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Leaves in the Wind

Leaves in the Wind artwork

The Light of Tabor: Notes Toward a Monistic Christology

May 27, 20241 hr 19 minAudio
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This is the third of this year’s Stanton Lectures, once again captured by that unpleasant little automaton the “Owl.” How well that device dealt with the acoustics of the lecture theatre is something of an open question; much depended upon how it was placed on any given day. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit davidbentleyhart.substack.com/subscribe

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_02Good evening, everyone, and welcome back to this series of Stanton lectures for the current academic session. We're particularly pleased to welcome Professor David Bentley Hart for the third in his series, On the Light of Tabor, Notes Towards a Monist Christology. Professor Hart has been exploring the variety of Christological models in the New Testament and early Christian traditions, noting that the central subject is always one likely to generate controversy.

SPEAKER_02But he's also been moving us, I think, towards recognition of some common soteriological patterns of thought and practice, these emerging amidst this diversity and offering ways of understanding and assessing how best to describe the significance of Jesus for our human condition. Tonight's lecture, as I say, is lecture the third in the series. Professor Hart has come well equipped with his lecture notes and his umbrella. And tonight's lecture will again be followed by a period of questions and discussions.

SPEAKER_02I should say the recording will continue for that. I hope you're comfortable with the arrangement. And without further ado, I invite you to welcome back Professor David Bentley Hart. Thank you. There are more people here than I expected, given the bank holiday and the rain. So my gratitude.

SPEAKER_02It's amazing to me that that machine not only has an American accent, but has by far the most annoying American accent possible, just to make us feel less. Recording has been getting rather unpleasant. Anyway, thank you, David. Let me begin again as I've been doing with a pericope.

SPEAKER_02The lesson is from the book of Sirach, chapter 43, verse 47. And We may say evermore and yet never attain the end. And the final summary of those utterances is, he is the all. As I foretold, I'm going to turn to two theologians who've written on Christology of late,

SPEAKER_02two books that to me have the great virtue of being in utter polar antithesis to one another and illustrating thereby two extremes that I want to avoid. to my mind.

SPEAKER_00Now,

SPEAKER_02I do this with certain trepidation, as I said, because one of them is Ronald Williams, to whom some of us owe a great deal of our theological careers. I mean, I only do Christian theology. It wasn't actually something I intended to do because of his book Resurrection, which I read as an undergraduate. The other one is Jordan Wood, a young fellow, young scholar, talented

SPEAKER_02little bit on the, uh, uh, pugnacious side, uh, who recently published a book called Maximus the Confessor that's very impressive and in many ways very wrong, it seems to me. But, uh, I, in fact, recommended the book, so, you know, obviously I think highly of it. I just disagree with it. So, the two scholars, one quite established and venerable, one quite young and promising, both, to my mind, quite ingeniously in error. on cardinal portents,

SPEAKER_02and happily I believe that they go astray at precisely the same point but in opposite directions. And so I'm going to take the differences between them as illustrative of that tension between, well, they're called the tension between the metaphysical and mythical intonations of the Christian story, just for want of a better categorization. the story the tradition tells of God and Christ, that is.

SPEAKER_02And especially as it's been told since the days of the Christological councils. Because I think there's a certain lesson to be learned, at least using them in this rather crude way, I intend to, from the ways in which throughout Christological, throughout the history of Christology, the balances have tended to dip now one way, now the other, but never ever reach equilibrium. in this tension between the story of Christ as a narrative of one who descends and

SPEAKER_02the metaphysics that, after Nicaea, became absolutely inevitable for Christian discourse about what it means to say that the identity of the eternal Son and the identity of Jesus of Nazareth are one and the same. Now, in the case of... Well, let me begin with the... la menace, la plus grise. I always look at him when I speak French. He's very much a continental man.

SPEAKER_02In the case of Williams, my metaphysical sympathies are very much on his side in general, even if I grow a bit restless about following some principles we share. I have a more guarded view, for instance, of Austin Powers' account of the relationship of the infinite and finite. I certainly concur with him, however, that the earthly career of Jesus cannot be read as, quote, an episode in the life of an eternal subject which changes its metaphysical location.

SPEAKER_02That the Logos, moreover, is not a divine, as again I say, quote, instance of the sort of thing that the human individuality of Jesus exemplifies, unquote. The Christian theology must say that the essa by which God is God is the same essa by which Jesus is Jesus, and that the humanity of Jesus does not add to or contribute to the eternal essa of the Son, and that it is the divine hypostasis that affects all divine and human activity in Christ. These are

SPEAKER_02fairly common orthodox affirmations. I approve moreover of his insistence on an analogical ontology of the world's relation to God and above all of his claim that this relation is non-dual and that it appears, quote, in the world in more and less transparent modes with the hypostatic union providing its ultimate and optimal criterion of discernment, unquote. None of which spares me a certain anxiety

SPEAKER_02at other points. Now, of course, for those who've read, speaking specifically in his book, Christ, the Heart of Creation, there Williams largely upholds Calvin's impermeable partition between the distinct divided human idiomata of Christ out of what he would consider proper fidelity to the same metaphysics that I think he and I broadly share, Whereas I tend to see this as getting things somewhat backwards,

SPEAKER_02at least his approach seems at times to suggest not only that God has, in Thomas's terms, no real relation to the creature, but also that the creature has no real relation to God. I think we put it that way. It affirms that God is not transformed in humanity, believes obscure how it is that the creature is truly transformed in God, or rather into God.

SPEAKER_02Repeatedly, Williams speaks as if the relation of infinite to finite is also a demarcation, rather than a complete modal difference between divine beings' absolute simple plenitude and creaturely beings' dynamic participation in that plenitude. or between infinite being and that which by participation infinitely becomes. But surely, as this difference is at once absolute, qualitative, and one of non-repugnance, neither the infinite nor the finite can be estranged from its own proper idiom by

SPEAKER_02operating in the idiom of the other. Or another way of saying this is that this modal difference subsists ultimately in an ontological indistinction. As God has no I'm hoping we all understand the domestic language of no real relation, right? God is not qualified, modified. It does not endure a pathos as a result of the relation. One can't presume these things.

