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Operational Velocity

Operational Velocity artwork

Ep 22. Addtech: The Daughter Serial Acquirer who Outgrew it's Parent

Nov 3, 202655 minAudio
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In 2001, Bergman & Beving split itself in three. One of its daughters, Addtech, listed eight days before 9/11 with fifty subsidiaries, a nine-person head office and a telecom crash already under way. Twenty-five years later it runs more than 150 companies and sells about SEK 23 billion a year. This episode is about the number behind that growth: profit over working capital, with a 45% minimum for every subsidiary. We look at how the ratio works, why Addtech runs above 80% while its parent runs at 36% on the same target, and how one number decides what Addtech buys. We also cover how the model survived the telecom crash, the financial crisis and a ransomware attack that hit 80 of its companies. This is part of our Nordic serial acquirers season; previous episodes include: Bergman & Beving: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/operational-velocity/id1896906148?i=1000798294775 Lifco: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/operational-velocity/id1896906148?i=1000792128368 Sources Addtech Annual Report 2001/02: https://www.addtech.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Arsredovisningar/annual-report-01-02.pdf Addtech Annual Report 2009/10: https://www.addtech.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Arsredovisningar/annual-report-09-10.pdf Addtech Annual Report 2025/26: https://www.addtech.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Arsredovisningar/Addtech-Annual-Report-25-26.pdf Addtech Year-end Report 2025/26: https://mb.cision.com/Main/3619/4347027/4102743.pdf Addtech Interim Report Q2 2026/27 (22 Oct 2026): https://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2026-10/69903043-addtech-ab-interim-report-q2-1-april-30-september-2026-399.htm Addtech, Our history: https://www.addtech.com/this-is-addtech/our-history Addtech, Overarching targets: https://www.addtech.com/this-is-addtech/overarching-targets Addtech, Six business areas (press release, 25 Sep 2025): https://www.inderes.fi/en/releases/addtech-strengthens-the-organisation-for-future-growth Truesec, Addtech ransomware case study: https://www.truesec.com/cases/addtech-saved-after-a-massive-ransomware-attack Bergman & Beving, Annual Report 2025/26: https://bergmanbeving.com/en/investors/annual-report-2025-2026 Skatteverket, 2001 distribution of Addtech and Lagercrantz shares: https://skatteverket.se/privat/skatter/vardepapper/aktiehistorik/l/lagercrantzgroup.4.1e92a90109fb231bdf8000909.html Email for Inquiries Operational Velocity is for education and general information only and is not investment, financial, legal, or tax advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The views expressed are the host's own, the company and figures discussed are drawn from public sources believed reliable but not guaranteed, and you should do your own research and consult a qualified professional before making any decision.

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00Great returns aren't luck. They're built on the floor. Operators and investors always pushing for more. From the deal sheets time to the systems in place. Speed without precision is just running a race. Operational velocity where execution sets the pace.

SPEAKER_01Hello and welcome to Operational Velocity. This episode opens our series on the Nordic Serial Acquires. And in a way, it had to be the first one because before Indutrade or LIFCO became a household name among quality investors, and before decentralized compounders became a category, there was a technical trading house founded in 1906 in an industrial town on the Swedish East Coast.

SPEAKER_01And this is their story. On the 21st of September 2001, a Swedish company saw its share price touch$27.50 krona. It had been a listed company for just 18 days, and it closed its first day of trading on the 3rd of September at 41 krona. Then the world changed on the 11th, and the telecom industry, which bought about an eighth of everything this company sold, was already in free fall.

SPEAKER_01The company had about 1,100 employees and around 50 operating subsidiaries and a head office of just nine people. Its published financial goals that first year were profit growth of 15% and a return of equity of 25%. There was nothing in that list about the ratio that would come to define it. Twive years later, that company sells about 23 billion kroner a year through more than 150 subsidiaries in about 20 countries and employs roughly 5,000 people.

SPEAKER_01And on the 22nd of October, 2026, it reported that its operating profit was running at 82% of the working capital it ties up. Its own minimum is 45. That company is ad tech, and this is the story of a ratio. Every episode this season is built around one operating question. And for ad tech, it's this. Why would a technical trading company measure itself every single subsidiary on profit divided by working capital?

