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C B m E & U

C B m E & U artwork

Moderate Compassionate Antinatalism with Marcus Teo

Nov 14, 202449 minAudio
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Send us Fan Mail In Episode 8, Sinead and James interview CBmE Doctoral Candidate Marcus Teo on his PhD analysing the ethics of having children (or not). Marcus answers questions about the antinatalist movement, his unique approach, and the difference between a life worth continuing from a life worth starting. Marcus asks us to consider whether we can truly ensure a child's life will contain more good than bad, and how we deal with the uncertainty of future planning. Remember people, be savvy!

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00The center presents a new podcast, C BME and You, a podcast devoted to promoting awareness and debate around controversial ethical issues in biomedicine.

SPEAKER_04Hello and welcome to CB Me and You, a podcast by the Center for Biomedical Ethics. Today's topic, the ethics of having children. When is it permissible to have children? What ethical considerations should parents or potential parents consider before having a kid? Joining us today is Marcus Tew, PhD candidate here at the center. Welcome, Marcus. Hi, thanks for having me.

SPEAKER_01Hi. It's okay. It's safe to be here. This is a safe space. So we have some uh introductory questions to get to know you a bit better. Uh coffee or copy?

SPEAKER_02Copy o kosong.

SPEAKER_01Copy or kos- I'm still learning the word everyone.

SPEAKER_02See, I think he's flexing on you right now.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, I know. It's okay. He can. He's Singaporean.

SPEAKER_02Yes, it's just black coffee without sugar.

SPEAKER_01Nice. Nice. What country do you want to travel to next the most?

SPEAKER_02I've been thinking a lot about this. I think the next country I really want to travel to is Japan. I've actually never been.

SPEAKER_01There is a consistency in this podcast. I think everyone bar one or two people has said Japan.

SPEAKER_04Yeah. Yeah. Japan. Popular tourist destination among biomedical ethicists. Wonderful niche to have.

SPEAKER_01Okay, my favorite question, the one I know you have been looking forward to the most and did not have a breakdown last night about. What's your go-to karaoke song?

SPEAKER_03Okay, so I have been anticipating this question because I am a regular listener myself. You're welcome. Um slid that in there. It's a sassy one. So I have um a few answers to this.

SPEAKER_02Um I've in my memory been to the karaoke once, and I think I enjoyed singing um Cold Plays Viva La Vida. It's a great song I have at a karaoke.

SPEAKER_01Is that different from um the Rob is it Robin Robin Martin? No, but that's an actor. How does it go?

SPEAKER_03I'm not gonna sing that for you on this podcast. Like that's not I don't think that's a good idea for myself nor the audience.

SPEAKER_01I think it'd be I think we'd bring in so many more viewers, so many more listeners.

SPEAKER_04I feel like that's not my prerogative.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, that's fair, that's our job.

SPEAKER_04We should probably edit this out, but it's the one that goes.

SPEAKER_01Oh my god, I do know that one.

SPEAKER_04Yeah, yeah, exactly.

SPEAKER_01Okay, yeah, yeah.

SPEAKER_02Up to 10 seconds is the YouTube rule, I believe.

SPEAKER_01Okay, thank you for that. I appreciate it.

SPEAKER_02So Viva La Vida by Coplay would be my was the song that I really enjoyed singing. The last time I went to a karaoke, the only time I've ever been to a karaoke. If I had the chops for it, I would love to do theatre. So anything from Le Miss, my Le Miss is my favorite um musical. Um, or my other choice would be some of the straight-ahead um jazz standards.

SPEAKER_01Okay. Yeah, I'm familiar. Straight ahead.

SPEAKER_04Can we get you to do the scatting thing when one of these days uh skippy-doop doo-doo doop?

SPEAKER_03Yeah, no, no, maybe that's a me thing. Yeah, I feel like you wanted to put that into the podcast. Absolutely.

SPEAKER_01We're not cutting that out.

SPEAKER_03Yep. Fair play, fair play. That was good. Skibble bubba poop. Okay.

unknownThat's about enough.

SPEAKER_01What do you think? You think you run this podcast? This podcast has gone awry so fast.

SPEAKER_04This is cursed already.

SPEAKER_01All right.

SPEAKER_04Okay, real questions. First one. Most people think that as long as you're pretty sure that you can provide for your kids, and as long as you're pretty sure that you're gonna love them, it's okay to have children. Uh, I know you have some thoughts about this, so uh I'd like to open by inviting you to share your thoughts and some of your concerns about uh what most people think, the common consensus or the common sense about having children.

SPEAKER_02Right. So in your question you ask, um, most people are pretty sure about being able to provide for their children, that they will love their children. Um and that already insinuates that there is some room for error. Right. Um I think one thing that I would be personally concerned about is whether of course whether or not those um those suspicions uh kind of like realize. Um and of course, in many cases they do, and people, you know, especially for those who have been trying, or they they're you know, young couples who decide that they want to expand their families, they go like, okay, I'm gonna, you know, we're gonna make a child and we'll provide um everything that we can for this child.

