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Impact Quantum: A Podcast for the Quantum Curious

Quantum Security Challenges - Cryptographic Identities, AI Threats, and National Policy

Sep 1, 202646 minVideo
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In this episode, co-host Candace Cahootie sits down with Christopher Turk, a leading expert in post-quantum cryptography at KPMG, to unpack the pressing issues facing organizations as quantum technology inches ever closer to breaking conventional encryption. Together, they dive into why Washington, D.C. has become a unique hotbed for quantum security, how government mandates are shaping adoption, and why the real challenge in post-quantum cryptography may lie more in asset identification than in technology itself. You'll hear firsthand accounts of red teaming quantum systems, debates on collaboration across the industry, and practical advice for both regulated and non-regulated sectors. Whether you're a quantum expert or "quantum curious," this episode will give you fresh insights on preparing for a crypto-future - where today's paranoia is tomorrow's best practice. Links Christopher on LinkedIn - https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopher-t-9a259783/ Watch on YouTube - https://youtu.be/AP0vKL-2J20 Time Stamps 00:00 Post-quantum cryptography origins 05:34 Cybersecurity threats to financial systems 09:18 International collaboration challenges 11:15 Changing perspectives on Nvidia 14:09 Need for better collaboration in quantum 19:57 Enhancing restaurant user experience 23:46 Technical vs. compliance focus in PQC 26:10 Understanding RSA configuration and security 29:56 Challenges in managing cryptographic identities 30:53 Discussing Salesforce sandbox integration 34:28 Bypassing quantum security measures 40:07 Credential Expiration and Security Risks 42:27 Discussing security measures for Dingo 44:37 Networking and upcoming conferences

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Transcript

From the show.

0:00Did you ever think you would work in a tense geopolitical or adjacent to a tense geopolitical space? Because I certainly didn't. I mean, how far back do you want to go? If you say a year or 10 years ago, probably not. Yeah, that's what I mean, like 10 years ago. I mean, I don't think— because I remember, and living in DC, you get a different perspective on the world than you do anywhere else. Candace and I both grew up in New York, and you get a very different perspective there. But since I've lived here now 20-plus years,

0:32the thinking here is different. So when I talk to colleagues and even— this would've been 2, 3 years ago, I said, you're going to see a company like Nvidia treated like a defense contractor. Right. And they're going to have export controls. And my former colleagues who are based in Raleigh and in Boston, and if you're clever and you can figure out how to use LinkedIn, you'll know exactly what company I'm talking about, thought I was insane. They thought I was tinfoil hat guy, right? Yet what have we seen over the last, what, 24 months?

1:05Yeah, something pretty close to that. Welcome to Impact Quantum. Hello and welcome back to Impact Quantum, the podcast where we explore the emerging industry that is quantum computing and what it means for the world at large, because as it becomes more and more closer to being real, and don't send the hate, it

1:38is very real today, that we're gonna have an interesting conversation today. But first, I wanna introduce the most quantum curious person I know, Candace Cahootie. How's it going, Candace? It's great. Thank you for asking. I'm really excited for today. We've been talking more about post-quantum cryptography lately, and today we have the opportunity to talk to an SME in post-quantum cryptography who is leading the efforts at KPMG. His name is Christopher Turk. How are you, Christopher? I'm doing great. Thank you

2:11for joining us today. Also, welcome to the show. Welcome to the show. Also a fellow resident of the DC metro area. We were swapping stories in the virtual green room about Northern Virginia and data centers and things like that. Although you live— you don't live in Data Center Alley, you do live next to it. But not close enough to hear the, the AC units going. So it's probably not a coincidence that you're in the post-quantum cryptography space and you live in DC and not where, not any other city in the world. I would imagine that's not a

2:45coincidence. I would say that it's not for sure. Military, or at least some in doing cybersecurity as well. And NIST is obviously a big part of, we could talk about that. She doesn't work in the quantum cryptography stuff or certifications. Though, funny story, when my oldest was at the daycare center there, one of the other parents— I didn't know this until they had for Mother's Day, what does your mom do? And one of the moms said she, she was a researcher in post-quantum

3:16cryptography. This is 10 years ago. This was like, now it's, I wouldn't say it, it's not like AI where everybody and their dog is an expert in it. But, or thinks they're an expert in it. But post-quantum cryptography used to, was a very niche topic 10 years ago. And so it's very interesting. This, I think this is one of the best places to be if you're in the PQC space, because the government saw this pretty early. Before I even knew about quantum computing, I was sitting at a public sector event at Microsoft and the, the, one of the

3:49speakers had said something to the effect of, yeah, this may be 10, 20 years away, This was 10 years ago. So 10, 20 years as a forecasted date was not unreasonable then. He said, but think about how slow government systems move, government IT moves. You wanna start today. So with that in mind, where do we stand now? Because quantum is as close to being able to break conventional encryption now than it's ever been. What's the temperature of the room now?

