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Operational Velocity

Operational Velocity artwork

Ep 21: Bergman & Beving: Grandfather of Nordic Serial Acquirers

Oct 27, 20261 hr 8 minAudio
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Meet the grandfather of Nordic serial acquirers, Bergman and Beving. Before Addtech, Lagercrantz, AddLife and Momentum Group, there was one Swedish technical trading house, founded in Norrköping in 1906 by two engineers, Arvid Bergman and Fritz Beving. In the spring of 1981, its CFO Anders Börjesson and his colleague Torsten Fardell wrote down a single ratio: operating profit over working capital (P/WC). Business units below a 45 percent threshold got no growth capital. Forty-five years later, that number still shapes how a family of six listed companies allocates capital. This episode opens our Nordic serial acquirers season. We cover: 120 years of history, from Karlsruhe classmates to Nasdaq Stockholm How the group is structured, with roughly ten people at head office The operating philosophy: P/WC, the three-tier Focus Model and the internal Business School Every spin-off: Addtech and Lagercrantz (2001), AddLife (2016), Momentum Group (2017), Alligo and the new Momentum Group (2022) The B&B TOOLS centralisation of 2007-2012, the 2008 stress test and the turnaround Bergman & Beving today, and whether an operating system survives its architect Sources 120 years of structural discipline: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years 1906 - Foundation: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/1906 1936 - Decentralisation formalised: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/1936 1976 - Public listing: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/1976 Late 1970s-1980s - Profit over working capital: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/late-1970s-1980s 1967-2000 - Structured acquisition: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/1967-2000 2001 - Structural separation: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/2001 2008 - Stress test: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/2008 2012-2017 - Return to core principles: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/2012-2017 2021-Present - Refinement: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/120-years/2021-present Financial Report 1 April 2025-31 March 2026: https://storage.mfn.se/d1da91c4-3082-48c5-ad2a-d5f0a59e076e/20260513-bergman-beving-bokslutskommunike-1-april-2025-31-mars-2026.pdf Interim Report 1 April-30 June 2026: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/press-releases/bergman-and-bevings-interim-report-1-april-30-june-2026 Affärsvärlden - Bergman & Beving: Rätt rustade: https://www.affarsvarlden.se/analys/bergman-beving-ratt-rustade Affärsvärlden - Bättre tider väntar: https://www.affarsvarlden.se/artikel/battre-tider-vantar-6702324 Affärsvärlden - Ny tillväxtfas hägrar i Bergman & Beving: https://www.affarsvarlden.se/analys/ny-tillvaxtfas-hagrar-i-bergman-beving Email for Inquiries Operational Velocity is for education and general information only and is not investment, financial, legal, or tax advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The views expressed are the host's own, the company and figures discussed are drawn from public sources believed reliable but not guaranteed, and you should do your own research and consult a qualified professional before making any decision.

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00Great returns aren't luck. They're built on the floor. Operators and investors always pushing for more from the deal sheets signed to the systems in place. Speed without precision is just running a race. Operational velocity where execution sets the pace.

SPEAKER_01Hello and welcome to Operational Velocity. Over the last couple of weeks, I received several requests on covering the Nordic serial acquisition model and some of the players within that space. So you ask and you shall receive. So here's the first of the series, which covers the granddaddy of them all, Bergman and Beving. Also, if you have other questions or requests, please put them in the email inquiries at the top of this episode.

SPEAKER_01And now on today's show. In the spring of 1981, two men at a Swedish trading company sat down with the problem that every operator listening to this at some point in their career. Inflation was high, interest rates were volatile, and capital was expensive. And their company, a 75-year-old importer of industrial equipment, was doing the thing that companies do in that environment.

SPEAKER_01It was growing and it was quietly tying up more and more money in inventory and invoices that customers had not paid yet. One of the two men was a chief finance officer, Anders Boriason. He had come in as an audit consultant to take the company public five years earlier, and he had stayed. The other was his colleague, Torsten Fardell. What they wrote down that spring was not a strategy. It was not a vision statement.

SPEAKER_01It was a ratio. Operating profit divided by working capital. And working capital meaning inventory plus receivables minus payables. The question it asks is brutally simple. For every krona this business has tied up in stock and in customer credit, how many or of profit comes back? And then they picked a number. 45%. Hit it and you earn the right to grow.

SPEAKER_01Miss it, and you do not get growth capital until you fix it. But why 45% and not 40 or 50? According to one Swedish financial columnist, the number goes back to a simple split. Roughly a third for the tax authority, a third for shareholders as dividends, and a third reinvested in the business. I cannot independently prove that this is how it was derived in 1981. What I can tell you is that 45 years after they wrote it down, the same 45% threshold is still printed in the annual report of the company where it was born and in the published targets of at least one of its descendants.

SPEAKER_01That company is Bergman and Beving. Most people outside of Sweden might have not heard of this company, but if you've heard of OddTech or Lagerkrantz or AdLife or the Momentum Group, or if you ever read an analyst's note explaining why Swedish serial acquires trade at the multiples they do, you've heard its echo. By the company's own calculation, a single Bergman and Beving share bought for 37 Kroner in 2001 is worth roughly 9,900 Kroner today across the six listed companies that share its DNA.

SPEAKER_01That is about 25% compound annual return for a quarter of a century from a group of businesses that sell screws, gloves, fall protection harnesses, pressure gauges, and mobile heaters. This is the prequel. In this episode of Operational Velocity, we'll cover the granddaddy of Nordic Serial Acquires. Because before Lifco, before Indotrade became a household name among quality investors, and before Decentralized Compounder became a category for investors, there was a technical trading house founded in 1906 in an industrial town on the Swedish East Coast.