SPEAKER_02That's great. Um the second part of your question that struck me was whether or not that is sufficient for procreation. And that's a lot of what I do my my work in. Um and I think as I'm sure we'll get more into um as this podcast episode progresses. Um I think there's a lot that we need to consider um if we are interested in being, you know, good people to for lack of a better term, uh, or moral people, um, that we need to think about when it comes to the plausibility of or you know, the remote possibility of bringing a uh a life into this world and the kind of responsibilities that we would have to undertake to make sure that we do so in the most responsible way we can.

SPEAKER_02So just off the top of my head, right, if we say, well, I'm pretty sure that I will care for this child, I have adequate resources to ensure that this child will, you know, live uh you know an unremarkable life in the best ways possible. Um then you know we also have to contend with um possibilities that the world isn't just that neat. Um a lot of things that we do, that a lot of things that we are at the mercy at are just not within our control, and there's nothing we can do about it.

SPEAKER_02You know, we are all one road traffic accident away from having any reasons for a life worth living to be stripped from us. Just to put a nice positive start to this podcast.

SPEAKER_01So what you're saying is loving someone and being able to provide for them is not sufficient enough reason to have them.

SPEAKER_02I think we have reasons to suspect. We have reasons to suspect against that, right? I think yeah, it's it's certainly important, right? I would want anyone who wants to become a parent um to have these things. I'm not saying that they're bad things to have. I'm just saying that we might be interested to think that there might be more that um would be necessary for someone to procreate in a morally permissible manner.

SPEAKER_01Okay, so there are two, or generally at least two people in this consideration. There is, or generally maybe three. There are the people interested in having children, and then there is the child themselves. And I'm assuming that some of your reasons apply to separate persons. So looking at the parents asking this question, why can you give us your best reason why they shouldn't, or the circumstances in which someone should not have a child?

SPEAKER_02Yeah, I think there are a lot of different reasons that can um that can that can mean something here, and they all um lead to different kinds of arguments. So one argument that I think has gained a lot more traction recently is um what we call eco-antinatalism, right? So these are you know young couples um who are you know well educated and they they kind of present with um very strong climate anxieties.

SPEAKER_02And we also understand um and we have evidence to believe that having a child is what will you know just immediately jack up your carbon emissions from the amount of single-use things you have to you have to kind of go through as you take care for your child, take care of your child. Um, and just the sheer amount of things that you consume and have to do by bringing a child into this world, your you know, the eco-conscious among us might see that as a good reason um to refrain from having children.

SPEAKER_02So that's one one of the reasons that I think came up quite relatively recently and I thought I think are quite strong. Um at the very least, it's something that if you don't subscribe to, or if you don't think that eco-antinatalism is strong enough to stop you from having a child, at the least it puts pressure upon you as a prospective parent to you know be mindful of your carbon footprint while you're there. So that's one reason, right, that we should we ought not to have that we might have reasons to think we shouldn't procreate.

SPEAKER_02Um But the reason that I'm more interested in and what I work on the most is um it goes by many names, but I think the most succinct way I would put it is called compassionate antinatalism, um, which is a kind of antinatalism that stems from concerns over a prospective child suffering as they are brought into the world.

SPEAKER_04So it sounded to me just now when you're describing uh some of your concerns. Uh you said that Well, even if you have are pretty sure that you're gonna love your child, even if you're pretty sure that you have the resources to care for it for a child, uh stuff can still go wrong. Um you might get into a car accident or something else might happen. There are so many possible things that can happen in the world that will really mess up your life, right? Um But of course, these risks exist for anybody, and no matter what you do, there's always going to be some risk.

SPEAKER_04Um so could you just paint a picture for me? Like under what conditions would you say that yeah, maybe having a child is permissible? What do you have to do? Like it seems like your the bar might be could be anywhere from extremely high to something a bit more moderate.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, that's a that's a great question, and that's a question that a lot of what I do aims to try and discover. Because um, so historically, some antenatalists, uh, right now I'm thinking, in particular, Professor Marty Hyrer. Um he he's famous for uh a piece that he wrote in year 2000, I believe, um, which now is dubbed the risk argument. So back then, um Professor Haira ran the risk argument, and he argued that any potentiality for risk at all has to be avoided.

SPEAKER_02Right? But obviously, now we think that that's super counterintuitive because um we undertake risks at everything that we do. Just drinking water entails some risk of choking to death. So, what I'm interested in, um, as you rightly point out, is where is this benchmark? Um so what I propose generally is a much more moderate view, uh, where I think that there is some way for a life to be worth starting or permissibly starting. Um, and just that I think that that bar is really high.

