Thirty years in the private equity ecosystem, most people accumulate a network in that time. Kit Lisle built a room. Mr. Lisle spent eight years as a US Army Military Intelligence officer, including a posting at the National Military Joint Intelligence Center under the Joint Chiefs. Then he founded Acclaro Growth Partners and spenr two decades running commercial due diligence for PE firms, investment banks, and portfolio companies. More recently, Kit built TheOperators.pe, a leading collaborative peer community for PE-backed executives and operating partners. This conversation is about what he can see from inside that room that almost nobody else can. In this interview, we cover: • What actually transferred from intelligence work to reading a management team and what he had to unlearn • "Private Equity Culture Shock": the moment a first-time PE-backed CEO realizes their old operating instincts just became liabilities • What genuinely breaks in the first hundred days and the sponsor best practice that does the most damage • Why the industry underwrites market risk brilliantly and execution risk badly, and why that hasn't been fixed yey • What the customer lens surfaces that the data room structurally cannot show • The widest gap between what sponsors believe creates value and what operators actually experience • Handing over the firm he built for two decades and what doing it to himself taught him that advising on it never did • Whether operating partners are now being asked to solve problems the role was never designed for Email for Inquiries Operational Velocity is for education and general information only and is not investment, financial, legal, or tax advice, and nothing in it is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The views expressed are the host's own, the company and figures discussed are drawn from public sources believed reliable but not guaranteed, and you should do your own research and consult a qualified professional before making any decision.
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Transcript
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SPEAKER_01Great returns are in luck. They're built on the floor. Operators and investors always pushing for more from the deal sheets signed to the systems in place. Speed without precision is just running a race. Operational velocity where execution sets the pace.
SPEAKER_00Hello and welcome to Operational Velocity. Today we have a special guest interview with Mr. Kit Lyle. Kit is a very experienced operator within the private equity ecosystem where he spent roughly the last 30 years. He currently runs a leading peer community for PE-backed executives and operating partners called the operators.pe. In this interview, Kit shares with us his wealth of knowledge in best practices, pitfalls of operating within private equity.
SPEAKER_00Hope you enjoy our conversation. Welcome, Kit, to Operational Velocity. How are you doing?
SPEAKER_02All right, thanks. Gotham, how you how you doing?
SPEAKER_00I'm doing great. So, Kit, what I'd like to do is, you know, with these type of interviews, is to start off with an origin story. So, could you kindly tell us a little bit about your background and experience and how you got into operations?
SPEAKER_02Well, it's a little bit of a long story. Uh, so I was a graduate student at the University of Virginia um right around the time that uh the revolution in the Czech Republic was winding down. And uh before that, I had studied abroad in undergrad when the Berlin Wall was coming down. And uh, you know, I had an obligation to the Army. I had a Razi scholarship in college, so I was a military intelligence officer, and I thought I was going to be a diplomat. So I fully expected that I would be traveling the world and um making change, but candidly, uh, as part of my master's degree research, I interviewed investment bankers and consultants and business people, and I thought, you know what, these are the people that are actually causing the change to happen in Eastern Europe.
SPEAKER_02Uh, this was the time of privatization and you know, eliminating the national uh industries and so forth. And I just thought this is kind of interesting. And it turns out that looking at a map of a battlefield and figuring out where the enemy is and what their avenue of approach is and what their capabilities are is not that dissimilar from looking at a market map and figuring out how to position yourself. So that was my story anyway, uh, and I stuck with it and it got me a job in consulting.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I'm interested because you know you you have a unique background in the sense that you were uh in military intelligence uh before mergers and acquisitions, private equity, and of course commercial due diligence, which you've done. Maybe a question around what did your time in intelligence tradecraft in terms of collection analysis decision ports teach you about incomplete information and the real quant consequences of being wrong?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I'll share a uh rather interesting story, at least I think it was interesting. Um, you know, in uh in industries in which you're dealing with a commodity, um you find that competitors in these large industries, these are very large companies, very large industries, uh, a very small number of competitors, they want any little insight they can possibly get. And in my client's case, they really wanted to understand if a competitor was adding manufacturing capacity, because that would have a direct impact on prices, of course.
