
Miller, "Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?" — Part 1 of 3
The cup on your desk at noon is, you'd say, the very same cup at one. Metaphysicians have two ways of making that true, and each draws a standing complaint: that nobody can say what it means for the cup to be "wholly present" at noon, or that the cup is really a series of shorter-lived objects that "come into and pass out of existence before our eyes." Kristie Miller takes up a third option that promises to dodge both: a worm stretched through time that is not built from segments. She asks whether it is a position worth holding. In Part 1, Solomon and Clementine start with the change Miller makes to Josh Parsons' title (must becomes ought), then lay out the four objections, two per side, that a worm without segments is meant to dodge; meet a spatially extended simple that is half orange and half purple yet has no halves, and the idea that a property can belong to a whole as a distribution; christen the third way of persisting, terdurance; watch the first option close when instantaneous simples hand back the perdurantist's ontology, either outright or with the segments merely relabelled as not-parts; define a terduring simple, which is where Clementine presses two questions: what is actually sitting at a "slice" of space-time, and whether the whole view is just endurantism with the identity crossed out; and pin down, with five clauses and a candle burning from noon to one, the rich perdurantist thesis that terdurantists deny. Part 1 ends at the word the whole view hangs on: what "part" can mean for a worm with no segments, and the two ways of giving it a time that Miller tries next. No prior metaphysics of persistence needed; we build every piece from the ground up. This is a close reading across three parts, so you come away actually understanding the argument, not just its headline. Read along if you like: Kristie Miller, "Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 4 (December 2009), pp. 619-646 - via its DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0062 [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.] New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show - see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself). Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast
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