SPEAKER_02So when we think about risks, there are quite a few kind of conceptual themes here that we need to pick apart. The first the first concept is the difference between a life worth starting and a life worth continuing. And those are two very important themes that that I interact a lot with in my research that I think have very important normative upshots. Right? So, um, for example, for a life to be worth continuing, I think that it takes a lot less to justify continuing a life than it takes to start a life, right?

SPEAKER_02Because that life has not started for the case of the latter. Whereas, you know, when it comes to a life worth continuing, that is already an existent person with existent interests and desires and projects and all that good stuff. Now, when we think about starting a life, those good things that we think about in our own lives, we cannot prescribe to a valid target. Um, you know, so we cannot say that um a prospective child has desires because they don't exist.

SPEAKER_02Um but it's precisely because they don't exist that I think we can respond to risk um in very different manners that we might consider appropriate. So one way to kind of like flesh this out without being too conceptual about it is to think, well, yeah, you take a risk every time you cross the street. But you are a living person with existing desires and projects and all this stuff that you pursue. And crossing the road or crossing the street is something that uh you need in a kind of needs-based kind of idea.

SPEAKER_02Um, you need to cross the street, you need to do these things for and and these and crossing the street is important to you for uh qua being a human. Now you can't say the same for a child that hasn't come into existence. That child does not need to come into existence. And just by a needs-based account alone, we see that risk as very different upshots. We take risk that we need to take. Um, but suddenly, if you feel like, oh, I don't need to take this risk, for example, I'm I don't need to cross the road unnecessarily to get to my to my destination, then yeah, you'll be taking a risk for no good reason.

SPEAKER_02And that's how I I see needs as one of the ways we can kind of um appropriately identify the difference between a prospective child and a human person.

SPEAKER_04Okay, but so we've talked a lot about risks, but of course, coming to existence also comes with potential benefits. So why not just say that if you know for every potential risk of a car accident, you know, you can have an ice cream or something like that. Uh both are equally of the exact same amount of value.

SPEAKER_01I mean, technically no one's stopping you.

SPEAKER_04Both could happen at almost the same time. But you know, like so why not just say that as long as uh the potential risks uh are outweighed by the potential benefits that you can bring into a child's life, um, those risks are just outweighed.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, that's a very common intuition. Uh and that that is something that I'm interested to kind of like think about as well. And I think through a a lot of my research, I've come to form the opinion that um harm, or you know, in this case risk of harm, um counts more heavily towards our moral actions, or you know, it counts more heavily in action guidance than the conferment of benefit. And I think that's uh an asymmetry that I'm quite convinced about, but certainly not everyone is, right?

SPEAKER_02I think there are some some of our colleagues who might um disagree with me quite strongly here. But so I generally I think right like if um that the prevention of harm is a more important um kind of moral prerogative than the conferment of benefit. So um one way I I might flesh this out, uh again to cite another philosopher is Shona Schifrin in 1999, um, when she came up with what she calls a consent argument.

SPEAKER_02So she she she demonstrated this asymmetry um by kind of doing drawing up this thought experiment, right? She said, Well, okay, in the first case, consider that you are trapped in your car and your car is sinking and you are going to drown and die. Now, I could save you, but in the process of saving you, I break your arm. Ie, in this case, I would have harmed you, but I harm you to prevent a greater harm, i.e., death, drowning to death, slow, painful death. Now, consider this against a second case where you know you're asleep, uh, and I just come into your bedroom and I just break your arm.

SPEAKER_02And then you wake up and you're like, what the hell, man? And I'm like That would be my reaction.

SPEAKER_04Uh what the hell, man?

SPEAKER_01Broke my arm. Yeah, not why in my room.

SPEAKER_02Suppose I show up in your room um and I break your arm and you're like, what the hell? And then I tell you, oh, hold up, hold up. But you know, what I just did is I broke your arm, but I'm going to confer upon you 10 IQ points. You're gonna wake up tomorrow morning 10 IQ points smarter, but you have a broken arm.

unknownRight?

SPEAKER_02And what Shana Schifrin invites us to do now is to compare these two cases and say, well, which one of in which one of these cases do I take a morally permissible action? Um and you know, it seems quite intuitive that it's a lot easier for us to justify harming somebody, to stop them from coming into a greater harm down the road, than to harm somebody to confer upon them a benefit. Right? And one upshot here is that look, you you could very well consent to having your arm broken for 10 IQ points. Shauna Schiffrin's point is that in both cases people don't consent, right?

SPEAKER_02Like in the drowning case, you can't consent because you're kind of underwater, it's a bit hard to speak. Um, and then in the second case, you're asleep. Uh and now she she uses this thought experiment to to think about procreation, right? She she accepts, as do most of us, that procreation entails some level of harm. Um and she thinks that, well, the only time it's justifiable to harm somebody without their consent is only to prevent a greater harm.

