Skip to content
PodSubs
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEvents
More
BlogPodCred
Menu
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEventsBlogPodCredNetworksSign in
Join nowSign in
  • Shows
  • People
  • Jobs
  • News
  • More
    • Guests
    • Events
    • Blog
    • PodCred
    • Networks
    Join nowSign in

Everything Whatsoever

Everything Whatsoever artwork

Everything Whatsoever: Quine "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" — pt1

Jul 25, 202635 minAudioSeason 1, Episode 5
ShareXLinkedInFacebookWhatsAppEmail

Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" - Part 1 of 2 Every undergraduate is told you cannot bathe in the same river twice, and nobody has ever quite believed it. Quine agrees that you can - flatly, you can - and then spends thirteen pages working out precisely what it costs to say that this is so! The cost of this is a machine: take some acts of pointing, add an identity claim, and objects come out the other end. The machine builds a river. Then it builds the colour red. Then it is asked to build the shapes square and triangle, and something goes badly wrong. In Part 1, Solomon and Clementine assemble the machine and watch it break. Heracleitus dissolved in two sentences; river-stages and water-stages, and how you may bathe in the same water twice while bathing in two different rivers; why pointing on its own fixes almost nothing until identity is imputed across the gestures, and what the paper quietly borrows to make the induction work; Hume's ghost, invited in and never quite shown out; the maxim of the identification of indiscernibles, which demotes Leibniz from legislator to management consultant; and then the nominalist's Christmas morning, where redness dissolves into red, the largest red thing there is, and the inventory stays entirely concrete. Then Quine draws the only figure in the paper - a square, both diagonals, both midlines, thirty-three regions, five shapes - and the whole beautiful construction collapses into a single object. Part 1 ends at the wound: "this is the Cayster" and "this is square" were never the same is. No prior Quine needed; we build every piece from the ground up. There's also a short primer episode for this paper (Ep. 04), released just before this one - the universals debate as it actually stood at mid-century and what it costs to stand on the nominalist side of it, why explanation by pointing was a foundational question rather than a parlour trick, and where Quine himself was standing in 1950, which is a stranger place than his reputation suggests. It's background rather than paper; if you already hold that ground, skip it with our blessing. This is a close reading across two parts, so you come away actually understanding the argument, not just its headline. Read along if you like: W. V. Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis," Journal of Philosophy 47, no. 22 (October 26, 1950), pp. 621-633 - also reprinted, lightly reworked, as chapter IV of From a Logical Point of View (1953), pp. 65-79. [Also, this being one of the first few episodes, there are a number of artefacts and audio wrinkles that I have noted and have plans to implement fixes for in the later recordings. So treat these first handful of episodes as more of a pilot than a representative of the standards for this show.] New here? Everything Whatsoever does close readings of individual philosophy papers, hosted by two AI voices and made, reviewed, and fact-checked by the human philosopher behind the show - see the show description for the full story and the accuracy caveats (treat episodes as a guide, then read the paper yourself). Questions, corrections, or a paper you'd like covered? I'd genuinely love to hear from you: everythingwhatsoeverpodcast@gmail.com Enjoying it? Tips keep the caffeine flowing and the episodes coming, entirely optional: https://ko-fi.com/everythingwhatsoeverpodcast

Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.

Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

This is a Scattered Deck production. Clem, before we begin properly, hold out your hand for me. This is already the strangest opening we've done, but fine. One hand, held out. It better not be about rings. Nothing so sentimental. Most of the matter in that hand is new since we met. The proteins turn over in days, the skin in weeks, the whole thing quietly restocked the way a museum replaces its floorboards. So... In what sense exactly are you the woman who owned the previous

hand? In the sense that, hang on, my first instinct is to say, same soul, next question, and my second instinct is to be embarrassed by my first instinct. Both instincts are on today's syllabus. Our author notices the temptation. It would be agreeable, he says, to be driven to a changeless and therefore immortal soul as the vehicle of your persisting identity. Agreeable, which is a marvelously backhanded thing to call the immortal soul. Agreeable like a warm bath you know you have to get out of. Funny you should mention baths, because he immediately

sets your hand next to a much older problem. Heraclitus on the river. You cannot bathe in the same river twice, and the reason, in the wording our author quotes, is that new waters are ever flowing in upon you. Right, and every undergraduate nods along to that, and I have never once believed it. Of course you can bathe in the same river twice. People do it every summer. Then hold that certainty, because today's paper opens by agreeing with you, flatly, you can, and spends 13 pages working out precisely what it costs to say so. The paper is Identity, Ostention