4:19So when I think about the temperature for post-quantum cryptography, I think I look at it from 2 different lenses. So one, there is a legislation lens pushing mandates. So I would say that's pretty hot. It's pretty heavy right now. We are seeing a lot of mandates come across out of the White House. We are seeing a lot of strategy being developed at the policy level. We know that NIST is already approving post-quantum safe algorithms for cryptography. So we're seeing a lot from, let's say, legislation policy.

4:53When I see, when I look at PQC from a different perspective, meaning industry, and when we say industry, we know that government, they're very focused on it. So we can say that we're seeing adoption discussions happening within government and Public sector. But then when we talk about the other industries that we've listed as these are going to be the next in line that really have to have it, which is like healthcare and finance, we are seeing the discussions are ramping up, but we're not seeing adoption

5:28come as fast as, let's say, we're seeing it being discussed within public sector or government. Right. That makes a lot of sense because you mentioned the 2 use cases where I would think privacy and things like that would have it. We had another guest, and hopefully by the time this is released, that show has been— we do too many podcasts, you kind of forget what's been released. But he basically said bad actors could destroy the global financial system, not just the US, and time that with a particular

5:59aggressive military kinetic type option and could literally destroy wealth overnight by breaking the financial system and the encryption and the keys, not just to our personal accounts, but to the higher-level accounts that kind of link all these things together. And that, that would cause more chaos than any bomb alone could do, right? And it would basically— it'd be a big problem and a big mess. So yeah, I would imagine that financial institutions, healthcare institutions are— And we've seen kind of just with ransomware stuff that healthcare institutions are

6:32not They can't handle conventional threats. I would say the banks are probably better prepared for kind of conventional cyber threats, but hospitals, as we see, and increasingly also local governments are not. So I think it's a wake-up call because for years you've heard this kind of Chicken Little type people, not that they're wrong. I don't mean it that they're wrong. They're like, there's gonna be a cyber digital Pearl Harbor type thing. But if you cry wolf, even if the wolf is really there for so long and everybody ignores you and every normal day is, it seems like you're crying wolf.

7:06eventually you're gonna be right and everyone's gonna be like, how come no one predicted this? I always like to say, during the pandemic, there was a historian talking about the 2 most— I think it was right after the invasion of Ukraine, 'cause we had the pandemic and then we had that. And he goes, the 2 most common things in human history are pandem— are plagues and wars. And yet every time they happen, we're all shocked that it happened. So what's interesting about post-quantum cryptography, or at least getting ready for it, is you, You can see the iceberg. You can see it coming. We're on the ship and

7:40we have to make sure that we're ready for it. Is this a time to panic or is this a time to prepare? I think that's really kind of like the 2 questions you get out of this. And then I'll stop talking and let Candace ask questions. I wouldn't say it's time to panic. I would definitely say it's time to prepare, but, but from where I sit, And from conversations that I have, most people are unaware of what that looks like. Right. How do we actually prepare? As I mentioned, government are releasing mandates,

8:11they're releasing legislation, we're getting those things, but then the adoption I feel is not moving as quickly as the legislation that's being released is because there's just a knowledge gap or skill gap in saying, okay, we know we need it, but what's the first step? And so I think preparation definitely needed, but I would say one precursor to preparation is understanding or education. I think companies need to focus on

8:42being educated on what this is and how they can proceed to prepare, because preparation for one industry versus another, or even one organization to another, is going to look different. So I think education It's time for us to get educated, for us to build awareness. Absolutely. So as quantum is increasingly being treated as a national security technology, how does that change the way countries collaborate on

9:14research and innovation? That's a great question. So definitely we are seeing it happening. So we know that out of the White House we have Project Genesis, for instance, in which we do have US-based organizations and foreign entities both coming to look like, and we are seeing alliances being formed. But then those alliances are lost in different groups. So maybe you could say there's a lot of

9:47collaboration between, let's say, the US and the UK, But then when we go to the eastern side of the world, we're not seeing so much collaboration between, let's say, Russia, China, and then America. So I think that if we really look at it, we say, okay, we have to first identify who our allies are. And then once we identify that, then we can identify what does the communication path look like? What does responsibilities, roles, and delegation look like? But I think it

