Welcome back to the Vlog. Today, we are joined by acclaimed Egyptian journalist, activist, and labor historian Hossam el-Hamalawy to discuss his vital text out from Verso Books, Counter-Revolution in Egypt: State and Barracks. A common mistake among Western commentators is to view the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as a simple replication of the old Mubarak-Sadat dictatorship. El-Hamalawy lays bare why this historical framing is fundamentally wrong: counter-revolutions do not restore old orders. They construct entirely new, hyper-militarized legal and security systems designed explicitly to correct the structural vulnerabilities that allowed the original popular revolts to happen. In this interview, we break down the explicit mechanics of Egypt’s Second Republic: The Transition from Coup-Proofing to Unified Repression: How the First Republic fragmented its intelligence agencies, police, and military to prevent top-down military coups. We explore why Sisi inverted this baseline, creating a hyper-centralized, coordinated security matrix designed entirely around the dominant perceived threat of popular working-class unrest. The Civilian Corporate Monopoly: How the Egyptian military has completely captured the domestic civilian economy. We analyze why military-owned firms - selling everything from honey and furniture to real estate - enjoy absolute immunity from taxes and tariffs while utilizing conscripted soldiers as a hyper-exploited, cheap labor pool to choke out private capital. The Gulf ATM and Sovereign Assets: How Sisi leveraged European fears of black and brown refugee migration to secure multi-billion-dollar western block grants and weapons contracts. We track how the UAE and Saudi Arabia acted as a financial backstop for counter-revolution, until shifting their strategy to aggressively eat up Egypt's core logistical assets, ports, and prime real estate in exchange for debt lifelines. The Imperial Boomerang: Why the highly militarized surveillance systems tested on Arab populations are inexorably boomeranging back into the domestic borders of the United States and Europe to crush civil liberties and local climate actions. The lesson of the Arab Spring remains clear: you cannot conquer an imperial apparatus through localized, reformist abstractions. Hossam el-Hamalawy's State and Barracks Substack is available now. Send us Fan Mail Musis by Bitterlake, Used with Permission, all rights to Bitterlake Support the show Crew: Host: C. Derick Varn Intro and Outro Music by Bitter Lake. Intro Video Design: Jason Myles Art Design: Corn and C. Derick Varn Links and Social Media: twitter: @varnvlog blue sky: @varnvlog.bsky.social You can find the additional streams on Youtube Current Patreon at the Sponsor Tier: Jordan Sheldon, Mark J. Matthews, Lindsay Kimbrough, RedWolf, DRV, Kenneth McKee, JY Chan, Matthew Monahan, Parzival, Adriel Mixon, Buddy Roark, Daniel Petrovic,Julian, Drea, Free Beer, SNT-BRCH, Joshua Parsons
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C. Derick VarnHello and welcome to Varmblog. And today I'm with Hassam El-Hamalawi, an Egyptian journalist, scholar activist, photographer, and socialist. He was recognized for his role as a journalist and organizer in the Egyptian Revolution and his involvement in the Egyptian labor movement. He has written for such places as the English edition of the Cairo Times. He's been managing editor for El-Badal and Al-Mazri, Al-Yum, English edition. And he most recently published a book called Canon Revolution in Egypt, Assisi's New Republic.
C. Derick VarnAnd I wanted to talk to you for two reasons. One, I think Egypt has kind of fallen off of the radar after the initial shock at Al-Cisi's rise, and also the somewhat unfortunately named Arab Spring was picked up by a lot of people. And I happen to also live in Egypt for part of the time that you're writing about.
SPEAKER_00Secondly, this book, as as you said, it does tackle the Egyptian revolution and the counter-revolution. And in answer to your question, I think there were so many misunderstandings about the revolution as well as the transitional period, just right in the run-up to the coup. The first thing, and and that was very common among also liberal circles, not just leftists, that this was a Facebook revolution or a revolution that was enabled by social media, whether it's Twitter or Facebook.
SPEAKER_00And I'm not trying to dismiss the role of the internet and the uprising, but it's it's it's wrong. It's just straightforward wrong to dub it this way. And it's kind of like sinister also to uh to approach it this way. Because once you say it's a Facebook revolution, then you're propagating the image of middle class bilingual youth sporting blackberries who want Western style of democracy.
SPEAKER_00For some reason, they woke up one day, had a Facebook event, and you know the people just responded to that event, and voila, you had the revolution. And in doing so, you're dismissing the fact that this was in so many ways the climax of a 10-year process of dissent accumulation that started with the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada, where Egyptians were reclaiming public spaces inch by inch, and and they won that and they opened the road to that revolution.
SPEAKER_00But then you had the transitional period, and that's just to jump into the core of your question. We had an elected Muslim Brotherhood president at the time, and most of the leftist traditions they tend to regard Islamism with all of its shades as just variations of fascism. And this is not just a Western approach or a Western position, but historically, the the Egyptian and the Arab left have also adopted similar positions, which at the end of the day made them jump into the same ditch and ally themselves with their military dictatorships in order to repress the fascists.
SPEAKER_00Hence you can understand why most of the Egyptian left threw its lot behind Abdul Fathsisi in 2013, who is our Minister of Defense who led the coup and endorsed some of the biggest massacres literally in Egypt's modern history.
C. Derick VarnYeah, I think about Samir Amin when he was still alive, writing from Senegal, that you know, continuously throwing support behind Al Sisi and the secular government. And even in the elections leading up to that, I believe he supported not L-Cisi, but one of the other factions that had arrived that were around with Mabarak priorly. And it's kind of a mess. It was really hard to explain to people watching from the US.
C. Derick VarnI agree with you also on Islamism and on Salafism in general being being misunderstood. When I was in Egypt, most of the Salafists I met were quietist, they just sort of for a variety of reasons, some of which were probably safety, had they didn't really want to talk to me about politics. Also, I'm speaking in English, you know, my my my Egyptian Arabic is really bad. It's not it's possible. I can ask for street directions, but that's about it.
C. Derick VarnSo I wanted to dig into a little bit a little bit about that. Why do you think it has that reputation? I mean, do you think that that reputation comes from applying the the context of the Iranian revolution and the massacre of the of the two day party? Do you think it's just a misunderstanding? I mean, what what is what is going on in the in the misunderstanding of Islamism and Salafism in Egypt?
SPEAKER_00Well, first I probably need to clarify that I'm not trying to to depict the the those movements as progressive or that they they hold, you know, I mean the keys to our liberation. But I'm I'm what I'm trying to say is that the position towards them should be more complex because it's a very complicated phenomenon. Meaning, you you've asked a very good question, which is I mean, why do the uh most of the left regard them as fascists?
SPEAKER_00And I think a partial answer to that is one, the Egyptian left and the Arab left in general have been largely uh Stalinists. They towed the Soviet Union line when it came to their positions when it comes to this or when it comes to that, and they also zigzagged with it. Secondly, I think it's ideological distortion and ideological unclarity, whereby any attack on the left was was regarded as fascism.
SPEAKER_00I mean, if you attack the left, that means you're attacking because you're a fascist. But uh in the context, for example, of of student politics, students fight with one another all the time. I mean, whether uh whether they are Islamists, leftists, liberals, or even unaffiliated, I mean, there were tons of fights that I've witnessed as students on campus. The third thing is that I think it's a very lazy answer to why the left basically failed and why the Islamists started to rise in the end of the 1970s.
SPEAKER_00So the easier thing to say is that they are fascists and they are supported by imperialism. Uh but in in my personal case, and in the case of the movement that I belong to, which is the Egyptian Revolutionary Socialists, we adopted a more nuanced approach to Islamism. First, we had to analyze what's political Islam. And you know, in case your idiot your audience didn't know, this is a very loose term that includes a wide variety of streams, hundreds of different tendencies that sometimes are even not on the same line, and they are busy fighting one another, also.
SPEAKER_00The second thing that I should also stress is that it's a modern phenomena. I know people are tempted to just throw the accusation, oh, these guys are like some medieval medieval freaks who belong, you know, I mean, to history from 1400 years ago. But actually, political Islam is a modern phenomenon, and it was born on the hands or at the hands of Jamal Din al-Avghani in the 19th century, when he was mobilizing or trying to fight British colonialism at the time.
