The path ends where the title always pointed: at figures of speech. In the finale, Yablo answers the objection that his repaired fictionalism is too baroque for anyone to want. The answer isn't a defence; it's a reframing that changes what the whole theory was for. The machinery was never a revolution asking for recruits; it's an anatomy of something every speaker already does. When you say the prof put hurdles in your path, or that Italy is a boot, you're doing the exact thing arithmetic does with numbers. In Part 3, Solomon and Clementine bring in Kendall Walton's prop-oriented make-believe to build the tool the paper leans on but never assembles, then watch figuralism take on platonism's showcase argument - that only real numbers can make arithmetic objective - and dismantle it with a dilemma. They trace the six things figuralism explains, follow the paper's cleanest cut (the difference between pretending and merely simulating belief - and the definition hiding in footnote one since page one), and work through the appendix's running battle with Jason Stanley before delivering their own verdict: strongest step, weakest step, what got paid, and what's still owed. The scorecard comes due. So does the title. That closes our three-part walk through the paper. Read it yourself - it rewards every reading, footnotes included: Stephen Yablo, "Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (2001), pp. 72-102 - freely available on Yablo's MIT page. [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.] New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show - see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself). Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast
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Transcript
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Welcome back to Everything Whatsoever, and to part three, the last part, of Stephen Yablo's Go Figure, a path through fictionalism. I'm Clementine, he's Solomon, and when we left off I had asked who on earth joins this revolution, and been promised a reply that denies there ever was one. Just so, and all three scorecard items come due today. Let us pick it up exactly there. Once more then, the state of play is this. the path has climbed from instrumentalism through metafictionalism
to object fictionalism which the bomb demolished reflexive fictionalism rebuilt it with numbers free to be lens or looked at relative reflexive fictionalism added engaged and disengaged registers riding on parasitic games clementine scorecard holds three parked items the decoder ring the iou and the balking platonist And Clementine herself closed last part with an objection I asked her to keep word for word. Burbatum. Who joins this revolution? The view works, maybe,
but it's a Rube Goldberg machine, and a revolution with this many rules gets no further. If overthrowing Platonism requires nested games and floating logarithms, the old regime starts looking comfy. And here is Yablo's reply, in two movements. First movement, a distinction from John Burgess and Gideon Rosen's 97 book, A Subject With No Object. A revolutionary nominalist wants us to stop talking about so -and -sos and start talking some new, purified way. A hermeneutic nominalist claims we never started, properly interpreted, we were never committed in the first place. Second
movement. Yablo declares his proposal is put forward in more of a hermeneutic spirit. And then he asks your question for you. What, we are all relative reflexive fictionalists without realizing it? And answers, no. But we are something closely related. We are people apt on occasion to speak figuratively. And then the sentence the whole paper has been walking toward. There is nothing in relative reflexive fictionalism not found already in figurative speech. Oh, the complexity objection just dies of embarrassment, doesn't it? Because it assumed the machinery
was proposed legislation. New rules, adoption costs, who'd sign up? But if the machinery is descriptive... If it's an anatomy of a competence every speaker of every language already runs effortlessly every day, then complexity is no objection at all. Nobody objects that the grammar in your head is complicated. You're not being asked to learn it. You already did by age six. And Diablo turns Quine's own poetry to the purpose. If ordinary usage were literal in its main body with metaphor as trimming, figuralism would be barking up the wrong tree. Applied arithmetic
could hardly be trimming. But Quine himself wrote, in a 78 piece on metaphor, and these are his words. Cognitive discourse, at its most dryly literal, is largely a refinement, an open space in the tropical jungle, created by clearing tropes away. The literal is the clearing, not the jungle. So arithmetic doesn't have to earn its way out of the main body into some exotic figurative annex. The figurative is the main body, and the question flips. What makes anyone think number talk ever left the jungle? Which question deserves an answer, and the answer requires equipment
the paper leans on but never assembles. So, flagged plainly, This is load -bearing, the paper will not build it for us, and we will. A deliberate descent five minutes into Kendall Walton, my maces as make -believe 1990, and for our purposes especially, a short 93 paper called Metaphor and Prop -Oriented Make -Believe. I am flattening Walton considerably, and saying so. Then descend, Professor. Walton's base machinery, a game of make -believe, is defined by props and principles of generation. A prop is a real thing. The principles
