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Leaves in the Wind

Leaves in the Wind artwork

The Light of Tabor: Notes Toward a Monistic Christology

May 29, 20241 hr 13 minAudio
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The penultimate chapter in this year's Stanton Lectures, again recorded - with questionable success - by the diabolical contraption known as the “Owl.” This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit davidbentleyhart.substack.com/subscribe

Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.

Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_02So don't say you haven't been warned with the recording in progress. The accent reminds me of that on a video game that my now very grown-up sons used to play when they were very small. Exactly the same voice I'm sure used to announce, much to their pleasure, target in sight. That used to say, sensors locked on.

SPEAKER_00I can still hear that voice now. But fortunately our sensors can be locked on to something fun or rewarding. This is the...

SPEAKER_02all of this year's standings and lectures being given by our guest, David Bengley-Hart,

SPEAKER_00on the subject of the light of table two notes,

SPEAKER_01a mystic Christology. Sorry, did I say something wrong there? Pardon me. So without further ado, let us welcome again, David.

SPEAKER_02I'm very demoralised even now, if I, if I, occasionally wince or reminisce. It's not you for the most part. I actually think it's my sciatic nerve or something, so it's giving me a bit of trouble. So forgive me if I'm occasionally more grotesque than usual. I will, in the final lecture, two nights hence,

SPEAKER_02Now, I just want to leave it a mystery that hovers over the whole thing, tantalizing and torturing. So again, as I do each lecture with the pericope, this one's very simple from John 10, verse 30. I and the Father are one. And I left off last night talking about the way in which the language

SPEAKER_02personhood in Christian theology has gone through its changes generation after generation, assuming any change. The meanings that we assign to whatever word we use for person in whatever language we're speaking in any given period. And I made some dismissive remarks about 12th century personalism in theology. But I do want to turn to a 12th century theologian, I think, who did understand

SPEAKER_02subtlety and penetration and a great deal of Russian Silver Age obscurity, Sergei Bulgakov, it seems to me at least that he made the best sense of that history of buying into person and tried to recover the understanding of the person of the Eternal Son in Christ in a way that was both true

SPEAKER_02to the centuries leading up to Nicaea, and also entirely true to everything that happened during the Concilia period and afterward. Beginning with Sertmann's relatively early theological texts, he gradually developed a model for understanding both the structure of personal subjectivity and the dogmatic language of the inter-Trinitarian relations without the sort of strain that such an operation typically entails,

SPEAKER_02what I've been talking about for the past several lectures, especially yesterday. In, for instance, the tragedy of philosophy, which only recently appeared in English and has received its most extraordinarily intelligent analysis from Joshua, he undertakes, in part, And offers there his first full account of what is at once a linguistic theory and

SPEAKER_02metaphysics of personhood and an ontology governed entirely by Trinitarian logic. According to his model, all existence has the structure of very simply an act of predication, an unmanifest subject becoming manifest in a predicate by way of the existential copulism, conjugate of the verb to be. Thus, for him, the structure of personhood is also the structure of being as such. The category of person spans not only the difference between the divine and human natures,

SPEAKER_02but also the difference between God and creation as a whole. Any person who can say, I am X, he argues, already thereby expresses the ontological architecture of all reality, since every substance exists not merely in itself as a subject, but also for itself as a predicate, and so in and for itself in the copula of the joint subject and predicate in the act of real existence. Every who and every what becomes manifest as he or she or this or that in the

SPEAKER_02living unity of an am or an is. This is also the reason for Bulgakov's very sharply expressed impatience with Kant's basically Cartesian assumption that there exists some gulf of alienation between the non-logical realm of the phenomena and the pathological realm of the noumenon, and therefore the subjective apparatus of perception is of its nature denied all access to the dinanzi. All being is personal expression,

SPEAKER_02is quite certain personal communion, and so the conditions of human knowledge and experience are the same conditions as those that allow for the existence of the known and the experience. And had I but whirled enough in time, I would linger over this at far greater length. But suffice it to say here that in that text, this scheme is at once a Trinitarian theology and also an anthropology. Quote, the subject, the hypostasis, always reveals itself, always expresses itself in the predicate,

SPEAKER_02while The plurality of the I is a fundamental axiom of thought and life that renders any attempt to think the I without only you unintelligible. At the same time, though, Bulgakov speaks also of an abiding transcendence within subjectivity, perpetually withheld the mention that he calls the subjects hidden depths or self-enclosure, or even that realm hitherto unknown to life. And these two sets of claims, though they might seem to be in a certain tension with one another,

SPEAKER_02they might seem to be in a certain tension with one another, require one another. In the much later work, The Comforter, Bulgakov makes it clear that it's precisely because the transcendence of the subject is in itself an undisclosed death, always in some sense logically prior to its manifestation or predicate, that the subject's total self-disclosure and self-realization In outward relation does not dissolve in pure process. It's precisely because that inexhaustible and indispensable in itself that is

SPEAKER_02always also given as in and by another, without ceasing to be in itself, that is also given to itself. See, it's ringing the changes on. and thereby constituted in the relation of any person or subject to its predicate by way of the copula is not merely some sheer dynamism by which an original interiority is somehow always already dissipated into its own exteriority,

SPEAKER_02but rather the imperturbable and abiding structure of personhood, which is of necessity a structure of the hidden and the manifest at once. Whenever Bulgakov argues that what is transcendent in the subject has been separated from what is imminent, he is necessarily asserting the reverse as well. There is in us, that is, a source of subjectivity that's never effaced, exhausted, or negated as the one and only source of the person,

SPEAKER_02even in being poured out in its revelation in another. a hidden depth that is always already manifest, but manifest also as a hidden depth. That we, I mean, I want to be clear, that the we that's always implicit in the I for him is not a social concord that either eventually yields a subject or simply dispels the hiddenness of subjectivity. It's the enduring hierarchy of the hidden and the manifest in their essential

SPEAKER_02convertibility with one another. not their opposition to one another in a hierarchy. The I of the subject is forever constituting itself in the we out of its, so to speak, ingenerate ground of subjectivity. All right, so this at any rate, I'm sorry to run over that so quickly, seems to be the general scheme one finds involved

SPEAKER_02other writings from the same period, something that's very hard to translate, because it's not even really Russian, but chapters on Trinitarity. He was a great one for inventing jargon, by the way. As much as I love Borgaco, I do not love his fascination with cumbersome, ponderous neologisms. I mean, some people find them exciting, but the picture that he unfolds there becomes clear, though only in later works.