SPEAKER_00And from Jamal Dinil Afghani, you had the diversion uh of the different movements uh throughout the 19th uh century. Sorry, I got uh uh century wrong. So, what is political Islam? Political Islam, and let's take like the mainstream uh organization, which you must have you know heard about, and living in Egypt, you know, this was the boogeyman uh for the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the oldest and the most established and the most influential all throughout uh political Islam history.
SPEAKER_00This movement it's what we regarded it as that it's the product of a failed modernization process whereby capitalism in in our countries evolved in a very uneven and combined uh way, whereby many of those in the countryside and in rural uh Egypt they migrated to the cities to become professionals, to become workers, and to become part also of the urban poor.
SPEAKER_00And political Islam provided a worldview for them, something that laments the past, something that laments the kind of social solidarity that got lost under capitalism. And at the same time, they have this reactionary conservative utopia that they believe in and they want to achieve or return to. Now, let's remember that also, and that's more importantly, that political Islam is a movement that's that includes cross-class support.
SPEAKER_00Meaning, if you look at the Muslim Brotherhood, the leadership mainly came from members of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, not maybe the big bourgeoisie, but they were capitalists. In addition to some of the traditional uh land-owning elites were also present in the leadership. The bulk of the organization included middle class professionals. And here, you know, we have to think about this whole accusation of being like medieval, you know, freaks. These are mainly doctors, pharmacists, journalists, engineers.
SPEAKER_00And at the bottom, you have they do have some support among the working class and among the peasantry and the urban poor. So, as you can see, this is like a cocktail, this is like a mishmash of classes. And what unites them is a very vague solution called Islam is the solution, it's this vague slogan. Hence, it's okay as long as they are in the opposition, but once they are in power or once they are asked to be concrete when it comes to taking position on that issue or this issue, they always vacillate and they always fracture because you cannot come with a position that would satisfy all the classes, basically.
SPEAKER_00Let me just cite one example, and sorry for uh speaking too long. During the transition, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood did mobilize uh what we call millionaire, you know, like the one million-person protests in the streets in order to demand the application of the sharia. Now, of course, for anyone who hears this, this is like a horror story. What do you mean? Like, you know, mobilizing all of those hundreds of thousands or millions to demand the application of sharia.
SPEAKER_00But I would approach any one of them and and ask them what is sharia for you. If you had asked Samarlah Khairat Shatter, for example, who was this neoliberal businessman at the top helm of the leadership, he would have probably said that sharia is privatization without corruption. Private property should be protected, but workers should also get fair wages.
SPEAKER_00And he would give you this kind of that's sharia for him, and would definitely include that workers should not strike and disrupt production because this is will harm you know the Ummah or the society you know that we're living in. But if you had approached one of their base cadres at one of those 1 million, you know, person protests and asked them what's sharia for you, they would have replied back saying, Sharia is job security, sharia is that I get decent housing, sharia is that I don't get thrown out in the streets with my boys, you know, because we can't afford uh to eat.
SPEAKER_00Sharia is having a strong independent labor union that can protect us at our workplaces from any oppression. So, as you can see, there are it's the same group, but depending on who you speak to and which class background, you will get different answers and different positions. Hence, it is wrong to label them as fascists. Fascism is it's a street thug-oriented movement that's out there to destroy the left and to destroy trade unions and working class organizations.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, they are hostile to the left, you know, they definitely don't like the left, but at the same time, they are not out there, and the raison that is not we need to destroy working class politics, and on the contrary, during this year, where Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood president, ruled uh before the coup, you know, as a revolutionary socialist, my movement, part of our engagement with the working class is to provide legal aid for strikers.
SPEAKER_00And some of the victimized strike leaders who used to come seeking our support were Muslim Brotherhood members. They were being victimized while their comrade is running the country, literally. That's not the actions of a fascist organization. Hence, our position is that sometimes we will work with the Islamists, but we will never be with the state.
SPEAKER_00And always we will have to maintain our independence. Like working with the Islamists on some issue, this does not mean that we will be silent over queer rights so as not to piss them off. Being allied or coordinating with the Islamists on some positions or defending their detainees from torture does not mean that we will make compromises with their sectarian positions towards Egyptian Christians.
SPEAKER_00So when they make such anti-civil liberties positions or they make these statements, we are with the minorities against them in that regard, but never with the state.
C. Derick VarnYeah, exactly.
SPEAKER_00I uh I wouldn't get a mayor. In case your listeners didn't know Mahdi, that's like the most up posh upscale place in Ga. That's where all you know the like Khalegas, you know, live also.
C. Derick VarnRight. Well, that's why I was. I mean, I was down the street from I think the Nigerian embassy, I believe. And what is it? What's the island? Zamelik. Zamelik. Yeah. That was that's more posh, but but yeah. And that said, it is interesting when you when you are in Cairo because because the problem that I immediately realized that I had is the problem of Western representation of of a lot of these things, period.
C. Derick VarnI I watched I had uh you're find this funny, maybe darkly humorous anyway. I was teaching a high school class and I was provided a curriculum where they actually mentioned the Arab Spring, and they had reports from Democracy Now from around 2011, 2012. And it wasn't just that everyone they interviewed spoke English, they all spoke English with either an American or British accent that was pristine, and and they were they didn't talk to anyone who they had to translate, they needed a translator for, and I was very bothered by this because I was like, okay, so it's not just that you're getting the middle class, you're getting a sperm, westernized, probably foreign-educated version of the middle class, because even here, you know, plenty of English-speaking Egyptians, they don't sound like that.
SPEAKER_00So um, yeah, I think there is also another problem, which is uh the timing. You arrived in Egypt by 2015, two years into the coup, and by then the regime had cracked down really hard on everyone, and most of the organizations that existed in the country at the time were dismantled, and people were either on the run or in jail or killed or fled the country.
SPEAKER_00So you you arrived definitely at very, very difficult times. I would actually be surprised that I mean to learn from you now that even the school, you know, mentioned the word R Spring, because by then it was no no no.
C. Derick VarnWell, that the school, this was actually the school in America when I got back. Okay, no, we did not talk about the Air Spring when I was in we didn't talk about politics at all. Like, like I was I was a socialist podcaster back then, and yeah, I will tell you the one place that I I told people, I am not talking to you about Egypt right now. Like, it is not even even my normal Western privilege is not enough to protect me here, so keep your mouth shut.
SPEAKER_02Yeah.
C. Derick VarnWhen I I when I was there and talk about labor, I did see, however, a lot of crackdowns on people trying to do community organizing because I was also there when they floated the currency and the Egyptian currency crashed, and there's like supply shortages of sugar and wheat that really affected the poor and even affected like merchants around Mahdi, which normally are pretty removed from that sort of problem. And there were labor protests and some petit bourgeois, you know, merchant protests working with them, and some of those leaders just were disappeared.
C. Derick VarnI don't know what happened to them, they were gone. And I was kind of shocked because the the reporting on the uh cc regime in the United States was very uh just biased towards the regime and and even things like you know this, but most of my audience probably doesn't. There's a there's a accidental, I'm gonna put it in quotations because I don't know, bombing of the Mexican attaches trip group out to the white desert.
C. Derick VarnSupposedly they confused them with veterans who were supposedly terrorists, and that's definitely in quotes. And even two Americans were killed and one American was maimed, and I didn't hear about it discussed in the US news for four years until after it happened. I heard I actually heard a report about it in 2020, and I was like, why? Why you bring this up now? This is this is very old news, but also like, why didn't you report on it at the time? You know, so I was going to ask you, I mean, you're in Europe, but how do you feel like the Western press has covered this?
SPEAKER_00It's uh it's disappointing, of course. I know and personally, many western journalists who are uh well-meaning and they did their best to report throughout the revolution and and throughout the coup and after the coup. And some of them worked for high-profile publications, so they were not your average independent left-wing freelancer, for example, trying to pitch a story here or there. No, I'm talking about like heavyweights, and and they were all good people, and their heart was in the right place.
SPEAKER_00But at the same time, the problem is not with them or most of them, as much as it's a problem of the industry. In in the West, the media, even when it is when when it does have bigger margins to to write and to report and to express opinions and and facts, at the end of the day, it does tow the country's foreign policy on so many occasions.
SPEAKER_00For example, Derek, for a long time before the revolution, Hosni Mubarak was described always in the Associated Press reports as a moderate leader. And and within that same Arab moderate camp was Saudi Arabia and Jordan, uh, two draconian kingdoms that we had. But it's because their barometer for moderation has to do with the position vis-a-vis America.
