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Operational Velocity

Operational Velocity artwork

Ep 23. Lagercrantz: From Solely Distributing to Owning the Product, Nordic Serial Acquirer

Nov 10, 202642 minAudio
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In March 2005, Lagercrantz earned an operating margin of 0.3%. Today it owns around 85 niche industrial companies, earns about 18%, and has set a new earnings-per-share record every year for more than fifteen years. This episode isn't about the deal count, it's about the operating transformation underneath it: how a distributor of other people's products became a group where four kronor in five come from products its own companies design and own. We cover: Why distribution economics nearly sank the young Lagercrantz, and what changes when you own the product instead The post-acquisition playbook CEO Jörgen Wigh calls "energy and structure": weekly order intake, three centralised functions, and growth pushed through the board Three subsidiaries up close: a Finnish maker of offshore helideck nets, a radon-measurement lab, and a Swedish sharpening-systems company that cracked the US market How Lagercrantz wins deals at four to eight times EBITDA when private equity pays more This episode is part of the Nordic Serial Acquirers series, which contain the related episodes below: Bergman & Beving: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/operational-velocity/id1896906148?i=1000798294775 Addtech: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/operational-velocity/id1896906148?i=1000799546079 Lifco: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/operational-velocity/id1896906148?i=1000792128368 Sources Lagercrantz Group, History: https://www.lagercrantz.com/about-us/history/ Lagercrantz Interim Report Q2 2026/27 (23 Oct 2026): https://www.lagercrantz.com/files/mfn/032d3804-2ff2-41fb-9744-2bfd11515488/interim-report-q2-202627.pdf Lagercrantz Year-end Report 2025/26: https://view.news.eu.nasdaq.com/view?id=b7a99eacab1804001d6f0d47d5e067f91&lang=en Lagercrantz Annual Report 2008/09 (five-year table): https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2009/06/30/127892/0/sv/files/113556/0/06302276.pdf Lagercrantz Interim Report 2013/14 Q1: https://www.globenewswire.com/de/news-release/2013/07/19/561147/0/en/Interim-Report-2013-14-Q1.html Landauer Nordic (Radonova), 2015: https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/09/30/772361/0/en/Lagercrantz-acquires-Landauer-Nordic.html Tormek, 2018: https://mb.cision.com/Main/995/2440757/783986.pdf Frictape Net, 2019 (IMAP): https://www.imap.com/en/news/2019/lagercrantz-frictape~n Email for Inquiries Operational Velocity is for education and general information only and is not investment, financial, legal, or tax advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The views expressed are the host's own, the company and figures discussed are drawn from public sources believed reliable but not guaranteed, and you should do your own research and consult a qualified professional before making any decision.

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00Great returns aren't luck. They're built on the floor. Operators and investors always pushing for more. From the deal sheets time to the systems in place. Speed without precision is just running a race. Operational velocity where execution sets the pace.

SPEAKER_01Hello and welcome to Operational Velocity, the show about how owners and operators actually create value. This is the next episode in our Nordic Serial Acquires series. And I just want to set the expectations up front. If you've heard our episode on Berving and Beving, you know where Lagercronz comes from. And if you also heard the episode on AdTech, then you've met its sibling. So I'm not going to retell that story.

SPEAKER_01The family tree gets exactly one sentence today. In 2001, Bergman and Beving split into three listed companies, and the electronics and IT distribution business became Lagercrons. Everything else about the inheritance, the founders, the philosophy, the split itself is in those two episodes. So I hope you enjoy this episode on Lagercron. Picture the helicopter deck of a production platform in the North Sea.

SPEAKER_01It's January, it's dark by mid-afternoon, and the wind is coming across the deck hard enough to lean on. A helicopter with a shift crew on board is about to put down on a slab of wet steel with a long drop to the sea on every side. There's two things that stand between that landing and a very bad day. The first is light, the illuminated circle and the letter H that the pilot aims for.

SPEAKER_01And the second is a net, a landing net stretched tight across the deck so the helicopter can't slide, and perimeter nets around the edge so that anyone who loses their footing doesn't go over the side. A remarkable share of those nets come from one small company. It's called Fricktape Net. Founded in 1977, headquartered in Finland, manufactured in Estonia from a tape material it developed itself.

