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The Permanent Problem Podcast

The Permanent Problem Podcast artwork

Adrian Wooldridge on liberalism's cycles of crisis and renewal

Jul 15, 20261 hr 4 minAudio
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In the heady days after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many imagined that we had arrived at the “end of history” now that liberal democratic capitalism had chased all ideological competitors from the field. Just a few short decades later, things look very different: autocracy is on the march around the world, and liberal democratic institutions and values are under assault in the United States and other advanced democracies. Adrian Wooldridge, my guest for this episode of the podcast, offers the consolation that we have been here before. In his new book The Revolutionary Center: The Lost Genius of Liberalism, Wooldridge relates how the centuries-old liberal political tradition has gone through repeated cycles of advance and ascendancy, decline and decadence, and self-criticism followed by renewal. Adrian and I discuss how the basic elements of liberalism - focus on the individual, tolerance of pluralism, and suspicion of power - have persisted through these cycles even as liberalism regularly has reinvented itself to deal with the novel and ever-changing challenges of modernity. We examine how a combination of staleness and overreach has brought on the current crisis of liberalism, and we look ahead to the institutional reforms and cultural shifts that can lead to liberal renewal. Below is a video recording of our conversation, followed by a lightly edited transcript. Brink Lindsey: Hello everybody, and welcome to the Permanent Problem podcast. I’m very happy to have today as my guest, Adrian Wooldridge, the journalist and author, author of a whole shelf of excellent, thoughtful, sensible, wittily written books on a wide variety of topics. Most recently, The Revolutionary Center: The Lost Genius of Liberalism. Adrian, welcome to the show. Adrian Wooldridge: Thank you so much for having me. Delighted to be here. Lindsey: Yeah. So we saw each other in the flesh in London back in May for the first time in many years, but good to see you virtually today. We met over a quarter of a century ago back in Washington. So you are currently at Bloomberg Opinion, but you were at The Economist for many years. Back then you were with The Economist, you were the Bureau Chief, I believe. And you had just written a book with John Micklethwait, A Future Perfect about globalization. And I was at the Cato Institute. I was the head of their trade policy center. I was myself writing a book about globalization at the time. So I want to tell you this story about how we first met. I don’t think you actually know this story, but I saw your book came out and I took a look at it and it looked really, really good. And there had been a lot of bad books about globalization. So this was a breath of fresh air. And then I saw that you were in DC and with The Economist and I thought, “Well, that’s a guy I need to meet.” And so I thought, well, the best entree would be to review his book because I like it. That would be a good calling card. So I wrote a review for Reason magazine and then we got the hard copies of the actual magazine. Back then. I believe we got the hard copies before the online version went on the website. So this was the first time I’d seen it. And I believe all writers have this magical third eye, which opens only when you’re reading something you’ve written in print for the very first time. And when you’re holding it there, the published volume, that eye opens and all of a sudden every typo that had eluded umpteen rounds of editing and proofreading just jumps out like a sore thumb. And so I had the Reason magazine to cover and I was holding it next to your proofs and I saw that I had written your name as Adrian Woolridge, not Wooldridge. So that was deflating. And I thought that ruins the whole entree. The number one rule of book reviews, I don’t care what you say about me, just get my name right. So I had failed that. But I called Reason in a panic and got them to change the online edition. And then I emailed you the online edition and we were off to a fine start. Wooldridge: But there is some sort of gremlin, isn’t there, in computers? Because I always make sure that I check at least the names of people when I write columns about them. And the number of times that despite checking really carefully, it goes wrong. Lindsey: Yes. Wooldridge: It’s quite extraordinary. I don’t know how it is. I mean, it is a gremlin that’s taking out a D or taking out an R or doing something. And the worst thing to do with people is, as you say, to get their name wrong. And it does happen a bizarre number of times, certainly my copy. Lindsey: So at that time with your book, we were in this end of history, delightful, idyllic phase where we were talking about globalization, which was basically the collapse of the last great challenger to liberalism standing, socialism and state-dominated economic development. It was collapsing and into the vacuum was coming more market-oriented forms of policymaking and we called that globalization. And so at that time, it looked like liberalism had chased all its challengers from the field. Things look very different today. Your book is about this, what we could call the 21st century crisis of liberalism. It addresses and responds to that crisis by reminding us what liberalism is all about. It’s not just about the current rather dysfunctional incarnation of it. It has a deeper history and a richer history and a richer body of ideas to pull from than we’re currently pulling from. And so that lost genius of liberalism, you want to surface for us so we can make use of it and get out of our current jam. First, just tell me, there are many different ways to define liberalism. You’ve got your three main themes that appear again and again in the history of liberalism. Why don’t you tell me about those? Wooldridge: Yeah. Let me talk about the three things that really define the essence of liberalism, because liberalism has many, many incarnations. I think there’s big government liberalism. There is small government liberalism. I think all of these are possible manifestations of liberalism. But the three essential things that you must have to have a liberal regime, are firstly individualism, that you start out with the individual and work upwards and outwards from the individual. Socialism starts with a sort of collectivism, traditional Toryism starts with a notion of collectivism as it were embodied in tradition, but liberalism will start with the individual and that is the fundamental thing that liberals will agree upon. The second thing is tolerance that liberals think, believe that we cannot be certain about a lot of important philosophical propositions, particularly when they’re metaphysical about the meaning of life, that we have to agree to disagree and that must pervade all of our actions. So we must have a belief in pluralism. We must have a belief in open debate. We must have a belief in discussion, all of which emanate from this fundamental skepticism. And thirdly is worry about concentration of power, that all liberals think that too much power in the hands of one person or a few people is in itself a very dangerous thing - even if those people can claim to be enlightened. Because power corrupts, people get old, people become degenerate, people become drunk with power. So liberals are always concerned with sharing power, disciplining power, dividing power, that it’s something that is too dangerous to be in the hands of one person. So those are the three definitional things that I think all regimes must have to be called liberal. Now for a long time, people have thought that there is this fourth thing, which is the balance between the state and the market. That if you’re a classical liberal, you would believe in the small state, the big market. If you were a sort of 1960s LBJ style liberal, you believe in a compassionate state that embodied certain compassionate values. Now I think that those are secondary things that you can be a small state liberal. You ca… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit brinklindsey.substack.com