and Hypostasis by Willard van Orman Quine in the Journal of Philosophy, October 26, 1950. Welcome to Everything Whatsoever, the show about everything whatsoever, which this week means rivers, bathing and the going price of pointing at things. I'm Solomon Osei. And I'm Clementine Ramsey. He's read today's paper more times than Quine did. I hadn't read it at all until the

theme started, which sounds like a flaw, but is the format. He's lived with it, I meet it fresh, and by the end we've both done the reading. So have you. The paper, again, is Quine's Identity, Ostention and Hypostasis, from 1950. Dense enough that we're giving it two episodes. This is part one of two. And you left me standing in a river, so let's get back in the water. You said Quine agrees with me. Nobody agrees with me. What is the trick? The trick needs a stage, so let me

set it quickly. 1950. Quine is at Harvard, mid -pivot. Three years earlier, the notorious joint experiment with Goodman in constructive nominalism, renouncing abstract entities outright. Two years earlier, On What There Is, where ontology becomes the question of what our theories quantify over. And a few months after our paper, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Lands. This piece sits in the crease between his two most famous essays. The quiet middle child between two celebrities, those are always the interesting ones. And this one has a further peculiarity. It comes from the stage

rather than the study. The first footnote tells you that most of it is the Theodore and Grace de Laguna lecture, called simply Identity, which Quine gave at Bryn Mawr in December of 49, with smaller portions from a talk called On Ontologies. You can hear it. The whole paper has a spoken cadence. It was built for a room before it was built for a page. Worth holding on to. A lecture is allowed to be charming, and charm is exactly the thing I audit. Noted. Now, the title. Three heavy words. Each is doing work. Identity you

have. Ostention is explanation by pointing, teaching a term by indicating samples. This and this and this. And hypostasis is the positing of an entity, the step from using a word to installing a thing in your ontology for the word to name. The title is very nearly a recipe. Identity plus pointing yields things. That's the recipe? Point at stuff, say same again and objects come out? Nearly the paper in one line and here is the map. One machine, demonstrated three times, it takes acts of pointing, adds identity, and manufactures objects. Demonstration

one, it builds a river. Demonstration two, the colour red, and there it gets audacious. Demonstration three, it is asked to build the shapes square and triangle. Whether the machine handles the shapes the way it handled the river is the hinge the paper turns on, and what Quine does with the answer is the thing he tells us he cares most about. Then the closing sections take stock of what it has honestly made. One machine, three products, and presumably the philosophy lives wherever the tolerances are tightest. Build me a river. Then here is Heraclitus answered, in two sentences. You can bathe in the same river

twice. What you cannot do is bathe in the same river stage twice. A river, Quine says, is a process through time, and the river stages are its momentary parts. Bathe on Monday and again on Wednesday, and you have visited two stages of one process, and that just is bathing in the same river twice. Identifying the river bathed in once with the river bathed in again is what settles that our subject was the process, not a stage. Okay, carefully because this dissolves so fast I don't trust it. The move is, concede the flux entirely, the new waters really are

ever flowing in, but rehouse the identity. The thing strictly self -identical across Monday and Wednesday is no parcel of water, it's the temporally extended process, and the two wet moments are its parts. Heraclitus was right about the stages and wrong to think stages were the only game in town, or rather, whoever gave us that slogan was. The line reaches us through Plato, and the fragment we actually have from Heraclitus has the waters changing while the river stays put, which is suspiciously close to Quine's answer. That is the shape of it. And

notice what you did not have to buy. No changeless soul of the river, no hidden substrate, just a process and its parts. The same offer stands for your hand, but the paper follows the river, so we shall too. I feel slightly fobbed off on behalf of my hand, but go on. Rivers it is. Now Quine adds a second character, with deliberately odd grammar. Let me speak, he says, of any multiplicity of water molecules as a water, countable, a water, this water, two waters. A water, like a barista. I'll bring two waters to table six. Precisely

like the barista, and the oddness lets him say something sharp. Every river stage is at the same time a water stage. At any instant the river is materially some batch of molecules. But two stages of one river are, in general, not stages of one water. The batch has moved on. Because

somebody trucked the water across country and you chased it down and jumped in again. That is 1950 Quine telling you to check the water's itinerary and I genuinely love it. Also... Fond of it for a very long time, you said, in the exact voice you'd use to read a gas bill. This is the neatest dissolution of a pre -Socratic paradox either of us will see this month, and you're doing your gas bill voice. I'm keeping an eye on you, Professor. I contain my delights. It's called cellaring. But keep your other eye on the paper, because now it gets concrete, and the concreteness carries everything that follows.

