This week on This Is Democracy, I spoke with Michael Kimmage, professor of history at the Catholic University of America and director of the Kennan Institute, about where the Russia-Ukraine war stands now and why it still demands our attention even as other conflicts crowd the global stage. Michael offered a framework I found extremely clarifying: Putinism, at its core, resembles the authoritarian models of Franco’s Spain or Latin American right-wing dictatorships, regimes built for stasis, not for war. The fatal problem is that Putin has grafted an ambitious, sprawling military campaign onto a system constitutionally unfit to run one. Mediocrity can maintain repression; it cannot win wars. And what’s new, Michael argued, is that Russians are no longer simply judging Putin as wrong or even as evil, they’re beginning to judge him as incompetent. For an autocrat, that is a different and even more dangerous kind of vulnerability. Ukraine, by contrast, has turned its decentralized, pluralistic character into a military asset. The same fragmentation that makes Ukraine difficult to govern has made it extraordinarily adaptive on the battlefield - capable of striking Moscow, disrupting Russian infrastructure across Siberia, and even exporting its military expertise to conflicts in the Middle East. Michael was clear-eyed about Ukraine’s weaknesses too: martial law, corruption scandals, deep social tensions between those bearing the war’s weight and those insulated from it. But Zelenskyy’s most important contribution may simply be that he has not gotten in the way of Ukrainian society’s capacity to innovate. What Zachary and I both found especially interesting is that this war is becoming a case study in how cheap, rapidly iterated technology can allow a weaker party to impose real political costs on a far larger adversary, a lesson with implications well beyond Ukraine’s borders. The path toward European integration remains complicated, even with Orbán’s defeat removing one major obstacle, but the direction is clear. What is not clear is any path to ending this war. The root causes, Ukraine’s drive toward Europe and Russia’s insistence on dominance over Ukraine, are not receding. If anything, both are deepening. A ceasefire is imaginable. A true end is not. However, Michael reminded us that Ukraine has come an extraordinary distance, and the contours of what Ukraine will be after this war - European, democratic, battle-hardened - are beginning to take shape. Click here to listen to the full episode or read the transcript. Democracy of Hope, produced by Jeremi and Zachary Suri, is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Democracy of Hope, Jeremi and Zachary Suri at democracyofhope.substack.com/subscribe
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SPEAKER_03This is Democracy A podcast about the people of the United States A podcast about citizenship About engaging with politics and the world around you A podcast about educating yourself on today's important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next
SPEAKER_02Welcome to our latest episode of This Is Democracy. I'm Zachary Suri. Today we're going to talk about a topic that we've talked about more times than any of us can count, but one that has enduring relevance, of course, and that is the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. But since we last talked, there have been a lot of developments, not just in Eastern Europe, but in the Middle East and around the world that really play into the dynamics on the battlefields of Ukraine.
SPEAKER_02For the first time in a long time, the Ukrainian forces have advanced and gained significant amounts of territory back from the Russians and also launched full-scale Large-Scale Drone Attacks on Moscow. So we wanted to discuss this topic, as always, with our good friend, Michael Kimmage. Michael is a professor of history at the Catholic University of America and the director of the Kennan Institute.
SPEAKER_02From 2014 to 2017, he served on the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, where he held the Russia-Ukraine portfolio. And his latest book is Collisions, The War in Ukraine and the Origins of the New Global Instability. Thank you for joining us, Michael.
SPEAKER_01Great to be with you, Zachary and Jeremy.
SPEAKER_02Thank you. And of course, we're joined, as always, by our perennial host, James Suri.
SPEAKER_00Perennial kibitzer, yes, Zachary, it's good to be with you and Michael as always Annual and perennial Yes,
SPEAKER_02exactly So Michael, I just want to first start by asking, you know, for those of us not following the conference very closely and many of our listeners can probably sympathize. You know, there's been a lot of things happening in the world since we last spoke. And unfortunately, this is not the only major conflict that the United States is tangentially or not involved in. At the moment, what do we need to know? What are the big things that have changed in the last few months?
