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Operational Velocity

Operational Velocity artwork

Ep 9. Nick Howley: The Price of the Part, Transdigm

Aug 4, 202648 minAudio

Nick Howley founded TransDigm in 1993 with $25 million of equity and four aerospace parts units nobody wanted. Over the next 28 years, the firm compounded at roughly 33- 37% a year, almost identically under private equity ownership and under public-market scrutiny. Today the company runs 54% EBITDA margins on manufactured hardware. The operating system was three items long, finished in 24 months, and never revised: price, cost, new business. But the drivers only explain half of it which very few people analyze: the aerospace supply chain (OEM, Tier 1, Tier 2/3), and service parts economics, the AOG clock that makes price elasticity functionally zero, the exponential relationship between service level and safety stock, cycle service level versus fill rate, the central-versus-forward positioning trade-off, and why airline parts pooling is disarmed by the same fragmentation that builds the moat. Inventory for Transdigm isn't a working-capital drag, it's the product. Sources TransDigm FY2025 Form 10-K and FY2026 Q2 results TransDigm Forms 8-K on the FY2024 and FY2025 special dividends, and the Stein/Lisman succession TransDigm Forms 10-Q (aftermarket "recurring revenues... many times the size of the original OEM purchases" language) DoD Office of Inspector General, Report DODIG-2019-060 (Feb 2019) and the follow-on report (Dec 2021) House Committee on Oversight and Reform hearing records, 15 May 2019 and 19 Jan 2022 GAO-25-107468, on data rights and vendor lock (Sep 2025) GAO-21-388, on sole-source spare parts contracts and cost/pricing-data delays GAO-06-839, on technical data needs (C-130J) FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval guidance and FAA Order 8110.42D Nick Howley in conversation with Will Thorndike, 50X Podcast (Jul 2022) Morningstar equity research on TransDigm's moat and PMA economics CNBC on engine aftermarket economics (Sep 2024) Oliver Wyman MRO market size and global fleet-age data (2025-26) Aviation Week Network commercial aftermarket forecast (Feb 2026) Standard service-parts inventory theory (service-level Z-factors; cycle service level vs. fill rate) Email for Inquiries Operational Velocity is for education and general information only and is not investment, financial, legal, or tax advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The views expressed are the host's own, the company and figures discussed are drawn from public sources believed reliable but not guaranteed, and you should do your own research and consult a qualified professional before making any decision.

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00Great returns aren't luck. They're built on the floor. Operators and investors always pushing for more from the deal sheets signed to the systems in place. Speed without precision is just running a race. Operational velocity where execution sets the pace.

SPEAKER_01Hello and welcome to Operational Velocity. You know, somewhere in the world right now, there's a commercial aircraft on the ground at an outstation, waiting for a single part. And it's not an engine, it's probably a valve, a pump, or an actuator the size of your fist. And for every hour it sits there, the airline is losing, by Boeing's own estimate, somewhere between$10,000 and$150,000. And there's exactly one company certified to make that part.

SPEAKER_01It holds a design approval. It is the only legal answer and has arranged its entire business, its pricing, its inventory, its acquisitions, and the way it pays its managers around being the one who answers the phone at three in the morning. That's not a manufacturing business, that's a service business wearing a manufacturer's clothes. And it earns 54% margin. That company is transdone. And over 28 years from its founding in 1993 to 2021, a dollar of original equity compounded at roughly 37% a year across two market collapses, a pandemic, and four changes of ownership.

SPEAKER_01$100,000 in the original deal was worth about$175 million by 2021, roughly 1,700 times your money. And here's a part that should interest operators specifically. 13 years private, 37% a year, and 15.5 years public, 35% a year. So it's almost identical. So the machine did not care whether it was private or public, it just kept running. I'm Gotham Bassoo, this is Operational Velocity, and today we take the cover off that machine.

SPEAKER_01And because this is a show for people who actually run things, we're going to spend most of our time on the part almost nobody analyzes. The supply chain and the spare parts operations that the whole 54% is built on. So let's get into it. It's 1993. Nick Howley is 40. He works at IMO Industries and Industrial Conglomerate, and he's been handed a job probably many of you had had. Take these four underperforming aerospace parts units, clean them up, and sell them.