SPEAKER_01Today we're going to do four things. First, the history, 120 years from two engineers who met at a university in Germany to a group that now trades on the NASDAQ Stockholm alongside five of its own offspring. Second, the structure, how the group is actually organized, who owns it, who controls it, and why the head office is a size of a small sales team.

SPEAKER_01Third, the operating philosophy, built around that ratio, profit over working capital, which the group abbreviates P slash WC. And fourth, the spin-offs, every one of them, including the one decade when the mother company forgot its own rules and what that cost. If you run a portfolio company or you're an operating partner or an investor or a searcher about to buy your first business, the single most useful thing you'll take from this hour is a way of measuring a business that every person in it can understand and every person in it can move.

SPEAKER_01So I want you to hold on to that and we'll come back to that later on in the episode. Maybe one housekeeping note. Every number in this episode has been checked against the company's own filings, annual reports, and stock exchange releases, or against the Swedish financial press and the Swedish Tax Agency. Where a figure is the company's own claim about itself, I will tell you. And where the sources disagree, I'll also try to tell you that. Let's begin with the history.

SPEAKER_01Let's start with Sweden at the turn of the 20th century. It's a country in the middle of a transformation from an agrarian society to an industrial one. Electrification is spreading, railways are expanding, and factories are pulling labor out of the countryside into the towns. What Sweden does not have yet in any depth is domestic production of advanced industrial equipment and instruments. The technology is on the continent, the demand is in Sweden, and in between there is a gap.

SPEAKER_01Into that gap walked two engineers, Arvid Bergmann and Fritz Beving. According to the company's own history, they met as classmate at the Technische Hausschule in Karlsruhe, in Southwest Germany, and later worked together at Brown, Bovy and C., the electrical engineering firm in Germany. They had seen the Industrial Revolution from the inside at the point where the machines were being designed.

SPEAKER_01And they recognized something about the Nordic market that is still true today. Foreign manufacturers had great products and no idea how to sell them in Scandinavia. So in 1906, they founded Bergman and Viggen in Norshiping. The business was that of a general agent representing foreign manufacturers, importing their technically advanced products, and selling them to Swedish industry.

SPEAKER_01Now, here is the first decision that matters, and it's a decision most training companies of that era did not make. Bergman and Veving chose to compete on competence rather than on volume. They hired qualified engineers as sales representatives, and they built an aftermarket service capability around what they sold. They did not try to be the cheapest box mover in Sweden. They tried to be the people who understood the equipment better than the customer did.

SPEAKER_01So if you work in distribution, you know the existential question. Why does a middleman deserve to exist? The answer has not changed since 1906. A distributor earns its margin only when it closes a knowledge gap the manufacturer cannot close cheaply on its own. One former insider described the Nordic version of this to the research firm in practice. Roughly 26 to 28 million people, several languages, manuals that need translating, customers who want answers in their own language, and for a manufacturer from the outside, setting all of that up is expensive and slow.

SPEAKER_01For a local engineer salesman, it is the job. And that gap is the moat. And it is a moat made of people, not assets, which is exactly why the capital light measurement we're about to get to fits this business so well. So if you fast forward 30 years, the 1930s are brutal for an import-dependent trader. Sweden is dealing with the aftershocks of the Great Depression and the collapse of Ivor Kruger's financial empire.

SPEAKER_01Protectionism is rising across Europe, and the trade flows Bergman and Beving depends on are being disrupted. Also, the founders are getting old. In 1936, they restructured their partnership into a limited company to ensure continuity. The first general meeting is held on the 9th of January, 1936, and the only two shareholders in the room are Bergman and Beving themselves.

SPEAKER_01What the company describes from that period is, I think, the most underrated organizational design moment in this entire story. By the mid-1930s, the product range had broadened considerably. So the two partners divided the work. Each of them became individually responsible for certain product groups and agencies. Meanwhile, the things that genuinely benefit from scale, the traveling engineers, stock management, and finance were run as shared resources.

SPEAKER_01Think about that, because it's the whole model in one sentence. Individual responsibility for the customer and the product, shared resources only where sharing actually creates value. And that's already in 1936. The company itself traces its decentralized philosophy to exactly this arrangement. And every one of the six listed companies we'll talk about today still runs a version of it.

SPEAKER_01After the Second World War, the company kept broadening its range, and in the 1960s, it began investing in electronics. There is one detail from this era worth flagging with a caveat. According to a history published by In Practice, after the war, Bergman and Beving signed on to sell the electronic measuring instruments of the Danish company Radiometer. And that relationship pushed it towards what we would call now value-added distribution.

SPEAKER_01And that's basically selling the product, but also providing technical service and training to the end user. I have only found that in one secondary source, so treat it as a color rather than gospel. But hold on to that name Radiometer because it comes back later in a way that will make any listener of our Danahar episode smile. Fast forward to 1967, and that's the year Bergman and Beving stops being only a trading house and starts becoming an owner of companies.

SPEAKER_01That year it acquires Johann Lagerkrantz, an electronics business. Lagerkrant's own history describes it as the group's first subsidiary and the first step into the technology field of electronics. And I want you to remember that name too, because 34 years later, it becomes a listed company in its own right. Then on the 15th of November 1976, Bergman and Beving lists on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.