SPEAKER_01When it was sold in 2019, all of its revenues came from exports, and its advisors on that sale put its share of net products in its main markets, above all the North Sea, at over 90%. And the revenue at the time was approximately 7 million euros. 7 million Euros, a product nobody outside the offshore industry ever thinks about.

SPEAKER_01And yet, when the chief executive of the Swedish group that bought Fricktape was asked recently to explain what his company looks for, this is the example he reached for. He didn't name it on air, but the company he described is this one. A net on a helideck, a market leader worldwide in something tiny and essential. That, he said, is what a niche looks like.

SPEAKER_01The group is called Lagerkranz, and it owns around 85 companies like that today. And it earns an operating margin of about 18%, and it has set a new record for earnings per share every year for more than 15 years. Twenty years ago, it was earning almost nothing at all. In this episode, I'm going to attempt to describe the thing that makes Lagerkrantz different from both Bergen and Beving and AdTech.

SPEAKER_01You see, Lagerkrantz came out of the split holding a hand that went bad almost immediately. And it fixed that hand not with one big bet and not with financial engineering, but by slowly changing what was inside the box. In 2001, Lagercranz mostly sold other people's products. Today, about four krona in every five comes from products it owns companies design and own.

SPEAKER_01Going from a distributor to a product company is one of the hardest transitions in industrial business. Lagerkranz did it while buying, these days, roughly a company a month and by its chief executive's account without ever raising new equity to pay for it. So today's questions are essentially operational. What actually changes when you stop distributing and start owning the product? And what does a group with a tiny head office do to a company in the weeks after it buys it?

SPEAKER_01And now that the machine is working, where is it showing strain? Let's get into this. Let's start with what Lagercranz was when it listed in September 2001. The company's own history describes it as mainly a distributor. Electronic components, IT products, cabling, and communication solutions. Think about the timing.

SPEAKER_01The telecom and IT boom had already broken. Every one of those categories was heading into a long downturn. Excessive stock sitting in the channel, prices sliding, manufacturers looking for ways to sell direct. And if you're a distributor in that world, you don't own the product and you don't own the price. Often you don't really own the customer either. What you own is the inventory and a sales force.

SPEAKER_01And when the cycle turns, the inventory loses value, and the sales force costs exactly what it cost last year. The company's official history calls what followed a couple of challenging initial years. That's a Swedish understatement. Here's what it looked like. In the financial year that ended in March 2005, Lagerkrantz had a revenue of about 1.5 billion krona and an operating profit of 4 million.

SPEAKER_01Not 400, but 4. So that's an operating margin of 0.3%. Now I'd like you to hold on to that number, 0.3%, because we'll come back to it later. Now the person who fixed it, Jürgen Vieg, grew up in a small rural community in central Sweden and studied at the Stockholm School of Economics. He spent about five years as an analyst, much of it valuing companies, and then a couple years at McKinsey.

SPEAKER_01And in 1998, he was recruited into Bergman and Bevy, where he worked closely with the group's leadership through the years that led up to the split. And then around the time Lagerkrantz was born, he left. And this is the part of the story I find most interesting because it never shows up in the financial tables. After he left, he co-founded a consultancy called Price Gain, which specialized in pricing and revenue management.

SPEAKER_01And for several years, his whole job was walking into companies and working out whether they were charging the right price for what they sold. Keep that in mind, pricing, the discipline of it, on both sides of the negotiating table, runs through everything that happens next. In 2006, Lagerkrantz bought him back as the chief executive officer, and he was about 40 years old. He said it was a hard call because by then he had his own business to run.

SPEAKER_01What pulled him back, as he tells it, was the professional challenge of a real turnaround and the chance to build the model himself instead of advising from the outside. That was 20 years ago, and he's still there.

SPEAKER_01Let's face it, words are cheap. What mattered was that they meant on the ground, and there were two moves. The first was organizational, and it was a return to the inheritance. Management by objectives, decisions pushed down, every company independent and accountable for its own numbers. We covered that philosophy in the Bergman and Beving episodes, so I'll leave it there. The second move is the one that defines Lagerkruns, and it's about capital allocation.