SPEAKER_01Adult fasteners, aero products, control X, and Wiggins connectors. It's roughly seven facilities with a combined EBITDA of$9 or$10 million. And he did that until he and his boss Doug Peacock decided to buy the business themselves. However, IMO did not want to sell to management. But Keslo and company financed them anyway. And then IMO chairman FART Doug Peacock made process for cooling to buy the business, which Howley concedes he completely was.

SPEAKER_01The purchase price,$55 million. $25 million equity,$30 million debt. Howley moved his family from New Jersey to Cleveland and put what money he had into it. The market was down, commercial and defense at once, which almost never happens. They closed four or five of the seven facilities, stepped up management, and picked up new business as the market recovered. Kelso bought in at 9 or 10 million of Ibita and sold to Odyssey at about 45 million.

SPEAKER_01Five-fold growth in cash flow in four years. And here's the part that matters: entirely organic, not one acquisition. Nick Howley's plan by his own account was to do this for four or five years, make some money and move on. That was 33 years ago. And he's still the chairman of the board. Something happened in those four years that turned a leverage buyout into a compounding machine. And he calls it developing the value driver concept.

SPEAKER_01By 1995, two years in, it was fully formed and never revised again. The operating system was not the product of 30 years of refinement. It was essentially complete in 24 months. Everything after that was distribution. Before we open the machine up, we have to talk about the table that it sits on. Because the reason those value drivers produced a 54% margin here and not somewhere else is structural.

SPEAKER_01And this requires getting into the actual supply chain structure that the industry is built on. So a quick tour of how an aircraft gets built. At the top, there's the OEM or original equipment manufacturer. Those are the Boeings, Airbuses, and Lockheed Martins. They own the type certificate and the final assembly. And below them is tier one. These are the major systems, the engines, landing gear, avionics. Those are companies like GE, Saffron, Collins, Honeywell.

SPEAKER_01And then below them, there's a Tier 2 and Tier 3. These are the companies that provide the subassemblies, components, fittings, valves, connectors, and so on. And the scale of that base is what people miss. An Airbus A380 is roughly 4 million parts from about 1,500 companies across 30 countries. As much as 80% of an aircraft's value by component comes from the supply chain, not from the company whose name is on the tail.

SPEAKER_01And conventional wisdom says value accrues upward. The OEM has the brand, tier one has the scale, and tier two and tier three are where the margins go to die. Build to print, don't own the design, get squeezed every time Boeing squeezes your customer. That is genuinely the experience of most of that base. And TransDime is a tier two and tier three business, yet it still earns 54% margins, while OEMs above it do not.

SPEAKER_01Understanding why takes four structural facts. The first one is that the commercial aerospace industry is a razor and blade industry. Large jet engines are typically sold at a loss, the manufacturer makes it back, and then some over the roughly 30-year service life through spare parts and maintenance. The numbers aren't subtle. GE Aerospace took in$11.7 billion from engine maintenance in the first half of 2024 alone, about 65% of its revenue.

SPEAKER_01As one industry analyst put it to CNBC, the money is made in the aftermarket. And that aftermarket is enormous. Oliver Wyman put the global maintenance repair and overhaul market above$136 billion in 2025, and that's up 8% on the year. And here's the line supply chain people should sit with. Annual MRO spending is up roughly 40% since 2019 to support about 10% more flying.

SPEAKER_01So 40% more maintenance spend to fly 10% more airplanes. Why? Well, the fleet is getting old and getting much older. Oliver Wyman's 2025 figure for the average age of a global commercial fleet is 13.4 years, up from 12.1 a year earlier. That's an enormous single-year move because the OEMs can't build fast enough. The backlog is north of 17,000 unfilled orders.

SPEAKER_01Estimated takes something like 14 years to clear. So the airlines fly what they have harder and longer. And every extra cycle on a 20-year-old A320 is a valve, a pump, and actuator moving closer to replacement on a part certified in the 1990s. So the OEM production crisis is an aftermarket stimulus program, and TransDime is downstream of it by design.

