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The Permanent Problem Podcast

The Permanent Problem Podcast artwork

Laura Field on the MAGA intellectuals

Mar 19, 20261 hr 6 minAudio
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In this episode of The Permanent Problem podcast, Laura Field joins host me to discuss both of our new books. The first half of the conversation focuses on Laura’s Furious Minds: The Making of the New Right, an examination of the intellectuals of American right-wing populism. We review the origins of the right’s turn toward populism, the resurrection of old ideas combined with some new improvisations, and the MAGA intellectual right’s strange combination of profound cultural despair with wide-eyed naivete about the possibility of renewal under populism. We then switch gears and discuss the overlaps and profound differences between my criticisms of contemporary capitalism in The Permanent Problem and the “post-liberal” bill of indictment against liberal modernity. While intellectuals of the MAGA right dismiss post-Enlightenment liberalism as profoundly misconceived and doomed to failure, I argue that liberal societies today are currently struggling with the consequences of one world-historical triumph - the marginalization of material poverty - and how to move on to the next great triumph: translating material plenty into mass flourishing. Below is a video recording of our conversation, followed by a lightly edited transcript. Brink Lindsey: Hello, everybody. Welcome to The Permanent Problem Podcast. I’m delighted to have as my guest today Laura Field. We’re actually going to be interviewing each other about each other’s books. Laura is the author of the excellent new book Furious Minds about the intellectuals of the MAGA right. She’s also a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, has affiliations with George Washington University and American University as well. And sadly, a former senior fellow at the Niskanen Center where I work. But lovely to have you here with me today and to talk about our books. Laura Field: Thank you. Thank you so much for having me, Brink. Lindsey: So, we’re going to start off, I’m going to ask you questions and then we’ll turn the tables about halfway through. Field: Reading your book, so much overlap thematically, even though they’re very different books, obviously. Lindsey: Yeah. So, your book, I think, has a tighter focus and so it makes sense I think to start with you and then we can talk about how my book fits in with those themes. So, your book is about the intellectuals of the new populist right. Which is an interesting thing: to be an intellectual of a profoundly anti-intellectual movement, a revolt against elites and especially credentialed experts. So, it seems to me that this phenomenon of the intellectual new right is an interesting combination of deep-seated old ideas coming back that had been kind of buried under a log for a while, but resurfacing. But then also a kind of mad improvisation to take advantage of the utterly unexpected 2016 election of Donald Trump, and then the ongoing radically unpredictable zigs and zags of his time in office. So, you have people trying to shoehorn some old ideas into some novel and fairly chaotic circumstances. So, how do you see that characterization? And do you see this as more of the recrudescence of old ideas or something new and weird? Field: Oh, I think that’s a wonderful way to characterize it as this mishmash and the deep, old, crusty things that have sort of been there the whole time and festering really. And then, but also just this insane moment that they were able to take advantage of. And I think overall, there’s a little more systemic consistency in the intellectuals on the intellectual side of things than I really expected when I first started researching and writing about these guys, insofar as there is this thread from the old, old right in the early part of the 20th century through to Goldwater, Buchanan, the Tea Party and all of this. So, there is this deep sort of consistency that I think they recognized in Trump. But there is just a strange mishmash of all kinds of the new, the kind of energetic tech stuff, the highbrow, the low, and just a totally different remix of all these old things. And I say in the book that there are three things that distinguish this new right from the old iterations of this same sort of fringe phenomenon. So, overall, the book is telling the story of the takeover of the GOP - essentially, the old Reagan-Buckley establishment, fusionism, whatever - by the fringe forces of the old right and the paleos. So, that’s the overall story. It was just taking it over by the fringe and it’s a story of intellectual radicalization. And I say there are three things that distinguish this new iteration from the old. And one is just an increased misogyny because I think that where there was anti-feminism... Lindsey: And by old, you mean distinguished from old Reagan-Buckley conservatism? Field: No, this is sort of in the weeds already. Lindsey: Just the old right? Field: More from the distinction from the older, old right. Okay. So, there’s this consistency and there’s this distinction. And I can say more about those distinctions, but the old paleo fringe stuff, that this is distinct from that because it’s more misogynist, it’s more tech-savvy and youthful, and there’s this youthful energy, and they’re just way more successful, right? So, they see this happening with Trump and they succeed. But I think the other thing I’d say is this blending of highbrow and low and this kind of bizarro mishmash feature of it that I think your characterization captured. So, I love that way you captured it, but there is a lot of consistency too to this sort of... Lindsey: The misogyny, part of that’s just a reflection of we’re in new times, right? So, once upon a time when the old right was really old, women were in their place in the home, right? They didn’t complain about that, right? Field: So, they didn’t need to. Lindsey: So, now then we had of course conservatism and conservative anti-feminism during the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s. But now we have women ascendant in many quarters of society - 60% of college students and taking over a number of professional fields that were once all-male preserves, an increasing percentage of women as the prime earner in their household. So, there’s a sense of male displacement. Field: Absolutely. Lindsey: And therefore, a kind of freakout associated with that. Field: Yeah. There’s much more fuel now for a backlash. Lindsey: It just wasn’t on the map decades ago, right? Field: Oh yeah, certainly, certainly. But it does actually make for quite a different flavor of reaction. Lindsey: Go into a little more detail on that. Field: Well, I mean maybe just for listeners - and maybe your audience is familiar with all this history, right? - but I mean, there’s the distinction between basically what the establishment right and the fusionist Reagan-Buckley right stood for versus what these new guys stand for and how that works. Lindsey: Sure. That’d be good. Field: So, I just call it the new right - there’s every generation a new right, so I just called... Lindsey: The establishment right was the new right once upon a time, right? Field: Yeah, new right, old right doesn’t... I mean, it’s a mess, but I just use the phrase Reagan-Buckley establishment to describe the old coalition. And that basically is this combination of - I don’t need to tell you this, but anyway - it’s a combination of liberal economics, free trade, free market economics, social conservatism, and sort of the social values of the Christian right, forged together through anti-communism and a kind of liberal internationalism or interventionism. And so that lasted basically till the end of the Cold War and then these other... But that was an uneasy settlement among conservatives and in American history politically. At the end of the Cold War, you have these other strains of conservatism that were always there, but continued to fester, which are more populist. The phrase that was used in the ‘90s is the paleoconservatives against the neocons, a reflection of that distinction and... Lindsey: And … This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit brinklindsey.substack.com

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_03Welcome to the Permanent Problem Podcast. I'm your host, Brink Lindsey, a Senior Vice President at the Niskanen Center. Each episode, we take a deep dive into the messy and uncertain transition from mass affluence to mass flourish, exploring what I call capitalism's triple crisis and the potential for rising above it. Hello, everybody. Welcome to the Permanent Problem podcast. I'm delighted to have as my guest today, Laura Field. We're actually going to be interviewing each other about each

other's books.

SPEAKER_03Laura is the author of the excellent new book, Furious Minds, about the intellectuals of the MAGA right. She's also a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution. has affiliations with George Washington University and American University as well. And sadly, it was a former senior fellow at the Scanning Center where I work. But lovely to have you here with me today and to talk about our books.

SPEAKER_01Thank you. Thank you so much for having me, Brink.

SPEAKER_03So we're going to start off. I'm going to ask you questions and then we'll turn the tables about halfway through.

SPEAKER_01I mean, reading your book is so much sort of overlap thematically, even though they're very different books, obviously.