SPEAKER_02And you know, you can't just call into a company and say, Are you planning to increase capacity? Well, you can. I did. It doesn't usually go particularly well. They don't like to answer those sorts of questions. So you have to figure out, well, what would be some indicators? What would be some signs and signals that they might be increasing production capacity? And I frankly didn't really know. So I asked some industry experts and they said, well, you would need additional water, you would need a train line coming in, you would need additional access to electricity to do that, and all of those things would require permits.
SPEAKER_02So I suggest that you, you know, develop a list of the so I thought this is exactly like a decision support matrix in the military, um, where you figure out, well, what would be something that would be likely to happen if the enemy were doing something? Um, and it helps you make a you know a better decision. So, in any event, uh it had a direct impact both in predicting that that competitor was in fact increasing capacity because it was very clear, all the signs pointed to it.
SPEAKER_02Um, but it's also very helpful when you have subjective, qualitative, ethereal information that's really not quantitative. Um, and when that happens, you can assign weightings and you can assign scores and you can sort of predict the future. You're you're essentially turning qualitative information into quantitative data to enable you to make better decisions. And that was a direct lesson learned from you know my stint in military intelligence. Yeah.
SPEAKER_00Very interesting. Yeah, and I can imagine that you know, being an operating partner for so many years in the private equity industry, that it's it's not the traditional kind of consulting uh or the investment bank banking route. So what I mean, do you think that if you if you kind of took a more traditional route outside of military, what what can that teach, for example, folks that typically come from backgrounds in consulting or investment, investment banking that go into private equity as an operating partner?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I'm not sure if this is where you were headed, but you know, those people who follow the traditional path and and they have degrees in accounting and finance, and they rise up through the ranks maybe in investment banking and then switch over to private equity. Um, it's that's that's the established trail. So the trail has been blazed and it's fairly easy and straightforward. But I can I can tell you one thing, those people do not have a thorough, comprehensive understanding of the other side of the table.
SPEAKER_02And by that I mean those people who are the operators making value creation happen. They just don't understand the degree of rigor and time and pressure and you know what is involved in in doing that because they've just never worked in that environment before. Um, they have very little exposure to it, even you know, those that have you know spent 20 years in private equity. So, you know, I I think my my path was not a traditional typical one, but it's much more holistic, comprehensive.
SPEAKER_02Um, I have a tremendous amount of respect and admiration for the operators. And by the way, the reason that I've called the community the operators, operators is a word for private equity-backed executives, is that many times I've observed that private equity deal teams who are unhappy with their CEO, CFO, COO, et cetera, refer to them sort of off-handedly as management. Well, if management can't figure it out, well, we'll just replace them and bring in experienced operators who know what they are doing.
SPEAKER_02And it's sort of like two sides of the same coin. Um, in many cases, I'll I'll end on this note here, Gotham. Uh, you know, it's very easy for a deal team member to not really understand why value creation is not, you know, gaining traction, why there seems to be drift. And it's very easy for them to say, well, it's got to be the CEO's fault. We'll just replace the CEO. Well, candidly, it might not have been the CEO's fault.
SPEAKER_00Exactly. And and you coined a term called private equity culture shock. Could you explain a little bit more about what you mean by private equity culture shock? And uh maybe a follow-up uh is perhaps walk me through uh a moment it actually lands. Is it is it a boardroom sentence? Is it a KPI? Is it a Monday morning email?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, sure. No problem. Um it happens in three different situations. The first is uh, you know, we we we've all heard the term founder friendly in the lower middle market. Um I was sort of joking, and uh I think you were part of the global webinar. Uh Lee McCabe heard me say, you know, I think the term founder friendly has done more harm to the private equity ecosystem than any other two words because it sets unrealistic expectations. You can't take a founder and say, we are impressed with what you've done.
SPEAKER_02We want to invest behind you, we want to support you, we want to help you grow your business, we want to give you a seat at the table as a board member. Those are all indicators that the founder is going to be able to continue controlling and running his or her business. And in reality, um, nothing could be further from the truth because everything that got the founder to that point is good and appropriate. And it got them there. It got them to the point of being able to sell their business to private equity. It's a huge monumental accomplishment in the world of business, no doubt about it.