SPEAKER_01And hold that when we get to pricing. Some of TransDyme's growth is Howley's machine. Some of it is Boeing's problem. The second structural aspect is the one that makes the pricing driver work. In aerospace, you cannot just decide to make a replacement part. It is generally illegal in the United States to install a replacement part on a certified aircraft without an airworthiness approval. The type design, a technical standard order, or a parts manufacturer approval, a PMA, as it's called in the industry.

SPEAKER_01So when TransDimes 10K says about 90% of sales are proprietary, it means we hold the design approval. Not a patent because patents expire, and their own filings say no single IP right is material. Design authority, the regulator's permission to be the answer. Now, a PMA is a real legal route around a design holder. Anyone can go to the FAA, prove their part meets the original, and compete.

SPEAKER_01The PMA industry exists and it's aggressive. So why hasn't it dismantled transdyme? Because of arithmetic, not law. There is an analysis that the clearest statement of it is that PMA economics works best for high-volume, low-priced parts. And transdyme's parts are low-priced and deliberately not high value. So to attack a transdyme part, you must spend real money and real time proving airworthiness to a regulator to compete for a profit pool too small to repay you.

SPEAKER_01And that's the moat. Not the patent, not the brand, not scale. The niche sits beneath the threshold of attack. Too small to be worth killing, too critical to be allowed to fail, which is why the company is shaped the way it is. Not one big monopoly, which attracts attackers and regulators, but hundreds of small ones, each not worth anyone's trouble, aggregated into a$9 billion revenue base. And that's not diversification for safety, that's diversification as camouflage.

SPEAKER_01The third major component is around the part. That's never the cost. Everything we've been talking about is about certification, the durable half of the switching cost. But there's a second switching cost, and if you run operations, you feel this one in your stomach. It isn't regulatory, it's temporal. It's where the spare part stops being a manufacturing business and becomes a service business. We met the term in the cold, AOG, aircraft on the ground.

SPEAKER_01An aeroplane declared unfit to fly until a specific defect is fixed is the most expensive sentence in commercial aviation. Boeing's estimate, again, a one-to-two hour event runs$10,000 to$20,000, and depending on the aircraft en route, as high as$150,000 an hour. So picture the negotiation. You're a maintenance controller at three in the morning, aircraft on a stand out and out station, a part number, and a meter running it up to$150,000 an hour.

SPEAKER_01And there's one certified source. Someone asks whether the price seems fair. You're not going to negotiate. You're going to ask one question: who has it on the shelf? So in an aircraft on the ground scenario, price elasticity isn't low. It's functionally zero. And it stays zero for as long as the aircraft is on the ground. And this is what most analysts of TransDime misses. The customer isn't buying a valve. They're buying the termination of a$150,000 an hour event.

SPEAKER_01Against that, the gap between a fair price and an outrageous one is noise. Both are cheaper than that one more hour. But who has it on the shelf is not a simple question. And this is where operations discipline actually lives, because the two things you're optimizing are in direct opposition. On one side, the cost of holding stock, cash converted to metal, depreciating, insured, counted at risk of obsolescence if the fleet retires. And on the other hand, the cost of not having it, an AOG or aircraft on the ground.

SPEAKER_01Service parts management is a search for the line between those costs. And aerospace makes it brutal because demand is intermittent. A given part number might be pulled twice a year, unpredictably from anywhere in the world. And you just can't forecast that with a moving average the way you'd forecast a consumer good, because the signal is mostly noise, and it's very hard to predict the event. You can only insure against it. The industry insures with a target called a service level.

SPEAKER_01And then economics here turn vicious in a way that works entirely for the supplier. The mathematics matter, so stay with me. Safety stock scales with a service level factor, what's called a Z-score, to cover 90% of demand variability. And the multiplier is about 1.28. And 95% 1.65, and 99% 2.33.

SPEAKER_01Watch what those do. Going from a 90 to a 95% service costs you a gap from 1.28 to 1.65. But going from a 95 to a 99, a small step in service, costs the gap from 1.65 to 2.33, a bigger jump in stock. The curve doesn't rise, it accelerates. The last few points of availability cost more than all the points beneath them combined.

SPEAKER_01One subtlety that separates people who've run this from people who've just read about it is the service level and the fill rate are not the same number. Cycle service level is the probability you don't stock out at all in a cycle. Fill rate is the fraction of demand you actually satisfy from the shelf. Because most stockouts miss by only a unit or two. A 95% service level typically delivers a 99% fill rate.