SPEAKER_03Yeah. So your book, I think, has a tighter focus. And so it makes sense, I think, to start with you. And then we can talk about how my book fits in with those themes. So your book is about the intellectuals of the new populist right, which is an interesting thing to be an intellectual of a profoundly anti-intellectual movement, a revolt against elites and especially credentialed experts. So it seems to me that this phenomenon of the intellectual new right is an

interesting combination of deep-seated old ideas coming back that had been kind of

SPEAKER_03buried under a log for a while but resurfacing. But then also kind of a mad improvisation to take advantage of the utterly unexpected 2016 election of Donald Trump and then the ongoing, radically unpredictable zigs and zags of his time in office. So you have people trying to shoehorn some old ideas into some novel and fairly chaotic circumstances. Mm-hmm. How do you see that characterization?

And so do you see this as more the recrudescence of old ideas or something new and weird?

SPEAKER_01Oh, I think that's a wonderful way to characterize it as this mishmash and the deep, old, crusty things that have sort of been there the whole time and festering, really. But also just this insane moment that they were able to take advantage of. And that I think, I think overall, there's a little more systemic consistency in the intellectuals on the intellectual side of things than I really expected when I first started

researching and writing

SPEAKER_01about these guys, just in so far as there's a kind of connect us, there is this thread from the old, old, right, right, in the early part of the 20th century, through to, you know, like Goldwater, Buchanan, the Tea Party, and all of this. So there is this deep sort of consistency that I think they recognized in Trump. But there is just a strange mishmash of all kinds, of the new, the kind of energetic tech stuff, the highbrow, the low, and just a sort of totally different remix of all these old things.

SPEAKER_01And I say in the book that There are three things that distinguish this sort of new right from the old iterations of the same sort of fringe phenomenon. So overall, the book is telling the story of the takeover of the GOP, essentially, the old Reagan-Buckley establishment fusionism, whatever, by the sort of fringe forces of the old right and the paleos. So that's the overall story. I was just taking it over by the fringe in the story of

intellectual radicalization. And I say there's three things that distinguish this new iteration from the old.

SPEAKER_01And one is just an increased misogyny, because I think that where there was anti-feminism... And by old,

SPEAKER_03you mean distinguished from old Reagan-Buckley conservatism?

SPEAKER_01No, this is sort of in the weeds already. Distinction from the older old right. Okay, so there's this consistency and there's this distinction. And I can say more about those distinctions, but the old sort of paleo-fringe stuff... that this is distinct from that because it's more misogynist. It's more tech savvy, right? And youthful and there's this youthful energy and they're just way more successful, right? So they see this happening with Trump and they succeed. But I think the other thing I'd say is this blending of highbrow and low, right? And this kind of bizarro mishmash feature of it that I think

your characterization captured.

SPEAKER_01So I love that way you captured it. But there is a lot of consistency too to this sort of... The misogyny, part of that's just a reflection of we're in new times, right?

SPEAKER_03So once upon a time, when the old right was really old, you know, women were in their place in the home, right? So they didn't mean that. So now it's, you know... Then we had, of course, conservatism and conservative anti-feminism during the 60s, 70s and 80s. But now we have sort of ascendant, you know, women in many quarters of society ascendant, you know, 60 percent of college students and taking over a number of professional fields that were once all male preserves. Increasing percentage of women,

you know, as the prime, you know, earner in their household.

SPEAKER_03So there's a sense of male displacement. Absolutely. And therefore, you know, a kind of a freak out associated with that.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, there's much more fuel now for a backlash.

SPEAKER_03It just wasn't on the map decades ago. Right.

SPEAKER_01Oh, yeah, certainly. Certainly. I mean, but it does it does actually it means it makes for quite a different flavor of.

SPEAKER_03Yes.

SPEAKER_01Reaction.

SPEAKER_03Yeah.

SPEAKER_01So, yeah.

SPEAKER_03You know, go into a little more detail on that.

SPEAKER_01Well, just, I mean, maybe just for listeners and maybe your audience is familiar with all this history, right? But I mean, just to put the, there's the distinction between basically what the old, right? I mean, the establishment, right? And the fusionist Reagan Buckley, right? Maybe I should start there, right? And just describe what they stood for versus what these new guys stand for and how that works.

SPEAKER_00Sure, that'd be good.

SPEAKER_01So, you know, I talk, I just call it the rate, every new right, you know, there's every generation, there's a new right.

SPEAKER_03The right was the new right once upon a time, right?

SPEAKER_01Yeah, new right, old right doesn't, I mean, it's a mess. But I call the, I just use the phrase Reagan-Buckley establishment to describe the old coalition. Yeah. And that basically is, you know, this combination of, I don't need to tell you this, but it's a combination of liberal economics, right? Free trade, you know, free trade, free market economics, social conservatism, and sort of the social values of the Christian right forged together through

SPEAKER_01anti-communism, right? And a kind of liberal internationalism or interventionism. And so that lasted basically till the end of the Cold War. And then these other, but that was an uneasy settlement, right, among conservatives and in American history politically. At the end of the Cold War, you have these other strains of conservatism that continue, that were always there, but continue to fester, which is a more populist movement. The phrase that was used in the 90s is the paleoconservatives against the neocons,

right?

SPEAKER_01A reflection of that distinction. And the paleocons had been famously marginalized during the Reagan administration

SPEAKER_03and were quite, you know, out of sorts. There was a famous when William Bennett became education secretary, I think. And or no, he was head of National Endowment for the Humanities. They pegged him for that first, as opposed to old right person.

SPEAKER_01Huge uproar over that. Right. Yeah.

SPEAKER_03Yes. Yes. So so they've been nursing grievances for decades.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. And these are a lot of people who were ousted, you know, quite formally from because of things like anti-Semitism or racism from some of these intellectuals. Sam Francis, who now we look back as a, you know, as a sort of progenitor of the MAGA, right?

SPEAKER_03Exactly. He was a very marginal kind of guy. And he finally got booted from his, you know, from National Review and from establishment conservatism for being too overtly racist in his rights.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. And Pat Buchanan being the kind of, you know, main... political figure representing.

SPEAKER_03A guy with ugly ideas and a great, you know, curating, right? Incredibly likable and personable, right? Which made it easy to sort of not focus on

SPEAKER_01Yeah.

SPEAKER_03Substance.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. So you have all that sort of on the, you know, in the background and then coming back into play in the 90s and then continuing, obviously, through our time. And they sort of, there's a more nativist dimension to it, more small government localism kind of flavor and definitely kind of isolationism built into all of that. And so... I think that what happened, which this was a surprising part to me, is that when Trump came on the scene, a lot of the intellectuals like Michael Anton and some of those

figures who were really the earliest sort of vanguard of the intellectual defense of Trumpism, they saw Trump and they thought not only was he like this great vehicle for

SPEAKER_01destruction. Right. And like and the religious, right. Some they talk about sometimes God anoints a wrecking ball. Right. I mean, there's but so there's some of that in Anton. But I think they also saw that he very clearly instinctively represented a lot of that paleo con stuff. And they were steeped in Sam Francis. Right. At one point, Anton calls himself a paleo Straussian. Right. That was surprising to me. I didn't expect them to be kind of so immersed in that stuff.