SPEAKER_01Vigd has described deliberately steering money away from electronic businesses with short product life cycles, where the ground moves under you every year, and toward companies with stable, long-lived products that throw off cash year after year, and increasingly towards one particular kind of company, the kind that owns its product. Let me make that difference concrete, because proprietary products sounds like a slide deck phrase, and it really isn't.

SPEAKER_01When you distribute, your gross margin is a negotiation with your supplier, and your supplier can take the line away from you. And when the market softens, your customer squeezes your price, and your supplier doesn't feel it. Your working capital is somebody else's product sitting on your shelf. And your differentiation is service. Things like stock availability, speed, and technical advice. That's valuable, but it can be copied, and most of the economics belong to whoever owns the brand.

SPEAKER_01When you own the product, you own the specification. You decide what gets designed in, which tolerances matter, how long you'll support it, and you own the priceless. You also own the installed base, and if you design it well, that install base pulls spare parts, accessories, and upgrades, perhaps for decades. And your customer switching cost goes up because changing supplier now means re-qualifying a component, not just changing a purchase order.

SPEAKER_01That's the economics. Here's the transformation in a single line of numbers. According to the company, in 2005, the share of revenue from proprietary products was close to zero. In the 2021-2022 financial year, it passed 70% for the first time. And the financial year that ended this March, it was 80. Last quarter, 81.

SPEAKER_01And the current plan says it's going to be at least 85. A portfolio doesn't go from 0 to 80% proprietary through product development. It gets there through what you buy and what you stop buying. Every acquisition for 20 years was a vote on that mix. And you can see it in the org chart too. In 2006, the group was cut into three divisions, electronics, mechatronics, and communications.

SPEAKER_01In 2012, a fourth was added, Niche Products, as a home for exactly the kind of small owned product companies the new strategy was buy. And the best way to see it is through one company. In 2006, the year Veg came back, Lagerkrantz bought a business called LPRE in Krampforce, a small industrial town in northern Sweden. LPRES makes electronic connection materials, the lugs and connectors that join heavy cables in power distribution and the tools that crimp them.

SPEAKER_01And here's the operating insight. LPRES doesn't really sell connectors, it sells a system. A connector and tool engineered together so the joint is right every time. And it backs the combination with a 10-year warranty. That's what owning the product lets you do. A distributor can sell you a connector. Only the designer can stand behind the joint. Under Lagerkrantz, El Press went from a strong Nordic player to an exporter.

SPEAKER_01About two-thirds of its sales now go outside of the Nordic countries, often won by its following by its Nordic customers into Europe, China, and the United States. And by 2022, it had become the largest company in the group. And when Lagerkrantz made what it describes as the largest single investment in its history, it wasn't an acquisition. It was a new surface treatment plant in Cromforce.

SPEAKER_01So let's sit with that for a second. A serial acquirer whose biggest ever check went into a plating line in a small town in Sweden. That tells you what kind of acquirer this is. The margins tell the same story, slowly. 0.3% in the year 2004-2005, and three and a half years after Veg arrived, seven years in, in the first quarter of 2013-2014, it was still under 9%.

SPEAKER_01And by 2016-2017, around 13%. And over the last 12 months, 18. And the division that's furthest down the road, niche products, where 93% of revenue is proprietary, ran at more than 23% last quarter. There's no single heroic year in that series. And that is what changing the mix looks like. A few points at a time, bought one company at a time for two decades.

SPEAKER_01So, what happens after Lagerkranz buys a company? Because this is where a decentralized model is either real or just a slogan. Their CEO has a three-word answer, and it's the best short description I've heard of what a decentralized owner is actually for. Lagerkrantz, he says, adds energy and structure. Let's take those in reverse. Structure first.

SPEAKER_01Most of the companies Lagercranz buys have been owned by one family for a long time, sometimes for generations. The people know their product and their customers better than anyone ever will. What they usually don't have is a modern follow-up rhythm. So Lagerkranz installs one and it's deliberately simple. Order intake every week, a simplified income statement and balance sheet every month, the full set every quarter, and cash flow watch far more closely than the company has ever watched it before.