SPEAKER_00If you are pro-US, if you are pro good relations or peace with Israel, then you're a moderate. But Hafaz al-Assad, oh my god, you know, that's like the kind of rogue regime that we definitely want to confront, although his brutality was matched actually by other dictators that were endorsed by America. So after the coup, and I I think there was there was a period of confusion, and it was confusion not just for the journalists, but you know, for for many Egyptian activists, uh, whether this is a coup or this is a new wave of of revolt, helped by the fact that Morsi was not really doing a good job, you know, I mean, during his year, anyways.
SPEAKER_00But as the coup regime evolved and kept consolidating its new power by one massacre after the other, one massacre after the other, I think many of the Western journalists who are already in town, I mean, could see that there was something wrong. But and you know about this, and you know about the media industry, the story always changes. Meaning, you had an Arab Spring, oh, lovely images of you know kids in Tahrir, men and women, you know, sporting their uh smartphones, tweeting, Facebooking, doing this, doing that.
SPEAKER_00That's the story. Okay, now we're bored, let's move on to the next story. And the same went, you know, with Egypt. First, CC made it like hell for anyone to try to report independently on the ground, including Western journalists, who, as you said, at some point before that had some privilege in terms of their personal protection. But following the coup, at least, you know, the initial years, I mean, no way, many of them were targeted and brutalized, or expelled also from the country.
SPEAKER_00Secondly, back home, diplomacy was steering the coverage. The US in the beginning, at least the White House, because we also discovered through the coup that there are several Americas. There is the America of the White House and the State Department, there is the America of the Pentagon, and and each America was telling the Egyptian military something different. So when they tell you that this coup was supported by the US, even when Obama denounced it, but I can assure you that the Pentagon was not really that much against it.
SPEAKER_00And Sisi would not have done that without some green light. And also, your your viewers and listeners should know that it's the Pentagon that runs the Egypt file, and and that's what really matters at the end of the day. Suddenly, Sisi became the strong man who will rid the region from political Islam. He's the one who's gonna fight the terrorists, or else, like ISIS is gonna like sweep over the region.
SPEAKER_00As the years progressed, the Europeans actually, the EU, came out to be CC's biggest supporters because he managed to sell them this whole idea. I will protect your shores from those hordes of black and brown people invading it. Support me, and not a single boat will leave Egypt in that regard. So here goes any any pretense for human rights, European values, and and all of this garbage that they have been lecturing us for years about.
SPEAKER_00Sisi also did another thing, which is Sisi was courting the Israelis uh from day one. And and actually, the Israeli military did help the Egyptian military in the fight against Islamist militants in Sinai. And Sisi allowed the Israeli Air Force to conduct operations in Sinai, which is something that never happened in our history uh before. And the Israeli lobby was lobbying in order to unblock the US military aid, in order to make Sisi acceptable and desired in the West.
SPEAKER_00And two more points. One is that Sisi also opted for the what I call the weapons diplomacy, whereby I'll go to France, I'll buy your Rafael fighter jets that no one wants to buy, and in exchange, you'll hush up about human rights. Uh I will go to Italy, I will buy from you weapons in exchange. You know, forget about this Giulio Regini, you know, guy whom I brutally murdered.
SPEAKER_00He's this Italian PhD scholar that I brutally murdered. I was in one of my dungeons. Yes. So this is and and this has worked. Egypt, like bought, according to Cypri, which is you know, this international uh Stockholm-based think tank that that that looks into arms transfers, Egypt was among the highest 10 countries in the world when it comes to arms purchasing for for for a good 10 years after the coup.
SPEAKER_00The last the last thing that I I would probably stress here is that CC also understood what cosmetic liberal democracy is needed in order to make his regime acceptable. Like he led a coup in 2013. So a coup, that's a bad thing. But then he orchestrated the elections, a presidential election in 2014.
SPEAKER_00Now he's an elected president, right? Now the Germans can uh host him in Berlin. Now the French can host him in in Paris. Now, you know, all European, you know, I mean countries can do business uh with Egypt because they have an elected president. Of course, it's a sham, it's a circus, but these are the cosmetic things that Europeans and westerners need in order to conduct business with the most brutal regimes.
SPEAKER_02Yeah.
C. Derick VarnWhen when your opposition party endorses you, you know how serious that opposition is.
C. Derick VarnBut in Mahdi, like we had a lot of Western Chinese contractors, but particularly Muslims, a lot of them Uyghurs that I ran into, and but we also had lots of Yemeni refugees, lots of Palestinian refugees, which of course that's not new, lots of Syrian tons of Syria. Like I think every five fifth taxi driver I met was Syrian. Um, and then Libyan refugees because they were all, I mean, the destabilization of the surrounding region was was massive, you know.
C. Derick VarnLike, like I remember being told if I wanted to go to Morocco, I had to fly through Europe because we could not fly over Libya, like it was just too dangerous. And I remember LCC really using this flood of refugees to justify all kinds of crackdowns, and you know, like the thing I mentioned in the White Desert that had to do with supposedly terroristic illegal refugees from Libya. The Sinai was all but closed.
C. Derick VarnYou could get the St. Catherine's if you like took a plane, but the Sinai was closed when I was there, and there were crackdowns on immigrants when I was there, but also uh lots of talk about how you know. Well, the we Egyptians were taking them at least, unlike you know the Gulf states, and we're keeping them from Europe. And how much do you think CC was able to leverage that?
SPEAKER_00Oh, he managed to leverage it really well, and he still does, up until this moment. I'm speaking to you. First, Sisi and other Egyptian officials have been have been in a disinformation campaign claiming that Egypt hosts 10 million refugees. Egypt does have 10 million, but these are the 10 million foreign residents. Not all of them are refugees.
SPEAKER_00And actually, the refugees, I can't now remember the exact number, but it's much they are much less uh than that, including many of the Syrians whom you bumped into in Ma'adi and elsewhere. These guys were in in Egypt with their own money spending on themselves. They were not taking any sort of aid from the state. I mean, someone like me, like Husam, I mean, I I wouldn't mind. I do believe that refugees should be welcome in any country, and whatever help that we could give to them, we should give to them.
SPEAKER_00But even but even that, you know, the state was not doing anything in that regard. But CC was using this as a leverage uh for two things. One is, as you said, to tell the Europeans in specific and the West in general that I'm keeping them in the country because if they are not here in Egypt, they would have been at the shores of Greece, at the shores of uh Italy, and in your capitals. And the second thing, they were also used as scapegoats.
SPEAKER_00Racism, that's like the oldest uh trick in the book, you know, divide and rule. So if there are economic, hard economic conditions in Egypt, or economic crises, or the prices of basic commodities are increasing, as you've witnessed yourself, it's because of the refugees. They are the ones who are buying all the sugar in the market. That's why Egyptians cannot find any. And this kind of racist and xenophobic discourse has only escalated in recent years, especially with the outbreak of the war in Sudan, and roughly one million Sudanese got displaced and and they they came into Egypt.
SPEAKER_00Many of them had applied an asylum, but others did not. And yes, they are subject to racist treatment from both the police as well as unfortunately some sections of the public. Revolutions bring out the best in people. They bring out the best in people, man. I mean, they bring out solidarity, they bring out strength, they bring out bravery, they bring about they they they they bring out love, empathy, but at the same time, a counter-revolution and as well as the economic crisis and hardships, they bring out the worst in people.
SPEAKER_00And they are the same people, by the way. It's not like we imported them from another planet, but these are the human beings, and and that's how human beings usually behave in these situations. Now that puts a responsibility on activists like myself to fight such xenophobic discourse, to engage in campaigns, uh, to tell Egyptians that these black refugees are not your enemy. Actually, your enemy is the one who's doing the devaluation of the currency, your enemy is the one who's squandering the country's money on vanity projects in the middle of the desert.
SPEAKER_00So, in answer to your question, yes, he did leverage this crisis uh really well for his sake.
C. Derick VarnYeah, I remember when I was there, the the rhetoric was was gaslighting, I guess. It's hard, it's actually hard to like uh articulate it to to an American audience or to um an English speaking audience, but we were being sold that oh Egyptians we're we're a multi-ethnic, multi-racial society, we always have been going all the way back. You know, if you look at the the ancient mummies, you know, you find uh you all kinds of skin colors, which is true, actually.