say what is to be imagined, given how the props really are. Tree stumps are bears. That rule plus a real stump generates the fictional truth a bear is there. The crucial consequence, fictional truth is not free invention. It is controlled by the props. So fictional truths carry real information. If it's fictional that a bear lurks by the creek, that's because a stump really sits by the creek. Anyone who knows the rules can read the world off the game. Now Walton's distinction, the one that matters. In some games, the game is the point and props serve it. Children care
about the bears and stumps are means. Content -oriented make -believe. But sometimes the orientation reverses. The game is scaffolding and the point is the props. Walton's example, Italy is a boot. Crotone is in the arch. The boot game exists so that we can convey real geography. Nobody savors the boot fiction for its own sake. Prop -oriented make -believe the fiction as an instrument for describing its own props. And metaphor, on Walton's proposal, is exactly that. When Hattie says the prof put hurdles in her path, she's
gesturing at a game, obstacles as hurdles, not to play it, but to use it, to say something true about the real course her term took. The game is a lens you assemble on the spot and look through, not at. Which is, hang on, that's the medium not message point from part one, generalized past numbers to all figuration. Object fictionalism's soul survived the bomb, it just turned out to be a theory of metaphor wearing a maths costume. Ascending now, equipment in hand. Yablo's section 11 presents six parallels, labelled A through F, between arithmetical sentences and undisputed
figures of speech. I give you the arithmetic, you hear the figure. Seven is less than eleven. Paired with... The back burner is kept at a lower temperature than the front. A molehill is smaller than a mountain. Pimprics of conscience register less than pangs. ordering relations among things nobody believes in, and obviously fine. Eleven is prime. The back burner is where things are left to simmer. The green -eyed monster brings the emotions up with him. Intrinsic characterizations of the fictional furniture. Also, prime numbers are mostly odd. Stomach butterflies don't sit
still, they flutter. Apron strings are short. Generic truths about the imaginary. People say these, mean them, are right. And then the biconditionals, D through F, the load bearers. The number of F things is large if and only if there are many F things. Your marital status changes if and only if you get married or divorced or widowed. Your identity is secret if and only if nobody knows who you are. The F things outnumber the G things if and only if they have more gall than you, if and only if they're more audacious. And the equivalence one, the number of f things equals
the number of g things, if and only if there are as many f things as g things. My bottom line is the same as yours, if and only if we'll each settle for exactly such and such and no less. The bridges between figure land and the world, the exponent rules made audible. And now the four deep similarities, because a list of cute pairs proves nothing. The claim is that the resemblance goes all the way down. 1. Every statement on that list strikes us as necessary. It is no accident that if there are as many F things as G things, the F things and G things have the same number, and no accident that if neither of us will settle
for less than the other, our bottom lines coincide. 2. Each employs a distinctive vocabulary, number, bottom line, that also serves for contingent claims about concrete reality. The number of sheep exceeds the number of goats. Negotiations stall because their bottom line keeps moving. 3. That second use is the vocabulary's reason for being. Nobody cares about stomach butterflies as such. The live question is always whether someone has them. And nobody, outside this podcast, cares about eleven's relations to seven as such.
The interest is whether the eggs in the carton have eleven as their number, and what follows for the carton next to it. Four, and it is the one that quietly does the most work. The vocabulary's utility does not depend on taking its referential -looking parts seriously. Those who believe devoutly in bottom lines, those who adamantly deny them, And those who never once considered the question all extract precisely the same expressive benefit. Belief is idle in the mechanism. Which retroactively explains impatience. No wait, we haven't done impatience yet. That's my prediction escaping
early. Fine, formal prediction, time stamped. If figure competence doesn't consult belief, then people using number talk should be weirdly indifferent to news about whether numbers exist. It should bounce off them. If the paper doesn't say that somewhere, I'll eat my scorecard. Your scorecard is safe and your timing is convenient because we've reached section 12, the rationale, where Yablo asks why anyone should believe any of this and answers by changing what fictionalism is for. The old rationale we had, or thought we had, arguments that X things do not exist
or could not be known. X things were obnoxious, so our talk needed reinterpreting. Yablo pronounces that form of argument, his words nearly, dead and gone. It needs strong premises about what can plausibly exist or be known, and such premises, per Burgess and Rosen, can always be ridiculed by offering the numbers themselves as paradigm counterexamples. What? Nothing exists outside spacetime. Tell it to seven. So the new rationale has to be explanatory. Not, numbers are intolerable, but figuralism is the best account of the practice.