Quine builds three objects the entire hour stands on, so we take them slowly. Object 1, which he calls a, I'll always say stage A so your ear can find the letter, is a momentary stage of the river Caysta in Lydia around 400 BC, one instantaneous slice of one ancient river. Why the Caysta of all rivers? Wait, 400 BC Asia Minor, is that a Heraclitus joke? Wrong river, right neighbourhood, right century -ish? I suspect exactly that joke, his part of the world if not his river, though the paper never says, so that's

ours. Object 2, stage B. A momentary stage of the same caister, two days later. Monday's river and Wednesday's, so to speak. Two slices of one process. So far, so bathing. Object 3 is the beautiful one, where the barista earns her wage. Stage C is a momentary stage at the same date as stage B, but not of the river. Of the water. The very multiplicity of molecules that filled the river back at stage A, two days on. And where are they now? Half, Quine tells us, still in the lower Cayster Valley, the other half scattered

at diffuse points in the Aegean Sea. Oh, that is lovely. The water has half emigrated. Stage C is Wednesday's snapshot of a straggling object, partly a river's worth of wet, partly a faint smear across an entire sea, and a perfectly good object on Quine's terms for all that it is a horrible shape. Perfectly good, and now the relations. Stage A and stage B stand in what he calls river kinship, stages of one river. Stage A and stage C stand in water kinship, stages of one water. Same shape of relation, different groupings.

Hold those two words. They are the paper's first piece of machinery. River kinship, water kinship, and crucially, kinship is not identity. Stage A is not stage B, and nobody says it is. Siblings, not the same child. Which tees up the central sentence of Section 1, introducing rivers as single entities, processes, time -consuming objects, consists substantially, and this is close to his exact words, in reading identity in place of river kinship. Reading identity in place of kinship. So the river isn't discovered so much

as issued. A kinship among the stages gets upgraded to an identity, and the upgrade requires a new object to be the thing that's identical. The river is what you get when you promote a family to an individual. And pointing is where the promotion becomes visible. It would be flatly wrong to say stage A and stage B are identical. They are merely river kindred. But suppose I point towards stage A, wait the required two days, point towards stage B, and affirm identity of the objects pointed to. That affirmation shows my pointings were never aimed at two kindred stages. They were

aimed at a single river, including both. The imputation of identity, Quine says, is essential here to fixing the reference of the ostention. The identity claim retrofits the gesture. Before I say same thing both times, my finger is ambiguous. The identity disambiguates it upward, to the process, and I can feel Hume clearing his throat at the back of the room. He does, on cue, and Quine gives him his paragraph. Hume's theory, the idea of external objects, arises from an error. Similar impressions, separated in time, are mistakenly treated as identical. Then, to

resolve the contradiction, momentary events that can't literally be one, we invent a non -momentary object to be the subject matter of the identity claim. The external object on this story is a patch invented to cover a mistake. A genealogy with a rap sheet attached. Does Quine buy the rap sheet? He conspicuously declines. Hume's charge of error is interesting as a psychological conjecture about origins, but there's no need to share it. What he keeps is the connection. Identity claims and the positing of time -extended objects arrive together. To impute identity rather than river kinship just is to talk of the river

caister rather than of stage A and stage B. So he keeps the mechanism and leaves the accusation on the table. Hmm, small flag and not yet an objection. He wants Hume's engine but not Hume's liability. Second time in five minutes he's borrowed the story and disclaimed the psychology and we began remember with the words let us imagine with momentary things. Imagine. So whose story is this, and what work is it doing? I'm not making anything of it yet. Margin in pencil. Pencil is the right instrument. The paper returns to Hume. For now the analysis deepens by asking

what pointing accomplishes on its own. Answer. Remarkably little. Pointing is of itself ambiguous as to the temporal spread of the indicated object. Point at the wet thing, and nothing in the gesture says whether you mean the instant or the century. And even granted a time -extended process, some summation of momentary objects, the gesture doesn't say which summation. Stage A belongs to the river with stage B, to the water with stage C, and, Quine says, to an unlimited number of further, less natural summations. Unlimited is right. Stage A plus the last three stages of the Thames

plus one stage of my cold coffee is a summation. Horrible, but nothing in the notion of a summation blushes at it. A single pointing underdetermines the object catastrophically. What rescues it? In ordinary life, a word. We accompany the pointing with this river, and those syllables call in a prior concept, a river as one distinctive type of time -consuming process. This river means the riverish summation of momentary objects containing this momentary one. Given that the word river is already understood, the ambiguity is gone. Given. Doing a lot of standing about, that given.