SPEAKER_01And look at what that cadence is designed to do. Order intake is the leading indicator. Revenue lags orders, profit lags revenue, and cash lags profit. A weekly look at the orders gives a 50 or 100-person company in an early warning system it has never had. And if orders soften in week three, you slow hiring, trim a shift, or pull back purchasing before any of it shows up in the PL.

SPEAKER_01And if orders jump, you staff up before you start missing delivery dates. None of this is really that sophisticated. It's simply what most owner managers companies don't do, because nobody ever made them. And VEG is specific about where the first improvements tend to come from: inventory control and pricing, which are exactly the two levers you'd expect from a former pricing consultant.

SPEAKER_01And if you heard our John Little episode, you know why inventory is the first place to look. In a stable flow, the stock you carry is the throughput multiplied by how long things sit. Cut the time things sit, and the inventory and the cash tied up in it falls without anything else changing. And pricing shows up in the reports more often than you think. In the quarter just reported, the group flagged higher cost for some raw materials and for freight.

SPEAKER_01And the very next line is that the companies are working to offset that in their prices. In a group where most revenue is proprietary, that sentence is believable. In a distributor squeezed between supplier and customer, it's more of a hope. Now here's what the structure doesn't include. Lagerkranz centralizes three things banking, insurance, and audit. That's the list. Not HR, not IT, not purchasing.

SPEAKER_01If a subsidiary needs a new ERP system, it phones a sister company that's been through one and asks how it went. No shared services center, no integration office, no 100-day plan run out of Stockholm. The one ritual the center does insist on is a gathering. Once a year, all the managing directors come together, and the CEO describes that as the real knowledge sharing system.

SPEAKER_01The first time you're the new face. After two or three, you have friends across the group. You can phone about anything. It's an informal network instead of a formal program, and it costs almost nothing. And how lean is the center? The roughly 85 companies sit in five divisions, and each division is run by a team of about three people. Those three sit on the boards of 18 or 20 companies each.

SPEAKER_01They also run acquisitions in their part of the market. In the segment reporting, the line for the parent company and group item costs 37 million krona last financial year against more than 1.9 billion of operating profit. Less than 2% of EBITDA to run a group of nearly 4,000 people. And if you've heard our episode on Nucore, the steel company, you'll recognize the philosophy.

SPEAKER_01The head office isn't where the work happens, it's where the scorecard is kept. The price of that design is that you can't force anything through. The benefit is that you don't break what's already working. My favorite example is a company called Directronic, which LagerKranz bought in 2007. And notice it isn't a product company. It distributes network and data communications hardware.

SPEAKER_01What it has is a service standard that is almost comically specific. When a customer calls, an expert answers within three rings. That's the whole edge. A person who knows the product on the phone right now. A centralizing owner would have moved that phone line into a group contact center in a year two to save a little money and destroy the business in the process.

SPEAKER_01Lagerkrantz left it alone, and Directronics Managing Director credits exactly that the decentralized structure for letting the company grow without diluting what it does. Now, energy. Vik is candid that many of the companies he buys have been serving a home market, paying their owners a comfortable dividend, and not trying especially hard to grow. Energy is ambition: a new country, a new segment, an export push.

SPEAKER_01And the main instrument isn't a program from head office, it's the board. Every subsidiary has one. A division manager sits on it. Often the former owner stays on it. And when a company is missing something, export experience, e-commerce, digital marketing, Lagerkranz adds someone who has it to the board, not as a manager sent from Stockholm. And there is money behind the ambition. The group runs what is called a growth fund to back subsidiaries, moves into new markets.

SPEAKER_01El Press used it to step into several export markets. That's the energy part made concrete. A board that pushes and a budget line that says yes. Let's look at three short stories that will make this more concrete. The first is Radonova. After smoking, radon gas is the most common cause of lung cancer. And this company measures it.

SPEAKER_01Detectors for homes, apartment buildings, and workplaces analyzed in its own laboratory. It started life as a corporate orphan. And in 2015, Lagercranz bought it. A small Uppsala business being carved out of an American company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. And for several years, its revenue had sat at around 35 million krona. Profitable, stable, but it was going essentially flat.