SPEAKER_02Or has nothing changed?
SPEAKER_01Certainly a lot has changed, as your question would suggest. I think we can start with Ukraine where in some respects, if we just think of the territory of Ukraine, the changes have actually been a little bit less extreme. And so you have had Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure over the last couple of weeks and months, but you've had that for the duration of the war. Ukraine is taking back you know some of its territory and you've seen that happen before and Russia is at times taking a bit of territory but you know really for
SPEAKER_01the last two years there hasn't been a huge shift in terms of the front lines of the battlefield it's still President Zelensky you know the relationship between state and society you know I'm sure that there are subtle changes if you're living there but you know no revolutions in Ukraine No revolutions on the horizon. If we turn our gaze to Russia, there is, again, you mentioned this, Zachary, that the war is coming to Russia much more than it had in the past.
SPEAKER_01Part of this is optics, and you might think here at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, a kind of showcase Global Event, as Vladimir Putin would like it to be. And you had a Ukrainian attack on an oil refinery in St. Petersburg at the time of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. And that's, you know, meaningful. You can say it's only optics, but in a war, optics is a lot, but it's also more than optics. Ukraine has been systematically making it difficult for Russians to gain access to Crimea, meaning kind of to go back and forth to Crimea, which is now becoming absolutely a kind of war zone
SPEAKER_01environment and in part because of Ukrainian attacks, but also for other reasons, you know, inflation and cost of living and cost of energy in Russia is shooting up. And so that's being felt in a very acute way, not in a way that's driving Russians into the streets or bringing Russia to the point of some political transition, but it's meaningful. And it's meaningful because one imagines that six months from now, all of these trend lines are going to be deeper, thicker, more intense in Russia. Let me identify two other changes that matter in terms of
SPEAKER_01the overall global landscape, although we could go further afield than the United States and Europe. But Europe, in a structural sense, has continued its shift toward Ukraine, not away from Ukraine, although you can tell those stories on a micro level in certain places in Europe. but Germany has remained committed to very high levels of defense spending for the sake of Ukraine really and for itself of course vis-a-vis Russia but the defense industrial cooperation between Ukraine and Europe is a major story of the present moment and it's been in the making for a long time over the last couple
SPEAKER_01of years really But part of the reason Ukraine is excelling so much with its deep strikes in Russia is because of its cooperation with Europe and because of Europe's commitment to Ukrainian security and defense. That's not a rapid shift, but it's a structural shift that you're feeling the consequences of in the present moment. And finally, the United States continues its process not of engagement in this issue. That's been a superficial story of the last 15, 16 months of various diplomatic initiatives, all of which have failed. But the United States is continuing its trend of withdrawing support both
SPEAKER_01from Ukraine and in a way more precipitously from Europe. And in an interesting way that may be pushing Europe to support Ukraine. you know sort of more more dramatically and so maybe there are ways in which these these changes intersect but it's making it a different war it's more of a European war it's one in which the war is coming home to Russia and it's one in which Ukraine is in a very important sense holding on
SPEAKER_00Michael, you published a wonderful piece in the New York Times earlier this month with the title, Putin Has No Good Way Out of His War. And you make the point very clearly that there isn't an anti-war movement that's threatening to overthrow Putin. But it's not just that he's unpopular. You argue that Putinism is uh the the promises he had made to russians about stability and some modicum of improvement in their lives that that those are going in the wrong direction
SPEAKER_00and you see him trapped i think that's the word you use explain that to us because from the outside it looks like he's as secure
SPEAKER_01as ever sure um you know there's always been a effort to kind of characterize putinism because it's not it's not easy to do it's definitely not the soviet union it's not nazi germany it's not fascism it's not Totalitarianism, though there are intelligent people who apply those words to Putin's Russia. I think in some ways, the best characterization of Putinism refers back to, you know, General Franco in Spain, or it refers back to various kinds of dictatorships that are familiar from the history of Central and Latin America,
SPEAKER_01which is to say, you know, sort of authoritarian regimes of the right that are socially conservative, that have some connection to the church, that are militaristic in a way, but that also frees societies as Franco-Spain got frozen, the sort of Iberian world off there to the side of Europe as Europe whooped on, Spain got stuck until the 1970s when Francoism was eviscerated in Spain. And in a sense, if Putin had just continued on with that model, which he kind of slowly arrives at in the early 2000s,
SPEAKER_01and then begins to perfect, you know, I don't think that there would be a crisis of Putinism at the present moment or there wouldn't be this sense of of no exit because those are models. And we think of, you know, dictators who live for a very long period of time where you could kind of ride it out until the very end and just give the people something, you know, have something of a state ideology. And then where it doesn't work, you use repression to keep your grip on power. The thing is that Putin has grafted a radical, ambitious, sprawling war that he is very much not winning onto this kind of system.
