Skip to content
PodSubs
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEvents
More
BlogPodCred
Menu
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEventsBlogPodCredNetworksSign in
Join nowSign in
  • Shows
  • People
  • Jobs
  • News
  • More
    • Guests
    • Events
    • Blog
    • PodCred
    • Networks
    Join nowSign in

Leaves in the Wind

Leaves in the Wind artwork

Fields as Formal Causes

May 19, 202435 minAudio
ShareXLinkedInFacebookWhatsAppEmail

[I am DBH’s temporary guest-editor while he and his family are taking time to themselves. This conversation was recorded on the evening of 10 May, at the London home of Rupert Sheldrake and his wife Jill Purce. Dr. Hart and his son were visiting for dinner, at which A. N. Wilson and his wife Ruth Guilding were also guests. Before everyone had gathered, there was time for RS and DBH to slip upstairs to the study for this quick conversation.] This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit davidbentleyhart.substack.com/subscribe

Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.

Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00Well, welcome, David. I'm very pleased that you're here in Hampstead, England. And it's wonderful that we can actually meet in person. Thank you. I do have an agenda. There's a question I'm burning to discuss with you. And whether or not you think it has any value or not, I haven't the faintest idea. But I've been thinking a lot about the basic principles of physics recently and

SPEAKER_00trying to think about them without the fog of mathematics that normally occludes all discussion and prevents all thought on the subject. And what I'm really interested in is the question of fields, the fields of nature, which include the gravitational field, the electromagnetic field, quantum matter fields, the strong and weak nuclear fields, and in my own hypothesis, morphic fields.

SPEAKER_00The fields of nature. As causes. But the thing is, as you and I and many other people have discussed, the mechanistic revolution in the 17th century, formal and final causes were amputated from nature. We were left with just material and efficient causes or material and moving causes. Yeah. But when field theory was introduced into science in the 1840s by Faraday,

SPEAKER_00it was a profound revolution that in many ways went beyond mechanistic understanding. And although fields have been crammed into kind of classical science and the physics textbooks and all that kind of thing, They don't follow the rules. And I've got this illustration that I thought I might try out on you if you're up for it. Probably I'm always here. Yes. So this is obviously a white plate. And what I have here, a series of small bar magnets.

SPEAKER_00There's one. And each one has a north and a south pole. Now, normally, when we're told about magnets, you know, the north pole repels other north poles and attracts south poles. And it sounds as if repulsion and attraction are equivalent. You know, they repel or they attract in seemingly equivalent ways. But actually, what happens is there's a formative process going on. And what I need to do is just throw individual bar magnets down.

SPEAKER_00And if attraction and repulsion were equal, you'd end up with a kind of random melee of magnets. That's not what happens.

SPEAKER_00Sue. You see, although attraction, repulsion, Northens, like poles, repels, different poles attract, sounds as if it's equivalent. In practice, attraction dominates. And what's happening is a formative effect here. What's happening is clearly some kind of formative process. Now, let's see if we want to guess both in the screen. There we are.

SPEAKER_00a kind of formative process where there's a kind of causation involved here which is not material causation because the magnetic field isn't material and it's not really energetic in the sense I have to throw them in and there's a certain amount of energy but what's pulling them together is a force a magnetic force and But that force is not moving energy.

SPEAKER_00It's something else. It pulls them towards an end. They're attracted. But when the magnet, each of those magnets, when it attracts another magnet, loses no energy. when it attracts it. There's no expenditure of energy. And if you have a magnet on your fridge door and it's holding up a piece of paper on the fridge door against the power of gravity, it can do it for years on end. And it's not expending any energy to defy the power of gravity.