SPEAKER_02As God has no real relation to the creature, creaturely becoming is always already comprised in God's being, while divine being is always already the infinite act within which every finite act of becoming occurs. Now this, I grant, does not annul the basic structure of finite being, but therein lies the essential issue for me. Spiritual creatures by nature always already exist, both as finite and infinite. I've argued for this elsewhere,

SPEAKER_02and I can't rehearse my arguments here, but I'll provide a bibliography at the end. And again, well, I'll take note of the difference. It is crucial to be a living spirit is to dwell in a condition of finite becoming. Yes, it's crucial to a finite becoming. but entirely is determined to an infinite end that indwells that process

SPEAKER_02intrinsically as its only possible final cause. Its natural destiny, which calls it forth out of that equally infinite depth of unity within which the living soul has its grounding, as any of us really can affirm or can verify for ourselves just from a scrupulous phenomenology of what it is to be a subject. This is a metaphysical and theological truth.

SPEAKER_02But again, also, it's a phenomenologically verifiable fact about conscious rational agency. All of reality is available to our cognition and judgment, our intentionality, always within a horizon of transcendental absolutes that summon the world into being for us in the interval that lies between itself and that indivisible unity of apprehension that lies deepest and most anonymously within each of us. Between, that is, two realities always already absolved of any merely finite local identity.

SPEAKER_02To be a rational spirit is to desire everything finite within the embrace of a more originally infinite desire. hence rational spirit, teleologically specified, is God. And God could not create a spiritual nature, not called the deification, any more than he could create a square circle. As Nicholas of Cusa puts it, who's the one who explores this with the greatest brilliance, Quod nisi deus,

SPEAKER_02es et infinitus, non foret finis desiderum. Were God not the infinite, could not be for us the end of desires. Gregory of Nyssa's image of the soul's epictetus into God is in a very real sense simply an image of human nature set free for its own natural end. Now again, I can't argue all of this here. As I say, I've already denounced it, but that's the perspective from which I start. And I'm waxing sententious, so my point is this. It's true that as William says in the name of Pharaoh,

SPEAKER_02That infinity does not fill in some gap within a finite causal chain, but is rather the whole system of finite agency. Even so, in the case of spiritual creatures, the infinite is already a rational relation, intrinsic to, already resident within that system, as he calls it. The infinite may not fill in a finite gap, but it does fill in the infinite openness of that and inhabits, therefore, the infinite as its sole perfection calls and intentional countenance.

SPEAKER_02In spiritual beings, the finite is always already capable of the infinite, even if in the mode of infinite becoming. And it requires no alteration of human nature for human beings to act in a fully divine idiom. By the same token, If the standard Trinitarian model developed after Nicaea is correct, God does not possess the particularities of the finite merely in a more eminent mode of the infinite.

SPEAKER_02Nicene Trinitarianism tells us that the infinity of the Father's hiddenness is wholly convertible with the infinity of the Son's manifestation of the divine, and with the infinity of the Spirit's life. And so God is always already expression, always already that infinite form or logos that is actively present in every finite form or logos. Whereas, for instance, Williams sees in Luther's admittedly, logically unrefined account of Christ's communion accounts here in Martin,

SPEAKER_02a failure to honor the integrity, that's his word, the integrity of the finite created order, I see this as its singular virtue. The entire narrative of salvation in Christ is one of the radical transformations of preachers, not simply into a more wondrous frame of finitude, but more essentially into a true realization of the divine infinity that spirit craves always in itself. Spirit exists only as the constant disruption of any imagined inherent integrity of finite nature.

SPEAKER_02And the God-man shatters the illusion of such integrity altogether. Even the Maya. Such integrity. So too, whereas Williams agrees with Calvin that the incarnation cannot be a necessity of creation and that Adam could have been perfect in humanity without reference to the incarnate Son, and denies that humanity can realize its nature only through union to the divine nature, as, quote, both the human and the divine are compromised, if this is the case.

SPEAKER_02I would argue the opposite, exactly the opposite, for reasons that I think I made clear in previous lectures. I think it wrong to suggest that the human is compromised the divine in order to exist as spirit or that the divine is compromised by being the necessary end for and by which spirit exists. Nor do I think it's easy to reconcile such claims with the gospel narratives. At least as Williams presents the story,

SPEAKER_02it sometimes seems to have suffered a certain expurgation, truncation. Here's a long quotation. Again, I regret not having that plummy RP Veritone. The divine act is recognizable not because it resembles any divinity of our imagination. It shows itself divine by utterly refusing what we might be tempted to regard as signs of divinity, by enacting itself ultimately in the emptying of power, the humiliation,

SPEAKER_02and the immobilization of the cross, and The resurrection is not a triumphant instance and epiphany of divine power. The life and well-being of the creation cannot be found in the disruption of the finite world by some insertion of the infinite into it. Christ, as finite, as creature, guarantees the integrity of the created order. Unquote. And I have to admit, I find all those assertions oddly jarring. The gospel, for one thing, the simplest level,

SPEAKER_02the gospel is clearly abound in episodes that most certainly do resemble the sort of divinity we might, and that late ancient persons definitely did imagine. Virgin birth, the miraculous creation of food and wine, the instilling of the elements by command, the glorious transfiguration, that's especially important. very much that notion of theophany, that pagans and Hellenistic Jews and pagans and Second Temple Jews and early Christians all share the principal sign of divinity.

SPEAKER_02Confirmation of divine status by a voice from the sky, resurrection, ascent through the heavens, and so on. I also find curious here the use of the word signs, as that is the very word that the fourth gospel employs to make it clear that Christ's acts of power are not mere feats of marvelous, well, power. Wonder workers were quite common in late antiquity.

SPEAKER_02Rather, The word signs is used precisely to show that these are epiphanies that fitted the reigning imagery of divine agency on earth. When Jesus is arraigned by some of his contemporaries for seeming to arrogate to himself uniquely divine privileges, such as forgiving sins or comporting himself as Lord of the Sabbath or otherwise, quote, you know, John 10, 33, making himself to be a god, his accusers appear to have a point.

SPEAKER_02Also, it seems to me that to resist describing Easter as a divine triumph seems strangely at odds with the language of both the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline Corpus. Even the claim that it is, quote, it is as human passivity freely accepted that Jesus's death becomes divine agency, unquote, true as it is, this is only one half of the scriptural picture. There is, of course, Another side, in the Gospel of John especially, no one takes my soul from me.

SPEAKER_02I lay it down for myself. I have the power. To lay it down. The power to take it up again. According to John, even Christ's passion is not simply a passion for the lawless, but is more originally the sovereign act of a divine agent exercising a fully divine power.