SPEAKER_01Under Lagerkrantz, local management and the board wrote a growth plan. They added business control and digital skills to the team. They put robots into the laboratory. They built a digital sales platform for Northern and Central Europe. And then regulation moved their way. From 2018, the EU's radiation protection rules included for the first time requirements to act on radon.

SPEAKER_01And by 2022, revenue was approaching 100 million krona, close to triple. And Radonova has since become an acquirer in its own right, buying radon specialists in the UK and this August in Norway. The second is Tormec. Tormec makes sharpening systems, the water-cooled grinders that woodworkers and craftsmen use for chisels, carving tools, and knives.

SPEAKER_01A Swede developed this machine at the end of the 1960s because he couldn't find a decent way to sharpen his own tools. And in 2018, his heirs decided the company needed a new owner. It was turning over about 90 million krona and selling in some 40 countries. What Lagerkranz did is telling. It rebuilt the board. Lagerkrantz people, the former owners, and people with experience in e-commerce and consumer products, which nobody in an industrial group has naturally.

SPEAKER_01So Tormick moved hard into online sales and social media and put its products on Amazon in the US and Europe, and launched a kitchen knife sharpener for serious home cooks in 2022. And it expanded its production in Lindsberg in several stages to keep up. Both stories share a detail that's easy to miss. When Radonova and Tormec built out in the U.S., they didn't do it alone.

SPEAKER_01Lagerkranz has a cluster of subsidiaries in the Chicago area, and the newcomers co-located with them. An established base, local know-how, and people who already learned the market. That is about the closest thing Lagercranz has to a synergy program. And notice that it isn't a cost synergy at all. It's a market entry synergy. And it lowers the cost of this energy part.

SPEAKER_01The third story is the one we started with. When Lagercrans brought Frick tape in 2019, it was just over 70%. The sellers kept just under 30, stayed in the business, and the deal included put and call options that let Lagercrans acquire the rest after four years at the earliest. Fricktape also holds approvals from both of the big classification societies, ABS and DNV.

SPEAKER_01And by its own account, it is the only safety netting company that does. In a safety critical niche, certification is the moat. And the structure is the point. It's how you make sure the people who built the niche keep building it after the check clears. Which brings us to the check. This is where those years as a pricing consultant come back. Lagercranz is unusually open about what it pays, four to eight times EBITDA for companies earning EBIT margins of 15 to 20% or better.

SPEAKER_01Veg has argued that being transparent about the range is a feature, not a weakness, because the entire model depends on discipline. Let price run away from you and the flywheel stops turning. In a recent interview on the MA Science podcast, the show framed the competition as private equity turning up at 11 times. Vig's own description was more modest. A couple of turns more.

SPEAKER_01Either way, Lagerkranz doesn't follow. So how does it win at a lower price? Three ways, and all three are operational. First, it gets there early. Veg describes deal sourcing that looks a lot like a patient, old-fashioned selling. A database of companies he'd like to own, years of coffee, and a calendar of reasons to call.

SPEAKER_01Nordic company accounts are public. So when a target files a strong year, that's the reason. The best ones have taken 10. And when a broker finally runs a process, Lagercranz tries to agree exclusivity early, six weeks or two months, rather than going the distance in an auction. Second, it sells something private equity can't.

SPEAKER_01Certainty about what happens next. The name stays, the people stay, the factory stays where it is. And for a third-generation family owner, that has a value. And Lagerkranz is effectively asking the seller to put a price on it. The third, and this is the bit I'd steal for any lower middle market deal, the earnout is billed on hard numbers. Lagercranz agrees a level of earnings it believes is sustainable, applies its multiple to get the price, and then shares profit above that level with the seller for about three years.

SPEAKER_01It dislikes adjusted figures. If the seller's numbers were straight, the price doesn't move after the letter of intent. You can see the mechanics in its accounts. A fixed price, contingent consideration with a capped maximum, and options over any minority stake. At the end of September, unpaid contingent considerations on the balance sheet came to roughly 400 million kroner, mostly due within three years.

SPEAKER_01The funding is just as plain. Acquisitions are paid for from the cash the existing companies generate, topped up with debt, and by Vig's account with no equity raises in his whole tenure. The target arithmetic is simple too. Earning growth of 15% a year, which doubles profit about every five years. One-third organic, two-thirds acquired. Which means Lagerkranz has to buy something like 10% of itself every single year.