Compare the theories on what they explain. Four questions, a tidy scoreboard. What does Platonism explain? What puzzles does Platonism generate? What does figuralism explain? What puzzles does figuralism generate? And Diablo's diagnosis of old fictionalism's big mistake, it conceded the benefits to Platonism and harped on the costs, leaving itself needing a knockout on obnoxiousness. Better strategy, show the benefits are largely non -existent, and the figuralist explains more than you thought on a less fanciful basis than
you thought. He runs Platonism's one showcase argument and figuralism will answer in its own column with six exhibits. Platonism's showcase objectivity. If the numbers really exist, arithmetical truth is fixed by the objects. Take the numbers away and all that remains is our practice of swapping proofs and plausibility arguments. And however disciplined, a practice cannot ground truths whose decision problem is of staggering complexity. Matters that complex are beyond our deciding. That, says the Platonist, is a task for the numbers themselves. That's the best Platonist
argument, honestly. Objectivity outrunning practice. What's the reply? A dilemma, and it deserves the slow treatment. Ask, is our conception of the numbers determinate? Meaning, for any arithmetical claim S, is it settled that any structure answering to our conception verifies S, or settled that any such structure refutes it? Horn 1. Suppose yes, determinate. Then the objects are idle. The conception itself draws the bright line between true and false, whether or not anything answers to it. Objectivity secured, numbers not required.
So the Platonist needs Horn too. The conception is indeterminate, leaving gaps, and the objects fill them. The world meets us halfway. Of the technically eligible candidate structures, the one that exists gets to be the numbers, and its features settle what our conception left open. And now feel the price. On horn 2, which arithmetical claims are correct becomes conceptually contingent, hostage to which number -like entities happen to exist. Yablo builds the counterexample with a pun I refuse to hurry past. Consider claims about twin primes, primes differing by two. Suppose
I say truly that there are infinitely many. My intrinsic duplicate Same conception, same practice, molecule for molecule, lives in a universe furnished with undetectably different number -like entities, and says the same words falsely. Twin claims, twin speakers, opposite verdicts. He is wrong on twin prime earth. And arithmetic isn't allowed to work like that. Arithmetical concepts aren't externalist. My doppelganger and I cannot disagree about the primes the way we can disagree about water. If there are infinitely many twin primes, the reason cannot be that such and such number
-like entities happen to be the ones lying around. So the dilemma closes. If we are clear about what we mean, the number hypothesis is not needed for objectivity. If we are not clear, it will not help, and worse, it becomes intolerable, because, Yablo's phrase and it is a keeper, arithmetical truth is going to blow with the ontological winds, in a way nobody wants. Platonism's showcase benefit cancelled. One symmetry worry before the applause. Because it's been nagging. Doesn't Horn 2 threaten the figuralist identically? If our conception, our game, is indeterminate, figuralism has gaps
in arithmetical truth too. No numbers ride to the rescue there either. A fair audit, and the answer is not in the paper. So flag it as my reconstruction and weigh it accordingly. The figuralist and the Platonist fare the same on an indeterminate conception. Gaps for both, but only the Platonist promised gaplessness. Objectivity through objects was her selling point, and it is her selling point the dilemma cancels. And on Horn 1 the figuralist is at least no worse off. If a determinate conception draws the line by itself, nothing need answer to it, though whether a conception can be determinate with
nothing answering to it is a question the Platonist will want back, and it sits close to the heart of the whole debate. Symmetric predicament, asymmetric damage on my books. Does that hold your audit if not retire it? Held, not retired, with the flag noted. That's Solomon's accounting, not Yablo's page, and the Platonist is owed a rebuttal hearing someday. Now the other column. What does figuralism explain? This is my predicted section. Six phenomena, rapid but each with its jewel. First, insubstantiality. Numbers are thin, they
lack, in Mark Johnston's phrase, a hidden substantial nature. There is no more to seven than the concept demands. and the suggestion that undisclosed further features apply strikes us as comical. Expected, if 7 was conjured for representational purposes, why fill in the story further than the job required? Second, indeterminacy. Presumably the identity version. There's often no fact of the matter whether 7 equals this or that set theoretic construction, whereas tables and chairs individuate crisply. Natural if 7 is made up. And Yablo's comparison cases will be figures?
Like, there's no fact of the matter whether the chip on my shoulder today is the same chip as yesterday's? His example's exactly the chip on the shoulder, and a pair of anatomical figures I leave inside the paper for the curious. Third, translucency. You see straight through my statement that the number of zebra muscles has doubled, to the fact that there are twice as many muscles. The as -if reference to numbers never registers, and you are surprised when it is pointed out. Natural. If numbers are aids rather than things represented, you see through Gandhi had a lot of guts the same way. And fourth is mine, impatience.