SPEAKER_01So that's like Franco invading Portugal and maybe Franco invading France and trying to make Francoism work under those conditions. And I think it's very hard because these kinds of regimes, these kinds of governments are by their very nature sclerotic. they're gerontocratic they're governed as much by malice as they are by mediocrity and you know mediocrity doesn't win wars malice might but mediocrity doesn't and
SPEAKER_01so Putin has this sort of aging a middling, low-talent government that knows exactly how to repress the Russian population and to sort of keep that threshold where it needs to be, but it's completely out of its depths in fighting the war that it's fighting against Ukraine. And just to go back to, you know, Zachary's question and to what's changed with the war, you now have Ukraine that is an absolutely formidable fighting force capable of going offense in ways that I think Russia is struggling to anticipate and certainly struggling to to respond to so we can go into all the ways in which this is i think
SPEAKER_01an unwinnable war for russia we've had that discussion now for the past a couple of years very happy to return to that topic but i think it's really a problem uh of regime uh that if putin set the regime a very low bar to meet he might have been able to do it but with the war he set the regime such a high bar russia has got to juggle sanctions International diplomatic relationships. It's got to juggle that with regime stability, with a war that is beginning to nip away, sort of chip away at the foundations of Russian statehood and Russian political economy.
SPEAKER_01And this is, I think, the moment, and this is why it is something of a striking transition within Russia, When Russians are beginning to judge Putin, not as a loser, and maybe not even as wrong for waging this war, they're beginning to judge Putin as incompetent. And that in itself is also a very dangerous thing for a dictator and for an autocrat. I don't think that they mind being looked at as evil, but they really hate being looked at as incompetent. And that is a phenomenon that's just beginning to take root in Russia. Big, big problem for Putin.
SPEAKER_00And Michael, if you could, could you contrast that with the Ukrainian side? Because what seems extraordinary to me, at least as someone with less on the ground expertise than you have, is how the Ukrainians have not only held out in this war of attrition, but how Zelensky has managed to hold this together and avoid many of the weaknesses you've just identified in Putin. How has he done that?
SPEAKER_01No, exactly. I mean, Ukraine does have, you could say, other weaknesses, which are sometimes connected to its strengths and fascinating ways. And I'll start with a few of the weaknesses so that we have as balanced a picture as possible. One of the obvious weaknesses, which is imposed by the war and not by Zelensky, is that Ukraine is under conditions of martial law. So there haven't been elections in Ukraine since the start of the war. That's tough, of course. Ukraine continues to struggle with corruption. And that is a kind of generic point, but there have been a series of scandals over the last six,
SPEAKER_01seven months, including people quite close to Zelensky that are Worisome. And that is a wartime dynamic. Think back to, you know, many wars, civil war in the US case and, you know, kind of graft and corruption that became problems. And you do see that, of course, in the in the Ukrainian case. And you also have and I'll start with this as a weakness and then turn this into a strengthened In a moment you have just this decentralized quality to Ukrainian life which is a way that Ukraine survives its regional differences and sometimes manages
SPEAKER_01the alienation that people feel from the government and the state through all kinds of mediating institutions and just a fragmented localized sense of of power. But one of the problems in Ukraine at the present moment is that you have parts of society, this is a typical wartime problem, not unique to Ukraine, but particular to the war. You have parts of Ukrainian society that are making huge sacrifices and living under very difficult conditions. And everybody, of course, is deeply affected by the war. But you also have parts of society that are experiencing relative privilege. And those are social tensions that are going to have to be worked out.