SPEAKER_01And what happens to a company when one number is allowed to decide what it buys, what it keeps, and how it's run? If that sounds familiar, it should. Because if you listen to our New Core episode, we spent a long time on how one production standard never moved, ran the culture of Nucore. And adtech is a Nordic version of the same idea, applied not to a steel mill, but to 150 companies that make and sell motors, mass, cable systems, sensors, and conveyor belts.

SPEAKER_01And as always, we tried our best to have every figure in this episode checked against primary sources, mostly AdTech's own annual and interim reports, going all the way back to its first year as a listed company. So let's get into it. Part one, the inheritance. The short version of the family tree, for anyone who skipped the prequel, is in 1906, two engineers, Arvid Bergman and Fritz Beving, started a business importing technical products from Germany and selling them to a Swedish industry that was expanding fast.

SPEAKER_01Bergman and Beving's own history puts the founding in Norshipping. Adtech's history lists the first products. Automatic scales, water meters, electricity meters, cables, and electrical writing instruments. Two things from the early decades matter for today. First, in the 1920s, the company began moving away from standard products towards more advanced ones with better margins, such as quartz lamps, ladder microscopes, spectrographs, carbon brushes, and vacuums.

SPEAKER_01Hold on to that for a moment. A trading company that learns to prefer the more technical and higher margin product is a trading company that will one day care a great deal about the ratio between what it earns and what it is sitting on the shelf. Second, from the mid-1960s, Bergman and Beving started buying companies in adjacent segments. Acquisitions became, in AdTech's own words, part of the day-to-day operations.

SPEAKER_01The company listed in Stockholm in November 1976 and expanded across the Nordics and according to Bergman and Beving's own timeline at some point between 1980 and 2000. And it introduced the profitability metric this episode is about P over WC, or profit over working capital. By the turn of the century, Bergman and Beving had become a group of roughly 200 companies. And in 2001, it decided to split itself into three: Lagerkrantz, AdTech, and what remained, which traded for years as B tools.

SPEAKER_01The mechanics were simple and very Swedish. For every Bergman and Beving share you owned, A or B, you received one Adtech share and one Lagercrantz share of the same class. No IPO and no roadshow. The new company was handed to the people who already owned it, which meant, as AdTech's first annual report put it, that ad tech's ownership largely mirrored Bergman and Bevings.

SPEAKER_01And that ownership had two names on it, that you'll hear again and again. At the listing, AdTech's chairman was Anders Borinson, who had run Bergman and Beving in the 1990s, and its vice chairman, Tom Hedelius, best known in Sweden as a former chief executive and chairman of Handelsbanken. Both held blocks of 10 votes, A shares, and in 2001, 2002 annual report, the Boringson family had 7.8% of the votes and Hedelius 7.4.

SPEAKER_01And by 2010, they controlled 15.6 and 15%, respectively. Sweden's shareholder association had called them a double act. Major owners across Adtech, Bergman and Beving, Lagerkranz, and AdLife. When Tom left AdTech's board in 2017 after 35 years in the service of BNB companies, Borison told the AGM their long collaboration had never produced a conflict.

SPEAKER_01Even though, as he put it, Adelus was a little more conservative. Today, Tom's son Hendrik sits on the board alongside Frederick Boringson, who represents Andre Borison's investment group, Thyssenhult. Twenty-five years, the same two families anchoring the vote. Keep that in mind when we ask what stops a decentralized system from drifting. One more founding detail tells you how this board thought.

SPEAKER_01Within four months of listing in December 2001, AdTech granted 700,000 personnel options to 56 senior managers at a strike price of 44.8 krona, 10% above the market price that week. They couldn't be transferred and only worked while you stayed employed. All of them were eventually used, and the program closed in February 2010. And the CEO's bonus terms in that first year already contained a twist that survives in today's remuneration guidelines.

SPEAKER_01An extra 20% top-up on any bonus used to buy AdTech shares. So, what did AdTech actually inherit? It was built on Bergman and Beving's industry business area, a sales of slightly under 2.5 billion krona and about 1,100 employees. The first annual report describes around 50 focused subsidiaries in nine divisions inside three business areas: production systems, transmission systems, and component systems.

SPEAKER_01Half of the revenue came from Sweden, 22% from Finland, and 16 from Denmark. 91% of the business was essentially within the Nordic territories. One technical detail from the formation is worth a moment, because it matters for everything that follows. Adtec AB had been a dormant shell inside the Bergman and Beving Group. And in March 2001, it was capitalized. And on the last day of that month, it bought Bergman and Beving Industry A B at a book value of 347 million krona.

