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Mythic Mind

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196 - Kierkegaard's Concept of Anxiety: Anxiety Is Not an Ailment to Be Removed

Oct 26, 202634 minAudio
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Watch the video: https://mythicmindfellowship.com/kierkegaards-concept-of-anxiety-anxiety-is-not-an-ailment-to-be-removed-mythic-mind-ep-196/ Today I'm giving you a free look into my Mythic Mind Fellowship course, The Psychology of Søren Kierkegaard: Life in Anxiety & Despair, as we begin with the preface and introduction to The Concept of Anxiety. Before the argument proper, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, the Watchman of Copenhagen, tells us what kind of book this is and what kind of book it is not: not a clinical study, not a self-help manual, and not a theology textbook borrowing a psychological title. He is a psychologist with theology in view, writing a monograph rather than a system. The course is underway now and is included with Fellow and Companion memberships, so joining the Fellowship gets you the rest of it. We look at what happens when sin is handled in the wrong field (aesthetics, metaphysics, or psychology on its own), why earnestness is the proper mood for this book, and how Haufniensis maps four neighboring disciplines: first ethics, dogmatics, psychology, and second ethics. Psychology can trace the real possibility of sin, but it cannot cross the qualitative leap. That is why its proper object is anxiety, which is not an ailment to be removed but the threshold where we face either despair or faith. Chapters: 0:00 A free look at the Kierkegaard course 0:30 The texts for this study 5:53 The preface and introduction 6:52 Vigilius Haufniensis and Kierkegaard's pseudonyms 8:28 A psychologist with theology in view 10:40 The Watchman of Copenhagen: a monograph, not a system 16:49 Sin out of place: the false moods 19:39 Earnestness, the proper mood 22:35 Four disciplines: first ethics, dogmatics, psychology, second ethics 27:44 Psychology's limit and the qualitative leap 29:43 Takeaways and what comes next The Psychology of Søren Kierkegaard: Life in Anxiety and Despair (course introduction): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQ6KDO2mNPY Anxiety Means You Can Choose (Mythic Mind, ep. 189): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DwKDIRfQGQY Kierkegaard on Man’s Highest Perfection (Mythic Mind, ep. 193): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJXOC2PfR3M The Death of Ivan Ilyich: Am I Guilty? (Mythic Mind, ep. 194): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIgiz_wQbXk Oblivion's Sheogorath and Kierkegaard's Sickness unto Death (Mythic Mind Games, ep. 34): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZUgEUzaBXU 📚 Books discussed The Concept of Anxiety by Søren Kierkegaard (Thomte translation): https://bookshop.org/a/129785/9780691020112 Philosopher of the Heart: The Restless Life of Søren Kierkegaard by Clare Carlisle: https://bookshop.org/a/129785/9781250798428 Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair by Gregory R. Beabout Join the Mythic Mind Fellowship: https://mythicmindfellowship.com/membership Listen to/watch the Mythic Mind podcasts: - Mythic Mind - Mythic Mind Games - Mythic Mind Movies #Kierkegaard #TheConceptOfAnxiety #Philosophy #ChristianPsychology #Existentialism #MythicMind Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/mythic-mind--5808321/support.

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Speaker 1Today I'm giving you a free look into our Mythic Mind course on the psychology of Soren Kierkegaard, Life in Anxiety and Despair. This is a course made of asynchronous lectures and recorded live meetings, both of which are available as videos and through a special podcast feed for fellows and companions of Mythic Mind. If you would like to jump into the course already in progress, or just work through it at your own pace, then I welcome you to sign on as a fellow today. But for now, let's talk about the preface and introduction to Soren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Anxiety. Welcome to The Psychology of Soren Kierkegaard,

Speaker 1Life in Anxiety and Despair. I'm Dr. Andrew Snyder, and I'm really excited to be leading you on this eight-unit study. I haven't had a chance to deal with Kierkegaard in this kind of formal setting since I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the theology of self-formation in Soren Kierkegaard, kind of looking at his theological narrative of what it means to become a fully integrated, authentic human self. And for that, I primarily based my work on the concept of anxiety

Speaker 1and the sickness unto death, which we will be reading for this study, and then also fear and trembling, which we won't get to at least directly in this study, although I'll probably mention it from time to time. In the concept of anxiety, well, it's just that. It's about anxiety. It's about human freedom. It is about focusing us on our responsibility to choose how we are oriented in this world. And that was really vague, but as Kierkegaard tells us,