C. Derick VarnBut I also saw a massive increase in anti-immigrant rec rhetoric while also being told, you know, by fairly elite Egyptians, we aren't a racist society. Like you look like you're Egyptian, and I'm like, I don't really, but like, you know, and and I'm like, okay, I I get what you're trying to do, but your your anti-immigrant rhetoric is is amping up. You're you're using it for justifications of of like terror bombing campaigns in the desert that have now had you know some pretty high-level collateral damage.
C. Derick VarnThat CC was also able to diplomatic. I mean, like, he was I don't I was trying to explain to someone about you know we have at my school, there's a lot of Mexican teachers, and people are like, why? I'm like, well, because of that event that I mentioned, part of the diplomatic outreach to Mexico was some trade agreements and also giving Mexicans the same deal on passports as they give the United States, which is kind of historically unheard of. And I'm like, this is kind of shrewd, and it got people to shut up.
C. Derick VarnDo you think that leverage works domestically? I I couldn't tell if you know, talking to average Egyptians, and again, my Arabic is not great, so I will admit that that my knowledge was limited to people who could converse with me or have the high tolerance for really broken Arabic. And um which was a lot of people, I won't lie, but it was still I I felt like there was something I was missing about whether or not this rhetoric was working domestically.
SPEAKER_00First, uh, racism is part of modern Egyptian nationalism. I mean, it's it's not like we woke up one day and we imported it from the US or that it started just after the coup. Um, Egypt had a colonial history, definitely not as grave and as wide as the Brits or the Westerners, but Egypt was a mini-colonial state in its surroundings.
SPEAKER_00The relations with Sudan had always been very complex, where on the one hand, more or less, we're the same people, and you know, there is so much intermarriages and family relations. Two of the Egyptian presidents, Mohammed Naguib and Anwar Sadad, their mothers were Sudanese, at the end of the day. And there is also a shared political history when it comes to the struggle against the British colonialism.
SPEAKER_00But Egypt was uh at times also was a colonial power in Sudan. After Sudan's independence, the Egyptian regime always treated Sudan in the same way that the US treats Central America as its backyard, which means that there were always Egyptian interventions like intelligence operations, support for coups, or meddling in the political affairs of the Sudanese.
SPEAKER_00So racism is not really something new. But again, racism, whether it's in Egypt, in the US, or elsewhere, even when it happens for structural reasons, but the impact of racism differs according to the political conditions and the timings. At the height of social struggles, when society is struggling against the state, there is a more fertile ground to basically create solidarity between the different sections of society and even with refugees.
SPEAKER_00Remember that Egypt is also a sectarian society. 10% at least of the population are Coptic Christians, and they they do suffer from sectarian discrimination. But during times of heightened struggle, like for example, during the strike wave, we had the longest and the most sustained wave of industrial actions from 2006 all the way till 2011, and this is what opened also the door for the revolution.
SPEAKER_00I found in any sector where it had a substantial Coptic presence that Muslim workers and civil servants were electing Coptic leaders to join to lead their struggle, whether it was in the railways, whether it was the tax collectors during their strikes, and in other sectors. But also at a time of reaction, the counter-revolution also brought out some of the worst. You had churches that got burned down, you had attacks against foreigners and xenophobic attacks on Syrians and other nationalities also in Egypt at the time.
SPEAKER_00So, in that regard, did it work or not? I would say that for some sections of the population, yes, I mean they got bought into it. But it's not a hopeless case, it's not the end of the story. The situation is always fluid. And if if I and the other activists actually, or other whatever remained of the Egyptian opposition, can uh fight against this discourse, can always Always go on campaigns against this discourse, at least the Egyptian citizen who is completely screwed at this point economically can hear another justification for why it happened, other than the fact that this black poor Sudanese guy is like stealing his sugar.
C. Derick VarnYeah. I I may am gonna pivot to some of the frameworks in the books, but I do want to touch on the Coptic situation because I unfortunately was very near one of the most infamous Easter Sunday bombings enough to have heard it. Didn't see it, but I heard it that hit the ground. Then the the interior ministry flew up, and like a local shopkeeper had to hide me. It seemed to me that Al Sisi was stoking these tensions somewhat in order to use them to be able to crack down on the general public.
C. Derick VarnBecause there seemed to have been an increased tension between the cops and the uh particularly the the Sunni population, and and also um but I'm and for my English speakers, I meant coped with a T, not cops, uh like police, but also Al Sisi's claiming of power, including his ultimate reinstatement of the national security law, was largely based off of a claim they need to protect the Christian minority.
C. Derick VarnUh was that was that technique old? Like, did Mabarak do it a lot as well, or because it seemed really effective, unfortunately.
SPEAKER_00Definitely, no, no, definitely you're right. Sectarian tensions in Egypt started really flaring under Sadat, who had tried to use religion in a very explicit way. Well, first, all all our rulers with varying degrees have used religion, you know, this is not new. But with Sadat in specific, since he was facing his main opposition were the communists and the left-wing Nazarists, so he unleashed the Islamists on them and tried to use the religion card in propping up his legitimacy.
SPEAKER_00But then he unleashed this Frankenstein that eventually killed him in 1981, but also led to the rise of sectarian strifes and fightings in in several governorates in Egypt. Under Mubarak, Mubarak used this tactic that you've just mentioned, is to try first, he he he appealed to the West as a secular leader. Although, I mean, any five-year-old who can read and write, and if you read Egyptian law, you will know that it's not really, you know, I mean, that's secular after all.
SPEAKER_00And this is specified in our constitution that Islam is the source of legislation. At the end of the day, maybe you don't find the same horrific, explicit scenes that you might find in other countries where the word sharia immediately invokes someone beheading criminals or cutting their hands and all of this. But at the same time, it's it's embedded in our law. So Mubarak did appeal to the Copts as their protector from the Islamists, whether it is the radicals, like the Gama Islami and the Islamic Jihad, and these were armed groups that launched an insurgency uh in the 1990s, and they were involved in sectarian attacks on Christians in Egypt.
SPEAKER_00And he also presented himself politically as an alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood, meaning, like, if I fall, it will be the Brotherhood who will come. And for the Cops, of course, for very legitimate reasons, they they have concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood. But then it's not a black and white story, Derek, because here is here here is the interesting thing. Egyptian Copts starting maybe from 2006, but really this picked up by 2010, they started mobilizing in the streets, which is not something that they used to do in the previous decades.
SPEAKER_00Triggered by sectarian attacks on churches or sectarian incidents, attacks on copts in their homes, you know, I mean, in some villages. They started fighting back and they started mobilizing. And actually, their mobilizations were among the mobilizations, I would argue, that opened the door to the revolution in 2011. And following Mubarak's fall, Coptic activism only escalated because you know, revolutions also, I mean, they unleash everything.
SPEAKER_00It's not just you know one happy story. Um, you also find groups that that rise, like you know, some variations or some tendencies among the Salafis who were extremely sectarian, they suddenly found a space also to organize. So the cop's activism only escalated to defend their churches, to defend their security and safety at their homes, and also to counter the Islamist attacks that and whether these are verbal attacks or actual attacks that used to happen on the ground.
SPEAKER_00But the election of Hammad Morsi and this one year of Muslim Brotherhood rule, in addition to very clever tactics by the military, managed to co-opt this activism and channel it into a support for the coup. And it didn't really help the fact that following the coup, part of the retaliation by the Islamists and their supporters did target churches and they burned down churches.
SPEAKER_00Their outlets, whether it's like newspapers, TV stations, or or newspapers before they were shut down, used to carry sectarian editorial line towards the Copts. Would definitely see the Cts flocking to the bosom of the state and Sisi. And he really played these cards well.
SPEAKER_00Now, are the Christians in a better position under Sisi today in 2026? I would actually say no. Not much really has changed when it comes to the institutionalized discrimination against them, when it comes to the right to build churches, the right to worship safely without any sort of intrusion or attacks by members of the society or the police.
SPEAKER_00So it's not, but at the same time, there isn't really a clear alternative for the Copts. The Egyptian Coptic Church is is co-opted by the state, and it does have so much influence over the Coptic minority. Sections of the Coptic population did dissent on occasions, especially during the revolution, and they were with us in the streets, and many of them actually were martyrs also during the revolution, they they were killed most infamously in the so-called Maspirou massacre in 2011.