SPEAKER_01The timing is not really that friendly because the Bretton Woods system had collapsed, oil prices have surged, and Sweden's traditionally heavy industries like shipbuilding and mining are in decline. And the krona is being devalued repeatedly. The same year, the company starts expanding abroad, establishing itself in Denmark, Finland, and Norway. By 1979, the group consists of 12 companies.

SPEAKER_01And the listing changes the conversation inside the building. A company that had been private for 70 years is now measured, compared, and judged in public every trading day. The company's own retrospective puts it well. The listing did not change the business model. It gave the existing decentralized culture a harder quantitative edge. And the person who supplies that edge is the audit consultant who helped with the IPO and then joined.

SPEAKER_01Anders Borriensen. So here we are back in the spring of 1981. Borjeson is the CFO. And a quick sourcing note: the company describes him as the CFO at the moment, while one Swedish press account describes Torsten Fardell as a deputy CEO. Titles aside, the two of them launched the tool, Profit over Working Capital, or P slash WC.

SPEAKER_01In Swedish, it's R slash RK. The company says the inspiration came from the asset-light approach of two very successful Swedish entrepreneurs, Ingvar Kamprad, who built IKEA, and Erling Pearson, who founded what became HM retailers. People whose fortunes were made by turning stock quickly and never letting capital go to sleep on a shelf.

SPEAKER_01Borison and Fardell took the retail instinct and applied it to industrial distribution. Let us define it properly. The numerator is operating profit. Today it is measured as IBITA, earnings before interest, tax and amortization of acquired intangibles. The denominator is working capital, inventory plus accounts receivable, minus accounts payable. And that is it.

SPEAKER_01No goodwill in the denominator. No fixed assets, just the capital that the people running the business touch every single day. And I want to slow down here because it's the most practical minute of the episode. P over WC decomposes into two things multiplied together. Margin, which is profit over sales, times working capital turnover, which is sales over working capital, so a business can earn its 45% two ways, by charging well or by turning its capital fast.

SPEAKER_01Let me give you two subsidiaries. Company A does 100 million kroner of sales at 12% EBITDA margin and carries working capital equal to 25% of sales. 12 divided by 25, P over WC of 48%. It clears a bar. Company B has a fatter margin, 15%, but it carries over 40% of sales and working capital because it stocks everything and lets customers pay late.

SPEAKER_01So do the math again. 15 divided by 40 is 37.5%. It does not clear the bar. The business with the higher margin is the worst business. Most PL driven management teams would get that ranking backwards. And here's why it works in a decentralized group. One Swedish columnist writing about the B and B sphere made the point that every employee can influence at least one of the six levers in this ratio.

SPEAKER_01In the numerator, how many units you sell, the price you sell them at, and your cost base. In the denominator, inventory receivables and payables, the warehouse manager owns a lever. The salesman who negotiates payment terms owns a lever. And the buyer owns a lever. Ulf Lilus, who we'll discuss as a CEO in this story, once summed it up for investors in roughly these words.

SPEAKER_01Buy low, sell high, keep stock low, pay suppliers late, and get paid by customers quickly. That is a metric a shop floor supervisor and a board director can argue about using the same numbers. And if you listen to our episode on John Little, you will recognize this as Little's Law wearing a suit. Inventory is just time made visible on the balance sheet. P over WC puts a price on that time.

SPEAKER_01So the 45% threshold was not decorative. According to the company, between 1979 and 1980, and 1983 and 84 financial years, it was the metric that was rolled out across the organization. P over WC went from 32% to 75%, and the operating margin went from 6.3% to 9.6%. Those are the company's own historical figures, so treat them accordingly.

SPEAKER_01But the direction is the point. They measured something new, and the business reorganized itself around it within four years. Then they built the rule that turns a metric into a capital allocation system. The company calls it the focus model, and it has three tiers. Units with P over WC above 45% or allocated capital for growth initiatives and acquisitions.

SPEAKER_01Units between 25 and 45% must first improve margins and capital efficiency before they get growth money. And units below 25% receive no growth capital at all. Their only job is to improve profitability. Think about what that does to the conversation between a group CEO and a subsidiary manager. The manager does not have to lobby for capital.

SPEAKER_01The manager does not have to write a beautiful strategy deck. The number decides which conversation you're allowed to have. If you're above 45, the question is, where do you want to grow? And if you're below 25, the question is, how will you fix the margin? The company says this is the tiered logic that was embedded into management incentives, investment decisions, and acquisition criteria. And that, the checklist Borison and Fardell built for evaluating business ideas, is still in use today.

SPEAKER_01So if you want to install this in a portfolio company, here is how I would do it in three steps. Step one, compute P over WC for every profit center you have. Use a rolling 12-month of Ibeta over average working capital. Average, not period end, because period end numbers are too easy to dress up. And do not argue about the definition for more than a week. The value is in consistency, not precision. The second step is to publish the ranking internally every month to every profit center leader.

SPEAKER_01And you'll be surprised at how much changes before you have changed a single incentive. The third step would be to tie growth capital, not just bonuses, to the tiers. And that is the step most companies skip, and it is the one that matters because it changes what managers ask for. A manager at 30% stops asking for. For a new warehouse and starts asking why receivables are sitting at 70 days. One warning: the ratio can be gamed by starving the business of inventory and frustrating customers.

SPEAKER_01That is why it has to sit next to a customer service measure and next to a human being at the head office who actually visits the business. There is a second investment from the 1980s that gets less attention and might matter just as much. The company says that close to 10% of its cost base during that decade went into employee development through an internal business school. The stated purpose was to turn engineers into business professionals.