Speaker 1anxiety itself is a little bit vague. But we'll get into more of what that means, obviously, as we work through the text. Also, we have the sickness unto death, which really focuses in on the misuse of freedom, our misrelation to anxiety that leads us into despair. And so Spoilers, the sickness unto death that Kierkegaard is talking about here is indeed despair. It's that spiritual death that comes through a misuse of freedom. And so he's going to analyze or he's going to demonstrate for us the various forms that this can take. And this is one of my

Speaker 1all-time favorite books. It easily makes the list of the top ten, probably top five. There's a lot of value in this text. I look forward to getting to that. And then I said I also did some work with Fear and Tremblings. which uses the scenario of Abraham and Isaac to talk about the life of faith, or more specifically, the leap of faith. But again, I will mention that probably more in context with the sickness unto death, but we won't directly get to that in this study just for the sake of capacity for time, but maybe we'll get to it some other time. Now, these are the

Speaker 1only texts that are required for this study. If you would like some secondary helps, there are a number that I could provide for you. I read I don't know how many books and articles when I was doing my dissertation. And so I still have that literature review somewhere if you want more places to go. But for now, I'm just going to recommend two secondary sources to you if you want to go that route. The first one is a biography, which I really like, and I'm actually still reading this one. It's called The Philosophy of the Heart by Claire Carlyle. It's a very Kierkegaardian approach to Kierkegaard.

Speaker 1I've read some of the longer, more... academic presentations of Kierkegaard's life. But this one, I think, treats Kierkegaard the most authentically by engaging with his mind and the things that he's wrestling with. It's a good way to engage with Kierkegaard rather than just learning about Kierkegaard. And I think that's the more appropriate way to go. And so I very much recommend Claire Carlyle's The Philosopher of the Heart. And then also for a text that is going to help you better understand what's going on in the concept of anxiety and the sickness into death. I strongly recommend

Speaker 1Gregory Beabout's Freedom and Its Misuses. Now, as I said, I've read many, many books that deal with these texts. And to be honest, most of them are pretty bad. Most of the Kierkegaardian scholarship, especially the modern scholarship, really tries to recast Kierkegaard as some kind of proto-secular existentialist. They try to link him with Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. And that is just an abysmal misframing of who Kierkegaard is. Kierkegaard is very much a Christian philosopher. He is a

Speaker 1Christian existentialist. And that's just going to come through very clearly in the reading, that he's giving us a distinctly Christian psychology. And so most of the scholarship tries to recast him. Gregory B. Abbott does a great job of dealing with the real Kierkegaard and dealing with what he really had to say about anxiety and despair and how we can misuse our human freedom. So definitely recommend this text. Now, if you have already started on the reading, you'll know that this is not an easy book. I remember when

Speaker 1I was first reading it, working on my dissertation, or at least preparing to work on my dissertation. I was up many nights into two, three in the morning, just down an espresso and racking my brain as to what he is talking about. This is not an easy first read. And so I really hope that these videos and our conversations will help to guide you through this, to walk through the labyrinth in order to discover the prize. And that's largely what Kierkegaard is doing, that sometimes, oftentimes, I

Speaker 1think he writes in a way that's difficult to follow so that you have to have absolute focus. You have to get engaged. You have to get involved. You have to struggle. As Kierkegaard says elsewhere, of course the task must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the noble-hearted. And there's a lot of nobility to be gained from this text, so I hope that these videos will help you to go a little bit further into what he's saying. Now today I just want to talk about the preface and introduction to The Concept of Anxiety. And so today

Speaker 1we're going to be reading the opening of Soren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Anxiety, the preface and the introduction. the pages that come before the argument prompter. So this is where he's really setting things up. No background on Kierkegaard is assumed here. If this is your first time with him, then you are in good company because much of the introduction is about where a reader ought to stand before the beginning. He's telling us what kind of book this is and what kind of book it's not. The quotations that I provide will be coming from the Radar Topped edition right here. These are the versions that Well, they're

Speaker 1the versions that I'm used to. I've looked at some other translations, and I'm sure that they're fine, but these are some pretty standard versions. These are the ones that I'm used to, and also, they all look nice together on a shelf, as they're part of the same edition. So that's always pleasing on an aesthetic level. And so these are the translations I'm using, the Thot for Concept of Anxiety, and the Hongs for the Sixth Ascent of Death. Now, if you look at the title page for the Concept of Anxiety, you're going to see that it is not saved by Soren Kierkegaard. But he provides a pseudonym instead, Vigilius Hofniensis, who presents himself as a psychologist rather than