SPEAKER_02Throughout the Gospels, there's a constant interfusion of divine and humanity, and it's not merely an irregular syncope between them. Right up to the point of their perfect coincidence in the resurrection, which at least in John chapter 20, Thomas addresses Christ as, or kereosmoke, or kereosmoke, again with the definite article. This seems to be quite the opposite of any preservation of dual integrities against mutual compromise or confusion.

SPEAKER_02Rather, what's revealed is that between the divine and the human, there is no opposition or separation to begin with, and so nothing to compromise or confuse. The human is not displaced or diminished. in acting in the divine idiom, but rather fulfilled, while the divine internally comprehends the human idiom itself as a proper mode of its own infinite agency. And yet, once again, to refer to an issue I raised in the first lecture, I know that the theological tendencies that Williams is resisting,

SPEAKER_02if allowed to become too preponderant, can shift the balance of Christology towards an untenable extreme on the opposite side of the balances And that's the specter, at least, that I see in Jordan Wood's arguments. There's much that's admirable in Jordan's book, which is called, what was the name of Jordan's book? I've suddenly forgotten. The Whole Mystery of Christ. It's from Maximus.

SPEAKER_02The Lord's will, the whole mystery of Christ be. manifest in all things or something like that. Anyway, there's much that's applicable in Wood's book. I may disagree with a good dealing of his reading of Maximus, but as the venerable adage goes, vita brevis, Maximus longus. So my disagreements there don't need to detain us. I definitely agree with Wood that Maximus, in the very real sense, regarded all of creation as an embodiment of the logos, though

SPEAKER_02I would prefer that he did not conflate the language of embodiment with that of incarnation, which I think in Maximus is a privileged term specifically for Jesus of Nazareth. And certainly that Maximus meant what he said when he spoke of those who are deified in Christ as actually becoming the Lord and even becoming uncreated. I don't think he exaggerates any of his readings of Maximus in that direction. What I find problematic in this book, however, is quite substantial.

SPEAKER_02To begin with, there's a voluble insistence that the union of natures and Christ must be understood in a radically, again his words, symmetrical way, meaning not merely that Christ is both divine and human to the same total degree, which is obviously essential to any coherent Christology, but that the Son's identity is determined by a mutuality and direct proportionality of act between his divinity and his humanity. Wood even characterizes what Maximus dangerously called the perichoresis of

SPEAKER_02Christ's two natures as a reciprocal interpenetration, going in both directions equally, as he puts it. Then, too, it's Wood's apparent conviction that those natures are not only infinitely incommensurable, quote-unquote, but intrinsically irreconcilable, since God and creation share nothing essential or natural whatsoever, and that admittedly is not an entirely unreasonable reading at first glance of Maximus' claim that the natures apostatized in Christ have no common thing,

SPEAKER_02no kinon or koinon, it won't be Erasmian about it, with one another other than the one hypostasis by which they're joined in single activity. For Wood, this means that even though deification in Christ is an innate destiny for creatures implanted in the very first, it is an utterly non-natural destiny. Again, that's his term, non-natural. So he concludes, Christologic requires,

SPEAKER_02that's one of his favorite terms, Christologic, requires that the principle of hypostasis be understood as what he somewhat nebulously calls an individual positivity, that is a purely dynamic reality that's totally ontologically indifferent to every kind of species, every kind of nature, and therefore indifferent to the absolute difference between divine and human nature. Quote, its positivity and indifference are the exact properties that permitted to exist as

SPEAKER_02the singular concrete fact of the incommensurable natures, that is to be their identity, unquote. The essential discovery of neo-Chalcedonian theology claims is just this, that the subject is the most fundamental positive metaphysical fact. I'm sorry to keep pausing here, but there are certain words that are very much part of the patois that he uses. Subject positive and positivity are especially central. So yes, this is the most fundamental positive metaphysical fact.

SPEAKER_02Well, if so, then it's also theology's most fundamental metaphysical contradiction. I have to say, Wood's project seems to me to involve a curious melange of diverse theological impulses. There's a pronounced preference for dialectic over analogy, but in both the Hegelian and the Barthian senses, which is curious both times. There's also something of a Barthian fear of any intrinsic structural fittingness of created nature to the event of Christ. There's also a formidable element of 20th century theological personalism,

SPEAKER_02a touch of Lutheran theogonic divine passivalism, unexpected soussant of two-tiered Thomism in the understanding of the relation of nature and supernature, and a very pronounced anxiety over what he rather abstractly denounces as metaphysical abstraction. This last in particular generates a great deal of rhetorical energy on Wood's part, but perhaps some vacuity as well.

SPEAKER_02Talk of creation in terms of participation, he inserts, he inserts, he asserts. I'll get over the jet lag by the time I get back to the stage. Talk of creation in terms of participation entails a positivity essentially independent of God's creation from nothingness of realities that differ infinitely from God. And every attempt to conceive of God in the world by the abstract logic of natural or essential relations can only reduce both God and the world to finite and

SPEAKER_02mutually determined realities. I think this is all a terrific inversion of logic. It is wood here, it seems to me, obviously precisely for want of a coherent understanding of analogy of participation who is reducing God to a finite thing that exists over against creation, differing from it not in a qualitatively infinite matter but as objectively alternative to it. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is cogent only as, without any remainder, a participatory metaphysics.

SPEAKER_02it is, I'm sorry to keep using this term, but it is important, it is a purely modal definition of creation, is the total donation out of the infinite plenitude of divine being of both essence and existence to creatures who are absolutely dependent on that infinite gift. Only if there was some context of being comprehensive of both God and creation as discrete entities into which the divine will merely posited something utterly unlike itself would it be possible to deny the essential participation of creation in God by nature.

SPEAKER_02But then this would make both creation and God reducible together to some higher principle of non-repugnance in which they would both together have to participate in order to exist in relation to one another, and then obviously God would not be God. The confusions deepen when Wood applies this metaphysical aversion to Christology. quote, the relation between Christ's person and either of his natures surpasses participatory and analogical logic,

SPEAKER_02unquote. There's a sense, admittedly, in which this is trivially true. No particular event of any kind is predicted or determined by an ontological description, and so in that sense every event always surpasses any metaphysical determinations. But no event, even a unique event, even the most original event of all, even the one event that founds all other events, can fail to exhibit and even exemplify the ontology and logic of the reality in which or at the foundation of which it occurs.

SPEAKER_02Again, a metaphysics is simply a rule of coherent predication, not a causal force. And it is not a demotion to causal subordination to save any real event that it must be susceptible of such. Predication, whatever we say about Christ is credible only if our claims are congruent with the real structure of being, even if Christ himself should be the singular fact that creates that structure. Nothing we say about Christ is concretely true, in particular if it cannot also logically be true in general.