10:18first starts with identifying who our allies are. Yeah, it's not a surprise to see that it's going to fall along existing kind of military-political alliance strategies. It's not— it's interesting. I never thought when I started playing with computers when I was a kid or studying it in school or starting this career that this would become a geopolitical Hot button point, right? Whether it's— this is very much a— it's a space— it's like the space race. I'm too young to remember the space race, but you

10:51see all these like shows and like history things about it. It almost feels like it's that same type of vibe. It is. Did you ever think you would like work in a tense geopolitical or adjacent to a tense geopolitical space? Because I certainly didn't. How far back do you want to go? If you say a year ago, say 10 years ago, probably not. Yeah. So I mean like 10 years ago, I mean like, I don't think, 'cause I remember, and you know, living in DC, you get a different perspective on the world than you do kind of anywhere else.

11:24Candace and I both grew up in New York and it's, you get a very different perspective there. But since the thinking here is different, so like when I talk to colleagues and like, even like, I just would've been, see a company like Nvidia treated like a defense contractor. Right. And they're going to have export controls. And my former colleagues who are based in Raleigh and in Boston, and if you're clever and you can figure out how to use LinkedIn, you'll know exactly what company I'm talking about, thought I was insane. They thought I was like tinfoil hat guy. Yet what have we seen over the

11:55last, what, 24 months? Yeah. Something pretty close to that. I would say. So like today's paranoia, is tomorrow's policy, right? It is. And DC, I think, is— people always bag on DC and politicians as being behind the curve, and there is truth to that. When it comes to stuff like this, they're actually ahead of the curve, right? The whole notion of Jensen Huang traveling places and it becomes a political event, right? Like, he was in Taiwan and like he had to be very careful about what he said, right? Like,

12:29I don't know, it's just interesting to see that. And if you had said that 3, 4 years ago, you would've been like, really? Is, is anyone gonna care that he visited any point on earth? I know there was some controversy. I guess when you become like the most valued company in the world, like the, the lens on you becomes a little bit brighter, right? It does. Yeah, absolutely. What did he do? He paid people off to skip a line in some streetside, like, it's not, it wasn't like a taco truck. It was in Korea. So whatever the equivalent of a taco truck in Korea would be, like he cut the line. He goes, would you mind if I

13:01each give you pay for your food? I can go first. And everybody's like, yeah, free food. But then all these people were like, oh no, that's terrible that he did that. Absolutely. Yeah. Perspective, right? It's very important. Yeah. To your point, the paranoia, it definitely drives action and it's going to determine our actions for sure. So let me ask you, what do you think the quantum industry is getting right today and what is it still talking about in the wrong way?

13:35Ooh. So, and to my quantum experts, I want to talk to just regular people for now. So if you're listening, you're a quantum expert, I want to talk to normal people for now. So it's going to be simple. So yeah, just keep that in mind. So I think what we're getting right is I think most being developed I think it's great. I think we're starting— I think we have great research on error correction. I think we have great research on— we have great research on— it's

14:08great. I think one thing that we do need to improve is collaboration. I do see that there's quite a few silos across the industry. Now, I can talk to physicists, and they have their own focus for research. But then I can talk to quantum engineers. Like I know software engineers that work for quantum hardware companies like PsiQuantum, and their research is focused on a totally

14:39different paradigm of quantum. And they're more focused on, can we develop quantum software that improves hardware characterization? But then you, it doesn't play a role here. We just need to focus on making the hardware better, use better materials, use better equipment. So I think even though we are seeing collaboration, as we mentioned, at the geopolitical level where policymakers and congressmen are coming together talking, I would say down on the ground, when you talk about scientists and

15:09engineers, we need to see more collaboration between scientists and engineers for sure. The other thing that I would say, something that I feel we're getting wrong in addition to working in silos, is the approach. Now, if I go back to when cloud first became a thing and AWS was on the scene and they were building cloud, there was just a lot of communication with business leaders and then architecture. Mm-hmm.

15:40So they had architects and they had business owners really driving, this is how we should design the AWS console. So there was a lot of business and architecture in the beginning, but I feel with quantum, we're not necessarily leading with business and architecture. We're just saying, I just wanna build something, but overall strategy is not present from what I can see as an industry. Now you do have Quantinum and IonQ, which I believe do a pretty good job, but the

16:10industry as a whole, there's not really a unified strategy that we're marching towards. So I would like to see quantum architecture take some legs and start walking, and I would like to see maybe quantum business or business leaders now weighing in on these are the use cases that are important to now drive engineering and scientific research. So if there are several competing quantum architectures going on right now, What do you look at when deciding which

16:44approach has the greatest long-term potential? I say it's based on the use case. Because if I'm an organization, if I'm a healthcare organization, and I say I want to use quantum for drug discovery, I want to figure out what is going to be the best sequence of treatments to help this person with Parkinson's disease. I want to know what that is. And so now your quantum approach is, I want to use quantum to improve GPS navigation.