If river is already understood, we've explained pointing by helping ourselves to precisely the kind of general concept pointing was meant to explain. Which is why Quine now runs it in hard mode, the technical heart of Section 1. Suppose the term river is not yet understood, and we're deprived of every other descriptive device. All we may do is point and use a name. I point at Stage A. This is the caster. Two days later, at stage B, this is the caister. What must the word this have referred to? Not stage A, gone by Wednesday. Not stage B. If both sayings are

true, this reach beyond both stages to something more inclusive, identical in the two cases. The river, conjured directly by the pattern of pointings. And neat, the two pointings already carry information. They associate stage A with stage B, not with stage C. My listener learns the caister is not a water without anyone saying the word water. Just so. Two ostentions suffice for that. But Quine being honest where he could have coasted, the specification is nowhere near unique. A vast variety of collections contain stage A and stage B in other modes than river kinship. So we keep

pointing. Additional stages, further dates. Each pointing eliminates alternatives, until the listener, aided by his own tendency to favour the most natural groupings, and that is his phrase market, has grasped the idea of the caister. His learning is an induction. From our samples he projects a hypothesis about what further momentary objects we'd be content to include. Wait. There it is, the load -bearing wall, and it's made of cardboard, aided by his own tendency to favour the most natural groupings. Solomon, that clause does all the work. The pointings never eliminate the

gerrymanders. After any finite sample there remain endless deviant summations containing every stage I've indicated. What kills them is the listener's taste for natural groupings, and the paper just... Hands him that taste. What is naturalness? Whose? Why are river -shaped summations natural and my river plus cold coffee object not? And what does the paper say in answer? You're asking because you know the answer is nothing at all. It says nothing, and let me be precise about the nothing, a fair cop, and also 1950. The tendency is a

psychological given. The listener just does favour certain groupings, and communication works because speaker and listener share the bias. Whether anything justifies the bias, whether naturalness is in the world or in us, not a word. Your objection stands, and he does not touch it. Then that one is mine and I am keeping it. Pencil, hard, underline twice. The whole ostensive story runs on a notion of natural summation the paper borrows and never earns. Call it the blank cheque, because that is what it is. And I have a suspicion about where that debt gets picked up in the literature, which

I am also going to sit on. Noted and underlined at my end too. Two things round out Section 1, one of them a small delight. First, everything about pointing across time goes for pointing across space. The caster is spread in space too, so the sample pointings must range up and downstream, as well as over dates, or the induction has no basis for the intended spatial reach. The full object is the four -dimensional caster. And the small delight? He notices the two spreads can't be pulled fully apart in practice. Pointings sampling the spatial spread necessarily consume time, and he permits himself one sentence of

showmanship. The inseparability of space and time, characteristic of relativity, is foreshadowed in this simple situation of ostention. Then, immediately, the hedge. If only superficially. I admire the hedge more than the flourish. He waves at physics for the room, then takes it back in three words. Lecturers flourish, logicians retraction, one sentence, vary hymn on 40 minutes acquaintance. Right, section one, played back. Pointing alone buys almost nothing, one gesture, one moment, indeterminate spread. Identity is

the amplifier, point n times, impute identity across the pointings, and all n gestures triangulate one large object, giving the listener an inductive basis for its reach, provided, asterisk, blank check, his taste in groupings matches yours. Without identity, n -pointings specify up to n objects and nothing accumulates. Pure ostention plus identification conveys, with a little induction, spatiotemporal spread. Nothing to correct. Section 1 entire. Asterisk included. Now watch the pivot. One innocent -looking sentence. Everything so

far concerned a singular term. The caester. One name. One object. But there's another ostention we do all day. I point at a pillar box, a sunset, your notebook, and say each time. This is red. General terms. Oh, and the pointing looks identical from the outside. Same finger, same words plus gesture shape. This is the caster. This is red. Same finger, same shape. Whether the same machine is running behind the finger, that is section two, and it is where Quine gets audacious. Audacious how? On its face the difference is obvious, no? With the caster, my pointings all land on one