SPEAKER_01I wouldn't say that Zelensky has managed them badly, but they're tensions that are implicit to the war. But that very decentralized nature of the war is a key element of Ukraine's strength because it ensures a kind of political pluralism. It also ensures a kind of media pluralism, although Zelensky is not a Boy Scout on that issue. He can be a bit rough when it comes to the issue of media freedom, but Ukraine does have media freedom for sure, again, because it is this pluralistic, decentralized society in so many respects. But I would also emphasize the point
SPEAKER_01and it's not that Russia has been unable to innovate in this war it does innovate at a pretty rapid pace but Ukraine has been brilliant at innovation many many different tactics and techniques and methods of warfare and I think the striking example of this is and I know Zachary you wanted to link up the war in Iran with the war in Ukraine and that's a good thing to do so you have a kind of US-Israel invasion of Iran in late February of this year And within a couple of days and weeks you have Ukrainians going to the Middle East not just to sell arms which they were doing but also
SPEAKER_01to provide advice to be kind of military consultants to governments that have huge resources and huge militaries and there you have Ukraine in a position of of advisor. And that speaks to the high, high quality of defense industrial innovation, which is a product of a society that is capable of doing that in some respects on its own, outside of government circles. And that's where you do see the difference between Ukraine and Russia. Russia does have a version of startups and that kind of dynamic. But for the most part, the vertical in Russia is pretty crushing.
SPEAKER_01And so there's decentralized, maybe democratic, not in the Jeffersonian sense, in the kind of technical Jeffersonian sense, but in the spirit of democracy that's you know very much there and that's paying real dividends so as much as it can be a source of dissension and you know fractiousness in Ukraine it's paying huge wartime dividends and you know you can say about Zelensky that he both celebrates that which is good and he does if you read his speeches and look at his political persona and profile but he also doesn't get in the way of it you know now and then I think he's tempted to but he really doesn't in a fundamental way get in the way of that and
SPEAKER_01that has been to be sure politically a great gift to Ukraine.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I'm struck, Michael, that every time we have this conversation, it seems like, you know, one of the two sides is in the better position or in the stronger position, and usually not the same one as last time. And you said it earlier that this has clearly become an unwinnable war for Russia. I wonder if it's also just become an unendable or unending war, period. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01Probably. I think it's probably the safest way to look at it, depressing as that thought is, because to end a war does mean going to root causes and to the things that created the war in the first place, to the factors, the instigators that created the war in the first place. And in a way, the two root causes of the war are not only still with us in some ways, they're both intensifying. And of course, they feed into one another. And this is not a line of analysis that cheers me at all, but it's worth pursuing.
