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Everything Whatsoever

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Everything Whatsoever: Quine "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" — pt2

Aug 14, 202627 minAudioSeason 1, Episode 6
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Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" - Part 2 of 2 Part 1 left the machine in pieces: five shapes pooled into one region, and the moral that the smallest word we have has been leading a double life. Part 2 is where Quine tells you what the second life costs, and the answer is three letters. Not a doctrine, not an argument - a suffix. Add "-ness" to a perfectly innocent adjective and you have just admitted an abstract entity into your ontology, and nobody will stop you, because the grammar does it silently! In Part 2, Solomon and Clementine work out the bill. Why the ostension of square differs from the ostension of the Cayster by exactly one word - whether identity is imputed across the pointings - and why that one word is the whole difference; how the general term goes deflationary, so that pointing teaches a skill rather than acquainting you with an entity, and "is square" need name nothing at all; Frege's toll-booth, a criterion for when a term is naming (will it go into an identity context and obey the law of putting equals for equals?), and how it welds Quine's two contrasts into one contrast seen twice; then the operator itself - "class of" and "-ness", one move in two notations - and Quine's shrug at the difference between an attribute and a class, which turns out to be a signpost rather than a shrug. Commitment lives in the noun, not the adjective. Then the conjecture: that abstract entities got their hold on our imaginations through nobody noticing this distinction in the first place. Then the verdict, and the three things Clementine has been carrying in pencil since Part 1. The blank check on natural groupings - left standing, and traced forward to Goodman, to entrenchment, and to grue. Discourse-relativity - paid in full by section five's pragmatic standard, just a section later than promised. And Hume's ghost, where the hosts genuinely disagree and end split rather than convinced. Start with Part 1 - this half runs straight on from the cliff, and we rebuild the room at the top but we do not reassemble the machine. This is a close reading across two parts, so you come away actually understanding the argument, not just its headline. Read along if you like: W. V. Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis," Journal of Philosophy 47, no. 22 (October 26, 1950), pp. 621-633 - also reprinted, lightly reworked, as chapter IV of From a Logical Point of View (1953), pp. 65-79. [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.] New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show - see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself). Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

This is a Scattered Deck production. Welcome back to Everything Whatsoever. I'm Clementine Ramsey, he's Solomon Isay, and this is part two, the final part, of our episode on Quine's Identity, Ostention, and Hypostasis. And if you're joining us cold, go and take part one first, because we left it hanging off a cliff. A machine that built rivers out of Pointings Plus Identity had just been asked to build the shapes Square and Triangle, and it built them identical to each other. Five shapes pulled into regions collapsed into one total region, and Quine drew the moral

that the little word is, two letters, the smallest word we have, has been leading a double life. That's the ledge we're standing on. So let me rebuild the room before we climb. We have the machine point repeatedly, impute identity across the pointings, and the gestures triangulate one big four -dimensional object. That gave us the river Keister from its stages. We have the maxim, identification of indiscernible, which shrinks

a discourse's objects down to the distinctions that discourse actually draws. And together they built you a colour. They built red as the largest red thing in the universe, and it worked. Then the drawing. 33 regions, 5 shapes, and because mereological fusion forgets grouping, the concrete universal recipe crushed all 5 shapes into one region. Intolerable. Hence the fork. This is the caster, part meeting whole. This is square, something else entirely. And I am still carrying three things in pencil, the blank check on natural

groupings, the discourse question he only half answered, and Hume's ghost, sport or scaffold. Perfect recall, and section four opens exactly at the fork. Quine interrupts what he cheerfully calls his speculative psychology, and returns to the analysis of ostention, asking, How does the ostention of an extended object differ from what we may call the ostention of irreducible universals, square, triangle, the ones the collapse left standing as irreducible? And the answer is almost insultingly small. Explaining the caester, I point at stage A, stage B, further stages,