SPEAKER_02The Comforter, especially, a very late work, has an epilogue in which the themes that are only adumbrated in the earlier writings, such as the inaccessible transcendence, the absolute subject rather than the manifest object of revelation, assumed a dominance that they had not previously enjoyed, And perhaps more explicitly than in those earlier works, Bulgakov applied this scheme to the life of the imminent Trinity.

SPEAKER_02In fact, Bulgakov claims that even within the imminent life of the Trinity, the Father is known to the Son and Spirit not only as Father, but as God, which is a strange assertion, you might think, but it follows almost inexorably at least one could argue this, from the one indispensable maxim of all Trinitarian theology and dogmatics, that the taxes of the economic Trinity is the taxes of the eminent Trinity. And that only by virtue of that identity is it possible to affirm anything about

SPEAKER_02God as Trinity in as much after all as we have no other access to knowledge about who God is. The Trinity is not, after all, a confederation of three individuals, any one of whom might go off on an adventure here below while leaving the other two behind, but Israel at the very order of relations whereby God is God. So one cannot conceive of the economy of revelation dissembling that eternal order

SPEAKER_02without effectively denying the reality of the Incarnation. The Divine Son is also a man only if his identity as the Eternal Son in relation to Father and Spirit is also who he is as that man. Thus in the kenesis of the Son in Christ, all that's not accidental to the humanity of Christ as Son ad extra, so for God-called reasons, must have its premise in the identity of the Son ad intra. The Kenneth quote,

SPEAKER_02the kenesis refers to the life of the God-man's personality, to his state, but it does not refer to his personality itself. On the contrary, according to the Calcedonian dogma, the entire power of the incarnation consists of the unchanging nature of the God-man's person. So, had the son's prayer to his God and father been only a temporary arrangement, this would have introduced a change into the very personality of the son, the Logos is. After all, and here Bulgakov is drawing on that angelomorphic language that I spent the first lecture

SPEAKER_02and the second, in fact, the angelic-orphic language of scripture and of the early church. And he does so without reservations in a real attempt to recuperate it into a theology of the logos as it emerged after Nicaea. The logos, the eternal and heavenly high priest, the great angel or angel of mighty counsel in whom the whole of creation is forever turned for the mystery of the Father, in adoration.

SPEAKER_02If then the revelation of the absolute in the world presupposes the self-revelation of the absolute in itself, as Bulgakov claims, it's a revelation not of natural or ontological differences among the divine hypostases, all of whom are equally God in infinite fullness, but of hierarchical distinctions within what he prefers to call the one trihypostatic person.

SPEAKER_02In that hierarchy of relations, the Father is forever at one and the same time both God revealing himself in the eternal chemesis of his love and also the unsearchable death of that self-manifest in abyss of love, the divine Archi, for whom the Son and Spirit receive themselves and whom they know as their own inexhaustible In his own proper idiom, or tropos epaxios, however, the father is not the object of that knowledge, but rather the subject who is being made known in the objective manifestation of

SPEAKER_02son and spirit. Now, it's vital here that when Bulgakov speaks, it's vital to understand, I should say, that when Bulgakov speaks of the interhyperstatic constitution of the divine life, he is not, again, speaking of three discrete persons poured out in one another as though from three distinct sources. Nor is he speaking of the dynamic exhaustion of transcendence in Genesis, or the exhaustion of the interior life of the Father in the absolute exteriority of begetting and procession or creation.

SPEAKER_02The Father is the one source of all that is, the one Fons Deitatis constituting the Godhead as the one trihypostatic person. This is not a threefold intersubjectivity, but a single subject in three hypotheses who are one in essence and three only as distinct moments within the structure of that divine personhood. And this must always remain a structure, as I said, of the hidden and the manifested ones,

SPEAKER_02subjective depth, objective revelation, if God is both one and truly personal. In that life of love, none of the divinities mode of subsistence, the tropos of Paxios, not the son of spirits as completely revealing the father and not the father as the transcendent mystery of the son and spirit revealed. Thus Bulgakov insists on the eternal identity of the father's inner word restrained

SPEAKER_02in silence and the utter of hypostatic qualities. Depending on one's taste for German idealism or either But this was, after all, the most notable advance that the 19th Constantinopolitan settlement made over earlier theologies that presumed an absolute disproportion between the Father himself and the Son and Spirit.

SPEAKER_02The transcendent hymniveness of the Father, which was axiomatic for all theologies, Nicene no less than pre-Nicene, was now understood as also made fully manifest in the Father's co-equal Son in the light of his co-equal Spirit. The whole pteroma of God dwells in Christ, as the New Testament says. He's illuminated by the Spirit. And yet still, the Son in that theology is not the hidden Father, and the Father is not the revealed Son. Finally.

SPEAKER_02And once again, I want to emphasize that for Wogokov, this is an account not only of the divine life, but of all personhood as such. In any act of personal existence, there is a subjective death that's constituted precisely as unified subjectivity, as that is a living I in the generation and procession of its predicate and copula, and then that death becomes a particular someone through this outward expression in its predicate,

SPEAKER_02as accomplished by mediation of real meaning, the and, the is, that predication. In that very act, the I must be constituted inwardly as what is withheld, even being given outwardly as what is expressed. In becoming a personal subject, that is to say, I become an object at once to you and to myself. In fact, my own subjectivity as pure subjectivity remains invisible even to me, and is known to me only in the act of reflecting upon what has been made manifest

SPEAKER_02to you, However, I'm known as the object of your subjectivity, which is of its nature withheld from me. Conversely, whenever you reveal yourself to me in words, even if it were possible that the words you speak should be not only perfectly true, but also miraculously wholly expressive of the full depth of your subjectivity, what you disclose to me still remains in itself a necessary hiddenness. What I know in the idiom of expressed words, you still possess also in the idiom of that interior word.