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_01Welcome to The Permanent Problem Podcast. I'm your host, Brink Lindsey, a Senior Vice President at the Niskanen Center. Each episode, we take a deep dive into the messy and uncertain transition from mass affluence to mass flourish, exploring what I call capitalism's triple crisis and the potential for rising above it. Hello, everybody, and welcome to The Permanent Problem podcast. I'm very happy to have today as my guest, Adrian Wooldridge, the journalist and author, author of a whole shelf of excellent,

SPEAKER_01thoughtful, sensible, wittily written books on a wide variety of topics. Most recently, The Revolutionary Center, The Lost Genius of Liberalism. Adrian, welcome to the show. Thank you so much for having me. So we saw each other in the flesh in London back in May for the first time in many years. But good to see you virtually today. We met over a quarter of a century ago back in Washington. So you are currently at Bloomberg, opinion, but you were at The Economist for many years.

SPEAKER_01Back then, you were with The Economist. You were the bureau chief, I believe. And you had just written a book with John Micklethwaite, A Future Perfect, about globalization. And I was at the Cato Institute. I was the head of their trade policy center. I was myself writing a book about globalization at the time. So I want to tell you this story about how we first met. I don't think you actually know this story, but I saw your book came out and I took a look at it and it looked really, really good. And there had been a lot of bad books about globalization. So this was The Breath of Fresh Air.

SPEAKER_01And then I saw that you were in D.C. and with The Economist. And I thought, well, that's a guy I need to meet. And so I thought, well, the best entree would be to review his book because I like it. So that would be a good calling card. So I wrote a review for Reason Magazine. And then we got the hard copies of the actual magazine. Back then, I believe we got the hard copies before the online version went on the website. So this was the first time I'd seen it. And I believe all writers have this magical third eye, which opens only when you're reading something you've written in print for

SPEAKER_01the very first time. And when you're holding it there, the published volume, that eye opens and all of a sudden every typo that had eluded umpteen rounds of editing and proofreading just jumps out. Like a sore thumb. And so I had the Reason Magazine to cover, and I was holding it next to your proofs, and I saw that I had given your name as Adrian Woolridge, not Woldridge. So that was deflating, and I thought, oh, that kind of ruins the whole... The whole entree, the number one rule of book reviews, I don't care what you say about me, just get my name right.

SPEAKER_01So I had failed that, but I called Reason in a Panic and got them to change the online edition. And then I emailed you the online edition and we were off to a fine start. Yeah.

SPEAKER_00But there is some sort of gremlin, isn't there, in computers? Because I always make sure that I check at least the names of people when I write columns about them. And the number of times that despite checking really carefully, it goes wrong. It's quite extraordinary. I don't know how it is. I mean, it is a gremlin that's taking. So, at that time, with your book, we were in this end of history, delightful, idyllic phase, where we were talking about globalization, which was basically the collapse of the last global world.

SPEAKER_01And so, at that time, it looked like... It's like liberalism had chased all its challengers from the field. Things look very different today. Your book is about this what we could call the 21st century crisis of liberalism. It addresses and responds to that crisis by reminding us what liberalism is all about.

SPEAKER_01It's not just about the current rather dysfunctional incarnation of it. It has a deeper history and a richer history and a richer body of ideas to pull from than we're currently pulling from. And so that lost genius of liberalism, you want to surface for us so we can make use of it and get out of our current jam. First, just tell me, you've got many different ways to define liberalism. You've got your own sort of three main themes that appear again and again in the history of liberalism. Why don't you tell me about those?

SPEAKER_00Yeah, let me talk about the three things that really define the essence of liberalism because liberalism has many, many incarnations. I think there's big government liberalism. There is small government liberalism. I think all of these are possible manifestations of liberalism. But the three essential things that you must have to have a liberal regime are firstly individualism, that you start out with the individual and work upwards and outwards from the individual that's Socialism starts with a sort of collectivism,

SPEAKER_00that traditional Toryism starts with a notion of collectivism, as it were, embodied in tradition. But liberalism will start with the individual, and that is the fundamental thing that liberals will agree upon. The second thing is tolerance, that liberals... Think, believe that we cannot be certain about a lot of important epistemological propositions, particularly when they're metaphysical about the meaning of life,

SPEAKER_00that we have to agree to disagree and that that must pervade. So we must have a belief in pluralism. We must have a belief in open debate. We must have a belief in discussion, all of which emanates from this fundamental skepticism. And thirdly, is worry about constant That's all liberals think that too much power in the hands of one person or a few people is in itself a very dangerous thing,

SPEAKER_00even if those people can claim to be enlightened. So liberals are always concerned with sharing power, disciplining power, dividing power, that it's something that is too dangerous to be in the hands. So those are three definitional things that I think all liberals, all regimes must have to be called liberal. Now, for a long time, people have thought that there is this fourth thing, which is the balance.

SPEAKER_00That's if you're a classical liberal, you would believe in the small states, the big markets. If you were a sort of 1960s LBJ style liberal, you believe in a compassionate state that embodied certain compassion. Now, I think that those are secondary things, that you can be a small state liberal, you can be a big state liberal, and we shouldn't be too hung up about the size of the state. That's a secondary thing. But what you can't be... So, you know, a lot of the debates between Milton Friedman,

SPEAKER_00let's say, and Keynes, or between Hayek and Keynes, are sort of about secondary things, which is the size and scope of the state. Is because we are now seeing fundamental attacks on these essential liberal principles.