saying each time, this is the caester, identity of the indicated object being understood from each occasion to the next. Explaining square, I point at various particulars, saying each time, this is square, without imputing identity of indicated object from one occasion to the next. That's it. That is the whole difference. Without. One word of difference. Both procedures hand my listener a basis for induction. With the caster, he projects what else you'd point to as the caster. With square, he projects what else you'd be willing to call square. The inductions are twins. The only daylight is whether an identical indicated

object is supposed across the pointings. And in the square case, what is supposed to be identical from pointing to pointing, if anything, is not the indicated object. The indicated objects are various particulars, plainly distinct. But, Quine says, at best, an attribute, squareness, shared by the indicated objects, at best. Sit on that qualifier for a second, because... Because, wait, hold on, let me try to get ahead of him because I can smell where this is going. Why concede even the attribute? When you taught me square by pointing, what did I actually acquire? Not acquaintance with an entity, a skill. I learn

when to expect you to apply the words is square and when not. Nothing has to be identical across the pointings at all, not an object, not an attribute, for that learning to happen. The pointings just calibrate my use of a phrase. You have now written his next paragraph, nearly clause for clause, and it may be the most important paragraph in the paper. So the general term goes deflationary.

predication without ontology. And notice how clean the two -column summary comes out. Column 1. Ostentions introducing a general term don't impute identity of the indicated object between pointings. Ostentions introducing a singular term do. Column 2. The general term needn't purport to name any separate entity. The singular term does. Two contrasts. Two contrasts, and then the sentence that welds them together. These two observations are not independent of each other. and to see why we go down a level again because the paper invokes a piece of machinery in one dense clause and never builds it. Briefly

then, and it comes from Frege, Quine cites the sense and reference essay and takes a criterion out of it. Ask one thing about your term. Will it go into an identity context? That is the whole test for whether the term is being used as a name. Or put it the other way round. In this context, does the term obey the algorithm of identity, the law of putting equals for equals? If it does, it is naming. Putting equals for equals. Build it with something in the roof. With the river then, and the example is mine, not the papers, suppose the caister is the longest river in Lydia. I don't know if it was. Geography, forgive me. Then anything true of the caister

is true of the longest river in Lydia, bathed in by so -and -so, four days' ride from the coast, whatever you please. Substitute the one term for the other in a plain statement of fact, and truth is preserved. Quine will spend the next decade cataloguing the contexts where even that breaks down, what people believe, what might have been, but leave those aside. That is what it is for Cayster to function as a name. It stands in identity statements and identity licenses substitution. And the general term flunks the same exam, presumably. Try it. Try it and hear it fail. Square is identical with what? The bare

general term won't take the position. You can't flank an identity sign with it and mean anything unless you first convert it into something that can be named. So the two contrasts are one contrast seen twice. not imputing identity across pointings and not purporting to name, travel together, because naming just is being in the identity business. Which retroactively pays a small debt from part one. And I want it acknowledged, I asked, at the two senses fork, how you could ever tell which is a speaker meant. And here's the operational answer. Watch the term's behaviour in identity context downstream. If it substitutes,

it names. Nice. And presumably Frege, being Frege, doesn't take this criterion as a stick to beat abstract objects with. Quite the opposite, and Quine is careful about it. Nothing in the criterion repudiates abstract entities. We remain free to admit names of abstract entities, and on Frege's standard, admitting them consists precisely in admitting abstract terms to identity contexts, subject to the regular laws of identity. Frege himself, Quine adds with what I choose to hear as a smile, was rather a Platonist in his own philosophy. The criterion is a tollbooth, not a wall. It doesn't say you may not drive to abstract

objects. It says, here is where you pay. And now the suffix. This is where the three letters come in, isn't it? Ring the till. Here is the paper's payload, and Quine sets it out as a two -step sequence. Step one, introduce the idiom, this is square, by ostention as we've considered, or by ordinary definition from prior general terms, and it doesn't matter which. At the end of step one, you can classify, predicate, sort squares from non -squares all day, and your ontology contains not one abstract item. Step two, a separate step. and everything hangs on its separateness. Derive the attribute squareness, or what comes