17:17It's a totally different paradigm to say I want to use one for medical treatments, I want to use— so I think the use case is going to be the most critical. Okay, interesting. So where do you think What about regular non-regulated industries, right? Which is fancy DC speak for everybody but healthcare, government, and finance. What I own, let's pick on Tim Hortons, right? 'Cause they own, the only Tim Hortons in

17:50Maryland is actually near my house. Who I have to worry about, or Starbucks, whatever, don't really deal with a lot of regulations to my stance on post-quantum cryptography. 'Cause I think in this industry, you live in DC, when you talk quantum cryptography, I would imagine with most of your customers, they get it. To people outside of that DC bubble, they probably think you've lost your mind. They probably see you as a tinfoil hat. You know that meme with the guy from It's Sunny in Philadelphia with all the stuff together? What do you say to people like that?

18:25So PQC, we really only talk about it from one lens, and that is some form of protection. Harvest now, decrypt later. A hacker is now gonna come in. steal my stuff. I need post-quantum cryptography from a protection lens. But I also say there's another lens in which PQC is useful, and that is operationalization of processes. And I'll explain what I mean. Now, if you have a banking app

18:56that you log into and you want to transfer money, now most people will say, I want it to be— I want to maybe use my thumbprint, get into my app, process something, have it go through immediately. The money transfers and everything is a matter of seconds. So we call that performance, operational performance. It's easy, it's fast, it's accurate. Go back to, let's say, 10 years ago, we didn't really have really good mobile banking applications. You pretty

19:27much have to go into the branch to do everything. And that is just because If I want to transfer money, I need this system to talk to this system. Now, this system talking to this system, you want to make sure it's secure, but you also want to make sure that it's fast and it's reliable, which is a performance metric. So I think if you're outside regulated industries, I own a restaurant, then now I'm saying I want to use post-quantum cryptography to make people ordering food easier. Because I have PQC

20:00embedded in my systems, someone can set up a profile for my restaurant. They can save previous orders that they've done. They can say, I like this type of food, and they can store their card information on the app. And it's secure, but it also helps with user experience because now I can just go in and say, hey, this is the order I got last time. I want to click on that. I know it's secure because PQC is there. I know it's going to be fast because I can easily just iterate through the different systems. If I'm the

20:32restaurant owner, I also want that because if I now need to track my sales, if I now need to update my inventory, update my sales, then I can do all that and I can have the integrations between my systems. And I know that it's secure and I know it's going to be fast because now I don't have to manually perform that step to update my general ledger. I can just have it connected directly to my accounting software and know that it's secure because PTC is present. So I think if you're outside of regulated industries, you're not worried that I need to meet this

21:04compliance standard. You're thinking, I want more automation and I want more integration so that users can get in and out of my apps really fast and it's going to be secure. And I want my backends to also be integrated and automated really well. but I also wanna make sure it's secure as well. So I can have post-quantum cryptography in between connecting everything for automation, but securing everything for peace of mind. So that's my stance on outside regulatory agencies or regulatory industry clients. So this is a

21:37question that I've often thought of, and I've kind of asked it to other experts. I never got really a great answer. So I'll pose it to you. No pressure, right? Given that there's no— how do we know these algorithms are secure against quantum computers since the quantum computer, they can— so 2 questions. How do we know they're secure? And 2, is there any guarantee that with more qubits and more processing power, they won't be secure? So we'll have to continually upgrade our encryption algorithms, right?

22:11Because I know when they had the— NIST had the contest and there were a couple of candidates. One or more of the candidates failed, right? Because cryptography's a tricky business. And if you ever want to, I recommend the Bruce Schneier book. It used to be red and now it's blue, or I don't know, but it came out. What? Because cryptography is an ancient science. People don't realize that. And it really got heavy into math sometime in the 1800s and 1900s, obviously World War II. But so if you really want to go deep into that, read that book. There is

22:42no substitute. Will you get a migraine? Most probably, because it's not for the timid. But You know what I'm talking about, right? So, but how do we know it's secure? Like, how do we know? And is this gonna be a, a new kind of cat and mouse game? We built it for it to survive this kind of attack, which is really the history of cryptography if you think about it, going back to the Romans. So I feel like there's— I know it's a whopper of a, it's a whopper of a question. I know. And I apologize. So