SPEAKER_01Manage against the wrong one, and you're either overbuy inventory badly or starve your critical parts. Then you layer the network on because the service level is meaningless without a location. No good having a part in Cleveland when the aircraft is in Singapore. So one deep central pool, cheap to run, slow to the wing. Or stock pushed out to a dozen of forward locations fast by multiplying inventory across every site.

SPEAKER_01Every forward location improves response time and worsens holding costs. So centralization versus responsiveness. There's not really a clean answer without a lot of analytics, but it's only a chosen point on a curve. Now hold on to all of that because the intermittent demand and an exponential service curve, a positioning problem, with no real clean answer. And look at it from the supplier's chair.

SPEAKER_01TransDime sits on the other side of every one of those trade-offs, and each one works for it. This is where inventory stops being work and capital drag and becomes the delivery mechanism for the whole pricing thesis. A sole source position on a part you can't ship tonight is worth far less than one you can. The stock isn't a cost of doing business. The stock is the business. And you can see the commitment on the balance sheet. TransDime carried about$190 million of inventory in 2010, and by fiscal 2024, it was about$1.9 billion, and it's still climbing.

SPEAKER_01The 10K has stated that the policy is nine words long. The company manages inventory levels in support of customer needs. So sit with that next to 54% margin and a company that refuses, as doctrine, to distinguish fixed cost from variable. This is a business that will strip 20% of a cost base in 90 days and then argue over shared receivables department and carry a fifth of annual sales and inventory without apology.

SPEAKER_01That's not a contradiction. The receivables department doesn't touch the customer's downtime. The shelf is the customer's downtime. And they are ruthless about every cost that does not touch availability and relaxed about the one cost that is availability. That's not inconsistency, it's the whole strategy expressed in working capital. And here's a reflexive loop, which is elegant and slightly sinister. Remember the exponential curve? The airline is on it too.

SPEAKER_01If a part is cheap, the airline can afford to sit at 99% on its own shelf and never call you. But TransDim's whole model is to make the part expensive, and an expensive part is expensive to hold at the top of that curve. So the rationale airlines hold less, drops its own service level, and leans on the supplier shelf instead. The higher the price, the thinner the buyer's safety stock, the more the buyer needs your safety stock, and pricing power manufactures the very dependence that justifies the price.

SPEAKER_01But airlines aren't stupid. They have a counter move, and it's exception that proves the rule. They pool. Carriers band together, sometimes through bodies like the International Airline Technical Pool and share common stock of expensive spares at outstations, so no single airline holds the full buffer. Clever, and it works from parts multiple airlines can share. But TransDyne portfolio is deliberately fragmented into narrow, platform-specific sole source niches, precisely the parts that are hardest to pool.

SPEAKER_01Because too few operators carry that exact item. The same fragmentation that keeps the PMA attackers away keeps the pooling cooperators away. The buyer's best defense is disarmed by the same design choice that build the moat. So the service business and the pricing business aren't two things. They're one thing. In TransDime's own long-standing filling language, the aftermarket parts generate recurring revenues over the life of an aircraft many times the size of the original OEM sale.

SPEAKER_01Because the company sits at the exact point where certification, downtime cost, intermittent demand, and the exponential economics of availability all converge on one answer. Call Transtime and pay what they ask. The fourth thing is and explains the acquisitions that tier two and tier three base is huge and fragmented. TransDime's own filings describe its niche markets as relatively fragmented small private businesses and small, non-core operations of larger ones, thousands of them.

SPEAKER_01Family machine shops that certified evalu in 1974, divisions, a conglomerate picked up in a diversification wave and has been explaining to its board ever since. These aren't the most sophisticated sellers. They're engineers who built a good part, priced it at a cost plus because that seemed fair, and have done it for 40 years. They own a 30-year annuity and carry it on the books as a widget business. Howling's own line on diligence that everyone claims to be proprietary and usually isn't, and that surprisingly often the seller doesn't even track their own aftermarket because they lose sight of the part once it's shipped.