to much the same thing, the class of squares. And notice what got appealed to in that step, a new fundamental operator, class of, or ness. Hold on, which of those is the operator? Because class of is two words and ness is three letters, and you said them as though they were the same thing. Fair, they are the same move in two notations. Class of is how you write it if you take the class. Ness is how English spells it if you take the attribute. One operator, two spellings, and which of the two you take is the next thing you're about to ask me. Ness, then. The three letters and the entire tollgate of Platonism is a suffix. And you were right that I was about to stop the

bus because you quoted him saying something my whole nervous system objects to. Or what comes to much the same thing, the class of squares. Much the same thing? The attribute squareness and the class of squares are famously not much the same thing. Classes are extensional. Same members, same class. Attributes aren't. Being a creature with a heart and being a creature with a kidney can pick out the very same animals and remain, on anyone's telling, two attributes. And the man waving this through with a comes -to -much -the -same shrug is Quine, the philosopher who will spend the next thirty years hammering precisely this distinction into every graduate student alive. That's not a slip. What is it?

It is a visible seam, and I'm glad you caught it rather than me, because the defence is instructive. First, for the point being made here, the difference genuinely doesn't matter. The claim is about the shape of the step. Hypostasis is a further move beyond predication, marked by an operator. Attributes or classes, an abstract entity has been purchased either way, whichever of the two you take. And second, because a shrug that's studied usually has a reason. Second, and this is why the shrug is principled rather than sloppy, when Quine himself pays the toll, he always takes the class, exactly because classes have clean

identity conditions and attributes don't. By his own Frege -derived criterion, you should only posit what you can put in identity statements. Same members, same class that you can check. When are two attributes the same attribute? Nobody has ever said. The aside isn't carelessness. It's a man at a fork declaring he'd take the left, for reasons the rest of his career spells out. All right, that resolves it. The shrug is a signpost, not a shrug, and I will drop the irritation rather than carry it. But I'm glad it's on the record that the sentence reads like a shrug. Now let him ring the till properly. What exactly does step two cost? Here is the

ontological point, and Quine says he attaches much importance to it. The traditional distinction between general terms and abstract singular terms. Square versus squareness. Use of the general term does not of itself commit us to the admission of a corresponding abstract entity into our ontology. But use of the abstract singular term, subject to the standard behavior of singular terms, the law of putting equals for equals, flatly commits us, his words, to an abstract entity named by the term. Say the tile is square, forever, and you owe nothing. Say squareness is rare in nature, and the moment squareness starts substituting

in identities, you have bought an abstract object, and no amount of nominalist regret at the counter will unring the till. Commitment lives in the noun, not the adjective. And now the origin story writes itself, doesn't it? Because look back at part one with this in hand. Ostensive explanation of the general term square looked almost exactly like ostensive explanation of the singular term caster. Same finger, same ritual. And red was the perfect ambiguous case, the one word where you could read it either way and, as he said, no difference need be made at all. So the natural tendency, treat all these lookalike terms as

names, each of a single entity. Grammar seduces you, it's syntactically convenient to handle a general term like a proper name, word order, cross -reference, and one day you wake up owning squareness and you never remember signing. which is precisely Quine's conjecture. It is readily conceivable, he says, that it was through failure to observe this distinction that abstract entities gained their hold on our imaginations in the first place. Note the register, readily conceivable. A just -so story flagged as one. And with that, section four closes. Pull it together for me before the last ascent. Right. Ostention of the

caister and ostention of square differ in one word, identity imputed across pointings, or not. Where identity isn't imputed, nothing need be identical. The pointings teach a skill, when to apply is square and the phrase needn't name. Frege's tollbooth, a term names when it substitutes in identity context, equals for equals. Hypostasis is a separate second step. taken by the operator Ness or class of, and only that step, the abstract singular term, flatly commits you. Adjectives are free, nouns are billed, and the whole ancient population of universals may have immigrated