SPEAKER_00In a sense, we've sort of taken them for granted because we've all agreed on them. But now there are a whole bunch of people, articulate post-liberal academics. Thank you.

SPEAKER_01So you have a capacious understanding of liberalism and rather roomier than actually some actually existing liberals, because during those big debates during the 20th century about the size and scope of government, both sides claimed liberalism. And it's.

SPEAKER_01We got through that. I think during the 90s and 0s and into the 10s, we had this kind of neoliberal consensus where the center left and center right no longer saw each other as across this sort of idolatry. And now that both the center-right and the center-left are losing ground to sort of social justice radicalism on the left and populism on the right, what remains of the center-left and center-right are sort of reconnecting and seeing

SPEAKER_01that they have more in common, and certainly they have... Their common ground now looks much more salient compared to the differences that separate them from the extremes.

SPEAKER_00Absolutely. I gave a talk about my book recently at the American Enterprise Institute. And at the American Enterprise Institute, there were a large number of people. So the common ground between these two opposed forces. Yeah, that's right.

SPEAKER_00So I think a lot of what we were debating in the 1990s, and perhaps what Keynes and Hayek were debating to some extent, was about the narcissism of small differences, in Freud's phrase, if you consider it in the That's a long arc of history. Not that these things are unimportant, but that there are certain very, very fundamental things that emanate from the Enlightenment that I think we need to defend collectively and in common before we can get to the wonderful work of I frequently have

SPEAKER_01these feelings of nostalgia for, wow, remember back when we used to really get hot and bothered about that?

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I know. Oh, absolutely.

SPEAKER_01So I want to come back. So why don't you walk through that history?

SPEAKER_00Yes, I say these fundamental things like sort of Wagnerian leitmotifs that must always be there. But the way that those things are put together and other things that go along with them change all the time. And so you get different. There are different sort of liberal regimes that emerge. Also, I think, central to liberalism, as well as these three things I talked about, is a sort of radicalism, a willingness to test and challenge established organizations.

SPEAKER_00So, the first sort of liberal triumph comes in the middle of the 19th century, when basically the principles of... So liberals say, well, the most important thing,

SPEAKER_00is to open jobs to competition or open markets to competition. And that means that all else that's good flows from that. So you get individualism, you get tolerance, you get a dynamic and growing economy. But then in the late 19th century, a group of people who are called not particularly originally new liberals come along and say, it's not enough just to give people opportunities and stand back. We must ensure that they can exploit those opportunities or take advantage

SPEAKER_00of those opportunities. We must sort of enable them through a certain amount of state action. Let's say a free education system or a pension system. And it's not enough that we should just let the market dominate.

SPEAKER_01They were saying this against the backdrop of mounting social problems for industrialization, right? Exactly. So the new problem is that laissez-faire did not seem responsive to.

SPEAKER_00Exactly. So it's partly that you're not giving people, you know, if some people are leaving school, And if, you know, everybody's building so much that the sewerage system won't cope with all the refuse that's created, you're not really getting the So they say the state must be more active to give people opportunities. And so you get that new liberalism. And it's an assault on the liberal order in the name of the individual.

SPEAKER_00And it's a sort of radical rethinking of things. And then that regime, that new regime, which is also designed to absorb some of the social discontent, which you're seeing at the time, works. You also get an active role of the state and say, we've got these massive conglomerates. And we're always kind of in sync with the UK and the United States. I had their analogue with our progressives.

SPEAKER_00Yeah. So then you get the Great Depression and things begin to fall apart. The global system falls apart because Britain no longer can play the role of the sort of guarantee of global order. And in the 1930s, liberalism is discredited as a creed. Everybody All serious intellectuals are saying the future lies with collectivism of some sort, with great leaders. Even people like Walter Lippmann, the great sort of liberal writer, is saying, well, liberalism is essentially finished. Mussolini is saying liberalism is finished.

SPEAKER_00Then again, liberalism sort of re-energizes itself in the 1940s and 50s, partly through the provision of the welfare state, partly through the provision of Keynesian demand management, but also, and more importantly, I think, after winning the war, setting up a sort of stable movement.

SPEAKER_01And winning the war had a bit to do with it too, right?

SPEAKER_00Absolutely. So liberalism in the 1930s looks dead. It revives itself again. Then in the late 1970s and 80s, which both you and I lived through, again, that sort of version of Keynesian liberalism It begins to decay and die because of overreach, because of government incompetence, a whole series of things. It's become too flabby and self-indulgent. And you get a bunch of neoliberals, libertarians who come along and say, let's give more role to the market, let's roll to the state, status quo. So you get another surge of liberal inventiveness.

SPEAKER_00So the history of liberalism is not just a history of establishing free principles and letting them work. It's a history of creating liberal reform. I think what we're seeing at the moment is precisely that problem again. A decadent elite that's been in charge for a long time and become self-indulgent.

SPEAKER_00That's a set of ideas which I regard as a sort of marriage between some elements of neoliberalism and some elements of progressivism. Left liberalism sort of congealing together in a sort of Clintonian sort of governing philosophy that have failed to answer a set of important problems. So we're prepared at the moment for another phase of liberal radicalism.

SPEAKER_01So you've got two allas to this sort of liberal decline or increasing liberal staleness. So first, liberalism just becomes the establishment, and as the problems accumulate, Usually the people at the top are least sensitive to them. And so there's a lot of discontent before it reaches them. And they, you know, they have their formulas for success. They worked for them in the past. They don't want to change them. So they're quite resistant. So you get this sort of entrenched establishment that's kind of tone deaf to...

SPEAKER_01Yeah.

SPEAKER_00Jobs to competition. They've disestablished the church in Britain in all but name. They're sitting there. They're happy. They feel that they're successful. The Gladstonian liberals are sitting there. And in America, free market liberals are sitting there. But you've got an... They're the establishment. They're the intellectual establishment as well, but all around them is an accumulation of problems. Sewerage, lack of opportunity, industrial discontent, the rise of a system like Germany, which is based on very different policies.