SPEAKER_01And so one of the causes of the war is Ukraine's totally understandable wish to be a part of European life in many respects, institutional life in Europe, security structures in Europe. travel and commerce and studying in Europe and all of that, European norms and access to Europe and sort of membership and belonging in Europe. That's where the conflict begins back in 2013 with this question of the association agreement with the European Union, which the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych at the time did not sign and it's not
SPEAKER_01that Ukrainians are less invested in that in 2026 than they were in 2022 or 2013 or 2014 they're more invested in that because they sacrificed so much not just for the sake of a Ukraine that will endure but they've sacrificed so much for the sake of a Ukraine that will be in Europe and it will be in Europe I feel very comfortable and confident making that statement or prediction but it is a cause of the war And the other cause of the war is a Russia that seeks dominion over Ukraine If we wanted to be very technical about it, Jeremy,
SPEAKER_01we could use the foreign policy term suzerainty Maybe sovereignty, maybe colonization, I'm a little bit less convinced of that But suzerainty, the kind of ability to control the foreign policy of another country Russia largely had that attitude in a general way in the 1990s I don't think Yeltsin was uninvested in that, although Yeltsin was pretty friendly toward Ukraine And Putin has wound his way ever more closely to a vision of a Russia entitled to rule Ukraine
SPEAKER_01over Ukraine. I think we can get into a complicated conversation of how much Russian society agrees with that and Russian elites and I'm not sure that they're all that invested in that vision, but Putin is all powerful in that system and he's able to carry forward with that. And I think for the elites who currently govern Russia, not just Putin, but the small group of other decision makers, I don't think that they're less invested in that vision than they were in 2022 on the eve of invasion I think they're more invested in it and here's the devil's logic of this war that as Ukraine advances militarily and integrates
SPEAKER_01into European defense industrial structures in some ways the threat or the quote-unquote threat to Russia grows and so the Russian investment in controlling Ukraine which is impossible for Russia that Russian investment also intensifies I don't think that this logic can last forever something will break it you know something will undo it but I don't see anything at the moment that's capable of undoing it maybe it's my limited imagination but it feels to me like if anything this logic is getting more bitter more deep more entrenched and
SPEAKER_01so you can envision a ceasefire you can envision a pause but a true end to the war is to me very hard to contemplate
SPEAKER_02Yeah, you mentioned Ukraine's relationship with Europe. And before we forget, I want to touch on one of the developments that I think got a little less attention, but it seems like Ukraine is moving one step closer. closer to membership in the European Union, in particular with the defeat of Viktor Orban in Hungary earlier this year. And I wonder if you could speak to what that means both for Ukraine and for Europe, that that relationship is strengthening and also the possibility
SPEAKER_02that Ukraine might even have a pathway into the European Union or at least into close association with the European Union without ending this war.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, it's a great question. And Chancellor Friedrich Meretz in Germany has floated the idea of a kind of EU membership that wouldn't be full membership, but a sort of partial membership, path to membership that he thinks is suitable for Ukraine in the short to medium term. And to be sure, the failure of Viktor Orban as a resolute opponent of Ukraine as such, and certainly of Ukraine in the European Union, really matters that vision has weakened.
SPEAKER_01So now it's basically Slovakia is the sole standout in terms of opposing in a very explicit way Ukraine's European path. But, you know, Europe is a hard place for me to fathom in this regard. You have the change in Prime Minister in the UK with Nigel Farage sort of nipping at the heels of whoever happens to be British Prime Minister.
SPEAKER_01You have Friedrich Meretz at historically low approval ratings and levels of popularity. You have a Macron who is, I don't know if one is a lame duck in France, but if one could be, he would be a lame duck. you know you have Georgia Maloney who's actually a pretty commanding political figure and relatively supportive of Ukraine but I don't think Italy is in the position to drive this process and then you have an EU that probably in some theoretical way would love to have Ukraine as a member but doesn't have the leverage or the power to make that possible it needs
SPEAKER_01the member states to do that and then if you hone in on a place like Poland you get a paradox of a country that's very pro-Ukraine on the security side but really resentful of Ukraine in terms of its memory politics at the present moment. They've just stripped Vladimir Zelensky of a ward in Poland and it's because of memory conflict over the Second World War. But even beyond that in Poland you have Polish farmers who don't want Ukraine joining the European Union because that would then drive down agricultural prices or diminish profits in Poland.
SPEAKER_01So in a way these are the humdrum issues of regional local National Politics, but I think it does mean that the path to full membership is going to be long and winding for Ukraine. And I think it's going to be hard for the EU also to lift a lot of the, you know, conditionalities that are built into the process of EU accession, where Ukraine is certainly going to struggle rule of law, separation of powers. Issues of Commerce and all of that are going to put Ukraine in a tough position.