SPEAKER_02For some reason, I find that ruffles the feathers principally of Lutherans. I like Lutherans, but they're touchy on this topic. This isn't even a relationship of priority and posteriority. Whatever is actual is by definition possible, and so that actuality and that description are, so to speak, simultaneously. To oppose the event of the incarnation to analogical or participatory metaphysics is simply a category of confusion.

SPEAKER_02It creates a meaningless rivalry between the Christian story and the basic logical grammar that no good story can fail to confirm. But I understand what's going on here. What motivates Wood's claims is obviously one of the deep anxieties of a great deal of modern systematic theology. And I find it a strange notion, but the persons that I respect greatly have been prey to that same word.

SPEAKER_02The notion that even to accord the Christian story an ontological coherence that can be predicated of other stories somehow compromises the uniqueness of the Incarnation. We must, it seems, assert not only that the event comes first, whatever that means, but that it does so in an altogether catastrophic sense, not only impossible to anticipate, but impossible to correlate with the structure of being, as it might be known, outside the ambit of immediate revelation, which is sort of the rather crudely reductive way I spoke of the first edition of

SPEAKER_02Barth's Reverie, crudely reductive and yet totally accurate, seriously enough. And thus we arrive at what I take to be the nonsensical notion of hypostasis as something ontologically indifferent to nature, and yet able through sheer positivity, which I submit is an empty word, through sheer positivity to reconcile the irreconcilable. I think at this point we're employing words evacuated of meaning. If two natures are naturally irreconcilable,

SPEAKER_02then no principle, be it ever so indifferent or positive or dynamic, can ever reconcile. Not even God could affect such an end any more than God could create a square circle. Conversely, if two natures can be reconciled by any principle, be it ever so indifferent or positive or dynamic, then they are not naturally irreconcilable. There is, and is true, an infinite incommensurability between the divine and human natures in Christ, but it is no different from that between the infinite and the finite, or between the absolute and the contingent,

SPEAKER_02or between the participating who participated and the participating. Hennessy was also at a far more radical depth, a con-naturality, taking us back to the first lecture. That single race or kind or genus shared between the divine and the human, according to the Book of Acts, that one primordial genus to Therion, race of God most high, to Therion. God is the actuality of every nature, the one nature of all natures of which human nature exists,

SPEAKER_02again, entirely and solely as a mode, which is to say as a mode in the mode of becoming divine. And surely that's precisely what the doctrine of the incarnation proclaims, at least as metaphysically specified, that the infinite plenitude and universal structure of all being is condescended to be also a finite and particular instance of the real. Now, as for the insistence on Christological symmetry, I don't think it's a sound reading of Maximus.

SPEAKER_02I don't think it's even possible for a 7th century thinker to have thought that way. I believe that the anachronism is basically infinite. But I don't think it's a logically coherent position either when you take it to pieces, which I'd like to do. As the former, it's true that Maximus employs the language of perichoresis with regard to the union of natures and Christ, which is a somewhat bold decision on this part.

SPEAKER_02But this certainly does not imply mutual permeation in, quote, both directions. Perichoresis is precisely not reciprocity, but rather an original natural containment of two or more terms of one another without confusion, at least This is so in the case of Trinitarian metaphysics and where Christology is concerned, I'm pretty sure that Maximus never entertained any more incoherent understanding of the word. God is not a finite being and the divine nature is not a permeable reality.

SPEAKER_02The incarnation is not something that happens to God. but is instead the reality of a man who is nothing but God happening in our midst as one of us. And then too, the only meaning the word nature can possibly possess is all that a thing essentially is or can be. If one's going to use it in the abstract way that, for instance, the book of Acts or Paul doesn't use it. When Maximus says that the natures hypothesized in Christ share nothing in common, kinon,

SPEAKER_02I suppose I take it to mean Something that I think is more consistent with the whole of this thought is denying not any natural participation of the human and the divine, but only the presence of any kind of univocum common to them both, some distinct property univocally possessed by God and humankind in the same mode. For manifestly, the infinite and simple God possesses nothing under the form of discrete properties or accidents or qualifications, whereas creatures possess their natures always in finite, composite,

SPEAKER_02and diverse divided between substance and accidents, or potency and action, so forth, whatever you want to, whichever metaphysical system you want to use. If, however, Maximus were really saying that the being and nature of the creature are in any sense extrinsic to the being and nature of God, bound to God by no natural analogy, and that these otherwise unrelated or irreconcilable realities are reconciled to one another in Christ only by virtue of this hypostatic indifference of which Wood speaks,

SPEAKER_02he would be saying something absurd, something even a little atrocious. For one thing, it would be foolish to imagine that God and creation could really be posed over against one another within some more propitious context of existence. Obviously, finite beings can possess no real natural properties or protections that are anything other than participations in the being of God. The absence of any univocal commonality between the natures can't be the absence of

SPEAKER_02an analogous commonality in their most original principle. Why am I dwelling at such length on Jordan's brook? Apparently it annoyed me more than I realized, but that's not the reason. It's because it actually touches on the Christological point in When Wood asserts that hypostatic positivity and indifference are the properties that permit a union of incommensurable natures,

SPEAKER_02he's saying something that I believe cannot be made to be logically continuous, coherent. Neither such positivity nor such indifference could conceivably be a property of any kind. At least I take it that a positivity is whatever else it may be an actuality, and an actuality is by definition also a potentiality, and the only potentiality that it can make actual is already natural to it. Any personal hypostatic realization of a nature is the realization of a nature

SPEAKER_02that's always already intrinsically, personally hypostatic, which is to say capable of actuality only in and as personhood, whatever that may be. And this capacity, which is clearly proper to both the human and the divine natures, if the Chalcedonian definition or any of the others on offer at the time is correct, is already an essential natural identity which finds its perfect expression in the one indivisible person of Christ. Otherwise, nothing would have happened to me in the current situation.