SPEAKER_01And so, I think there was a real intellectual consistency there. They saw what he was. They thought, that's our guy. It wasn't just a marriage of convenience. It's like, oh, this guy actually stands for this stuff. It seems to me that the end of the Cold War is sort of critical in figuring out how

SPEAKER_03the right has developed since then, because it was the international global dimension, the geopolitical conflict with the Soviets, That acted, I think, as a huge disciplining force on the, you know, creepy crawly right. That there was a need to have bipartisan consensus with Democrats to maintain the Cold War and maintain a, you know, a solid front against Democrats. against the Soviets. So that put a lid on how far, how wacky things could be allowed to go.

SPEAKER_03So, you know, in the sort of founding of conservative fusionism by William F. Buckley in the 50s, he's completely in bed with proto-MAGA-ism, right? So McCarthyism and massive resistance to segregation, he's on board with and making excuses for both of them. But still, the Trump card ultimately is prevailing against the Soviets in the long twilight struggle. And that forced upon him, in addition to just his natural sort of upbringing and kind of patrician sort of

SPEAKER_03orientation, but that foreign policy priority forced upon conservatism, a need to do business with Cold War liberals.

SPEAKER_01Right. And even, I mean, in doing some of this research, it's quite explicit when they say, you know, they talk about how, okay, well, we can even back we can even tolerate big government if it means for the sake of the security apparatus, right? Like we can, we'll, we'll get on board with this, even though it's make us uncomfortable. I think it was Buckley who said, you know, he's like, well, we can, I can do this because it's, you know, if welfare standing is the price we have to pay for a big Pentagon budget,

SPEAKER_03we'll do it.

SPEAKER_01Exactly. We'll do it.

SPEAKER_03Yeah. But then, so when the, when the Cold War ends, then the enemy with a capital E is gone. Right. Politics generally thrives on hatred and enemies. So it's there is a vacuum there to fill on the right and very easy to slot liberalism, domestic liberalism in as the enemy with a capital E. So there was always that kind of, you know, that that there were the reds and then there were the the reds

abroad and the

SPEAKER_03pinkos at home. Right. yeah yeah yeah but and they really do think that liberalism trends towards marxism in a very kind of clear slippery slope way yes that there's a slippery slope and that you can't control it and so yeah once once the far enemy was gone the you know domestic liberalism or progressivism became the existential threat yeah and that the sort of you know, the despair that many Cold War hawks felt about being on the

losing side of the

SPEAKER_03international struggle when Whitaker Chambers famously, you know, flipped from being a communist to being one of the, you know, the great anti-communists and witness against Eldra Hiss and all the rest. He said, I think I'm moving to the losing side. So it's, It's in the nature of, you know, of people of conservative right-wing disposition to be a little glum, a little gloomy, a little pessimistic about the future. And so all of that gloom then got invested in,

SPEAKER_03not in a foreign enemy, but in fellow citizens, right? Yeah,

SPEAKER_01I mean, I hadn't thought of it that way, connecting that part of the story to the end of the Cold War. I just hadn't thought of it that way, but I think you're right. I mean, I just think of it in terms, I've been thinking more in terms of, You have the end of the Cold War. You have 9-11. You have the wars in the Middle East. You have the financial crisis. You've got all this stuff brewing, right? There's tons of discontent. And then Trump comes out and says it, right? Says the wars were a mistake. But you're right. It's bundled up with this very persistent anti-liberalism and

the domestic enemy.

SPEAKER_01Right.

SPEAKER_03And it goes both ways. That is, I think the end of the Cold War is not just important in explaining the rise of the MAGA right, but also in explaining just polarization more generally. I think it's noteworthy that the last time a president was elected and the losing side... didn't like it one bit, but was completely clear that they had lost and didn't make bones about it and didn't cry foul and just accepted it like good Democrats are

supposed to accept

SPEAKER_03being out of power now and again, was 1988, the last Cold War presidential election. So George H.W. Bush won. Democrats were not at all happy about a third Republican term in a row, but they knew they had lost and there was no arguing about it. But then Along came Clinton in 92 and there was Whitewater and Jennifer Flowers and he wasn't really legitimate. Plus, it was this weird Ross Perot third party thing. So Republicans never really accepted him as a legitimate occupant of the White House.

Then Bush comes in in 2000 with Bush versus Gore and Democrats thought he wasn't a

SPEAKER_03legitimate president right out of the box. And then Obama comes in and you've got the whole birtherism and the conspiracy that he's not really a citizen and therefore not a president. Then Trump comes in and he was installed by the Russians. And of course, he violated norms in all kinds of ways to make people freak out. But still, there was a lot of crazy conspiracy theories as well that weren't really rooted in facts. And of course, Biden wins in 2020 and they just straight out deny it.

SPEAKER_03So we haven't had... This is depressing.

SPEAKER_01You're right.

SPEAKER_03The Cold War kept a lid on- All that and perhaps, yeah. And, you know, you look back at the history of American democracy as I have, you know, since things came unwound in 2016 and trying to figure out what's going on, I did a lot of reading of American political history. And really, it's been kind of a dumpster fire a lot over the years. And so it's kind of like we're reverting to form in some ways.

SPEAKER_01That's right.

SPEAKER_03And it's grim that it takes, you know, having 10,000 nuclear warheads aimed at you to make Republicans, Democrats, you know, get along with each other in a minimally acceptable civil way. Yeah,

SPEAKER_01but it is good to keep the long history in mind because, you know, there are realignments, there are major shifts. I mean, it's so complex, right, too. Anyway, we'll get to the hopeful stuff later.

SPEAKER_03Also, we've had, you know, there's not just... illiberal extremism on the right. There's a species of a liberal extremism that has risen on the left. Certainly a species of new, you know, of a break from Obama-style liberalism in important ways. Also, I think, kind of born out of despair. I don't know that I see their origin stories as linked, but I see them feeding off each other. How do you...

SPEAKER_01Yeah, I mean, I think there's a feeding off each other and a sort of iterative, you know, pushing, push-pull dynamic that certainly is part of it. I, I mean, I, as you know, I mean, I, I've focused quite a bit, I think the rights quite a bit worse and more dangerous and less justified. I think you agree, but I think, so I guess I'm kind of the... But yeah, it's certainly there. And there's certainly problems in both directions.

SPEAKER_03My own formulation, you may not agree with this. I suspect I'm a little to the right of you on some issues. Sure. And that may color my judgments. So I think the populist right is a threat because it's a threat to the fundamental integrity of liberal democratic governance. I see the sort of social justice, radicalism, woke socialist left as a threat because it convinces swing voters to vote Republican.

SPEAKER_03So it enables it enables the right. I think it's you know, it's it's utterly remarkable that Donald Trump is run for president three times and and each time he gets more votes. So something is, you know, turning off a lot of people on the left and driving them towards Trump, even if they're not enthusiastic about him at all, even if they see that his character is lousy and he's erratic and there's a lot of reluctant Trump voters.

SPEAKER_03And so that's what I see. My deep frustration with what's going on on the left is not that it's a direct it's threat to civil liberties or to freedom is just, you know, I think orders of magnitude less in the here and now.

SPEAKER_01Right. Right.

SPEAKER_03For me, to me, it's primary problem is how it empowers the right.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. I mean, I think that's true and how it pans out. I think, and I'll come back to your question about the origins of these things maybe, but I think that, I think that partly what, I mean, my honest view is that partly what's happened is the centrist, centrist and, um, Everybody falls into this hype about the threat of the left. It's a bit of a hype. There's no analogy between the nastiness on the far right and AOC, right? I mean, even on the anti-Semitism question, it's so disanalogous.

