Send us Fan Mail In this episode, Prof. I. Glenn Cohen (Harvard University) gives us his world leading answers to some of the stickiest issues in modern reproductive ethics: What does in-vitro gametogenesis (and can Sinead pronounce it correct at least once) mean for parenthood? If there is no other means for a person to exist but with a genetic condition, is trying to select against certain embryos even good for anyone? Is there a possible way to make coffee even more gross than just instant? What is the importance of genetic relatedness in determining who our parents are, and to us as individuals? What's the difference between IVF and IVG? Remember people, be savvy!
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Transcript
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SPEAKER_00The center presents a new podcast at C BME and You, a podcast devoted to promoting awareness and debate around controversial ethical issues in biomedicine.
SPEAKER_03Welcome back to CB Me and You, a podcast about biomedical ethics. Now, have you heard of three-parent babies? Have you heard about creating an embryo from one person's DNA? Would more parents really be better? Today, we talk about assisted reproductive technologies with international expert Professor Glenn Cohen, the James A. Edward and Leslie Williams Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School. Welcome, Glenn. Thank you for having me.
SPEAKER_04Welcome, Glenn. We've got a few icebreaker questions for you. And uh before we get to them, I realize that every time we have a new podcast, uh new podcast guest, I forget to warn them about James's accents before we start. More often than not, the guests get quite surprised. It's brilliant though. Anyway, icebreaker questions. Uh coffee or coffee, or if you haven't been to Singapore, what is your go-to coffee order?
SPEAKER_01So my first trip to Singapore coming, and this is gonna be embarrassing to confess, but I only started drinking coffee about two years ago, and I don't actually like the taste very much. So I do this thing that people find horrific, which is I mix in a protein shake in the morning with coffee. So that's kind of my start of the day.
SPEAKER_03Uh for the record, for the podcast listeners, Sinead has an absolutely horrified look on her face right now.
SPEAKER_01It's very efficient, but not not what I think most coffee love. And I'm again, I respect them and I respect kind of their traditions, and I realize this is not perhaps consonant with the cultural understanding of coffee. But maybe over time I'll develop more of a taste and more of a sense of it.
SPEAKER_03You gotta do what you gotta do to uh get the protein down and get those gains, right?
SPEAKER_04Okay, okay. That's what you gotta do, and then there's ruining art and a good thing. Okay, just just just to clarify, which coffee do you have when you put the protein in?
SPEAKER_01That's just so I'm actually completely un uh fussy about it. We have like a little uh Nespresso machine at home, so that's usually what I do. So basically a pod of coffee that I make and mix in coffee a protein shake to it. That's literally how I start most of my days.
SPEAKER_04Okay, okay. There's one more question. Um, why did you start drinking?
SPEAKER_01This is the important question. The bioethics audience really wants to know the answer to today.
SPEAKER_04Oh yes. Why did you start drinking coffee if uh you're just gonna ruin it with protein?
SPEAKER_01You know, it's uh caffeine delivery system for me. I actually found myself falling asleep in a meeting and uh transatlantic after a long transatlantic flight. And so I'd always had like coffee in the background as a break glass opportunity if I needed it. And I found about two years ago I needed it.
SPEAKER_04Okay. Look, to be fair, I didn't start drinking coffee until my fifth year of law school uh when I had to do a summer semester and an internship at the same time. Um, and I was like, something's gotta give. But here we are, quite a few years later. Um, and while you're here for ABN, I will make sure I get some special coffee grab delivered and we can taste tests for you.
SPEAKER_03There we go.
SPEAKER_04Okay, excellent.
SPEAKER_03Okay, and I'll bring the protein shake you and put it in. James of both worlds, it's perfect.
SPEAKER_04Uh next question, what country do you want to travel to next?
SPEAKER_01I'm very excited for my trip to Singapore because I haven't been. Uh, but high up on the list also are Chile uh and India. Those are two places I'd like to go that I haven't been yet.
SPEAKER_04All right, all right. So you're excited for Singapore? That's next week.
SPEAKER_01And so yeah, I have to keep it out of my calendar, but I think it is next week. I think it's almost a week than today.
SPEAKER_04We're looking forward to having you here. Um, and I hope you have enough time to actually see around rather than just stick to the conference. But yeah, that you might have to sneak out of one of the sessions.
SPEAKER_01I'll do my best to be surreptitious.
SPEAKER_04We'll put James on door duty. Uh, last question. What's your go-to karaoke song?
SPEAKER_01So this might surprise people, but it's actually Johnny Cash and it's the Folsom Prison Blues, uh, in part because I think it's actually fairly easy to sing, right? So I'll hear the train is coming and it's coming around the bend. It's like not so characteristic in that I have never shot a man in Rena or anything like that. But I think it's just the idea of uh I find it a good song to sing, and people often know it. If it's a group, I might do more ABBA, but if it's just me up there, it's gonna be Johnny Cash.
SPEAKER_04Yeah, okay.
