Welcome to the security box, podcast 280. We're going to need to do this in multiple parts, so podcast 280 will be here for quite awhile with the intermediates a through whatever to finish the series. On this podcast, the Evolution of Cyber Security, part 3: Organized cybercrime and social engineering, part 2. This time, we have one big news item, and we also play a bit of music throughout the program as well as a few of our items from our resources. We cover 2005-2007 in this part as well. The whole series will take you from late 2000 through 2013. We hope you enjoy the program!
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The opinions expressed are those of the show hosts and may not necessarily be of any company in which the show hosts may represent. The following podcast may contain some strong language. Parental discretion is advised. The Security Box, Podcast
280, The Evolution of Cybersecurity, Part 3, Organized Cybercrime and Social Engineering, Part 2, recorded Wednesday, September 9th, 2026, and released on September 11th, 2026. Hello folks,
welcome to TSB Podcast 280 Intermediate Episode A. I'm Jared Reimer. We are here and we are going to give you the podcast. We are releasing it today and we taped on Wednesday, September 9th, but we are releasing it today. We had other commitments, so sorry for the delay. This is the Evolution
of Cybersecurity Part 3. Organized Cybercrime and Social Engineering Part 2. And in this episode, we are doing 2005 to 2007. And we are not doing news notes for this episode. But we did have
something that broke just prior to podcast taping. And that is talked about. And it is something that we are monitoring here at... TSB Headquarters. We talk about it and then we get right into the episode. Jared Reimer is the host. Nicholas Jackson is with me. Terry Ring comes on a little bit
later on. Preston was not available for this taping. Hopefully everything went well with what he was needing to do. I hope that you all will enjoy the program. And I thank each and every one of you for listening and learning along with us. Have a great day, everybody. Podcast 280,
Intermediate A. I am Jared Reimer. Nicholas Jackson. my transit alert system let me know of a huge
huge breaking story which I have to be careful about how we cover this because I am a I am a a Well, not necessarily an employee, but I am part of the company in a role of sitting in on
meetings. So I want to be very careful about how we cover this, but this one is more of a claim than a... What the hell went wrong? And unfortunately, we just published it because I was on the phone with another company filling out a survey for the company. So... That took
a bit of my morning, even though I started to do this earlier in the morning. I know you haven't read it yet, Mr. J. But if you want to peruse it, we'll do news now. I know that I have not covered much lately. I've had a lot going on. I've had to catch up on logs and catch up on things and write reports. But I hope to try and
get back into... Writing again. That is the goal, anyway. Even though we're about to get busy at said company. Mr. J, go ahead and peruse this thing. I know it's lengthy and long. And then let me know what you think. While he's doing
that, email iMessage. Well, actually, I got a chance to look at that email that you just posted. And that's fair. That's fair. I mean, there's, you know, as we've seen before, groups will make many exaggerated claims. Sometimes they get their names out there. Sometimes it's actually true. It's just too hard to tell right now. I think
it's too early, but my transit alerting system did exactly what it's supposed to do. And I monitor that, even if I don't read everything in RSS. I have it in RSS, and I also told it to email. Remember when we set that up back in May? So I have both, depending on what my time is and what my needs are. emailed me yesterday, but I didn't get to it until this morning. So, it
is what it is. It's a day old, but it's still big. Of course, the... Ransomware group we've covered here on this podcast. And I believe that
this is going to be an up -and -comer. And we're not going to see the last of them. This reminds me of the early days of groups we're going to cover way later in the series of the cybersecurity
in review is what we're really calling it, right? Yep. And this is going to be part two of part three of a five -part series. And we're not going to claim to cover everything today, but we will cover as much as we can within a few hours. And
I really think that going back through the history and asking... You know, what have we learned? Yes, we've learned a lot of stuff. But it goes back to the same concepts. So... The company
in question, by the way... which is being talked about again, is LA Metro. But LA Metro has not been the only thing that has been targeted this year. There's been all kinds of coverage. If you tell Google to sign you up for... Transit
Cyber Attack. You will get notified when publications cover these things. And I get all kinds of stuff. Some of it may not necessarily be of value. There may be some misses. But there have been some big name agencies around the world that have been targeted. Some of it we've covered. Most
we have not. Because we don't really deal with transportation cybersecurity. Not on a regular anyway. J -A -R -E -D -R -I -M -E -R at 986themix .com or tech at M -E -N -V -I dot org. Text or WhatsApp 804 -442 -6975. 888 -405 -7524. What
has been in the industry news since I've been MIA, Mr. Ye? Honestly, I don't think you've really missed a lot. I mean, the bites of malware. We're talking about some... I can't exactly remember off the top of my head what they were, but some pretty serious... Vulnerabilities that have been
patched in the latest update of Chrome. Yes. Chrome. Yes. That means Sean will probably get his paws on that. put up something unless he has already. He actually has. I mean, pretty
basic, just kind of giving the generic patch Tuesday update, but yeah. Okay. If you've gone through bleeping or other sources, is there anything that we need to have chat assist me in writing up because it's got to go out? I haven't at the
moment. All right. That's fair. You're not in trouble for that. You know, that's typically my job, but between the hit me. And Metro getting back to work. Oh, right. That's bigger. Yeah. But we will be okay. I know exactly where we
are in our file. We don't have to do a long news notes. But I think covering this is going to be enough. Read the article. Understand what this is. We made sure to cover RAAS. Can you imagine these days the criminal groups... Okay,
maybe I'll ask this a different way. If you were never on TSB, Could you imagine a cyber criminal entity? Let's say you were just reading malware bytes. Uh -huh. And you really didn't understand more than what the bytes was giving you. Could you imagine cyber criminal groups being a common...