SPEAKER_01Think about that ratio: 10% of the cost base. Most companies would call that a luxury. Bergman and Beving treated it as the price of running a decentralized group. If you're going to hand people a PL, a balance sheet, and a cash flow statement, and then leave them alone, you'd better teach them to read all three. By 1989, the group had grown to 60 companies. And Lagerkrantz's own history notes that at that size, the Greek needs a clearer structure.

SPEAKER_01More on that in a moment. One more character enters in this decade. During the 1980s, Tom Haederus, at the time he was a chief executive of Handelsbanken, joined Bergman and Begin board, and he later became the chairman. A sourcing note Swedish sources disagree on the year he took the chair. One says 1982, another says 1993. So I'm not giving you an exact date.

SPEAKER_01What is not in dispute is that Hedelus and Borison became the defining pair in this story, a partnership that lasted for decades and that still shapes the ownership of the whole family of the companies today. Starting in the late 1960s and running for roughly three decades, Bergman and Beving executed a systematic acquisition program. The company says it bought more than 200 niche companies over that period across industrial tools, electronic components, technical instruments, and medical technology.

SPEAKER_01The principles, as the company describes them, were consistent. Preserve operational autonomy, centralize capital discipline, avoid forced integration, measure returns against working capital. So, in other words, buy a good small company, leave its name on the door, leave its manager in the chair, and hold that manager accountable to one number. The company itself goes as far as to say this model is widely regarded as the origin of the Nordic serial acquire model.

SPEAKER_01That is the company's claim, and I would note that Sweden has other serious contenders in this lineage. But it is hard to find an older, cleaner, and a better documented version of the playbook than this one. Let me give you the structure as it looked by the 1990s, because the request I get most often from listeners is how is one of these things actually organized? At the top, a lean parent company that owns the subsidiaries allocates capital, runs acquisitions, and sets the metric and runs the business school.

SPEAKER_01Underneath, business areas which group subsidiaries by market or technology. And in the 1990s, for example, the electronics-oriented companies were coordinated in two business areas called electronics and lagercrons. And then at the bottom, where all the actual customer contact happens, the operating subsidiaries, each with its own brand, its own managing director, and its own PL, and its working capital to manage.

SPEAKER_01The landmark deal of this era was in 1994, when Bergen and Beving acquired Engross, AB Faro. And according to the company, that single deal doubled group revenues to over 6 billion krona and lifted profit by 86%. It also bought in two brands, Luna and ESV, that are still part of Bergman and Vebing today. Luna in Tools and Machines and SVE in fastening technology.

SPEAKER_01If you have ever built anything in Sweden, you probably held an SVIX group. And the results of all of this, by 1996, the company says earnings per share had risen by almost 20% a year since the 1976 IPO. And under Anders Boringsson as CEO, by the company's own account, Bergen and Beving delivered a total shareholder return of about 25% a year from 1979 to 2001.

SPEAKER_01Boringsson, who had arrived as audit consultant on the IPO, became, according to the Swedish press, the company's first external CEO. Now, the ownership, because this is a structure too. In the early 2000s, Haiderless and Boringsson bought in the company together, acquiring a block of high vote A shares. Swedish dual-class shares, and for listeners outside the Nordics, give A shares many times the voting power of B shares, which is how a small number of long-term owners can anchor a listed company for decades.

SPEAKER_01A 2017 Swedish press report described the pair as principal owners in a whole series of mid-size listed companies. Adtec, Bering and Beving, Lagerkrantz, and AdLife. When Tom Haederlis stepped off AdTech's board at that year's general meeting after what he was described as 35 years in the service of the Bering and Beving companies, Borienson joked from that chair that in all those years they never had a conflict, even though Haederless had been, quote, a little more conservative.

SPEAKER_01His son Henrik took his board seat. Notice what is missing from this model. The 100-day integration plan. In a typical private equity add-on, the acquirer arrives with a list. Move the ERP, consolidate purchasing, merge the sales team, rebrand, so on and so forth. In the Bergman and Beving model, the acquirer arrives with a metric and a calendar of reviews, and the integration plan is close to empty on purpose.

SPEAKER_01The name stays, the managing director stays, the customer relationship stays. What changes is that the business now reports one number upward, gets compared with dozens of sister companies on that number, and gets access to a business school, peers, and capital if it earns it. That is a very different promise to make a founder who is selling. And as we'll hear later from a Finnish business owner, it is often the promise that wins the deal.

SPEAKER_01Decentralized operations, a hurdle rate that does not bend, and capital that flows to the business that earns it. Consolation Software is famous for its hurdle rate discipline. Bergman and Beving had a written hurdle and a system for rationing growth capital against it in 1981. The difference is the unit of measure. Leonard thinks in return on invested capital, including what you paid for the business, whereas Bergman's Beving's P over WC deliberately leaves the purchase price out because it is designed to judge the operator, not the deal maker.

SPEAKER_01The deal making discipline has to live somewhere else, in the head office, in the acquisition criteria. I want you to keep that distinction in mind. It is a reason a group can have excellent P over WC in its subsidiaries and still destroy value by overpaying for them. By the turn of the millennium, Bergman and Beving had become big. The company describes it at that point as roughly 200 companies, around 3,000 employees, and a revenue of around 9 billion kroner.

SPEAKER_01A sourcing note, I would treat that employee figure with some caution. It looks slow for a group of that revenue and that many companies, but the revenue and the company count are the important part. And breath had become a problem. Industrial tools, electronic components, technical instruments, and medical technology all one listed wrapper. The capital market did what capital markets do with a conglomerate, it cannot easily understand.