Speaker 1as a theologian. And Kierkegaard often does this, especially in his very psychological writings, in that he writes with pseudonyms. And this is a way of having these different texts do different things. His different pseudonyms are writing from distinct perspectives, distinct orientations. And so all together they create this cast of characters. that gives us a rhetorical advantage over just having Kierkegaard himself tell us what he believes. This is

Speaker 1part of his existential strategy. This is part of the labyrinth where you have to look at his corpus as a cast of characters enacting a play of sorts. And the play itself is telling us something, even as each character is telling us something. And so this particular character, this particular pseudonym, is playing the role of the psychologist rather than a theologian. And Kierkegaard said that he wants anyone who quotes these books to cite the respective pseudonyms rather than his own, rather than Kierkegaard's. And that's because, I mean, sometimes his pseudonyms say things that Kierkegaard might

Speaker 1not say. And so in order to respect Kierkegaard's wishes, but also to better understand Kierkegaard himself, we need to somewhat distinguish the pseudonym from Kierkegaard. And so when I refer to Hofniessus, I mean the particular voice that wrote this book, even though obviously I'm still talking about Kierkegaard in the end. Now, in ordinary speech, the way that we normally use it, anxiety names a condition to be treated and, if possible, removed. Hofniessus is not writing a clinical study or a self-help manual, nor is this a

Speaker 1theology textbook on original sin that has borrowed a psychological title. And by the way, sorry if you hear some background noise here. There's some construction going on nearby. But so instead, this is a psychological inquiry into anxiety written by someone who keeps the doctrine of hereditary sin in view. So it's going to be very important for Hofniessus that we carefully distinguish what we're doing and what lens we are doing it with. So we stay in our proper domain. He is not a theologian approaching psychology. He is a

Speaker 1psychologist with theology in view. And this division of domains is important. He does not want us to use the wrong set of methodological tools for dealing with the phenomena in view, dealing with the subject matter that is in view. This is why at the very beginning, even before the preface, we get this line about how Socrates was great because he knew what he didn't know. And Kierkegaard, he wrote his dissertation on Socrates. So he very much has appreciation for the Socratic spirit of recognizing what it is that

Speaker 1you don't know and not overreaching into that realm of ignorance and claiming it as knowledge. And so he's going to instill in us this humility and and this fidelity to subject matter in reference to the discipline that we are dealing with. Now, in this presentation, we have four main sections, and each one prepares for the next. First we have the preface where we learn who is speaking and we get the modesty with which he speaks. Next we're going to look at the mismatched disciplines. What happens to a concept like sin when it's handled in the

Speaker 1wrong field? Next we're going to look at four neighboring ideas or disciplines. psychology, dogmatics, and two kinds of ethics, each with its own task and its own limits. And then lastly, we're going to look at psychology's limit. What can psychology see and what can it not see? And then we're going to stop just before chapter one, where Hophniessus turns to Adam and the human race. And one question will take us through all four of these main stops. Where does the question of anxiety belong? Now, the preface

Speaker 1tells us a little bit more about the kind of voice that we're going to be hearing from Hophniessus. Now, this name, Vigilius Hoffniensis, it means roughly the Watchman of Copenhagen, which of course is where Kierkegaard lived. And the Watchman's post fits. He stands at a fixed point and he reports what he sees there. That's what he's doing. He's reporting what he sees. He's reporting his observations. And this post is his chosen limit. He observes and he describes the human being. Doctrine stays in view, but he does not claim to preach it or to settle it. This

Speaker 1is not a book of faith, even though he will talk about faith. Our next pseudonym, when we get to the sickness unto death, he is going to be a more explicitly faith-driven or theological writer. But Hofdien says he's more of an observer. And the preface opens with this lesson in discipline. He says, in my opinion, one who intends to write a book ought to consider carefully the subject about which he wishes to write. And this sounds obvious. For Hofniessus, this is a rule that he intends to keep.