SPEAKER_01Isn't it a throwaway? It's the entire arbitrage. He was buying certificates from people who thought they were selling castings. So put the whole board together, a profit pool and a 30 year aftermarket annuity, not the sale, a certification regime that turns design approval into a legal monopoly, niches too small to attack, a fragmented base who don't know what they own, and Howley invented none of it.

SPEAKER_01GE knew about The annuity. The FAA wrote the rules. He was just the first to run the play on the small stuff, systematically, 95 times for 32 years. Now the three value drivers stop looking like a slogan and start looking like the only three moves available. And here's the entire operating system. Three items. It's been the three items since 1995, and it's only three items in fiscal 2025 10K, in almost the same words.

SPEAKER_01Number one, obtain profitable new businesses. Number two, improve the cost structure. Number three, price highly engineered, value-added products to reflect the value provided. Price, cost, new business. And Nick Cowley's argument, these are the only three things that change the intrinsic value of an industrial business. Everything else is tertiary. And the elegance is that they regulate each other. Cut costs so far you can't deliver quality on time and you lose price and new business.

SPEAKER_01So you're forced into balance. The system has its own governor. Take them one at a time because the devil is in the implementation. TransDime doesn't price to cost, it prices to value, a function of what you provide, what the customer switching cost is. And we just built that switching cost from first principles. Certification plus the AOG clock plus exponential inventory math. Highly repeated observation across 95 acquisitions, most niche engineered product businesses underprice because they underestimate the strength of their franchise in the aftermarket.

SPEAKER_01They don't understand their own switching costs. So the unit president, not a pricing analyst, is personally, intimately involved in pricing. It can't be delegated. And the tactical advice from anyone frozen in front of a price increase is worth writing down. Pick a subset you can afford to lose. Decide in advance how you'll back off it if it fails and test it. Don't wring your hands before you try it. And then there's the cost, my favorite driver.

SPEAKER_01And the single most transferable idea in this episode. TransDime does not distinguish fixed from variable cost. As a matter of policy, Howley states we don't understand fixed from variable, and we're not going to get into that argument. Your cost base is your revenue minus your IBITA. That's your cost, all of it, and it's all addressable. Why does that matter so much? Because the moment you allow a fixed versus variable distinction, cost control stops being an engineering exercise and becomes a negotiation.

SPEAKER_01A game of what I classify as fixed, what's genuinely not addressable. Every plant manager on earth will win that game against you because they know the plant and you don't. So he refused to play. Revenue minus C beta, count all of it. The standing target is beautifully simple. Offset inflation every year with savings, not a transformation program. Just don't go backwards. Watch it under stress.

SPEAKER_01So after 9-11, the industry stopped. TransDime turned production rates down and took 20% of the cost out of the company that already ran lean. Same argument, no debate. Revenues down 20%, someone's taking costs down 20%. And in the same breath, they pushed new business up. First to market with a cockpit security system, cost down and new business up. In the same quarter, in the worst environment, the industry had seen.

SPEAKER_01And the third driver is the least understood. When TransDime buys a company, it typically finds hundreds of engineering projects underway, consuming real expense, and throws out roughly half the day it walks in. Either the probability of winning is poor, or the pricing is such that winning is worse than losing. And that second category is a sophisticated one. Because in Howley's own language, some of them you're going to lose even if you win, because the contract has already given away the IP or the aftermarket rights up front.

SPEAKER_01You win the OEM contract, book the revenue, celebrate, and surrender the only thing on the platform that was ever going to make money, the annuity. It's always the annuity. So they gate hard at the front end, and the measurement standard is brutal and correct. No credit for emotional wins. A purchase order in the door. Adam's Wright is the case study, the largest maker of aircraft faucets in the world. About 5 million of Ibita on 40 million of sales.

SPEAKER_01Howley ran it personally for six months. 20% of the cost out in 60 days, mostly people, and the note, the precision. Not people doing nothing, people doing things that didn't matter. He repriced the aftermarket line by line, held a hard line on long-term agreements that had been fixed price for years, and the margin went from 12% to about 25 in 18 months. Price, cost, new business.

SPEAKER_01That's the drill. At the 2006 IPO, TransDimes headquarters had about 18 people against 1,400 employees, roughly 80 operating people for everyone at corporate. Today, 16,500 employees and north of 50 operating units run from one suite on Euclid Avenue in Cleveland. The argument is sharper than the usual decentralized sermon.