SPEAKER_03No, because it's not politicians. It's a much more, it's schools being shut down for a second year.

SPEAKER_01No, that stuff, I'm with you. And I think that the, so that's right. And there's a threat in the, I'd say the cultural, there's a cultural threat on the left that I've sort of been a little too probably soft on in terms of just... what, you know, what that means and how that affects people. Because I'm sympathetic to individual claims, you know, about history, and I want a free society where people can say, you know, make their woke arguments. I mean, I think those, you learn a lot, and I'm not against, you know, postmodern philosophy. But there is a kind of skew, that's an understatement, right?

SPEAKER_01There's a kind of, there is a systemic problem there. There's a lot of cultural stuff that I think needs some sort of reconfiguration. So I... Anyway, we could go on forever about this, right? But I think, let me say that I think that there is a kind of consistency between the extremism in, you know, if we're just talking about like the Bernie side and the new right. In terms of their critique of liberalism and the kind of and the deeper problems

that I think you share some of that diagnosis right in terms of how part of what

SPEAKER_01has happened is, if we think about the new right intellectuals. When Trump got elected, they also had some explanations at the ready for how this had happened and why this strongman had emerged. And it has to do with the kind of disintegrative effects of liberalism and liberal economics, right? And liberal philosophy, the sort of failure of our civic institutions and our associative institutions, right? All of these things were kind of, if you think that of Patrick Deneen's analysis right his idea is that sort of liberalism and why

liberalism failed you know the idea is that liberalism acts as and you use this word too an acid right on the social fabric and and that the result then is because of the emphasis on the individuals and he also says the emphasis on like the conquest of nature right that

SPEAKER_01these two things are a departure from the order of things And, and ultimately just has such a devastating effect on human life that the very foundations of modern liberalism are just sort of rotten and doomed to fail. And then he says, so what's going to happen here is there's, and he says, it's already happened because the, you know, it's already in the past. Liberalism has failed. And he says, yeah, when the social fabric, the political fabric, and he goes through every institution you can imagine,

SPEAKER_01when liberalism takes hold, all of the ties that bind are gone. And so people start yearning for a strong man, right? And they yearn for authority figures to fix the problems and to sort of reorganize and resort and, you know, reorder our lives. And so I think there's something very compelling there. I don't think, I mean, just intuitively, because it's such a simple explanation. And he came along in 2018 and said, look, this explains Trump. This explains so much. And I think...

that at least on the economic front, right, the far left agrees with that completely.

SPEAKER_01They're like, yeah, you know, Sam Moyn wrote a review of that book and he said, it's neoliberalism that's the problem, not liberalism per se.

SPEAKER_03So the cultural pessimism has been, you know, constitutive of modern conservatism from the get go. And, you know, especially post 60s. So pessimism leading to sort of outright despair, I think, you know, in the oldies and early teens, as it just looked like social conservatives were just getting rolled on one issue after another. And so there was this sense that theirs was a completely lost cause, that they no longer called themselves the moral majority.

People were coming to see themselves as an embattled minority and starting to talk

SPEAKER_03where Andrea wrote the book, The Benedict Option, that we've lost. Our best option is just retreat and quietism.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, there's nothing left to conserve is how they're talking now. Yeah. Yeah.

SPEAKER_03And then this shock happened. Right. And so that that changed their mentality a lot. And it took, you know, Anton was an early, you know, person who saw the potential in Trump. Right. From his perspective. But some of them, you know, they were they didn't like him at the outset and they weren't too thrilled at the beginning. But just the fact that he won and then and then the fact that he was so good at. at outraging the people that outraged them, just ultimately won them all over.

SPEAKER_03And in your book, you tell the story about how they just get, a lot of these folks are getting progressively radicalized over time, becoming more and more just overtly, Trump is great. And then also becoming more and more okay with letting in the overt white nationalists and neo-Nazis and having a no enemies to the right kind of mentality that you've seen a real sort of intellectual slash moral degeneration over time as the standards have lowered because of the

opportunities of proximity

SPEAKER_03to power.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, absolutely. And this sort of sincere radicalization in terms of, okay, we didn't think it was possible. I think Deneen's the clearest example of this where He writes this book. It's a kind of the Why Liberalism Failed book. It came out in 2018, right?

SPEAKER_03So during Trump's first term.

SPEAKER_01Yeah.

SPEAKER_03And Barack Obama plugged it.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. And it's, you know, it's, it's an, it's a clear articulation of all of these ideas that are very common on the right. And, and he has a pretty sort of quiet conclusion. That's kind of like, well, the time for big ambition is not here yet. We're going to not, he talks about epic theory that now's the time to kind of huddle, you know, preserve ourselves. It's almost been up, right. It's almost this Benedict option stuff. And he's like, you know, let's just take our time, bide our time, see what, see what's next. But then within a couple of,

SPEAKER_03He was writing that with Trump and power and he he wasn't yet sold. Right.

SPEAKER_01No, he wasn't sold. And and I don't. And then for Adrian Vermeule wrote a review of the book that called him out on that and said, you know, you this is way too weak need. This could have been a masterpiece, but you failed. Your system is still your solutions are still are still too submissive and subject to the liberal framework. Right. You need something much more radical, much more robust because you need to sear the liberal faith with hot irons and just own it. Right. Own it that you actually want something bigger.

SPEAKER_01And sort of basically like our time has arrived. Let's do this thing. And when Deneen writes a new intro to the to the paperback edition and he's like, OK, let's go, you know.

SPEAKER_03And then the next book is Regime Change. Yeah, the next book is Regime Change.

SPEAKER_01And he's still, you know, he's still a little shy and they're all pretty shy and cagey in different contexts. But, you know, he's talking about replacing the elites, you know, winning the culture and so forth. And so, yeah, you go from the Benedict Option to Integralism from, you know, from... declaring you've lost and retreating to imagining that you can actually take over

SPEAKER_03America and run it according to Roman Catholic principles. It's an astonishing leap in ambition in a few years, right?

SPEAKER_01Yeah. But and it's partly like, well, Trump is proof of concept. You can do you can do crazy things. Right. For I think is what sort of a lot of them have taken away from this. And they've gotten remarkably far with it because J.D. Vance is the vice president. Right. And potential future.

SPEAKER_03And so, yeah. Talk about him just a little bit as the kind of, you know. Yeah. Yeah. The most. So Trump is just a wild card. He is. He's just an id. Yeah. living living his impulses from moment to moment and and they're aligned in some sort of gestalt way with the mood of the yeah most liberal right but but he's not a thinker he's not intellectual you know no he's not he's not paying much attention vance really is vance was converted to catholicism the same time he converted to trumpism right it was kind of this dual move i mean i don't

mean that in the sense

SPEAKER_01that it's in sincere seems to be sincere and clearly opportunistic but also i think sincere and so you know in terms of just think really believing that this is their moment that this is for the bad for the good of the country i think i i think he probably believes that you know that this is all necessary for the future and the sort of future of flourishing right i mean thinking about how you how you talk about some of this that And so, so Trump, I mean, so Vance, but Vance was kind of cultivated in the Petri dish of the first administration and

SPEAKER_01he had come out with his Hillbilly Elegy book. He was close to people like Rod Dreher and then I think introduced to people like Patrick Deneen and some of these others. And so he ran for Senate, he was backed by Thiel, but then he's also kind of being groomed by people like the Claremont Institute. I don't, that language is probably not quite right, but you know what I mean? Like he's close with the people at the Claremont Institute, doing interviews with them, going to the national conservatism conferences. So he's really in the thick of just this pretty narrow slice of, Right. Of the Republican world.