Speaker 1And he also punctures intellectual self-importance in the preface. He says that not everyone who is stoop-shouldered is an atlas, nor did he become such by supporting a world. This line separates the appearance of seriousness from seriousness itself. To appear burdened by great ideas is not necessarily to carry them. And we've already seen this in the recent discussion that we had on to need God as a human being's highest perfection. That Kierkegaard is constantly going to push us to sincerity, to a real internal appropriation of the truth

Speaker 1that we claim to believe. He's not going to let us keep things on the surface. He's not going to let us live according to appearance, but he wants us to live according to reality. He also says that he who presumes to develop a system is responsible for much. but he who writes a monograph can and also ought to be faithful over a little. Hufni Asis declines the ambition of a system. He writes a monograph, a study of one concept, and he asks only to be faithful to it. This is not false humility or a polite disclaimer.

Speaker 1This modesty is part of his method. A system is responsible for much because it presumes to place everything, the existing individual included, within one movement of thought. But a monograph accepts a narrower responsibility, and in accepting it, it can be honest about what it does not and cannot explain. And so we need to judge the pages ahead by the standard that he sets here, not whether they explain everything, but whether they stay faithful to the one concept in hand. And this is going to be very important, because there

Speaker 1are some points where it seems like he has some dubious theology. To be quite honest, he sounds very Pelagian, for those of you who know what that means. where it sounds like he's propping up this very works-oriented kind of religiosity. But he's not. He's not operating in the realm of dogmatics. He's operating in the realm of psychology. And I think that when we understand the limits that he's placing on himself, that's going to save him from

Speaker 1some possible theological judgments, if you take a more orthodox kind of position. And I'll deal with that in more detail when we get there, but already I think that this framing is very important to keep in mind. He's dealing with one particular topic. He's not attempting to deal with everything all at once. Continuing with this warning about intellectual showmanship, he says, By failing to proceed in a scientific manner and by not taking care to see that the individual issues do not outrun one another, as if it were a matter of arriving first at the masquerade,

Speaker 1a person occasionally achieves a brilliance and amazes others by giving the impression that he has already comprehended that which is still very remote. And so picture the masquerade. Questions that should arrive in their proper order push ahead in costume, as though the point were to arrive first. The result can be dazzling, but it is the brilliance of a disguise, the impression of comprehension without its substance. His example is logic, and he says, Actuality is not served thereby, for contingency,

Speaker 1which is an essential part of the actual, cannot be admitted within the realm of logic. Logic is not served thereby, for if logic has thought actuality, it has included something that it cannot assimilate. It had appropriated at the beginning what it should only presuppose. So Hofniessus is defending both sides of a boundary. Logic is harmed when it pretends to contain actuality. and actuality is harmed when it is reduced to a moment of thought. And what he's doing here, and I'm not going to go too far off into this tangent, but he's really critiquing the thought of Hegel. Hegel,

Speaker 1who was a major name in his day, he was a rationalist, something of a pantheist, where he believed that reason or God, you know, rationality, the logos, and the contingent moving world around us, that it's all one and the same. It's all one thing. And so for Hegel, logic necessarily is what is. But Kierkegaard wants to push back against that and say that no, logic belongs to the realm of idealism. It provides a set of rules for what can or must happen given certain conditions. But

Speaker 1the logic is not the same thing as the actuality of those conditions. There is an important difference there that preserves human freedom. Because if logic is directly tied to reality, the world of facts, of things that are actually happening right now, then even my freedom is nothing more than the movement of pure logic, of absolute fatalism. And Kierkegaard is going to reject that. He says, no, I have real genuine choices to make. And the only reason you would say otherwise is because you're misunderstanding the domain of logic.

Speaker 1So it matters. It might sound like academic disputes, but this actually matters in a very real human sense where these disciplines are finding their boundaries. It matters where a question is treated and in what kind of spirit it is treated. So here's the claim on which the first half of the introduction turns. Sin, Hapniyasa says, has its specific place, or more correctly, it has no place. It is an absence. It's a privation. And this is its specific nature. When sin is treated in a place other

Speaker 1than its own, It is altered by being subjected to a non-essential refraction of reflection. The concept is altered, and thereby the mood that properly corresponds to the correct concept is also disturbed, and instead of the endurance of the true mood, there is the fleeting phantom of false moods. Concept and mood come together. The way that we're framing something and the way that we're oriented toward it, these ideas or these activities come together. To misplace sin is

Speaker 1not only to define it badly, it is to take up the wrong posture toward it. Aesthetics is the first wrong whom he gives. He says that thus when sin is brought into aesthetics, the mood becomes either light-minded or melancholy, for the category in which sin lies is that of contradiction, and this is either comic or tragic. Sin dealt with in aesthetics becomes something to laugh at or something to lament, and in either case, something is looked at from a distance, It's not looked at as the absence that is within you.