scattered concrete thing. With red there's no one thing, there's an attribute, redness, whose instance is the pointing sample, so the spread conveyed is conceptual rather than geographical. Exactly the obvious answer, and Quine states it fairly. The difference would seem to be merely that the spread concerned is conceptual, generality, rather than spatiotemporal. Then the question the whole paper pivots on, as flatly as he asks it. And is this really a difference? Oh now, go on then, make red a thing. Watch how little it takes. Think of the word red in full analogy

to the word caester. Pointing and saying this is Cayster, at various times and places, teaches you which portions of spacetime my word Cayster covers. Pointing and saying this is Red does exactly the same for the word Red. Same procedure, same induction, same product. A region of spacetime. The only asymmetry is that Red's regions are scattered, discontinuous, where the Caysters bundle into one streak. To which Quine says, so what? So what, because discontinuity was never a bar to being one concrete object. Go on, I can feel a list coming. A good list. The territory

of the United States, including Alaska, is discontinuous, and nonetheless a single concrete object. So is a bedroom suite. So is a scattered deck of cards. Then the kicker, which I relish. According to physics, every physical object that isn't subatomic is made of spatially separated parts anyway. Continuity was an illusion of scale. The pillar box is a swarm. If the pillar box and the scattered deck are each one object, why not red, a single concrete object extended in space and time, gappier than most, in good standing? The largest red thing there is. Every fire engine and every raspberry, one enormous straggling

individual. And the book is red just relates two concrete things. The book is a spatiotemporal part of red, the way, oh this is nice, the way a certain waterfall is a spatiotemporal part of the caister. Book is to red as waterfall is to river. Solomon, I'm going to say something rash. I would expect nothing less. Say it. I love this. I might buy this. Everything universals were doing, a semantics for general terms, a story about what pointing at samples teaches, and the inventory stays all concrete, all particular, with relaxed standards about scatter. A nominalist's

Christmas morning. Redness dissolves into red, the great red object, the abstract entity was never needed. Where has this view been all my life? Clem, listen to yourself. Forty minutes ago you audited the word given like a tax inspector. Now you're moving furniture into a view you met ninety seconds ago because the estate agent showed you a nice deck of cards. You've been swept along by the paper's own rhetoric. Lovely rhetoric. That's what it's for. Before you sign, kick the tyres. Ask what the view must get right beyond the one example it was demonstrated on. That's fine. A fair rib taken with both hands because

I did exactly the thing. I heard raspberries and signed. But I'm only half standing down because the tyres are holding air. Red works. What's your actual worry? My worry can wait, because Quine now does something a showman shouldn't. He shows his hand before proceeding to consider. His framing, how it is that a general equating of universals to particulars breaks down. He wants to go back over the ground already covered. Breaks down. His words, in passing, like a stage direction left in the script. So you may know this much. The demonstration model has a fault somewhere. Where and whether your Christmas morning

survives it, the text has not yet said, and neither will I. So the tyre kicking was Quine -endorsed all along, noted Professor. Fine, double back to what? To a question we skated over. Why does the identity trick pay? What is its survival value? Quine's answer is disarmingly practical. Convenience. Identity beats river kinship because the objects related no longer have to be kept apart as a multiplicity. If nothing I want to say about the caister turns on distinctions among stage A, stage B, and the rest, carrying the stages separately is bookkeeping for its own sake. Represent the subject matter as one object,

and the books simplify. He even names the principle, an application, in a local or relative way, of Occam's razor, the entities of this particular discourse reduced from many stages to one river. Hang on though, that's a very strange use of the razor because globally he hasn't shaved anything. The stages are all still there, nobody dropped stage A from the universe, he's added an entity. The census went up by one river. Locally, the discourse got tidier. Ontologically, this is the razor run in reverse. The beard is longer. Stop there, because you have just written Quine's very next sentence, nearly word for word. Note,

however, he says, from an overall or absolute point of view, the expedient is quite opposite to Occam's razor. The stages have not been dropped. The caester has simply been added. You reinvented the caveat before the page could deliver it, and his conclusion is the pragmatist's shrug. The case there remains a convenient addition because of the context in which it does affect economy, which makes ontology a branch of good bookkeeping. I'll take the point and the compliment, but notice the shrug, because bookkeeping is a strange final answer to what exists, convenient for whom, relative to what ledger. Keep going, I suspect this gets systematised. Immediately,

in three directions at once, watch the ratchet. Temporal, we have, when a discourse never distinguishes river kindred stages, trade many stages for a few rivers. Spatial, when what we say about broad surfaces never concerns their parts, take whole surfaces as single objects. And then the third, conceptual integration, the integrating of particulars into a universal. Suppose a discourse about person stages, in which whatever is said of a person stage applies equally to every person stage, earning the same amount of money. or an economics seminar. Nobody in the model cares which person you are, only which bracket. Then simplify, says