SPEAKER_01I mean, the book, they think they've become very important, but, you know, it's not like this is a it's a pretty niche crowd. And so Vance is right. I mean,

SPEAKER_03the entire, you know, the entirety of the conservative intellectual apparatus that didn't go along with Trump is now just, you know, in Siberia. Right. It's.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, exactly. So they're ousted, and there are the, you know, so there's Holly, Rubio, Vance, a few others who are sort of glomming onto this stuff. But he really is their guy. He's their creation. I was joking at some point that he's their Frankenstein monster, but I don't think he's going to turn against them,

SPEAKER_00right? Right.

SPEAKER_01And so, you know, he's... He's really in it all across the whole, you know, he's got ties to all of these guys and he's in a very, he's kind of like the Kevin Roberts, like he's in this difficult position now because there's all these cleavages and there's all this upset over anti-Semitism and basically all the stuff they've let in quite happily. Right. And so Kevin Roberts is like the canary in the coal mine, like Kenyon. He's their heritage president who famously wouldn't scold Tucker Carlson for interviewing. Platforming Nip Quentes.

SPEAKER_01Nip Quentes, right. And then kind of did, and everybody's angry at him.

SPEAKER_03A big exodus from heritage.

SPEAKER_01Yeah.

SPEAKER_03But...

SPEAKER_01So he, you know, he shows us how difficult the positioning is now that they've created this situation. And Vance hasn't been able to say much. I mean, Vance has been very, you know, withholding, I would say. He's not going after Carlson.

SPEAKER_03He doesn't show any interest in exerting any kind of discipline, though.

SPEAKER_01No, or any kind of moral principle, right? And I think that's because he's tied himself to Trump, and so he knows that he can't really get away with alienating people like Carlson. Anyway, so Vance is very much the figurehead to carry this forward after Trump.

SPEAKER_03We're about halfway through our hour, so let's segue. Your book is about the intellectuals of the new populist right. My book, The Permanent Problem, was in large part motivated by the rise of the populist right. My book starts with an analysis of the serious problems facing contemporary rich capitalist societies, the U.S. in particular, but not only the U.S., And it was really the shock of the 2016 election that triggered it. My sense that America's problems were much deeper than I had

thought before,

SPEAKER_03that for our country to have done this, for faith in established institutions and elites to have been so shaken that you can get a plurality support somewhat as extravagantly unfit and out of bounds as Donald Trump seemed to me there's... something deeper is going on than just fluky political factors. And plus this is happening all over the world right now. This populist right is ascendant everywhere. So this seems to me something that's,

that's a lot deeper and, and there's, yeah, there's,

SPEAKER_03Economic, social, cultural factors underneath the partisan warfare and polarization that are grabbing the headlines. And so I want to get a hold on those. And it was so it was motivated by trying to figure out how we had gotten to where we are that occasioned this book. First, a Substack and then the book. So I had I had written a book, a fairly upbeat, optimistic book. political and cultural history of post-war America called the Age of Abundance about how mass affluence had triggered this cultural upheaval

and had given birth

SPEAKER_03to both the new left of the 60s and the new evangelical right of the 60s. By the time I conceived this book in the late 90s and wrote it in the early O's, it seemed like the the storm and drung of the cultural upheavals created by mass affluence were in a rearview mirror. So I was presenting abundance as a as a relatively unproblematic, you know. Opening of opportunities rather than than opening Pandora's box of troubles and threats. I saw troubles and threats. I just they didn't seem to be panning out.

And so I thought that at that time, from that perspective, I was telling a happy story.

SPEAKER_03So when I was researching how we got into electing Trump. The working title for my project was The Age of Abundance, What the Hell Happened? I've come around to the idea that the electorates that are falling for populism are responding to real social problems. And they are, alas, elevating demagogues who are not going to be doing anything constructive to solve those problems. They're going to use those problems to gain power and wealth. But it's not just a crazy bad mood, right?

SPEAKER_03There's something real going on. And so I would say that in common with the post-liberal MAGA intellectuals, not all of them call themselves post-liberals, but I'll just use that as the term, that when looking at what's wrong with American life today, we identify some of the same symptoms, not all by any means, but some of the same symptoms. The difference is that we, I think, differ fundamentally in diagnosis and then in prescriptions.

SPEAKER_03So Can I say a little bit about how I thought of your book in connection with some of

SPEAKER_01the things we just talked about?

SPEAKER_03Yeah, yeah, yeah.

SPEAKER_01So, I mean, I think when I'm in this, as you saw in my book, there's a kind of theme of the vulnerabilities of liberalism, right? And your subtitle to your book is... Well, the book, right? The Permanent Problem, The Uncertain Transition from Mass Plenty to Mass Flourishing. And in a very direct way, I think you're talking about how we've got mass material plenty, or we could, but we still have this permanent problem of kind of spiritual malaise and discontent, and we don't know what to do with ourselves,

SPEAKER_01right? And I think... In my sort of broad historical thinking about this, it does seem like liberalism has this massive vulnerability in terms of sort of formation of the self, right? Where liberalism says, we're not going to tell you how to live your life. You get autonomy, you get freedom. And the right wing would say, and I think... somewhat correctly, that for generations we've been sort of coasting on the fumes of our old traditions, right? And that now that those traditions are becoming less secure and

challenged mainly

SPEAKER_01by pluralism, that liberal people have just nothing to say to that. And so, there's this massive vacuum of sort of cultural sustenance, right? And I think that's, there's some real truth to that. And so when I think about the future of liberalism, I think about, and this is the book I would have, maybe I'll write next or whatever. You kind of, there's parts of this in your book and in other things that are happening, but there's a kind of need to become much more deliberate about our lives. And hold on to pluralism but to find ways to you know cultivate

community cultivate a liberal way of life that also borrows from these other inheritances but it's got to be it's got to be we've taken so much for granted it's become so stagnant that there's this sort of crisis of meaning and your book i think i think you're very you're you're you're sort of in the weeds of a policy and in the best sense frank

SPEAKER_01like you're thinking this through on kind of a broad broad platform or like i don't know the like that you've it's a very ambitious book there's it's very rich and there's sort of so much exciting i mean it's very depressing i'd say the first like eight chapters are like whoa and i think you're much you're more dour than me i think you've got right i mean i i don't know it's very interesting to see like you're more the the the flavor of it is more denine like than than i would be comfortable with and i think that's interesting and and

SPEAKER_01you may be right

SPEAKER_03And that has led, you know, that's led to a couple of critical reviews that have that have lumped me in with post liberals. Right. Well, it's very interesting because it's also so I think there's all this.

SPEAKER_01It's just it's so interesting. And and there's but I think you're also in a more I mean, that's just also maybe a matter of what what you're thinking about while you're writing and just how, you know, you're you're looking very, I think, in a hard headed way. It's some very real problems that it's very educative to read through that stuff. I don't I don't bear you.

SPEAKER_02I mean, I would, you know.