I don't know. Microsoft or a big name entity that runs like a normal business? In that situation, no. So if you were just relying on bleeping or... Cyber News or Malwarebytes alone. What would
your thoughts be? I think my first thoughts would be, wait, these people, huh? Ransomware as a service? What even is that? Because they don't define it. And I think my writing is starting to recognize that these places don't define it
to the general public. They expect you to know. Right. And I'm trying to change that, even though I'm still irritated and have no hair left. Right. For the transcript, left parentheses, laughs, right parentheses. What about with the knowledge
that you have today, seeing that you've been on the program since about... 2022? Yeah. Yeah. That's... Okay. Well, sadly, I'm not surprised that this is how... A lot of these are operating. I mean, this is basically how they can survive, unfortunately. Okay. I mean, yeah, okay, when
there are the very rare takedowns that happen, sure, that's great news, but most of the time, sadly, it's an ecosystem that is doing well, and I'm not surprised that A lot of people are moving to this model, or a lot of groups, rather. Because that allows people who are interested in getting into this not to develop anything,
because we already have everything that works. Uh -huh. Yeah, we've already got phishing... Yeah, we've already got phishing pages. Yeah. And they train you. They don't train you on what to do. Yeah, you know, hey, we've got the phishing pages. We've got the websites to direct people to, so you just send out your shit. You customize it maybe a little bit for you, but we've already
got the infrastructure there, so just go ahead. Like, okay. Sounds good. That's more similar to what other major business? I run one. Like
development sort of? Not necessarily development. Not development per se, but we do offer something that gives you a way to do development. Hosting. Hosting is correct. I am a reseller under a company that is already registered to do business. So
they have the infrastructure. I lease a segment of that infrastructure to host everybody else. But you can also be a web host. With your own
infrastructure. So I would be cautious in saying that the RAAS could be similar to a reseller, not a full -blown webhoster. That's what I think.
What do you think? I mean, I think that's fair. We do not think that's fair. No, what we do is good thing. We totally good business. You should get into it. It's good. It's very good business. That's right. We host things for you. That's
right. And you make lots of money doing it too. Yes, you have to. That's right. You have to share it with us. You will get a lot too. We take some, but we make sure you get a lot. That's right. And we charge more. We have to charge more. That's correct. But that's basically what RAS is. It's
a higher price. Of... Of... Basically web hosting. Yeah. And don't worry. You're not going to get caught. You will be fine. Then... It's funny
that we've had some good news where a lot of the infrastructure was taken down, isn't it? That's because they did stupid thing. We fixed that. It's not going to happen. Because some fucking idiot infect himself with... What's supposed to go to somebody else? Stupid motherfucker.
Wow. Okay. And you don't claim to write such things? No. I do not. We do not write that. Okay. Because, yeah, I think there was actually a story, like, not recently, but, yeah, I remember somebody did do that shit. They did? He's not lying. Yeah, they infected themselves. And I think we covered
that. I think we did, too. On a Saturday. On a Saturday show, we were like, why the hell would you fucking infect yourself with this shit? But then, there's actually valid research to do that. How do you think we know how this crap works? This is true. Somebody has to do it. Except,
of course, they've wised up to that because, you know, now a lot of them, they, you know, from the get -go, they detect whether it's, you know, a sandbox or a VM that they're dealing with. So, yeah, unfortunately, they're starting to get onto it. And that's part of the detection process that they do, which you're absolutely correct with. But they could also have a brand new computer that they're using for this purpose
that isn't set up for this. Ah, true. Like, yeah, I just bought this computer. Let's just go to this... fishing website and download this payload and see what happens. Because they could just restore the machine to default. Right. And they'll be fine. That's why companies like Trend Micro
are out there that do this type of work. This is what they get paid for. And I think without them, we would be up Schitt's Creek. Oh, we would. We would be so far gone. We would. Everything we do is good. There's no bad software. All the
software is very useful. And if you know what's good for you, you run it and you make money. You tell her to run the software and you make money. Oh, that's funny. When it locks your stuff up. But that's where you make the money. That's
where you make the money. Exactly. So it's bad software. No, that good software for you. Yeah, but you're charging victims that don't have that kind of money. But that doesn't matter. That doesn't matter. You're the one who's doing well.
And while this is fictitious, that unfortunately is probably the mindset. It is the mindset. I'm pretty confident of that. You're doing well. Don't worry about the rest of them. Just get them to install this. Yeah, send an email. We all know it's bad. Uh -huh. But it's not bad.
Even though we all know it's bad, between the industry, we know it's not bad, but they may claim it's all bad, but we're making a killing. That's right. Did you catch our one -year anniversary
of A Day in the Life? I read about it, but unfortunately did not. Okay. What else do you have for us before
we get back into this evolution of cybersecurity part three discussions? Oh, you know, the usual telecrap stuff. Oh, Preston sent us a good one. Oh, he did. That was so good. He did. And they're
going, what area do you think your target is in? Right. And why would I be contacting a girl on Telegram? Yeah, who's not even you, it sounds like. I doubt it's actually you. It sounds like what it is is some stupid bot. And I see they
haven't made very many changes, so I expect this to be a cesspool over there. Oh, and I got another one from somebody claiming to be... I think it was was supposedly her name. And one of the questions she asked, you know, how are you? And I respond, I'm terrible. And, you know, at first she sounded genuine, like, I'm sorry to hear that. And then
she says, take care of your day. Take care of your day. Oh. Okay. That's how we talk these days. That's not how many people I know talk these days, but wow. Oh, no. Another 301 message.
What is this? Political. It's got to be. I knew it. Okay. All right. I knew it. I knew it. Steve Hilton again. Steve Hilton again. And why would
Steve be texting everybody, you know, asking for money? He's got money. Lots of it probably too. That's how these guys work. I mean, he was our host, I think, for a while on Fox, who was doing pretty well from what I remember. Yeah.