SPEAKER_02And I think that's quite intuitive to me. I wouldn't think that I would be justified to harm somebody if I think that I was gonna confer upon them some benefit. Now, one way that I depart from a lot of other antenatalists that have come before me here is that I think that if the benefit was great enough, it could technically justify some level of harm. Right? Like if I plucked a hair off your head without your consent, and I told you that, oh but I'm gonna sell this hair for like a billion dollars and it's all yours, suddenly I think, well, maybe we might be justified in doing that.

SPEAKER_02Um well, Shauna Shiffin might disagree, but I think that it's at least a lot more defensible, uh, a a potential action to take. So this then brings us all back to thinking about benchmarks, right? Like at what point can we say that a life is uh is justified to start? And generally, after all this talking, my answer is just that that benchmark is surprisingly high simply because uh you know, the avoidance of harm plays a bigger role than conferment of benefit, even if you think that coming into existence would be a benef a net benefit.

SPEAKER_01I am concerned though with the use of the idea that, well, a a person doesn't have interests until they exist, so therefore you can't count those benefits as something that the non-existent person has interest in. In the same way though, you can't then count the harms to those interests as reasons to not bring them into existence in the same way you can't use the benefits of their interests. So then how do you deal with that asymmetry if you're saying I'm not going to consider your future benefits, but I will consider your future harms?

SPEAKER_02Yeah, so that's a great question. Um and here one one way that um I've come to think about it is uh inspired by, you know, again, now the most famous antinatalist philosophers, David Benetta. Um he wrote his book Never to Better to Never Have Been in 2006. And in there he argues that um there is a very distinct difference in kind of this like ontology of pleasure and pain, and that lets that led to his his famous asymmetry of pleasure and pain. So Benetta argued, um quite convincingly, I think, that um harm is bad simplicity.

SPEAKER_02So harm is bad irrespective if there are people to experience that harm. Whereas pleasure is good insofar as there are people to experience their pleasure. Um he tries to explain this in several ways. Um for example, um he thinks that you know a world is made better by removing harm in it, even if, you know, for example, no harm was felt or that removal was not felt by anybody. Um but a world would only be made better if pleasures were felt by some people in that world.

SPEAKER_02Um that's kind of one way to bring it up to bring it up. I think um that's that's kind of getting into very thick metaphysical like concepts that I I don't think I'm super equipped to to answer as well. But I think we could take both um harms and benefits for prospective people seriously, right? Like let's just like we can we can do that at least for now and then consider okay, um, well, when we bring a child into this world, yes, we can consider that they will have future interests, they will also have, they will also be subject to harm.

SPEAKER_02And ask ourselves um how, you know, how do we react or like how do we interact with these prospective harms and benefits? Um and this is where again I will cite Benatar because I think he points out a very important intuition here that um we think of ourselves as as having a far greater duty to prevent the birth of into abject of children into abject suffering than to bring happy people into the world. For example, if you choose not to give birth um and you cite that, well, I don't think I should procreate because I have no I have less reasons to think that my child will live a good life, for example.

SPEAKER_02You might actually be celebrated as a good person, right? Um But now if you say if you choose not to procreate because um we have no duty to bring um happy people into this world, but we have a duty to prevent the birth. Birth of people into abject suffering. If you had refrained from procreation because you think you have reasons to think that your child would enter into abject suffering, you might be a good person, you might be celebrated for that reason. But if you brought a child into this world and you say, Well, I think that this child would have a good life and all that, you're just like, okay.

SPEAKER_02Right? Like, you could be celebrated, right? You you would be a good parent, and you know, if your child turns out well, all's great. Um, but I think we respond, at least in my to my intuition, we respond better to the case of the per the prospective parent who opted not to bring a suffering life into this world than the parent who successfully brought a happy life into this world.

SPEAKER_01So I think that a lot of this discussion so far has been interesting, but I think it's been based on some premises that we haven't actually been explicit about, which is um the difference between the words harm and suffering and the and the different natures of harm and suffering. And so I think there are many people who've value suffering, or even I would say most people value some form of harm. And I think that we can regret the harmful things that happened to us, but we know for certain that they either made us better off or we learned something from them, or you know, some people say you can't love without hurting because they they come hand in hand.

SPEAKER_01You cannot have this benefit without a corresponding harm. And so in our last episode, palliative care physician Han Yi said that the suffering experience during end of life can bring incomp incomparable meaning to one's existence. So if it is therefore true that existence is suffering or it contains suffering, would someone else not just claim, well, suffering is meaningful?

SPEAKER_02Yeah, um the way I see it is that suffering in this sense is suffering that is outweighed by some greater benefit. Right. Um So for like the the the simplest way I I like to explain this is to say, well, um suppose that you want to do well for your exam, so you study really hard, and you know you are harmed, so to speak, because you have to, you know, mug and you have to read and you have to do all these things that you don't really want to do.