SPEAKER_03We love EBBA here. Uh now, just just so that uh like I think I know who Johnny Cash is, but he's the guy who's like, uh who's he sounds like he's kind of like mumbling in that southern accent all the whole time, right?
SPEAKER_01I'm not sure how the American music uh cultural institution was would respond to that particular characterization. There's a film about him full of off the line. You know, he's one of the greats of American country music, I would say.
SPEAKER_04Okay.
SPEAKER_03That's a that's a very uh political answer, diplomatic answer.
SPEAKER_04Just to clarify, just to clarify, Johnny Cash is is is is he is he rock?
SPEAKER_01I think most people would call him more a little bit more country, like a little more twang, like you know like Matthew McConnell, all right, all right, all right, all right. Let's say Matthew McConaughey is an inheritor of the Johnny Cash tradition.
SPEAKER_04It goes the other way around.
SPEAKER_01The Johnny Cash legacy. There we go.
SPEAKER_04Okay, all right. Uh thank you for answering our questions. We'll make sure to add that karaoke song to our ever-growing Spotify playlist.
SPEAKER_02Listen to it. False Imprison Blues. It's very, very good song. But anyways, all right. Sounds fun.
SPEAKER_04Okay, we'll do that. We'll do it, we'll do it in honor of you at our next karaoke session.
SPEAKER_03Alrighty. So, Glenn, you've done a lot of research on the ethics of emerging reproductive technologies. Uh, and there are a lot of terms here that I don't understand. Uh, like IVF and IVG, MRT, which sounds like a local reference, and you'll find out what that is. Uh, but it's got nothing to do with reproductive technologies and ectogenesis. Just for our audience and for people like me, could you uh explain what some of these are? Uh just I guess in brief detail.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, I mean, IVF and nutrient fertilization's been around uh the longest uh now, right? Uh with the birth of Louise Brown, among others, many years ago. And this is the way many people today in um many industrialized countries, really around the world, uh, have reproduction in that we fertilize an egg with sperm outside of the body, and then we implant the uh developing embryo into the body to develop into a fetus and the like. That's pretty familiar to people. I think the others are less familiar in vitro, in part because uh they're not widely available.
SPEAKER_01In vitru gametogenesis or IVG is, and when I tell people about things I work on, this is uh uh always the thing that they think I'm making up that it doesn't really exist. But we've successfully done this in many mammals and in human embryos. It's essentially taking adult cells like skin cells and deriving gametes of sperm and egg, including cross-sex gametes from adult cells. So that's in vitro gametogenesis, so we can derive sperm or egg from your adult cells, your skin cells, and use that to produce an embryo, implant it, bring it to term.
SPEAKER_03I can see why people don't believe you when you when they say that.
SPEAKER_01That's that's sound rather science fiction, but it's quite amazing that we've been able to do this. Mitochondrial replacement involves putting together the mitochondria from one woman with the nuclear, um the nuclear parts of the ucytes of the other parts of the genetic material together to produce an egg, which is fertilized by a man's sperm. So two genetic mothers, one providing the mitochondrial DNA, one providing the rest of the DNA, and a man's sperm, sometimes called three-parent IVF. I think it's a little bit of a misnomer or presumes an answer to an interesting set of questions.
SPEAKER_01Uh, and then there are other things like um uterus transplants that we can actually transplant a uterus from one woman to another, uh, ectogenesis, which again, so uterus transplants we have done and we're doing in the United States. MRT, which I just mentioned, is being undertaken in the UK and some other countries, but not the United States. IVG on humans, not being done anywhere at the moment. And then ectogenesis uh is the idea of kind of artificial wounds and uh generating kind of an embryo that could be sustained without implantation over a period of time.
SPEAKER_04This is incredible. I think I remember, well, I know that IVF is on the app. Like there's there's lots going on. I know that in Singapore, I Googled it yesterday. Um, they're almost doubling their in their use of IVF every year or every couple of years at least. Um, and one of the interesting things that I've seen come out of the news, uh, and obviously when you do something more, more likely to make a mistake, is that things go wrong in IVF. And like it used to be really, you know, controversial. People thought, oh, how could you make be making test you babies, these sorts of things, etc., etc.
SPEAKER_04We got used to it, and now some mistakes have happened. So in Australia earlier this year, it was announced that a woman had been raising a child that she had given birth to following IVF that was genetically unrelated to her and her partner or her husband. And it actually belonged to the another couple who were trying to conceive through IVF. Now, the mistake wasn't realized until several years after the child's birth. Um, and then once you start going down this rabbit hole on the internet, you start to find quite a few more of these being reported.
SPEAKER_04Um, there was a major one that happened in Israel. It actually made it to the Supreme Court. Um, and honestly, everyone just sort of wants to know who are the the real parents? And I hope, I hope you can hear my finger quotations as an audience when I say the word real, because I can't think of a better word.
SPEAKER_03You could like do like, who are the real parents?
SPEAKER_04Yeah, I'll do that next time.