SPEAKER_00But at this point, dissent is kind of like muted.
C. Derick VarnWell, I want to specifically get to some of the frameworks in your book that actually clarified some things for me. So when I was reading your book, Counter-Revolution in Egypt, you argued that it's a mistake to view Sisi as just restoring the Mubarak Sadat regime, and that this is structurally distinct from even the kind of hyper militarization we saw after the Camp David Accords. And and for for those who don't know, there's a lot of like the second putting this in quotation marks too for my listeners.
C. Derick VarnUm, the second largest uh receiver of military aid from the United States after Israel is Egypt. But what that tends to be is block grants to buy surplus American military equipment. So I was, you know, I remember seeing in Egypt. Oh, I've seen more old American tanks here than I have ever seen in the United States. But you you point out that this actually is not just what is going on post you know 20 2014, 2013, 2014, that there's been a shift in the power dynamics of the of the military, a shift in the diversity of where the Egyptian military is getting its equipment from, as you mentioned, a massive increase in purchases from Europe as well, not just relying on you know the the block loans getting from the U gotten from the US to buy military equipment.
C. Derick VarnAnd you've also mentioned the intelligence services have increased. I I can personally feel like I vouch for that because I had secret police watching me just because I was there, they would show up at my house every now and then, check my papers and leave. So how how do you think this this has differed from the prior regime under Sudat Mebarak? And and how successful do you think this hypermilization has been?
SPEAKER_00You're now touching on the core argument of my book, and this was counter-revolutions do not restore old orders, and they don't restore old orders because simply the old order has failed. And by failure, here I don't mean the kind of failure that you and I, Derek, would think of like the regime was not democratic enough, the regime did not respect the equal distribution of wealth. No, in the eyes of the counter-revolutionaries, the old regime has failed because it failed to repress the revolt.
SPEAKER_00The old regime failed because it was too lenient, too weak. And and these kind of descriptions, by the way, these are quotes from the generals who led the 2013 military coup. They thought Hosni Mubarak was too weak, was too lenient. He allowed the circus of human rights and NGOs, you know, to run around and mock him and ridicule him, and that's what led to the catastrophe of 2011. So the kind of regimes that evolve out of a victorious counter-revolution are usually regimes that that avoid the mistakes of the past, that are more efficient at repression, they've learned their lessons.
SPEAKER_00So there was so much debate following the coup and and throughout the years later about the nature of the Sisi regime. And everyone at the time was shouting, Oh, it's uh Mubarak is back, now Mubarak is back, Mubarak 2.0, you know, this and that. Now, today in 2026, obviously, any five-year-old can tell you that this is completely different from Mubarak. But they usually point to the high levels of of violence or the even more dismal economic performance than Mubarak.
SPEAKER_00But I was trying to answer what is different, in what way is this is the Sisi regime different? And I I focused on on a few things whereby I compared the post-2013 uh regime with the so-called first republic. That's the description of Sisi actually, and that first republic is the one that supposedly lasted from 1953, when following one year of their coup, the Egyptian free officers who were an eclectic group of nationalist army officers who overthrew the monarchy and declared the republic uh later, so from 1953 all the way till 2013.
SPEAKER_00And I focused on a few things. One is that how the security apparatus was organized, and one of the main differences that I was arguing for that under the First Republic, whether it's Nasser, Sadat, or Mubarak, the security apparatus was fragmented because the dominant perceived threat at the time was the threat of a military coup. Now, any good autocrat, if they want to stay in power for a long time, they have to shield and protect themselves from all sorts of dangers and threats.
SPEAKER_00But there is always one dominant perceived threat, and according to it, you start organizing your security sector. So if that dominant perceived threat was that of a military coup, then you try to coup-proof your regime by fragmenting your apparatus, by creating multiple organizations with overlapping mandates that are competing with one another, that do not share information, that do not coordinate with one another, so that only the ruler would have the bird's eye view of what's happening.
SPEAKER_00And this was the case with our military and interior ministry, i.e., the police, and the general intelligence service, or the Muhabharat, as we call it in Arabic. These three were in constant competition in the decades up until the revolution. What I was arguing in the book is that Sisi, his dominant perceived threat after 2013 was that of popular unrest.
SPEAKER_00Because before 2011, Derek, our rulers never took us seriously. They never took us seriously. They never thought that Egyptian people have agency. They knew that every now and then they could have a few rights here, few demonstrations there. But for us to pull together a revolution that could have brought down the entire order, like what happened in 2011, this never crossed their dreams. But this changed with 2011.
SPEAKER_00So CEC, his dominant perceived threat is that of popular unrest. And he doesn't really make a secret of it. I mean, up until today, whenever he gives any public speech, he has to mention 2011 and the catastrophe and how the country almost like went into ruins and how he saved Egypt and this and that. So if you're facing that kind of threat, you unify the security apparatus. Meaning you are now in an existential fight to save the Egyptian state from saboteurs and Asian provocators like Hossam and Derek and the others who work for foreign proxies, who are trying to bring the state from within because of like some evil related goals.
SPEAKER_00So they are coordinating with one another, they are sharing information, and they they are even sharing personnel, which is something that's unprecedented in our previous history. Does that mean they are in a honeymoon and that there are no differences or disagreements between them? No, I mean there will always be.
SPEAKER_00I mean, anything uh that's a civilian commodity. And this started in the 1980s to really take shape uh at the time, led by then our Minister of Defense, Abu Ghazala, who was pro-US, anti-communist, very popular among the officer, uh among the officer corps in Egypt at the time. And he started this whole military economy thing, which only expanded in the 1990s with our neoliberal transition, because it saw the army actually intervening to annex and annex here like between courts like by public sector companies under the pretext that I'm saving them from privatization.
SPEAKER_00And they engaged in partnership with local and global capital, left and right. I mean, there is uh there was definitely an expansion, but this is nothing compared to what happened after 2013. Before I speak about 2013, I should also clarify to your listeners if they don't know, our military firms they do not pay taxes and they don't pay tariffs, and they use a cheap pool of labor, meaning the conscripts.
SPEAKER_00We have conscription in Egypt. So even like Like according to liberal free market mechanisms, they are they have an unfair advantage over you know an ordinary civilian capitalist, for example. Hence, you find these calls by the IMF and the World Bank on occasions that the military should leave the economy. It's not because they are against militarization, but you know, they want the free market forces not to be manipulated as they see it.
SPEAKER_00Following 2013, there was this massive expansion, they are everywhere. I mean, at this point, if you're in Egypt, you know, they are everywhere. And when it comes to small minute consumer products, all the way up until the mega projects that you see. But I we need to understand why. Why is this part of it has to do definitely with coup-proofing that even when CC his dominant perceived threat is that of popular unrest, he also has to secure himself against any dissent in the military.
SPEAKER_00So he keeps on reshuffling commands ritualistically almost every year. And the second thing is that he wants to make them happy by giving them basically uh the bigger share of the cake when it comes to the economy. So part of it are army privileges, but the other part, and this is something that's hardly discussed, at least in the West, it corresponds to his worldview. CC despises civilians, he regards the military as an apex form of way to organize and discipline a society.
SPEAKER_00And that if Egypt was run like a military camp, we would have been in a completely different place, uh, other than these kind of like catastrophes. Uh so for him, it is these kind of forces, meaning the military, that can basically discipline workers that can get the job done, that are professional, that if he tells them, you know, split the C for me, they would do it, just like Moses.
SPEAKER_00They they would do like whatever he wants to do. Uh now, is that working? I mean, you can see it for yourself. When CCE rose to power in 2014, the Egypt's Egypt's external debt amounted to roughly 41 billion dollars. Today it revolves around 163 billion dollars. In the Egyptian government budget for this coming year, 63 percent of the government revenues will be devoted to to paying the debt interest, just the interest in that regard.
SPEAKER_00So I think that it it it it kind of like destroyed everything at this point.
C. Derick VarnYeah, I've been I've been talking about the military policy to people in the past and trying to explain also like the agricultural changes in Egypt, how it went from you know, 2,000 years of being the the breadbasket of North Africa and Europe and to a net food importer because of partly because of military policy. It's not the only reason, population, density, urbanization, and around the Nile, but but military policies are a major contributor of it, and also have opened Egypt up to like food shocks related to things that have nothing to do with their own policies, such as you know, the war in Ukraine led to a bread shortage in Egypt not too recently.