About that. Is there anything else new? I don't really think so. Okay. Then I will do a file switch. When we come back, we're going to continue where we left off with part three. No, I don't
want this one. That's what I want. This is going to be part two of the evolution of cyber security, organized cyber crime, and social engineering. So, let's take that final break, and we'll continue across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. Welcome
back. The Evolution of Cybersecurity Part 3. And we're going to start where we left off with Sony. In fact, Sony Sony, this is actually not going to be the first time that you hear their
name during these portions of this program. This first one is kind of the first time we actually hear about root kits. Do we... actually hear
about them these days? Not so much. Okay. Do you know where we are? Or shall I start and you'll find me? Sony BMG and the Rootkit 2005? Yes. Alright, yep, I do then. Would you like to start
the honors? Sure. Go ahead. Alright, so, just repeating what I just said, but hey, why not? Sony BMG and the Rootkit, 2005. In 2005, one of the strangest security controversies of the decade began with something completely ordinary. Someone bought a music CD. The CD came from Sony
BMG Music Entertainment, one of the largest record companies in the world. Like other music companies confronting widespread digital copying and file sharing, Sony BMG wanted to control what customers could do with music, from some of its CDs. That meant Digital Rights Management, or DRM. DRM
is a broad term for technologies designed to control access to or use of digital content. Depending on the system, DRM might restrict copying, playback, the number of devices on which something can be used or other activities the publisher wants to control. And boy, do I remember that. Early on in iTunes, it's like you couldn't play
music outside of... This was before iTunes. Oh, that's right. That's right. Wow. This was before. Yes. iTunes was there for those who started with the iPhone when the iPhone started. But it wasn't widely used until after that Before, we were
using programs like Audio Galaxy. We were using programs like Net... One of them is still in business, actually. What's the name of it now? Well, there were many of them. The names may not much matter. Interesting, because I remember using iTunes, well... Not accessibly, unfortunately, back in, I want to say 2004. Maybe that's when
it started, but it wasn't necessarily big. Yeah. It was just getting started. Right, right. Oh. It was just getting started in those days. It wasn't huge. No. And what you could buy, I remember, was... I mean, the selectionist stuff was decent,
but it was still pretty limited. But you had other big -name services that could give you everything. Not that I was aware of back then. I mean, legally anyway. Well, but that's not the point. The point that we're making here is that there were services out there giving you a bunch of stuff. Right. Whether it was legal
or not is a whole other issue. Beyond the scope of this program. Because back in those days, that's what we were using. Some programs were better than others. One big name company got taken to court. Oh, Crapster. That's correct.
And now they're running as a paid service alongside iTunes. But iTunes wasn't big as Napster. Napster was the biggest file sharing network out there for its day. And this was before we had the ability
of torrent. Napster was before torrenting. Go ahead, Mr. J. The security problem wasn't simply that Sony BMG used DRM. It was how one of those DRM systems worked. On October 31st, 2005, Windows
security expert, you'll know this name very, very well, guys, Mark Racinovich, published an extraordinary account of something he had discovered while investigating his own computer. So, Mark's been around the industry forever. He built one of the biggest tools out there that Microsoft
has. What do you think its name is? Unfortunately, I think it's listed right here. If we're thinking of the same thing. It is. Okay. Yeah. Cis Internals? Cis Internals is correct. And... It was meant
to show you more than the operating system could give you. And Steve Gibson was talking about very highly during the early days of security now when things came up. But CIS Internals is correct. Okay. Okay. Next paragraph. Go ahead, please. Racinovich. was a co -founder of Sysinternals
and an expert in the internal operation of Windows. While testing a rootkit detection tool, he discovered software on his system that had been deliberately hidden. That brings us to another term we need to define. A rootkit is software or a collection of techniques designed to conceal the presence
of programs, files, processes, or other activity on a computer. Rootkits are particularly dangerous because they can interfere with the operating system's normal ability to tell the user or security software What is actually happening? Yeah. That
was big for that day. And to have something hide from the operating system was huge. Um, yeah. What do you think replaces this today? Hmm. I
mean, maybe... What about things like EDR killers? EDR killers? Ransomware as a whole? Yep. Yep. But more specifically, EDR killers? I will take that as a correct answer. And we only started EBR killing... What? Two years ago? Around there.
Give or take? Yeah, it seems about right. I mean, the exact timeline doesn't matter at this point. We'll get to it when we cover 2014. 13 to the present in the 281 saga. But the point we're making is that this is not going to be the last time you see of rootkits. They're not known as rootkits these days. No. If malicious software
can hide itself from the tools you're using to inspect the computer, determining whether that computer is trustworthy becomes considerably more difficult. Resinovich began investigating the hidden software on his machine. Eventually, He traced it to a Sony BMG Music CD. The copy protection system was called Extended Copy Protection,
or XCP in all caps. And it had been developed by a company called First 4 Internet, who I've never heard of. That 4 is numbered. It's a number, yes. And I don't think we've ever heard of the name since. And this is, by the way, the first
time I've heard of them. We heard about the fact that there was a rootkit, and we knew it was bad, and we know security now covered this. But I don't think we ever knew who actually developed the fucking thing. Yeah. And this is why I thought doing this series would be so good. And it is.
Because then we learn things. So, this is going to get very interesting. Oh, that it will. But could you imagine? I mean, Nick, you buy Britney
Spears. You know, a very well -known artist. You like the music. You think, well, alright, I'll go buy a Britney Spears album. You buy whatever the album is. It doesn't matter. You, as a purchaser of the CD, have No idea who Britney uses as the
label. Nope. So you pay the $10. We'll call it $10. Right. You bring it home. You unwrap it. You open its case and you pop the motherfucker
in the computer. Uh -huh. Because you decide you're gonna add it to your library. Right. Now, granted, you know there's the few songs on there that you like. And maybe you'll check out what the album... It has to have. Right. What else it has to offer. Right. That's what Mark did.
I'm not saying he bought Britney Spears, but I'm using Britney as a logical point of reference. Because everybody knows who Britney is. Well, yeah. Yeah. Go ahead, please. Installing the software associated with the CD modified Windows
in ways designed to conceal portions of the copy protection system. And that's where the story went. from questionable DRM to a security disaster. Like, what the just happened to my computer? Exactly. Yeah. Exactly. Yeah, that fits too.
But you didn't have any idea. Nope. But that was the whole point. Wow. The whole point was for you the average. to be able to listen to
the CD on the computer, probably using Windows Media, but regardless, it doesn't matter. Windows Media or real crapper player. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. That one. Oh, gosh. Yeah. Fucker. Dun, dun, dun, dun. Dun, dun, dun, dun. Yeah, I know a lot of
internet radio stations when they streamed back then in the early days. That's a crapper. Or Windows Media Player. Windows Media. Those were the two major formats on The early days. Yep. Was Windows. Media crapper. And real. Real crapper. Real crapper. And sometimes. It really did take
a real crap. It did. I remember those days. I would be listening to something. And then the next thing. You know the computer was slow. At. As fuck. Uh -huh. Mr. Rigg, welcome to TSB. Are you talking about real time? No. Real player.