SPEAKER_00And what happens is, at least in Britain and the United States, is that you get liberal reformers coming along and saving the system from itself. Teddy Roosevelt in the United States, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Asquith in Britain. You don't get that on the continent so much. But the Anglo-Saxon world saves itself because it regenerates liberalism. And I think we're going through a very, very similar set of circumstances today,

SPEAKER_00even down to the issue of antitrust, I think, in some ways.

SPEAKER_01So you can epitomize our establishment with the folks who congregate at Davos

SPEAKER_00every year. Absolutely. It's a cliche, but it's a cliche that's absolutely radically true. And there's a sort of element about these people that they've been successful. You know, they came onto the scene quite often in the 80s and 90s. They've accumulated enormous wealth. You know, they've done incredibly well out of asset inflation. They're at the top of the tree, and they're quite pliable. And they knew it too.

SPEAKER_01Now, Davos has this really sort of tired, stale vibe, I think, to those of us outside. Those insides still seem to feel like, you know, it's the same as it ever was. They know something's gone wrong, but they don't know any new lines to say about what's happening. So they just repeat the same old lines.

SPEAKER_00It's quite extraordinary. If you think about when we were writing our globalization books in the year 2000, if you look, for example, at McKinsey, you would look at that and say, these are really interesting guys who seem to understand. Yes. Yes. That used to be sort of regarded as a font of wisdom and now just nowhere.

SPEAKER_00So you have two things. You have one, an institutional decay. And that institutional decay in terms of the management of Davos is incredible. It's quite extraordinary. Certain elements of neoliberalism, which is affection for the market, skepticism about the state, worries about rent seeking in the state sector and things like that.

SPEAKER_00And you take certain truism, certain things about left liberalism, about people being allowed to choose there. Their personal identities, people being liberated from certain conventional morality. You put those two things together and you produce a new synthesis, which doesn't give the neoliberals everything they want. It doesn't give the left progressive everything they want, but it gives David Brooks,

SPEAKER_01in his wonderful book, Bobos in Paradise, called this the bobo synthesis. Bohemian bourgeois, bourgeois bohemianism.

SPEAKER_00So you get that, and it is something that is there in Blair. It is there in Clinton. It's there in most people at the top of most corporations, I'd say, that it survived. And it could take a Republican form. It could take a Democratic form. But it's basically a synthesis that survives for a long time. But it's become a sort of constraint on thinking that there are certain things that people who belong to the synthesis are incapable of recognizing as problems.

SPEAKER_00I would put immigration, the flow of people without proper assimilation as being a very important part of that. I would put certain externalities from big companies as being part of that. Food companies making us all fat, getting us addicted to things. More importantly, the digital companies just pumping stuff out without any accountability and any regulation, even dealing with sort of digital addiction. This bourgeois-bohemian synthesis does not recognize some of the biggest problems.

SPEAKER_00It has blinders, which prevents them from dealing with that. And it doesn't also address the big issues of the threat from the emerging world. I mean, from Russia and from China, the former emerging world, the emerging world, let's just say in the case of China. And so the great neoliberal thing about China, we've got this great civilization emerging, good. Let's have free trade. Let's deal with it because it will inevitably be the case that the Chinese,

SPEAKER_00as they become richer and more successful, will also become liberal, just like us. So get them into the World Trade Organization and soon there'll be a liberal democracy. That has not happened.

SPEAKER_01And that's the same around the same time that led us into Iraq, basically thinking underneath

SPEAKER_00the surface of everyone is a liberal just itching to breathe free. Exactly. So it's and beneath that sort of I mean, that was a that that's more than a strategic. It doesn't give enough emphasis or it doesn't take enough account of culture, of politics. So there's a whole bunch of things.

SPEAKER_00This boho synthesis, which is incredibly powerful, continues to dominate a lot of our thinking, almost without us knowing it, or the thinking of our ruling class, has led to big problems, which you It didn't anticipate, but it's also revealed because it led to those big problems to have a certain naivety built into it. And I think the task of liberalism is to grapple not only with the consequences of policy mistakes, but also with the naivety of some of the assumptions that led to it.

SPEAKER_01For your general approach about what is to be done now, you have a nice, you use the life of John Stuart Mill as a kind of a metaphor for where we are and what we need to be doing.

SPEAKER_00So play that out for us. He's an exceptionally interesting thinker, partly because he writes so well as people in the mid-19th century did, such a vigorous thinker, but also because he's so different from the sort of notion of Mill that we tend to remember. Think of him as what Milton Friedman and Hayek probably would have called a classical liberal, as somebody who is essentially a utilitarian, essentially believes in small government,

SPEAKER_00and essentially believes in government getting out of our way. Mill is a much richer thinker than that. Mill was brought up as a utilitarian and brought up as a small government guy. His godfather was Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism. His father, James Mill, Mill forced him to learn Greek at two, Latin at three, write a history of India at eight, and all of these sorts of extraordinary things. He was brought up as a sort of prodigy because he was brought up to be the ultimate sort of legislator.

SPEAKER_00Mill wanted... Bill Sr. wanted him to be a legislator who would put into practice, both philosophically and practically, the whole, call it neoliberal, utilitarian program. And at the age of about 20, he goes through a mental breakdown, not surprisingly. He begins to think a number of things. He begins to think that utilitarianism isn't enough because there are good preferences and bad preferences, that individualism purely in its atomized form isn't enough

SPEAKER_00because people are embedded in cultural traditions and all the rest of it, and that the ceaseless calculation of interests isn't enough because people have things like human affections. So he sort of, in my view, he sort of moves simultaneously to the right and to the left from this utilitarian position. He moves to the right in the sense that he begins to think about cultural traditions, about culture. Preferences, high preferences and low preferences, high culture and low pressure.