SPEAKER_02Were this not so, the event of personhood would be the solution of the subject. And in that exchange, whereby each of us is yielded up as the object of another's subjectivity, was each engaged in the other's constitution as a person, each allowing the other to come to himself or herself as the distinct subject of their village. Still, the structure of personhood abides, As Bulgakov writes,

SPEAKER_02quote, revelation of the noumenon in phenomena presupposes the subject of predicate and the copula between them. It presupposes that which is revealed, that which reveals, and certain unity or identity of the two, a mystery and its revelation, unquote. Thus, in his chapters on Trinitarity, for instance, Bulgakov can speak of the life of spirits. as the dynamic identity of subject, predicate, and copula, and also as the ontological love by which the I lives never in itself,

SPEAKER_02but always also in the you and in the he or she and so forth, and by which the I achieves self-knowledge only in and through the other. But he's no less insistent that this self-revealing subject is expressed out of an unrevealed state of death, his words, and the at the same time a certain silence, a certain expressed word, and a certain concrete life. The I, however it may come to itself as I or you or we,

SPEAKER_02all the while remains I. And once again, what is at issue here is not a process, not even an eternal and timeless process of interiority being converted into exteriority, or exteriority being converted into interiority. Rather, it's the eternal co-adherence of inner and outer, the hidden, the manifest, the engendered source, and its generated and breathed, that is living, discourage. You know,

SPEAKER_02much of, I, again, I myself struggle to enjoy the fictive idiom here, but the point he's making is wonderfully illuminating of what happened at Nicaea. reasons that I've already brought up in previous lectures. I just want to point out that much of the obscurity in Christian talk of the person lies in the simple and rather trivial reality that under ordinary conditions,

SPEAKER_02the first question one asks of any person that has that person is, who he or she is? In regard to God, that's a question that has to be qualified by the additional specification of whether it's being asked about God as addressed by creatures, and then whether God's so addressed as to be understood as the Father to whom Jesus directs us to pray, or rather as the Trinity, and then whether in that latter case, this is to be understood as an address to what Golgotha calls the one-ply hypostatic person, which each of the persons according to the distinct medium of the person,

SPEAKER_02and so forth. To inquire after the who of a human being, by contrast, is to seek not a simple answer, perhaps, but at least one whose subject is more or less precise or, at the very least, local. So one might legitimately wonder whether an analogical rupture occurs here within the very concept of personhood when we attempt to apply it both to God and to the creatures that are in the divine image. And here, too, we happen upon a certain seemingly irresolvable ambiguity in the way the language

SPEAKER_02of the person operates between the economic and the trinity. Jesus of Nazareth was none other, says Dogma, than the person of the divine son, while at the same time being only human in his very personhood. Firstly, the whole hope of the creature's deification in Christ depends on a genuine proportional equivalence between the exchange of divine and human natures in that divine person. and that same exchange within created persons.

SPEAKER_02And this creates something of a difficulty in defining how the hypostasis of the Incarnate Son is distinguished as one of the Trinitarian persons as opposed to the other two. After all, when tradition says that only one of the Holy Trinity suffered from the cross of Christ, surely this can't mean that Jesus' sufferings belong to only one of the divine persons as a private psychological subjectivity in a way that simply excludes the Father and Spirit as separate private psychological subjectivities.

SPEAKER_02To say that the Father did not suffer on the cross is not analogous to saying that it is not you who feels the pain when I cut my finger. All that claim can coherently convey is that the real divinity of the one who by Genesis suffered in Jesus of Nazareth is the real divinity. Sorry, not that divinity. It certainly can't mean that the divine son alone was the psychological subject of the passion, or that his is one of three such subjectivities within God.

SPEAKER_02God does not have a psychology, except, of course, by condescension. The psychological self of Jesus, the soul group, see he, the life principle, belongs to no one other than the Logos, but it did so entirely in the same manner as flesh and blood, as the form of the son's self emptied. Moreover, God does not possess three separate subjectivities, psychological or otherwise. To imagine he does would simply be tritheism, producing the Trinity with three individual subjective instantiations of a general

SPEAKER_02nature or essence. And that's certainly not what the Nicene formula is meant to suggest, at least not if the Cappadocian fathers were right about it. And they're the ones who secured the vocabulary of Nicene orthodoxy. And they maintain that it is the divine usia that, in a sense, founds the deity of the Trinity as personal. And that is, so to speak, concretized as the true triune I, that is, triune I,

SPEAKER_02in whom the three divine hypotheses are distinguished by relations of origin. By virtue of this essential oneness, quote, God is the absolute person, is therefore also the trihyperstatic person, truly one in three and three in one. He is not three in one, but the triunity of the divine person and of his life, unquote. We can then say at one and the same time, perhaps, that the divine simplicity is the

SPEAKER_02and openness of infinite persons, but also that the distinction of the persons within the one God is the result of the infinite simplicity of the divine essence. Otherwise, we trade in mythology, speaking of God either as an infinite psychological subjectivity possessed of plural affects, or as a confederacy of three individual centers of consciousness, in either case reducing God the transcendent source of all being to a composite being in whose subjectivity there will remain, even within the imminent divine life,

SPEAKER_02some sort of unexpressed interiority or interiorities, some surfeit of the indeterminate over the determinate in which some reserve of self is withheld by each of the persons for that person alone. Rather, In the divine life, each hypothesis is fully gathered and reflected in the mode of the other, as the one and as other, as it wants I and we. Obviously, for us, this can't be the case, except in the most tenuously analogous sense.