C. Derick VarnI was trying to explain why to some people who were asking me because I was like, Oh, yeah, it it's it's related to military use policy, food the integration. And this brings me to my next point. There's two things that I noticed when I was in Egypt. One, as you can guess from where I was living, I was teaching at a private international school, I wasn't affiliated with the State Department, so so that was actually it's somewhat in my favor when the screen courses were moving around.
C. Derick VarnBut it it is I did have a kind of glimpse into the Egyptian elite, and I noticed that most of them didn't actually work in Egypt if they weren't military. So I a lot of military families used my school, but then a lot of people were basically interfacing with the UAE and the Gulf as a means of getting any form of capital, and particularly once there was a there was a reserve currency crisis when I was there, dollars became dollars and pounds of by that I mean Egyptian not Egyptian pounds, um British pounds, not Egyptian pounds, became super sought after to reinforce the currency spiral.
C. Derick VarnBut a whole lot of these business people were basically doing most of their business abroad because and they would they would tell me this outright, they couldn't compete with the military. I think ironically that that kind of opens you up to two two kind of problems, and and also something that you make a lot of points about in your book, that it's easy to view the Egyptian state as something that exists kind of as in a you know a little vacuum in the in the gateway between Africa and Asia, and that's completely wrong.
C. Derick VarnThat one it's logistics hub for the world. I pointed out, like just off, you know, there's a massive set of uh internet cables off the coast of Egypt that if they ever got cut, the the internet connection between uh the Americas and Eurasia would disappear. It would have to rely on satellite outlinks, right? Like, so there's that element of uh of Egyptian power is is this placement in world logistics, but also that there are other networks, regional networks, that LCC operates with because of these economic ties that I'm mentioning, but also sources of aid and dealing with tensions within them.
C. Derick VarnSo uh you you talk a lot about the UA and Saudi Arabia as well as the West. I I was there when the relationship to Qatar soured. So, like in I just in a superficial way, my access to both Egypt to both English and Arabic Al Jazeera went way overnight. Like, and I was like, oh well, that's interesting. How much is Egypt structurally dependent on these other networks economically and and politically?
C. Derick VarnAnd how complicated are they? Because I've also tried to explain like Egypt and Turkey have a very strange relationship in all this, like sometimes they're they seem like enemies, sometimes they're not. Egypt and Israel, I mean, domestic hatred of Israel is and I I use hatred uh appropriately, um, is very high, but the government has a very good relationship to them. It may be souring now.
C. Derick VarnI mean, that it does look to be souring at the moment, although I can't really tell how much of that is real, real, and how much of that is for international consumption. But how how much is CC's project really an international counter-revolutionary project, at least in the region?
SPEAKER_00In every sense of the word, it is regional and international project. When the so-called Arab Spring, I know not everyone likes the term, but you know, I use it pragmatically because that's what everyone, you know, I mean, understands what what I'm referring to. So when the Arab Spring started, the the countries that were spearheading the counter-revolution and are still playing that role up until today were the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
SPEAKER_00These were the two hawks, the two hawks who were either intervening directly and militarily in some countries, like for example, most notoriously in Bahrain, but also in other countries, or they were using their money and political and diplomatic clout to interfere in in other countries. And on the top of that list was Egypt. Egypt, and I'm not saying this out of patriotic reasons, I'm an internationalist, at the end of the day, I'm a socialist.
SPEAKER_00So, but Egypt is the most important country in the region when it comes to stability. Stability here, and I'm using the term that they would use, but for you and I, I would say for progressive change, you have the biggest, it's the most populous Arab nation, the biggest uh working class in the region, very strategic in terms of its geographical position, bordering uh Palestine-Israel, having the Swiss Canal in such a strategic hub.
SPEAKER_00And you also now talked about the internet and the cables. I can go on and on for hours listing why geopolitically Egypt is very important. But what's even more important, Derek, is that whatever happens in Egypt always resonates uh by the domino effect in the rest of the of the Arab world, if not the whole world. Let's remember that the Sudanese Communist Party, which was the second largest communist party in the Arab world after the Iraqi, was built at Cairo University.
SPEAKER_00The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was built in Zagazig University in Sharkhiya, that's a governorate in Egypt. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, yeah, I mean they uh you they are all offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood when it comes to ideology. So, whatever happens in Egypt, and of course, I mean Arab nationalism it didn't start from Egypt, but when Egypt adopted it under Nasser, it became such a revolutionary current in the region. So the main obsession of the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, uh, following the uh revolution was how to end this, how to defuse the Egyptian revolution, if not crush it completely.
SPEAKER_00Hence, it is the UAE on the top of the list, then comes Saudi Arabia, who assured Sisi and the military that if you go out of your comfort zone and launch this coup in 2013, don't worry about the Americans or about the aid or about any economic boycotts or diplomatic isolation. We will pay for it. Whatever you want. But just finish off the Egyptian revolution and finish off the Islamists in specific.
SPEAKER_00And for 10 years at least, these countries were the biggest supporters, and they were writing blank checks for Sisi. And that helped him to go on this like spree of mega projects to make his military pleased and happy, and also to serve as a tool in the in the Arab Gulf counter-revolutionary diplomacy in the region, supporting their counter-revolutionary uh roles uh that they were playing. I mean, look at Libya, look at Sudan and elsewhere.
SPEAKER_00And more importantly, look at Palestine. The siege of Gaza following 2013 reached an unprecedented level. It created a true humanitarian disaster with the blessing of Israel. It was not just an Israeli siege, it was an Egyptian Israeli siege, and we have to be very clear about this. Now, and as I'm arguing and clarifying in the book, by the end of 2022, those Gulf backers they started uh, you know, like getting really sick of it.
SPEAKER_00You know, they felt that they were being treated as ATMs and that the money is being squandered left and right. And, you know, alhamdulillah, now they are done with the revolution, they are done with the Muslim Brotherhood. So CC, you know, served his role really well. Why should we keep on you know just pumping in money and cash? It's as if you're like plowing the sea at this point. But then came the Gaza war, and this changed the whole situation.
SPEAKER_00Prior to the Gaza war, Egypt was on the brink of declaring bankruptcy. Um, and part of this package was the rapprochement with Qatar and Turkey after adopting a hostile foreign policy towards them, as you rightly mentioned earlier, for you know that the previous 10 years. But this was again part of a regional rapprochement that CC was following in the footstep of his sponsors, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, uh, at the time.
SPEAKER_00And I don't think that he could have done it, I mean, without their approval to start with. So CC started basically offering them assets in exchange. He he's giving them prime real estate, chunks of Red Sea shores, important Egyptian public sector companies and and banks and state institutions. People now talk about Imorati colonialism in in Egypt. Now, I I I I would, of course, have my reservations on the use of this term in specific.
SPEAKER_00I don't think it's accurate, but the Imoratis are eating up the country and large chunks of different economic sectors in it. Most importantly, the ports, which is always an Imorati obsession. The Gaza war starts, and suddenly Europe and America and the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the Gulf backers, suddenly discover that oh, the region does not need more instability.
SPEAKER_00So even when Abdelfatah Sis's regime is a failed regime and Egypt is a failed state, but it's too big to fail. So that's when the bailouts uh started, and that's where criticisms of economic performance, let alone human rights record, kind of like muted. In 2023, Derek, if you go back to the Financial Times and other outlets that was carrying the statements of the IMF officials, they were in a state of war with Sisi over the position of the military in the economy.
SPEAKER_00Now they don't give a shit. Now they don't open, you know. I mean, their mouths are out. They they pay it like lip service, but you know, I mean, they they just want the regime to float. They are really worried about a collapse in Egypt, a collapse that will unleash those hordes of black and brown people to invade the southern shores of Europe, that might, God forbid, you know, support the Palestinians in Gaza and stop the genocide, that might break into the borders of Israel, that might allow the Sudanese a route into Europe to flee, you know.
SPEAKER_00I mean, the wars that or instability that could trigger a revolution that would rewind the Arab Spring once again and impact the Gulf monarchies. So, in answer to your question, I think it's a brilliant question, man. I mean, it is CIC's project is part of a regional and and count and international counter-revolutionary project. In the same way that when Egyptians rebelled, they inspired people in Wisconsin, they inspired the occupy movement across Europe and the US, but also defeats they spread by the domino effect.