SPEAKER_04But you are I'd like to make it known to all my school teachers that I have been harmed.

SPEAKER_02Indeed, as have all of us. Uh but yeah, so you undertake this harm, you consent to being harmed.

SPEAKER_03As a school kid, no.

SPEAKER_01Kids cannot consent people.

SPEAKER_03That was below the age of consent. Okay, maybe I'm thinking about like university.

SPEAKER_01Thank you.

SPEAKER_03Because I certainly consented to being harmed in uni uh because I really want to do it in school.

SPEAKER_02Um and so, but you see, in that case, like the suffering that we're talking about is suffering that is outweighed by the benefit of doing well in school, getting good grades, getting into the PhD program that you want to be in, and being able to talk with your colleagues about smart things.

SPEAKER_01You should have been born just to be here with us today to talk.

SPEAKER_04Yeah. Um he's like, I'm being hum right now.

SPEAKER_01But isn't that isn't saying that studying is harm a bit of a stretch?

SPEAKER_02Of course.

SPEAKER_01Can't some things be neutral, or just can some things be hard without being harm?

SPEAKER_02Sure, sure, right? Like, that's just an example. You um you could think of like, oh, you know, I'm gonna walk, I'm gonna cross this really busy street, um, so I'm gonna take the overhead bridge. Climbing the stairs is a harm. You cannot deny that. There's no way I will accept counter-arguments here.

SPEAKER_01Everyone, we've just discovered objective truths.

SPEAKER_02So I would harm myself by climbing up this flight of stairs, but it's uh it's you know outweighed by the benefit of crossing this really busy street without being run over by a car or being able to um meet whatever need or end goal I have across that street. So so harm and suffering can be great if it's justified by some ends that you know outweigh the kind of like suffering or harm that we're talking about earlier on. Um so the exam example was my standard example that I give to people, but apparently some people now think that exams are not harmful, which I think again very very counterintuitive.

SPEAKER_01Maybe we pick a less controversial topic other than exams.

SPEAKER_06Surgery. Sure.

SPEAKER_01But even in the even in the stare example, I think like harm can only exist to an interest. Um, but life is just a juxtaposition of different benefits and harms to the same interests. Like the interest in my health comes at the harm to my laziness. Um and even picking up that lazy life of sitting on the couch eating all the snacks I ever wanted to exist is a life of harm. And so, can if we cannot have one without the other, are you saying we shouldn't have any?

SPEAKER_02Well, no.

SPEAKER_01Um, that's not what I said.

SPEAKER_02Indeed. That's indeed not what I said.

SPEAKER_01I do love that.

SPEAKER_02So, like I think if it it's it's tricky because um obviously everyone suffers, right? Like, at the very least, homeostase, like just by virtue of being alive, we are we we have to suffer. Um, at the very least, at some point, you you get hungry. You're hungry right now. I know this.

SPEAKER_01I did, I did say this at the start of the book. I can confirm I am suffering dearly.

SPEAKER_04Just to be clear, we are not shaming each other for our dietary habits. No, it is lunchtime as we're recording this. Um that's why it just to be they don't know. They don't know the people don't know when when we're recording this.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, so we're recording this over lunchtime. Uh and Shanine is getting really hungry, and I don't blame her for this. I'm not shaming her for this. Um, but look, so we all suffer, right? Now, that doesn't tell us anything about lives of abstract of abject suffering. Um, so like I think the reason why I was so quick to say no to what you just said is, well, yes, you're right. Like, there are harms that we undertake every every day, and we think that a lot of these harms are very meaningful. But you don't get that that kind of state of meaningfulness, that property of meaningfulness when it comes to harm is not transitive to a lot of other cases.

SPEAKER_02Right? If suppose now you are living in you know a myriad of war-torn territories around the world, that harm you don't really get to to kind of like think is like oh super meaningful, especially if you know you're talking about, oh, I'm a civilian, I'm just waking up going about my business, and there is every likelihood that there's a sniper in the building across from me. Suddenly you're like, well, maybe that harm could be avoided. Now, what's all all of this is just to say that yes, you're right to point out that harm in many cases is justified.

SPEAKER_02But that doesn't stop us from trying to consider that, well, maybe we can reduce the amount of harm that is required of us or like that we are that we need to have in this world. If suppose um I have a pill that would put you in you know the absolute pink of health without having to work out, without having to diet, without having to go through surgery or enhancement, would that not be a better outcome than having to, you know, squat and do leg day every week?

SPEAKER_01See, you got me there because you know I hate squats. But if you had said But then you wouldn't have to rock climb or you wouldn't have to swim or you wouldn't have to surf, I would say, well, I mean it would be nice to be healthy, but I'm gonna do these things anyway.