SPEAKER_02Even our presence to ourselves as discrete persons is in this life an incomplete and always inadequate revelation of our subjective depths to ourselves in an always incomplete expression or predicate, which is only partially actualized. Hence, once more, we come to ourselves only in and through others beyond ourselves, and can fully come to ourselves only in God. Our personhood is always as much beyond ourselves as it is.

SPEAKER_02In God, then, the intra-Trinitarian distinctions among hypotheses are distinctions not among separate subjects, but among distinct moments, each a troposypoxios within the one a good way of summing that book up. That's my attempt. Each of the divine hypostases is the one God in his folders, according to one specific idiom, but the one God nonetheless remains always the one trihypostatic person who was at

SPEAKER_02once the hiddenness of the Father, the express image of the Son, the living reality of both together in the Spirit. And so then to say of the Trinitarian hypostases it was the Son who suffered on the cross, is not to say that the Son alone, in the interiority of his own discrete subjectivity, experienced what the other two hypostases in the interiorities of their separate subjectivities did not. The purely subjective interiority of the Son in its full death simply is the Father.

SPEAKER_02The Father's fully expressed exteriority, the radiance of his glory, the impress of his substance, the apocryphal Hebrews 1.3, simply is the Son. The perfect life and actuality of the Father and Son as personal simply is the Spirit. Thus Christ names himself as the Son, saying, he who has seen me has seen the Father, but the reverse revelation would be meaningless. This is not a statement about a reciprocal relation between two selves,

SPEAKER_02but a structural description of the divine personhood. For the same reason it would be meaningless to suggest that some other of the three high discussed in the first lecture or the second. Wherever God is disclosed, there is the Son. The hiddenness of the Son is the Father. The oneness of the two in the divine life is the Spirit. One ought to say, for instance, not that the Son is the person, the divine person who appropriated the incarnation,

SPEAKER_02but rather that God incarnate, God manifest, is of necessity. The assertion that one of the Trinity suffered in the flesh is an idiomatic or a modal claim, not a claim about the subjective identity of the particular divine agent of the incarnation. Not suffered in the mode of the Son, who is at once the eternal mode in which God is reflectively present to himself,

SPEAKER_02and the creaturely mode in which God is subjectively present to us, who live, move, and exist within that life of the mind. and knowledge. The Father as unexpressed and unmanifested himself is present to himself and to creation and the Son, and so does not suffer in himself. The Spirit is the living presence of Father and Son to one another in the one divine life of love that, so to speak, eternally overcomes any abstract opposition. I don't even like that language of overcoming,

SPEAKER_02but any abstract opposition of hiddenness and manifestation. such as that between the not-suffering of the father and the suffering of the son, or let's just put it this way, when you experience pain, the always unmanifest source of your personal existence, call it the noose or the intellectus, if you like, or if you want to be a little bit more occurrent, the transcendental or perceptive eye, or if you want to be a little bit more daring and exotic,

SPEAKER_02the utmost, the soft-shade and the go for it, is not in itself either the agent or the patient of one's experience, but your conscious I is, and your existence as a rational spirit of the living unity of these truths that have been made actual constitute you as a real subject. Now that is, needless to say, a very distant, defective, and wholly inadequate analogy of what happened in Christ.

SPEAKER_02Even so, the not suffering of the Father is more like that than like your not suffering when I cut my finger. All of which is to say that the language of person in Christian thought, to the degree that it possesses sufficient analogical scope to make sense simultaneously of Trinitarian theology, of Christology, and of creaturely personhood, must be a language grounded not simply in the threeness of the divine hypostases,

SPEAKER_02but also, and no less securely, in the oneness of the divine essence understood as what Bulgakov, with his, again, knack for unwieldy neologisms, called the hypostasible, hypostasible, hypostasible oneness of the divine person who God is. And it's only in terms of that same unity that one can make sense of the claim that in the one person of Christ both the divine and human natures in their

SPEAKER_02wholeness are present and fully expressed, as well as of the reciprocal claim that creative persons are called to realize both natures in themselves in like manner, like race. Again, person and nature simply can't be separated. The explanation of how it is that human nature is not an impediment to union with

SPEAKER_02the divine in one person, or how it is that divine nature is not the destruction of the human in that union, is not, again, simply some ontological indifference on the part of the principle of hypostasis to the difference between the two natures, but rather, more originally, the primordial indistinction of those natures and their divine source. Yes, the principle of personhood is exclusively neither divine nor human, but that's only because it is always already both. At least, Bulgakov persuasively argues this as much.

SPEAKER_02He insists that there must be some prior commonality in the human and divine natures mediating and serving as the unalterable foundation of their union with Christ. And this he chooses to call Sophia, or Sophianicity, or divine humanity. or the pre-hypostatic hypostasibility of the divine essence as it is possessed of the Father, and probably any number of other things I'm forgetting just now.

SPEAKER_02All of which is to say, that intrinsic movement of personhood that is always already the essential going forth of the Father, both in the imminent divine life and in creation, that hypostasibility. The possibility of the incarnation, says Bulgakov, is not merely the correspondence of the divine and human natures to one another, but he insists it must be something more radical still. Quote,

SPEAKER_02even their primordial identity in Sophia, heavenly and preacherly, in as much as with regard to personality, the son of God's kindred and the sons of God's own grace, unquote. And this is one of those, delightfully exorbitant formulations that are so abundant in Bulgakov's writings that scandalously combine want and audacity with absolute logic and inevitability. Conversely, moreover,

SPEAKER_02the human being must always already be capable of receiving and encompassing the divine apostasis. Quote, by his initial essence, man must already be divine human in the sense such that one must postulate that same primordial identity between the divine eye of the Logos and the human mind. It's really surprising he didn't get condemned more often. He got condemned for the wrong thing, but the wrong thing is the right thing, as he might have been.