through a grammatical resemblance nobody was policing. That is section four in a locket. Section five is the widest lens in the paper. Quine steps back from the machinery and asks where our entire conceptual scheme came from and how to judge it, and it opens with the finest footnote in the analytic canon, so I request the chair's indulgence. Oh no, he's found a footnote. Ladies and gentlemen, he has been waiting two entire episodes to do this. Look at him, he's practically vibrating. The gas bill voice is gone. Go on then, Professor, take us down the footnote. Guilty and unrepentant, and I promise it pays its way. The text says the conceptual scheme we grew up

in is an eclectic heritage, its evolution conditioned by forces running from the days of Java Man onward. And on Java Man there hangs footnote 5, which is not a citation. It is a poem, four lines of comic verse, Quine's own, about Homo Javanensis, early man, whose unrefined and sluggish mind. the verse tells us, could manage only what was concrete and present to the senses. Doggerall, in the Journal of Philosophy in 1950, deadpan, no apology offered. Logicians smuggling light verse past the referees. And your promise, how does it pay its way? Because the joke is the thesis. That quatrain compresses the whole genetic

story that Section 5 then tells at length. Start with expressions for physical objects. Those came first because objects were the fixed points of reference, the things language could socially coordinate on. That is the concrete and present to the senses of the poem. Physical objects first. What arrives second? General terms, and almost as early. Similar stimuli psychologically induce similar responses, so similar things get called by the same word. No invention required for that one. So the first two are free, which leaves the third. The third is abstract singular terms, and they bring the positing of abstract entities

in with them. That step Quine calls a further one, and, his exact pair of words, philosophically revolutionary. Revolutionary. And nobody voted on it. Nobody voted on it, and yet, he says, we have seen how even this step could have been made without conscious invention. Nobody stormed anything. A suffix crept in, unexplained, and brought an ontology with it. The revolution nobody noticed they were having. And his verdict on it, because there's a fork here, you can tell that story as debunking, abstraction as an ancient administrative error we should now reverse, or as a windfall. He forks it exactly and with unusual delicacy. On general terms, no fork at all. Every

reason to rejoice, whatever the cause, language would be impossible without them, and thought would come to very little. On abstract entities, named by abstract singular terms, there is room, he says, for divergent value judgments. What clarity demands in any case is recognizing the intruder, the additional, unexplained operator, class of, ness. Perhaps failure to notice its intrusion is what engendered belief in abstract entities, but And here is the sentence your item three has been waiting for. This genetic point is independent of the question whether abstract entities, once with us, are a good thing from the point of view of conceptual convenience after

all. Happy accident, he says, though their adoption may have been. Happy accident. So the disreputable origin doesn't settle the question of value. A thing can immigrate on forged papers and still be the best worker in the building. Hold that sentence. It's exhibit A when we do the verdict on Hume's ghost. What does the accident buy us? It buys an engine that never stops, and this is where the paper suddenly opens onto mathematics. Once abstract entities are admitted, the conceptual mechanism generates an unending hierarchy of further abstractions as a matter of course. Because ostention was never the only way in, once a fund of ostensibly acquired terms exists, new terms

can be explained discursively by paraphrasing to terms already at hand. And discursive explanation, unlike pointing, works just as well for defining general terms that apply to abstract things, shape, say, or zoological species. Oh, no, because now the operator can eat its own output. Can't it go on now apply the operator again Ness or class of on the general term shape, the attribute of being a shape, the class of all shapes, second -level abstract singular terms, repeat for a third level, and so on, theoretically without end. And it is in these higher levels, Quine says, that the mathematical entities find their

place, numbers, functions of numbers, according to the analyses of the foundations of mathematics, usual from Frege through Whitehead and Russell. So the whole tower of mathematics is uphill from a man on a riverbank in Lydia. That's the picture, isn't it? One continuous grade, no cliff anywhere. Pointing at stage A with identity gets you the caster. Pointing without identity gets you is square. Three letters of suffix gets you squareness. The suffix iterated gets you shapehood, classes of classes, and eventually the number 17. From mud to set theory and at no step did anyone knowingly do metaphysics. The vertigo isn't that abstraction