23:13I, Quantum is so new in terms of talent pool and skillset. So what I mean by, we don't have a lot of experts in this space. We have cryptographic experts for sure that really understand cryptography. But when we talk about these new quantum-safe algorithms, we know there's experts at NIST. We know there's a handful of experts at your different hardware vendors. So we know they're there, right? When we talk about— there's

23:43probably experts at places we don't know about, but yes. But largely, hold on, say application. So the reason why I'm saying that is because I see people kind of diverge in 2 different directions so far with PQC. Either they're going to be focused on the compliance aspect of PQC. Can we do assessments or analysis that says this is all the things you need to have to implement PQC? So compliance standards. But then you have people like me that are more technical in nature. I'm more curious about how can we address this technically? What type of microservices can we

24:16build? So the reason I say that is my response is going to be more technically driven. And so for me to say, how do we know it's secure? If you ask someone that's focused on compliance, they will say, oh, because all the controls are implemented. So if all the controls are implemented, then we can say it's secure. Right. And that's a compliance answer. But me, if I'm going to give a technical answer, then I'm gonna say that the only way we can really know it's secure is through testing. We have to test it, right? And

24:49so me personally, I have developed something that we call a purple teaming exercise. So I deployed like a quantum environment at my house. So I've built it. So I have, I have my, Quantum libraries there, I have Qiskit deployed, I build like a quantum server, hypervisor. You've taken home labbing to the next level. That's awesome. I'll have you back and geek out on that one, man. Because

25:19the question you just asked, if I'm leading PQC and I'm considered a PQC expert, then how do I know this algorithm and this configuration will stand up to a quantum attack? The only way I can know that is if I launch a quantum attack and I see, will it hold? And we just call that purple teaming. Right. And so in my purple teaming, this is what I've identified. Now, again, based on the maturity of the industry, we really focus heavily on cryptographic identities. Do

25:50I have RSA? I do. Do I have EDS? What do I have? Do I have PKI? I've identified a cryptographic identity. So, but we're not focusing on the configuration of cryptography. And I think that really, if we want to know it's secure, we have to get into the detail. I have RSA. Great. I know I have RSA 2048. It has 248 bits, 2048 bits. I know that. But now, how is it actually configured? What is it actually doing in this system? Am I using it

26:21just to protect my web pages so that when people put their credit card information in, it's not exposed? How am I using RSA? And I think that when we can go down into the weeds and say, I'm using RSA really just to provide some type of encapsulation of people's socials when they entered on my website, then now we have to evaluate things like, okay, if someone does a bypass attack, will it work? And that's purple teaming.

26:52So to your answer, how do we know it's secure? We have to understand how is the cryptographic identity configured? What is its job? Why is it there? What is it doing? And then once we know that this is what it's supposed to do, this is how it's configured, then we can use purple teaming to test it. We can use a quantum system like Qiskit, like IBM. GCP also has it. We can use that to now attack it once we deploy it. If we deploy that key, we can attack it

27:25with an actual, some type of quantum simulator, and we see how well it does. But without that, without understanding the configuration of it, without understanding what it's being used for, and without testing it, we have no real way of knowing if it's secure or not. Just have to take it on faith, right? If you hit all the compliance things. So here's a real-world example for folks that are not used to the compliance world in the DC kind of bubble. I have 5 dogs and 2 of them are escape artists. And there's been

27:55some recent issues I'm not gonna get into for what could be a potentially legal problem. 5 dogs. We have a wireless fence in the ground. We have wireless fence that is truly wireless. It broadcasts a radio signal. We also have physical barriers and we have a zipline tie-out for some of them. But earlier, so we, this is all because they've been escape artists, right? Mm-hmm. So all of these things I've been doing, they are, I, I like the way you're putting this, right? They are red teaming my ability to keep them fenced in. Right?