SPEAKER_02But the skills that enabled a founder to grow a business from zero to say 30 million in revenue or whatever are different than the skills that take that business from 30 to 300. As an example, um, you know, a founder is typically a benevolent dictator. Not all of them, but they often are. And that means they're at the center of the spider web. They make every decision, they talk to every customer. If there's ever a conflict or disagreement, you know, the founder is going to solve it for you. Um, the management team, therefore, does not have a huge amount of responsibility relative to what they would have in private equity.
SPEAKER_02So, in any event, this the point that I'm trying to make here is that founders experience private equity culture shock because they sort of expect that they've done a good job, they've sold their business, they're going to be able to continue doing pretty much what they have done in the past, maybe with some help. They don't expect that everything will change. And it will, it will change, it will not be the same because private equity is simply a different playing field. Uh, it's a different sport altogether.
SPEAKER_02Secondly, the members of the management team who stick around or held on uh are referred to as incumbent members of the management team. Guess what? They've never reported to a board before, they've never been responsible for strategic decision making. They don't know what governance is. They hear the word exit and they assume you're talking about how to escape a burning building. Um, the words liquidity event, um, value creation plan, they mean nothing.
SPEAKER_02And uh, I'll give you an example in just a minute. But the third type of culture shock happens when an experienced senior executive is recruited from, say, Google or General Electric or pick your favorite big company. And they're brought in to transform a much smaller company. And they have no reason to believe that the systems and processes and technologies and people will be that much different than they were at at GE or Microsoft or wherever.
SPEAKER_02But they are, and so that that executive might figure it out by saying, okay, well, um, you know, are you sending the private jet to come pick me up? Or, you know, who is my executive assistant who's going to take care of my travel plans? And they quickly realize, you know, there's not support, there aren't systems, there aren't processes. You're and they realize, my goodness, I have committed to doubling the uh the EBITDA of this company in three years, and I've got nothing to work with. This is like an entrepreneurial company.
SPEAKER_02What have I gotten myself into? So, in all of those three cases, they're literally grabbing their head and saying, Oh my goodness, what have I done? So, the example that I'll give you is the uh the incumbent member of the management team. I've got many stories, but the one that I'll give you is an executive who uh found himself in an office in New York City. It was the private equity group's headquarters. He said I was in a conference room with two 20-somethings. I had a yellow notepad in front of me, pen in hand, 45-minute meeting.
SPEAKER_02I'm nodding and smiling and sort of taking notes. The meeting ends. I shake hands and nod politely at both of those 20-somethings, and I walk back to the assigned uh office that I had for the day. I put my head down on the desk and I sobbed. I literally cried. I'm a grown man, and I cried because I had literally no idea what I was nodding to and agreeing to and, you know, acknowledging. I didn't even understand the vernacular, the acronyms, the language they were speaking.
SPEAKER_02So the next call I made was to my wife, and I told her I had to find a new job because I couldn't perform in this role because I literally didn't even understand what was being said to me. And that's not, you know, that's not that individual's fault. Uh, I think it should be incumbent on the private equity group to provide some form of onboarding training, a certification process, and at a minimum to hand over the investment thesis and the value creation plan so that individual at least has a sense of context of why we bought this company, what were we worried about when we did buy it, what diligence uh items are still keeping us up at night?
SPEAKER_02Uh, what were some of the mitigants that we've kind of settled in with? So long-winded way of saying three types of private equity culture shock. Very real.
SPEAKER_00Absolutely. And would that explain uh a lot of the churn in operating partners kind of coming and going or based on this kind of private equity culture shock that you're talking about?
SPEAKER_02Do you do you have not so much at the operating partner level? From an operating partner standpoint, there's not so much churn per se. Um, the culture shock doesn't hit operating partners nearly to the extent that it hits the management team members. Operating partners may not have prior private equity experience, but they typically do.
SPEAKER_00Let's talk a little bit about the first hundred days. Uh, because if you look at the, let's say, the literature, it's mostly aspirational. You either get called at the due diligence if you're lucky, um, or on day one, or at the point of drift. What actually breaks in the first hundred days for a team that's never had a sponsor and is it the same break every time?