SPEAKER_00Hierarchies of value. Hierarchies of values, all of those sort of things. And he moves also to the left in the sense he begins to realize that people, different people have different sets of opportunities. Not everybody has the opportunities that he had. And the trade unionism might, in fact, be a reasonable way in which people who are powerless and don't have any capital can express their interests. So he moves in these. And of course, he was quite a head serve in holding the rights of women.

SPEAKER_00Absolutely. So he begins to think about oppressed minorities, and particularly in his case, about women because of the woman who becomes his wife, Harriet, in the long run becomes his wife, but becomes his companion. And I think that what happened in, let's say, 2016, when Britain voted for Brexit, and when America voted first for Trump, was a sort of million style breakdown. Right. Mental breakdown. Collective,

SPEAKER_00as you say, using Keynes's phrase, sort of collective nervous breakdown that we go for, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. And I think that the way to deal with that nervous breakdown is to I mean, to the right in the sense that we need to grapple much more with culture, hierarchies of values, what choices we're making. We can no longer conceive of individualism as being generalised. Just about the consumer going shopping in a great supermarket.

SPEAKER_00We have to think much more about the nature of the preferences, but also moving to the left in the sense that when we were growing up when we were sort of around in the 1990s, It was all about business is the solution, markets are the solution. Government is bad. We must try and liberate these markets. And now we have to be, I think, a bit more skeptical about markets or a bit more skeptical about certain businesses. And I mean, above all, the tech businesses because of their size and because of what they're trying

SPEAKER_00to sell us.

SPEAKER_01So let me dive now into your three elements of liberalism and pull things out that I think are noteworthy, because I think not all current day liberals buy your version, but I think they should, right? Yeah. First, on liberal individualism, this idea that it's a rich, you know, striving version of individualism, questing version of individualism, that's seeking self-improvement, self-betterment, not just upward mobility.

SPEAKER_01You know, to self-realization, realizing your potential, not in terms of, you know, just having the maximum number of consumer options, but producing the best possible you, right? Which could mean, you know, turning away from lower commercialized pleasures in pursuit of higher things. And, you know, That is just not the regnant, dominant version of individualism we have today.

SPEAKER_01So culturally, the expressive individualism we have today is all about, you know, satisfaction of preferences. Don't look at what the preferences are. Have as many options as you can. The more options you have, the better off you are. So it's all this very, you know, value-free kind of tallying up of the number of choices you have, regardless of, you know, what the quality of those choices is. And so I think there's the background of just this, you know, consumerism. Right.

SPEAKER_01He engineered this turn. It existed before, but he certainly pushed for a vision of justice that put aside questions of the good life and that privileged right and wrong over good and bad. And had this idea of liberalism as just a pure procedure that you take these disembodied people with no identities, no pasts, no anything, and put them behind the veil of ignorance. And liberalism is what they will choose, right? It's just a procedure. So there's that. And then, you know,

SPEAKER_01we think a lot more in, especially elites think a lot more in social science-y terms now than they did 50 or 100 years ago. And economics is... So we have intellectual tendencies. Adding further momentum to a background culture of expressive individualism

SPEAKER_01and moral relativism. And that all feels like it's leading to very materially affluent, very spiritually impoverished people in large swaths of society. Of course, we've never been materially better off, but you look at a whole lot of indicators for individual well-being. Chances of getting married, chances of having children, chances of growing up with both your parents, having friends, having a sense that your life is important and has meaning.

SPEAKER_01A lot of these, the arrows are going the wrong way for large populations in the rich capitalist democracies during the 21st century. And yet I found, after writing The Permanent Problem, and I'm interested to see what your reaction is, I've gotten a lot of pushback from people. From saying that, you know, actually existing liberal societies of the 21st century are dysfunctional in some fairly profound ways and are in need of some fairly deep cultural renewal. Absolutely.

SPEAKER_01I sound like a post-liberal. I sound like an anti-liberal. So there's a real sort of defensiveness of actually existing liberals today that doesn't want to hear that they've gotten anything wrong, doesn't want to hear that we need to do any kind of deep rethink. That the populace just went crazy and the fever will break and we'll get back to normal somehow or another. It's funny,

SPEAKER_00writing this book, I started off thinking in a quite simple way that woke was the problem. The book is the problem in the sense that it judges people as collectives rather than as individuals. And so I wrote these stirring passages about how evil and appalling Foucault And we needed to get beyond this sort of 1960s sort of collectivist ideology

SPEAKER_00and reassert the power of simple liberal individualism. People should be judged meritocratically. They should be judged in terms of their self-perception or their self... Abilities rather than in terms of these big, broad categories. And I talked to a lot of centrist people like myself, and we all agreed on that, and that was great. And then I began to think, well, what do we mean by individualism?

SPEAKER_00What is individualism? Because it's the background noise of all our assumptions. And I began to read a lot of these post-liberal thinkers who were saying that liberalism, because it's pure individualism, just doesn't work. You go to the streets of San Francisco and see people taking drugs and doing all of that sort of stuff. If that's what individualism means, or you go to a shopping mall and see people wandering around just buying this and that and the other. The post-liberals say, if that's what individualism is, we've got to have something better than this.