Go on, pay my prediction. Paid in full, with Yablo's little theatre. You are a maths teacher. You have just taught little Fred that two and three make five. A meddler arrives with news. The oracle, which Yablo stipulates we all trust, has revealed that everything is concrete, hence nothing is a number. Do you call Fred back in to confess your mistake? Obviously not, you tell the meddler to bug off, which I gather is the technical term, because the Oracle's Bulletin is irrelevant to what I was really saying, that two things and three things make five things, not six as Fred had it. Compare being rebuked
for saying Gandhi had a mind of his own on the grounds that Gandhi was wholly physical. The rebuke isn't false so much as aimed at nothing. Belief is idle in the mechanism. Similarity four, cashing out exactly as predicted, and my scorecard remains uneaten. Fifth, Representationality. Hiding the paper's best joke. Every abstract object yet discovered has, and Yablo's scare quotes are audible, turned out to come in handy as a representational aid. Numbers, sets, properties, worlds. Remarkable coincidence. It should remind us, he says, of Wittgenstein's fable, we invent
clocks and only later notice they can tell time. No surprise when things whose reason for being is representing show a consistent aptitude for it. The discovery was a memo from the inventors. And sixth is the modal one, carried over from part one. Existence claims are the paradigm of the contingent a posteriori. Yet arithmetic, up to its neck in existence claims, feels necessary and a priori. Because the real content of 2 plus 3 is 5, if 2f things and 3g things are no overlap, then 5f or g things is a logical truth. Arithmetic
feels necessary and a priori because, properly understood, it is. He'd flagged a fuller treatment elsewhere, I assume. A footnote to his own abstract objects. A case study then forthcoming, which leaves the fourth quadrant, What puzzles does figuralism generate? The quadrant where the paper stops arguing and starts confessing. The objection, if we are only pretending when we say the number of planets is nine and it was nine in 2001, let the date stand, should we not know it? Doesn't figuralism posit a drastic novel failure of first personal authority? Whole populations pretending
unawares. And the answer can't be we do know it deep down. Nobody experiences their times tables as theater. So the answer has to be that pretending is the wrong category. It has to be. Look, pretending is something you do, deliberate, effortful, at least available to consciousness. Whatever ordinary speakers are doing with number talk, it isn't done, it's discovered, a stance you find yourself in and can be surprised by. The paper needs an attitude with the as -if structure of pretense, but none of the deliberateness. Does he have one? He has one, and its construction is a single clean cut. Making believe, Yablo
says, is an amalgam of two things. One, being as if you believe. Two, being that way through your own deliberate efforts. The figuralist needs only the first. Drop the deliberateness, keep the as -if. He calls what remains simulation, crediting the term in this use to Walton's paper Spelunking's Simulation and Slime. So, simulating belief that S is things being in the relevant respects, as if you believed S, while on reflection you find you don't believe it, or are agnostic. Or, and here the paper's first footnote comes home, listen, or at least you do not feel the
propriety of your stance to depend on the belief, if you have one. You do not believe it, except possibly per accidents, by accident, as the Latin says. The belief merely happens to be in the room. Wait, that's the horses. That's word for word the horse's footnote. The propriety of our stance doesn't depend on the belief, even if we have it. Solomon. The refinement he slipped into footnote 1, page 1 before anything. It was the definition of simulation the whole time. The paper opens by defining its final concept in the fine print and then spends 30 pages walking back to it. I have read this paper perhaps a
dozen times. I noticed that this week. A dozen readings and the first footnote was holding the last section's key in its exact words, and I walked past it every time because first footnotes are where papers keep their throat clearing. It is the finest piece of construction in the piece, and it is hidden in the one place a professional reader is trained not to look. I am, genuinely I am, delighted, and somewhat ashamed. There it is. There it is, the pinball machine again, and this time I'm not even ribbing you because you've earned the shame and the delight in one packet. That's what a dozen readings buys, the
ability to be ambushed by page one. All right. Examples of simulation because the category needs population or it's just a label. Walton's examples, relayed by Yablo. Copernicus, who knows the astronomy cold, still simulates belief in a setting sun. Things are, perceptually, conversationally, as if he believed it, and no effort is involved. Einstein. Relativity in hand still simulates belief in absolute rest. Walton has a lovely passage on this from a 2000 piece, Existence as Metaphor, which Yablo quotes at length over in the appendix, about watching the next train