Real player. Yeah, or real crapper. Which was a piece of crap. Well, yeah, Windows Media Player is no better. That's what we were just saying. Even now. Well, it's not really used very much now. I mean, Windows 11 systems like the one I have, you have Media Player, which is basically
the same thing. It's not Windows Media Player, but it's the same concept. It's the same concept, yeah. Egg, can you bring me a bottle of water? I've got frozen ones in the bottom. I don't know if he hears me. But yeah, we're talking about
the Sony BMG CS, well, it's part of our file. You don't need to read today. That's fine. You can read that on your own time. Oh. Yeah. Yeah, I remember when that Sony shit happened. Go ahead,
Mr. J. And that's... Okay. The hiding mechanism wasn't limited... And that's where the story went from questionable DRM to a secure... Oh, you did read that. Okay. I did read that. Yeah, I did read that. The hiding mechanism. Sorry. The hiding mechanism wasn't limited exclusively to Sony's own files. files and other objects whose names began with a particular sequence
of characters could also be hidden from ordinary Windows tools. In other words, Sony BMG had distributed software that created a hiding mechanism that other software could potentially abuse. Oh, that's just great. Isn't that lovely? Oh, it really is. Isn't that wonderful? Uh -huh. Think about
what that means. A customer legally purchased a commercial music CD. The customer put that CD into a Windows computer. software associated with a major record company installed itself and deliberately concealed portions of its operation using techniques associated with root kits. And the mechanism used to hide that software could
potentially help other malicious software hide as well. And I'll read this paragraph because it's written as I. Yeah. But before I do, let's tell a device that I'm not. Ed, can you bring me a bottle of water? There's some in the bottom shelf. Bottles. This was something that was,
like, big, right? Yeah. Like everybody knew. And Sony, as you'll later find out, got a little bit of backlash from this. But as you'll later
find out when we hit the later years, this wasn't their first rodeo. And that's what's so crazy about this. You think after the first time, a company would know, right? So you'd think. I
mean, look at what we just covered at the beginning of the program. Just in our news portion. Although, it's very vague right now, so we don't really know a whole lot, so we gotta be careful. When... I was reading about this at the time and hearing Steve Gibson discuss it on Security Now. My reaction
was essentially, you have to be fucking kidding me. And yes, we left the apostrophes in place. I didn't change them. But it got worse. Removing the software wasn't initially a simple matter of opening add or remove programs and uninstalling
it. Residovich documented the difficulty of removing XCP safely. And Sony BMG's response created additional controversy. How many remember that? I don't remember it that well back then. Okay. Fair enough.
It's a question. You don't have to be right or wrong. An initial web -based removal process required users to install additional software and security research subsequently identified vulnerabilities associated with the removal, mechanism itself. Oh, good fucking grief. I knew
that was coming. I knew that response was coming. I knew that response was coming. And it's too bad that I don't think we can isolate that because it was... YSF. But that's how it was in those days. Right. Right. That's why the response I made sure it got in there. You have to be fucking
kidding me. Uh -huh. And that was 11 years ago. Give or take. I mean, seriously? No, 21 years ago, sorry. My mistake on math. But the point still stands. 20, 21 years ago, they were doing
this shit. And thinking it was okay. Now we don't have to worry about the big name company. We have to worry about the smaller ones who contact you out of nowhere telling you that you need to be paid. But you don't even know who the fuck you are. They are. And they write those emails
in Spanish. And they write those bastards in Spanish. And it's an area code, well, a country code for Chile, I think. It was. And I don't do business in Chile. I didn't think so. Which
made that email... Oh, and they were using a sequence of sending an attachment that I... Oops. I need to go to a different webpage. Sorry. Um... And I didn't even know what this extension was.
That's what made that even more interesting because I had asked chat, what is this attachment? I've never seen this before. .UUE. Correct. And it told me what it was. It was an old way of sending file attachments, especially when it was binary in nature. It was an old way of sending binary.
That's bad. Yeah. I expected that 20 years ago. Right. Sorry, I'm responding to a text. I think this goes back to the third person category. If we see an I, I'll take over. But go ahead with the next paragraph. It does. It goes back. So customers were confronted with an extraordinary
sequence of events. Buy a legitimate music CD. Get unwanted copy protection software. Discover that the software hides itself using rootkit -like techniques. Learn that its hiding mechanism can create additional security risks. Then discover that trying to remove the thing may introduce still more security concerns. By this point,
antivirus and security companies were becoming involved. Some security products began detecting or removing components of Sony's copy protection software. The controversy also raised an uncomfortable question for the security industry. What makes software malicious? If an unknown attacker secretly installs software that modifies an operating
system, conceals its presence, and creates an opportunity for other malicious software to hide, security companies don't have much difficulty deciding that something is wrong. Does that judgment change because the software arrived on a commercially purchased music CD from a major corporation? Increasingly, the answer from security researchers and customers was no. Sony BMG eventually announced
that it would temporarily suspend production. of CDs using the XCP technology. The company subsequently recalled affected CDs and offered exchanges. By that time, it was too late. It asked a very interesting question there. Do you
guys want to take a stab at that? Where was that question? I heard it. I'm responding to texts, but where was that question here? Does that judgment change because the software arrived on a commercially purchased music CD from a major corporation? That's the question. What do you guys think?