Speaker 1Metaphysics is the second wrong home that he gives, the wrong discipline. He says that if sin is dealt with in metaphysics, the mood becomes that of dialectical uniformity and disinterestedness, which ponder sin as something that cannot withstand the scrutiny of thought. Here sin is thought away, as if it were an error in the argument rather than something that concerns every human being. And so I think it's true, and I think Kierkegaard would agree that sin is a privation, but it's even framing it that way removes some of the existential struggle, right? It treats it as a metaphysical object,

Speaker 1even as a negated object, but doesn't yet treat it as something that we have a relationship to, and that's where sin needs to be treated. Now, the third wrong discipline that he gives us matters most for this book because it is psychology treating sin by itself. He says that if sin is dealt with in psychology, the mood becomes that of persistent observation. like the fearlessness of a secret agent. The observer is fearless because nothing is at stake for him. He's simply the observing psychologist. And under

Speaker 1that gaze, sin hardens into a condition to be studied. Sin becomes a clinical enterprise rather than an existential and a spiritual enterprise. And in the next slide, we're going to look at why that's a mistake. And so this is not, of course, a rejection of psychology. Hofniessus is a psychologist after all. And he named psychology's proper mood as that of a discovering anxiety. The point is that psychology must not take sin as its object. Psychology's object is going to be anxiety. And so those are the false moods that he gives. So what is the true one?

Speaker 1What's the right one for dealing with sin? Hofnese says that the mood that corresponds to sin is earnestness. He will not separate understanding from the positive. of the one who understands. A concept such as sin must not merely be defined. It is received in a certain mood. To meet it with a smirk, a sigh, or an observer's detachment is already to have misunderstood it. And this is why the psychologist's gaze fails. He says that sin is not a psychological state. And treating it as such will

Speaker 1continually annul the reality of what sin is. Sin is not a specimen to be pinned and studied at leisure. It is that which is to be overcome. Mere observation lacks what he calls the victorious flight of earnestness out of sin. Earnestness, then, is the mood with which this book has to be read. It's not hyper-focused on getting dogmatics right. It is instead focused on the seriousness of a person, who knows that the matter concerns him. That's

Speaker 1what matters, seriousness, earnestness, this internal appropriation of the realities that we are discussing. And now Hofniessa states the book's task in his own words. He says that the present work has set as its task the psychological treatment of the concept of anxiety, but in such a way that it constantly keeps inment and before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin. And this sentence has two halves that are doing some different things. He says that the treatment that he's giving is psychological and its object is anxiety. Remember that that is psychology's object, anxiety, not sin. But

Speaker 1the dogma of hereditary sin is kept in mind and before the eye, but it's not what psychology explains. And so he's presupposing dogmatics, but he's not analyzing dogmatics. He doesn't have dogmatics in view. He is simply presupposing dogmatics. Later in the introduction, he draws this line with more precision. He says that While psychology thoroughly explores the real possibility of sin, dogmatics explains hereditary sin, that is, the ideal possibility of sin. And keep those two possibilities in part. The real possibility of sin is psychology's field, the condition

Speaker 1of the existing human being, chiefly anxiety, in which sin can come about. And so we're looking at the conditions of the human being, chiefly anxiety, in which sin can come about. But the ideal possibility is dogmatics field, that is hereditary sin, which does not derive or explain away but presupposes. Neither discipline takes the actuality of sin as its object. That belongs, as we're going to see, to what's called the second ethics. So psychology does not replace doctrine, and doctrine does not do psychology's work. And this is

Speaker 1why I read Hofniessus as a Christian psychologist rather than as a secular one. His description of anxiety is offered from within a theological frame, that it never pretends to generate. We're not dealing with apologetics here. We're dealing with presuppositional Christian psychology. Now, here's the map for dealing with four major disciplines that he distinguishes in this introduction. And really, the whole book depends on keeping these categories distinct. And so each of the fields shown here has its own starting place, its own presuppositions, and its own relation to sin.