SPEAKER_02Well, there are five questions that a healthy management team should be proactively asking of the board, or five types of questions. And then there are five risk factors. So we'll go through them all. Um, first is the the why. The most important question that a member of a management team can ask in the first 45 days, frankly, in the first three days, is why did you buy the company in the first place? What did you see that was attractive? What excited you?
SPEAKER_02Um, what opportunities do you see? But more importantly, what were the threats? What were the concerns? What were the risk factors? And what were the mitigants that you've discovered along the way? And frankly, when it relates to diligence, what keeps you up at night still? What are some of the concerns? What do we what do we have to do incredibly well in order for this business to be deemed a success? So that's number one, the why, the context. I call it commander's intent uh from my days in the military. Um we'll we'll we'll cover another military analogy in a second.
SPEAKER_02The the the second one is governance. So many members of um you know family-owned or founder-led businesses don't really even understand the word governance. It's essentially decision rights. So who gets to decide in what situation, uh at what you know investment level? So you should proactively develop a list of 10 or 15 scenarios or situations that are plausible future situations.
SPEAKER_02Um, what if we decide that we need to X? Uh, do I make that decision to invest in that uh or to spend that money myself? Do I have to ask for permission? Is it a collaborative decision? How do we how do we do that? And you should have an entire list of those. So that's that's the second one. Um the third is um let's see, when when do we plan to exit? So if the decision is that we're expecting to exit this business in 2032, let's say in uh October of 2032, how many months do we have the backwards plan from there to get to that point?
SPEAKER_02What has to happen between now and then? You literally have to lay it all out almost like a map to say, okay, we have to be at this point by this, and this point by then. Um, so that's the when. Um we've talked about why, the who, the when. The next is the where. Where do we stand right now? So if the first board meeting is three months away, then what you'll be reporting on, collaborating on is a better word, is where do we stand today relative to day one?
SPEAKER_02Are we more likely to achieve the value creation plan today than we were on day one, or are we less likely? And if we're less likely, why is that? What lessons have we learned? What pivots do we need to make? So signaling, messaging, not so much reporting, but collaborating with the board in between meetings. It's the meeting that happens before the meeting that's most important. Um, that the actual board meeting is a conversation. So when you think about it, these private equity-backed executives have never been in a board meeting in many cases.
SPEAKER_02They've never reported to a board or had a conversation with a board. It's rather intimidating, and they have no idea what they're getting into. And usually the the default status is to over-report and share, share, share, and there's too many slides, and the board gets exasperated. They they want to have an intellectually stimulating conversation about a problem that you want assistance solving. That's the purpose. Um, and then we get into the the what? What leadership style will be most effective for this business, um, given the size and situation and uh you know maybe the industry and so forth.
SPEAKER_02So those are the questions, the kinds of questions that the management team should be asking. And I would encourage every member of the management team to develop their own list of questions and don't hold back. Ask the board, ask your deal team partner um as many questions as you can in those early days, and and literally say, I want to succeed, I want to do well. There's a lot that I don't know, don't understand. I'm capable in my role, I know my industry, I know this company like the back of my hand. I don't know private equity.
SPEAKER_02I want to know it, I want to understand it, I want to be an athlete in at this league at this level, uh, but I need help. I need I need to understand. So that's why I have so many questions. Now, secondly, there are some sort of risk factors that we can identify, and I'll just walk through them quickly and then we can elaborate. So the first risk factor is the risk of misalignment, the risk of mistranslation, misunderstanding. They don't have the context. They did not receive the value creation plan, they did not receive the investment thesis, they have no idea what your intentions are with this business.
SPEAKER_02That's a death sentence. That is like putting handcuffs on a management team because they don't have any idea where we're going, and it's going to be very different than it was uh when the founder was running the business. Um, second risk factor is the risk factor of governance and decision rights. We've covered that. Third is what I call deployment or line of sight, and that's a military term usually used in a like a radar uh or um signals intelligence content context, but it's it's similar to like um an old terrestrial radio station or cell tower.
SPEAKER_02You need line of sight, otherwise, you don't get the signal. Well, if a CEO has a town hall meeting and says, everything's changed, our new priorities are A, B, and C. That's what you should be focused on. Everybody collaborate on A, B, and C. And then, you know, two months later, the CEO says, I don't understand why these people are still doing what they used to be doing and they're not prioritizing this. I told them, well, that's not enough. You've got to tell them, tell them again, tell them what you're gonna tell them, tell them what you told them, maybe tell them again, and then check to make sure that were they listening?