from a stopped carriage and how one cannot perceive motion without perceiving something as absolutely fixed. The make -believe indispensable to perception itself. The moviegoer simulates the squid attack. The dreamer simulates the Nobel Prize. Nobody in any of these is doing anything. It's a permultiface. And then, I remember spotting this on my first flip through. Yablo's own confession? The most disarming sentence in the paper. It came as a great surprise to him, he reports, to realize that although it was as if he believed that an invalid argument is one with counter -models, he did not really believe it, save per accidents,
for he did not believe in models, save per accidents. A working logician, mid -career, discovering by introspection that a definitional conviction of his trade was simulation, surprises the fingerprint. You can be wrong about whether you are simulating in a way you could never be wrong about whether you are pretending. Which answers the first personal authority objection by conceding it, structurally. Yes, no immediate authority, because the attitude in question was never the here and now kind. Belief outruns the moment. It's dispositional, forward -looking. Would you still accept this on reflection? Would you premise on it when the
context is unclear and nobody has privileged access to their own counterfactuals? The concession is a feature. So the summing up section 13 and notice what it is. The predicament restated in the new vocabulary one octave deeper. What are our options upon discovering that we only simulate belief in X things? Stop simulating by ceasing to be as if a believer. Stop by becoming a genuine believer. or, per the per accidents clause, by coming to express genuine belief in the uttering. Keep simulating, but only where a paraphrase you really believe stands ready. Quine's menu,
all three courses, and then the fourth, your simulated assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts. If so, construe the simulated assertion that S has a real assertion about those facts, the facts that make a simulation like that appropriate. And the danger, which he names, and which has my handwriting all over it, His words, close to, the construal may seem contrived or self -serving. Am I engaged in legitimate self -analysis or tampering with the record, retrofitting my past statements to my current beliefs? And this, he is explicit, is where the figuralist version earns its place, the check
against self -servingness. Point out how similar the X -talk is to certifiably figurative talk. Hattie says the prof put hurdles in her path, construing her as simulating hurdle belief while really asserting that he obstructed her term, nothing contrived there. The challenge, case by case, is to make the construal his phrase ring true. Ring true. And there's the decoder ring come due because rings true is not a criterion, it's an ear. So, does the paper pay it or not? It pays what it has and confesses the rest. And the confession should be heard before the verdict,
in Yablo's own cadence. Deciding whether a construal rings true is difficult, he writes, and not made easier by our tendency toward wishful thinking and the rewriting of history. Figuralism may be a tool inherently liable to misuse. One certainly hopes for more and better controls than he has provided. And then the Grice comparison. Grice came to regret conversational implicature somewhat, unsure he could wield it non -opportunistically, but never concluded it should be scrapped. Implicature happens. One develops a working relationship with it. And the last words of section 13, exactly.
Figuration happens too. You learn by trying. Before the verdict, the appendix. We're doing the appendix, yes? Because I flipped to it expecting acknowledgements and found a second paper. We are doing the appendix origin story first, because the origin story is the most me thing in the document. It began, Yablo reports, as some footnotes on Jason Stanley's hermeneutic fictionalism, in the same volume of Midwest Studies, and the footnotes became, his word, a humongous endnote which at the editor's suggestion became the appendix, a footnote that ate the paper's tail. I have
the same weakness. I merely lack his editor. It runs perhaps eight rounds against Stanley. We take three, with a jewel or two collected in passing, and I flag the compression. Yablo goes quickly in places and we go quicker. Round one. The average mother. Stanley's exhibit. The average mother has 2 .3 children. The fictionalist reads such sentences as figures. Stanley objects that the average mother is not a normal definite description. It resists tests that the red car passes, and, more pointedly, that the average mother has 2 .3 children. But there is no average
mother, could be true, whereas the shortest spy is in France, but there is no shortest spy contradicts itself. Yablo's reply, prefaced by a disarming shrug on the page, he has no great investment in the example, Jason may well be right about it, runs. Normality is a red herring. The fictionalist never claimed the average F was normal. Run the same tests on the shortest spy and you get the same wobbles, and nobody concludes the shortest spy does not purport to refer. As for the conjunction, its first conjunct is true figuratively, its second true literally, mixed construal, no contradiction.