28:26And 2 nights ago, the 3-year-old had basically opened the door for them and had— so then that was something I had not anticipated. So now there's zip ties on that door. So, so basically you're right. The only way to know something is secure, if somebody from, say, animal control came by and said, how are you securing them? Mm-hmm. And let's just say this might have already happened. I showed them every possible barrier that I have created, right? And But I can't account for the 3-year-old just running out and opening the door, right? Now I

28:58have, but, and that, so that's kind of like the difference between compliance and virtual, like what you're saying, you actually know or not, right? Red teaming against it and things like that. I had, my assumption was that the dogs would be on their own to figure a way out, but little did I know there'd be an outside actor, an outside threat compounding that too. So now I have to think about it very differently. So I think it's very much a similar type of problem, right? Absolutely. Compliance, I can show all day. I have this control, I have this control. But until I have my 3-year-old do some red teaming on me, I really don't

29:30know. Absolutely. Absolutely. And I'll stop talking and let Candace talk. I'm just wondering if PQC primarily is a tech— a technology problem, or is the bigger challenge identifying where vulnerable cryptography exists Ooh, they're both really big problems. Okay. My experience tells me, so I think everyone is saying, I see a lot on LinkedIn. I see a lot of posts

30:02on LinkedIn all the time, and people inbox me quite a bit. And so I see a lot of talk of which algorithm should we use. We don't know that yet. Most organizations don't know that yet. And then they're saying, oh, can we do an assessment and find where our cryptographic identities are? I feel like organizations aren't ready for that either. I think that kind of step one for us is, hey, where do I even want to look for cryptographic

30:32identities? Should I look in my mainframe? Are we thinking to look there? Are we thinking to look in James's laptop where he's been there? We're probably not thinking to look there because he has so much code on his laptop. He has so many cryptographic identities on his laptop that's not in a production server. Are we thinking to look in a sandbox environment that we got from Salesforce? Because Salesforce said they're going to give us a sandbox we can use for 3 months and learn how to deploy apps, but we have already started integrating with our system.

31:05So now there's cryptographic identities there. Are we thinking to look there. And so trying to identify the target systems, I think we need to do that. And even having a complete list of what are our targets as an industry, we haven't really— we don't really have a structure for that yet. So to your point, Candice, if I'm looking at, is it a technical problem? Is it a compliance problem? Should we be looking for our identities? I think From a

31:35technical problem perspective, we don't even know what we have. And then to say we don't know what we have, we don't even know where to look. So I think, where are we actually looking for quantum or for cryptographic identities? Can we first get a list of assets that we need to actually look at? And then how can we actually look in someone's laptop to look for cryptographic identities? How are we actually going to do that? Now it comes back to the technical aspect of it. But it's like we need a target. So then

32:07when we find RSA, what do we do about it? Like how now, where does this technology part come in? Do I now try to do a hybrid? Do I deploy a quantum-safe algorithm next to it? Do I rip it out and replace it? So now it, it's kind of a loop in my, in my opinion. You find a target, you find a cryptographic identity, you develop some type of technical remediation for that. But the, the first part is identifying our targets, identifying our assets. That we need to even look, we haven't done. We haven't done. So I would say— Yeah,

32:40I'm sorry, I didn't mean to cut you off, but I think you, you bring up something that is true in at least conventional cryptography, right? Which is, it's never— people always like to give you the big numbers of a brute force attack will take this many years. How often has a brute force attack actually been the thing that actually gets the thing? It's always the key management is always the issue. And you mentioned The developer laptops and things like that. That, and I'm by far from a cryptic, you know, cryptographic or cryptanalysis type expert, but I can appreciate the fact that

33:12it's that last mile is the issue, right? Mm-hmm. An unwatched key, an unlocked laptop, a left behind thumb drive will, has the potential to blow a massive hole through a multi-billion dollar defensive thing, right? It becomes like the Achilles heel of all of this, right? And I can't imagine quantum cryptography would be much different, right? Because you still have the— there are probably more niceties that it has in terms of being able to detect eavesdropping, blah, blah, blah. But the whole notion of key sharing,

33:46all right, key sharing, you can say you can mitigate it because I have a direct quantum thing that is anti-eavesdropping thing. But I can't imagine that there's probably got to be some weak point that can be exploited and blown wide open, or— Probably the most likely thing is there's, since these are systems that are by and large not really built yet, or if they are built, they're not heavily tested through years of rigor. There's probably weaknesses we don't know about yet. I can tell you in my own testing, my own red teaming and purple

34:16teaming, I've identified 2 threats that are proving pretty difficult to stop. And one's called cryptographic envelope bypass. That's one. Ooh, interesting. And then there's another one that's called operational context bypass. So those 2 are already proven tough to stop. So even if you deploy a quantum safe, a lot of attackers have a way to bypass it. And so that's what I'm seeing. So whether it's

34:47operational context that they're using to bypass or whether it's, hey, I know you have this envelope that sits here on the network. Guess what? I can take a backdoor and go through a load balancer and just bypass that and authenticate on the other side. And I don't have to go through that particular handshake. I don't have to go through that, that little security garden that you have built on the edge. I can just go around. And to your point, I think if we go back through history and we look at most of the attacks that have happened