SPEAKER_01So the best one can say is that Europe is going to have to be creative in this regard. I think they see the reason for being creative. The incentive is there because what Europe kept doing with Ukraine going back into the 1990s is sort of kicking the can down the road and saying that there is some sort of issue of where Ukraine is going to belong, but we'll figure it out when the time comes. And then 2022 came along and because the whole issue was so unresolved, Europe had a major war to face taking place in Ukraine. And I think there's a desire for greater clarity or an association
SPEAKER_01of greater clarity with greater European security. But it's very, very tricky. And there are so many ways in which this process could be ripped apart without a Viktor Orban or populists or others to sort of get in the way and those people might emerge in Europe. So I think it's a very, very hard landscape for Ukraine. to navigate. And this is one of the ways in which Europe is a fascinating sort of protium, remarkable place, but kind of frustrating to pin down.
SPEAKER_00Michael, how much of the Ukrainian position and its recent strengthening has been a result of technology? You pointed to the innovation and the strategic acumen of the Ukrainians in contrast to often at least a slower process on the Russian side, a more cumbersome process. And In a sense, the Ukrainians have started to export their model in some ways. And clearly, there's a lot of credit that goes to the Ukrainians. But are we also seeing just a phase shift in the nature of war? And this is sort of case study number one.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, I'm certainly at the edge of my competence here in terms of being able to comment directly on these issues. And going back to Zachary's initial point of curiosity about global interconnections, I think it is essential here to link what's happened in Iran over the last few months with what's happening in Ukraine. And sometimes it's sort of economies of scale that weapons can be produced now very cheaply that actually have really significant battlefield and even beyond the battlefield effect it does seem like to take
SPEAKER_01the Iranian example Iran has been able to use relatively cheap drones and rockets to exert a kind of control over the Strait of Hormuz and that in turn is having a political impact in Washington so that's not just a battlefield effect it's sort of a geopolitical effect and I think you've seen something similar at work in Ukraine that Ukraine is able to break up Russian transportation routes and to drive up the cost of energy in Russia and to do so in ways that are relatively low cost and doable and there's this sort of to cite
SPEAKER_01a famous page from Mad Magazine there's a kind of spy versus spy quality to the war where with jamming technology and other things the Russians will make an advance and then you'll see the Ukrainians make an advance and that's resulted interestingly in A kind of stalemate along the line of contact between Russia and Ukraine, but you can actually see on both sides, and it's more a matter of technological innovation on the Ukrainian side, is that both sides are acquiring political tools, which is of course a major objective in warfare,
SPEAKER_01that to start with the Russian side, there are lots of concerns about the coming winter in Ukraine. or that Russia may try to make major cities, including the capital city in Ukraine, may try to make them uninhabitable by going after water sanitation, the very basics of civilian infrastructure for cities. And Ukraine is playing this game at the moment where there's a limited number of interceptors and Russia has a lot of missiles that
SPEAKER_01that it can send in. And it's not easy for Ukraine to defend. And that's a problem that touches not just on purely military matters, but on the basics of politics. And there, Russia has some advantages that may emerge in the next couple of months. Back to Zachary's point about how this is a war that seesaws in terms of who has the perceived advantage at any given moment. But Ukraine has, as I already mentioned, acquired a real lever of political influence within Russia.
SPEAKER_01And that Russians now tie their economic misfortunes to the war is really important. And that goes back to the issue of optics, but it also goes back to the issue of Ukraine being able to strike deep within Russia. Okay, Moscow. I mean, look at the map of Moscow, how far that is from Ukraine. That's remarkable. But the strikes are like way in Siberia, all the way in the eastern parts of Russia. And that's just astonishing and says to Russians that none of you is really insulated from this. And that's a political message and an exceptionally powerful one in the Ukrainian case. And it does stem,
SPEAKER_01to go back to the essence of your question, Jeremy, it does stem from technology and technological innovation.