SPEAKER_01It plied a holding discount. The IT bubble had also sharpened investor appetite for focus and transparency. So the board asked a question that very few boards ever seriously ask. Are these businesses worth more apart than together? And the answer was yes. In 2001, Bergman and Beving was divided into three independently listed companies.

SPEAKER_01The technology trading operations became AdTech, the electronics and communications operations, the old electronics and Lagerkrantz business areas became the Lagerkrantz Group. And the remaining industrial and construction rated operations stayed with the parent under the Bergman and Beving name. The mechanics were simple. For every share you held in Bergman and Beving, you received one share in Adtech and one share in Lagerkrantz of the same share class.

SPEAKER_01AdTech's new listing date, according to the Swedish Tax Agency, was a third of September 2001, and Lagerkrantz describes its own separation as September 2001, too. And here's the detail that I love because it tells you what the market thought at the time. When a Swedish company does a spin-off like this, the tax agency published how shareholders should split their original acquisition cost between the old and the new shares.

SPEAKER_01And that split generally reflects relative market values around the separation. For the 2001 split, the allocation was 38% Bergman and Beving, 35% AdTech, 27% Lagerkranz. In other words, the market valued the two children at almost two-thirds of the original, and the parent that kept the old name at barely more than a third. The leadership choices were deliberate too.

SPEAKER_01On the 22nd of August 2001, Stefan Wiegren, the deputy CEO, took over as CEO of Bourbon and Beving, replacing Anders Borison. Boringson became the chairman of both AdTech and Lagerkrons, with Tom Hedelius as the vice chairman of both. And on the parents board, the roles reverse. Hedelius as chairman, and Borison as vice chairman.

SPEAKER_01Adtec's first CEO was Roger Burquist, and Lagerkrant's first CEO was Jan Fries, who had previously run the electronics business inside Bergman and Bevin. The company's retrospective described the logic in a way I think every operating partner should write on a whiteboard. Rather than pursuing for synergies, leadership chose to unlock value through separation.

SPEAKER_01Each entity received its own board, its own management, and its own listing. And the shared heritage, decentralization, P over WC discipline, long-term ownership was carried forward independently by each one. And with hindsight, the company calls the separation one of the most value-creating decisions in its history. And that is where the 37 kroner wrote roughly 9,900 kroner figure comes from.

SPEAKER_01That is a company's own calculation across all six descendant companies. So treat it as a claim rather than an audited number. But the broad shape is not controversial in the Swedish market commentary. As one Swedish investor site put it, most of the spin-offs have beaten the index. And it is above all Lagerkrantz and Adtech that have delivered fantastic returns.

SPEAKER_01So the question comes up: when should a group split? And here's my practitioner's test. And it is not one investment bankers use. Investment bankers ask whether the sum of the part is worth more than the whole. Operators should ask a different question. Can the head office still hold enough context about each business to allocate capital to it intelligently? And can each managing director still see a direct line from their own decisions to the number they are judged on?

SPEAKER_01When the answer to either of those becomes no, complexity is diluting accountability. And in a decentralized group, diluted accountability is the only thing that really kills you. A spin-off is not a retreat. It is capital allocation in its most powerful form. That is not my line, by the way. It is almost word for word how Bergman and Beving describe divestments today.

SPEAKER_01Now, the part of the story the company itself does not hide and then makes it far more useful than a victory lab. After 2001, the two children, AdTech and Lagercronz, kept running the decentralized playbook. The parent did something else. It chose consolidation. In 2007, it renamed itself BNB Tools. Perhaps a quick sourcing note. Some data providers list the rename as 2001, but the company's own history says 2007 and refers to 10 years under the tools name before reclaiming the original name in 2017.

SPEAKER_01So I'm going with the company. The strategy behind the new name was to build a unified distribution platform under the tools brand. The ambition, in the company's own words, was to consolidate more than 100 previously acquired companies into one organization with shared IT, shared logistics, and a shared product range. And for a few years, it looked like it was working.

SPEAKER_01The company's 2013-2014 annual report notes that the group grew strongly from 2005 to 2008. Offerswerding, the Swedish Business Weekly, later wrote that BNB Tools took an active role in consolidating its market, completed around 100 acquisitions, and grew revenue from roughly 4 billion to 9 billion kroner in a few years. And the same Business Weekly wrote the sentence that serves as the epithet for the whole strategy.

SPEAKER_01The company grew too much and too fast, and it was punished for it when the financial crisis hit. One Swedish columnist summarized the centralization logic this way. In the spreadsheet, it looked like BNB Tools could extract attractive synergies by integrating product companies, wholesalers, and retailers. In reality, it was considerably harder. And I would bet that anybody listening to this has seen that spreadsheet.

SPEAKER_01I've certainly seen it. And the Synergy tab always looks fantastic. Here's what the company says actually happened when 2008 arrived. Reduced agility, elevated leverage, unclear accountability, and profits fell sharply. The ballot sheet was strained, and working capital as a share of the revenue increased markedly, which and when a group built on P over WC is the equivalent of a cardiologist ignoring his own blood pressure.

SPEAKER_01Meanwhile, according to the company, AdTech and LagerCrons, which had stayed with the decentralized model, proved significantly more resilient through the same period. Recovery was slow, and to give you one data point, in the first half of the 2012-2013 financial year, BNB Tools reported an operating profit of 93 million kroner against 202 million in that same period a year earlier.

SPEAKER_01Now the correction. And then on the 1st of November 2012, a new CEO took over, Oof Lilios. The board's announcement had Lilius had run tools momentum since 2010, and that momentum had been the group's most profitable business for many years.