SPEAKER_01The 292 million krona of goodwill that Bergman and Beving had been carrying for that business did not come across. Adtec started life with zero goodwill on its balance sheet, a clean operating business judged from day one on what it earned from the capital it actually used. And how was that split valued? Swedish tax rules required shareholders to divide their original Bergman and Beving cost basis across the three new companies.

SPEAKER_01The Swedish tax agency's allocation was 38% to Bergman and Beving, 35% to AdTech, and 27% to Lagerkrans. And on day one, AdTech was roughly a third of the old house. The president was Roger Bergquist. The head office, according to the same report, was just nine people. And the business concept was three words long. Value adding tech provider. Essentially a trading house, the link between a foreign manufacturer and a Nordic customer earning its keep by understanding the application better than either side.

SPEAKER_01What did an ad tech company look like in 2001? The first annual report profiles a few. And they're worth hearing because they're the genetic material. Columbia Electronic in Crokuk made test fixtures for circuit boards, every fixture unique to one board. Founded by two brothers in 1975, bought by the group in 1986, 26 people, about 35 million krona of sales, with Nokia and Ericsson among its customers.

SPEAKER_01Test system in Stockholm, about 15 people, about 80 million krona of sales, and it had stopped selling from a catalog of more than five years earlier. 60 to 70 percent of what it sold was unique to the customer. Its president said it didn't have sales representative in the traditional sense. They had application engineers. And tube control, about 50 people designed and delivered turnkey hydraulic systems for makers of materials handling equipment.

SPEAKER_01Small, technical, close to the customer's design department, earning a margin on knowledge rather than on volume. That profile, not the trading house label on the front of the annual report, is what AdTech would spend the next 25 years buying more of. That's the starting position. 50 companies, nine people at the center, two anchor families, and a parent whose favorite profitability metric hadn't yet made it into AdTech's shop window.

SPEAKER_01And then came the first year. This is what we call part two baptism by telecom. Adtech's first financial year as an independent company ran from April 2001 to March 2002. And you could probably guess how it went. Revenue fell from 2.5 million krona to$2.36 billion. Operating income fell from$214 million to 86 million.

SPEAKER_01And the operating margin went from 8.6% to 3.6%, and earnings per share 5.36 krona the year before came in at just 1.92. The damage was concentrated. Production systems, which was basically production equipment and test systems for electronics manufacturers, sent 35% of its sales to telecom. Its customers were names like Ericsson, Nokia, and the contract manufacturers that built for them.

SPEAKER_01Its revenue fell 29%, and its operating result swung from 60 million kroner profit to a 16 million loss. Meanwhile, transmission systems, which manufactures change, gaskets, machine parts, and hydraulics for mechanical industry and its aftermarket grew, revenue 19%, helped by acquisitions, and component systems fared better thanks to a growing share of deliveries to the vehicle industry.

SPEAKER_01The two things in that first annual report are worth reading closely, because they're the companies operating DNA in its raw form. The first is concentration. Burfqwist wrote that no customer accounted for more than 5% of sales, and the report adds that no supplier represented more than 5% of purchases, and that the 10 largest customers together were under 15%. That he pointed out was why the group posted a positive result in every single quarter of a year in which one of its core customer industries collapsed.

SPEAKER_01Fast forward to the latest annual report, and the largest supplier is about 1% of purchasing volume. The diversification wasn't a slogan, it was a design constraint tightened for 25 years. The second thing is the response. A savings program launched in mid-2001 took out about 40 million kroner of annual cost and around 100 people, close to 10% of its workforce. Inside production systems, the plan cut about 30% of staff.

SPEAKER_01And Burvqwist wrote down what amounts to a three-line crisis doctrine. Paraphrasing closely, use our willingness to change so that most of our resources sit where the best opportunities are. Hibernate as well as we can the parts we judge will have the best opportunities when the market recovers, and quickly and efficiently close the businesses that structural change has left without a future.

SPEAKER_01Use, hibernate, close. If you run a portfolio, that's a very good operating manual for a downturn. And it's a notable that a first-year CEO in public in a crisis wrote it down. The recovery wasn't instant. In 2002-2003, revenue slipped again to$2.275 billion, but the operating profit rose to$98 million. Profit after financial items grew 15%, and the operating cash flow quadrupled from$41 million to$169 million.