is high, it's that the staircase is so gentle. That is the picture, gently graded end to end, and having built the staircase, Quine spends his final two pages standing at the top, asking what the whole edifice is for, and the register changes, audibly, you can hear the lecture becoming a credo. The fundamental seeming question, how much of our science is merely contributed by language and how much is a genuine reflection of reality, is perhaps, he suggests, a spurious question, one that arises from a particular type of language, for we're in a predicament if we try to answer it. To answer, we must talk about the world as well as language, and to talk about

the world at all, we must already impose on it some conceptual scheme peculiar to our own special language. There is no standpoint outside every scheme from which to take the measure of schemes. Which sounds like a cell door closing. You're stuck forever inside the scheme you... inherited, and I assume he refuses the fatalism, or the last 40 minutes of plank -by -plank tinkering make no sense. He refuses it in the paper's most famous borrowed image. We must not leap to the fatalistic conclusion that we are stuck with the conceptual scheme we grew up in. We can change it, bit by bit, plank by plank, though meanwhile there is nothing to carry us along but the evolving

conceptual scheme itself. The philosopher's task, he says, was well compared by Neurath to that of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea. You may replace any plank, provided you stand on the others while you do it. What you may not do is bring the ship into dry dock and inspect the hull against the ocean from outside. But because there is no dry dock, there was never a dry dock. Never. Hence, Quine suggests, it is meaningless to inquire into the absolute correctness of a conceptual scheme as a mirror of reality. The standard for appraising basic changes of scheme can only be a pragmatic standard. Concepts

are language. The purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in communication and in prediction. That is the ultimate duty of language, science and philosophy. And it is against that duty that a conceptual scheme is finally to be appraised. There goes the second one then. And let me do it out loud, because this is the payment arriving a whole section late. I put it in pencil in part one. The maxim is discourse relative, ontology sliding about with the ledger. And I asked, relative to what, and who settles it? And section five answers you. Section five answers me. There is no absolute ledger and that is not a bug in the maxim. It is the condition of every

scheme whatsoever. The standard was never going to be correspondence measured from dry dock. It is serviceability measured from the deck. So he has paid it and paid it properly rather than waving it off with one thing left over, which is that he has paid in his own currency. If you do not take pragmatic appraisal as the last word, the debt has not gone anywhere. It has only moved. I will say that much and move on, because there is one more paragraph and you have gone quiet in the way you go quiet. One more paragraph, elegance. Conceptual economy also enters as an objective, Quine says, but as a secondary virtue, sometimes secondary as

a means. Elegance can make the difference between a scheme our poor minds can manage and one too unwieldy to use, and there it simply serves the pragmatic standard. But elegance also enters, and here it comes, as an end in itself. Quite properly so, as long as it's appealed to only where the pragmatic standard prescribes no contrary decision. And then the last sentence of the paper, where elegance doesn't matter. We may and shall, as poets, pursue elegance for elegance's sake. Look at you, Solomon, look at your face. Two entire episodes I have been prodding the gas bill voice, begging you to be excited about the coolest arguments in the building, and the sentence

that finally undoes you is the one where the sternest ontologist of the century admits that when the accounting is silent he writes for beauty. And there you are, Professor, two episodes and it took a joke about poets. Clemmie, I have been excited since 400 BC. I simply cellar it, and this is the vintage I was cellaring for, because that sentence is the paper confessing its own... method. Every joke we've enjoyed, the barista's waters, the trucked river, the doggerel, was elegance pursued where the argument left slack by a man who has just told you that's not decoration, it's a license the pragmatic standard itself countersigns. As poets, he says, in the Journal