SPEAKER_01Notice what the board did here. Faced with a group that had drifted away from its own metric, it promoted the leader of the unit with the best numbers. That is the focus model applied to people. Lilius, according to the Swedish press coverage at the time, flattened the organization, increased customer focus, and pushed the sales mix toward more profitable areas, reduced debt, and decentralized.

SPEAKER_01The company's retrospective adds the details. Annual cost cut by roughly 100 million kroner, properties divested, capital freed up, and decision-making authority returned to the individual business units. P over WC was reinstated as the primary performance metric and the focus model reintroduced. By 2016, the operating margin was at its highest level since 2007-2008, and P over WC had recovered to 27%, still well below the 45%, but moving the right way.

SPEAKER_01Then the structural fix. In June 2017, the reseller operations built around Tools Store Chain were spun off as a separate listed company called the Momentum Group. Its first day of trading on NASDAQ Stockholm was 21st of June 2017. Shareholders received one momentum share for each BNB Tool's share, and the tax agency split the acquisition cost 67% to the parent and 33% to Momentum.

SPEAKER_01The product companies, the brands like Luna, SV, and 10 Tools stayed with the parent. And the parent reclaimed the name Bergman and Beving. But the family tree did not stop branching there. The Momentum Group that listed in 2017 went on to bid for the Swedish workware and tools retailer Swedo in 2019 and absorbed it.

SPEAKER_01In 2020, the investment company NordCernon made a mandatory offer for momentum at 120 kroner a share. And in December of 2021, that company renamed itself Aligo. And in March 2022, It distributed its component and service business to shareholders as a new, separately listed company, which took the Momentum Group name. The first day of trading, the 31st of March 2022, the CEO of Momentum Group, Ulf Lilus, and its chairman, Johann So, a former CEO of AdTech.

SPEAKER_01This gives us something close to a natural experiment with an important caveat. If you look at the two companies that came out of that 2017 spin-off, Aligo is the integrated reseller. It sells workware, protective equipment, tools, and supplies mainly through the Swedol brand in Sweden and the Tools brand in Norway and Finland, through stores, field sales, and digital channels. In the second quarter of 2026, its adjusted EBITDA margin was 7.2%, up from 5.8% a year earlier.

SPEAKER_01The Momentum Group runs a decentralized collection of industrial component and service companies. And in that same quarter, its EBITDA margin was 12.8%, and its return on working capital was 59% against a target of at least 45%. Now, here's the caveat, and it's a big one. These are different businesses. A store-based reseller should not expect to earn the margins of a niche component specialist, whatever its organization chart looks like.

SPEAKER_01So I am not claiming structure explains the whole gap, but what I am saying is that the pattern is consistent with the lesson the parent paid for between 2007 and 2012. Integration can be worth doing, but only if, after the integration, somebody can still look at the number and know it's theirs. After the 2017 split, Pontus Bowman led the slim down Bergman and Beving through its first phase as a pure product company group.

SPEAKER_01And then in February 2021, the board announced a change. From the 1st of May 2021, the new CEO would be Magnus Soterland, who came from Lagerkranz, where his most recent role was executive vice president, acquiring and developing the group's niche technology companies. A small sourcing note: the press release says that he spent 13 years at Lagerkranz while the company's current history says 14 years as deputy CEO. Either way, more than a decade inside the most consistently decentralized of the siblings.

SPEAKER_01And here's a detail that makes this story feel like a family saga. The chairman of Bergen and Beving at the time was Jorgen Wieg, whose day job was CEO of Lagerkrons. Averswarden pointed out the office. He knew better than perhaps anyone what Soderlin was capable of. The child that was spun out in 2001 had sent its playbook and its people back to the parent. What Soderland changed, according to the company, was a shift in objective, from revenue growth as the primary goal to profit growth and profitability, with the delivery phasing out of low-margin, high-volume business.

SPEAKER_01The business school was relaunched, incentive systems redesigned, and the group built what's called the B Toolbox, a set of practical methods to help subsidiaries accelerate change. The company says that since 2021, the Ibita margin has gone from about 5% to nearly 10, and the gross margin from 41 to 47%. And that propriety products now make up almost 75% of sales.

SPEAKER_01It has completed more than 25 acquisitions since 2021, including an expansion into the UK. Now the latest hard numbers. For the financial year that ended on the 31st of March 2026, Bergman and Beving reported revenue of approximately 4.97 billion krona, flat on the prior year, and adjusted EBITDA rose 11% to$537 million.

SPEAKER_01An adjusted EBITDA margin of 10.8% and P over WC reached 36%. And the company reported its 25th consecutive quarter of improved earnings. In the first quarter of the new financial year, April to June 2026, revenue was approximately 1.32 billion, Ibita rose 9% to$142 million, and the margin was 10.7%.

SPEAKER_01And the streak then continued to reach 26 consecutive quarters. The CEO also called the machinery and equipment division a disappointment in that quarter. And now the honest part. Since 2021, the company had an interim target it calls 51045. And this basically means 500 million krona in e-bit, a margin above 10%, and P over WC of 45%.

SPEAKER_01The outcome for 2025-2026, as reported by the company, was 418 million, 8.4%, and 36%. So therefore, all three were missed. Note that the target is defined on EBIT after amortization, which is why it reads lower than the EBITDA figures. And note what that means. The mother of all these companies still does not clear its own 45% hurdle. Its children do.