SPEAKER_02So should we all be. That's an extraordinary formulation, the primordial identity between the divine eye of the Logos and the human eye. It's also, I think, necessarily correct if the Christian story is more than a Beguiling fantasy. The Logos is the, quote, the pre-eternal God-man as the proto-image of the creaturely man. So all human beings are called to deification by their very nature, while the incarnation is the natural fulfillment of the human essence.

SPEAKER_02All persons, whether divine or human, is born of the same divine human hypostasibility, and so the perfect adherence of the divine human in the one person of Christ is not an extrinsic juxtaposition, synthesis of nature that's not their combination in some sort of ontological Tertian quid without any nature of its own, as the 20th century school of personalism wanted to suggest.

SPEAKER_02Rather, it is the whole of natural expression and enactment of both divinity and humanity in the always already divine and human principle of the person. Sophia, type of stress ability, divine humanity, what have you, it is that original commonality of the divine and human logically prior to any differentiation of the two natures that is also the perfect concordant commonality of those natures in act, even to the point of perfect identity in one and the same person. And once again,

SPEAKER_02given that aforementioned primordial identity between the divine eye, the logos, and the human eye, it's not only licit but necessary to say that the same logos that is the ground of the self of Jesus of Nazareth is also the ground of every self. But in Jesus, the self-subjectivity, his psychological self, is so perfectly transparent to that ground that there is no interval about it. There's no distance between the human eye and the divine eye. truly is God incarnate.

SPEAKER_02So too, all spiritual creatures existing only as participating in that divine source of the I are called to have their selves transformed into that very same transparency before their shared divine brain. Whitney wrote this book, way in which the German idealist language is giving way,

SPEAKER_02Gregory's accountable practices, and the mirroring of his mind in the ever-changing mirror of the soul. As finite beings, our reality as persons is both something given and something never as yet wholly realized in us. Our very nature is always also a project for us, one in which we are dependent on and responsible for those outside ourselves.

SPEAKER_02Each of us is and yet is ever seeking to become the I who can truly say I am. We become objects of our own reflective subjectivity by becoming also objects of the subjectivity of the other and vice versa. And yet the entirety of humanity by itself and even the entirety of creation still does not exhaust the depth possibility of that subjectivity and cannot bring that I fully to light. As Bulgakov says, God alone in his infinite spirit overcomes the mere satiety of subjectivity in

SPEAKER_02perfected love and therefore alone is entirely proven personal. Only in God is the full depth of personhood fully known and fully loved and loving. Each of us is in transit. Each of us is always as yet becoming a person and the I that we are always seeking to become is the I that the incarnate Logos always already is. It's not a break with Maximus' language of becoming the Lord, becoming uncreated.

SPEAKER_02The human being who is wholly human and being wholly God and who thereby entirely realizes the divine and human essence of our nature is that I. We become persons only in that perfect person who is the full expression of the one trihypostatic person of God. When, therefore, that dependence on others that constitutes us as living subjects becomes an ultimate dependence on the person of the incarnate Logos. Making his manifestation of the Father the object of our own subjectivities,

SPEAKER_02we are transformed into what he is. So again, as Gregory of Nyssa described this miraculous commerce of divine and human identity within us, really with exquisite loveliness as a kind of inverse and transfiguring reflection in the mirror of the soul's human structure in this manifestation. This reflection of the humanitarian order of God's self-revelation. And Bulgakov echoes Gregory when he says that one becomes a true and actual eye only in gazing upon the divine eye,

SPEAKER_02and thereby knowing oneself as the image and reflection of that divine sun, S-U-N. All of which seems to me to lead to a fairly inevitable conclusion. Bulgakov's is, of course, by any just characterization, a menacing metaphysics, but this isn't in any sense surprising, as much as any coherent metaphysics is a monism in some sense. grounded in some primordially irreducible and universal principle,

SPEAKER_02being, act, the one, God, infinite substance and infinite mode, the begriff, even perhaps difference, as pronounced in a strangely transcendental register. What is remarkable in Bulgakov's case, given its Christological foundation, is the claim that it's not merely possible and coherent, but necessary to say that among the privileged names for this most original of principles the highest of all is person or even the person,

SPEAKER_02though again he's not speaking in any way like the 20th century personalist theologians. That person is the one in whom all personhood has its existence and in which all things have their ground as personal. The one divine person who is all that is, who shall in the end be all in all, and who alone is forever the I am that I am, within every I good there is. And actually, I'll stop there tonight, because that leads nicely into the final lecture.

SPEAKER_02I'm sorry about reacting to the pain in my back. That's why my voice keeps failing me.

SPEAKER_01So forgive me. Now this happens in my back there. So let me go back. I'll leave it there for now.

SPEAKER_03Thank you very much, David. Excuse me while I read out.

SPEAKER_02The floor will now be open to questions. I have to say I will not be leading the way myself because As a mere historian here conscious, as Dr.

SPEAKER_00Johnson so wisely opined that in the historian the greatest powers of the human mind are dormant,

SPEAKER_02I have to surrender the ground to philosophers and theologians who I think are better equipped than I to grapple with this. So please, explore.

SPEAKER_00Yes, I have a question about and I would like to ask to what degree Spinoza's monism resonates with you.

SPEAKER_02Will you be here for the final lecture? Yes. Can I put off the answer for the most part to that? Yes. No, I mean, obviously, I mean, with Spinoza speaking of infinite substance in infinite modes, I mean, He's laying out a logical grammar that seems, I suppose, offensive to Christian sensibilities,

SPEAKER_02though it needn't be. But the sort of monism that I'm attracted to, I have to admit, is somewhat purely Neoplatonic or even Vedantic in that regard. It's the principle. I do, however, think that it is correct to say that the difference, well again I get to this in the last lecture, but the difference between the metaphysics of emanation and the metaphysics of creation ex nihilo is non-existent.