SPEAKER_01And by 2005-2006, operating profit was$271 million. And by 2007-2008, revenue had passed$4 billion and operating profit was$415 million, a margin just under 10%. Two more markers from this period. In early 2005, AdTuck bought a business called Meditech and turned it into its own business area, AdTech Life Science.

SPEAKER_01Remember that name. And in January 2008, Roger Bervquest handed over to Johan Sho, who had joined the year before. Show would run the company for 10 years, and his first full years in the chair would be the moment the ratio proved what it was for. Let's talk a little bit more about the ratio. We covered it in the previous episode on Bergman and Beving, but it's worthwhile to go into the details.

SPEAKER_01Let's look at the arithmetic properly because the whole episode basically depends on it. In adtech's current definitions, P is EBITA, operating profit before amortization of acquisition related intangibles. And WC is working capital, which is measured as an annual average and defined narrowly, inventories plus accounts receivable minus accounts payable. Not cash, not fixed assets, and not goodwill.

SPEAKER_01Just the money sitting in the stock and in customers' pockets, net of what you owe your suppliers. The target published by the end of AdTech's first decade and unchanged since is that the ratio should be at least 45%. Sound familiar because it's the same number that Bergman and Beving had as their target. And here's the detail that matters most, because in AdTech's 2009-2010 annual report, and even on its website today, both say that targets apply to each subsidiary and not just the group.

SPEAKER_01Every company. And their own explanation is one sentence. P over WC rewards high profit and low tied up capital. And combined with a 15% growth target, it makes self-finance growth possible. And here's why that's elegant. Because profit over working capital is just two ratios multiplied together. Your EBITDA margin, profit over sales, times your working capital turnover, sales over working capital.

SPEAKER_01So take a subsidiary that ties up 20 krona of working capital for every 100 krona it sells. To clear 45%, it needs an EBITDA margin of 9%. And if it can run on 15 krona working capital per 100 of sales, it needs under seven. So if it's a slow-moving distributor carrying 30 krona of stock and receivables for every 100 of sales, it needs 13.5. So let's look at it illustratively at what the number does to a managing director's week.

SPEAKER_01And there are only a handful number of ways to move it. You either charge more or sell things that carry a better margin, you carry less stock, collect faster, or pay on terms you actually negotiate it. Every one of those is something the boss of a 40-person company controls. And none of them needs a corporate strategy department. It can basically be a sales engineer that can work it out on a napkin. And here's the hypothetical: this is my and not ad techs, to make it real.

SPEAKER_01A subsidiary that sells 100 million kroner a year earns 9 million of IBITA and ties up 20 million in working capital. 45% exactly on the line. A big customer offers a contract but wants a subsidiary to hold 5 million krona of extra stock. So obviously, working capital goes to 20 million. To stay at that same 45%, that contract has to bring in at least two and a quarter million of extra EBITDA.

SPEAKER_01If it brings in 1 million, the ratio drops to 45%. And the MD will be explaining why at the next board meeting. The ratio doesn't forbid the deal, it prices it in a language everyone in the building speaks. And look what it does to the growth target. If you need to grow sales 15% and your working capital grows with them, the extra working capital you need is 15% of what you already hold. At a P over WC of 45%, that's about a third of one year's EBITDA.

SPEAKER_01And at today's 80 odd percent, it's under a fifth. Growth funds itself. And that's the whole reason for pairing the two targets. And it's why Bergman and Bebing family talk about self financing. Growth almost as a moral principle. Compare that with how most groups measure their units. Return on capital employed drags in goodwill. So for an acquired company, it's mostly a statement about the price you paid and not about the business being run.

SPEAKER_01So Ibita Margin on its own ignores the balance sheet, and you can hit a margin target while carrying three months too much inventory. So P over WC is an operator's number, and it's about the business the MD runs and not the deal the parent once did. If you heard our LIFCO episode, you'll recognize a cousin. LIFCO reports EBITA over average capital employed, excluding goodwill. So it's essentially a different denominator, but has a very similar instinct.

SPEAKER_01Now here's where it gets interesting because Bergman and Beving, the parent that introduced P over WC, still publishes the same 45% target, and it reported a P over C of 36% for its 2025-2026 financial year. Adtech reported 81% for the same period. Same family, same metric, same bar, and a gap of 45 points, which tells you that the ratio on its own does nothing.