Quine. Shift the subject matter from person stages to income groups. Distinctions immaterial to the discourse are extruded from the subject matter itself. Now the maxim, in full, the second piece of standing machinery, the maxim of the identification of indiscernibles. Objects indistinguishable from one another within the terms of a given discourse should be construed as identical for that discourse. More accurately, and this refinement is his own, you reconstrue the references. The original objects give way. For the purposes of that discourse the terms now refer to other objects, and fewer of them, so that any two originals

you could not tell apart are both replaced by one and the same new object. The identification of indiscernible. That is a properly cheeky name, and I want one beat to enjoy it, and this next bit is me, not Quine. Leibniz gives us the identity of indiscernible as metaphysics, a law about what cannot fail to be one. Beautifully put.

Savour it. And here is one of mine rather than his. Leibniz demoted from legislator to management consultant, and Quine shows the consultant a striking client, the propositional calculus. Follow some modern literature, he says, and read the letter P and the letter Q as referring to propositional concepts, whatever those may be. Within this calculus, propositional concepts alike in truth value are indistinguishable, interchangeable so far as anything expressible there is concerned. So the maxim directs, Reconstrue the letters as referring merely to truth values, to objects, the true and the false. and the false, in place

of a wilderness. Which Quine notes in passing was precisely Frager's interpretation of the calculus. And I hear a reservation in how you set that up, whatever those may be. Quine's own, stated with unusual mildness. For his part, he prefers to read the letters as schematic, standing in place of statements, referring to nothing at all. But if they are to be treated as referring, the maxim is in order, a conditional endorsement. I wouldn't hold the séance, but if you're holding it, here's how to seat fewer ghosts. Which is funny, and also, wait. This matters. The maxim keeps saying, for that discourse, construed,

reconstrued, always for purposes of the discourse. Solomon, relative to what discourse do I get my ontology? The tax seminar identifies me with everyone in my bracket. The biography seminar doesn't. Am I one thing or many? Quine sees this, say what he sees. He sees it, says it, which is to his credit, and leaves it, which is your opening. The maxim, he admits, is relative to a discourse, hence vague insofar as the cleavage between discourses is vague. Discourse departmentalises itself to some degree, and that degree, his words trail off, will tend to determine whether maxim

may prove convenient to invoke. Will tend to determine. That is an IOU wearing a sentence's clothing, and, no, hang on, let me be fair to him first. He concedes the relativity, he concedes the vagueness. That is honest, and I will give him it. What he does not give is any account of what fixes a discourse, or of what happens to what there is when two discourses collide. So he has paid some of this and not the rest, and the rest goes in pencil under the first one. Relative to what, and who settles the boundaries? Fairly put. Both halves of it. And now we return,

machine and maxim in hand. Section 3 walks them back to the nature of universals, and it opens by pushing your Christmas morning view as far as it will gloriously go. I'm braced. Push it. Red, we said, admits treatment as an ordinary spatio -temporally extended particular, on a par with the caester, the largest red thing in the universe, the scattered total whose parts are all the red things. Very well, run the construction on the income groups. Each income group is the scattered total spatio -temporal thing made of the appropriate person stages, various stages of various persons, pooled by pay. And Quine

insists, and it matters, an income group so construed is just as concrete as a river or a person. Like a person, it is a summation of person stages, merely bundled by a different principle. Different sorting rules, same warehouse. And oh, he's going to cache the old example, isn't he? Say it with the stages. Exactly cached. Income groups are related to persons much as waters to rivers. Remember, stage A was part, spatiotemporally, of both a river and a water. Stage B, same river, not same water. Stage C, same water, not same river. Two summation principles cross -cutting

one stock of momentary things, and persons and income groups cross -cut the person stages the same way. Survey everything built, rivers, waters, red, income groups, and ask, has conceptual integration ever done anything the spatiotemporal kind didn't? Up to now, no. The distinction appears idle. All is spatiotemporal integration. All is spatiotemporal integration. The particular is paradise at full tide. Every universal so far is just a big gerrymandered concrete thing and the word just is holding. So now he needs a case where the construction is forced to fail, not merely unexplored. Where