SPEAKER_01Um, you know, so uh we you know you actually I wrote about the Israel case with two callers with Vardee Ritzky uh from the Hastings Center and Shelley Samana, who's a professor at BC law while it was being litigated. So, first of all, you know, just to give some context, we should also be clear that errors and mix-ups happen in non-reproductive technology cases. Believe it or not, this case law about babies switched in hospitals and when to switch them back, because sometimes the wrong baby is brought home. And so that's interesting to say that, you know, there's something, while the cases where reproductive technology have gained a lot of attention, actually, numerically speaking, unclear whether the how what percentage of possible cases are.
SPEAKER_01Okay, that's said.
SPEAKER_04Wait, wait, those mix-ups still happen. I thought that was like a thing of bygone times.
SPEAKER_01You know, I mean, again, there are switch cases. There are also cases that have misattributed paternity. So there are estimates, for example, that uh maybe somewhere between one and five percent of individuals are incorrect about their paternity. And indeed, 23andMe, and uh, you know, I warned this about people who were buying these for families and for, you know, a nice holiday or a present, like a stocking stuffer, that actually these genetic tests can often reveal really uh difficult things about a family. Actually, there was a book I edited a couple of years ago on consumer genetic testing, and uh there was a really remarkable chapter someone had written about their own life experience, where I believe it was a niece who had undertaken one of these as part of a school project, uh, 23andMe, or an Ancestry.com test.
SPEAKER_01I can't remember the details. And it basically revealed a long-held family secret that um the mother, so the, I guess the aunt's mother, so the great aunt or the grandmother, excuse me, of the child in question did the test, was actually the victim of rape and had been the victim of rape at a young age. And this was something that was never addressed in the family. And the child was raised as though it was part of the family, like every other child, but it turned out there was this whole part of the family tree that was not genetically related. And this was uncovered in this process.
SPEAKER_01So this is just to say that the idea of complicated kind of mixings and secrets and you know, things that are not clear at first to become clear, is not specific just to the embryo mix-up cases. But speaking of the embryo mix-up cases, yeah, there's a few different ways you can think about the question about parentage. And I think about this as a lawyer is who is the legal parent. That's maybe the way I would phrase it, like which person is a legal parent in this instance. And, you know, one possibility, which is the traditional, is to do it on the basis of gestation and the marital presumption.
SPEAKER_01So the idea is if you are the gestator plus the person who's married to the gestator, you are the legal parents. A second approach is to focus on genetic relatedness. A third approach focuses on the best interests of the child, and we can talk about all sorts of interesting problems about thinking about how that applies in the context of reproductive technology. And the fourth approach you could think of just theoretically, is that actually why are we trying to get it down to one parent or two parents? Why not recognize multiple parents? And there can be more than two.
SPEAKER_01And what's interesting about the embryo mix-up cases is that in regular surrogacy cases, where the similar question is raised, if a surrogate, a gestational surrogate, that's a surrogate who carries the child but doesn't contribute genetic material, if she's agreed to be a surrogate and then she changes her mind, there is this question about who gets to claim legal parenthood, the woman who provided the egg or the woman who did the gestation. And in the regular surrogacy cases, many courts are in favor of what's called uh the intent rule, that essentially we look to see who intended to be the rearing parent, and we kind of contractualize this whole area or try to read in a contract.
SPEAKER_01What's interesting about the embryo mix-up cases is that actually there is no intent because uh surrogacy occurs as a matter of error. And there's a way in which you can view, and some might find this offensive as a framing, but it's uh helpful conceptually to say, one can view the person who carries another rearing family or another genetic family's embryo as a kind of involuntary surrogate, somebody who ends up in the situation of the surrogate, but not by intention and not by agreement.
SPEAKER_01And so now we kind of more nakedly face the question of under that circumstance, we can't rely on the intent rule. We have to rely on one of these other things. And I'll just say one more thing about it is to say you might be attracted to the best interest kind of analogy, which is something we often think about when we have a custody fight or questions about adoption. I think there's both a conceptual problem, which has to do with the application of best interest reasoning to an entity that doesn't yet exist and what effects that might be. And we can at some point talk about non-identity problem or stuff like that.
SPEAKER_01But then there's also just a very practical question, which is to say when you have uh an embryo, if you discover it in the course of pregnancy or shortly after pregnancy, how do you have any data about which of these parents would serve the best interests of the child, right? Because we often think about the best interest as being a very, you know, contextual kind of analysis, a lot of data about how a particular child relates to a particular parent. You've got none of that at the very beginning. And so you worry a little bit that the best interest analysis becomes a kind of fig leaf for all sorts of social prejudices or views we have about class or about resources or about who makes a good parent.
SPEAKER_01So I'm not a particularly big fan of resolving the cases that way.
SPEAKER_04Do you think, though, that um so I'm aware that when courts are tasked with determining legal parenthood, guidance, custody, et cetera, their only jurisdiction is over parents' patria. So they can only make a decision in the best interest of the child. And I'm speaking from my understanding of the Australian court system here. Which you're right, limits it to questions about what is in the child's best interest, their well-being, who are uh what existing relationships are already there. And there's just something you said, which was that, you know, when the mistake is discovered in womb, there isn't, we can't, it's it's too difficult to make a determination about which relationship is strongest.