SPEAKER_02And that when we say that creation is the free act of God, which is true, what we shouldn't think that means is the deliberative choice of God as a deliberating agent choosing among a landscape of possibilities. The bonum diffusivum sui is the correct model for understanding. This is a modal definition of creation as entirely contingent, as possessing its being only in God,

SPEAKER_02and therefore having no ground in itself. But it should not be mistaken for a sort of voluntarist interval within God. In that sense, you know, Spinoza's monism, which is often written in terms of necessity. It shouldn't be, really, because in the absolute principle, there should be a modal collapse, not of, we should think of it not as the collapse of freedom into necessity, but the collapse of all modality whatsoever. So, you know, to that degree, I have no problems with Spinoza's basic intuition,

SPEAKER_02but I prefer Van Gogh's approach. I'm very fascinated because the figure of Christ takes a very central role for Spinoza. Yeah, strangely, yes. This is true. And I wonder whether it's maybe strangely, but not accidental. I mean, not accidental for him or not accidental. I mean, no, I don't think it is. I mean, I think to a very real degree, I mean, Spinoza is

SPEAKER_02philosophy was inflected throughout, just no less than the German idealist philosophy of later searching was inflected throughout by the Christian narrative. But that's a very long conversation.

SPEAKER_03Thank you for your question.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, thank you so much. I wanted to ask something related to Spoonzer as well. But it's a slightly different question. I'm wondering, is what Bogakov is doing through this introduction with the idea of personhood as this, if you want to call it the highest, you can say, attribute that we can give to God in that sense, does it move away from his system in a sense of making it come to life?

SPEAKER_02Oh, no, I mean, this, this, I think, is clearly the case. And it's not just Bulgakov. I mean, it's Victor Hegel and Schelling, of course, in a sense, answering the Spinoza picture. I mean, this goes back to the Spinoza controversy of the time. So, yes, the answer would be yes. It's right. And, but what's fascinating to me about the reason I inserted Bulgakov into these lectures is what he does with personhood is radically different obviously whether

SPEAKER_02the theme for him is not what it became in 20th century so much 20th century theology especially in the great deal of orthodox theology which we sort of back to his claims about hypostasis you know personhood is somehow a higher reality than nature which sounds very moving you know as a kind of parametric force to But when you think it through, you realize that you're not really saying anything meaningful there, and all you're doing is creating not only a mythologically inert version of what

SPEAKER_02nature is, but an absolutely rhetorically vacuous cipher, a person trying to cover a logical . But yes, the answer is yes. The simpler answer is yes. Could you,

SPEAKER_00David, from a position of student ignorance, ask where this, you spoke about how the person you're wishing to discuss, the person you're wishing to discuss is very distinct from 20th century personalism.

SPEAKER_02What is the nature of that distinction? Where has this personalism, as you see it, gone wrong? Well, in the last lecture, I covered this in some length. I mean, for one thing, I just think it's logically incoherent. It makes no sense to say, for instance, the bipartisan But it just means nothing in general anyway. I mean, I think that there's sort of impeccable, again, I keep using this term, impeccable logic that what actualizes something is nothing other than the

SPEAKER_02actualization of that something. If a hypothesis actualizes a nature, then that nature is naturally hypostatic in that way. It just becomes a sort of empty assertion. But it became a sort of affective, emotive theological position in the 20th century in which we were somehow, you know, a high tide of existentialism. We were somehow affirming the existence before us

SPEAKER_02lent a kind of dignity to the dynamism and specificity and mentality of the person as such and elevated personhood over abstract essences and so on and so forth, all of which, again, as I say, has an affective force to it. And then when you're thinking through it, you realize it has an immovable force. It really is all just vacuous rhetoric. Bulgakov is not doing that. He's doing quite the opposite. If rather than thinking of person as a kind of abstract word,

SPEAKER_02not abstraction, a kind of terrestrial equivalent, actualizes an abstract essence and thereby individuates it. I'd say it's just the opposite of the primordial principle, this person and nature or natures are the individuation of that principle. It's the reverse. Joshua, if that's still there.

SPEAKER_00I've got one more question. Thank you, David. I found that immensely powerful for two reasons, actually. The first is I just haven't really ever connected what Bogart has to say in the Tragedy of Philosophy about everything that we think of as a binders. Empirical subjectivity belongs on the side of the predicates in the way in which in that way you're able to say that there is a psychological person, as it were,

SPEAKER_00I found that very illuminating. And the other thing that I continue to struggle with, and I found the way you addressed it very helpful, is yes, you simply say that we can maintain at one and the same time that the Father is at once God manifest in the kenosis of his love and is God in some way hidden. And I suppose the difficulty that I have not with what you're saying, with what Bulgarko says, I suppose, is that you've made it clear, I think, to me why we have to have these two definitions of,

SPEAKER_00you know, Bulgarka will say a person is their kenosis, you know, and he says each person is their popomodem kenosis. But for this not to be vacuous, I think is the word you're using, or the fuller text, you have to have this structure of the hidden maps. I think that's right, surely. I completely agree. I suppose, I just don't know, does your account meet what Bulgarka feels he does have to say about the father? When he says that the son and the spirit behold the father, you know, before them, living in himself,

such that there's almost a relation of opposition between them,

SPEAKER_00as there is between, I behold, you living in yourself. And I wonder, does the account that you advance require the length that Borgarco seems to go there? Well, it's the problem.

SPEAKER_02The thing is, for one thing, as we've said, as you and I have said, with Borgarco, it's always both and, right? Yes. They want to go in there. but you then qualify it in a way to see what you said in the office. But yes, in the sense that there are two issues. One has to do with revelation, which is that there is a tax system of economic Trinity, which is our sole access to.