The full of it sentence in a cardigan. Stanley has a second shot in that round though, doesn't he? Something about weight? He does, suppose the average mother picks out a unique entity, then Stanley argues from the mere premise that mothers have mass it would follow trivially that if there are any mothers there is a mother of average weight, yet that sentence expresses a substantive truth, not a triviality. Yablo's counter -question, why trivially? Only if the average mother must herself be one of the mothers, and she had better not be on pain of impredicativity. Her properties would depend on the average working
mothers, which could depend right back on hers, and onward through the average single mother, the average stay -at -home mother, without limit. Average mothers should not be mothers, and they do not have to be. No more, he says, than former presidents and toy trucks have to be presidents and trucks. The fictional entity is cast for the role, not recruited from the population. That's the appendix's best joke, and it's doing real work. And before we leave this stretch of appendix, one payoff hiding in it, because our connections segment will send listeners here, Yablo reconstructs Carnap. The internal -external
distinction always had a fitting problem. Carnap explains it once by example, are there numbers versus is there a number, that added to three yields five, and once by spirit, plain questions versus philosophical ones, and nothing says why particular strings of words track particular spirits. The fictionalist supplies the why. Is there a number that added to three yields five, has a real content, a long harmless disjunction about things and things making five things, so asking it is asking after real content, internal, plain, settled in agreed on ways. Are there numbers,
has no real content to speak of, literal content is the only game in town, so asking it is asking metaphysics. External, which is exactly how Harry, Yablo's nominalist who works as a mathematician, accepts the first sentence and rejects the second, without a flicker of inconsistency. So Carnap's distinction wasn't wrong, it was unexplained. One question aimed through the lens, the other aimed at it. The framework was the fiction all along. And back in the average mother round, I saw a footnote with Russell in it. Footnote 19, and it is a gift. Russell attributes to Santayana
the view that there is no God and Mary is his mother. Our problem as interpreters, Yablo remarks, is to find a basis for the unequal treatment that charity would seem to require. The whole appendix in one blasphemous epigram interpretation is the art of deciding which conjunct gets the figure. Systematicity. Stanley's serious charge, speakers compute real -world truth conditions with astonishing reliability. The natural explanation is compositional semantics. Fictionalist real contents look unsystematic, so understanding
goes mysterious. Yablo's first reply is scope. Hermeneutic fictionalism is not a rival semantic theory of the language, it is a strategy aimed at particular constructions. And nobody expects compositional semantics for hyperbole, metonymy or irony, which we nonetheless understand. If number talk resembles those, strong systematicity or bust is the wrong standard. But that's a dodge unless he can actually state the rule. Can he? He can, and here is the seed. A proposal he credits to David Lewis's 88 paper, Statements Partly About Observation. Propositions as sets of worlds.
A proposition is entirely about a subject matter when worlds equivalent on that subject matter never disagree on it, and the real content of a mixed sentence is the strongest weakening of its literal content that is entirely about the physical world. The figure chips a stronger literal content down to a weaker real one, hyperbole's mechanism, by an explicit rule. And Lewis is not alone on the page. Yablo offers a second mechanism, credited to Robert Stalnaker, tactical presupposition. Suppose for a second, you need not believe it, that there is a man in the moon. Then the place I am saying the spaceship landed
is right by the left eyebrow. Shrink the context for a moment, borrow the fiction's map, and the real information comes through. So the decoder ring gets, not a criterion of taste, but a candidate algorithm. Real content is the concrete directed part of literal content, extracted by subject matter arithmetic. That materially changes my verdict math, and I'm noting it now. Round three? Round three, whose punchline you already know. Stanley presses why care about the commitments speakers believe they have. Ontology should track actual commitments, the ones the best semantic theory assigns. Yablo's reply distinguishes the
speaker's commitments from the semantic theorists. Quine the theorist says predicates stand for sets, yet denies that using a predicate commits one to sets, and rightly since there are no sets is plainly not self -defeating. So what makes commitment worth caring about at all on his telling? Consistency. To say that S commits you to F things is to say you cannot consistently hold S while denying F things, and on when they are contradicting themselves, speakers who persist after reflection are owed deference. And then the aside that closes our circle. Suppose the theorist says the number of Democrats denotes a function from times to
numbers. Is the speaker thereby committed to functions? If so, why is she not inconsistent when she adds, and the number of functions is, as ever, zero? As ever, it's a running gag now. The number of numbers is zero. The number of functions is, as ever, zero. The sentence that was a catastrophe in section six is, by the appendix, a reflex. He closes an argument with it. The motif files its own paperwork. Watch its career across the hour. Born a contradiction in the bomb. Redeemed as a figure by full of it. Mechanized as self -applied talk in section eight. Relativized