SPEAKER_01Howley's position was that he reinforced by every acquisition that corporate staff contributes very little value in niche engineering businesses. Some functions must exist. You have to pay taxes, you have to borrow money. Most of the rest are value detactors that produce programs the operators don't believe in, so the operators fill out forms and pass them back. He once stated, you have to be willing to pass up apparent cost savings on the belief that the loss of ownership will cost you more than a shared receivable department will save you.

SPEAKER_01And that's a hard belief to hold because the synergy math is always right there on the slide, always positive and always wrong in a way that doesn't show up for three years. The second half, half people skip, is that you have to move people out fast who don't fit. Everyone wants autonomy. What they usually mean as they want to be responsible when things go well and not when they don't. His phrase, I'm the president of the good stuff.

SPEAKER_01No, you're the president of all of the stuff. So if corporate is 18 people and the units are autonomous, what holds it together? Quarterly product line reviews. And I'd argue this is the most undercopied management practice in industrial America. Units are divided into product lines, roughly three each, and so on the order of 150. Everyone is reviewed every quarter. The product line manager presents, the unit president, the EVP, and typically the CFO are in the room.

SPEAKER_0115 to 20 minutes each. The format never changes. Income statement, bookings, and shipments by market segment, and then always price broken down by channel. Commercial OEM, defense OEM, commercial aftermarket, defense aftermarket, plan versus actual on each, then cost projects against target, and then new businesses. Two things worth stealing. First, the coverage rule. You need twice as many prospects as you're sure you'll close.

SPEAKER_01And on cost, you need 100 out, bring 200, you're confident of. Second, the most sophisticated part, the reviews create lateral peer pressure that management could never generate vertically. Because everyone's equity is tied to company performance, not their own unit. The room polices itself. If you're getting 3% price and someone with a similar product is getting four and a half, the question comes from the room, not the chair. And they're rough on sloppy thinking.

SPEAKER_01Things going badly as normal, sloppy numbers, and unprepared answers are not. Doug Peacock's line on why they slice it so finely is the best sentence in the whole corpus. If you want to confuse, you conglomerate. If you want to illuminate, disaggregate. Every company says its people think like owners.

SPEAKER_01The problem it solves, PE comp works because there's a terminal event. Buy, build, sell, split the carry. Public markets have no terminal event, so they build a synthetic one every year. And here's the mechanism. Take Ibita times a valuation multiple, held deliberately constant, so the managers get neither a windfall nor a penalty from swings in sentiment. Subtract debt, divide by shares, intrinsic value per share.

SPEAKER_01That number has to grow past a hurdle before anything vests. It started at 20% a year, later eased towards 17.5. And it runs on a five-year cycle, then re-ups. Now, the half that makes it real. They deliberately underpay cash. Senior managers and unit presidents sit at roughly 25th to 35th percentile in cash below market on purpose. But over a four or five-year period, the equity takes a performer to two, three, or four times what a comparable job pays elsewhere.

SPEAKER_01And critically, the options vest on total company performance, not unit performance. The annual bonus is tied to the unit, but the bonus isn't big. The wealth is tied to the whole, which is what produce peer policing in the review room. Everyone's tied to the same kite. Look at who's on the plan at each unit. President, head of sales and marketing, head of operations, head of finance, and sometimes engineering.

SPEAKER_01That's it. The leadership team of what Nick Cowley explicitly calls a portfolio company. And his framing is you could clip the wire on most of them and sell them the next day. That's not a metaphor, that's the operating model. And since 1993, TransDime has acquired 95 businesses and product lines. And here's the number that should stop you. Across all of them, by Howley's own account, the loss ratio is zero.

SPEAKER_01No capital impairments, set that against the base rate. Half to three-quarters of corporate acquisitions destroy value. How? Two mechanisms operators can actually use. First, they run MA like a sales force, not a deal team. An operating executive runs it, not a banker. Someone who understands the value drivers well enough to decide fast whether they can squeeze the value out. And Howley tracked it like a sales pipeline.

SPEAKER_01How many contacts, how many letters, how many dinners, 95% acquisition with zero impairments, run as a top-of-the-funnel volume problem with an operator at the gate. And the second component is the underwriting, is standalone and honest. Every target is modeled as its own PE buy, no credit for strategic fit, a clear path to a 20% plus levered return, exit multiple equal to entry.