SPEAKER_04But do you think that's biologically accurate in so far as, you know, like the gestational relationship between gestational mother or or progenitor or whichever term is is preferable here, and and the fetus is actually much stronger than we realize at that point in time, particularly for the mother who research suggests calls it a transformative experience.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, so I think it it matters what we mean by relationship and what we mean by best interest. So it's it's definitely the case that um uh upon gestation for nine months, uh, you know, the biological relationship with a fetus is different from the person who merely contributed an egg. On the flip side, if you think about the rest of the life and kind of what kinds of connections matter and how we, and there's a social and anthropological and sociological aspect to this too, in terms of how do we think about the social practice of parenthood. You know, years ago, I wrote a paper where, among other things, I pointed out that there are other cultures, I think like Malinowski's Trobeander Islanders, right, who have different conceptions about what contribution of parents are.
SPEAKER_01And again, this is like vague memory, so I might get this wrong, but I'll try to remember off the top of my head. The idea that like mother's ancestral spirit comes in, and father's job is to open up the pathway for that. This is the way sex is understood culturally and the cultural cognition of this particular culture at the time when Malinowski is writing. And you might say, you know, what is our own folk psychology or cultural cognition around parenthood? And what is it that we think one contributes? And I would say we're a heavily geneticized sort of society that we tend to emphasize the genetic ties as a cultural one.
SPEAKER_01And, you know, this is true even uh when it comes to thinking about uh surrogacy and the desire in regular surrogacy, contractual surrogacy in places where it's permitted, which is not everywhere in the world, to really kind of transform it into a conception of labor or employment, right? A special kind of employment, but yet an employment that has like a termination point. And I'll just say again, this is like, you know, anecdot. But when you talk to gay couples who are trying to determine who their surrogate is going to be and who their egg donor is, and you ask them, what are your feelings towards these two people?
SPEAKER_01And how do you think about these two people? With the egg donor, there's a lot of identification and a lot of attempts to kind of shop for traits. And there's a sense that like the decisions I'm making with the egg donor are really going to be extremely important. Whereas I think the surrogate is seen by many of them much more as a service provider, someone who has this limited role, in some ways, an analogy to the role of the physician, the fertility doctor, that they're causally responsible for this thing coming into existence, but it's not kind of this deep connection with who my child will be, depending who the surrogate is.
SPEAKER_01Now, the the interesting question for me is it doesn't seem to me that's like metaphysically uh necessary, that one could imagine a flipped perception of the two. And perhaps there are societies where that exists, but it is, I think, deeply embedded in our culture that genetic ties are seen as very important, perhaps because we are such vain creatures and we tend to think a lot about ourselves and our own genes, and such that the contribution to this other genetic partner becomes extremely important in thinking about this as a cultural matter.
SPEAKER_03Yeah, the the issues of what is in the child's best interest is really interesting to me, uh, both as you know, on the metaphysical side, uh as well as on the more practical side of like how do we know? Um, so we'll we'll get to the metaphysical side in a bit, um, because I I want to get there. Um but but also there's a practical side, and you've raised an interesting issue of like, you know, this is at the very beginning of a child's life or even before a child's life uh even begins. Like, how do we know which parents are gonna be in the child's best interests?
SPEAKER_03And you've raised an issue the the point that uh if we're just using genetics, well, it's not clear that that actually means as much as we think it might mean. But if we don't have genetics, uh if we're not going with genetics, um, is there really no are we really left with uh nothing?
SPEAKER_01As yeah, I mean, so I'm again I'm very skeptical of the best interests analysis apply in this circumstance. And I guess here is uh sort of one of the reasons is you might think if your goal in life was for this child to live a flourishing life, why is it that you would bound your choices between being either the gestational mother or the genetic mother? One could imagine fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh other people out there in the world who would actually be uh even more in the best interests of the child if we took this seriously because of their outstanding parenting skills, their outstanding resources, whatever it is you matters to you.
SPEAKER_01I don't want, I'm trying to be ecumenical about this, but there's no reason to think it's merely these two people who are the certainly the best of all possible parents. And if I say, well, why aren't those people allowed to have standing to make a claim to the parenthood of this child? Your answer would be, well, they're excluded because they don't even have the gestational or the genetic tie. So it seems to me when we talk about best interest, we're not thinking about it in a truly robust sort of way. We actually mean this as a kind of tiebreaker. And then if I say, as tiebreakers go, what kind of epistemic kind of advantage do I have in figuring out who is in the best interest and how much confidence do I have in that judgment?
SPEAKER_01I think just early on, it's just such a rife terrain for stereotyping rather than sound judgments that I would just assume not invite it. Now, of course, if somebody has reason to think that they're going to be an unfit parent or a terrible parent, well, one thing I point out is that those people get to at least start out being parents through cordal reproduction all the time, right? We we need to have some significant evidence before we'll remove a child from the care, right? So why is it that we're so quick in this space to jump in and think we understand what we can make predictions about best interests so well?