SPEAKER_01Adtech reported P over WC of 81% for the same financial year, and momentum is at 59%. So the company that invented the bar is still climbing toward it. Let me tell you a little bit about the structure today because it answers the structure question better than any org chart. Bergman and Beving is organized now into four divisions: Core Solutions, Safety Technology, Machinery and Equipment, and PPE and utilities.

SPEAKER_01Across them, more than 35 independent companies, roughly 1,300 employees in total, and according to the company, 10 people at the head office. Just 10. And if you listen to our NuCor episode, you'll remember that Nucor running a steel company with a head office about 22 people. So here is a 5 billion kroner industrial group doing it with 10. So what do these 10 people do?

SPEAKER_01Well, they allocate capital, run acquisitions, set and police the metric, run the business school, and the internal benchmarking, and maintain the toolbox. Everything else, the customers, the pricing, the inventory, the hiring, and the product roadmap belongs to the subsidiary. The company describes a deal with its managers as significant operational latitude, with responsibility for profit, balance sheet, and cash flow.

SPEAKER_01The acquisition machine has been codified. According to the company, it evaluates about 30 potential candidates a year and does in-depth reviews on 8 to 10 and completes roughly six. About one in five reviewed. Target companies must show sustainable EBITA margins above 15% and P over WC above 45%, and leading positions in niche markets and resilience across economic cycles.

SPEAKER_01A prominent Swedish business journal noted that the companies BB buys typically have a revenue in the region of 50 million krona, and these are small businesses, founder-owned often. Which brings me to a story that I think every serial acquirer or searcher listening should hear. In Finland, Bergman and Beving own Polar Therm, a maker of mobile heating equipment for demanding and often mission critical use. Aircraft heating, which the company has built since the 1980s, ground support and tent heaters supplied after competitive tenders to the U.S.

SPEAKER_01Air Force and later the Canadian Armed Forces, much of it built under customers' own brands. In an interview on Bergman Beving's website, Polar Therm CEO Passi Antila explains that the company did not come to BB with an operational problem. It came with an ownership problem. Its traditional structure, where the company bought back shares when a shareholder retired, was no longer sustainable. They needed a long-term owner who would let them keep working in the same spirit, the same people, in the same place.

SPEAKER_01Antila's own summary of life afterwards, and what surprised him most was how little the day-to-day works changed. And this is for our ETA community specifically. That is a succession problem described from the seller's side in a Finnish industrial niche. It is the exact problem that ETA acquires, exists to solve. And this is who you're competing with. Not only private equity, but a 120-year-old Swedish group with a 10-person head office, permanent capital, a reputation for leaving companies alone, and a two-sentence pitch.

SPEAKER_01We will not sell you on, and on your Monday will look like your Friday. So if you're a searcher that's operating in the Nordics, this is your real competitive set. And the answer cannot be price. It has to be what you personally bring to the business that a 10-person head office in Stockholm cannot. Two more details on discipline. First, the company says that during the zero interest rate period, it refrained from making acquisitions in Scandinavia because prices had been driven up.

SPEAKER_01Soderlin's own framing from the company's anniversary material as that many wanted to replicate the model when interest rates were near zero, and his quote, the processes were not in place. Second, when a business does not meet the threshold, the group acts. It sold the Nordic operations of Skida, a protective equipment business, to Ozel. The same Swedish business magazine reported that the divested operations had a revenue of 375 million krona.

SPEAKER_01Solerin's summary of the whole philosophy fits on a sticky note. Quote, P over WC was defined decades ago and we still use it. And now the market. Bergen and Beving B shares closed at around 258 krona on Friday, the 16th of October, 2026, down from the lows of 320 in May May. And that puts the market value at roughly 7 billion krona.

SPEAKER_01The Norwegian broker SB1 Markets has started coverage with a buy rating, noting that the shares traded at about 16 times expected 2026 EV to EBITA, a discount of more than 20% to Nordic acquisition-driven peers, and arguing that the discount would get harder to justify as organic growth turned up. Berenberg, after the first quarter report, trimmed its price target slightly, but kept it a bye.

SPEAKER_01And the next quarterly report is due shortly, so check the latest numbers before you act on anything. And as always on the show, this is not investment advice, it's an operation story. Now, let me walk you through the family tree with the latest numbers for each branch. Adtech, which was spun out in 2001, today describes itself as a technical solutions group with about 4,500 employees and more than 150 subsidiaries operating under their own brands.

SPEAKER_01For the fiscal year, March 2026, net sales were 227.7 billion kroner, and eBITA was 3.64 billion, up 12%. And the famous ratio, P over WC, was 81%. It completed nine acquisitions in the year, adding about 1.6 billion kroner of annual sales. And CEO Nicholas Stenberg, the group is organized into six business areas: automation, electrification, energy, industry, process, and safety.

SPEAKER_01And each one is in turn a portfolio of small companies, which tells you how far the parents' 1936 idea has been fractionalized. Lagerkranz, the descendant of the first 1967 acquisition, spun out in 2001. For the financial year March 2026, revenue rose 13% to 10.6 billion kroner, EBITDA rose 17% to 1.92 billion, and the EBITDA margin was 18.1%, with a stated ambition of reaching 20% within two to three years, according to their CEO.

SPEAKER_01AdLife, a grandchild, AdTech built up a life science business area, made it big enough to stand alone by acquiring Mediplast in 2015. It then distributed to its own shareholders in March 2016, and one AdLife share for every four AdTech shares, first day of trading on the 16th of March 2016. Today, AdLife has about 2,300 employees in around 85 operating subsidiaries.