SPEAKER_01But what really matters is what an organization does to pursue it. So what has adtech done? Walk the series with me because the trajectory is the story. In 2008-2009, P over WC was 45%. So right on the line. Then the financial crisis hit Nordic industry, and in 2009-2010, revenue fell 17%, and P over WC fell to 30, 15 points below its own minimum.

SPEAKER_01The response is a textbook use of the ratio, because back in autumn 2008, every subsidiary had been told to drop an action plan to defend profit under different market scenarios. So working capital was cut from 830 million kroner to 674. About 275 people were laid off and 100 of them in production units. Schose told the annual report's interviewer that headcount had come down by almost 20% and that pay had been frozen for everyone in company management positions.

SPEAKER_01So when peak collapses, WC is the lever you can pull fastest and pulling its relicious cash. Operating cash flow that year was 293 million krona, barely below the year before, on 17% less revenue. The crisis also showed how differently the parts of the diversified group behave. In 2009-2010, Adtech's business areas reported returns on operating capital ranging from 11% in industrial solutions exposed to sawmills, pulp, and engineering, to 37% in energy and equipment, and 31 in life sciences, which barely felt the downturn.

SPEAKER_01Once again, same group, same discipline, a threefold spread. That spread is the point of diversification, and a ratio like this makes it visible every month. And by the way, the ratio was back above the line within two years. 53% in 2011 and 2012, then hovered around it for a while, 45 in 2012-2013, and 47 in 2013-2014, and 44% in 2015 to 2016.

SPEAKER_01And then it started to climb. 69% in 2021-2022, 66, 68, and 76 in the subsequent years. And as of end of September 26, it's 82.

SPEAKER_01Now here's what I think is the most single most important fact for this whole episode. And it's buried in two annual reports, 24 years apart. In March 2002, ad tech's working capital was equivalent to 21% of net sales. And in 2025-2026 financial year, an average working capital was 4.5 billion krona on sales of 22.7 billion.

SPEAKER_01That's just under 20%. The two figures aren't measured on exactly the same basis, so don't hold me to that decimal. But the conclusion is robust. Adtec's working capital intensely is roughly where it was in 2002, which means the ratio didn't climb from the 40s into the 80s because ad tech learned to squeeze inventory. It climbed because the margin moved. Operating margin in that first year was 3.6%, and Ibita margin the last financial year was 16%, a record.

SPEAKER_01And it's actually 16.7 in the latest quarter. Divide 16 by 20 and you get 80. That's the modern P over WC in one line of arithmetic. A quick aside for anyone who runs one company rather than 150. For example, if you're a searcher who just bought a business or an operating partner with a portfolio company, you can compute this ratio this afternoon. Take the last 12 months of EBITA and take your average inventory plus receivables minus payables over the same 12 months and divide.

SPEAKER_01If you're under 45%, the ratio tells you which of the three conversations to have: price and mix, stock, or terms. If you're above it, it tells you something just as useful. How much growth your business can fund without calling the bank. And if you own several businesses, compute it for each one and put the numbers side by side. You'll learn more from that one table than from most board packs. One caution, which is where we'll end up later.

SPEAKER_01And don't let anyone improve the ratio by starving the customer. A business that hits 45% by being out of stock isn't efficient. It's leaving. So the real bad question becomes how does a trading house more than quadruple its margin without turning into a different kind of company? And this is where we talk about how the ratio chooses what to buy. Start with what adtech says it's looking for.

SPEAKER_01In its current annual report, it lists five criteria. A high-performing company with a business-to-business offering, high in knowledge and technical content, a leading position in a well-defined niche with growth potential, a focus on its own products and sustainable business, committed management that wants to keep developing the company inside ad tech, and a match with the culture. Two of those five are the margin story hiding in plain sight.

SPEAKER_01Own products and high performing. And here's how the mix has shifted.

SPEAKER_01Value added by being the link. You don't get from about half standard products to a quarter trade products by drift. You get there by buying year after year companies that make things. And in Nicola Stenberg's words, in the latest full year results, by acquiring companies with their own products and higher profitability than the group average. And that last phrase is the ratio at work. If a group runs 80% P over WC, every acquisition running at 60 dilutes the number, even though it clears a 45% floor.

SPEAKER_01So the bar a target really has to clear isn't 45%, it's the group average. And that's how a ratio ratchets. You can see it in the business areas. In the 2025-2026 annual report, each of the six reports its own return on working capital. The industry was 130%, energy 103, process 72, safety 65, electrification 63, and automation 56.