Speaker 1The first is ideal ethics. First, he deals with ideal ethics. He says that this first ethics proposes to bring ideality into actuality. On the other hand, it is not in the nature of its movement to raise actuality up to ideality. He likens this to the law. He says that what is said of the law is also true of ethics. It is a disciplinarian that demands, but by its demands only judges, but does not bring forth life. This first ethics presupposes metaphysics and ignores sin. Sin belongs to it,

Speaker 1he says. only insofar as upon this concept it is shipwrecked with the aid of repentance. And so this first ethics is the law. It provides the domain of the good. This is what ought to be, what ought to be done. What it doesn't provide is a mode of bringing sinners up to the ideal, right? There's no atonement here. There's no redemption here. All there is is the law that judges. And we certainly see some of his Lutheran tendencies approaching here, right? It's the law that That kills, it doesn't bring life.

Speaker 1Next we have dogmatics, which moves in the opposite direction. He says that this proceeds from actuality. It begins with the actual in order to raise it up into ideality. It does not deny the presence of sin. On the contrary, it presupposes it and explains it by presupposing hereditary sin. This next line is carefully worded here. He said that dogmatics must not explain hereditary sin, but rather explain it by presupposing it. Now, psychology is given a narrower field. This is the real possibility of sin, as we saw

Speaker 1in the last slide, with the actuality of sin denied to it. Its proper object is anxiety. And then the second ethics that he talks about rests on a different foundation from first ethics. He says that the second ethics has the actuality of sin within its scope, and here psychology can intrude only through a misunderstanding. It presupposes dogmatics but completes it only in such a way that here, as everywhere, the presupposition is brought out. Even so, it deals with sin's manifestation, but not with its coming into existence.

Speaker 1And keeping these categories distinct is important. It's a quick review looking at the chart here. First ethics provides us with the demands of ideal goodness. Like the law, it judges, but it does not bring forth life. Looking at dogmatics, it begins not from the ideal, but from the actual. This is more of an existential enterprise. It begins from actuality, what is given, and it deals with the presence of sin that is already there. And the psychology deals with the real possibility of sin. This is the anxiety that accompanies human freedom. Next, we have second ethics. This is

Speaker 1sin's actuality and manifestation, not its coming into existence. This asks the question, how do sinners become redeemed? How do we achieve the good? How do we rise up to the ideal? But that table makes things look a little bit static. Hophniensis also tells us the story of how one gives way to the other. And this story begins with failure. The first ethics was shipwrecked on the sinfulness of a single individual. Therefore, instead of being able to explain the sinfulness, the first ethics fell into an even

Speaker 1greater and ethically more enigmatic difficulty since the sin of the individual expanded into the sin of the whole race. An ethics of ideal demand meets a person who has already failed those demands and has nothing to offer that failure. Dogmatics answers the difficulty. At this point, dogmatics came to the rescue with hereditary sin. A rescue is not an explanation. Dogmatics does not show how sin came to be. It takes hereditary sin as its starting place and only proceeds from there. And only on that foundation does a new

Speaker 1ethics begin. The new ethics presupposes dogmatics, and by means of hereditary sin it explains the sin of the single individual, while at the same time it set ideality as its task, not as a movement from above and downward, but from below and upward. The direction of ethics has now been reversed. The first ethics looks down from the ideal and finds only failure. The second ethics begins where we actually are, with sin acknowledged, with dogmatic sin acknowledged, and it sets the ideal before us as a task. Its ideality lies,

Speaker 1he says, in the penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin, But note carefully, not with metaphysical light-mindedness or with psychological concupiscence. And so the first ethics looks down from the realm of the ideals and it finds only sinners who don't measure up. Dogmatics does not so much explain our sinfulness as it does give it a name, right? Hereditary sin, original sin. It names the fact that we are sinners. It better frames our position before the ideal. And the second ethic says in light of this dogmatic reality,

Speaker 1Where do we go from here? That's the question that it's asking. And now we arrive at the limit that defines this whole book. He says that psychology can bring its concern to the point where it seems as if sin were there, but the next thing, that sin actually is there, is qualitatively different from the first. And so look at these two boxes here on the slide and the space between them. On one side is what psychology can do. It can describe the conditions, the contours, the possibilities. On the other side is the fact that sin is there. It's what happens on the other side of this leap.