to Tuesday's register in section nine. Retired in the appendix as a punchline, the whole path compressed into six words. Now the verdict. Everything from here is us, not the paper. Clementine, you hold the scorecard. Prosecute. Three parked items. Item one, the decoder ring, who fixes real content, what stops self -serving construals. Payment received, the ring true test, resemblance to certifiably figurative speech. Plus, from the appendix, the Lewis subject matter rule. A real down payment. An explicit chip down algorithm,
not vibes. Payment outstanding. Yablo's own confession, wishful thinking, rewriting of history, hopes for better controls. My finding. Partially paid, and I'll say something for him before something against. The confession is the most trustworthy sentence in the paper. Philosophers do not usually tell you their tool is liable to misuse. But, a tool of self -interpretation whose failure mode is flattering yourself, issued without controls, is a loaded instrument, and rings true hands it to the interpreter with the safety off. The residue stands. Defend if you're defending. A
partial defense, in two sentences. First, the Grice parallel is not decoration. Implicature was likewise uncontrolled at birth, likewise liable to opportunism, and forty years of pragmatics disciplined it into indispensability. Figuration happens, and a phenomenon is not refuted by the difficulty of its theory. Second, and this is my Quinean superego speaking, whom you have heard grumbling since part one, the demand for controls is Quine's legacy inside the view. The double -talk charge survives precisely as the standard figuralism must keep meeting. Concession. The residue stands. The paper wins the right to the
tool, not yet the right to trust every hand that holds it. Your point on balance. Noted and banked. I win one. Item two, the IOU. Parasitic games tend to swallow their hosts. Details to be given elsewhere, I hope. Payment received. None in this paper. The footnote is the payment's absence. Notarized. And it isn't peripheral. Engaged mathematical talk. The register actual mathematics lives in. Runs on the parasite. My finding. Unpaid. Standing. though I grant the honesty of the notarization. No defense on the merits, Clemmie. A sentence
of context flagged as context. The details were a genuine research program, not a bluff. Yablo's subsequent work, which the connection segment will touch, is in large part the paying of this note. Within the four corners of the paper, unpaid, standing, agreed. And let me balance the ledger by conceding your general point with a specific admiration. The two most honest sentences in the document are a hope and a confession, and a paper that shows you its own unpaid notes is doing something most papers armour themselves against. Taken. Sol. Item 3. The balking Platonist.
The parenthesis claiming she doesn't really advance objectively real content outside the philosophy room. My finding going in was, a pat on the head, I'll hear the defence. Here I do defend, and not merely as the paper's counsel. The parenthesis is short, but it is not evasive. It is the hermeneutic method applied consistently, one last time, to the last holdout. The entire paper has argued that avowed ontology and operative content can come apart. Quines, ours, the mathematicians. The Platonist at the Blackboard receives no exemption. Her seminar room avowals are data. So is her
Blackboard practice the impatience, the translucency, the shrug at the oracle, and the practice sides with Yablo. If hermeneutics was good enough to convict Quine in section 2, it is good enough to acquit the paper in section 10. I move to retire the item. Hmm, motion granted, with a limp. Retired on the grounds that the reply is principled rather than merely brief, but I record that the Platonist herself would not grant it, and a theory of agreement that the second party rejects has a wound it should dress at length some day. Now the open floor, strongest step and weakest step, and hold ingenuity apart from
worth, your rule, and it's the right rule here. Because my candidate for cleverest step is also my candidate for shiftyest. Then name it. The hermeneutic turn in section 11. As craft, the single best move in the paper, the complexity objection doesn't get answered, it gets dissolved, the machinery is reclassified from legislation to anatomy, and every adoption cost worry evaporates in a sentence. And, I half suspect it's a conjuring trick, both at once. Because the reclassification is doing enormous work on trust, revolutionary proposals owe feasibility arguments. Hermeneutic
proposals owe empirical adequacy, and the paper pays the empirical bill with six parallels in a boot -shaped country. That's a brilliant down payment, and it is a down payment. If the analogy between arithmetic and figure ever frays, if the psycholinguistics comes back wrong, the whole path was a beautiful bridge to a bank error. Admire the step, doubt the landing. A fair double -take, though the record should show the paper saw you coming, in a round of the appendix we compressed past. Yablo insists the fictionalist's claim is semantic, not psychological, so it does not stand or fall with arithmetic and make -believe