SPEAKER_03So I think there's a lot to be gloomy about. There's a lot to be excited about, too. I really do feel like we're in a best of times, worst of times, Dickensian world these days. And it's very difficult for people to keep both of those ideas in their head at one time. No, I agree. If they're focused on optimistic things, they don't want to hear about the bad stuff. And if they're focused on the bad stuff, they want to just completely write off the good stuff. But I really think we're in a confusing, critical time, a crisis where things can go one way or the other and diverge sharply.

SPEAKER_03Yeah. So there's a lot of promising, exciting things going on, and then there's a lot of things to be gloomy about. The difference, the radical difference, I think, that separates me from the post-liberal types is they think liberalism is fundamentally rotten, right? That it was misconceived from the Enlightenment forward. Whereas I think that we are dealing with the messy aftermath of liberalism's greatest triumph, which is the conquest of poverty or the marginalization of poverty. And that has opened the possibility then of not just reducing suffering,

SPEAKER_03but of actually inculcating affirmative wellbeing on a mass scale. And the irony is that having made this leap, It's brought problems of its own, and some of those problems are then complicating this transition from one great world historical achievement of the eradication of mass poverty to the next great world historical achievement, which is the achievement of mass flourishing. So for me, I see liberalism as stumbling into problems, but I'm on its side.

SPEAKER_03I celebrate its triumphs, and I want it to triumph in the future, right? Mm-hmm.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, and I think, I mean, in a way, you're thinking very deeply and seriously about, I mean, the permanent problem, which I love that character. I love how you use all that idea. And just in a similar way to the post-liberals, and this is where I'm perfectly comfortable with them, they're thinking about deep questions about what it means to be alive and about sort of the common good. You're doing a much better job, though. I mean, because you're using fresh language, right? So you've got, for me, the concept of flourishing or eudaimonia comes from playful. From Aristotle, right?

SPEAKER_01It's this idea that, you know, we need to think about how to live well, that that's what's distinctive about human politics. And you've got, you know, you talk about, I just think you're using fresh language that is something that is... very it's just so refreshing because most people don't do that right they they they use the old versions of it and they're not creative and you're talking about i don't maybe you're borrowing this but the relationships what what constitutes freedom for people really are not flourishing relationships

projects experiences i mean i love that that that's something i think everybody can say yeah there's something to that maybe i would add a couple other things but like this is this is a rich characterization of and if you know philosophic formulation for what

SPEAKER_01what people need in life to be very happy, you know?

SPEAKER_03So you mentioned before this sort of, you know, key component of the post-liberal case against liberalism, which is that it is parasitic upon pre-liberal culture and values for social coherence and cohesion and for meaning, and that it is sort of systematically ripped through that inheritance and now we're bone dry and now the crisis is upon us. That's the story. First, I don't think that's as a story about liberalism generally.

SPEAKER_03I just don't think that's correct. I think there's been plenty of times of remoralization during the liberal era, right? We had the second great awakening in the United States with a huge drop in alcohol consumption and the birth of both the abolitionist and women's suffrage movements. And an enormous increase in churchgoing. So we were not a very churchy people at the beginning of the 19th century. We became much more churchgoing over the course of the 19th century. The Victorian era of remoralization in Great Britain

SPEAKER_03It was a conscious effort to raise standards again. Right. So these things happen in the United States. We've seen it split along class lines. But but in the 60s and 70s, we had a general sort of breakdown of marital stability. But in the college-educated class, that has been reconstructed. So now marriages are just about as stable as they ever were. They've fallen apart for the majority, alas. So that's a real problem. But the idea that liberal societies can summon up resources for

revitalization,

SPEAKER_03rejuvenation is clearly true. Okay.

SPEAKER_01Of course, yeah.

SPEAKER_03But it is the fact that actually existing liberal societies, and I don't blame the political principles of liberalism. I blame more the social practices of consumerism and bureaucratic managerialism. Uh-huh. that liberal societies have liberated us. They've liberated us from a whole bunch of traditional values and connections, many of which had a dark side and an oppressive side, and that it's good to be done with them. But they've liberated us from pretty much everything except

consumerism and bureaucracy.

SPEAKER_03And that's not the stuff out of which you make a rich, fulfilling life. So we don't have anything currently... Acting as a kind of unifying cultural counterweight to the just outsource everything and comfort and convenience of consumerism and infantilize everyone because the experts know best of managerialism. We don't have anything pushing back against that. So I think we are in a kind of cultural crisis.

SPEAKER_03And it is the great challenge of liberal societies today to do social reconstruction, to rebuild, to reweave a fabric of connectedness and meaning. But I don't think it's not innate in liberalism that it can't do it because it's done it plenty of times.

SPEAKER_01Yes, I totally agree. And I mean, it can be more deliberate. Maybe deliberate's not the right word, but it can be done again. I think that there's a lot of thirst for this in all kinds of different ways. But I'm thinking about different parts of civil society probably than you, but I think that's very helpful. See, you could have put more of that hopeful stuff in the book, right? About the... You know, the usual policy wonk book is nine chapters of what's wrong and one chapter of what will just begin.

SPEAKER_03I had three whole chapters about what is to begin.

SPEAKER_01You did. Yeah, I know. And I'm not one to speak. My book has one little paragraph about the future. But I wanted you to say a little bit more about... the managerialism thing, because this is sort of a new, I mean, to me, when you're talking about this stuff, you, so parts of the book reminded me of Deneen. And then this part, I'm sorry to say, it reminded me of bronze age pervert, right? Costanella Maria.

SPEAKER_02I have not read him.

SPEAKER_01It's okay. It's okay.

SPEAKER_02I have read James Burnham.

SPEAKER_01I mean, Bronze Age Pervert, it is funny, and I think that he's tapping into something real, and there's something there that's undeniable. But he talks about the... It's super gendered, right? For him, it's like the longhouse of the matriarchs, and it's awful. But there is, I mean... I can't help but laugh at BAP because I've never had an issue with the bureaucracy before. It doesn't really bother me, like for whatever reason. I feel like, OK, but but then but there is something where, you know, you can still see it and the and the kind of COVID.

SPEAKER_01And, and I think having, you know, young kids and young, I have two young boys in, in schools and I'm much more sympathetic to like public schools and stuff. Like I have no problem with any of that. I think it's a center for community. So let me get like, but there's still the, the bureaucratic managerialism problem I think is, is absolutely real. And I, and I liked reading about it from you. So much more than bronze age perverts. So could you, would you describe the, can you characterize the problem a little bit? Yeah, sure. Explain it again.

SPEAKER_03So first, I think we see it in both the public and private sectors. And pro-market people tend to focus on the downsides of public sector bureaucracy. And my book, I think the central problem I identify with contemporary capitalism is this sort of disintegration, the breakdown of vital social connections, the reopening of a class war, political polarization, just decreasing number of friends, increasing loneliness, decreasing marriage,

SPEAKER_03decreasing childbirth. So all of that is going on. But also, so in other words, the connection between economic growth and well-being has gotten further. But meanwhile, there's a subsidiary problem. So I call that the crisis of inclusion. The crisis of dynamism, meanwhile, is that the system's capacity to actually continue producing economic growth is spluttering as well. And there, I think it's easy to identify bureaucracy around a mock as a bad guy.

SPEAKER_03That's at the center of the contemporary abundance movement, which I and the scanning colleagues had some hand in Coming up with some of the policy analyses and ideas that got woven by Derek and Ezra into their book, Abundance, the emergence of a vitocracy that sort of makes it very difficult to accomplish anything in the world of atoms. That's something that's now widely seen on the center left as well as the center right.