SPEAKER_00And so when a magnetic field or a gravitational field is operating, it's not expending energy. So take the Earth's gravitational field to look at another formative field. The formative effect of gravitational fields is usually to create spheres, the moon, the sun, the Earth. But say there's a meteorite heading through empty space with a particular velocity. If it's attracted towards the Earth through the Earth's gravitational field and

SPEAKER_00zooms down and hits the Earth with a big bang, The meteorite hasn't gained any, well, it's gained potential energy from the Earth's magnetic field, which gives it kinetic energy, which makes it hit the Earth. But the Earth has expended no energy whatsoever in making that happen. In fact, when the meteorite arrives on the Earth, the mass of the Earth increases a little bit and its gravitational pull increases significantly. So what I'm suggesting is that the gravitational fields and the magnetic field are

SPEAKER_00acting as formal and final causes. You know, when Aristotle said, a stone falls to Earth because it's seeking its proper place and it's a final cause, actually, that seems to be the case. So I just wondered, and I've never seen this discussed in philosophy of science anywhere.

SPEAKER_01It's very attractive though, isn't it? Of course, when formal and final causes were banished from scientific language progressively in the 17th century, They had already, in a sense, been converted in the minds of many into extrinsic physical. So they were still being thought of in terms of mechanical energy, mechanical relations, push and pull.

SPEAKER_01But of course, that's not what they actually are in Aristotle's law. There they really are a set of rational relations that are logically prior to the actions of that obey them and that are indiscerpable from one another. But actually, I never thought of this before. No energy expected. Yeah, I mean, of course, that's always been the issue with fields, hasn't it? I mean, we don't really know what gravity is.

SPEAKER_00No, Newton was baffled by it, and he never came up with, you know, his ultimate answer was in terms of the divine will, because he thought matter itself couldn't have the power to act on all other matters through the universe at a distance.

SPEAKER_01the very notion of a formal cause was something that had been so utterly altered by the early modern period in people's imagination. There was already a sort of tacit mechanism that had come into scientific or natural philosophy as early as the 14th century. And I think that by the 17th century, it was a fairly established way of misreading the Aristotelian traditions.

SPEAKER_01But what you're saying makes, I have to say, a surprisingly kind of sense to me, because what a formal cause really is, in Aristotle's thought, is a rational relation of order that explains... possibility that doesn't seem to be inherent merely in matter and motion, right? A set of ordered relations dictated by an antecedent finality,

SPEAKER_01which again isn't something that things are necessarily aiming at, but the perfectio, the complete expression of their potentials. It's an entirely different understanding of causality than the mechanistic picture. You might be right that maybe one of the reasons that we find fields so baffling trying to define them is because we are

SPEAKER_01we're using a truncated causal ideological language. See, you've taken me off guard here.

SPEAKER_00It's all right. I mean, it's all right for me, but I'm maybe not all right for you particularly. The thing is, you see, well, I mean, it's only recently that I've got excited by this because I've always thought that my whole hypothesis of formative causation with morphic fields is all about morphic fields as formative causes or formal causes. But it's only very recently that I've come to realize that all fields have that property. And that if you say what you were saying about Aristotle,

SPEAKER_00something that's not just contained in the matter or in the movement, which gives a rational order, then the organization of these magnets that we just looked at, lining up is a formal pattern. It's to do with rational relations and stuff. It's nothing to do with the matter because the matter of the iron magnets, if you demagnetize an iron magnet by heating it up, the actual amount of iron is still the same. The weight is still the same. The molecular, the atomic constitution and crystalline form is much the same.

SPEAKER_00All that's happened is it's lost its magnetism. And so So it's not the material cause, the iron, that's giving this effect. And it's not the way I threw them on the plate that's causing this effect. Because if I'd thrown little bits of ordinary iron, if they were demagnetized, they wouldn't have lined up like that. Right.

SPEAKER_01You know, I have been fascinated in recent years by the field, is it Paul Davies, the fellow with the demon in the machine, this desire to find a way of writing information into the fundamental laws of physics. But always with the presupposition, I think, I mean, I can't speak for them, the presupposition that what they're hoping to do is to write the laws of information into physics according to the paradigm of mechanisms still.

SPEAKER_01Yes. So that in some sense you can get from information theory to the information itself. Of course, information theory concerns only bits, transmission of information. Yes, it's very limited. Right. In fact, they would call it the syntactic rather than the semantic. I wouldn't even call it that because that's a misuse of the idea. Syntax already isn't order of symbolic relations, rational.