SPEAKER_02I mean, the whole history of the conciliar definition of Trinity relies upon this, that what is revealed in the relations made manifest with Father, Son, and Spirit in the mission of Jesus is the real revelation of the knowledge of God in the imminent Trinity. Because otherwise, all diatribal language, all theological language is nonsense. And it also would, of course, reduce God to this sort of strange father to a subject who creates a sort of

SPEAKER_02ordained exterior, okay, kind of alternate nominalism, you know, which God really is just pure deus absconditus. But also there has to be a ground of the relation of the structure of all being present as we know it already in God. That somehow though in God it is that one simple infinite act of I am that I am, still even in eternity, is the fully comprehensively,

SPEAKER_02fully exhaustively accounts for the logic of we, you, I, and all the ways in which the hidden subject is predicated in the literature. So for him to leak that out would leave a kind of strange logical horror in the story in which what happens in creation that isn't that of an alienation or a declension from or some opposition between the structure of ourselves as

SPEAKER_02spiritual beings and the eternal reality of God who is who I am. So I don't think, I mean, you may not want to do it quite the way it was because, of course, he's also remembered because he's more of a box priest, he's in the tradition, he's trying to recover a proper appreciation of both Alexandria and the 19th century, he's trying to, because He doesn't want, because it is part of the tradition, this language of Christ as prophes, of the heavenly high priest, the angel of might and counsel,

SPEAKER_02the one who leads the liturgy of eternal intelligences and all that. So he's trying to do justice to all these things at once. But I think at the level of just a lot of logical, of consecutive logical consistency, he does need to do that. Whether the way he does it, George and I are going to have But, I mean, this is true also in this different way of Hegel, you know, I mean, like all the Russians in that period, it's the German idealist tradition, it's wrestling with the ones appropriating and altering,

SPEAKER_02so.

SPEAKER_00There's one other thing, just quickly, which is one of the things that I find very interesting about this, is it does mean that on the one hand you will say the Father is the transcendent, even within the Trinity, i.e. that, and the Son and the Spirit are cataphatic persons in a way, but what I find interesting about this is on the one hand, the father looks most like what we recognize as personhood, and that's why he said we are, in some ways, an imago patris, because we are subject to who the father is. And I find that very interesting as well. And I don't...

SPEAKER_02But he's clear that even in that, imago patris, without that pure subjectivity ever being an object to itself, except as perfectly expressed. Absolutely, yes. But, you know, I do find that fascinating. And again, as I say, Well, Galkov has always had this effect on me. The more dissonant my initial reaction to what he's saying is, the more I realize that it's logically irresistible.

SPEAKER_02Now, question A. I have a question about the radical change that you suggest in the locus of subjectivity.

SPEAKER_00I have a question how we then should understand the suffering Christ on the cross.

SPEAKER_02Because it seems that neither the Father nor the divine logos could suffer on the cross. So I wonder why would that be? No, I mean, remember what I said, we were here from here earlier, right? Yes. That's what I talked about in Passover, how this is not, all it asserts is that what God knows knowing our suffering, for instance, isn't a pathos as it is for a final being,

SPEAKER_02a qualification or a reciprocal qualification between substances. It's purely act, but for that very reason, it is related to the mode. So I would say that if you follow that properly, only all of us can fully know human suffering. We can only know it in part because he is infinite act and such. is capable, but I'm not quite sure why you would say that. When I say the Father doesn't suffer in say, I don't mean that there's a separate subject that's not suffering.

SPEAKER_02What I mean is that transcended ground of subjectivity is not the manifest act of agency on suffering in itself, but in and by through the Son in the Spirit. So it's not the case that there are three distinct moments of subjectivity so much as God as infinite subjectivity, as infinite himness, as infinite I, is the Father. God as manifest, as is the Son.

SPEAKER_02God as... That language of tropos and parxos really should be taken seriously. It's not just a rhetorical tropos. It's not simply, this is how we talk about it means that these really are the modes whereby God is God, as distinguished from one another, but as one in the divine essence, in the hypostasical divine essence. I don't know if that made things any clearer if I just went in circles there, but I know what I'm saying.

SPEAKER_02We have a question there. Oh, well, I'm afraid to ask it. I think I'm more sympathetic social humanitarianism. So you're trying to do this. That's my question. I mean,

SPEAKER_01I think it's possible to articulate forms of social humanitarianism that are not tritheistic, at least not intentionally. Yeah, I didn't mean to run over your neck. Therefore, I didn't.

SPEAKER_02But what I was intrigued by was that I love my either tritheistic or mythological I wasn't sure if that was you or... I don't know. So... And there I was using the mythological approach, which I normally don't. Well, that was my question, because I mean, if I was going to take the horns of the dilemma, I would go with the mythological, but in a more positive way. Well, look, I mean, even Borgaco has a social result.

SPEAKER_02He's not. Precisely, there is a we there. But the important thing to realize is that that we is not a concord of separate selves that results in a unity, which is meaningless anyway. It obviously wouldn't make any sense to speak of God. That really would just be tritheism. And then tritheism, a polytheistic variety, because it would be finite beings.

SPEAKER_02But there is, I mean, I mean, even the business of the Spirit and the Son, you know, praying for Father as God, and the Son praying for Father as God, but not just as Father. I mean, you know, everything, all the differences we see in Freud, for him are real, have to be affirmed, but they have to be affirmed firmly within the advice of proper understanding that this isn't eventuating in a unity, it's the very structure of that centering unity.

SPEAKER_02I think that I'd be careful in saying your own sympathy for social Trinitarianism, simply because of what that totally means in most people's minds. I mean, they really do. I mean, if we really talk to persons who are deeply committed to this, you will find that they are, in fact, Tritheists, and they do, in fact, think far worse than the Spirit. three guys who got together one day and said, let's be God. Not quite that. I'm being a little unfair there. But they do think of the subjectivity of each of them as like a psychological subjectivity.