Absolutely not. In fact, it makes it worse. Give me your thoughts. Back then, I could understand the rationale for, again, as we were just reading, you know, copy protection, but doing it in this way, which is the same way that other bad actors would do it back then, Or potentially could back
then. I mean I'm sorry. That's. It doesn't matter. Who does it. I. I think it's wrong either way. I agree. And I think that's why the. You have to be fucking kidding me. Comment. came in there because I was discussing with chat before it built this, my reaction when it was reminding
me about some of this. It's like, you have got to be fucking kidding me. I mean, even Steve, even Steve was like, wait, this is coming from a major corporate entity. They should know better than this. I mean, I don't remember the exact
comments, but he did cover this in Security Now. You can search Sony BMG and then plus GRC .com or plus Security Now and it'll bring it up. Even if you read a transcript, I would if I were you. It was huge for that time. Mr. Rigg, what do
you think? I'm not hearing anything. I do not hear him. I don't either. Um... Alright, that's alright. Um... Go ahead, Mr. J. Then came the
lawsuits. Consumers and government authorities challenged Sony BMG over the software, the disclosures surrounding it, and the security and privacy implications. The controversy... We just had our hottest days ever. Yes, we know. Yeah. The
controversy ultimately resulted in settlements and requirements affecting how Sony BMG handled the affected CDs and future software installations. The incident also became an important moment in the relationship between DRM and computer security. Copy protection had been intended to protect music from unauthorized copying. Instead,
the technology itself became something security researchers were warning users about. And there is a broader reason the Sony BMG Rootkit belongs in this history. Until now, most of the malicious software we've discussed came from worm authors, attackers, or other people who clearly weren't supposed to be modifying somebody else's computer.
Sony complicated that picture. The software arrived through a legitimate commercial product. Commercial product or production platform. I was going to say production. I looked and I realized it was a product. But it was done through a commercial production step. Yes. So you could have said
that too. I would have accepted that. Okay. But I mean, this is bad. This is as bad as it gets. Oh, very much so. During this time, this is as bad as it gets. You're going to find out later it got worse. I know that we talk about the news and such, but if you're a first -time listener
and you're hearing this series, you'll hear about stuff whether you've heard of it or not. For that time, to have that type of controversy, because your intentions were good. Boy, do you
think my intentions are good. Oh, boy. Please don't let me be misunderstood. We're just a group whose intentions are good. Oh, no. Please don't let us be misunderstood. So... They were misunderstood
really bad. Yes, they were. And that tarnished them for a little bit. Because they had a lot to deal with. Uh -huh. Alright, that just...
Wow. So, for that time period, that was bad. No kidding. I mean, they used their own production line to do this. This wasn't done through, say, A ransomware attack or that email that I talked about. This was a purchase at a fucking music
store. Who had no idea? By the way. They bought the stuff. They sold it. They had no idea. It was wrapped. Why would they unwrap it and go and make sure they were all good? Right. That's
what reselling is. You know, you're Walmart. You're, you know, big name CD stores. in that time, had no idea, Nick. No, none at all. And
that's what made this such a big for that day. Go ahead with the company. The company distributing the software wanted the software installed because it served a business objective. But serving somebody
else's business objective didn't automatically make the software safe. for the owner of the computer. That distinction remains important today. Software doesn't become trustworthy merely because the organization distributing it is legitimate. And I think that's still worth it. I mean, this was a CD distribution. Yeah. So in that paragraph,
it was CD. It was talking about the CD distribution. And that's what we were talking about, right? So you distribute that CD. You know it, but nobody in the hell else does it. That's right. Go ahead, Mr. Briggs. Isn't that interesting, huh? I see you don't even know. I'm learning. Poof. Yeah.
Go ahead with the question. I believe this is a question here. We still have to ask what the software does, what privileges it receives, what it changes, what information it collects, and whether the person whose computer is being modified meaningfully consented to any of it. And the answer to that was a hell fucking no. Especially
when Racinovich got started on this. If you've got Racinovich or Gibson yapping about it... Yeah, that's trouble. That's trouble. Could be. That'll be something. Go ahead. The Sony BMG
controversy wasn't the beginning of cybercrime. But it was one hell of a reminder that sometimes the software creating a security problem could arrive with a corporate logo, a license agreement, and a receipt. And that's the whole point, I think. Yeah. I don't think Sony intended this to be a cyber criminal act. They were trying
in all intensive purposes to do something to solve a problem. But they said jack shit. So, that I think is the takeaway. Is that they said
jack shit. If you were up front and you said, alright folks, we're gonna... You're gonna buy CDs, but they're gonna have this software on it so we can... You know... we can deal with the piracy of music, maybe people probably wouldn't
have cared so much. But maybe they probably would have because this probably still would have come out because you just don't install something without somebody's consent. So I think even if they said something, they probably wouldn't have been truthful about it. Even if they said, yeah, we're going to install software to prevent piracy.
Then Mark found what he found, and it probably still would have been a problem. Yeah, we told you we're going to do it. Yeah, but this motherfucker basically fucks up your computer. Did you guys know that? No. Well, bring on the lawsuits. Go
ahead, Mr. J. When you're ready. Meanwhile... Outside the world of music CDs, attackers were discovering something considerably more profitable. Instead of merely infecting computers, disrupting them, or proving that they could control them, criminals were beginning to build infrastructure... Out of? I think you... Oh, yeah. Infrastructure...
Out of compromised machines, the botnet was becoming a business. Yeah, it's out of compromised machines. Yeah. So, that ends that segment. Is there any other comment before... We move in to the beginning.
Well, that was, so basically Sony was 2005 and 2006. The biggest CD problem ever. Okay, that was broken. That was broken. Hearing none, do we take a file break here? I mean, if it makes
sense, if we're going to have to switch sections, which we're about to do, then yeah. We are about to do that. We're going to be switching sections. Yep. Let's do that then. The next section is Storm and the Rise of the Criminal Botnet 2007. And this is when botnets started to become very
big. So, this is the beginning, the very beginning, now be known as All Hell Broke Loose. We will continue with this in just a moment across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. may not necessarily
be new, but it has been advertised through the last several years. And they are similar to Express, where they don't track you. You turn it on, and it just works. Tests have indicated that the tabs on the bottom of their application for iOS may not be accessible, but that could definitely
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NORDVPN .com is their website, and find their link on our website at emailhostsecurity .com.