SPEAKER_01So everyone above 45 and the two above 100 both described their businesses in terms of in-house production and proprietary products. Now the price.

SPEAKER_01Asked why AdTech didn't grow faster, he said it could, but its philosophy meant taking substantially lower risk, and the group had to be sure it had the management capacity to look after every company it bought. Then the deal structure. Adtech normally pays a base price plus contingent consideration tied to future earnings with a fixed cap, typically falling due within three years. And it often doesn't buy everything.

SPEAKER_01In the last 18 months, 80% of Axion in Germany, 80% of Kubra Acronet in Austria, and 90% of NoTech in Canada. And in signed in October 2026, 82% of mechanical power transmission. Leaving a minority with the people who run the businesses keeps their skin in the game, and the earnout aligns the first three years. So who runs these deals?

SPEAKER_01It's not the head office, and the annual report is blunt. The acquisition process is strictly decentralized. Identification, negotiation, and completion are handled by the business area management teams, who own their pipeline all the way through integration. And that's how a group with a small center completes nine acquisitions in a year without a corporate development army. The company's website names Daniel Prevelvik, who runs a business area as the group's acquisitions coordinator, an operator, and not an MA department.

SPEAKER_01The pace has changed dramatically. Adtech's 2009-2010 annual report said that the group had made around 30 acquisitions since listing. Its own history page says about 40 by 2005, so the early count is fuzzy. And we flagged it. What isn't fuzzy is the recent run. In 2025-2026, it charts roughly 140 acquisitions across 13 financial years from 2013-2014 onward, and says adtech has bought more than 200 companies since 2001.

SPEAKER_01And where it buys has changed even more. So in 2001, 91% of the sales were Nordic. And by 2025-2026, 42% of the sales came from outside the Nordics. And eight of the year's nine acquisitions were based outside the region. Germany, the UK, Netherlands, Austria, and Canada. One deal makes it concrete. In March of 2026, the electrification business area bought RAMME electric machines in Germany.

SPEAKER_01A maker of electronic motors and generators for propulsion and dynamic positioning on medium-sized specialized vessels. And this is not a distributor. It's a German engineering company with its own product. It was bought by a Swedish group that began life importing German products into Sweden. So therefore, the arrow has turned around.

SPEAKER_01Let's talk a little bit about the machine around the ratio. Because the ratio is only as good as the organization that's allowed to act on it. Adtech is built on a phrase that runs through its annual reports from the very first one: freedom with responsibility. Companies are free to run and develop their own businesses as long as they deliver on the group wide targets. The current report lists the core values as simplicity, efficiency, change, and counted as one, responsibility, and freedom.

SPEAKER_01And it has a motto I genuinely like because it's a design spec disguised as a slogan. Small scale businesses, large-scale wise. So what does the center actually cost? The parent company AdTech AB, Group Management Plus the Reporting and Finance Dev, had administrative expenses of around 163 million kroner in the year 2025 to 2026.

SPEAKER_01And that's against group sales at 22.7 billion, so roughly about 0.7%. And in 2001, the head office was nine people. It's slightly bigger now, but it's still a rounding era on the PL. Underneath it, it works in layers. Each operating company has its own board. And back in 2010, AdTech described those boards as including the company president and managers from the business unit or business area. The companies sit in business units grouped by technology or market.

SPEAKER_01And today, there's 15 niche strategies across six business areas. And the business unit's job, in adtech's own word, is to coach and support the companies and give them a network for spotting opportunities in their segment. And one detail that I like is that in their own description from 2010, the manager of a business unit often doubled as a managing director of one of the companies inside it. So the person coaching your company on the ratio was actually running a company against that same ratio.

SPEAKER_01So that's not a staff function, it's a peer with a day job. And if you think about it, adtech, they say that they do not force synergies, but encourage collaboration for sharing of experience. And any collaboration between subsidiaries comes from below. We don't make the decisions centrally, as they like to say. And if you see that against our Danahar episode on the Rails Brothers, they built a center with a toolkit and a method called the Danahar Business System.

SPEAKER_01And they pushed it into every company they bought. And of course, Adtech Center has tools too: financial strength, IT security, strategic pricing, an acquisition model, and internal business school, but it offers them. It does not install them. The one thing every acquired company does have to adopt is the reporting system. Their CEO described it in 2010. Many people think it's a nuisance at first.