SPEAKER_00When we had our military coup in 2013, that emboldened half of that emboldened Bashar al-Assad to launch gas attacks, uh, that emboldened the Tunisians to start cracking down on their post-revolution democracy that they had, that emboldened the Arab regimes in the Gulf to even crush their own local Shia population even more, because they are proxies of Iran, as they uh called it. So everything started going down the drains regionally, also after the 2013 military coup in Egypt.
SPEAKER_00All causes are related and all revolutions are related.
C. Derick VarnYeah, that's actually a huge point. And this is, you know, people have picked it up around Gaza today, but I don't think they pick it up around the other Eb Spring states that that have been dealing with counter-revolutionary forces for a decade and uh more than a decade now. And also, I don't think it's insignificant that like in the West we barely talk about Occupy anymore. We're almost embarrassed that it happened, you know, even on the far left, where a lot of people started that moment, you know, and and Occupy.
C. Derick VarnIt's just like, oh we talk about Bernie Sanders or whatever. And I I have I have found this deeply problematic, uh, for obvious reasons, because I'm like, well, we're erasing our own history and understanding of why that stuff what were the limits to understand the limits, we have to actually admit that we were it was important. Um, and it was important that it was related internationally. Like my experience of this was very different than the average American because I wasn't in the United States. When this started, I was in East Asia, I was part of Occupy Yoedo.
C. Derick VarnAnd when this ended, I was in North Africa, I was in, I was in Egypt and Sudan. So like I I felt it felt very strange to watch the whole cycle and then watch it when I come back to this. I came back to the states in 2017 and listened to people start to forget. I I want to ask you though, because this is a little bit beyond the this uh your book, but it it seems very live right now. Well, we in the United States are kind of feeling our the US Israeli aggressions on Iran.
C. Derick VarnUh, you know, I've I've read that even Western commentators talk about the UA having an Icarus moment where it foe too close to the sun got too involved in and the Iranian war and now is like collapsing. Um how is this going to affect Egypt since since this since the Gulf powers, even if they were getting tired of it, even if the MF was getting tired of it, even now the IMF doesn't care about what Egypt does. If the if the Saudis in the UAE are really being depleted because they're actually the people taking the brunt of the war, not the United States.
C. Derick VarnI mean, we've lost we we've lost a several handfuls of soldiers, and you know, I'm not celebrating that, but also that's not a lot for a war of this size, whereas you know, I hear about major infrastructures being hit in in the UAE and and in all kinds of regional areas. I mean, only Oman really has not been reported on as being a target. Um, how's that gonna affect Egypt?
SPEAKER_00It's gonna affect it on so many levels. To start with, any regional instability would impact tourism, which is a very important stream of revenue for the Egyptians. If the Houthis in Yemen uh resume their attacks, I know they they they threatened to do so, and the war is resumed at the Horn of Africa, this means bye-bye Suez Canal, this means another strong hit that the Egyptian economy is going to receive.
SPEAKER_00And more, and more than that, if the Egyptian pound keeps on losing value due to the regional instability, actually the whole global instability, and due to the fact that the Gulf will not be as keen as rushing in to bail CC out for the zillion bazillionth time, this means not just that the economic uh situation of the average Egyptian citizen will deteriorate even more, but also it would mean that our industries, which all with varying degrees depend on uh foreign imports and foreign components that go into the production process, this means that Egyptian exports will also take a hit in terms of the prices.
SPEAKER_00I I don't see a positive scenario coming out of this, but also you have to consider another political factor which uh is rarely discussed in in the Western press a part of Of Sisi's propaganda since the start of the genocide in Gaza in order to legitimize his submissive foreign policy, is that I am helping Egypt navigate through troubled waters, and as you can see, the whole region is on fire, and we are not intervening in anything.
SPEAKER_00I'm not sending like the military to do this or to do that, or I'm not getting us into wars and and and what have you, because we cannot get into adventures. And here you have a global south country, or if you want to call it a third world country like Iran standing up to the US, standing up to the Israelis, taking strong blows, but fighting back. The average Egyptian is watching this and they are making comparisons.
SPEAKER_00Well, guess what? I mean, a small also global south country can actually resist. So why do you even have to be that submissive? And it's it's no secret. I mean, you don't need to know Arabic, you know, use whatever AI. Go on Twitter and go through like the Twitter streams of Egyptian social media users. There is overwhelming support for Iran in this war. Egyptians are rooting for Iran, not out of love for Iran as much as it is anti-US imperialism and anti-Zionism.
SPEAKER_00Uh, and people are now making comparisons. If they can stand up to the Americans and Israelis, why couldn't you? Uh, so this is also eating up from the regime's clout even more at this point. So, to cut a long story short, we still haven't seen the full impact of the current crisis, which doesn't look like it's gonna end anytime soon on the Egyptian economy, but it's definitely not going to be pleasant.
C. Derick VarnYeah, I mean, it feels like a powder keg. I mean, like, yeah, so just to give a little financial history to the audience because it is relevant here. So, like it was like five Egyptian pounds to the dollar in like 200 like eight, right? And then they went up slightly during the first part of the revolution. Part of that had to do with internal price controls and internal exchange rates that the IMF hated, hated, hated, and also frankly, and I know this makes a lot of my socialist friends uncomfortable.
C. Derick VarnChina also hated just um because it was actually the Chinese that seemed to have talked LCC into making the final decision there. It's it's a little bit unclear, but at least that's what the Egyptian news was reporting. I don't know how much I trust that. But so I was there when when the Egyptian pound, which was already losing value, but like plummeted overnight. It went from, I think I I remember it being between eight and ten EGP equals to a dollar to like 20, 18 to 20 equals a dollar.
C. Derick VarnAnd yeah, that was fun to live through. I was about to say it's bad now. They've been structuring uh structurally deleveraging, you know, devaluating the pound. So as opposed to the overnight free fall, they've accepted that they're going to free fall, but they're trying to like click it down. But yeah, I think I saw that it's it went from about 18 because it seemed to stabilize for a little while and around COVID, then right after COVID, 24 EGP to a dollar.
C. Derick VarnNext year, 30 EGP to the dollar. Now it's like 50 something EGP to the dollar, and similar, similar bad exchange rates with the euro and the and the British pound, which means most of the world's reserve currency is now expensive to Egyptians. Between that and the overwhelming sympathy for Gaza, and also the belief that whatever the flaws are of the Iranians and whatever the sectarian differences, they're fighting for the they're fighting for the Gazans and the Lebanese, who are not Shia.
C. Derick VarnYou know, just a reminder. So I do I feel like it's got to be a a powder cake. Also, I guess this is my last question because in this, I feel like we have a similar problem that we have in the United States, believe it or not, in completely different economic conditions, obviously, but Egyptian society, particularly post-counter revolution, has been animized in a lot of ways.
C. Derick VarnAnd even if even in trying to like defang Islamism and all and all this, a lot of the a lot of civic society in Egypt seems to be forced underground. How do you think a globally minded uh socialist movement should start to handle this atomization and to put back this idea that what happens in Egypt, what happens in Libya, what happens in Morocco, what happens in Nepal, what happens in southern India matters to us because I Gaza has put one of the things I can say about just from my perspective here in the states is in the early 80s the US left had a very internationalist outlook from about 2016 to about 2022.
C. Derick VarnI don't know what happened that year. You had finally uh a renewed focus on US imperialism, which was nominally part of US left critiques, but really didn't come up that much. And the situation abroad, and then inflamed even more by the events of October 7th and the overwhelmingly devastating response to that. I mean, I've I have never seen the Israelis lose American support so thoroughly and so quickly as they did between uh October 7th of 2023 and the beginning of 2024 in the United States, like it was it was the goodwill went from like oh poor Israelis to oh my god, what what are we seeing?
C. Derick VarnAnd you know, even conservatives here will sometimes say that it is a genocide, which is unheard of in the past. How should we orient towards this and how do we deal with this atomization? Because you know, this is a problem, and and the developing world, the quote unquote third world. I I don't know what the preferred nomenclature is these days, but um, but that having lived in both, that atomization actually seems to be it's a little bit better actually in the developing world than it is here, but it's happening everywhere.
C. Derick VarnAnd how should we try to both fight that and keep an international perspective? Because I think it's absolutely vital for reasons that you said stuff stuff, even though we don't know it, like we don't feel it. I do think that there's a direct relationship between the US inability to process, you know, the post-occupy American left and the crushing of the Arab Spring and various countries. Like these that they are related, even if we're not we don't perceive it that way.