SPEAKER_02Sure, right. So then in that case you are pursuing some kind of pleasure, right? Because you you seek or like you derive pleasure.

SPEAKER_01In your words, it's hard and therefore it's harmful.

SPEAKER_02Sure. Um, well, so suppose you really like you really enjoy rock climbing, and I say, well, okay, you can still enjoy rock climbing, go rock climbing and everything, but you don't have to worry about you know um the caluses on your hands peeling, right? You don't have to worry about the kind of trade-offs.

SPEAKER_01You saw straight through me. That is a good argument.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, so so that's what I'm trying to say, right? Like there are cases where harm is meaningful, but they are meaningful insofar as we know them right now. Um again, surgery is good because uh yes, you are harmed by being cut open, but you are benefited overall because you are you know um cured or treated for some illness. Now, if there was some future in which I didn't need to cut you open to solve that same problem, would you not think that's choice worthy? So it's compatible to say that some harms are very meaningful and at the same time claim that we could do with having less harm in the world.

unknownYeah.

SPEAKER_04All these examples seem to me to show though that there is some trade-off that we would happily take in most circumstances uh where we take voluntarily take on some harm in order to experience a benefit. We're talking about studying, we're talking about working out, eating healthy, uh climbing upstairs.

SPEAKER_01Um that was a good example.

SPEAKER_04Yeah, it's a reflexive. Yeah, I would climb up a flight of stairs to like get some get some ice cream, right? Um we all have different utility profiles. Yeah, I'm not an ice cream.

SPEAKER_01Take a better example.

SPEAKER_04Anyway, so the point is it this seems to suggest to me that there is an exchange rate um that we would take on. Um and I think uh let's say we can find an exchange rate that the majority of people would take on in any hypothetical situation. And perhaps that that exchange rate might be uh pretty pretty permissive in some cases, right? Like having to work out really sucks sometimes, uh, but it's worth it for the health benefits.

SPEAKER_04So I guess what I'm what I'm asking is might you be uh underestimating the permissiveness of this kind of exchange rate? Um and therefore it might be more permissible to have children as long as you can make uh ensure that you kind of hit the right exchange rates.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, that that's something that I'm interested to think about a lot as well, and that's something that I've um written about um in some cases. So the again we we're back to the to the to square one where we're thinking about well, okay, um insofar as I can I can you know ensure to the best of my ability that um you know my child will have a good life, then you know it should be permissible for me to to to procreate. And that's the the kind of standard um common sense view. Um so all I argue is that there might be some case, and I think you might be right, perhaps, that I I'm underestimating this exchange rate um to employ your terms.

SPEAKER_02Um but I I still I think that the bar for permissible procreation is still um really really high just to justify these harms. Um now remember, recall that earlier I talked a lot about how um harm kind of affects us very differently depending on our state of existence, right? Um we undertake harms to pursue meaningful things. Um prospective children don't have that, right? They don't have these meaningful things, at least not yet. Um now what I've argued for is this thing called the likelihood asymmetry.

SPEAKER_02Um because apparently us antinatalists really enjoy asymmetries. Um but what I what I argue is uh that in coming into existence, um being harmed is necessary. Now, I don't I don't argue that all existence is suffering, right? Existence equals suffering. That's not what I'm saying. Um what I'm saying is that all existence contains suffering necessarily, right? Um again we can think about the lower level kind of suffering from like hunger, thirst, thermal regulation, all the way up to things like existential dread, um, climate anxieties and all that.

SPEAKER_02But on the converse, reasons to think that you have a life worth living are not guaranteed. Now, your parents certainly play a big role here, right? If they have the resources for it, um they have a good environment for you to grow up in, but not being born into abject um poverty or war, then yeah, there's a greater chance that you might have access to a life worth living. But you see, that kind of like it's not as uh guaranteed as knowing that a prospective child will suffer.

SPEAKER_02Now what what this tells us is that um we have to consider that when we decide to procreate, and we want to do so in a way that is um morally permissive or permissible, sorry, um we need to make sure that that asymmetry is something that we can reasonably account for. And in another argument, I've put forth um the concept that maybe it's a lot harder than we think, because reasons for a life worth living it takes a lot to think that a life is worth living.

SPEAKER_02Um and now we to to kind of ensure that is something that no person can possibly do, precisely because of the asympto the likelihood asymmetry that I've mentioned earlier on. But also because so many things are outside of our control. Right? You could have the you could be the richest person in the world, um, and your child might still grow up to you know, again, experience the worst levels of existential dread. Um the great tale of um Gautama Buddha kind of tells us that you know it's it's not the kind of stuff that that you are born into.