SPEAKER_02Did they comprehend what you said? Did they actually analyze what they said and interpret it? And then did they change their behavior? And you know, you you often have maybe a plant manager or senior VP of sales or something who says, I've been here a long time, I've seen a lot of changes come and go. I I'm good with where I am. I'm just gonna keep doing things the way I want to do them. And they don't stop doing what they were doing, which is a problem. So that's uh that's deployment. Fourth is accountability. You got to check in with them, and then um let's see, number five is that leadership style, execution discipline is what I call it.
SPEAKER_02So, you know, two ways to think about it questions you should be asking or risk factors to be aware of.
SPEAKER_00Right. And you mentioned it a couple of times, and I've heard you in uh several of the operators' uh uh conference calls about you know the the the people that are actually deploying. And executing the value creation plan, they don't receive this why, which is the deal investment thesis. And this relates to the first question or the second question I asked you about the information asymmetry problem. How do you actually tackle that? If you have incomplete information and you don't have the why, i.e.
SPEAKER_00the investment thesis, then how can you actually deploy and execute a value creation plan?
SPEAKER_02Well, you you can't. Um you can't do it well because it it's sort of like uh you know, I'm trying to think of a good analogy. Imagine that you're uh you're a race car driver and uh you know you hear the uh I was gonna say the the pistol go off, whatever, whatever. You're starting the race and you've got blinders on and you can't see the track. You know, you're just sort of guessing where you're going, or maybe you put it in reverse and you can look in the rearview mirror, and that's that's obviously you're not gonna be very successful.
SPEAKER_02So without understanding the value creation plan, which essentially is telling the team these are the priorities that you should be focused on. It could be pricing, increases, reduction of costs on the operating, you know, operational level, and we're going after a new customer channel, for example. So everybody has to be focused on those three things. You know, even if you're a CFO, you're you're focused on those three.
SPEAKER_02If you're a COO, if you're a C H R O, you're those are the three. And that does mean stopping doing certain things. So if you never got the message, if you never got the memo, if you maybe didn't ask the question, what should we be focused on, then you're just gonna continue doing the old stuff that you were doing. And and think about it this way: if you're all in a canoe, and let's say it's a very large canoe, uh, you're gonna be rowing in different directions and you're gonna end up going in a circle rather than where you want to go.
SPEAKER_02That's not good. Absolutely.
SPEAKER_00Absolutely. If I recall uh this misalignment between the investment thesis and the value creation plan, it happens quite a quite quite a bit, right? So I what is the percentage that that that this happens? This this risk becomes material.
SPEAKER_02Well, nobody really knows. Um, but I would I would suspect, if I had to guess, in the lower middle market that more than 80% of all deals that take place in the lower middle market, and that's you know, the private equity ecosystem is shaped like a pyramid. So you got very few companies at the absolute top, and a huge number of private equity firms down at the bottom. So 80%, that's a substantial percentage of the overall ecosystem. Um, so 80% do not, as a matter of course, hand over a written document that says investment thesis or that says value creation plan.
SPEAKER_02In fact, they should be handing over the, you know, for those who are new and were recruited to the company, they should receive the management presentation and the sim as well. And you may not realize this because you may not have prior private equity experience, but you should ask for it. If the bank, if there was a bank involved, and there almost always is, the bank created a confidential information memorandum.
SPEAKER_02It's a sim, it's called a book. You should ask for that and you should read it and understand it. Uh, you should ask for the management presentation as well.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, and and going on a little bit around the the execution risk, and you had a nice uh kind of framework in describing all the various elements of the risks. So, in terms of the execution risk that lives inside a management team's capacity to absorb change, has the private equity industry systematically underestimated it? And why hasn't it been fixed?
SPEAKER_02That's an extremely good question, Gotham. Um, let's see if we can break that down. Has the private equity industry underestimated the management team's capacity, capability to embrace change? Is that the question? Yes, sir. Yeah, I I I think that's a a uh a novel question. I'm not sure I've been asked that before, and I'm not really sure I've I've given that a huge amount of thought, but the uh the evidence would support the fact that they expect that management can rapidly absorb the incredible amount of change that they'll be exposed to.