SPEAKER_00These people, what they're saying is not foolish at all. There is something wrong about this. We were talking earlier about bourgeois bohemianism and why these two groups of people who are quite often so different in terms of their vision of society, one being very pro-market, the other being very pro-big estate, what they actually have in common. And then you discover that what they have in common is a certain non-judgmentalism. There's expressive individualism on the side of the progressive left

SPEAKER_00and preference maximization on the side of the market right are both two sides of the same coin. So they agree on this fundamental thing just as they... They mostly agree on globalization. So these things that hold people who have different notions of tax levels, you know, on a much deeper level, they agree with each other. And I began to think to myself, well, wait a minute, not only do I disagree with them and not Not only am I tempted and drawn towards quite a lot of this pro post liberal stuff, particularly having visited San Francisco not that long ago and seen just what

SPEAKER_00a ghastly mess hole the whole thing was in the streets. So I then began to read more of these liberals, what were called classical liberals, began to read what the people in the 19th century are saying. And I was thinking, well, classical liberals are people who believe in big, big, big states, small governments. Preference maximization. So I then begin to read Mill and I begin to read Burkhart and all of these people with a fresh eye. And I realize that that's not what they believe at all, that they, classical liberal so-called, are people who are compassionate.

SPEAKER_00Completely absorbed by the problem of individualism who see a hierarchy of values, who see what is essential to individualism is self-development, self-improvement, self-discovery, not just in a purely sort of, I'm going to improve myself by going to night school in order so that I can get a better job, but I'm going to become a better person. Central to real liberalism, classical liberalism, is the notion of a self-improving individual who is striving to live a good life,

SPEAKER_00according to I mean, what Mill says that you've got to do, or what Coleridge is saying through Mill, is that you have to have a sort of clerisy in society who sees its job as preserving high civilisation. Yes.

SPEAKER_00Educating people's preferences, you're in big trouble. So you say that and people say you're completely crazy because the Rawlsians don't like that because it's all about the veil of ignorance. The economists don't like it because it's all about preferences. The left liberals don't like it because you might be saying that some modes of life are better than other modes of life. And all of that is bad. So you suddenly get a whole range of enemies that you didn't even know you had. But essential to this is I think that there is an answer to the problems that

SPEAKER_00the post liberals are raising. That is within the liberal tradition. And I think also that we need really to focus much more on this than we have. We need to be having these arguments. So even if we get a lot of pushback, it's important to be raising these things because a world of pure expression. Substack, Substack, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey, Brink Lindsey.

SPEAKER_00The dysfunctional nature of big organizations, the rest of it.

SPEAKER_01I want to move on to your second element of pluralism or skepticism about ultimate truth. But I think it ties in because, yes, there is clearly a sense of being open to the other side. Willingness to keep the lines of discussion open, a sense that the truth is difficult to get to, and we're not confident that what we've got right now is right, that if we keep pushing, we're going to have a better understanding down the line.

SPEAKER_01So there is definitely this essential to the liberal sense of pluralism is a sense of fallibility and a kind of skepticism. But I distinguish between sort of You know, final, ultimate truths, truths with a capital T, and liberalism doesn't, you know, doesn't want to recognize those, at least not enshrine them in government policy, right? But then there are sort of foundational truths with a capital T, the axioms that you can't prove, but they are articles of faith that...

SPEAKER_01That allow us to move forward and to go into a process of discovery and trial and error. So a belief in the fundamental goodness of human beings, right? A belief that the natural world is knowable and that using our knowledge of the patterns in nature to... To improve the material a lot of human beings is a good thing to do, right? You can't prove these things, but they are the foundational truths of a liberal mentality. And they get swallowed up as well.

SPEAKER_01We have this kind of tolerance of intolerance that we have. We have a skepticism even about the kind of foundational truths of liberalism so that we allow, you know, illiberal populations to come in and set up a law unto themselves. And we're afraid of applying our own laws because we don't know what's, you know, we don't know the difference between right and wrong. Right. So that the skepticism that leads to a healthy pluralism can go too far. Right. I think there are limits to that skepticism. You agree with that?

SPEAKER_00Oh, absolutely. I think if you think, where does liberalism come from? Liberalism comes from two things. One is the world in motion. That's in traditional societies, basically the assumption is that... There's a limited amount of goods to go around, and that you allocate them according to certain sorts of principles, whatever they are, dynastic power, or the will of the king, or something like that. And the liberals come along and say, no, society can We can grow.

SPEAKER_00We can get wealthier so long as we have open competition and free markets and all of those sorts of things. So the question at the heart of politics becomes different, not how to justly distribute a fixed buy, but how to live in a world of... And if you don't accept them, you'll be driven out of society. And liberals say, no, we have to agree to disagree.

SPEAKER_00Terrible cliche, but a fundamentally great breakthrough in society, that society can't be based on everybody accepting certain epistemological truths, that we have to agree to disagree. And that leads you to a It leads you to a world of pluralism in which people can establish communities on different principles. It defines politics down. Politics That is absolutely fundamental, I think.

SPEAKER_00And I think where in many ways that the post-liberals have gone wrong is the post-liberals want to go back to this pre-enlightenment world in which we can have an agreement about ultimate truths. Because I think if you don't agree about ultimate truths, every other problem. If you can't agree that this particular reading of the Bible is true, then you end up eating dogs or whatever. And what you're saying is absolutely right, that on the one hand, we have to agree to disagree.

SPEAKER_00I mean, The immigration question hangs over a lot of this because one reason where the bourgeois bohemian synthesis breaks down is the bourgeois bohemian synthesis says immigration is, say, a great thing because it's good economically. Right.

SPEAKER_00The first of those things, because per capita growth doesn't exist. I mean, the increase of the size of the pie in Britain in particular has not led to per capita growth, which is the thing that matters. But also, there must be a limit to multiculturalism in the sense there must be a limit to the pluralism that we're willing to tolerate if what we're tolerating is intolerance. And we do have communities in Britain that have cousin marriage, that have very few rights for women,

SPEAKER_00that have complete patriarchy deciding on women's marriages, on how they vote and whether they can vote. And that is testing liberal societies to the extreme, that we have to think that there are certain values that we can agree on as being constitutive of liberalism. Again, individualism, the right Right to determine your ends, certain of your ends in life. And toleration, that we have to have religious tolerance, tolerance of what faith you have and how you express it as a fundamental component

SPEAKER_00of liberal society. So again, this synthesis, which seemed so powerful, a bourgeois bohemian synthesis, which seems so powerful and all-encompassing, begins to break down when it deals with the reality of the societies that we've created.