SPEAKER_02You or me. Maybe even Donald Trump. I'm not sure he reaches sentience. Sorry. But you know. Animal kind. Animal kind. Or a mother who doesn't. It's the kind of thing we get to do. But But yeah, no, that's not absent from Volgakov. I don't mean to give the impression. It's because I'm heading in one particular, I mean, all of these lectures, obviously, they're setting up a picture that puts the emphasis on that I am,

SPEAKER_02the oneness of that I am. In fact, if anything, Volgakov goes a little too far in that direction in my taste at times. I mean, you can say it's okay, you know, you should be willing to Father, Son, and Spirit is having their own, you know, he almost talks at times as if they're their own agendas. I think we have time for a final opener. I think we've got a couple of questions.

SPEAKER_02Fred and then... I'm just going to say in your first and second lectures that adequate Christology

SPEAKER_01properly integrates metaphysical and mythical aspect.

SPEAKER_02How is the mythical informing the Christology that you've been developing? Well, that's where it all is, the next lecture. But I gave an indication when I talked about what origin that was coming. Which I think that whether or not we're willing to appropriate an origin-like story

SPEAKER_02I mean, he doesn't think that this is a dispensable fiction, but he insists that within that story, the identity of the Eternal Son, of the Logos of Jesus, should not be understood as the descent of the Logos as a subject in the way that, you know, the Apollinarians with some aspects,

SPEAKER_02and that rather what has happened in Christ is the absolute, the perfect, the interval-less becoming God of a man, or becoming God of a spiritual creature. I mean, it could be, I mean, it could be, I actually do believe, this is where I agree with John Bear, whereas I agree with him on the essential theological insight about how the structure of Christology works in Origen.

SPEAKER_02I disagree with him in saying that there is no actual descent into the flesh in Ionian. I really do believe that Origen did believe in the pre-existent Ionian agency that comes here. It's just that the identity of that agency, that story alone is not fully adequate to describe place that story within the deeper context of something like what Gokul understands

SPEAKER_02the mystery of the incarnation to be.

SPEAKER_00I always ask a really simple question to do well to honor it. So another simple question for you. I've been reading Anselm recently. to pursue substitutionary atonement.

SPEAKER_02Obviously, he's... I actually don't believe that Anselm's account is substitutionary. Oh, okay. I think the very first theological article I ever published was... I'll go back to the archives. But the question I have for you is if we share the same nature as the Son, where does the incarnation pan into your theology of atonement? And I was wondering if this is freedom from the sarks, or freedom from the flesh, or if there's a different personal guilt or sin that we're needing to be free from.

SPEAKER_02A personal guilt? Well, I mean, we're all sinners, yeah. Of course. I mean, it seems like under Anselm's logic,

SPEAKER_00we need to be free because we have a sinful nature that's an original sin. And so Christ...

SPEAKER_02takes on. In point of fact, just to be clear, in Anselm, I mean, what I would say in some soteriology is one of recapitulation, actually, and that is the repair of a wounded nature. That's true. By having it united to its one true archetype and instantiation, it's actually much the same argument that Athanasius makes about God having to preserve his archetypes. It's really it looks like the substitutionary model until you actually look at it more carefully.

SPEAKER_02In fact, he rejects the substitutionary model quite explicitly before he gets to his argument. But putting that aside, that's the issue. You know, when I say that the human and divine natures have their ground in the one divine nature, the goddess, the nature of all natures, that doesn't clearly be a specific condition or state of, if human nature really is a modality of the divine nature, there's no reason why you,

SPEAKER_02in possessing that nature, don't also possess it in a way that's essentially wounded and broken and you're incapable of healing yourself. The assumption, I have no problem with the assumption of nature in my language. I mean, again, that's just simply constitutive of Christian orthodoxy. I simply want to understand what that means and what I can take into me and what I think is fundamentally incoherent to suggest that it means a second light.

SPEAKER_02Well, what I attributed to Jordan Wood in the last lecture, you know, just trying to create an opposition between two genuinely discontinuous natures by introducing the magical category of a positivity which to me, again, is simply meaningless. And I think Bougainville's right. The deeper ground of the unity, it's not a synthesis.

SPEAKER_02It's not a unity achieved by the overcoming of the colonial distinction. It's the restoration of the colonial unity. If you don't mind me just asking for I don't mind at all. I do begin, I mean, after a while, the meter ticks off. We'll see how close we get. Where in particular does that, the reunifying happen? Is it, because it's not, it doesn't sound like it's in the Psalms for you.

SPEAKER_02Well, it's certainly not for Paul. I mean, Paul clearly says that that is what passes over its most, you know, passing away at the old age, flinging on cat and arrow to cat and arrow to cat. So far I haven't said anything for myself. These have all been attempts to reconstruct a picture. I honestly believe that our understanding of Paul's theology and the metaphysics of late antiquity that he existed within is fundamentally flawed through most of Christian doctrinal history,

SPEAKER_02and I'm just trying to pull mean a sinful human nature he was literally death bound mortal composite fleshly life so no the uh the restoration occurs for him most definitely in christ being life-giving spirit and being being refashioned in the true frame of all spiritual being

SPEAKER_02from the condition of flesh and blood to one of spirit, which for him, of course, is both vivifying in a way more than psichias, but also, in a sense, an element, a substance. The body itself is made of spirit. And that requires death. It requires, yeah, well, as long as we're trapped in the body of death, it's the dissolution of that. But it requires, again, Christ's death, the death of the one who has the power to defeat death and die and become a healing spirit.

SPEAKER_02And if we can die into that death, you know, who died in Christ and raised in Christ, yes, that's what's required. Thank you. Now, I think David, but I'm right in saying that Thursday evening's lecture will be the culmination of this sermon. Yes, and indeed of the whole Christian tradition. Perfect. Then after theology will become obsolete.

SPEAKER_02With a trailer like that,

SPEAKER_00who could possibly fail to be here with me and with David on Thursday evening

SPEAKER_02before we go, I'd just like us to show our appreciation for the continued wisdom that we've had.

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