SPEAKER_02And let's face it, human beings do not like change. We do everything we possibly can as humans to avoid change. We like pattern recognition, we like doing things that are in our comfort zone, we like recognizing that we were successful doing things one way, and we don't really like figuring new stuff out. So I think the simple answer is absolutely. I think maybe perhaps going out on a little bit of a wing here, uh, I think perhaps there is in the back of many deal teams' minds the thought that if we keep pushing, if we keep pushing and keep introducing new elements of change to this management team, they're going to break.
SPEAKER_02Or they're another way, another analogy, they're going to sink. And there may be one or two members of that management team who are left swimming that can that can adapt. And those are the one or two that will keep, and everybody else will replace. But honestly, it takes nine months or 18 months to observe that. And that's kind of standard operating procedure at many private equity funds is to not ruffle feathers, not upset the Apple card, just sort of sit back and observe.
SPEAKER_02Uh, keep pushing and poking and prodding, but you know, we're not gonna change management too much, in part because they've made obligations to the or commitments to the founder. But at the nine-month mark, at the one-year mark, that's when they start to say, all right, well, now we're gonna bring in our experienced operators that know what they're doing. Um, so yeah, there's the the simple answer is yes, they uh yes, they do push too much and don't recognize how difficult change is, but I think on maybe in the back of their head, they're thinking, well, maybe they'll quit.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, and we know, for example, in many private equity uh firms that the deal teams are different from the actual operational teams. So have you ever seen uh an instance where you know the value creation plan that was on the slides looked great in the investment committee memo memo, but essentially it it was designed to break the team that had to execute it. Have you ever seen any instances or cases where where that was that was the that that actually materialized?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, and I'm gonna go back to another military example, and this time I'll I'll choose the uh the the enemy, the Navy. I'm just kidding, I'm an army guy. Um, so the the Navy SEALs are very highly respected and admired, of course. And one of the reasons is what they put SEAL team candidates through. The only people who apply to go through SEAL training are the best of the best, the people that know they have a fighting chance. And the reality of it is if you're putting the best of the best into that situation, that training environment, and it's incredibly grueling, uh, unrealistic expectations.
SPEAKER_02Um, they're pushing, prodding, poking, they're expecting a huge amount of change to come out of them. In other words, it's very similar to what a private equity, well, not physically, but uh, you know, mentally, emotionally, it might be similar. Um, and the reality is I don't know the exact percentage, but maybe a percent of the people who go through SEAL, SEAL school, SEAL training, you know, come out the other side as a SEAL. I don't know the percentage, so uh don't quote me, but it's a very low percentage. And every single person who goes through, starts to go through the training, thinks they have a fighting chance, otherwise they wouldn't put themselves through it.
SPEAKER_02So, you know, part of it I think does make sense. They're trying to get the best out of people, they're trying to suss out who are the ones that can swim.
SPEAKER_00Maybe shifting gears, kit. Uh, you've built this community of 700 plus PE-backed executives and operators, and you moderate rooms where they say things that they won't say to their sponsor. So, what's the widest gap between what sponsors believe creates value and what operators actually experience? And maybe a follow-up on that. Is that gap narrowing as the industry professionalizes or is it actually widening?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I'll take the second question first. I I think I think it's narrowing and it has to. I think that um, you know, there there's been a history, let's say private equity got its start sometime around 1980. Uh and it was called leverage buyout back then. And uh so the the history of private equity is not that long, and we're currently in the absolute worst period of private equity that this industry has ever experienced. And part of that is that deal teams boards recognize that they have to be much more hands-on and proactive in ensuring that value creation actually does take place.
SPEAKER_02In the past, it was sort of the rising tide raises all ships, and you buy it at a multiple of, you know, eight times, and you're pretty sure you'll be able to exit it at 10 or 12 times. And you know, it's not a it's not a huge amount of of lift and work. Um, but it's different today. And so, you know, what experienced operators will say to you that they won't say, you know, in a board meeting or in front of their sponsors, is that I think the main one is that deal team members, board members often say, well, just go figure it out.