SPEAKER_01What they're really talking about would be more paratactic. And of course, I think that's the fundamental error. They realize that there is something missing from the picture that explains the propensity towards order that seems, I mean, even negentropic order. which you see everywhere in life, but they want to do it in a way that's still continuous with the 17th century

SPEAKER_01scientific revolution's basic premise that everything is a mechanistic relation.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, well, I think it was doomed to failure because I think what I think anyway, I mean, obviously, I don't represent the majority of you, but I think the key word is form, not information. Right. I think information means puts form into something. It just mystifies the whole thing by creating another mathematical fog because then you think information theory, quantifying bits and all that kind of thing. Whereas the plain English word form helps to explain, you know,

SPEAKER_00the form of the sun is roughly a sphere and so is the earth. And the form of these bar magnets are sort of long, thin things and they join up into an elongated form. All these things are plain in our mind's work in terms of recognizing forms. That's what they do. I mean, it's information simply obfuscates the issue, in my opinion.

SPEAKER_01No, I haven't. I mean, you're speaking to the converted, actually. In fact, the book that I have coming out in August has at least in part an argument just to this effect. And I also agree that it's doomed to failure to try to understand the ordered relations of things such as... you see in a magnetic field or arising from a magnetic field or imposed or impressed by a magnetic field.

SPEAKER_01In terms of information theory, anything that was to quantify it in terms of allowing it to be dissolved into relations between discrete quanta of energy or mass is not going to succeed because the form is inherently a top-down structure. Yes. Even when you're talking about semantic and syntactic information in terms of information theory, one of the more nonsensical suppositions that one gets both I think in

SPEAKER_01But evolutionary theory, but also things as diverse as linguistics and physics and any other number of differing spheres of concern, the notion that somehow one can move from the quantification to what is clearly a qualitative state of ordered relations that does not emerge naturally merely from mechanistic juxtaposition or the

SPEAKER_01exertion of one force on another is never going to work. You're never going to be able to demonstrate how the one arises from the other because it's precisely the opposite, isn't it? Yeah. In fact, even in information theory, this should be obvious because, of course, information theory tells us that the greater the order at, say, the semantic or formal level, the greater the disorder. and what they call the syntactic,

SPEAKER_01that you can create an algorithm that repeats a limited pattern of numbers, say, in a periodic way. You know, one, two, seven, three, with repeat infinitely. But, of course, that's a very impoverished, very little information actually contained there.

SPEAKER_01It can be done, but the more orderly the syntactic or, as I'd say, paratactic level is... the more confined, the constrained and impotent the level of actual, what they would call information, let's just say semantic content or formal content is. So you could never come up with an algorithm to generate an occurrenia. No. Because the causation works in the other direction. It's the semantic content which exists primarily at the level of, well, in that case,

SPEAKER_01an intending intellect that's already related to the future, imposing an order on what would otherwise be simply... Well, random in one sense. I mean, it's a random sequence at the paratactic level. The more determined it is at the higher level, the more random it is at the lower. And in another sense, totally deterministic if it were simply mechanistic relations.

SPEAKER_01So you'll never be able to get from the latter to the former. There must be. And I never thought of applying this to fields before. Of course, you talk about morphic fields, so it should be obvious, I suppose. But it seems sort of obvious, doesn't it?

SPEAKER_00Yes. Well, it wasn't obvious to me until recently that it applies to all fields because... All fields are top-down causes. The gravitational field of the universe, according to Einstein, contains the entire universe and is that through which the interrelation of all planets, galaxies, and everything is ordered through this field. It's a top-down field. It doesn't emerge from matter. It's there to start with. It's there right from the beginning of the universe, according to Big Bang theory.

SPEAKER_00According to Big Bang theory, there's a primal, well, M theory and super string theory, there's a primal 10 or 11 dimensional field at the very moment of the Big Bang, which then splits up or bifurcates into the other fields of nature. But the point is that the whole thing is within a field right from the beginning. It's not that the field somehow emerges by informational processes somehow. It's there from the beginning, and the magnetic field is there from the beginning,

SPEAKER_00the electromagnetic field with light and its presence in matter. And the fields that organize the quantum matter fields that organize electrons and atoms and molecules and things, are there from the beginning, or at least from the beginning of the molecule. So all fields, it seems to me, are top-down causes, and all of them are formative. And I mean, I'm still thinking about this, but nearly all of them work through attractional repulsion.