does he find it? He draws it. The only figure in the paper, and we build it at dictation speed because the next 10 minutes live inside it. Take a square, draw both diagonals corner to corner, an X through the middle. Now the vertical and horizontal midlines, a plus sign through the same centre. Eight spokes from one hub. What the lines carve out and compose, Quine tells us, is 33 visibly outlined convex regions, small and large. 33 Let me see the eight little pie slice triangles, then the four quarter squares, the two halves each way as rectangles, bigger triangles made of two slices, the whole square

itself, and some slice pairs make, no wait, some pairs make triangles and some make weird kites. Do kites count? Kites aren't... Clementine. Slow down. You're attempting a census at highway speed, and the census we may take on faith, the argument survives any honest miscount. What matters is the roster of shapes. Among the thirty -three regions there occur exactly five shapes, the isosceles right triangle, sixteen regions, the square, five, your four quarters and the whole, the two -to -one rectangle, four, the halves, and two forms of trapezoid, four of each. Thirty

-three regions, five shapes. Now Quine stipulates a discourse. Within it, any geometrically similar regions are interchangeable. Nothing we say distinguishes same shaped regions what does the maxim direct exactly what it was built to direct similar regions are indiscernible here so stop saying two regions are similar and start saying they are one in the same region reconstrue the objects no longer 33 regions but five shapes the subject matter shrinks the discourse runs cleaner and each of the five is a universal the square full stop

The isosceles right triangle, full stop. We've manufactured universals with the maxim. And now the pattern says, make them concrete. Same move as red. The shape square becomes the total region pooling the five square regions. The shape triangle, the total region pooling the 16 triangles, and... And finish it. You've stopped walking. Because I've seen it. Solomon, it doesn't work. Look at the picture. Pull the 16 triangles and you tile the entire figure. The eight slices alone cover the whole square. The total triangle region is the big square. Pull the five square regions,

the whole square is one of them, the big square again. The halves union to the big square, the trapezoids too, all five shapes, pulled, come out as one in the same region, the total one. So if the shape is the pulled region, square is identical with triangle is identical with rectangle, five universals collapse into one object and it's the whole drawing. There it is. The paper's detonation, found before the page could hand it to you, I'll shake your hand, then we do the autopsy. You have just discovered what Quine calls concluding. His word for the horror is exact, intolerably, identity among the five

shapes. So the theory of universals as concrete, which, mark the phrase, happened to work for Red, breaks down in general, happened to work. And here is my reading of why, not his. Red was luck of distribution. No two colours pooled to the same scattered total, so no two colours were ever conflated. Squares and triangles are not so polite. Their instances overlap and compose. and the pooling forgets everything except coverage. Forgets. Say more about the forgetting. I want mechanism, not vibes. Then we go down a level, because the paper leans its whole weight on this and does not build it. It points a footnote at

Goodman's forthcoming structure of appearance and walks on. So we will build it ourselves, briefly. Pooling is mereological summation, fusion, in the calculus of individuals that Leonard and Goodman set out in 1940. And the property you want out of it? One property, and it decides the whole argument. Fusion is flat. The fusion of some things is the least thing overlapping exactly what they cover, and that whole keeps no memory of the grouping you built it from. No layers, no brackets. Show me with something I can hold. Take a deck of cards. Fuse the four suits, and you get the deck. Fuse the thirteen ranks, and you get the deck. The very same object.

Wholly different groupings. Identical fusion. Whereas a set remembers. The set of suits has four members, the set of ranks 13 different sets guaranteed over the same cards because sets keep the brackets and fusion throws them away. So the collapse isn't a quirk of Quine's drawing, it's structural. Any two universals whose instances cover the same total get conflated by the pooled region construction. Necessarily, it stores a universal in an object that cannot hold grouping information. Red survived because color totals happen never to coincide and the figure is just

the smallest case where you can watch it happen. Autopsy complete, and precisely right. Descent over, back to the paper, where Quine now retells the Hume story one step further, this time flying a banner over it. Purely as philosophical sport, he says, no serious psychological or anthropological imports supposed. Then, momentary impressions, per Hume, are wrongly identified on the basis of resemblance. Time -consuming objects are invented to be the objects of those identities. Spatial spread enters similarly. The entity red, universal or widespread particular as you please, we are beyond Hume now, enters by the same process.