SPEAKER_04That's a really good answer. Um, and it yeah, I think it makes it It makes me think, you know, or or question just genetic affiliation and the role it plays in determining legal, but also things like moral parenthood. But then that sort of questions the rest of the ART or assisted reproductive technologies that we're got we're moving forward with and we're trying our absolute best to develop. So we've got things like IVG, so in vitro gab help communogenesis.
SPEAKER_04Communogenesis, um, MRT, uh, ectogenesis. All of this is doing our absolute best attempts to make sure that everyone has the best opportunity they can to have a child that's genetically related to them. And I I just I know that this might come across a bit weird or or or or judgmental, but do you think that like this is kind of unfair in that we are spending so many resources trying our absolute best to make sure everyone can have a kid that's genetically related to them? When A, um many people can't even access basic reproductive care in the first place.
SPEAKER_04And and B, there are there are so many children out there who need homes, or you know, like the whole foster adoption thing. And I know it's not a solution, but I think you understand my point.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, so let me cut this a few ways. The first is, you know, years ago I was very interested in uh I have a wonderful colleague, uh, she's now retired, Professor Bartholet, who is a big fan of adoption and skeptical about uh so many productive technologies as a result because of the fear that this is pushing people away from adoption. So we tried to do an econometric analysis many years ago, uh, using the fact that uh infertility insurance mandates are introduced at various times in the United States to figure out whether when you make uh infertility care cheaper, do people substitute away from adoption?
SPEAKER_01And we couldn't basically find a significant effect. So that's like just an interesting empirical, it's one study, econometrically could critique it. There's other ways of trying to measure it and the like. But that's you know, an empirical question whether people do or not. Second thing to say is uh if you are worried about children being available for adoption, as I think is a fair thing to do, it's unclear to me why you think the duty or the obligation to do something about that problem ought to fall amongst people who are facing infertility, especially if your view is about infertility, if we're talking about infertility, medical infertility, for example, but people who are suffering from a kind of disability.
SPEAKER_01It seems like a strange logic to say we have the social problem, children in need of adoption. The correct person to put that burden on is somebody who's already disadvantaged on something else. So that's like a second uh cut uh at the problem. You know, a different cut of the problem, though, I will say. So that's like pushing back a little bit, pushing in the same direction, though, is to say many of these technologies, vitrigram metogenesis, mitochondria replacement techniques, are substitutes for using uh someone else's gametes. So you can often, for the vast, vast, vast majority of uses you could imagine, uh, a solution other than these technologies would be to use a gamete donor, a sperm or egg donor, depending on who the parent facing the uh who's causing the problem that would otherwise manifest without these technologies, such that any defense of these technologies depends on some preference for genetic relatedness of both parents.
SPEAKER_01And if you don't believe that there is any interest that's a weighty interest, I don't want to necessarily use the word right, but any rights claim or interest claim here that's quite weighty as a genetic relatedness, then I don't think these technologies make a whole lot of sense. But that said, then again, neither does necessarily uh um some of the existing technologies that we have that we treat as more traditional, right? So I think there is this interesting question that culturally we do seem to assign a significant amount of importance to genetic relatedness and uh whether we're willing to cash it out with a new wave of technologies the way we've cashed out with old waves of technologies as well.
SPEAKER_03Yeah, it seems to me that one possible view is just that look, people have interests in having children who are genetically related to them, but they don't necessarily have a right to have children who are genetically related to them. And so it's kind of up to the rest of society how much um subsidies or assistance we might provide. And, you know, may if it turns out that we are willing to provide uh uh assistance up to a certain point, but not to the point of uh more expensive or more high-tech solutions, uh, then that that's just what it is, uh, or something like that.
SPEAKER_03So that isn't that one possible uh view?
SPEAKER_01But notice that your framing has compressed the conception of rights to compress uh all rights as being positive liberty rights, and that you might ask, what about at least the negative liberty rights here, right? So even if I conclude that your interest in genetic relatedness does not uh give you a strong rights claim to a limited pool of resources for support from the public, does it at least give you a negative liberty right against non-interference or a law prohibiting it? Because in most of the countries uh that exist right now, many of these technologies are not lawfully available. It'd be a crime to engage in one of these practices in the United States because of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, and it's unapproved, it's a roundabout way that it would be kind of unlawful.
SPEAKER_01So you might say, maybe I have no rights, claim to resources for support, but I do have rights, claims at least to uh uh non-interference and the negative liberty. I'll also just put out though that one of the interesting questions here, and this is a place where I think uh bringing it to the LGBTQ IA community or at least the LG community is quite interesting in that one use case for in vitro gimetogenesis and mitochondrial techniques possibly too, but at least uh IVG is cross-sex gametes that basically female female couples could derive from one partner uh a sperm and from the other an egg.