SPEAKER_01EBITA for the calendar year 2025 was approximately 1.42 billion krona, and in the second quarter of 2026, EBITA rose 11% with a 12.6% margin, according to their CEO. The Mementum Group, the 2022 spin out from OLIGO, which was itself the 2017 spin-out from Bergman and Beving, industrial components and services, return on working capital of 59%, and six acquisitions in the first half of 2026, according to their CEO.

SPEAKER_01A new CEO, Samuel Altburg, since the 1st of June 2026, and clearly improving margin from a low base. And then you have Bergman and Bebing itself, the parent, 120 years old this year and 50 years listed. Put them together, and by the company's own count, the combined market value of the six companies exceeds 180 billion krona.

SPEAKER_01The parent is about 7 billion of that, which tells you something remarkable. The company that started all of this is now a small fraction of its own family's value. The company also says that 11 active CEOs of listed companies have been shaped inside the BNB sphere, which has earned its nickname in Sweden, the CEO factory of the stock exchange. And you can see the factory in the boardrooms.

SPEAKER_01Lagerkron's CEO chairs Bergman and Beving, AdTech CEO has sat on Bergman-Beving's board. A former AdTech CEO chairs Momentum, and Momentum CEO used to run Bergman and Beving. And Bergman-Beving's CEO came for Lagerkron's. And as of the 2024 annual general meeting, the Boringson and Hedelius families were still represented. Boringson chairing Bergman and Beving's nomination committee on the behalf of the Thyssenholt group and both Frederick Boringson and Henrik Hedelius on the board.

SPEAKER_01And this is the part of the model most outsiders missed, and it is the part that is hardest to copy. The metric is public. You can write P over WC on a whiteboard tomorrow. But what you cannot copy tomorrow is 45 years of people who learn to run the business under that metric and who now run the boards of each other's companies, and who share a common language for what good looks like. The ratio is the operating system, and the people are the network it runs on.

SPEAKER_01And now a few comparisons to the rest of our backcod at operational velocity, because this season is going to be coming back to them. If you listen to our Rails Brothers episode on Danahar, Danahar is the opposite pole of the same idea. Danahar centralizes its method in what's called the Danahar business system. Kaizen standard work taught from the center and pushed out to every operating company. Bergman and Beving centralizes the measure and leaves the method to the local manager.

SPEAKER_01Both work, and they work for different kinds of businesses. And here's the loop I promised you earlier. Radiometer, the Danish instrument maker, whose products Bergman and Beving reportedly sold after the war, was acquired by Denar in 2004. The two models we kept contrasting on the show have both had their hands on the same Danish instrument company. Also, if you look at, for example, Mark Leonard and Constellation Software, which we covered, decentralized plus an unbending hurdle rate, new core, a tiny head office and pay tied to what local teams control, and LIFCO, which comes from a different Swedish lineage entirely, makes a useful contrast as this season goes on.

SPEAKER_01The common thread through all of them is the same uncomfortable idea for head office people. The center's job is to allocate capital and protect the standard, not to run the business. So let me try to pull this together into five principles that you might be able to take something from. Number one, measure profit against the capital it consumes, not against revenue. Revenue is basically vanity. A margin without a denominator is half the story.

SPEAKER_01Profit over working capital is a number that every person in the business can move and every person can understand. Number two, ration growth capital by return tier, not by the quality of the pitch. Above 45, grow. Between 25 and 45, fix first. Below 25, profitability only. The number decides which conversation you are allowed to have. Number three, decentralize the operations.

SPEAKER_01Centralize capital allocation in the standard. Bergman and Beving runs a 5 billion krona group with 10 people at the head office. And the 1936 version of that design, individual responsibility with shared resources, only where sharing creates value still holds. Number four, treat separation as capital allocation. When complexity dilutes accountability, split. The 2001 split and the spin-offs that followed created more value than any single acquisition in this story.

SPEAKER_01And last but not least, number five, hold the threshold symmetrically through the cycle. The company says its return thresholds have not been relaxed once since 1976. And that claim is about the bar itself. The parents' own performance fell well short of it for years, but the bar did not move. And that is precisely why it is possible to see the drift and correct it. And now the question we keep asking on this show.

SPEAKER_01In the Mark Leonard episode, Tim Cook, and the Ken Iverson New Corps, we ask: Does the operating system survive its architect? In Bergman and Beving, it gives the most interesting answer we've found so far. Anders Borenson stepped down as CEO in 2001, and the system survived. In fact, it multiplied. It was copied into ad tech and Lagocronz, and then into AdLife, and then into Momentum. And each copy kept the ratio, kept the threshold, and kept the small head office.

SPEAKER_01But here's the uncomfortable part. The one place where the system nearly died was in the parent company itself. And it happened on the watch of a board that included both of its architects. In 2012, when the correction finally came, Tom Hedelius was still in the chairman, and Anders Boringson was still a director. The architects were in the room, and the drift happened anyway. So I think the answer is this. An operating system does not survive because its architect stays close.

SPEAKER_01It survives because it is written down as a number simple enough that when the company drifts, anyone can look at the number and see it. The number does not care who is in the chair. In 2012, it told the board exactly what had gone wrong and exactly which leader in the group knew how to fix it. 45% written down in the spring of 1981, still in the annual report in 2026.

SPEAKER_01This is the prequel to every Nordic serial acquirer you will hear about in subsequent episodes. So next time on this season, we'll follow one of the children out of the house. This is it for operational velocity. I hope you enjoyed this episode. And until next time, take care.

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