As far as in the private sector, though, I think we can see this kind of managerial ethos. And so it's born out of the fact that we went from an industrial economy to a

SPEAKER_03post-industrial information age economy. And we needed a whole bunch more white collar office workers to manage and coordinate things rather than to just, you know, use their brawn. So our workforce has changed and we have created this new class, which is the leadership class is the dominant class in American life. And they're college educated and they're managers and professionals. Right. So they that's how they think. Right. And so. So in their professional lives, they manage. And when you've got a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

SPEAKER_03So we see it not just in bureaucracy and government. We see it in the proliferation of administrative offices on campus, the bureaucratization of campus life. We see the HRization of corporate life. We see surveillance capitalism with employers checking on employees every keystroke and bathroom break. We see it, I think, in the rise of helicopter parenting and this sort of grim desire to squeeze every

SPEAKER_03drop of spontaneity out of childhood in the name of safety. So I think this impulse, which is that the experts know better and we can organize and rationalize things and that will be more efficient and more effective than just leaving it to spontaneous bottom-up, you know, winging it. So this faith and expertise, which... I think, has carried on to excess. Meanwhile, the people doing all of that are also, you know, they're the people, they're the same kind of people who hold all the power,

SPEAKER_03the levers of economic power in the country as well. And their cultural values are quite distinct from, in many important ways, from the non-college educated majority. So to me, my sort of fundamental read on the populist uprising is that it is a rebellion, of the majority against the professional and managerial elite. And it's not surprising then that the populist right would hook up, would put its particular right-wing and often misogynistic spin

on this phenomenon.

SPEAKER_03But I do think it's a real phenomenon. Yeah, and it's the kind of thing that Tocqueville warned about 180 years ago. Yeah.

SPEAKER_01I mean, I think one thing to say, my sense is it's kind of this group think that it also stunts the managerial, like they're sort of stunted for freedom. Is that fair to say that there's a kind of.

SPEAKER_03Yeah, it's a group think and conformism.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, and an unwillingness to just sort of live in the free ways that are appropriate to people who are good and to allow other people to participate in freedom, right? There's a kind of cloying control psychology.

SPEAKER_03You know, as a parent, when you see your kid fumbling with tying their shoes or fumbling with something, you know, and you're late and you know, I can just do this immediately, right? And get it done and we can effectively accomplish the day's chores faster if I just do it for them right now. But you know. Yeah. I got to learn. And you sit there and you're patient and you let them do it. And even though they can't do it as well as you, it's there. So we have managers now looking at the populace, like parents looking at kids and saying,

SPEAKER_03oh, I could do things so much better than them. But that's just not the way for free society supposed to work.

SPEAKER_01No, no. And it's sort of inhibits both sides of, you know, everybody's stunted by that, I think. I mean, I've found it pretty compelling that, okay, so, okay, I want to move, can we move on to your solutions here? Because there's, again, pretty depressing, but very useful eight chapters. And then you kind of end... And it's sort of in the abundance line of things, energy-wise. Like, there's a lot of that stuff that I used to think... When I first heard about abundance...

SPEAKER_01I mean, I guess I had heard a little bit about it from you guys, but, you know, I finally I got the book, the Ezra Klein book or whatever, and I read it and I thought I thought I was going to hate it. And I really didn't. I really loved, you know, I felt pretty hopeful reading that book. I wouldn't say I loved it because I still got questions, but whatever.

SPEAKER_03I think this, you know, interest in these ideas is one of the few hopeful things going on in politics, Steve.

SPEAKER_01It is. It is exciting. And it's a lot. It's just a lot less. I sort of expected it to be this shallow consumer or something. And it's not at all. And so and I think that's also true of your stuff. And and you're you're but you're doing something I find. more deeply that resonates with me, but not for the reasons I think you would like, because I'm very sympathetic to like the Ben-Op, the Neen and the eco like Wendell Berry world, right? Like in my soul, I know that it's a little nutty and I don't, you know,

and degrowth, right? I think not, I haven't done any real readings in that, but I'm like, yeah, I get that impulse.

SPEAKER_01And I think you're combining a, I mean, you reject that, but you're also, I think, still using a high tech version of it. You're doing a high tech world building version of it that I love. And, and I think that, that I really like, I deeply love because there's even something like Heideggerian, what you're doing, or like Matt Crawford, that kind of like recrafting world that I, again, it's not something I've thought too much about, but I, I know it resonates with me. And so I, it's kind of like you're writing the Ben up for the secular

crowd or for the abundance crowd. And there's a real emphasis on decentralization and on community building and sort

SPEAKER_01of just thinking through new possibilities for, for everybody that I find very compelling. But anyway, but again, you're more resistant to things like to some of the institutions that we have in our world that I'm, you know, that I think, so, so there's, I have some disagreements, but why don't you tell us a little bit about the, about your vision here yeah so i i don't think we need to invent a new social system i think there isn't there isn't a new good one to invent and the search for that is just leads to grief what we need is capitalism is is

the greatest social technology for for you know enrichment and material improvement ever invented and uh we're gonna be able to make good use of it for a long time and i think what we

SPEAKER_03What we need to do is we need to, on the one hand, refocus capitalism and sort of clear some of these barnacles and phytocracy out of the way so that it can be more effective at advancing the technological frontier and raising material living standards and particularly reducing the cost of living and making us richer that way. But at the same time, I think we... can recognize that technological progress is no longer a mass mobilization project.

SPEAKER_03And that's at the heart of a lot of our class divide these days, that the old class divide was based on the dependence of capitalist progress on huge inputs of brute... physical labor. And so the only way to have progress was to enlist all these people into doing this dirty, dangerous work. And so there was a heavy blood price to be paid that engendered all kinds of conflict, right? It produced conflict in the workplace. It produced, you know, class consciousness in the working class. It produced the socialist movement, produced totalitarian communism that produced the cold war and

the threat of

SPEAKER_03nuclear annihilation. That is some serious social instability growing out of the dependence of capitalist progress on, you know, physical labor. As we've gotten richer and moved into post-industrial information age economy, technological progress, the progress of the system is ever less dependent on the inputs of ordinary workers. It's becoming more and more something that highly trained specialists do. And so we've either automated in the rich countries, we've either automated everything or what we haven't automated yet, we've outsourced to poor countries.

SPEAKER_03But in general, the Once upon a time, ordinary workers and their bosses were side by side on the technological frontier. Now the technological frontier is occupied by elites and ordinary workers are kind of shunted to the backwaters. On the one hand, that's a humanitarian triumph, right? So that progress is no longer dependent upon terrible physical suffering. And the workplace is just much cleaner and safer than it used to be. And wages are much higher than they used to be. But On the spiritual side,

SPEAKER_03I think something serious has been lost, that ordinary people's contribution to the great common wheel is just less important than it used to be, because once upon a time, they were essential to progress, and now they're not anymore. So I think that sense of being superfluous and therefore being kind of despised by the elites is... is a real component of the resentments that drive populist anger. But the good news then is if technological progress isn't

dependent upon mass

SPEAKER_03inputs of ordinary less skilled labor, then maybe we don't have to have mass mobilization anymore. Maybe we can focus on getting richer and richer so that more and more people don't have to work all the time. They can either retire early or they can work 15 hours a week, which was what Keynes predicted when he was thinking about the permanent problem 100 years ago. Or maybe they could work episodically as circumstances changed. You would have highly trained knowledge workers who have interesting, challenging, high status, high remuneration jobs.