SPEAKER_02Um it's just we look around, you look around you and there are just kind of causes or like sources of suffering um that pervade our our existence no matter how well off you are. So I I think that that sets us up in a in a in a starting position or an initial position that's already against the favor of the prospective child. And it's gonna be an uphill battle to kind of like turn the tide to make sure that that child has a life worth living in a way that you know again we cannot guarantee.

SPEAKER_01So does this mean if there is a very high threshold that there is an onus on pr prospective parents to prove why they should have children rather than the current norm, which is that people who don't have kids have to prove why they're not having them?

SPEAKER_02Yes, definitely. Um I think and I think we are we're starting to see that a lot more. Uh in local news, we are looking at articles that are being published about how younger couples are opting to have less, if not no children, and perhaps um filling their homes with pets instead of children. Um and I recall once seeing um an article or an opinion column, I can't remember what it was, um, calling for that exact thing. Um saying that, well, why are we interrogating our young couples for their decisions not to have children when you know these are the people who want to be responsive to the kind of the weight of that decision of bringing a life into this world?

SPEAKER_02Uh instead, we ought to consider um interrogating those to justify why they decide to have children. Um I would not be surprised. Of course, I have not done the empirical work here, so I cannot claim to know, but I will not be surprised if kind of our common sense uh is shifting towards needing to justify procreation instead of justifying refraining from procreation. So I think you're absolutely right. These pressures, irrespective of whether or not you're convinced by antinatalism, at the very least we have to admit that the arguments put forth by antinatalism gives rise to concerns um and these kind of pressures that um we can, you know, I think reasonably place upon um prospective parents to at least try and um navigate as they as they continue on their endeavors to procreate.

SPEAKER_01So, with that in mind, can we pretend that James is deciding whether or not to have children? Uh what would your advice be? And please look him dead in the eyes.

SPEAKER_03No.

SPEAKER_01No, like so that settles it. So convincing.

SPEAKER_02Yeah. Um so I so the view that I defend uh is what I call moderate antinatalism, right? Uh as we've talked about today. Um I don't think that it's universally impermissible to have a child. So that's where I depart from the kind of like traditional antinatalists who argue things like, oh, all existence equals suffering, and that's bad. So you shouldn't have like I'm not that edgy.

SPEAKER_01Um such a Gen Z. You traditionalists, I'm not as edgy as you.

SPEAKER_04Yeah. When we meet David Bennett, I will let him know he's a bit of an edge lord. I think he knows.

SPEAKER_01But so much of his so yeah.

SPEAKER_02Uh defending a moderate why why I call it moderate antinatalism is because uh I don't think that there's a universal kind of prohibition on having children, right? It's just that I think it's just a lot more difficult than we intuit to justify having children. That's all I'm saying. Now, so suppose that James now comes to me and says, hey, I'm really considering uh you know making a child. Uh my first my my first honest question would be why? And I don't mean this in a way like I don't I don't mean this in a very disrespectful manner, right?

SPEAKER_02I'm not going like, well, why would you do that? No, I uh one reason why I think why it's a very important question to ask is because uh I think that we should be interested not to create children as a project um to as means to our own ends. Um so if we if the moment you hear things like I'm gonna make a child because number one, it would save my marriage, number two, um, I want to have progeny, right? I want to have, I want to leave behind some symbol of my existence, I want to pass on my genes.

SPEAKER_02Like a lot of these reasons that people can come up with as to why they want to have children in a very shallow sense, tends, if you think about it, it makes children a means to an end. And I really don't think that's something that we ought to do. Right? If we don't think that it's permissible to make use of someone else as a means to our own ends, especially if that comes to harm them, I don't see why we can permissibly do that to our children. Um so in my own culture, it's very common to say, like, oh, if you don't have children, nobody will take care of you when you're old.

SPEAKER_02Now, I think that that's really problematic. Why would I want to, you know, make someone come into existence experience the harm that they will experience? Um, and yeah, sure, experience the benefits that they will experience, right? But I'm doing this because I want to have a caretaker when I'm old. I I just want to pay for.

SPEAKER_01That's literally it.

SPEAKER_02Sure, right. And so that's one re that's one one thing I would really want to ask, like why? And I think that uh in terms of kind of the motivations that come up for creating children, the only plausible motivation that I think would be plausibly justifiable here is to say that I want to create a child because of like I want to like make this child um you know have like the best life, and like everything is for the child as an ends in themselves.

SPEAKER_02Now, there are some ways to argue against this, right? So I could potentially say, well, yeah, but because this child is not an end in themselves yet, what you are doing is you are again desire satisfaction, right? Like you want to create this child, you want to do things right by this child. That's your desire. That child does not have a desire to be done right by, to be respected, to be, to have dignity. Um, and yeah, so so my question would then be motivation, right? I think that there's like a scala kind of ways in which we can think about our motivations to have children.