SPEAKER_01Your third element of suspicion of power, I just want to make one note, and it's a note I just want to make as a recovering libertarian, which is my expanding sense of what power, of the kinds of power we should worry about. Libertarians famously think the only power you need to worry about is state power. But I've come to see that we need to worry about other things as well. And I think right now you're especially worried about tech giants and the propaganda. Absolutely.

SPEAKER_01Absolutely.

SPEAKER_00As with my two other definitions of liberalism, individualism plus skepticism, a lot of people might say, well, that's all banal. We all accept that. We all agree with that. Who doesn't believe in limiting power and things like that? Well, I would say that there are two things that make this notion, this emphasis possible. On power, absolutely central to reinvigorated liberalism. One is the rise of strongman rule, that we have strongman rule in a lot of the world. And that is based on the idea that power shouldn't be limited or

SPEAKER_00in practice shouldn't be limited that much. And we have a version of that in the United States with Donald Trump, who does not believe in constraints on his own power and is trying to build... So I think that has gone from being something that we all accepted to something that needs reasserting in a big way. But the second of those two things is the private economy. And I agree. I think when Lord Acton said power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely,

SPEAKER_00he was thinking of the public economy, he was thinking of government, but he also applies to the private sector. That we do have in two ways. One is that we do have a world in which power is extremely concentrated in a very small number of companies. And that is in itself a worry to me. It's not a worry to people. Certain traditions of libertarians, Robert Bork and the rest of it, it is a worry to me, partly because I think that those people will use that power in ways that interfere

SPEAKER_00with our lives. If you've got a handful of companies running their lives, It's not just whether they're providing consumer goods at a good price. That of these tech people being modest, sort of hoodie-wearing people, they're developing into oligarchs in their lifestyle, in their style of existence, and in their relationship with the government.

SPEAKER_00So that is a bad thing in itself. But also what worries me is what these immensely powerful people are doing with their power, that they are encouraging fragmentation of attention, they're encouraging addiction to certain products, and they're encouraging... A life on the screen, which I think undermines the most precious and important thing about the liberal tradition, which is individualism. You cannot be an individual, educated, self-developed, self-conscious.

SPEAKER_00And if you look at the history of liberalism… It's quite interesting the extent to which liberalism as an intellectual tradition or as a political tradition has been exceptionally worried about addiction, that addiction to alcohol, that Addiction to drugs,

SPEAKER_00addiction to stimulation of various sorts is a very worry for liberals. And a lot of people have said, well, the prohibition, it's all because they're morally uptight, they're weird. But I think it's because they put at the heart of their philosophy, the individual as a sort of self-developed, self-actualizing being, and that that is undermined by addiction in various ways.

SPEAKER_01So let me move towards kind of the final section of this conversation with some Gloomy questions. Your history of liberalism tells a cyclical story, but we're not going in circles, right? We're going in a spiral. So there is a circular element where, you know, there is a cyclical element, but we're also there. So that's the cyclical history of ascendancy, decadence, renewal. But then we're going, you know, there's linear history that all of this is happening

SPEAKER_01through ever-changing circumstances at a At the human frontier, we're exploring social terrain that Homo sapiens has never occupied before. Right. And so we're making everything up as we go along. And so before that spiral took off, you could see precursors to liberalism, but you didn't see the real thing. There were certain, you know, historic enabling conditions that set the stage that that had to happen. You had the emergence of proto-liberal social practices and proto-liberal habits of thought.

SPEAKER_01And so that social reality was on the ground first. And then you had intellectuals and intellectual entrepreneurs who wove those realities into a coherent ideal and then applied that ideal as a standard to judge society. And then people started using that ideal as a direction in which to push society, right? So the big question is, how much do you worry that the linear element of this spiral that we're going on may be carrying us into historical circumstances that are no longer congenial to

SPEAKER_01the liberal ideal? And let me lay out three elements. So first we've had famous, you know, the decline of organized religion in Christendom, what used to be Christendom at least. And that has gone along with a kind of acidic moral relativism that doesn't even have a vocabulary of right and wrong. So that's fascinating. Pretty barren cultural soil in which to plant ideas, this rich idea of agentic, striving, self-improving individualism.

SPEAKER_01So, can liberalism survive without some kind of faith? It doesn't have to be, you know, dogmatic, but... Are we are we missing some fundamental foundation to a liberal worldview? Secondly, liberalism arose with the age of print. And and I think I've become more and more convinced by the kind of Marshall McLuhan, who's the guy who wrote Amusing Ourselves to Death. I'm forgetting his name. Right.

SPEAKER_01That the actual medium of communication really does have an effect on the nature of our thought and that print literacy encourages logical thinking, rigor. It's, you know, you can, it's deliberative, whereas oral culture is spontaneous, reactive, emotional, and we are moving, hurtling into a kind of post-literate age now as viral videos have taken over

SPEAKER_01the attention spans of more and more of us. Most of us spend the majority of our waking lives staring at screens and most of the people staring at screens are not looking at anything edifying. They're looking at, you know, Junk food for the brain, and it is, you know, creating, forming minds, encouraging habits of mind that just aren't, you know, aren't, again, good soil for the abstractions of things like balance of power and rule of law.

SPEAKER_01These are highfalutin notions that a kind of a post-literate reactive public, you know, doesn't seem to put much stock in. Finally, we've seen this in the information age, and I think at this sort of the new class chasm we have between the college-educated class and everyone else is ultimately at the root of the populist upheaval and a lot of our dysfunctional politics. So we've had a whole... Group of people sort of they're materially better and better off, but their place in the world has been marginalized. So the working class during the industrial era,

SPEAKER_01they worked in companies at the frontiers of technological progress. They worked in the automobile and steel industries. Their inputs were absolutely vital to the progress of the overall capitalist system. Whereas, and that was a very hard bargain that produced a whole lot of instability. The dependence of capitalist progress on brutal physical labor meant, you know, class conflict and meant socialism and meant, you know... The Cold War and the possibility of nuclear warfare, right?