SPEAKER_02Only the same intrinsic orientation toward personhood in the divine and human natures at once makes it meaningful to speak of them as fully actual in and as the same person, in such perfect unity that those natures are not merely contiguous, but truly co-inherent one in the other. So to deny that deification can be a, quote, supernatural mode of the preacher's natural activity, unquote, or in fact, natural at all,

SPEAKER_02quote, unquote, as Wood does, I mean, he says that this would limit deification to the proportions of a natural capacity, is to fail to note an inevitable axiom of all finite change, whether of agency or of patiency. Of course a creature's deification occurs only in proportion to the creature's natural capacity. Any transformation of a finite reality truly in excess of its natural potential

SPEAKER_02cannot be anything other than its annihilation. While any transformation of a finite reality that is not annihilation is by definition natural to it and so not in excess of its potentials. An argument also made it considerable elsewhere. The conclusion then that Wood should draw is not that deification exceeds humanity's creaturely capacity, but rather that humanity's creaturely capacity is naturally infinite.

SPEAKER_02Again, a thing's nature is not a particular attribute or quiddity among other items in that definition. It's simply what that thing is. actually, potentially. If a finite being exceeds what it is at present without ceasing to be itself, even if it can do so only with the help of some extrinsic agency, to go back to the last lecture, then the principle of that very exceedingness is innate to it. You can exceed your own native powers, but not your own nature.

SPEAKER_02Spirit is that which by nature always already exceeds the mere creature. And so its deification is a fulfillment of its nature and absolutely nothing other than such a fulfillment. If human nature can be actualized by a divine hypostasis, then divine hypostatization is a natural human potential, even if it can be conduced to its natural end only by grace.

SPEAKER_02I have to think what it would mean rather than say that hypostatic identity is the only real identity that differing natures can attain. That's the final claim of George Lucas. He argues it with great force at times, but I still see it as an inversion of logic. Hypostatic identity is possible only because of an always prior ground of identity in the natures. I'm certain that must be true, and I'll argue it more tomorrow. Tomorrow? Tomorrow.

SPEAKER_02Hypostatic identity is possible only because of an always prior ground of identity in the natures. I love quoting myself. I didn't mean to do my line twice. What could it possibly mean, after all, to speak of the hypostatic as a real dimension of agency and abstraction from the natural? What is this principle? It's neither properly natural or even supernatural, but quite literally preternatural, existing somehow in addition to all orders of human and divine. actuality.

SPEAKER_02How could we then say that the nature ever properly subsists at all in the person, or that the person has the power to make the nature subsist? What could it possibly mean to say that the hypostasis of the sun is both indifferent to the divine nature and also capable of something somehow more than the divine? Who then is the sun and what then is the divine nature? Is God then a being among beings whose nature can be exceeded? And how can this notion of hypostasis be reconciled with the use of the term

SPEAKER_02hypostasis in Nicene theology? To really shift into the Greek, it becomes the actual legitimate term, where its whole purpose is to signify the real subsistence of a nature as from the actual, distinguished only according to a certain mode of subsistence, a certain proposiparsis. And in what way can the hypostatic actualize in nature unless the hypostatic is in itself nothing other than the actualization of that nature?

SPEAKER_02If personhood is not understood as essentially the instantiation and subsistence of the nature it makes actual, and so as rooted in that nature has its own innermost potential, then it becomes an oddly nihilistic concept. a kind of ontological portmanteau within which potentially any collection of disparate natures and abstract properties might somehow be contained together in a preternatural accommodation that never truly united. This would conceptually sever those natures from their own intrinsic expression,

SPEAKER_02thereby evacuating the very category of nature of any real meaning and deprive persons of the power of truly expressing any nature at all. At that point, the word's prosopon and persona would seem to refer to the most superficial meaning, a mask, either dramatic or funerary, indicating only a kind of sterile hyxiety, a unity superimposed only as an outer aspect upon what in itself is just a confluence of diverging forces, as much a rupture as a union.

SPEAKER_02It's almost a sort of delusor vatarian sort of union, the ever-repeated univocity of person, the unrepeatable equivocity of persons. Rather than claim that the personal union of human and divine, either in Christ or in creatures, demonstrates a priority of hypostasis over nature, it would be better to say that the natural oneness of the human and divine in Christ follows from the principle that hypostasis is entirely the subsistence of

SPEAKER_02the nature it expresses and is exhaustively dependent on that nature. This alone as I'll argue in nights to come, renders the Chalcedonian formulation coherent. And so one still must ask what it is about the divine and human natures, what primordial commonality or identity exists between them at a level more fundamental than any merely univocal properties could occupy that allows them to become full, perfect, united expression in one and the same person.

SPEAKER_02The properly essential question of Christology, then, and the only one that can yield an answer that's more than a rhetorical gesture towards some more-than-miraculous quantum ignotum or persona ex machina, is not, how are two incompatible natures reconciled in a single apostasis? That's rather like asking how two plus two and seven might be reconciled in a single sufficiently dynamic or positive equation. indifferent to the difference between them. Rather, the real question is, how is it that a full subsistence of the divine nature and a full subsistence of

SPEAKER_02the human nature can be one and the same subsistence without contradiction? And only one answer is possible, it seems to me, or interesting. I'm going to start winding down now. And I've been terribly unfair to both these folks here now, especially to Jordan, apparently. I didn't realize there was such What I find most fascinating about their juxtaposition,

SPEAKER_02however, is that both authors arrive at what I can think of only as a two-tiered picture of creation, rather like that of the manualist tradition. Both allow for something like this pure nature, even if for both of them, as for the manualist tones before them, it remains always only a logical possibility rather than a real creative order. Williams grants the possibility of a human nature that's conceivable entirely in itself, not requiring to be deified to achieve its natural end, Wood insists,

SPEAKER_02on a logically prior irreconcilability of the divine and human that has always already been and has become by an innate but still non-natural union. In either case, I'd contend the logic of the Christian narrative must collapse under an insupportable weight of noble competition. And yet these are not two careless thinkers. It seems to me that what causes their views simultaneously to gravitate quote, opposed extremes, and yet nevertheless to converge on the same aporia is that same familiar tension written into the very terms of Christological orthodoxy as it has most often been

SPEAKER_02interpreted in theological tradition. Each author is, I submit, attempting to repair an irreparably disjunctive logic, chiefly because both the whole reading of the conceptual grammar of the ancient Christological controversies been in this country over a few days and I'm going native. Converses that cannot help but generate false dilemmas. It's still not going to eat Heinz beans at breakfast. You know, actually, one sees the same tension even in Maximus.