35:17and most of the data breaches, it's an end-user device. It's somebody's phone, it's somebody's laptop. And that's my bypass. And I can just go around and say, I'm going to go around, get on this guy's laptop and authenticate through this jump box, which is far away from the edge where all my defenses are critical. And to me, that's an architecture strategy gap. It's not necessarily saying the quantum doesn't hold, but it's just saying I'm just going to go around it. I'll find another way in. So those old school style stuff still sound like they have a— they're not going away. They're just going to

35:49evolve and adapt. Yeah, if folks want to— if folks want some hair-raising stories, you should just look up books or audiobooks or YouTube videos on key management. The vulnerabilities are always at the edge, like you said, and it's always stupid stuff. Even this, like, if you can narrow down the wear patterns on keyboards, there's— yeah, I think Black Hat just happened in Vegas. Yeah. I've never been, but I've always— I've heard stories about kind of like just— it's just the dumbest things. It's, you know, somebody who's in a cleaning crew, they

36:20take a picture of your keyboard, they send that picture to somebody and it's like, oh, this key is worn more often. And does that get them close? No. But instead of tens of billions of options, now you're only down to 1 or 2 billions of options. And you could do other things to narrow that down to, 'cause no, no one tries. I'm not aware of anyone having a successful brute force attack. I don't think that the— Doesn't really happen. The cost of it. I don't think it does. But it's funny 'cause people always say it'll take 10 million years with a brute force attack. I'm like, does anyone do that? It's like you have this

36:51fancy security system, but it doesn't have backup power. So cut the power, then you can just walk right in, right? Exactly. Security, I think, is a holistic— requires holistic thinking, whether it's conventional or post-quantum, right? Absolutely. And to your point, I don't think the experts— I don't think there's enough expertise or just time to build out the battle scars of how do you make a real post-quantum encrypted secure thing. There are things we think will work,

37:21But I think there's gonna be a whole lot of learning on the way in the next 10, 20 years. Oh yeah, for sure. So as we're talking about cryptographic identity, I think this is actually the first show that we, that, that phrase has been brought up. So I'm just absolutely captivated by it. So could cryptographic identity become even more important as AI agents and autonomous systems increasingly act on our behalf? Oh yeah. We're already seeing pretty sophisticated AI attacks, right?

37:53We're already seeing it. And so to your point, cryptographic identities, and when you look around, people really only talk about encryption in kind of 2 things. I want to encrypt my users. So I have some type of what we call PKI, public key infrastructure. I have an SSH key that I use as a user to log in. We talk about kind of encryption of data. So now I have my SSL cert that kind

38:23of encrypts my data on a webpage, my encryption at rest, my encryption in transit. I want to encrypt my database. So that is now saying I'm using encryption to kind of help protect my data. And then I'm also using encryption to help protect my user identities. And so when we talk about identities, then now it— For the most part, If you want to use AI to now hack in, then they know, okay, I have these 2 things I'm looking for. I know that this user has some type of

38:53identity that's encrypted and coded. I know they have some type of access key that they're using to access. So I know there's an access key somewhere, whether it be at the network level or the server level, or even the app key, app-level key. I know it's there. But then I also know I want to get to the data. I know that there's also going to be some sort of encryption on that data. protecting the edge, trans— in transit and at rest. So AI knows to look for those, right? And so if we don't know to look for them and understand that I have these types of identities, this one is

39:26legacy, it's really old, I need to swap it out, then AI is just gonna have a field day or a hacker's gonna have a field day with AI because they're like, we already know what you have, we already know what's there, then now we just have to figure out where are the holes associated with it. So— Go ahead. I'm sorry. So I would say that's the entry point for AI. It's looking for those identities. And so our job is to make sure that those identities are secure or up to date, I would say, is more, more of the challenge. Because if you,

39:58if a credential gets revoked, you have to know about that, right? Like, but again, security is a holistic field, right? Like, it's temp— time is a factor in it. Right? If I hire you, Christopher, for 6 months, 6 months and 1 day, or midnight is your last day, that credential should expire, right? And I know the Target hack, one of the issues was the credentials were for, I think it was an HVAC vendor allowed

40:28bad activity, something like, and it didn't expire, right? And then the attackers were able to leverage that. And I mean, it's easy to bust on them 'cause they're a big company and like you think they should know better, but like I wouldn't be so arrogant about it. One, I've had intermittent experiments with my own home labbing experience. Fun fact, in actually about, I was still living in New Jersey, so this would've had about 20 years ago, I decided to host my own web server. I'm like, this is great. I'm learning and I'm doing this. And I set up an FTP server and then