SPEAKER_01Today, that's 8 to 12 deals a year. And in the first six months of this financial year, it closed eight. And if you've heard our episode on Mark Leonard and Constellation, the contrast is useful. Constellation's discipline lives in the hurdle rates, a required return. Lagercranz lives in a multiple range and a working capital metric. Different instruments, same refusal. Neither will pay for a story.

SPEAKER_01Now, put that pace in context because the last five years explain why the machine is running as hard as it is. In the spring of 2021, Lagercranz published a plan built around one number. A billion kroner of pre-tax profit within five years, roughly double where it stood. Alongside it came a reorganization into the five divisions it has today, each with a clear focus area.

SPEAKER_01Electrify, Control, TechSec, Niche Products, and International, at a stated pace of five to eight acquisitions a year. It reached the billion in a little over two years. So in the autumn of 2023, it reset, double again to 2 billion within five years. About two-thirds of the growth come from acquisitions, a third organic, which the company itself says could mean up to 100 companies, and at least 85% proprietary, and a wider map, gradually more of the northern Europe, not just Nordics, and there's a Swedish idiom for raising your ambition.

SPEAKER_01Spana Bagen. I may have butchered that, but it stands for stretching the bow. And it's exactly how the company describes this step. The wider map is already visible. Look at the 13 companies Lagerkranz has bought since July 2025. Nine are Scandinavian, four are English, but those four English companies bring well over a half of the acquired revenue.

SPEAKER_01Electrify entered the UK this spring with a switchgear business, and control brought a British maker of sensors for harsh environments, mostly used in motorsport. And TechSec added two med tech companies in England, and the group that once had to escape a Swedish distribution business now earns about 75% of its revenue outside of Sweden. And the niches are as specific as ever.

SPEAKER_01In the last six months alone, a Danish maker of niche tools, a Norwegian radon business folded into Radanova, and a Swedish company that makes silencers for hunting firearms. Small, dull to everyone except their customers, and very hard to dislodge. So it works over the last 12 months, revenue of about 11.6 billion kroner, operating profit of about 2.1 billion, and earnings per share at yet another record.

SPEAKER_01But as we know, this show is practitioner to practitioner. So here's where I would push if I sat on that board. One, organic growth. The model says a third of the growth should come from existing companies, and for long stretches it hasn't. In the 2019-2020 financial year, organic growth was zero. In the spring of quarter of 2024, it was negative. And the latest quarter was a strong 12% carried by electrification, infrastructure, and defense and security, while the construction-like businesses stayed weak.

SPEAKER_01That's a pretty good result, but the real test of a decentralized model is whether 85 managing directors can grow in a flat market, not a hot one. The second thing is the canary metric. The group's measure on return on working capital, which is basically operating profit divided by inventory plus receivables minus payables, the number Lagerkrantz inherited and still runs on was 81% at the end of the last financial year.

SPEAKER_01Six months later, it's 72. Inventories on the balance sheet rose by nearly a fifth over those six months, partly from acquisitions and partly from growth. An operating cash flow for the half year was flat, even though profit after financial items rose by more than a fifth. When a business grows quickly, working capital eats the cash first. So the question is whether that weekly orders, monthly balance sheet discipline catches it subsidiary by subsidiary before it compounds.

SPEAKER_01Related to that, net debt has risen by about a billion krona in six months, mostly to pay for acquisitions. Interest cover is still around 10 times, so this isn't a warning light. But the self-funded flywheel is leaning a little harder on the bank than it used to. The third thing is that not every niche works. The control division took restructuring costs this quarter for underperforming units.

SPEAKER_01That's healthy honesty, but it's also a reminder that no exit horizon means you live with your mistakes permanently and you have to fix them in place. The fourth thing is the market has stopped paying extra for consistency. Lagerkrant's shares hit an all-time high of about 260 krona in May of 2026, and in late October, they were trading around 224. At the end of March 2025, they were about 206, which is roughly 40 times that year's earnings.