of Philosophy, it is the most disarming ending in his corpus, and I have never once read it without smiling, whatever my voice was doing. Then I take back the prodding. No, I don't. The prodding worked. Sol, that was worth two episodes. But now the paper is closed, the till is rung, and you know what time it is. Three things in pencil. Is any of it true? All three, then. Start where you started. The blank check first, and I am leaving it standing, though I will say the paper knew perfectly well it was writing the thing. The whole ostensive machine runs on the listener favouring natural summations, and nothing in thirteen pages says what naturalness is or why gerrymanders lose. And the suspicion you

have been sitting on since part one. The suspicion. The debt does get picked up, by exactly the man the paper's own footnote sends you to, though not at the place it sends you. Footnote 3 is about the collapse, and Goodman handles the collapse. But elsewhere in that same book he names the problem of abstraction and takes Carnap apart over it. And listen to the charge. Carnap needs an assumption he cannot check from inside his own system to stop the wrong groupings forming. Goodman calls that a serious defect. Goodman's words or yours? Both. That is my complaint about Quine's listener, word for word, filed against somebody else. And then explosively in the GRU

puzzle, that is, fact fiction and forecast, the lectures. GRU is my cold coffee summation with better tailoring, a predicate that fits every observed sample and projects insanely. And where does he land? Nowhere near naturalness, which is the striking part. He lands on entrenchment. Some predicates simply have a track record of use, some are projectable and some are not, and saying which is a research program rather than something you help yourself to. So Quine's blank check became a famous open problem, which is... the most honourable way there is to leave a debt standing. The field spent decades trying to pay it for him. No defence from me, I would add only

this. The field then spent thirty years trying to answer it, which is its own kind of testimonial. There was something really there. The second one. Discourse relativity, and he paid it in section 5 when the pragmatic standard arrived. No dry dock, so serviceability is the only measure going, and the maxim's relativity stops being a scandal and becomes the general condition. What is left over is what I said upstairs. He paid in his own currency. If you do not take pragmatic appraisal as final, the debt has not vanished, it is somewhere else. Accepted, both halves. And one bit of context, which is us and not him. The same year. Same year, 1950. Carnap

published Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, splitting questions internal to a framework from external questions about adopting one, with adoption judged, of all things, pragmatically. The two of them are circling the same move, and the fight that is coming is about whether that internal -external line is even drawable. Anyone who enjoyed today should read the two papers as a pair. Seconded. And the third is the one where you and I finally disagree, so do not be gentle with it. Hume's Ghost. He flies the banner over the genealogy, purely as philosophical sport, and he does it twice, and then the genealogy goes and does real rhetorical work, swept in on a faulty analogy

as what makes hypostasis feel like a diagnosed accident rather than a described step. So what bothers me is that the sport label lets him keep the persuasive force of a debunking story while disclaiming any liability for it. He wants, let me get this right, he wants the cargo insured and off the manifest at the same time. And my whole answer is one sentence of his which I will stand on. The genetic point is independent of whether abstract entities once with us are a good thing after all. Happy accident. That sentence does the very thing you say cannot be done. It explicitly severs origin from verdict. One sentence against a whole rhetorical current. Then try

the deletion. Take every word of speculative psychology out of this paper and see what survives. The ostention analysis survives. The collapse argument survives. The Frege criterion, the operator, flatly commits all of its stands without Hume. The genealogy is charming scaffolding around a building that was already finished. And I half agree, which is why this ends as a split rather than a conviction. The arguments survive deletion granted. But the paper without the genealogy is a different paper. It would tell you what hypostasis costs and never whisper that you were overcharged by accident of grammar. That whisper is doing work on the reader that no numbered

premise does. So we leave it open, both of us on record, and you can settle it. Which brings us to the honest reckoning, strongest thing in the paper. The collapse argument, without hesitation. And the framing here is ours, not the text's. That little drawing is the cleanest demonstration I know that a universal cannot simply be the mere logical sum of its instances. But you are about to spoil it for me. I am about to be honest about its afterlife. which is a better story than the tidy one. When Armstrong lines up the nominalisms in 1978, he does kill the mereological version. He does not do it with Quine's argument. He does it by observing that every part of the heap of white things may well be white, while