sharing a mechanism in the head, and he cites Gibbs to note that the literal first processing model, the one your worry leans toward, appears to have been refuted already. The bridge has more piling under it than you allow. The river can still rise. Now I will set my own beside it. Strongest step for me loving the bomb, not surviving it, loving it. The move from anyone who says people are full of it is full of it, to the number of numbers is zero is the moment the paper stops defending fictionalism and starts learning from the objection. The Blast Papin read as a blueprint. That is what philosophical maturity looks like on the page. And the weakest,
spend the coin honestly. The paper's quine and it cost me something. The double standard indictment in section 2 is rhetorically perfect and slightly convenient. Apologist Quine gets a paragraph, hermeneutic Quine gets custody of the child, and a Quinean of my vintage notices that the menu's austerity was never meant as a theory of ordinary speech. It was a theory of what to say when limning. Yablo convicts him of hypocrisy, partly by holding him to a standard he explicitly declined. The conviction still stands, persisting without even sketching a reconciliation is on the page. It is hand, but the sentencing hearing should have noted the mitigation. My allegiance
tested. Verdict bent, not broken. Split verdicts, then, and honestly left split. Mine. The path is real, the destination is figuralism, and figuralism is the most livable nominalism I've met. I come out more of a fictionalist than I walked in, with two liens on the property, the controls, and the parasite. Yours? Mine. The paper's deepest achievement is not the ism but the reframing. Fictionalism converted from a desperate measure into a description of competence. Obnoxiousness retired, explanation enthroned. I remain agnostic about the numbers, as befits a man Quine trained,
and no longer agnostic about the method. Connections then I take the road in, you take the road out. The road in this paper is a junction box. Quine 48 and 60 supplies the predicament and the menu. Carnap 56 haunts section 10 and the appendix internal and external questions, reconstructed rather than repudiated. And the weakest. Spend the coin honestly. The paper's Quine and it cost me something. Van Frassen 80. Metafictionalisms Rosen 90. builds the bomb's target, and the bomb itself is forged in 93 by Rosen and independently
Stuart Brock, then generalized by Nolan with O 'Leary Hawthorne in 96. Walton, 90 and 93, provides the make -believe machinery and the prop -oriented turn. Burgess and Rosen, 97, supply both the revolutionary hermeneutic distinction and the demolition of obnoxiousness arguments, and Yablo's own 98 Aristotelian society piece, Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?, is the sibling text, read them as two halves. The road out, and it forks three ways. Fork one, Yablo himself, the IOU gets worked, the myth of the seven, manuscript
here, lands in Mark Calderon's 2005 collection Fictionalism and Metaphysics, where this paper's whole research program throws its coming out party, and the Lewis seed from the appendix grows into the 2014 book Aboutness, where real content stops being a metaphor with a logarithm and becomes a worked semantics. If the appendix interested you at all, Aboutness is the payoff volume. Are the other two forks? Fork two, The Fight. Stanley's hermeneutic fictionalism sits in the very same volume as this paper, buy one get the war free, and the pretense versus commitment debate runs
on through the 2000s. Fork three, The Neighbors. The deflationary mood here feeds the meta -ontology boom, whose crossroads is the 2009 meta -metaphysics collection, and Amy Thomason's easy ontology program is the nearest cousin, though mind the family politics. She deflates the same debate but concludes the numbers do exist, and argues against pretense readings like Yablo's. Her quantifier easiness and his figures are rival diagnoses of the same patient, and comparing them is a ready -made seminar paper. Reading guidance? Four instructions for the listener now opening the PDF. 1. Read the footnotes as text, not apparatus.
Footnote 1 is the paper's final definition in disguise. Footnote 11, together with the parenthesis it hangs from, is the IOU. Footnote 19 contains God, Mary, and Santayana. At section six, letter the bomb yourself on paper. A through E forwards, E prime to C prime backwards. Ten minutes and the entire middle of the paper becomes weight -bearing. Three, at section eight, ask of every number word, aid or thing represented. That turns the taxonomy from terminology into a reflex. Four, do not skip the appendix for being an appendix. It is the engine room, and the Lewis passage
is three sentences you will meet again in a book thirteen years later. And the walk -home version, one sentence each, mine. Quine's menu was missing its fourth option because Quine was sitting at the fourth table. We keep the talk and drop the belief, because number talk was figurative speech all along, and no one audits the jungle for the clearing's paperwork. Mine. The path through fictionalism ends where the first footnote began, with the discovery that the propriety of our stance never depended on the belief, and the proof you have arrived is that you can say, in perfect sincerity and perfect innocence, that
the number of numbers is zero. Go, and figure. The paper was Stephen Yablo's go figure. a path through fictionalism. The scorecard closes at one note unpaid, one paid in instalments, one retired with a limp, which, for a paper this ambitious, is a career. Thank you for walking the path with us. Mind the stumps on the way out. Some of them are bears.
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