SPEAKER_00Right, and it seems to me, Michael, what's striking in both the Ukrainian and Iranian cases is that these much weaker countries relative to the country they're fighting, they are able to produce technology at low cost rapidly with the promise that they'll continue to do that. So, you know, if you're sitting in Moscow or Siberia, it's not that this was a one-off attack, like, you know, a Japanese balloon that was launched on the West Coast during World War II, but that this is actually something that will continue to And in the near term,
SPEAKER_00there's nothing you can do about it, even though you have such vast superiority in the larger military items.
SPEAKER_01No, absolutely. And there is a structural difference here between the war in Iran, whether it's over or not, and the Russia-Ukraine war, because in the case of the U.S., it's much more indirect. It's energy prices and the American economy. I mean, that's what President Trump is worried about, that if the war would go on too long, that he would suffer political consequences because of secondary effects on the American economy. Of course, for Iran, this is a primary objective of Shutting down the Strait of Hormuz.
SPEAKER_01But it's very different in Russia if you're sitting in Moscow and Ukrainian drones are shutting down the airport, which just happened last week. Three out of four airports, I think, in Moscow were shut down at the beginning of last week. If you see plumes of smoke in the capital city and in many parts of Russia, this has been a story actually for the last couple of months. You have rolling blackouts because of effects on electricity. You have internet Outages sometimes caused by the Russian government, but sometimes caused by the war.
SPEAKER_01So that's really, it's in a way a much more intimate war now for Russia in the sense that it's intervening or sort of making itself felt in the personal lives of people. And that, I think, is still inconceivable for Americans now. Who knows? A war a year from now, two years from now, could change that. And the U.S. could experience what it's like to have cheap weaponry affecting life on the home front. But that's not the case currently for the U.S. But it's absolutely the case for Russia. So in some ways, Putin's problems are the worst of all possible worlds for him.
SPEAKER_01So there, too, the kind of no-exit quality of Putinism is is exerting itself. How do you prevent Ukrainians from producing these sort of cheap tools and using them within Russia itself? I don't think that there's a 100% way of doing so.
SPEAKER_02I want to bring us to a close with where we started, which is not just the seemingly endless nature of this war, but the many distractions that I think keep people from paying attention to this war. You know, thinking about the Russia-Ukraine conflict in a global perspective, you know, what is your case for our listeners for why they should continue to pay attention to this war and why it still matters?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, that's a very important question in the crowded media world that we live in. And unfortunately, I mean, The Economist had a a chilling graph to this effect in an issue a few weeks ago and it was just a graph that sort of visualized global warfare from 20 years ago to the present moment. And it's an upward trajectory in quite a dramatic way. So it's not just wars in the Middle East and wars in Europe. It's underreported wars in Africa and Asia as well.
SPEAKER_01And the trend lines are not great in this respect. And I wonder if it doesn't go back to Jeremy's point also about technology, that it's almost incentivizing you know it's almost incentivizing warfare in some ways if it's possible to hold out or to kind of push against a stronger foe because of these new tools or whatever the explanation is we do live in a moment of increasing militarism and violence and so the question is absolutely the right one why pay attention in a sustained way
SPEAKER_01to Ukraine when there are many other conflicts and issues that deserve our attention you know I think The answer has to be beyond just the most important basic answer of the humanitarian situation in Ukraine because as many Russians are experiencing higher prices at the pump you have you know kids who can't go to school in Ukraine and you know you know mass humanitarian suffering and you know attacks on on on major cities and we just saw you know a
SPEAKER_01900-year-old church that had been refurbished after the Second World War, rebuilt after the Second World War, but nevertheless was destroyed or damaged seriously by Russian rocket fire. So you have all of the costs of the war which we need to take account of, and that's a human story. to begin with. But it is the case that the geopolitical implications are profound. And some of them have been mentioned already, but let me just repeat them in this context. We have Europe going from a place of peace to a place of war.