SPEAKER_00The strong nuclear field, for example, which is the field responsible for what are called the strong nuclear interactions, keeps the quarks together inside a proton or a neutron. and then helps shape the whole nucleus of the atom. And these are very localized fields. They only operate on the scale of an atom. And the weak interaction keeps atoms together, and through changes in it, you get radioactive decay. But these are fields that are incredibly localized, but nevertheless organize the nucleus of every atom.

SPEAKER_00And then, so you've got very localized fields there which are still top-down because the strong interaction keeps the quarks together in a proton or a neutron. And without this strong interaction, they'd fly apart. And when you put them into a particle accelerator with enormous energy, you can break up this strong interaction. Then you can get these separated particles briefly. And then they assemble again. So all of these fields seem to me to have this top-down quality.

SPEAKER_00And I think one of the problems in philosophy of science, and indeed in the thinking of scientists, just in practical working in science, is exactly that this kind of causation is they've tried to sort of shoehorn this into a mechanistic model. And I've just been reading a book on history of theories of fields in the ether. the history of fields in the 19th century. You know,

SPEAKER_00when Faraday thought that the whole of space was permeated by forces and matter was produced by forces that were non-localized, they came together in kind of knots in atoms and things, but they spread through all space. And then Maxwell tried to think of the electromagnetic ether, the luminiferous ether, And a lot of 19th century physicists liked the idea of ether as subtle matter and to explain its properties mechanically.

SPEAKER_00You know, Maxwell's model was of vortices of fluid whizzing around in tubes for the lines of force. But then what relativity theory in Einstein in 1905 showed that you don't actually need this mechanical ether. The fields are self-sufficient or self-subsistent. But then what are they? And, you know, as Sir Lawrence Bragg said in a wonderful historic footage from the Royal Institution,

SPEAKER_00talking on magnets, you know, giving demonstrations of magnets, picking things up and so on. He says the magnet is the ultimate explanation. The field of the magnet can't be explained in terms of anything except magnets or electromagnetic fields. And he says, what is a magnet made up of? It's made up of little magnets inside it. And so even in superstring and M-theory, which try and explain magnetic fields in terms of other fields,

SPEAKER_00it's basically fields all the way down.

SPEAKER_01You know, of course the great resistance, I mean, that's one way of characterizing classical, Aristotelian etiology is simply to say that it presumes from the first that nature has a mind-like structure, rather than mind being an emergent result of physical forces, that all of nature has a mind. Because, of course, a top-down cause, a formal cause, has to be constrained by a finality.

SPEAKER_01I mean, it has to be determined by that for which it is. which means that there's a sort of horizontal structure in the sense that there's something like the structure of time in the sense that there's a past and a future and a present in the way that there is in a thought that intends an end. But it also has to exist in a kind of now at a higher level to be informed.

SPEAKER_01I'm being very vague here, but the point is that if you start talking in that way, if you try to recover that notion of form in its classical acceptation rather than the sort of distorted mechanistic picture of it, which allowed it to be dismissed just on the grounds that it was a defective mechanistic model. Then, of course, you're also... I mean, I see what the anxiety would be.

SPEAKER_01You're also... You begin... invoking a prior mind-like structure to the physical relations you're talking about that has to be there first. And this little mystery of what direction that might seem to point in for- Yes.

SPEAKER_00But you see, the prior mind-like structure is actually there in field theory. I mean, the whole universe as a universe insofar as it's a unity is held together by the gravitational field. And that's part of physics. It's not just some wild speculation. Physics has these top-down explanations. It's not just atomistic. It's a combination of top-down and bottom-up theories, and the fields are what give the top-down explanations. And although they may have crudely misinterpreted Aristotle,

SPEAKER_00the fact is that his theory of stones falling to the earth in terms of formal and final causes wasn't just something in the mind. Stones actually do fall to the earth and go splat if they fall into water and things. So something was actually happening. It wasn't just in the mind.