Okay. And I will take this one. Go ahead. Storm and the Rise of the Criminal Botnet 2007. By the middle of the decade, the idea of controlling Large numbers of compromised computers were no
longer new. Botnets had already been used for spam, distributed denial of service attacks, and other activity. But the economics were changing. Compromised computers had become resources that could be used repeatedly. And criminals had increasingly
strong reasons to keep those computers infected, keep control of them, and make the infrastructure difficult for defenders to dismantle. In 2007, one of the clearest examples was something commonly
called the storm worm. And immediately... Go ahead, Mr. Ray. Oh, look, a cat. Oh, my God. My cat had to put his two cents in. What does he think of this botnet? Thank you. I don't think
he really cares for the botnet. He's like, I don't care. Talk about something different. Talk about my food. Talk about my food. Although, it's not quite time for him to eat yet. At least not get refed. And immediately we run straight
back into the naming problem. Swarm was also known by names including... What is this? Peacom, Noir, Tibbs, and Zahelton. Despite becoming famous
as the storm worm, researchers sometime classified the underlying malware as a Trojan rather than a traditional worm. The name Storm came from one of the social engineering campaigns used to distribute it. In January 2007, malicious email used attention -grabbing subject lines.
referring to the severe storms that had struck Europe. Tell me if this sounds familiar to you guys. The subject changed as the campaign evolved. Uh -huh. Vaguely. What about in today's landscape?
Actually, yes. Getting people to click on messages that supposedly are about some really shocking news story, yeah. This was the beginning of that. Uh -huh. Although now what I've been getting a lot of is bullshit, you know, your iCloud account
is full spam. And how would they know that? Right, especially considering that the addresses look like they're Gmail, not Apple. Hmm, interesting. And if you looked at those links with insert KK, if you're looking on the computer, because I know you're an NVDA user. Right. You'd see... That... It's not an Apple -based address. Uh,
no. But we try to help you. We tell you it's full. We're giving you opportunity to fix... Yeah, sure you are. That's right, we are. We watch everything on the internet. We know what's
full. Uh, right. Right, I bet you do. That's right, we do. And you know, that's why people continue to do that, though. They could have these types of conversations, even though we're faking it. We're using various renditions of this. That's right, because people still believe.
Oh, it's Apple. How nice of them to tell me. Oh, good. I'm glad they let me know. Wait a minute. Yes? Why? Why? I didn't buy three full -length movies. Uh, you did now. You did now. But...
weren't supposed to have my Apple ID. Wait, they just said that I was going to be able to click that link and fix this. Well, they've handed over your crap. Yes, you did. And how did most of my iTunes library get deleted? Oh, that's how. That's how. And it's been replaced with
Bollywood. I don't even like that. Well, tough. Yeah, Bollywood and Raffi. Well, yeah, I guess you're going to have to learn to like that. Tell
me if this sounds familiar. Storm's operators repeatedly adapted their lures to current events, holidays, and subjects people might be curious about. Uh -huh. Researchers documented campaigns involving everything from news stories to sporting
events and electronic greeting cards. The delivery mechanisms changed as well. But getting malware onto the computer was only... the beginning once infected a machine became part of the storm botnet we introduced the word botnet earlier but now
it becomes central to the story a botnet is a collection of compromised computers that can be controlled as a group That requires some way for the operator to communicate with the infected machines. This is called Command and Control,
commonly abbreviated C2 or CNC or C2C these days. That's the beginning of this, gentlemen. We try
to help you. We tell you. You lie. Think of it as the communication systems connecting the person
operating the botnet with the compromised machines. Through command and control, bots can receive instructions telling them what to do. Earlier botnets frequently depended on relatively centralized command and control infrastructure. That creates an obvious weakness. If defenders identify the
server controlling the botnet and manage to seize it, block it, or take it offline, they may be able to seriously disrupt the operation. Storm made that considerably harder. Instead of relying entirely on one central command server, Storm
used peer -to -peer networking as part of its command and control architecture. But this isn't the first time peer -to -peer has been used. Audio Galaxy, which was one of the major file sharing services, used that. You told it where all your crap was you wanted to share. And then it basically connected to other peers using the
same service. And people can find a whole bunch of crap. And then the little program downloaded everything. Yeah, let me see. I want to get this random dog barking sound. And I want to share it with everybody here. Okay. Where do you have it stored? Oh, it's in this folder. Alright.
Nothing left your computer. It was all still stored locally. Okay. Oh, wow. They just use the computer as a downloading tool. But that's the beginning of peer -to -peer. And then in this case, instead of it being used for good
like that, you have somebody clear across the world. That can tell your computer what to do. And when. Yeah. Send out this spam email at 2am. Okay. Pretty much. Yeah. Send a... bunch of crapload
requests to connect to this website. Alright. And all of you do that at the same time. Okay. But that's how it worked. I know. Alright, spam it. Send this email out about these great supplements. Alright, sounds good. Sounds good, boss. Peer
-to -peer, or P2P, means that computers communicate with other participating computers rather than every machine depending exclusively on one central server. On one central server, yeah. Got it. Legitimate peer -to -peer technology had plenty of ordinary uses. Oh, by the way, we did just
talk about those important uses and legitimate uses. I mean, at the time, that's how file sharing worked. The important point here is that Storm applied the same architectural idea to a botnet. And I think that's what turned something good. And to tell me something bad. Tell me something
you don't want to hear now. Let's do something bad. Can't help it. Can't help it. Sorry. Left parenthesis breaks into song. Right parenthesis.
An infected machine can communicate with peers, obtain information through the network, and participate in a command structure that was much more difficult to... What is this? Decapitate. Decapitate by simply finding one server. By simply finding
one server and publishing the plug. Pulling the plug. Or publishing it and making it known that this is a bad thing. Researchers at SRI International described Storm in 2007 as a new generation of malware and noted that it was among the early
buttonettes to combine peer -to -peer command and control. with another technique that became increasingly associated with cybercrime, a fast flux. And this is F -L -U -X. Fast flux involves rapidly changing the IP address or addresses
associated with a domain name. Normally, when you enter domain name, the domain name system, or DNS, helps determine which IP address should receive the connection. Criminals realize that compromised computers could be placed in front of that malicious infrastructure as rapidly changing intermediaries. Instead of a malicious domain
pointing to one server at one IP address for a long period, it could point to different compromised machines over relatively short periods of time. Boom. Take one machine offline, another one may
appear. Block one IP address, and the domain may soon resolve to another. The actual criminal infrastructure can remain concealed behind this constantly changing collection of compromised systems. This is called a fast flux service network.