SPEAKER_01We have Germany now spending a half trillion of its budget, half trillion dollars, euros, I can't quite remember, to make Germany in what in the future will be the fourth biggest army in the world. I don't think it's a negative development. I don't think it means Germany is going to be what it was in the 1930s. But still that's a profound transformation within Europe itself. You have Europe itself, not just Germany, but many other countries investing heavily in defense and military affairs. That's going to make for a new Europe. You have a European project that since the 1940s has been defined by peacemaking.
SPEAKER_01is now being defined by war making, not by European choice. They would have preferred to be peacemakers, but they're being transformed into something else. You have a Russia that has gone from a kind of shoddy authoritarian, but also not totalitarian system in 2022, go to a highly militaristic You know, sort of deeply, you know, repressive system and government that's going to have a long-term effect because
SPEAKER_01if you look at Russian education, I would commend to our listeners to take a look at Mr. Nobody Against Putin, the Oscar-winning documentary and the indoctrination of Russian children. Now, we know, unfortunately, from the story of National Socialism, That even though indoctrination can end at a given moment in time, it still stays in the minds of people, and that's a profound long-term consequence. You also have the kinds of relationships Russia is forming with North Korea and with Iran, which is affecting non-proliferation and the status of nuclear weapons in our world,
SPEAKER_01and that's being changed by the war. Just the profundity of these changes matters. You know, first and foremost, of course, the people of Ukraine and their story and the things that they're going through, but the massive geopolitical implications throughout Europe, certainly in Russia, but rippling around the world. World in many many many forms food security was a story of the early war I think that that's less of a story now I would really focus attention we can do this in the in a later conversation Jeremy and Zachary but focus attention on the nuclear dimension of this war because this war among other changes is rewriting
SPEAKER_01the nuclear code of the 21st century in ways I think that we're just beginning to understand but that change alone is is crucial for anyone in the anyone in the world to pay close attention to wonderful
SPEAKER_02Well, thank you so much for this real tour de force of the many geopolitical and psychological dynamics at play in this conflict. So thank you as always, Michael, for joining us.
SPEAKER_01Thank you so much, Zachary. And I would say many of our conversations, especially sort of a year ago, two years ago, were really bleak about this war. I don't think that the bleakness has left us. It's still staring us in the face. But Ukraine has come a really long way. And you see that. And I think that there is light at the end of the tunnel when it comes to the Ukraine that will be after this war. And we're just beginning to to glimpse it. Wouldn't want to go beyond that in terms of any kind of predictions
SPEAKER_01or anticipations, but that's a pretty big transition.
SPEAKER_00Well, and I think, Michael, one of the real strengths of the analysis you've shared with us, and of course you've shared in other forums and print and in podcasts and other things, is Is how we're all learning. I think there's a tendency we have to bring our paradigms and our models to the reality around us and then try to make the reality squeeze into our models. And this war and your analysis of it is reminding us that we're living through a period of incredible transition, uncertainty and unpredictability.
SPEAKER_00And that might not always make us comfortable, but I think the strength of your work, Michael, has been to, as any good historian would, to follow the evidence and update your analysis as we go. And I think that will continue to happen. We don't know where we're going to be one, two, three years from now.
SPEAKER_01Well, I'm sure the experience is very familiar to you, Jeremy. You make the historical analogy, you knock it down, you make it again, you knock it down, and you keep on going more or less forever in that pattern. And it's not, I don't find it Sisyphean or maddening, it feels in some respects, like, you know it gets you somewhere well it's good work if you can get it right
SPEAKER_02well thank you to our two historians on today's episode of This Is Democracy and thank you of course as always to our listeners for joining us for this one of many discussions on the war of Ukraine and probably hopefully I guess not the last for the three of us so thank you all thank you
SPEAKER_03Thank you This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts ITS Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin The music in this episode was written and recorded by Scott Holmes Stay tuned for a new episode every week You can find This is Democracy on Apple Podcasts Spotify and YouTube See you next time
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