SPEAKER_01And the sperm would come through IVG, the egg through uh regular egg retrieval. And so they might say that it's actually not merely an abstract claim genetic relatedness, but a claim towards equality and towards recognition that we ought to be treated like every other parent and that just as every other heterosexual parent gets to have both parties be genetic parents, we ought to have the same claim. Now, others, like my wonderful colleague Françoise Bayliss, would like, you know, say, no, that's completely wrong. And it's a perversion of the idea of what we're using reproduction for.
SPEAKER_01But all of these questions I think do raise the question about what reproduction is for, what is the good of reproduction? And to me, it's like moral, moral, moral all the way down. There's no way to escape kind of these profound questions.
SPEAKER_04I was gonna, uh yeah, um was super interested in the way that when uh sometimes you invented technology to address things that people with disabilities or diseases or illnesses or infertility in this case example, um, when you address the issues they're facing, that it also wides it up for a bunch of other people who weren't necessarily considered like same-sex couples. But you know, uh going the other way with in vitro, uh oh, again, in vitre. Jim Genesis. Yeah, Jimmy's in Genesis.
SPEAKER_03IVG, just say IVG. IVG. Uh M and Money.
SPEAKER_04Yeah, I'm trying to do a favor for our listeners by like uh saying the uh the full name, but I think I'm doing them no favors because I keep forgetting it.
SPEAKER_03Um you're doing them favours for by reminding them that uh it's really hard to pronounce, and it's okay that you can pronounce it.
SPEAKER_04Yeah, yeah, yeah. Thanks, James. Wow, thanks. Going the other way though, um, IBG opens up the possibility of solar reproduction. So technically, from my bone marrow, we could divide um derive, you know, induced pluripotent stem cells. I could create a sperm and an egg. Well, not me, because I'm not talented like that and I don't have the equipment. But then someone could create a child for me that's not a clone. It's not an exact copy or replica of my DNA, but it was in you know effectively reproduced from my DNA. Does this does this seem like a really great idea for people who simply don't want to have to partner in order to have a kid?
SPEAKER_04Or does this or is this going down towards the more narcissistic route that you should you want to have a kid? I can't, I can't tell. Could you help it?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, I think it's a very interesting uh case. I mean, the other one that I think is interesting is called multiplex parenting, which is going in the opposite direction. So yeah, and just to catch to explain this uh briefly, right, is that one could imagine uh deriving an embryo through IVG, and then from that, you know, basically taking 16 parents, so compressing a whole group of grandparents or great-grandparents, and then deriving essentially embryos from each of them, right? Deriving embryos for that and producing what would be one child that is the result of four generations of reproduction.
SPEAKER_01If you've got 16 people together, a single child, right?
SPEAKER_04So your grandfather would also be your dad.
SPEAKER_01Well, I mean, the idea here, I mean, I think it's just an easy way to describe it, this multiplex parenting, that we can have more than two parents, we can have multiple, multiple parents by engaging in kind of repeated forms of this technology. So you know on the one hand, both of these seem profoundly strange. The solo, the person who wants such exclusivity that they want to be only them and all sides. And on the flip side, the person who wants to produce a child, not with the regular two, but with 16. Now, if I say in between these two, why is two the magic number, right?
SPEAKER_01Maybe three with mitochondrial replacement techniques. Is it naturalistic fallacy that's doing the work? Or is it something that we think is actually important? How much is this connected to a particular narrative, appropriation ought to follow monogamous coupling and a particular conception of what a life partner is? And is there a way which these technologies are kind of liberating? Now, all that said, uh, I also have a strange reaction to the solo case. And it does seem narcissistic and perhaps uh problematic as a desire.
SPEAKER_01And one might think the person who wants this, they don't need uh reproductive technology, they need psychotherapy, right? The idea is to say they need to understand, like that's like a particularly understandable reaction. On the flip side, if it turns out this is a person who would not reproduce otherwise, now we get into the throes of a little bit of the non-identity problem where we have to ask uh, would the act of reproduction be harmful to the child if but for the permissibility of this act, no child would come into existence, such that we're talking not about replacing one child with another, but instead preventing a child from coming into existence.
SPEAKER_01So, to what extent any of these technologies or prohibitions on it can be justified based on concern about harm to future generations, or are there other non-harm conceptions? I won't get into the fancy philosophical lingo here, but non-simple harm-based conceptions uh that could do work for us morally as well.
SPEAKER_04Since you brought it up, uh James has been waiting.
SPEAKER_03So I I know that you've written uh a little bit uh against certain legal restrictions um uh in these kinds of areas where there's an argument that says, well, look, if we uh restrict this person from let's say uh solo reproduction, or we restrict this person from uh choosing one like path of reproduction, uh whatever that means, over another, uh, it will be in the child's best interests uh in some sense.
SPEAKER_03And and you've uh kind of taken the position against that argument. Could you explain, I guess, in like quickly as possible, I guess.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, squickly as possible.