SPEAKER_02You know, that's what we hired you for. And it's almost dismissive, disrespectful, a lack of understanding of the degree of effort and lift and you know, time constraints. Somebody put it really, really simply uh to me on a call just yesterday. They said that, you know, imagine that you are a senior executive at a founder-led or family-owned company, and you've worked there for 17 years, and you've never had to work um on a Sunday.
SPEAKER_02It just didn't even enter your remotest capacity. Generally speaking, you show up at 8 and you leave by 5:30 and you collect a paycheck, and all of a sudden, there's a new set of expectations laid upon you. And one of those expectations is that there's a phone call every Sunday night, for example, to prep for a Monday morning meeting. And it's just sort of like really surprising. Um, I'll give you another quick example that I thought was a good one. A chief strategy officer inside a private equity-backed company was the seniormost member of the management team who was an incumbent.
SPEAKER_02In other words, he used to report to Bill when Bill was the founder of the company before private equity. Bill's no longer involved. So the seniormost person there is the person that most of the staff, most of the employees, turn to now to ask for informal advice or to complain or to ask questions because they don't really know their CEO very well yet. And so this chief strategy officer told me that every day, it's not like there's a line waiting out his office door, but every day there are people coming in to visit.
SPEAKER_02And it's usually questions like, where's the fire? Like, where's the urgent? Why the urgency? Why, why is everything changing? Why are we all working so hard? Why where's this pressure? Where are we going? Like, what's the plan? What's the vision of the future? I have no idea. What's in it for me? And frankly, what was wrong with this company? What was wrong with the way we ran the company when Bill owned the company? I mean, it was good enough for that private equity group to buy us. Why, if they liked us and they obviously did, they bought us, why are they changing everything?
SPEAKER_02It doesn't make any sense. And you know, he said, these are good questions, and they're questions that the CEO needs to hear, but um, I shouldn't be answering them. They should be asking the CEO these questions.
SPEAKER_00Yes. It almost goes back to this private equity culture shock that you were talking about.
unknownRight.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, yeah.
SPEAKER_00It's a completely different world. And and when maybe going back to that example, so this chief strategy officer, does he or she um actually talk about the returns that need to be made within a given holding period? Do they go into that level of detail or oh yeah, sure.
SPEAKER_02Um, but at the end of the day, you know, one of the most powerful things, I'm sort of taking a little bit of a left turn here. One of the most powerful things I think that has happened to private equity in the last couple of years is the sudden notoriety and rise of sharing equity distributions all the way down to the lowest level employee in a platform company, which is unheard of in the past. And I think it was the Riverside Company that was one of the first to adapt this philosophy of well, if we if we embrace the concept of equity and equity distributions, then people do have something at stake personally, and they do say, What's in it for me?
SPEAKER_02Oh, that's right. I know what's in it for me. Um and I think this does really help enable this transition for people that are suddenly finding themselves feeling like they're putting out fires and they're working so hard under so much pressure. And I'll give you a simple example. There was an individual who worked in a manufacturing facility, and he realized that they were um uh they had three people working um on the night shift. And the only reason those three people were working on the night shift is that one particular type of machine required some sort of maintenance in the middle of the night every night.
SPEAKER_02And so those three people were involved in swapping out parts or doing whatever they needed to do. And so he thought about this and he said uh he he approached uh the operating partner and then this is just a factory floor employee. This is not even a manager. He said, you know, there is another piece of equipment, and that piece of equipment costs$65,000. And we have 11 facilities that are doing the same thing. So it's obviously something more than$650,000. That's a big investment for you to make.
SPEAKER_02But if we make that investment, then we won't have to pay the salary for those three people at 11 facilities. And if I just do sort of back of the envelope math, between now and the time we sell the business, I actually think this could have a positive impact. Do you do you think it could? And the operating partner said, absolutely. And he said that was an immediate one and a half million dollars that went to the bottom line with a multiple of, let's say, 10, that's 10 million bucks that just came from this one guy just raising his hand and saying, Hey, I have a I have an observation.
SPEAKER_02Now, would he have spoken up if he didn't have equity and they didn't say something to him about, you know, of course not. So I think it's powerful.