SPEAKER_01There was a lot of instability that came from that dependence of capitalist progress on dirty, dangerous work. But now, as capitalist progress weans itself from dependence on dirty, dangerous work, ordinary people's capacity to contribute to the common wheel in as important a way is declined. Their status is declined. During the 20th century, you know, we had Diego Rivera murals in public places and we had Aaron Copeland writing fanfare for the common man.

SPEAKER_01And one third of the world lived under regimes that said the working man is the protagonist of world history. And the free world was worried about that. And so they wanted to kind of pretend that maybe that's true, too. But the status of the ordinary people is very different now. So I think there has been a real downgrading. Absolutely. Absolutely.

SPEAKER_01So liberalism depended upon, you know, of course, we've got to treat the common man well because we utterly depend on the common man. So the whole 20th century push towards a more egalitarian form of liberalism was pushed because of the obvious need to, you know, And so and then also we extended the franchise over time because we needed their bodies to fight our wars for us. Right.

SPEAKER_01And so democracy expanded dramatically in Europe right after World War One because because of that. So as people become less and less economically valuable and are replaced on the battlefield by, you know, drones and robots, what is the leverage that ordinary people have to be counted as equal anymore? So there's that, there's the declining habits of mind through literacy, there's the declining moral... Yeah. Universe from secularism.

SPEAKER_01Are we are we hurtling into sort of post liberal historical circumstances?

SPEAKER_00Let me add two other ingredients to your great bowl of pessimism here before. I'm trying to say something a bit more optimistic. One is, just to continue with your point, a lot of the history of liberalism was in an era of the rise of the middle class or the rise of the working class. A period of rising opportunities for more and more people. And now it seems that politics is being rewired by the decline of the middle class.

SPEAKER_00And Mamdani, a lot of it is about the fact that a group of people who are educated, Who have been brought up to think of themselves as in some way the products of opportunity are seeing declining living standards or declining opportunities in the future. They've got massive burdens of debt. They find it hard to see. A career ladder. Here, the Labour Party in this country, it used to be said of the Labour Party conferences that they represented, I mean conferences where people gather together every year or so,

SPEAKER_00that they represented the aristocracy of labour. How they represent the sort of dregs of the middle class, that declining social groups are defining politics more and more, which is very worrying. If you look at the great revolutions of the rise of Nazism or the Soviet, the Baltic Revolution, Declining intellectual groups are very, very represented in that discontent. So, liberalism was about the rise of aspirational groups. Now we're seeing post-liberalism, in a sense, the decline of these groups.

SPEAKER_00The second thing is that we're seeing across the world the rise of a sort of model of authoritarian modernization.

SPEAKER_01Yes.

SPEAKER_00China being the capital of that, whereby you have big states, powerful parties making a deal with the people that they will have all the power and you can do the work. Don't intimidate. We'll have state-run companies, state-run activities, state-run political systems, and those countries have been getting bigger. Singapore started the model, China has continued the model, but you see it's happening. Right across the Middle East, with these big countries, oil-rich countries.

SPEAKER_00Saudi Arabia is a sort of authoritarian monarchy. But right across the place, Rwanda, you have the Singapore model being put there. And we've always thought... Yeah. We've slowed down from 20th century pace, but we're superstars compared to the rest of us.

SPEAKER_00We're not growing at all. Germany's not growing at all. And so if you're looking for growth in the world, it's not in liberal capitalist countries. It's in autocracies. It's driven by state capitalism more than liberal capitalism. So that's my second ingredient to a bowl of pessimism. Against that, I would say two things. One is that I do document in my book that whenever things look particularly dark for liberalism, then the liberalism jumps out of its coffin and revives.

SPEAKER_00And, you know, however dark things are now, they were worse than the 1930s. Absolutely.

SPEAKER_01I've done myself in the 1930s. I'm okay. I'm okay.

SPEAKER_00Not a particular thing to say. But it's extraordinary if you look at the 1930s, how self-confident people like Mussolini were, that they discovered a new model of how to run the world, how pessimistic liberals were, how the notion of an individualistic civilization was dead. Post-liberals were all over the place in that era. And by 1950, we defeated fascism, we defeated Nazism, and we created a working system. And secondly, although we don't have a liberal leader at the moment who we could all say,

SPEAKER_00this is the guy who's doing, there's no Teddy Roosevelt that we could point to, there's no Asquith or anybody that we can point to as creating a new form of liberalism. You do see an enormous amount of popular pressure against the tech giants, against the culture of distraction, defending the culture of the page against the culture of the screen, saying that these things are all bad. So there's a sort of sense out there in the population at large that this cultural crisis needs to be dealt with by a return

SPEAKER_00to certain basic truths. Wow.

SPEAKER_01I agree with that. And so we can wrap up here on a hopeful note that there is recognition that things have gone wrong. There is active debate. There is movement in the right direction. So that's good. And then at the bottom of it all, we're liberals. And that means we have this fundamental faith in the ordinary individual human being. And you can't have that faith unless you somehow or another think that the human species is kind of phototropic, that it leans into the light.

SPEAKER_01When it's faced between a choice between darkness and the moral abyss and real self-development and Thank you so much for coming on. Great. Thank you for having me. Thanks for listening to The Permanent Problem Podcast. Check out my essays on The Permanent Problem over on Substack,

SPEAKER_01as well as up in the Scan & Center website. And be sure to catch all our episodes on Substack, Spotify, Stitcher, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you love tuning in. Until next time, I'm Brink Lindsey, signing off.

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