SPEAKER_02There's a troubling vagueness, for instance, in his choice of the word perichoresis to describe the relation of divine human and Christ, because as used in Trinitarian theology, after all, the term indicates a total co-inherence of the divine hypostases in one another and only by virtue of all three wholly possessing the simple form of the one divine essence, while differing from one another only in the upper modes of subsistence. By extension, then, the term would appear to be intelligible as applied to Christ's two natures,

SPEAKER_02only as indicating the distinction within a prior natural identity. So, indeed, as Chalcedon asserts, the two natures in Christ are at once unseparated and unconfused, But this is chiefly because no separation or confusion is possible, as there is no rivalry or repugnance or essential differentiation. It must be overcome. There's only the absolute unity of the primordial ground of its perfect expression in the minute moment of extinction to the infinite and finite.

SPEAKER_02So let me close just with a few observations that lead into the next lecture, which is about Bulgaco. When I speak French, or when I speak Bulgaco. I'm, in what's going to come, I'm going to be especially keen to resist various personalist theologies that arose

SPEAKER_02in the last century. in which it became more or less axiomatic that for Christian thought, uniquely a person is a concept transcended of and logically prior to any concept of nature or species. With this, obviously followed from the necessary claim that the two natures can be united in a single hypostasis, as well as from the assumption that hypostasis and person, in the sense we tend to give the latter word today, are somehow directly convertible . For most of theological history,

SPEAKER_02however, the very language of persons has been something of protean presence and has never assumed the stable form of conceptual clarity or moral centrality we sometimes want to imagine it has. If we reconstruct its doctrinal mystery, What we find isn't so much a lucid and specific idea naturally developing out of earlier epochs of Christian discourse, but something more like the tale of an uninvited dinner guest who, through a tenuous connection with one of his host's distant relations,

SPEAKER_02insinuated himself into the household and then by sheer tenacity somehow established himself as heir to the family fortune. The Latin word persona entered the Christian lexicon as little more than a siphon. called upon to discharge the rules of two distinct Greek terms of art, prosopon and hypostasis, and the former cases are more or less literal rendering in the latter for want of any better way in the Latin of the fourth century for representing the distinction between the two terms, hypostasis and usia,

SPEAKER_02which were themselves already hazily ambiguous ciphers whose principal usefulness lay in their syntactic rather than semantic distinction. What these words established within the dogmatic grammar of Christianity was that there is an essential what-ness, of which the Father and the Son and in time the Spirit could then be regarded as a subsistence, specified solely by a proper paternal, filial, or numatic mode of subsistence.

SPEAKER_02Most of the Trinitarian terms proper to the Nicene settlement were not names for clear and precise concepts. They were not meant to be. They were semantic tokens distinguished from one another in order to exclude alternative arrangements. And in being translated from Greek into Latin, the range of meaning in those terms was even then slightly impoverished. The clearest content of the word apostasis, subsistencia, in a more literal transposition of the Latin,

SPEAKER_02was progressively diminished, and the same is true of the term prosipon or persona, which gradually ceased to carry the clear connotation of an aspect or appearance of a nature essence. And down the centuries, in consequence, the language of person, or its equivalent in other tongues, has come successively to acquire, even within theological usage, all the attributes and connotations with which we've invested in any given epoch,

SPEAKER_02ethical, legal, psychological, social, or what have you. And all the while, we've been constantly, retroactively, and largely unconsciously altering our understanding of its usage in the traditions of all. You know, it's as I was going to say that the concept of person in any period of Christian thought is like a quantum potentiality wave in the standard Copeland interpretation, at least, that in being observed collapses into one particular history,

SPEAKER_02thereby, in a sense, creating its own past. But I'm going to leave off there and return to that tomorrow, at least, tomorrow morning. Thank you. As Professor Hart indicates, the lectures continue tomorrow evening at five o'clock. So please do return for the fourth in the series.

SPEAKER_02But we're very grateful to him for this exposition of tonight's lecture. And we have plenty of time for questions and discussions. So feel free to raise your hand and speak if you shall move. Please. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Hart. My question was How dispensable is Christology then?

SPEAKER_03Because it seems that the solution that we're tending towards is this. It's essentially the first part of what I'm talking about, or rather the early, it seems,

SPEAKER_02but I'm not here to much, so I might just say it now. So if we dispense with the idea that there is some kind of penetrability, something that's put together, what is the third thing?

SPEAKER_03There's a lot of dispensing with the whole thing. He says, do you mind humanity? Leave the Christology there.

SPEAKER_02And then you have the kind of antinomic, transcendental infolding of the absence So it seems that you can do all this stuff of establishing plus or minus the amount of grace in nature in exercise psychology. And that's what it seems to me. I'm sorry, I lost the last part of that sentence. I heard grace in nature, but I didn't hear the words around. I'm sorry.

SPEAKER_01It seems that you can do all the correct formulations and maneuvers with grace in nature.

SPEAKER_03using Trinitarian, Psychological, Transcendental, you know, the whole antinomic structure is simply this God is breaking through creation as creation.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, but that's, that's, actually that's not exactly what, that's not exactly what we're talking about. But the point for him is that Christology is what reveals the structure of the beginning, but it also achieves, creates, and perfects that structure. There is no, as we, will you hear the other? There's a difference between saying that human nature possesses the potential intrinsically,

SPEAKER_02naturally to be divine, that which is possible. doesn't mean that human beings or creation itself, which is entirely dependent on God in every sense, possesses the venamis, the facultas in scholastic Latin, for realism. Only that one who is in his logos as a man, as a human being, also entirely coincident with in total indistinction from

SPEAKER_02the eternal utterance of God the Father without any interval of difference can possibly be the ground, the union of all natures and God. He doesn't place Christology... It's true that the divine Sophia is the... Well, I'm going to talk about this tomorrow night, so actually I'm not going to say anything.

SPEAKER_01Perhaps in respect, perhaps what I meant was that we haven't yet living in the way that Jesus lived. Oh, I...

SPEAKER_02You have been levels of the way that we live, the way the price uncovered the way that we must live in that perfect union of

SPEAKER_03grace and nature. But in a sense, what you're doing is establishing levels within nature such that we are not really real. Yeah.

SPEAKER_02And of course, that's actually one of the things that Jordan gets right in his reading of Maximus, is that in a sense, for Maximus, creation has not yet actually happened. And I think that's a fair reading of Maximus' Logos theology. Yes, I mean, as I said, well, again, you weren't here the other time, but the creature exists only as becoming infinite called from non-being into infinite ascent into the divine, right?

SPEAKER_02That is nothing other than becoming what Christ is from eternity, right? From for the whole tradition. What's essential though is not to say is that the creature has any, or the creature, the nature has any sort of ontological specification of any kind outside that relationship. very strange notion that, I mean, what would it mean for God to posit over against God?