SPEAKER_02And some are better motivations than others. If you are having children for the sole purpose of social security, please just buy an insurance plan. See your agent. But if you're having children because you're saying, like, oh you know, I think that there are really meaningful things that can arise from my child's life, and I strongly believe that I can make that happen, and this child will one for nothing, this child will be the happiest person in the world. Maybe that's more justifiable than having children for social security.

SPEAKER_04Yeah. What if the the justification, what if the story was something uh uh more bigger, you know, something like, oh my government says that I should have two or more children if I can afford it. Um that's my motivation.

SPEAKER_01You don't have to answer that question.

SPEAKER_02Yeah. It's interesting because now you see that motivation is again very extrinsic, right? Like now that motivation can come together with an intrinsic motivation of all the noblest um sources, right? So it could be the case that my government, like, you know, this government wants me to have more than two three children, for example. Um so and I intrinsically really want children. I have every reason to think that this child is gonna have a good life. I will provide for this child, and everything that happens, I will take full responsibility.

SPEAKER_02Like all the you know, the cards are stacked in your towards your favor. Sure, right? It's not mutually exclusive. You don't get to say, like, oh, because some political power told me to have three children, I'm gonna have three children. Like, that's not how the world works, at least not how I hope it does. Certainly not what I can see. And I really, if it's not the way it is, I really don't want to know.

SPEAKER_01I wonder if your arguments apply the strongest to a couple who are deciding to have a child, and then instead of creating one, they just adopt. Because then you have all of the wonderful reasons, but not the responsibility of actually creating them. But in order for that to be true, someone else has to create them.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, so that is actually the exact upshot from my PhD thesis. And you foresaw that, um, which I think I think I would imagine is not um you know super far from imagination, but that is the exact upshot um that I'm trying to argue for. Um so there's so much to discuss here, right? Um, if you talk about choosing to procreate versus adoption, I in in my in my PhD work, I argue that we have a very strong moral obligation um to firstly consider adoption and only procreate if adoption for some reason just cannot work for you.

SPEAKER_02And that can happen for several reasons, but those reasons that I do not accept are things like preference.

SPEAKER_06Yeah.

SPEAKER_02Right? Um So what I argue for is what I call a conditional obligation. Um for to a conditional obligation to adopt instead of procreate. That's a pretty long name. Um, but I call it conditional obligation because I use that obligation to target only those individuals who intend to transit, to make a transition, right? A psychosocial transition into becoming parents. So I'm not interested, even though I might be in the future. I'm not interested at this point to say, well, globally, all of us should be adopting children, irrespective of whether or not we want to be parents.

SPEAKER_02Right? That would be interesting for future work, but not right now. Um so now I'm targeting people who want to transition into becoming parents. I think that they should first and foremost um adopt. And if they choose to procreate, they have to justify procreation against their decision not to adopt. Right? Um, and this is where again comes it comes back to kind of um one of your earlier questions about about justifying non-procreation versus justifying procreation, kind of that culture shift.

SPEAKER_02Um and yeah, I think that there are a lot of good reasons to think that such a conditional obligation might be true. For example, you're right, someone would have had to create that child first, but at the point of time of deciding of whether or not you're going to have a child, or you know, you want to exp expand your family unit, so to speak, um your child, your prospective child would not have existed yet, but there is an orphan child in need of a home. Right? Like, sure, someone would have had to create that child first and then put that child up for adoption, which obviously is not ideal, but that's besides the point.

SPEAKER_02The point is I'm thinking of create of having a child. Now I'm thinking, okay, do I make one or do I adopt one? And there is a modal difference in the kind of suffering you're trying to deal with. Right? A prospective child will suffer as a matter of necessity from coming to this world, but there is an existent child who is presumably, I think uncontentiously, harmed by being in an institution as you know, as an orphanage. Um, and now it I think it's quite intuitive to think that we have greater reasons to kind of like uh save or at least alleviate an existent person's harm than we have reasons to you know confer a benefit upon a prospective future person.

SPEAKER_02Right? And this also takes into consideration the kind of like asymmetry that I was talking about earlier. So we look at if we compare the kinds of harms um from an orphan child and your prospective child, it seems like we really ought to prevent the harm or continued sustained harm or even exacerbated harm to an existent person um versus a harm that hasn't yet kind of like come into You have greater reason to save the drowning person than to create someone who will have an okay life.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, exactly.

SPEAKER_01Um I think that's all we have time for today. This has been a fascinating discussion. James, no further questions? James has no further questions.

SPEAKER_04You said that we had no more time, so I'm done.

SPEAKER_01Great. Um, thank you so much for coming on. We have really enjoyed this chat with you.

SPEAKER_03Thank you for having me. Thank you.

SPEAKER_00Thanks for listening to our new podcast. Subscribe online and tune in every first of the month. In the meantime, listen to C BME and U and be savvy.

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