41:02for some reason I turned the password off. Oh. I did something stupid to the password. So then, and I forgot about it cuz it was just a temporary measure. Why I, as much as I'm tempted to make fun of people when they make these gaffes, I'm like, eh, there but for the grace of God go I, right? So over the course of the next few weeks, my internet connection started really dropping to like, I had no bandwidth. So I'm like, ah, I called cable, I called the cable company. They were like, we don't know what's going on. And so then Now I'm older and

41:33wiser. There's other things I would do, test network traffic, Wireshark, all that. But I was young. I was 20-some-odd years younger and not as wise. But, and then I was looking through the hard drive because suddenly I was, the next thing I noticed, my hard drive was being filled up. Oh, that's weird. And I'm like, that's weird. And then I noticed that there are all these, somebody had found my website, my FTP, and loaded it with PlayStation 2 ROMs. And basically was a massive pirating operation on my server.

42:04And I was like, how could that happen? And then I found out how they got in. They got in because I temporarily did it and I forgot to close the window. So it's very easy to make fun of companies when they make these huge mistakes like this, but it can happen. And if you think you're secure, you're not. If you have that level of arrogance and confidence, you don't. Because even people in industry, as you have to test it, you have to hold your own things. So fast forward to what, a few months ago, Candace. So we're, Candace and I are working on a product called the Dingo, thedingo.ai, which maybe will be launched by the time you're

42:35listening. So when Vercel had their breach, right? She asked me, are we vulnerable? And I was like, no, no, because I had all the passwords and user data encrypted from the get-go because I vibe coded 90% of it and it was just Doing it myself would've taken X number of hours. Vibe coding it would've been, would've taken an extra sentence in a prompt and a few hundred thousand more tokens. So I did it. Plus I, my real inspiration was, God, if I'm storing plaintext information

43:07on a passwords on a server, my wife will never let me forget, live that down. So I actually did it and, which seemed like overkill when I made that decision. But then again, 6 months later. when the, when the hack happened, or a few months later when the hack happened, I can be not so worried about it because I took that extra step. That's why I like to say today's paranoia is tomorrow's best practice. It is. It goes back to the paranoia, always back to the paranoia.

43:39I always think to that, that FTP server that became this massive PlayStation pirating hub, which, you know, thankfully the, the FBI never knocked down my door. I wasn't running it. If you're looking at the The IP traffic, it would've not been a good look for me. Absolutely. Oh, that was probably helped that I didn't have a PlayStation at the time. If I had a PlayStation at the time, I would've been, I would've probably taken— I discovered that I immediately pulled the network cable outta the wall cuz I'm like, and then I had friends tell me and make fun of me and then run this when you plug it in. And

44:10sure enough, when I plugged everything back in, there was a lot of these failed requests that kind of came out and then, and then I dropped it from the— so you live and you learn. Right? And if you're smart, you can learn from other people's mistakes. Oh yeah. We've had a great conversation with you. Your Quantum Home Lab, man, we got to— we have to have a geeky deep dive on that one, man. I'd love to talk to you about that and invite you back on the show. But we are coming close to time. Where can folks find out more about you and what you're doing? I try to be pretty active on LinkedIn, so definitely people can reach out

44:41to me there. I do speaking engagements. I have a few conferences coming up, so Yeah, if it's a major quantum conference, I'm probably there. You can catch me there. I think my LinkedIn, I have some contact information on there so that they can reach out to me. But yeah, so I work obviously, but then I kind of build my own stuff in my home lab. And then I also work with this biology group and we're working on some quantum biology stuff. So I do that as well. Oh, interesting. Yeah. They're called the Burden Center for Spatial

45:14Biology. It's a nonprofit. But we, we're doing some pretty cool research on quantum storage. And so trying to work on quantum storage. Yeah. You can run into me through KPMG. You can run into me on LinkedIn. Those will be the main avenues. And then the major conferences, I'll, you can expect me to be there. Awesome. Any parting thoughts, Candace? Honestly, I love this. I love cryptographic identities. I can't wait to talk more about this with you. So you have an open invitation to come back for sure. This was wonderful. We really enjoyed it.

45:47Awesome. I enjoyed it too. You guys asked me some tough questions. You really made me scratch my head a little bit. It's all right. You'll be ready. You'll be stronger for next time, right? Yeah, absolutely. And with that, we'll let the outro music play. Oh, that was great, man. That was fantastic. That was— really enjoyed it.

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