SPEAKER_00Super interesting. I love it. Uh I I just did uh did an episode uh on Nick Halliott Trans Dime exactly on this uh uh specific case uh that you're talking about, which is you know the price of the part, because you're not looking just at the price of the part, but you're looking at the price of downtime, right? And so if you calculate all of that, uh then that it it makes sense financially. Um so I I love that, love that example. Um let's start to bring this home, Kit. So what's the honest state of the lower middle market right now?
SPEAKER_00And what does the next three to five years look like for companies uh that were only ever profitable because of the interest rate environment?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I mean, I I think the big picture uh is that we have still a lot of aging baby boomers who own their businesses. We still, you know, we have a huge number of people a little bit older than I am that own businesses that generate more than$2 million of EBITDA, huge number of them, and they don't necessarily have an exit plan. And so they're ripe for the, you know, for for acquisition by private equity. So I would say the big picture is there's plenty of tailwind, there's plenty of future opportunity for private equity.
SPEAKER_02Um, you know, private equity does a lot more good to the U.S. economy, to the global economy, uh, than it does harm. It does cause pain, it does cause suffering. If you go to Reddit and read some of the posts there or Quora or wherever your favorite forums are, you can read all kinds of horrible stories about private equity, and they're largely true. But the grand, the biggest picture is private equity does improve the operations of so many businesses by making them much more efficient, much more profitable.
SPEAKER_02And you know, we all share in that because these businesses are obviously paying taxes. So that said, um, what's causing the pain and the discomfort right now? So it starts with the investors. The investors are not the private equity funds, they're just the ones that are deploying the capital and making the investment decisions. The investors are called limited partners, um, and it could be a high net worth individual or a pension fund or whatever. They're frustrated and disappointed, and they're kind of applying the squeeze because they're not getting the returns that they once did in a timely manner.
SPEAKER_02And if there's a lot of uncertainty about when they actually will get their returns. Why are they not getting their returns? Well, that's pretty simple. It's because 2021, 2022, uh, people were paying too much for businesses. Um, and today they can't sell those businesses for the amount they paid for them. So they're not going to sell them, they're just going to keep holding them. So we have these ghost funds, phantom funds, um, these secondary uh vehicles where a private equity group kind of extends the hold period artificially or creates kind of an artificial new fund to hold those companies for, you know, uh uh essentially for legal reasons.
SPEAKER_02Um, and you know, the interest rates are part of the problem. Um, it costs more today to acquire a business than it did five years ago. So it's it's um it's generally speaking, it's more difficult. So there was an article, I think it was Vane, that said uh 12 is the new five. And what that meant was you have to achieve 12% growth per year rather than 5% growth, which was the the old norm. And if you think about it, that's an enormous, it's more than a hundred percent increase.
SPEAKER_02So that's hard. And that's why there's so much emphasis today on value creation internally, the actual operations of the business. So um, as I said earlier, private equity is in the most challenging environment that it's ever been in in its history, but I don't think it's going to go away. You know, there's a lot of opportunity for acquisitions, and there really aren't any other uh, you know, what's the alternative? The odd the alternatives are twofold. Uh, these companies that you know need to exit because the founder is getting old, they they could go public.
SPEAKER_02Well, that's not going to work in 95% of cases. And then the other option is they sell to a strategic. And that is wholly dependent on whether the strategic acquirer would have actual appetite to do that acquisition, whereas private equity has continuous appetite. So bottom line is uh long-term, big picture, over the next three years or so, I'd say private equity is is going to be just just fine, but it's it's in an awkward situation today.
SPEAKER_00Well, this has been uh this has been a great interview, uh Kit, and uh really appreciate the insights from the inside of the operators' community. So if people want to get in touch with you, um, how would they do so?
SPEAKER_02Well, it's it's pretty simple. So my name is Kit, like first aid kit, so K-I-T, and my last name is L-I-S-L-E. And I think if you put those two words together in LinkedIn, you'll find me. Uh, I don't think there's too many other kit Lyles. Um, my email address is kit at theOperators.pe as in private equity. So I'm relatively easy to find, and I'm happy to connect with people on LinkedIn and uh I I respond to every email that I get. So happy to happy to connect.
SPEAKER_02Thank you. Thanks for this opportunity, Gotham.
SPEAKER_00That thank you, Kit. Appreciate it.
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