SPEAKER_01On trailing earnings today, it's nearly 35. So earnings per share are up by about a third over that stretch. The share price, not much. The management's response is to raise the bar again. A group EBITDA margin of 20% within two to three years, and a 2 billion krona of pre-tax profit under the five-year plan launched in 2023. Over the last 12 months, it made just under 1.7 billion.

SPEAKER_01So let's start to bring this home and pull it together. The four things that I'd take from Lagercrans into any kind of operational role is number one, the mix is the strategy. Lagercrans didn't out-execute its wave from 0.3% to 18%. It changed what it owned. And from other people's products to its own. One acquisition at a time, over 20 years.

SPEAKER_01The second thing is the structure is the cadence, not a department. Weekly orders, monthly simplified books, quarterly full books, and cash is watch closely. Three central functions. Everything else stays where the knowledge is. Number three, price discipline in an operating capability. The man who spent years helping companies price runs an inquire that refuses to overpay.

SPEAKER_01And the first lever it pulls inside a new company are pricing and inventory. And the fourth thing is energy is a board seat. Growth gets added through people who know what the company doesn't, exports, e-commerce, a new market, sitting at the board table, not through programs from the head office. And then there's our favorite question we keep coming back to on this show. With Mark Leonard, Ken Iverson, Tim Cook.

SPEAKER_01Does the operating system survive its architect? Jürgen Wieg was born in 1965, and he has run Lagerkranz for 20 years. His shares are worth roughly a half a billion kroner, and since 2019, he has also chaired Bergman and Beving, the company whose name started all of this. However, no successor has been named as of yet. But here's the case that Lagercrans may be the easiest version of that test we've looked at.

SPEAKER_01The system was designed so that almost nothing depends on the center. 85 managing directors run their own companies, and around 15 division people sit on their boards. Three functions are centralized, and if the model is what it claims to be, then Vig's real legacy isn't the 90-odd deals. It's the companies that don't need Stockholm very much at all. So, somewhere in the North Sea tonight, a helicopter will land on a net made in Estonia by a Finnish company whose founders kept a stake in what they sold.

SPEAKER_01Nobody at the head office will have touched it, and that's the whole point. That is Lyra Kranz. This is Gotham Bassoo, and this is Operational Velocity. If you like what you're hearing on this podcast series, then please make sure to subscribe. And if you find it useful, send it to one operator who gets something out of it.

SPEAKER_00Operational velocity where execution sets the pace.

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  1. Ep 24. Alligo: Selling What Runs Out, Nordic Serial Acquirer

    Nov 17, 202643 minAudio

    Every other company in the Bergman & Beving family bets on the entrepreneur operator. Alligo bet on the platform. It was formed by the 2020 merger of Swedol and Tools. It now runs one ERP, one logistics network and one...

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  2. Ep 22. Addtech: The Daughter Serial Acquirer who Outgrew it's Parent

    Nov 3, 202655 minAudio

    In 2001, Bergman & Beving split itself in three. One of its daughters, Addtech, listed eight days before 9/11 with fifty subsidiaries, a nine-person head office and a telecom crash already under way. Twenty-five years...

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  3. Ep 21: Bergman & Beving: Grandfather of Nordic Serial Acquirers

    Oct 27, 20261 hr 8 minAudio

    Meet the grandfather of Nordic serial acquirers, Bergman and Beving. Before Addtech, Lagercrantz, AddLife and Momentum Group, there was one Swedish technical trading house, founded in Norrköping in 1906 by two...

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  4. Ep 20. Brad Jacobs: XPO, Logistics Roll-Up, Build It, Run It, Break It Up

    Oct 20, 202648 minAudio

    In 2011, Brad Jacobs bought control of a $158 million Michigan-based logistics company at approx. $7 a share. Fifteen years later, that one share has become three NYSE companies: XPO, GXO and RXO. This episode tells the...

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  5. Ep 19. Couche-Tard & Circle K: 9,000 Chains of One

    Oct 13, 202643 minAudio

    On 31 July 2026, Alimentation Couche-Tard, the company behind Circle K agreed to buy Poland's Żabka: more than 13,000 stores and around US$8.6 billion in equity value, the largest deal in its history. Just six days...

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