SPEAKER_01So here's gonna be the quick version. So actually, let's use a simple case. So in the UK, for example, for many years there was a prohibition on reproduction past a certain age, right? So if the sum of the age of the two reproductive parties is beyond a certain age, they couldn't use IVF. So that's an easy, straightforward example. When you ask people why did you have this rule? One argument that was made was well, if a child uh is born and their parents are much older or their parents die before they reach the age of maturity, that child is seriously harmed.
SPEAKER_01Uh now, once you think about that for a moment, you start to wonder exactly what they mean. And to be clear, my work is about asking people to be clear about what they mean. And then when they actually say what they mean, whether what they mean uh now has the same moral force as they thought it did, as opposed to saying there are not good arguments here. So uh if your claim is that the child is harmed by being brought into existence, you need to have a counterfactual conception of what the non-harm state would be. And if the non-harm state is non-existence, because if I prohibit a woman at the age of 50 from reproducing because I'm concerned about harm to her offspring, the alternative would be that that offspring is not born.
SPEAKER_01And that seems that's at the core of Parfitt, Derek Parfitt, like Derek Parfitt's non-identity problem. Now, there are other instances where you're actually talking about substitution, where it's not a question of no child being born, but instead replacing this child with another child. And, you know, that might be uh you can justify that even though nobody is harmed and nobody is made better off, right? Through what are often called non-person affecting principle approaches. But when I pause someone and say, when you say and you criticize that person for having a child at the age of 16 rather than 20, what you really are trying to say is the world would have been better off had we replaced that nice child you had with this other child over here.
SPEAKER_01Now all of a sudden, that doesn't feel like a very easy and like completely we should all coalesce, and that's like a clear, easy thing to say as a moral justification for the outcome. Instead, it's quite complicated and has a lot of implications. So I want to just kind of expose to people that unlike when you're talking about best interest for an existing child, or that existing child's life would go better or worse, depending on whether we allow a certain decision to make to take place, like an adoption. With reproduction, when we change the rules about who's allowed to reproduce, we might produce no child at all.
SPEAKER_01Hard to argue that's in the best interest, non-existence in most cases. Or we're making arguments about replacement. Uh, and as Jan uh Narvison once said, uh, we have many reasons to make children happy, but we may not have the same reasons to make happy children, right? There are very two different kinds of arguments with different kinds of moral forces, and in my view, different justificatory forces for legal restrictions on reproduction. That was a little bit long-winded, but hopefully it wasn't too bad.
SPEAKER_03It was very succinct considering the problem that we face.
SPEAKER_04So um, what you're saying uh has uh touches on uh not a recent, but a 2017 case in the UK, the case of Evie Tombs. And I'm sure you're aware of Evie Toomes.
SPEAKER_01I think at one point I was, but tell me more, yeah.
SPEAKER_04Okay, okay. So for our listeners who probably are deep into the law of wrongful conception, uh, Evie Toomes uh was, I think, 18 or 19 at the time of the case. Essentially, um, her conception was uh a kind of sad story. So essentially her mother went to the doctor before trying to have a kid, asked the doctor, is there anything I should be doing to make sure that when I conceive this baby is healthy? Specifically, she said, um, should I take folic acid? The doctor said, nah, you're good.
SPEAKER_04You'll get enough in your diet, which was at the time wrong. It was a mistake. That research was sufficient at the time to show that taking folic acid can drastically reduce your chances of having a kid with a neural tube defect. So the mother proceeded to conceive within the next week, um uh and then wasn't told about folic acid until three or four months into the pregnancy. Um and the child was subsequently born with spina bifida or neural tube defect, causing some um disability for the rest of her life.
SPEAKER_04Uh so she was 18 at the time, of which she uh sued the doctor for wrongful conception. So this is the idea that uh you made a mistake, and I shouldn't, I uh the mistake was prior to my birth uh or prior to my conception, um, and that was wrong. Now, courts have long struggled with comparing existence with non-existence. And for that reason, they have never awarded, as far as I'm aware, never awarded damages to the person because they say, well, you exist, and the alternate of the person not being negligent was that you would never exist, um, and that is worse for you.
SPEAKER_04Or we actually can't tell. But in the UK, they have a piece of legislature which says that people can sue for this, which is quite interesting. Um, and it sort of bypasses the question of having to compare existence as someone who might be suffering a disability with non-existence. It sort of picks up on the idea that something did go wrong and someone has suffered. Whether or not we can compare that their life would, you know, happen without that suffering, they are nevertheless suffering in this moment.
SPEAKER_04And I found it quite an interesting bypass to the non-identity problem. The parliament was like, yeah, we're just not going to deal with this and we'll just make it a statute anyway. I was wondering if you'd uh given that any thought or if you thought that was a good solution to this, uh, or a good regulatory solution anyway, to the non-identity problem.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, so without speaking to the specifics of the UK uh case, which I'm not familiar enough to really speak with any authority, I will say a couple of things. First of all, one thing to say is that our in the United States, wrongful life lawsuits are typically unavailable, but wrongful birth is available, whereby the parents might be able to bring a lawsuit. So one interesting question is if you're worried about deterring misconduct, how much extra misconduct do you deter by allowing a wrongful conception of the wrongful life lawsuit on top of the wrongful birth lawsuit, right?