SPEAKER_01Well, when I say mind-like, I don't mean just in the mind. I don't mean something that one has dreamt up that exists only in thought. I mean that the very physical relations that say compose a tree is a tree are a set of rational relations that are always already mind-like as if the tree itself as a physical object is a thought. You say science is full of top-down and bottom-up,

SPEAKER_01but of course, the ideological, I wouldn't even say ideological, the religious commitment of someone like say, well, the recently departed Daniel Dennett, for instance, is that somehow all those top-down causes can be reduced to the bottom-up causes.

SPEAKER_00Yes. I mean, what he dismissed as skyhooks, things that come from, well, gravity is a skyhook. Yeah, well,

SPEAKER_01that's why I'm enjoying this conversation, because actually, you say it, and it immediately seems obvious, but for some reason, apparently, our habits of thought don't. point towards the obvious. That's what I always thought, though, about the Aristotelian scheme is that it is simply a recognition of something that's obviously true about the ways in which you describe a thing or event. If I were to ask you what something is or what happened,

SPEAKER_01of course, I'm asking you immediately a set of interrelated questions that can't be separated from one another without making the question vacuous. What it's made of, what shape it has, what... but also what makes it happen, how does it begin, and what the full expression of all its potentialities are. That is, that would be its final way of thinking, a final causality is, whatever it is,

SPEAKER_01is defined by that telos, that full expression of whatever its potentials are as a finite thing or event. And all that the Aristotelian etiology says is that this very obvious set of rational relations, which is what your mind tells you you need in order to define, to recognize, to recognize something as a discrete something or event in relationship to a universe

SPEAKER_01of other somethings and events is really an ontology. There's no reason... But the whole history of modern thought in the West, at least, on these things, I mean, we talk about the mechanistic philosophy on the one hand, which was trying to separate, say, final and formal causes or just supposititious notions of some sort of extrinsic design,

SPEAKER_01which is not what they were. But it's also, you see, the Cartesian division between erased cogitans and erased extensas, if these are ontologically distinct realities and that the latter can only, as you're saying, And to the degree that it possesses order, it's solely through the will of God. It's not something intrinsic to the very structure, or even the Kantian supposition that there's something so utterly discontinuous

SPEAKER_01between the novelogical realm and what mind does that... All we know of reality is representation, and the representation is itself only a kind of noetic allegory of a reality that we can't know. Whereas Aristotle, you're in the realm of common sense, which is, you know, the stone falls, you know, and it always falls. Therefore, there's a finality written into the relationship of stone and earth.

SPEAKER_01What is the nature of that finality? And it somehow is obviously primordial. It's not something that arises out of the accidental juxtaposition of stoneless and earth.

SPEAKER_00Well, exactly. But that's exactly why, you see, I think we can recover something of that sense through thinking about fields in a new way. I think the answer is hiding in plain sight. That the gravitational model, I mean, back to Dennett and Skyhooks, I mean, you say, what's an explanation of the tides going up and down in the ocean every day? Well, the gravitational force of the moon. Well, That sounds like a sky hook to me. Quite literally, yeah.

SPEAKER_00Literally. I mean, the thing is that the...

SPEAKER_01But it's amazing, actually, people like Dennett, how many quanta ignota he was willing or they are willing to tolerate. as simply promissory notes that at some point, these will be reduced to blind mechanical interactive forces that are nothing but the exchange of energy between physical masses.

SPEAKER_00But what's so extraordinary about it is that it's such an old-fashioned agenda because it was superseded in physics itself by field thwippers from Faraday onwards. Well, maybe from Newton onwards. Well, from Newton onwards because, well, Newton didn't call it a field thwipper, but nevertheless, Newtonian gravitation never fitted into this mechanistic model. And in 17th and 18th century science, electricity and magnetism were more or less excluded.