Then square impressions are identified with one another, and a single entity, square, is imported as vehicle for the identity, correspondingly triangle. So the genealogy says universals slid in on a faulty analogy. Concrete extended things first, red came in with the caster as one more concrete thing, then triangle and square were swept in on the pattern of red, swept in, and here's the retrospect. We now know, from the drawing, that the analogy limps. If square and triangle related to their instances the way concrete holes relate to stages and fragments, square and triangle would be identical with each other,

which they intolerably are not. So whatever square's relation to the square things is, it is not part to whole. And the section lands on its conclusion, a fork in the deepest grammar we have. Two different types of association, concrete parts in a concrete whole, and concrete instances in an abstract universal, which surfaces as a divergence between two senses of the smallest word in the language. This is the caester, the is of part meeting whole. This is square, the is of instance meeting universal. Same two letters, never the same word. That's vertiginous, and I need to say the sport thing before we pull it together because my pencil

note just became ink. That disclaimer, he's issued it twice over the same Hume story and the second time he flies it as a banner, purely as philosophical sport, and yet the story does real work. The swept -in genealogy is what makes the two senses conclusion feel like diagnosis rather than stipulation. If the genetics are sport, the paper should stand with them deleted. Does it? I honestly don't know yet, and I am not letting go of it. Hume's ghost, idle decoration, or load -bearing, and if it is load -bearing, who is underwriting it? That is the third one, and it is the one I want

back. That is the subtlest of the three, and part two gives us the material to fight about it properly. Now play the day back for me, all of it. Deep breath. Heraclitus first, dissolved, you bathe in the same river twice by bathing in two stages of one process, and stage A, stage B and stage C taught us river kinship and water kinship, then pointing, which on its own fixes almost nothing. Identity across the pointings aims them at one big four -dimensional object and the listener inducts the rest, modulo the blank check. Modulo the blank check. Keep going.

Then the maxim, identification of indiscernible, Leibniz demoted to consultant, which tidied the propositional calculus into truth values, at the price of the discourse question he has only half answered. Then maxim plus pooling built red as the largest red thing, every universal a scattered concrete particular, and it was glorious right up until the drawing. And the drawing. 33 regions, 5 shapes, 1 total region. Fusion forgets grouping, the concrete theory dies there, which leaves two senses of is, part meets whole,

instance meets universal, and Hume's ghost still standing in the corner, sport or scaffold. That is the state of play. Flawless. And the sentence to carry out the door is the fork itself. This is the caster, and this is square, where never the same is. Part two is the surgery on that wound. If pointing at squares does not relate parts to a concrete whole, what does it do, what are we saying, and what are we buying, when we say this is square? Quine's answer will hang an entire theory of ontological commitment on a single suffix, three letters marking the exact spot where talk starts costing you entities. That suffix is where we begin next time. Three

letters to itemise the bill for abstraction. For once, Professor, your gas bill voice may be the appropriate register. Part two, then, bring a pencil in your receipts.

Open the transcript file

Hosts and Guests

Nobody is credited on this episode yet.

Credit the people on this episode

Be the first to rate this episode

More episodes

All episodes
  1. Miller, "Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?" — Part 1 of 3

    Oct 26, 202626 minAudio

    The cup on your desk at noon is, you'd say, the very same cup at one. Metaphysicians have two ways of making that true, and each draws a standing complaint: that nobody can say what it means for the cup to be "wholly...

    Credit the people on this episode

  2. Everything Whatsoever: Quine "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" — pt2

    Aug 14, 202627 minAudio

    Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" - Part 2 of 2 Part 1 left the machine in pieces: five shapes pooled into one region, and the moral that the smallest word we have has been leading a double life. Part 2 is...

    Credit the people on this episode

  3. Everything Whatsoever: Quine "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" *Primer*

    Jul 25, 202617 minAudio

    Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" - Primer Listen to this first if you want the background before the paper itself; skip it with our blessing if you already hold this ground. None of it is the paper - that's...

    Credit the people on this episode

  4. Everything Whatsoever: Yablo, "Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism" — pt3

    Jul 21, 202639 minAudio

    The path ends where the title always pointed: at figures of speech. In the finale, Yablo answers the objection that his repaired fictionalism is too baroque for anyone to want. The answer isn't a defence; it's a...

    Credit the people on this episode

  5. Everything Whatsoever: Yablo "Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism" — pt2

    Jul 20, 202628 minAudio

    Yablo, "Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism" - Part 2 of 3 Object fictionalism looked like the clean solution. It looked like a way to mean something true about numbers without believing in them. Then its own logic...

    Credit the people on this episode