SPEAKER_02That which is infinitely irreconcilable with God, or that which is, you know, it becomes a kind of nonsense language in which you're simply seeking to affirm divine transcendence with a sufficient tone of holy awe in your voice through constant hyperbole. And it says nothing. Thank you. Thank you once again.

SPEAKER_02I think I'm following what you're saying about the compatibility of the divine and human natures being combined in the lens of systems of Christ. Sorry. I think I understand what you're saying there. My question is on the divinization side. And I'm wondering about whether the potential to become divine or the potentia, as you said, is if you see that there's also a telos to become divine and that there's not much distinction.

SPEAKER_02Is there a distinction between those two for you? Well, if you were using the Aristotelian line, which is good, I actually think that they properly understood that the Aristotelian system is one of rational relations that's modally impeccable. It's, you know, there's not like the potential exists other than as that which is as its beginning of motion towards the Thanos that defines it. These are not extrinsic forces in relation to one another.

SPEAKER_02Of course that was the misreading of Aristotle in the 17th century, the notion that we're talking about some causes extrinsic to one another. between origin and end, as between form and potency, is complete integrity. It's an identity, but it's an identity specified by the rational relations. Catherine.

SPEAKER_00Thank you. David, I've got lots to ask you about, and I read it now, but because Sally's here, I wanted to ask about... My favourite of her novels. Lesser assisting mediations. You've been talking about this radical taking up of the human person, the human being into God, this chaotic movement. And I want to know about this optional enchantment that accompanies that,

SPEAKER_00that you mentioned in your first lecture, the assisting mediation. mediations of angels and fairies and things. Tell us how this fits together, how this panoply of other beings are part of that vision. Yeah,

SPEAKER_02when I was trying to reconstruct the cosmology and intellectual world later particularly, I mean it is true that we have turned a way of understanding say the language of Paul, but the entire doctrinal inheritance is one of dialectical oppositions. It really is. Eternity is timelessness over against time. It's one or the other, without the Ionia, without the Ivan,

SPEAKER_02the angelic Ivan, which is there even in Thomas Aquinas. Really, that begins to fall apart. Really, the 16th century is clearly there. in late scholasticism and the Renaissance. And that same cosmological division, I think, is simply symptomatic of this whole notion that it's an either-or that is reconciled by an inherently paradoxical event,

SPEAKER_02which is, in one sense, the rupture of the logic of creation. or its preservation as an integrity over against God, depending on which of these two extremes are. I think the more generous view, yeah, I mean, you know, just as the angels pushed the planets and all that, and prayers to angels and saints and the influences of angels and saints were all part of this community of spiritual life in which there's a natural continuum.

SPEAKER_02I mean, as I said, of course, in late antiquity, the distinction between the spatial and the spiritual has not become what it is for us. So the thinking was at once both of a spiritual continuum and literally a cosmic spatial continuum, which, by the way, I still believe in. I still hold to the ancient cosmology. I don't believe in all this infinite space. Or if I do, I... But you're right. I see it as part of the same.

SPEAKER_02I was trying to cover a picture that in every sense has been lost, and yet it was the picture that Paul preserved. There simply is not in Paul language to nature. It's certainly not nature, supernature. any more than there is an oregano. It's just not. And the nature of grace distinction, works righteousness, all of these distinctions that we've imposed on the text,

SPEAKER_02I believe, are not only later constructions, but fundamental distortions. And if you were, so yeah, that was the connection. And I'm all for fairies and angels and the astral intelligences. I'd like to pray to Alpha Centauri with the appearance, but Joshua. Thank you, David. Obviously, I won't ask about Bulgarka because we can do that tomorrow.

SPEAKER_02But I just want to say I completely agree that obviously one can't say that Christology is dispensable in Bulgarka because Christ doesn't reveal a system that would exist indifferently in him. It is, of course, the completion of the creation, the act of creation. And the object. Yes, but I wanted to ask you really about Rome Williams, actually, and that passage that you brought out of the book on Christ, the heart of creation, yes, where that very interesting set of assertions about no authoritative demonstration

SPEAKER_02of divine power, sort of outside of, really, I think this is where... You probably could, you have a lovely voice. Thank you David. But I suppose it is the centrality of the cross for Williams, isn't it? It's just this idea, and I wonder if he would say something like, all of those demonstrations of theophany are relativised or subordinated to and become propodutics to the cross,

SPEAKER_02and I just wonder where that sits in what you're saying. Well two things. Plenty of gods die and rise, okay, and die badly, actually, you know, dismembered, you know. If that's the issue, what's different, obviously, so this is the real suffering of a real human being, a real historical individual, yeah, that's a radical revision of the picture. But a revision is not a contradiction, it's not... In John's gospel, there's a reason why.

SPEAKER_02Now, how one interprets it is important, but there is a theological statement being made there that's very radical. No one takes my soul from me. I lay it down and I take it up again. I have the power to lay it down. I have the power to take it up again. I mean, the point there is that, yes, on the one side is very much a human passion. Both the human and the divine are present there on the one hand.

SPEAKER_02The light, I mean, I think we all know that in the Gospel of John, the light of the resurrection is there from the very first. I mean, it pervades everything. The cross is already exaltation, already glorification for John. But that's not, you know, just the ambiguous paradoxical glorification of here is the broken body of man. It's firmly stated that this is an act. This is an act of sovereign power, divine power that he can lay down, he can

SPEAKER_02choose to die or not to die. And the point that I was making about this thing is not, again, I'm not denying there's a very big difference between the Christian story. It does radically alter everything. But it's also the case that many of the tropes of the late antique understanding of divinization or exaltation, Jewish, pagan, and both, You know the Second Temple literature, this divine angelomorphic ascent and descent.

SPEAKER_02I hate the term angelomorphic, but let's speak on static. It's very much a part of the Second Temple literature. It's very much a part of the Hellenistic world in general and understanding what it is for a divine agent to appear in humans. for human beings to be transformed into divine beings, into stars, to become glorified among the splendors, the glories. And that's the other point I was trying to make, is that it's not, most definitely is,

SPEAKER_02throughout the New Testament, the two idioms are both present in and with one another inextricably. And there isn't, and my problem with Rowan's book is that it's like they're on two sides of a partition. At least that's how it reads. And it's, I mean, I'm not a great, I don't have a great sympathy for Calvin's Christology, and that's the direction he goes in. The extra Calvinisticum right there. So...