SPEAKER_00I think you you answered the question like much earlier in our interview when you were rightly referring to the the US, both elites and even sections of the activist community, that they tend to erase history and erase the past. The US, it is the biggest imperialist power uh in the world, but also the US has such an impressive, long history of struggles from below that have acted as a source of inspiration for people around the world.
SPEAKER_00And as someone who is a victim of police brutality and participated and helped organize a revolution that was essentially uh sparked by police torture and police brutality, watching from afar the abolished police movement, for example, in the US and Black Lives Matter, I can't begin to describe to you, Derek, what an inspiration it was for me. And I was eating books, like almost literally eating them, you know.
SPEAKER_00I mean, of all of these American thinkers and intellectuals and activists who were theorizing for how to abolish the police and abolish prisons. And I was like, I should have read this a long time ago. And I'm actually ashamed that I'm a leftist, but I never came through such abolitionist material before. So, in in answer to your question, you have to start where you are. Your country has a long history of struggle, and this long history, the ruling elites would always work to try to erase it or dilute it or diffuse it or distort it.
SPEAKER_00So just by putting it and reviving it on a mass scale, using modern communication. I mean, back in the day, like you know, last century, you we should have owned a newspaper in order to be able to talk about this. Now, you know, you and I are talking through the internet and with an app that you know we're probably paying a subscription to like$100, you know, I mean a year, that's it. And and we're having our own radio station, more or less. So technology did help in making our job also much easier in that regard.
SPEAKER_00I want to to tell my my American brothers and sisters and my comrades is that although I have nothing except disdain and hate towards your government and towards the White House and towards your military, but what unites me and you, Derek, and what unites me and anyone who supports the Egyptian revolution, the common ground that we have is much bigger than a common ground that I would have with a relative of my own flesh and blood who could be supporting this uh regime of Adil Fathsisi.
SPEAKER_00In that case, you will be my real brother, not him. And any victory for us in Egypt or in the Middle East is a victory for you, in the same way that any defeat uh for us will also be a defeat uh for you. The kind of repressive technology that has been used against you, Derek, and against other fellow Americans during the Black Lives Matter, these were technologies that were tested first in Iraq, that were tested on us as Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East.
SPEAKER_00And then with the imperial boomerang, it boomerangs back home. So the same drones that were used in hunting us down, now they are hunting protestors. The same war on terror tactics that were used in the Middle East, now they boomerang back home and they are used against civil liberties organizers, whether when it comes to technology, whether when it comes to the language and the legal discourse and what have you. Now, when Americans ask me, how can we help you?
SPEAKER_00How can we help the Egyptian cause? And my answer, uh, I give them, you know, the general generic answer of like, you know, stay updated with the news from Egypt whenever you can, you know, try to lobby your elected officials over this or over that. You know, I mean this kind of like package. But the most important thing you can help us when it comes to the Egyptian cause is to get active locally. We live in a global interlinked matrix called the global capitalist system.
SPEAKER_00If we manage to weaken that system anywhere, that's a victory and that's a plus for the rest of us. So uh you don't have to demonstrate in support of Egypt, although I would love to, you know, that that you would do so. But in your own town, if you win a fight in order to stop the privatization of your public transport system, you're helping us in Egypt. If you win a fight over garbage collection fees or or the deforestation, you know, of the green areas in your state, you're helping us in Egypt.
SPEAKER_00Any strike, any campaign that you can do against American militarism, this means less troops for us in the Middle East to confront us. Uh it is the same cause, and we always have to think, and this is not just an empty slogan, that we deserve better. Another world is possible, we deserve better.
C. Derick VarnYeah, I'm thinking about right now, like we're our our our local big battle is hyperscale AI centers, which are probably, although no one is saying this, being used for global surveillance, like because otherwise they don't make economic sense. And you know, for us, I live in a I live in a landscape that's actually not that different from when I lived in Egypt because it's still a desert, but you know, building a hyperscale AI center in in a desert that is covered by snow capped mountains so that we can have a global surveillance state that's also beyond what I've been trying to get people is this is not even about you know, these functionaries are our global capital, and you know, if the US empire declines, they don't necessarily decline with it.
C. Derick VarnBut if we win victories against them domestically, it will actually affect their global operations. And it really is global, and you're absolutely right. That I mean, the amount of technologies that the US military developed in the Iraq war or was developed. I mean, particularly a lot of people focus on this now, maybe a little bit too much, but it's still important to emphasize the amount of these surveillance technologies that were specifically designed by Israelis and sold to all the world governments, including supposedly socialist ones, to monitor particularly the populations in the West Bank and Gaza that are now being used on us, you know, just blatantly, these flock cameras.
C. Derick VarnYou know, I'm like seeing things that remind me of you know when I was in the was in the Middle East and when I visited Israel and then managed to visit Gaza, which that was hard, mad, even as an American, to see a lot of this stuff. I'm seeing it here, like, and you know, people will you'll you'll get people say, uh, well, America's becoming a third world country, you know, liberals often say this, and I'm like, well, no, part of the reason is to be quite frank with you, third world working class people more resilient than we are, but but I don't think that's permanent.
C. Derick VarnLike, I think people will learn. That's I don't mean to, you know, uh say that domestic battles don't matter. But I've been really thinking about it, and reading your book made me think even more about it about this hyper-militization and the blurring of the lines of military, civil, and police society. And your book put got me to to look at this in a very particular way because we've also, you know, had a fragmented security state that had heavy internal competition, and after 9-11, it started to be centralized, and people thought it was about fighting the global war on terror.
SPEAKER_00And it's very clear today that maybe always, but definitely since 2016, this is about domestic politics as much as it's about anything else because they're afraid of us now, exactly, and you know, and I I felt like you know, living in Egypt, living in Mexico, that I had seen all this before, and I'm just like you know, I was speaking with an American journalist friend of mine the other day, and he also lived in Egypt, so he was talking about the cisification of America at this point.
C. Derick VarnYeah, it it honestly really, really does feel that way. I mean, like the I was telling someone the other day, I was like, you know, the corruption in Egypt and in Mexico, the was actually subtle compared to the corruption that we're dealing with in America now. And like, you know, we used to be really, really good at subtle corruption, and now it's like we're we're just blatant about it. But it is, I think it is that imperial boomerang is is really important because in a real sense, you know, when you when you talk about like an individual labor action, I'll I'll give you an example locally.
C. Derick VarnI've had trouble getting the unions to really be mad about building detainment centers here for supposedly for immigrants. I we don't really know what they're for, but supposedly for for illegal and put that in heavy quotations, immigrants here, and because it provides jobs and and otherwise job, you know, construction jobs have been a lot harder to get around here. And I have been like, okay, but you are cannibalizing your own, I mean, particularly in construction, you are cannibalizing your own workforce by doing this, and they're also doing a good job right now at the federal level of breaking the backs of the federal union.
C. Derick VarnSo I don't know that you're gonna benefit from this as much as you think. And I think with the I mean, I'm making a big deal out of the data center, but I think with the data center, be like, hey, this is just for domestic surveillance, it's also for international surveillance. It's it's this is an international issue. You should care about what happened, what happened. And I mean, most even most good liberals and I'm the socialists do care about what happened during the global war on terror, but they don't, it's only recently where they started connecting it to the things that have been happening here.
C. Derick VarnAnd it's it's like, no, it was always gonna come back, yeah. And so I'm glad you made that point. We've been talking for almost two hours, so I'm gonna finish this up. I want to ask, where can people follow your work in addition to your book? Which I will like make sure all the information for people to find it from Verso is in the show notes. But where can people follow you if they want to keep up with what's going on in the Arab world?
SPEAKER_00I do have uh a substack, it's called the State and Barracks, where I publish weekly, every Monday, a report about Egyptian politics with a focus on the military and the police and the general intelligence service and what's happening with labor activism and the military economy. And on Thursdays, on the same also Substack, I do publish a history piece where I try to write something about the history of the Egyptian military, but from below.
SPEAKER_00Not in sense of like nationalist glorification, but I'm interested in dissecting this institution and understanding its history and ideology. So please go to my Substack and follow my work over there.
C. Derick VarnAlright, I will link that as well. Thank you so much. Hassan, thank you, Derek. Have a great rest of your day.
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