There was even more resilient variation known as double flux. With ordinary or single fast flux, the IP addresses associated with the malicious service change rapidly. With DoubleFlux, the infrastructure responsible for answering DNS
queries can change rapidly as well. So we had two problems, gentlemen. And yes, I remember Steve talking about these at one point, but this is probably the only time you've ever seen this. I don't think this was really common. It was
common once and then disappeared. Comments, gentlemen, before I continue. Tell me something good. Well... Yes, Mr. J. What I was going to say is I think I have to agree with you. It's not something I've really ever heard of these days. It came
and went. It was talked about then and then it was gone. We've never seen it again. Of course, because they found even shadier ways to do it. Oh, lovely. Yep. Yep. Like our friends' proxies, residential proxies, and, you know, we had, what, like our socks for a while. We did. I think it
was. Yep. Yeah. Our friends and our socks. Well, let's see. Let's connect to this guy's computer in his bedroom and, oh, okay, let's have it route this really shady -looking traffic from this phishing page. Yeah. And let's make sure it blends
with his legitimate traffic so we don't get caught. Yep. Yep. It's like, yeah, he normally doesn't visit adultfriendfinder .com, but, you know, that's okay because there are so many other sites that it'll blend in with that nobody will notice. Yeah. And, of course, when we start 281, We'll
hear about things like Adult Friend Finder and Ashley Madison and the problems they... Well, Ashley Madison more than Adult Friend Finder, but still. I don't think Adult Friend Finder had those issues. No, it had bigger ones. As far as I know. Oh, no. Oh, no. I think... if my memory serves me, but we'll research it. Really?
I don't remember them ever being breached. Ashley Madison, yes, but... Adult Friend Fighter, maybe not so much, but they were known, I think it came out once, somewhere, that they didn't actually delete your account. They actually acted like they deleted your account. And you couldn't actually get access to it. But they actually added something
to your email address to make it look like you can't get at it. And that got out. And they got in trouble for that. They added something like adddeleted .com to your email address. And people found that. And found their shit wasn't deleted when they asked for their accounts to be deleted.
Uh -oh. Uh -huh. Uh -huh. Ashley Madison was the biggest 2014 story ever. So, defenders aren't
merely chasing the location of the malicious website or service. They may also be chasing the infrastructure telling everybody where the service is located. If that sounds deliberately complicated, that's because it is. The objective is resilience. How many times have we talked about resiliency? since this podcast's inception when it became TSB. Gentlemen? Quite a few. The
criminals don't want somebody at any ISP, security company, or law enforcement agency to identify one machine, disconnect it, and end the operation. Storm is therefore important for more than the number of computers it infected. It demonstrates... What? Well, instead of reading this word for
word for the moment, if you never read this or you never was part of this history, what do you think it demonstrates? Never mind reading for the moment, Nick. Just talk. general terms, what does it demonstrate if this is the first time you're hearing this? That they can adapt. And it can work. Uh -huh. Massively, unfortunately.
This says, it demonstrates criminals beginning to think like infrastructure operators. They were building systems designed to survive interference. They were distributing control. They were hiding services behind compromised computers. They were changing their social engineering campaigns.
They were adapting their malware. And... They were using the resulting network to make money. That's right. And it was good. That's right. We have to make money. researchers found that
Storm being used to distribute enormous quantities of spam used to distribute enormous okay its botnet was associated with pump -and -dump stock spam in which criminals promote a low -priced
stock to artificially increase interest and price before selling their own holdings. Also known as... Oh, yes. The pump -and -dump... Scams. Oh, I think I saw... I don't know. Did any of you ever tune into spam radio? It's the funniest
thing. You've talked about it, and I believe you said it's gone now, and I never got a chance to hear it. Oh, man. Yeah, I think it was gone. Yeah, I think it's gone now. So essentially what it was... was this website where I don't know who was behind it, but they designed it so that there was music in the background and a synthesized voice, and it would literally read out various
spam emails like it was a freaking radio station. I say that because there's one that I'm remembering that's coming to mind right now that totally fits what you're saying. So, this one piece of spam was about this, I think it was maybe a record label or something that was traded or somehow because they did have, I think, a ticker symbol.
I think it was gold mark. And, yeah, it's like... It was exactly that. They would promote this label and all the rap artists who were on it, probably to get tons of random people interested in it. And then they, of course, dumped their random stocks that they got who knows how. Yeah.
And it'd be funny, like, because some of them, based on the way the spam was written, they would have, like, the weirdest pronunciations of words. Like, one of the ones I remember was, like, they were trying to sell these fake Swiss Rolex watches. And someone would say correctly, like, yeah, we have these replicas. They are genuine. No battery required. But then other pieces of spam
were like these replicas. Replicas. Yeah. Or V1 V1 Agra. Oh, yeah. And you know why they did that, right? To make it C1 Alice. Yeah. Yeah, I was going to say. To basically make it so that
spam filters couldn't detect. Correct. And it was very efficient for those days. Uh -huh. I'll
let you take over for a little bit. Storm was also associated... Storm was also associated with ordinary spam, additional malware distribution, and banking Trojans. That last item is... Uh -huh. Banking Trojans, yes. This starts that segment, too. Go ahead. That last item is particularly
important. A compromised computer could be monetized in several ways. Its internet connection could send spam. Its processing power and bandwidth could support attacks. Its network address could help conceal malicious infrastructure. And additional malware could be installed to steal information from the person who actually owned the computer.
