. Phenomenology, medium not message. I'll be honest, I came in a nominalist hoping to be armed, and I'm armed, this is the view. Why is there half a paper left? Actually, no, hold on, before you answer that,
one thing has been itching at me since the logarithm and I want it parked properly. Who fixes the exponent? You said the story is rigged so fictional truth tracks worldly truth. Rigged by whom? Checked how? If I get to pick the real content of my own past utterances, I will always pick the one that makes me right. The lens can be a funhouse mirror and no one audits the glass. Park that. I'm keeping it for the verdict. Call it the decoder ring. by name the decoder ring who fixes real content and what stops the fixing from being
self -serving it goes on your scorecard and i will tell you now without spoiling anything that the paper itself touches that worry before it ends and pays it only partly the residue will be yours to prosecute as for why there is half a paper left Go on. I have been in this seminar room a long time, and I know the look of a graduate student who has been handed an elegant machine and has stopped patting it down for weapons. You came in with an allergy to smoothness. Station 3 is the smoothest thing you will read this year. Where did the allergy go? Okay, that's fair,
and it stings precisely because my whole brand is not being swept along, and I have been swept fully along, humming. Okay, doing it properly. The view stands or falls with those tracking by conditionals. Quasi -assertible if and only if true in the story. Quasi -assertible if and only if the real content obtains. Two, if and only if spalted to the same hull. If they ever pull in different directions, the hull tears. Do they ever pull in different directions? The next section of the paper answers that question. I will tell you only its title. The title is The Bomb. It's called The Bomb? Section 6 of
a Midwest Studies paper is called The Bomb? Section 6 is called The Bomb, and Section 7 is called How I Learned to Love the Bomb, which tells you Yablo has seen Dr. Strangelove, and tells you something else, if you think about it, which I invite you to do between now and next time. Bring your two biconditionals, bring the scorecard, and Clementine, bring the allergy.
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