SPEAKER_01And no margin expansion is assumed unless they do something. Because there are only three things to do. The pricing question and diligence has three answers up, down, or the same. If it's down, don't buy it. If it's the same, they probably don't either. The benchmark is 10 times purchase multiple, has to become five times on run eight eBeta in within five years. And they usually get there in three. And then there's a balance sheet.

SPEAKER_01You can't discuss trans dime honestly without the leverage. The target range is five to seven times eBeta. They don't pay a regular dividend. They pay enormous debt-funded special dividends. $75 a share in 2024,$90 in 2025, each funded with billions in new debt. The stated rationale, straight from the press release, is admirably free of euphemism to deliver returns comparable to well-performing private equity funds while offering the liquidity of a public market.

SPEAKER_01That's the whole company in one sentence, a private equity fund that happens to trade on the New York Stock Exchange, and it has never pretended otherwise. I'd be doing you a disservice if I stopped here, because the same machine produced a second set of numbers, also verified, also primary, and it lands right back on the supply chain. In February 2019, the Department of Defense Inspector General reviewed 47 spare parts transdyme sold to defense agencies.

SPEAKER_01It treated profit above 15% as excess. On 46 of the 47, profits ran from 17% to 4,451%. $16.1 million of excess profits on parts that cost the department$26.2 million. And a second report in 2021 found at least$20.8 million more across 105 of a hundred and six part types.

SPEAKER_01An assistant Secretary of Defense called it before conference a disgraceful business model designed to exploit current statuses and regulations. And the IG made a finding above the model itself. TransDime seeks out and acquires sole source companies with a stable demand, and profit margins and prices rose immediately after an acquisition in nearly every instance, frequently over 25% a year, some over 200.

SPEAKER_01Read that finding again. It's Howley's acquisition screen, the one we built in segment two. In the government's own words, presented an indictment. The IG didn't undercover a scheme. Howley's defense under oath in full, because he's entitled to it, and it isn't stupid. Those parts are commercial items, and TransDime offered 25% discount to the commercial price across the audited basket.

SPEAKER_01His words, this is not gouging. It is simply not. He also noted the department often went more than five years before buying the same part, which, if true, says something real about the buyer's own supply chain management. And that's the uncomfortable point for the government. And it's a supply chain point, not a pricing one. If an F-16 is grounded and there's one certified source, cost data doesn't create a second source. It only changes the conversation.

SPEAKER_01Cost transparency is a negotiating tool. Vendor lock is an architecture. You can't negotiate your way out of an architecture. And this isn't my inference, it's the GAO's. In a September 2025 report, the GAO defines vendor lock-in as what happens when, for lack of technical data and rights, programs must rely on OEMs through sole source contracts. One example settles the whole argument from the buyer side, the FA18.

SPEAKER_01Maintainers spent over a decade trying to get the data rights for radio frequency cables. The program costed the alternatives, reverse engineer the part, or contract to stock spares, and determined both would be too costly. And the United States Navy ran the arithmetic on escaping a sole source cable and concluded, don't bother. And that is exactly Morningstar's PMA finding, restated by the customer.

SPEAKER_01The niche is behind the threshold of attack. Not a pricing failure, an inventory, and a data rights failure. 30 years upstream, paid for at the point of sale. So TransDime didn't create vendor lock, it bought it legally from sellers happy to take the check. The lock was manufactured in a contracting office decades earlier by someone optimizing the acquisition price of an airframe. So here's where I land. The three value drivers are morally neutral.

SPEAKER_01Cost down and profitable new business are unambiguously good. Pricing to value is neutral right up until the value you capture comes from a switching cost the customer can't escape and you didn't create. At that point, pricing to value and extracting a rent are the same arithmetic. And the operating system contains no term that distinguishes them. That's not a flaw in the machine. It's the machine working exactly as specified, which is why, if you run this playbook, you'd be better supply the missing term yourself, because your customers, your regulators, and eventually a legislator with a whiteboard will supply it for you.