SPEAKER_03They're working longer hours than their parents and grandparents worked. And that's okay. I mean, there's downsides to that, but there's not a social crisis in that. But for everyone else, I think that we have been liberated from the need to have everybody working for solely external rewards all the time. And so the central crisis of flourishing today is this lack of social connection, is the lack of deep and abiding and durable social bonds with flesh and blood

people on a face-to-face basis.

SPEAKER_03And to my way of thinking, one of the main reasons why this has happened is that we're victims of our own success, that once upon a time, face-to-face relationships fulfilled vital practical functions. Your spouse was your partner in economic production. Your kids were... helped out on the farm when they were young and they took care of you when they were old, when you were old. Your neighbors were collective security on the frontier. They were collective insurance policy when times were bad. They were also your only source of entertainment other than

listening to the

SPEAKER_03crickets at night, right? So, but... All of these things we've either outsourced to the market or to the welfare state. So we don't need flesh and blood people for material survival anymore. But we need them because we're a hyper-social species that is utterly dependent upon deep and abiding contact with others. We need them for our quality of life. And we have been lured into deprioritizing human relationships. So I think what we...

The goal of getting richer is to rebuild face-to-face communities that then have

SPEAKER_03practical functions. Those practical functions, right now, they're mostly what's technologically the lowest hanging fruit is just caregiving. It's caregiving for kids, homeschooling for children, and caregiving for our parents and grandparents. Over time, as technology develops, you can picture communities becoming more and more self-sufficient through vertical farming or through small modular nukes. They can have their own food and energy.

SPEAKER_03So you can have... I see the... goal of, you know, why do we have economic growth? What are we pushing towards? Not just more bells and whistles. We're trying to push towards a better life. And a better life to me looks like a much more decentralized life where a lot of people are focused more on building their own homes and communities and taking care of each other in and living their lives shared in common than working for the purely external rewards of a paycheck. So to me, that's what progress looks like,

is a revitalization of human bonds through opportunities created by continued

SPEAKER_03technological progress.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, I mean, I think there's something sort of deeply attractive about that, especially when you think about it. It's kind of like an off. There's also like an off grid element. It's all it's kind of like Ben. It's like Ben Ops for preppers, too. I mean, I'm joking, but there's something I think deeply appealing.

SPEAKER_03And it's deeply, deeply, you know, committed to pluralism. And yeah, and forms of pluralism. I'm not going to really cotton. You know, I'm not going to really dig very much, but but I'll bite that bullet.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. Yeah, I think that's, I mean, I think there's something really exciting here. I've got one last question. I've spent the last week or two, or I've been reading Oren Kass in the last few weeks. And I saw, we hosted an event with him at the Illiberalism Studies program. So I've kind of been reading that alongside your book. This is all much more wonky than I usually am doing, but I couldn't help. So he's really... trying to revitalize and revalue work in a way that I think your approach, and including physical labor,

SPEAKER_01right? I mean, there's a kind of this re-industrialization stuff and this idea, I think he would say that your idea to remove, you know, you've, I think, made peace with automation, right? and the implications of that in a way that he maybe hasn't. And he sees that the psychological need for a sort of more, a different kind of work, especially for men is so vital that it must be subsidized and we must find a way

SPEAKER_01to, you know, recreate that. And I, I mean, I'm sort of sympathetic to his way of thinking in terms of just maybe big projects that can be built. And there's a, there does seem to be a lot of work that could be done, uh, that is still physical, like that's still going to need to happen and could be maybe generated. And so, and also just like a kind of farming. And partly I'm resistant to like this idea of caregiving being the primary thing for, you know, just for gendered reasons that seem like I don't want to do that. I mean, I love my kids. I do...

SPEAKER_01There's a lot of caregiving that is going on. I'm sure you've heard that. I'm just a little skeptical, but I'm also extremely sympathetic, and so I sort of want all of this together. Yeah, I want more women back in the home, but I want more men back in the home, too.

SPEAKER_02Of course.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. Yeah, I know. I want them both back equally. I do, too. I'm more skeptical about how that's going to actually shake out.

SPEAKER_00Yeah.

SPEAKER_01But what do you think about the cast and the work? Because you're sort of saying we need to make our peace with the fact that we're going to have less people doing market, what you call market labor, I think.

SPEAKER_00Yeah.

SPEAKER_01Right? And that we're going to have different forms of activity. And I guess the deeper thing here is that if we're going to, I want to tie this back to the Aristotle stuff. You know, Aristotle for him, activity and happiness and flourishing is an activity, right? And so, and I think that you do believe this and that your articulation, it's not just social connection, it's projects. Right. And so I think that that's something maybe that or, you know, maybe anyway. So but yeah, tell me what you think about that.

SPEAKER_03Yeah. So I think he's fighting a lost cause. So he's looking he's looking to revitalize male flourishing, friendly work within a, you know, post-industrial economy. And I think I don't think we can wind back the clock. There's just no way to create blue collar manufacturing jobs. And those jobs were horrible.

SPEAKER_01Right. There's a real romanticization there. Right. So I think we're going to recreate flourishing, friendly work outside of the system.

SPEAKER_03So the system should focus on being an effective system, which means generating technological progress. So we shouldn't be introducing a lot of inefficiency into the system, just gumming up the works. The system should work as well as it can to enrich a lot of us to live more and more of our lives outside the system. where we can reserve for ourselves work. And this is, you know, now we're in one of the hype cycles of AI. We just had, you know, stock market, you know, bloodbaths with software firms getting,

SPEAKER_03you know, getting dinged because of new AI releases and occasioned all of this round of speculation about whether we're going to have, you know, mass elimination of white collar work. So that ultimately, This idea that, you know, it may not be in the far distant future that we don't have to do anything. So then that's the real question for human flourishing is what are humans supposed to do when they don't have to do anything? But not having to do anything, that means you're free, right? So this means how do we live free lives free from material necessity?

SPEAKER_03Right. And a lot of that is sort of self-imposed difficulty. Right. So tennis isn't fun without a net. You need to for a project to be fulfilling. It has to be challenging. So we're going to end up reserving some work for ourselves because we're going to prefer humans. services or man-made, human-made goods to machine-made goods. I think that's almost inevitable. But it will be a form of play, right? Because we don't have to do it that way. We'll do it because it's enjoyable and good for us,

SPEAKER_03not because it's the most efficient and effective thing from an economic perspective.

SPEAKER_01OK, well, let's let's end it on that. I think that was really fun.

SPEAKER_03We could we could go another hour easy. But hey, this was this was great chatting with you. And congratulations on your book. It's doing wonderful. It's gotten lots of glowing reviews. And so all the best to you. And thank you.

SPEAKER_01And congratulations on yours, too. It's very exciting and and and brave, brave, braver stuff, I think, to be thinking in that constructive way. I think it's very difficult.

SPEAKER_03Thanks. Thanks so much, Laura. Thanks for listening to the Permanent Problem Podcast. Check out my essays on the permanent problem over on Substack, as well as up in the Scan and Center website. And be sure to catch all our episodes on Substack, Spotify, Stitcher, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you love tuning in. Until next time, I'm Brink Lindsey, signing off.

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