SPEAKER_01Then they grow to like it because they can finally see profitability by area. And he also added every subsidiary must be ready to be listed on the stock exchange. That's the whole deal in a sentence. We'll leave your company alone, we'll see your numbers every month, and your numbers will be good enough to stand on their own. The controls behind that promise are lighter than you expect, and probably more systematic. In 2010, AdTech described integration starting before the takeover date, during the negotiation, training in group reporting straight after closing, so a new company consolidates from day one, and a session for all of its employees on the group's vision and philosophy.

SPEAKER_01Every company completes an annual self-evaluation of its internal controls, things like customer contract terms, credit checks, inventory valuation, and payment procedures, with each of the companies answered, validated by its own external auditor. And on top of that, 15 to 20 companies a year get an in-depth review from business area controllers and central finance. The board decided it didn't need a separate internal audit function.

SPEAKER_01The incentives point the same way. Under the remuneration guidelines in the current annual report, variable pay for the CEO and group management is tied to earnings growth, profitability, and cash flow capped at 40% of fixed salary, with 20% premium if the bonus is used to buy ad tech shares. Growth, return, cash, the same three things that run the subsidiaries. Two mechanisms carry the culture across 150 companies.

SPEAKER_01The first is a school. In their first annual report in 2002, it already described the business school, courses with names like How to Succeed in Business for New Sales Reps and Business Acumen for Experienced Ones. With videotape sales role plays and profitability calculations, today it's the AdTech Academy. And around 500 people a year, from managing directors to customer service and order processing staff, go through some part of it.

SPEAKER_01Think about it what it means to teach an order clerk profitability arithmetic. That's P over WC at the level of a single order line. The second is promotion from within. Adtech says outright that its ability to recruit internally is an important part of its success because it keeps continuity and embeds a culture. When the group reorganized into six business areas in October 2025, both new business areas heads, Marcus Johansson in Energy and Asa Skarbon in the new safety area, came up through business unit roles inside the company.

SPEAKER_01The CEO and CFO recruited internally too. The CEO's own path is the clearest case study of the model. Nicholas Stenberg is a lawyer by training with a degree from Uppsala and then law firm Delphi. He worked with Bergman and Beving and BB Tools from 2005 to 2010, and he joined AdTech after a crisis year as a managing director of a subsidiary, then business unit manager, then head of Power Solutions, which is at the time the group's most profitable business area.

SPEAKER_01He took over as a CEO at the AGM on the 30th of August 2018, appointed at 44 years old. Johan Sho stayed on the board and later chaired it. So, a man who runs one subsidiary, then a cluster, then a business area, measured on P over WC at every rung, now runs the whole group on the same number. Let's shift gears for a moment and talk about stress tests, because a decentralized system looks great in a spreadsheet.

SPEAKER_01The question is what happens when something hits it? Adtech has been hit three different ways in its listed life by markets, by criminals, and in a sense by its own success. We've covered the markets, the telecom collapse in year one, and the 2008 to 2010 industrial crash, answered by cutting working capital costs and headcount fast. The pandemic year was slightly milder, revenue dipped about 3%, and organic growth went negative, P over WC was 52%, and the CEO called it in between year.

SPEAKER_01The criminals are a more interesting story. On the 30th of October 2019, AdTech was hit by ransomware. The next day it told the market that 80 of its 150 companies were affected, roughly half of the group's sales. AdTech's own history says the attackers encrypted the central IT environment and demanded a ransom. Adtech refused, not paying, and its own phrase was the obvious course of action, and it chose instead to explain it openly what had happened.

SPEAKER_01The market, however, was not calm about it, and one Swedish business paper reported at one point that the share had fallen more than 15% since the breach became public. The incident response firm that worked on it, TruSec, says almost 1,700 of the group's roughly 2,900 employees were affected, and that parts of the business had systems back within a couple of weeks, and that everything was back in production after about two months.

SPEAKER_01Attech's first estimate of the hit that the year's EBITA was about 150 million krona. The final annual report put it at about 130 million of sales and about 100 million of eBITA below the first estimate. And here's the part that says the most about the model. In a quarter of the attack, October to December 2019, ad tech sales grew 12%, 5% organically. And the CEO wrote that although the attack hit the affected company's efficiency hard, all of them were largely able to keep operating by various alternative methods.