the parts of the heap of one kilogram things almost never weigh a kilogram at all. Oh, that is crueler and simpler. Go on. Then he kills the class version too, at far greater length. On your Cordate and your Renate, co -extension, he says, is its notorious weakness, and he walks out of the whole survey a realist about universals. So nobody here is being handed a winner. What survives Quine's particular argument is the class version, and it survives precisely because classes, unlike fusions, remember their brackets, your suits and your ranks. That is a thinner survival than I wanted. Surviving one argument is not the same as winning the war. And running second,

the operator point, commitment marked by ness and class of, the thought that grows into ontological commitment as Quine's signature doctrine. On what there is, two years before this gave the slogan. This paper gives the mechanism, the tollbooth where the slogan collects. And I owe the man a double take on the red seduction, the one I fell for on air. It is the best teaching in the paper, and it is also a piece of stagecraft. He builds the concrete universal view lovingly, for pages, precisely so that his death teaches you the fork. I was meant to move my furniture in. Your rib stands, but I was following the eye. architect's plan which makes the rib half

mine and half his half his weakest thing we have already said the blank check And forward from here, the coda most of all, because listen to that ending again. Conceptual scheme, plank by plank, pragmatic standard, no scheme neutral standpoint. This paper came out in October 1950. Two dogmas of empiricism arrives that January, three months. The last two pages of our paper are, functionally, the trailer for the most famous paper in 20th century analytic philosophy, and Neurath's borrowed boat becomes Quine's own flag. A trailer released before the feature was even cut. And the longer arc? The longer arc, divided

reference and the apparatus of individuation get their full treatment in word and object, 60. That is where he does it properly. And the river stages grow up to become the four -dimensionalism debates, worm theorists and stage theorists, Sider and Hawley, and I am going to say turn of the millennium because I would have to look up which of them was first, still arguing about whether you are the whole space -time worm or the stage that is listening right now. And backward, my direction, the paper is a crossroads, Hume behind it, Frege of 1892 under it, Leibniz inverted inside it. And beside it, the joint paper Quine wrote with Goodman in 1947, steps toward a constructive

nominalism, where the two of them tried to live without the abstract entities entirely. Read this paper as the sadder but wiser sequel to that experiment, the man who tried to refuse the toll, mapping the booth. The sadder but wiser sequel. I like that better than anything on the cover. Reading guidance, then. Yours first. Mine is short. Read it in one sitting with a pencil. It was a lecture at Bryn Mawr, and the cadence rewards the ear. Circle the word is every time it appears, and ask which sense you're holding. That's the whole paper in an exercise. Draw the figure yourself, actually count some regions, and do not skip the footnotes. Two is Frege,

three cites Goodman's book a year before it exists, and five is the only poem I know of that carries an ontological thesis. And mind the gear change for the final two pages. You're leaving an argument and entering a credo. And it reads best if you know the trailer you're watching. So, takeaways. Mine first. And mine is the river. You can bathe in the same river twice. That turns out to be cheap. One identity claim and the river is yours. Bathing in squareness is the thing nobody has ever managed and I finally know why. Adjectives are free. Nouns are billed. Check which one you are holding before you sign anything. Mine is

the other half of that one. Go on then. Half of mine. Identity is how pointing buys objects. Point twice, say same thing, and you own a river. Add three letters and you owe a universal. The bill always arrives with the suffix. And the kindest thing this paper does is teach you to read that bill before the drift of grammar reads it for you. On which we are out of river. Out of river, but never out of stages. Whatever wave of you started this episode has half emigrated to the Aegean by now. Thank you for letting the later stages stay with us. That has been Everything Whatsoever on Quine. In two parts. Identity Ostension

and Hypostasis 1950. If part one of you and part two of you both heard me say this show's name, congratulations, you are river kindred at least. Go point at something and mind what you say while you do it. Same time next week. Same podcast too. And now you know exactly how much that claim costs.

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