SPEAKER_00No one really understood them. It was really only field theory that came to the rescue with Faraday. But if you look at the early magnetic theory of Gilbert, you know, 1600, De Magnete, where Gilbert shows that the lodestone points towards the Earth's North Pole, not the North Pole star, that the Earth itself is a magnet. Gilbert called it the soul of the Earth. And so he's lauded as the origin of modern magnetic theory,

SPEAKER_00but his explanation of the motive power, as it were, of the magnet was the soul of the Earth. It was a form of course. Well, of course,

SPEAKER_01Psyche literally is a form in Aristotle, the form of the body, but also the form of the living thing. No, you see, that's why I brought up this issue of this etiology being mind-like relations, is I think that that shouldn't be treated simply as a metaphor or as a quaint, sentimental or picturesque way of talking,

SPEAKER_01that actually there might be some good, hard, empirical... Without reason to say, calling it the soul of the earth, that it has an actual rational structure toward an end.

SPEAKER_00Well, I think that actually what's happened is that the old idea of souls is organizing everything. principles and things, has actually in modern science been replaced by fields. Because the first Greek pre-Socratic philosopher, Thales, says the lodestone has a soul. The Greeks thought magnetism was explained by souls, not just living organisms, magnetism. So did Gilbert at the beginning of the 17th century. Then Faraday calls it a magnetic field. And they thought that the soul of the universe held everything together,

SPEAKER_00the anima mundi or whatever they called it. But then we have the gravitational field. What Aristotle called the vegetative soul shaping bodies is, in my way of understanding, the morphogenetic field. So there's a sense in which souls have replaced fields in modern science. Having been driven out in the 17th century, they came back in the 19th century in disguise under the name of fields. Well, and also because,

SPEAKER_01of course, the language of soul had been subsumed into the Cartesian picture, you know, in which the soul isn't actually a formative principle. It's not even part of natural philosophy. So, yes, no, I like those things. Again, as I say, though, what I find rather shocking is it all seems obvious now that you say it. But honestly, it had never occurred to me before that you could actually... I mean, I've always... That there's a principle of order in the formation of everything,

SPEAKER_01the formation of life, and the way in which all things consist. that obviously can't be reduced to mechanical causes, but I actually hadn't thought in terms of something that's resonant in modern physics as a real, quantified in modern physics as actually qualifying for the descriptions.

SPEAKER_00It's right there, staring us in the face. I mean, it took me a very long, I mean, it's only in the last few months I've been thinking about this. I think we could continue this later. We have to break off at this stage because it's dinner time. Thanks very much.

Open the transcript file

Hosts and Guests

Nobody is credited on this episode yet.

Credit the people on this episode

Be the first to rate this episode

More episodes

All episodes
  1. A Quick Message

    Oct 14, 20262 minAudio

    Navet (Tredi), 23 Vendémiaire, CCXXXV This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit davidbentleyhart.substack.com/subscribe

    Credit the people on this episode

  2. The Light of Tabor: Notes Toward a Monistic Christology

    May 31, 20241 hr 19 minAudio

    And, at last, the final chapter in the sprawling epic that was this year’s Stanton Lectures. That infernal machine the “Owl” seems to me to have done an especially bad job of separating voices from the ambient sound in...

    Credit the people on this episode

  3. The Light of Tabor: Notes Toward a Monistic Christology

    May 29, 20241 hr 13 minAudio

    The penultimate chapter in this year's Stanton Lectures, again recorded - with questionable success - by the diabolical contraption known as the “Owl.” This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other...

    Credit the people on this episode

  4. The Light of Tabor: Notes Toward a Monistic Christology

    May 27, 20241 hr 19 minAudio

    This is the third of this year’s Stanton Lectures, once again captured by that unpleasant little automaton the “Owl.” How well that device dealt with the acoustics of the lecture theatre is something of an open...

    Credit the people on this episode

  5. The Light of Tabor: Notes Toward a Monistic Christology

    May 25, 20241 hr 28 minAudio

    Here is the second of this year's Stanton Lectures, delivered at the University of Cambridge earlier this month. In this case, the lecture was recorded at the time of its public delivery. The device that captured the...

    Credit the people on this episode