SPEAKER_01So you might already get closer to optimal uh deterrence. The other thing is to say beyond uh non-harm or non-simple harm-based, person affecting, harm-based theories, you could believe again in this uh non-person affecting principle approach. You also could believe Shauna Schifrin uh has an old article on this subject in legal theory about this idea of what I would call wronging without harming, that we could have wrongs that are done uh without harming. Um, I have to say that I've written years ago, I wrote considerably thought deeply about this, so that I'm not convinced.
SPEAKER_01But it would be an odd, you know, one way to understand or possibly to justify some kind of penalty here or statutory damages is it acknowledges wrongdoing, even if it is harmless wrongdoing, or harmless in the sense that uh there is no comparative harm, that somebody is both made worse off and better off. And Schiffrin's article argument, you know, one of the things that she says quite interestingly in this old paper, if I remember correctly, it's a number of years since I last read it, is that it might imply that actually all acts of reproduction are wrongful or are prima fascia wrongful because they impose a harm, the harms of ordinary living, just for a pure benefit, right, coming into existence, because nobody is harmed by not being brought into existence.
SPEAKER_01Uh, such that actually the wrongful conception case might have much more in common with the average normal conception case, in that it imposes both uh a kind of negative state and a positive state at the same time. And one of the things she says is that even if you thought Pure and Fashi, all acts of conception are wrongful, if I remember her argument correctly, uh, you might think that actually some of the wrongdoing is dispelled by the fact that in the normal case, a parent shares in that they're the decision maker to conceive, and they share in some of the things that when a child's life goes badly, as all our lives occasionally do, right?
SPEAKER_01They're there for the child. And that raises interesting questions about family structure and the like. So another way of defending something like what the court has done is that it's an instance of, or the legislature, I guess, in the UK, as a case of wrong, a wronging without harming. There are also people who are threshold deontologists about this kind of stuff, or think that there's some kind of threshold model. So I think the philosophy is quite interesting. One thing I find interesting is this is one space where the courts have actually been interested in something that resembles the non-identity problem, even though they don't cite Parfit. But the reasoning of the cases actually very much resembles what Parfit says in uh in reasons in persons in some ways.
SPEAKER_01So that's an interesting place where you would not have thought of all people, of all the philosophers in the world, that Derek Parfett, you know, mad genius that he is, would be the one to uh whose ideas would influence courts. But there's a way in which the same idea has seeped in in the general kind of desire not to recognize wrongful life cases.
SPEAKER_03Yeah, I first learned about Sean O. Schiffin's theory about like how you can harm your child just by bringing them into existence in grad school. Uh I took a picture of that slide and sent it straight to my parents. It did not hold down well.
SPEAKER_04Ah, she antenatalist meaning for my child.
SPEAKER_01I mean, I think that for me, and again, over the period of, you know, I've been at this for about 18 years, I guess, something like that. Over the period, I think if you read my early stuff, I sound much more like a philosopher. And if you read my later stuff, I sound much more like a technocrat. And I think that's an interesting kind of personal development of the way I think about it. But I think the philosophical instincts remain helpful in the following way. Uh, if I ask you to try to hit a target, it's really important to know what the target is and what the target you're trying to hit is.
SPEAKER_01And, you know, there's all sorts of other professions in academia and the real world who can help you to hit a target once you identify what it is. But what philosophers do better than others is to really question and push hard on the idea of what the target should be. So before I can tell you what a good informed consent process is, I have to just have a have a theory about what kinds of information are meaningful, why I want that information to be available to you, and the like. So I think for me, I often think, and I this is what I tell non-philosophers about why they should be interested in philosophy is that most of life and most of policy is if-then statements.
SPEAKER_01If x, then why. And the filling in the if-x part, lots of parts of the academy and in the world do that. Sociology, economics, political science, they tell you whether a condition is met or not. But actually, you only know which if x to ask about when you know what then why you care about. So the idea that we actually have to think a lot about what matters in order to form good questions to me is I think the best gift I ever got from philosophy.
SPEAKER_03That's an excellent listen. I'll I'll ask them that the next time some relative asks me, what do you do again? Why do you do it? I'll try I'll try that one. I'll try that one.
SPEAKER_04I think that's all we have time for today. James, do you have any final questions?
SPEAKER_03I do not.
SPEAKER_04After I've just said we don't have time.
SPEAKER_01I can't wait to hear Johnny Cash renditions when I next see you. And thank you again for the time today.
SPEAKER_03Maybe at ABN we'll organize a little karaoke session.
SPEAKER_04Yeah, after the conference dinner. Uh thank you so much, and we look forward to seeing you next week.
SPEAKER_03Likewise, thank you all very much.
SPEAKER_04Thanks.
SPEAKER_00Thanks for listening to our new podcast. Subscribe online and tune in every first of the month. In the meantime, listen to C BME and U and be savvy.
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