SPEAKER_02Thank you again. Also a question and comment about Rowan's book. I'm the editor of the critical edition of Barrow's Scholastic Vision that Rowan begins with and builds that whole... I'm just not, I just have a very different, I'm not as fond of it as... all that. Well, that's the second half of my question. The first is, as grateful as I was that Rowan used that text, it feels very bolted on for me in terms of the structure of the book. He says that he's paying homage to Ferrer on the 50th anniversary of his death,

SPEAKER_02and then he does come back to him at the end, but I just wonder how much work does that introduction actually perform? Would the book have been better if he had just spent... It would have been better with something. I agree. I think it's it constrains him in the direction that he can go. And I don't like Ferrer's reading of Chavarro, to be honest. I think Ferrer saw the structure, but not the original rhythm.

SPEAKER_02If you remember in Chavarro, there's the original structure, the Urstultum, and then the All Rhythmus. And Ferrer got the first, the former, but not the latter. I'm sorry, I spoke over you. No, no, that's great. My follow-up question was, what were your objections to Ferrer's actual metaphysical framework? And you've answered that in part. Yeah, I think he creates a structural difference between the finite and the infinite that

SPEAKER_02ultimately becomes a partition between two things, even though that's precisely what he's trying not to do.

SPEAKER_01Yes, I have two questions. Well, the first is, to what degree do we think is the insight into theosis a question of revelation, and to what degree of intuition and rational insight, so maybe philosophical insight? And secondly, do we know everything about the theosis we can know, or is it an ongoing intuition revelation?

SPEAKER_02I don't, I mean, the distinction between revelation and rational reflection is one that I would draw very lightly. In actual practice, these things aren't separable. I don't think that revelation is an enigma that drops from the sky and we point at it the way the early Barts do. trying to articulate the unutterable. So I think it's always a matter also of rational reflection and speculation, but I also see that as a grace.

SPEAKER_02What we know is important to us through the light of natural knowledge, which is always already divine light.

SPEAKER_01There is no explained distinction between, let's say, Plato and Paul. Plato has maybe had more with it, grace the inside.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, but the, well, of course, Plato, it's actually, it's kind of hard to pin down because of variations, but the later Neoplatons, the Platonist tradition, especially by the time you get to Proclus, insists also on the divine descent for that reason. There's also a revelation at times when, uh, especially in certain episodes of Divine Dissension are absolutely crucial because it can't simply be theory of something that actually has to be a palpable,

SPEAKER_02sacramental, incarnate, and Catherine would like me to say theurgic, reality as well. But I mean, I think Paul Marshall's metaphysical argument just as much as he relies on revelation, definitely. For instance, just in 1 Corinthians 15, talking about the resurrection body, there's a very worked-out metaphysics there, obviously, as the influences of Stoicism, but also probably of emergent platonism.

SPEAKER_02I don't think we know, yeah, I mean, I... certainly we don't know what there is to know about theosis until we actually see face to face and know even as we are known, but I don't think it's the progress of false tongue which we work out the details better according to the dialectical method which we, you know, we've dispensed with one school because another has come, rather than the experience of theosis in each life. a disclosure of God through the disclosure of who I am.

SPEAKER_02The great greatness of the mirror of the soul is forever brightening, and one sees who God is in the mirror of the soul, which is becoming the uncreated. Okay, we're going to take two more questions. And then I think we'll break. So it's just brief because you've already. No, no, I just want to clarify.

SPEAKER_01When I say dispense, Joshua was right, of course, that I didn't mean to dispense. I just mean in the order of demonstration, there's a hurdle that seems to sort of mess too much up. That's all I meant. Of course, he doesn't dispense, yes. I forgive you.

SPEAKER_02I'm very gracious. Make sure I'm gracious.

SPEAKER_03Um, uh, first, uh, crisis written, uh, secondly, this is very, it's also nasty. Uh, and, um, it's very unsocratic question because it reveals the paucity of my, uh, my knowledge of this particular subject, but I was particularly keen on the emphasis on the understanding of, uh, of the passion as a, as a triumph. And what I wanted to ask specifically was in terms of, um, forget my ignorance, because this isn't really part of my Christian tradition.

SPEAKER_03the contrast between the understanding of the descent into Hades and the bestowing of life and the subsequent descent as a triumph, as opposed to, say, the Catholic reading of it as victorious Christ. I was wondering, is there a way to be precise about that?

SPEAKER_02You're betraying my ignorance here. What's that distinction? What's the distinction you're making? The distinction between... I mean, the Holy Saturday is celebrated by the Orthodox as a product of flinging laurel leaves, and you've done very well. Well, the other one, I mean, there's something about Hansel's and Balthasar's theology of hope setting, but that's a rather aberrant phenomenon in Catholic thought too, believe me. I mean, I agree with Robert that it was a bit bizarre according to at least the doctrinal tradition.

SPEAKER_02And I'm so busy, I actually don't know what your question is.

SPEAKER_03The question also is to what extent can we be presumed through the precision of language that we employ, be distinct about the understanding of the passion of resurrection as divine triumph and not to fall necessarily into the trap of using empty hyperbolic language to speak of it as being a case of Christ imagined as sort of invictus in two sort of miniaturistic or nationalistic sense?

SPEAKER_02Well, I mean, obviously it's the triumph of one who before his shares was done, like a lamb brought to salt. I mean, it's still the triumph of one who utterly recapitulates the human in total devotion to the Father by not using violence to dominate, but instead accepting, but as a sovereign act of freedom,

SPEAKER_02You know, that's the point of John and of Paul. I don't think it's hard to do. I mean, you know, of course, at this moment, in the history of certain branches of the Orthodox Church, the language of Easter has been used by a certain Satanist named Kirill. I mean, you know, Patriarch of Moscow, Satanist of the Center. At the moment, they seem to be the same thing.

SPEAKER_02But I think one of them has to be precisely that the cross is the triumph. It is in the Gospel of John. It's already exaltation. But at the same time, when you say that, this is the problem I, again, have with certain of the intonations in Romans book, is it's a triumph. It is an act of free power. It is not simply brokenness and passivity and dereliction,

SPEAKER_02right, it is the conquest of those things by one who will go to the Father by any route to find us along the way. It seems an appropriate note on which to end, but before we break, we thank Professor Mark Wormley once again for not only his lecture, but for his willingness to engage in conversation with us. And we look forward to tomorrow's lecture, the fourth and the final in the sequence on Thursday.

SPEAKER_02So Tuesday and Thursday, please do return for Professor Hart's final two lectures.

SPEAKER_01Thank you all very much.

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