SPEAKER_01The question that matters for anyone building an operating system, and check the tape, Howley stepped down as CEO in 2018. Kevin Stein ran it for seven years. Mike Lisman took over the 1st of October in 2025. And his path is the succession model in one line. From private equity to running a business unit to the head of M ⁇ A to CFO to operational oversight of units to co-COO to COO.

SPEAKER_01Not a career, a curriculum. And the results, fiscal 2025, revenue of 8.8 billion, up 11%, EBITDA margin of 53.9%, up 130 basis points, 54% on manufactured hardware, and 32 years after founding, and seven years after the founder left the chair, fiscal 2026 is tracking harder still.

SPEAKER_01Second quarter revenue is already up 18%, and guidance raised twice. But, and I promise both halves, the stock isn't celebrating. It's off its 2025 high and the market cap down year on year. Guided net income is roughly fat because of the interest on the debt they raise to pay those special dividends. That's exactly what a private equity fund looks like in a higher rate world. The operating machine is running as well as it ever has.

SPEAKER_01The financing machine costs more. So the market is repricing the second and not the first. All right, so what can we learn from TransDime and Nick Collie? I think there's five main things or five insights. The first one is find out where you actually sit on the board before you touch anything. Not your tier, your design authority. For every product line, do we own the approval that lets this part exist?

SPEAKER_01And is our niche small enough that nobody would spend the money to attack it? Those two answers are your pricing power. And most operators have never made that diagnosis. The second thing is price your customers' downtime, not your part. What does an hour cost them when your component fails? In aerospace, it has a name, aircraft on the ground. And Boeing will tell you it reaches$150,000 an hour. In a mine, a refinery, a data center, a packaging line, the same number exists and has never been written down.

SPEAKER_01Your price is anchored to your cost. Their loss is anchored to their revenue. The gap between those is yours. The third main thing, decide deliberately whether inventory is a cost or a weapon. If availability is what you're selling, stock is the product, not a working capital drag. Most operators get this backwards. A lean warehouse and a fat head office. TransDime does the opposite. And run the service level math honestly.

SPEAKER_01Know where you are on that exponential curve and know whether you're managing cycle, service level, or fill rate, because they are not the same number and confusing them is expensive. If you're on the buying side of a sole source supplier, and if you're in a portfolio company, you are, remember the FA18 cable? Your leverage is created years before the negotiation when you decide whether to buy the data rights, qualify as second source, or hold your own stock.

SPEAKER_01Do that work before you need it. The fourth main thing is count costs, the way TransDime did. Revenue minus Ebita. Refuse the fix versus variable conversion entirely. Not because the distinction is false, but because permitting it turns cost control from engineering into politics, and you'll lose that fight to the people who know the plan. Then set one target, offset inflation with savings every year. And the fifth thing is fix the compensation before anything else.

SPEAKER_01If your unit presidents earn market cash with a bonus tied to your own unit, you've hired managers and you'll get managers. Pay cash below market, make the equity large, tie it to your intrinsic value per share for the whole company, and put a real hurdle in front of the vesting. That's what turns your review meeting into a room full of partners asking each other hard questions. And you can't buy that culture with a poster. Nick Howley is 75, and he's still the chairman of the company he founded in 1993 with a partner who'd just been fired for trying to buy it.

SPEAKER_01Former employees have called this company the cancer of the industry and the Satan of aircraft parts. If that makes you uncomfortable, good. It should. But here's a takeaway, and it has nothing to do with how you feel about the man. He read the board correctly. The profit was in the annuity, not the sale. The certificate was the asset, not the casting. Availability was the product, not the part. And then he built an operating system three items long, finished it in 24 months, and never revised it.

SPEAKER_01A system that survived 9-11, the financial crisis, COVID, two congressional hearings, four owners, and the departure of its author at 54% margins on manufactured hardware. Most of us don't fail for a lack of strategy. We fail because we have 11 priorities, an elaminated card, and nobody in the plant can tell you what any of it means on a Tuesday. Howley had three price, cost, new business.

SPEAKER_01Everybody knew them, everybody was paid on them, everybody was presented against them every 90 days for 30 years. The machine wasn't clever, it was just never turned off. I'm Gotham Bassoo. This has been Operational Velocity. If this was useful, send it to people in your network that need to hear it. And take care.

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