SPEAKER_01That's what 150 independent companies look like under fire. Each has its own customers, its own suppliers, its own sales engineers who knew the customer by name and its own habit of solving problems without asking permission. The thing that was centralized, the IT environment, went down. The thing that was decentralized, the businesses, kept running on phones, spreadsheets, and relationships.

SPEAKER_01Today's annual report lists, among its cyber risk mitigations, minimum IT security requirements for every subsidiary and the fact that each company has its own IT infrastructure, which the report says minimizes risk for the group as a whole. Whether that's a direct lesson from 2009-10, the report doesn't say. The juxtaposition is mine. The third stress test is success. When a decentralized group gets big, the temptation is to centralize, and the risk is that the business units harden into a bureaucracy.

SPEAKER_01Adtech's answer twice now has been to split rather than consolidate. In 2016, it spun off its own life science business area. The one built around that 2005 Meditech purchase. It's separated as a separate listing company called AdLife. The spin-off that spun off, Bergman and Beving now says that since 2001, it has spun off three companies that today make up five listed ones: AdTech, AdLife, Aligo, Lagerkranz, and the Momentum Group, with a combined market value of more than 175 billion kroner.

SPEAKER_01And at the 2016 AGM, AdTech's own presentation showed the arithmetic of that split. A group with about 8 billion kroner of annual sales became roughly 6.3 billion staying in adtech and 1.7 billion leaving with ad life. And in October 2025, rather than laying on more management over a growing group, AdTech went from five business areas to six, carving out safety and adding business units.

SPEAKER_01Their CFO framed it explicitly as increasing acquisition capacity by giving more ad tech people responsibility. More boxes at the edge, not more floors at the center. So I want you to notice the pattern. Telecom crash cut fast at the edge. Financial crisis, free working capital at the edge. Cyber attack, the edge kept selling while the center rebuilt. Growth, add capacity at the edge.

SPEAKER_01Every time the center stays small and the number stays the same. Now, let's start to bring this home with the five principles that you can potentially glean from ad tech. As always, these are my kind of lessons that I've drawn from the record and not the company's slogans. So here we go. First thing is choose a number of salespeople that can calculate. P over WC is margin times turnover, and every lever in it, price, mix, stock, collections, payables, sits inside the walls of a 40-person company.

SPEAKER_01A metric that needs a finance department to compute it will end up managed by a finance department. Two, put the bar at the unit, not the group. A group average can hide anything. 45% for every company means there is no corner of the portfolio where a mediocre business can shelter behind a great one. And it makes a conversation between a business area head and a subsidiary MD very short. The third thing is let the average, not the floor, choose your acquisitions.

SPEAKER_01The floor is 45, and the group runs at 80 plus. The quiet result is that every deal has to be at least as good as what you already own. And over 20 years, that one habit helped turn a trading house into a group where only a quarter of its sales are pure trade products. The fourth thing is keep the center too small to meddle. Parent company admin of about 0.7% of sales. Synergies are encouraged, but they're never forced.

SPEAKER_01Acquisitions run by business areas and not the head office. One mandatory thing, the reporting. And a standard that every subsidiary should be good enough to list on its own. The center's job is to see clearly and not to steer. The fifth thing is when the ratio raises, check which half moved. Adtech's working capital intensity is about where it was in 2002. The climb has mainly come from margin.

SPEAKER_01That's a strength because the businesses are better, not just leaner. But it's also the thing to watch. A ratio that can only rise through margin eventually needs volume to keep the growth target honest. And if you listen to our previous episodes on Constellation Software, NuCOR and LIFCO, we kept arriving at the same question. Does the operating system survive its architect? And AdTech is an interesting answer because it's not obvious if it ever had a single architect.

SPEAKER_01The famous ratio actually came from Bergman and Beving, years before AdTech existed. Adtech made it to the public standard for every company within its first decade. Johann Scho used it to steer through the financial crisis. Nicholas Stenberg measured on it as a subsidiary MD, now runs the group on it, and three chief executives, the same two families, on the share register for the first 25 years, and one number that none of them invented, with a bar that none of them has moved.

SPEAKER_01So maybe that's the lesson. If you want an operating system to outlive its architect, don't build it around the architect. Build it around something simple enough that the next person and 150 after that can carry it without you. I think that's the main lesson that you can learn from the case of AdTech. And that concludes our episode for today. I hope you enjoyed it. And until next time, take care.

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