Speaker 1And between them is not a slope, but it's a qualitative difference. No amount of psychological description carries us across it. And later chapters will call that crossing, this leap, this word that I already threw out there. Now, Hofniessus draws this boundary as strictly as he can. He says that on the other hand, when it comes to sin, the whole content of actuality is denied to psychology. Only the possibility of sin still belongs to it. But for ethics, the possibility of sin never occurs. Psychology, he adds, sits

Speaker 1and traces the contours and calculates the angles of possibility, and that is its proper task, and it shouldn't pretend to do more. And this is why this book, this book of psychology, is about anxiety. Anxiety is the psychological state that stands at the threshold, the awareness of possibility before the leap. And the threshold is ambiguous. Anxiety is neither good nor evil in itself. It is the occasion of decision. It can become the occasion of despair, where the self tries to establish itself on its own, or

Speaker 1it can become the occasion of faith, where the self freely accepts its dependency on God, and so becomes itself. And that's the reading that I really want to press in here, that anxiety is ambiguously formative. It's not an ailment to be removed, and it's not the sartorian burden of having to create oneself. No, it forms us precisely because it places us before our relationship to God, where freedom is fulfilled in faith rather than in self-assertion. So three things to take away here and how each changes

Speaker 1how you read the rest of the book. First, we have mood and category. Where a concept is placed shapes both what it means and how we relate to it. Misplaced, sin becomes comic, tragic, thought away, or a mere state. but its proper mood is earnestness, earnest resistance, he says elsewhere. When Hofdiennes says it takes us time to really focus in on methods, this is why, because getting the method wrong is going to mess up the subject matter that we're dealing with, and that has very real-world results. Second,

Speaker 1we have these four neighboring disciplines, first ethics, dogmatics, psychology, and second ethics. They each have their own field, and the shipwreck on page 20 shows us why the first must give way. And so we need to really pay attention to what angle we're using, what discipline we're maintaining. Psychology deals with the possibility of sin, which manifests in as anxiety. And the second ethics is the view from below with sin's actuality in view. And so we are affirming the dogmatic reality of the sin that we've inherited.

Speaker 1And now we're trying to figure out how we reach the ideal. And so psychology, which is going to be our primary focus, goes as far as the possibility of sin or the possibility of the qualitative decision, but that's where it stops. The sin that manifests through a misuse of our freedom is qualitatively different than what came before it. And so psychology can look at the self before sin, the self before the qualitative leap into sin. Psychology can then look at the self that is in sin, but

Speaker 1what it can't really deal with is that transition point. And so we're going to read every chapter ahead as a description of this threshold, looking specifically at anxiety and not as an account of the crossing over that comes through the decision. Next time, we're going to take a look at section one with this great title, Anxiety as the Presupposition of Hereditary Sin and as Explaining Hereditary Sin Retrogressively in Terms of Its Origin. Put simply, the chapter is going to ask us how Adam, the human race, and each single individual belong together and what anxiety has

Speaker 1to do with the first sin. And there, Hophnesus will write that the prohibition from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil awakens in Adam freedom's possibility. Our current distinctions are what let that line be read as psychology rather than a story about the origin of evil. And so this is important to understand as you move forward, that even when he's dealing with the Genesis account of Adam and with the fall, he's not doing so first and foremost as a theologian. He's doing first and foremost as a psychologist. And so he's using Adam as a

Speaker 1case study for the universal man. But he's also going to talk about in what sense Adam is the universal man and how the individual relates to the universal humanity. And so keep that in mind. He's doing psychology with theology in view. He's not first and foremost doing theology. So I hope that this was a helpful introduction. Next time we'll be going through all of section one of the concept of anxiety. And I will say that if any of this or anything that you read doesn't sink in right away, that's okay. It took me several reads

Speaker 1to start to get some framework for what KickGuard is doing here. And so my recommendation for you is if you get stuck in a certain section, it takes some time to reread a little bit, think about it. But don't take too long. Right. Sometimes it's best just to keep going and you'll pick up things as you move along, even if you don't pick up everything all at once. And so as you keep going, things will start to click. Things will start to come together and you'll start to get a better understanding of what he's doing. And so don't give in to despair. Maintain freedom's possibility and continue moving on. I'll talk to you next time. Thank you

Speaker 1for listening to the Mythic Mind Podcast or watching on YouTube or the newly redesigned site at mythicmindfellowship.com. If you haven't seen it yet, then I welcome you to check it out. In my humble opinion, it is truly a beautiful experience now that I'm very happy with. And if you're not already a qualifying member, then I welcome you to sign on as a fellow to access the rest of the course. I'll talk to you next time as we continue to explore the Psyche. Thank you.

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