The compromised machine had become part of an underground economy. This is one of the places where the history of malware stops looking primarily like a succession of outbreaks. With something like SQL... slammer, the astonishing fact was how quickly the worm spread. With Storm, propagation was important, but maintaining the botnet was
important too. The infected population was infrastructure. And infrastructure is something you protect because you intend to keep using it. This is also why estimates of Storm's size varied so widely. Researchers studying a decentralized peer -to -peer botnet couldn't simply locate one command server and
count every machine connected to it. Machines appeared and disappeared. IP addresses changed. Different measurement techniques produced different answers. Some contemporary estimates place the population in the hundreds of thousands, while other claims went considerably higher. The exact peak number matters less to our story than what
those machines could collectively accomplish. Yeah, I have to agree with that. I think that's the point. Whether it's hundreds of thousands, whether it's millions... That's here nor there the point. We don't honestly know. But for that time, it was large. Oh, definitely. Security
researchers studying Storm found that during some periods, It was responsible for more than 10 % of the spam received by their spam traps. A spam trap is an email address or system maintained specifically to receive and study unsolicited email rather than to conduct ordinary correspondence. Once again, defensive researchers were building
ways of observing malicious activity Indirectly, much as network telescopes help researchers observe internet scanning. And this is the first time we've heard of internet telescopes, as I told it before. This is a term I never heard of, so this is something we all are going to learn about together. And Nick said same here, so I want
to make sure the transcription understood that. But I want to make it clear that this is a new term that everybody is going to learn today. Yeah, I haven't heard of that one either. I haven't heard of that either, so that's why. Yeah, I haven't heard of that term either. I didn't think
anybody heard of it. So I thought having it add that was great. I can continue if you'd like. Go ahead. The attackers were building infrastructure. The defenders were building infrastructure to study the attackers. And the internet was becoming
an increasingly complicated battlefield between the two. Storm also provides a useful bridge between two generations of malicious software. It still relied heavily on something very old. Convincing a person to click something. Although I will stop and say we're still seeing this today,
but not in the same way. Right, right. But it's still alarmingly high numbers of people who still do it. Yes. But it's not used the same way. That's what we need to mention. Right. Actually, some of them are reverting to something even older. Phone calls. Yes. Yes, hi. I'm Dan calling from
your IT department. There seems to be an issue with your system. It's sending corrupted error reports. We're going to need to come in and take a look at your computer. Oh my gosh, okay, okay. And they don't even realize their computer's working just fine. Uh -huh. And then Dan, quote -unquote, actually physically shows up. Or doesn't.
Remember, they can do all this remotely. All they have to do is convince somebody to run what type of tool? Ah, remote access. Correct. You don't have to show up. Oh, but some of them want to, apparently, from that one, I think it was bleeping, that I remember reading way, like, months ago, I think it was. I agree with you.
I'm not saying they won't. I'm saying that's not the only way. That's what I'm saying. Right. The social engineering wasn't fundamentally different from the lesson of I love you. People are curious.
People respond to news. People open greeting cards. People click on things that appear interesting, urgent, or familiar. Behind that familiar social engineering trick was now a considerably more sophisticated criminal system. You know, I'm
reading this, and I don't know if I would call this sophisticated. For its time, the answer would be yes. That was sophisticated for its time. Would I call it sophisticated today? Probably
not. Gentlemen, please weigh in. You don't have to be wrong. It's not about right or wrong. I insist. Again, we're talking about... What was
the question I was looking... Okay, so the paragraph I read was, but behind that familiar social engineering trick... was now a considerably more sophisticated criminal system. I think for its time, it was sophisticated. Yeah, back in 2007, sure. I mean, today, this would be considered not even worth
their time. But they're still doing that. But they're still doing it today. Look at the email that we talked about. That is basic 2007 activity. Here, we haven't paid you. Here's an invoice. The fuck? This is a UUE file. What the? But it was a PDF .UUE. remember a lot of these trojans
worms and viry were like .pdf .scr or .something .exe and this is why we were telling you to enable the viewing Of what? Full file extensions. That
is absolutely correct. I would have taken file extensions, but full file extensions I will take. I thought I had that enabled. I'm not sure, but yeah. I can help you with that. It'll be similar with 11, or... You can ask a chat bot and it'll help you with that. Okay. It's a little bit different
in 10 and 11 these days. But that is exactly what I was looking for. The email was merely the entrance, and that's the point again. And they're going back to that because of how effective this is. The real objective was what happened after the computer became compromised. And if
criminals could build infrastructure from infected computers, The obvious next question was what they could steal from the people using those computers. One answer was sitting online, sitting, sorry, in online banking accounts. By the end of the decade, a banking trojan called Zeus as
in the god Zeus, would become one of the defining examples of malware built not merely to infect computers, but to steal money. And I see I'm
on page 50 of the 40 cell copy. Gentlemen, Zeus and the banking malware is next. What are you feeling? Do we want to stop here and do 2005 to say 07 -08? I don't remember. Let's see how long when this actually... Started here. Was
that 08? It might be 08. No, it was still 07. It was still 07 -08. What are you guys thinking? I know we covered a lot. We can cover as much as we need. It's 20 minutes to 2. We started
at 10 minutes to 12, give or take. And this is taping time, by the way, for those who are listening on the podcast. Do we want to continue? Or... Do we want to end here? I think we can continue at least through this next section. Okay. At
least I would be okay with that. Are you okay with that? We'll do Zeus and then call it a day? Yes. Let's do a file switch. I want to make sure that if something goes wrong... that if we have to come back... If we come back... Okay. If we come back or something goes wrong, I know exactly where we are. Before we do this, since you're
open, do you have any comments? No, not really. I don't have any comments. Interesting. Yes, very interesting. Definitely interesting. Interesting but predictable. You all lie. This is not bad. We tell you. It's good. What you're saying is
bullshit. That's right. No, I didn't say anything. No. So Terry, as an outsider, I guess I can address this to both of you. But as an outsider, what do you guys think when you guys are reading about this versus what we're dealing with now? I think
it's only gotten worse now. That's just how I see it. I agree. It's only gotten worse and it's not gonna get better. It just doesn't seem like anything has changed. Right, that's what I'm saying. Not for the better. Yeah, not for the better. Not for the better. No. These are old schedules. Yeah, it doesn't matter how much training
people get. Don't click on this. Here's an example of what one of these emails looks like. Don't respond. It's like that. The text just says people are curious. But I got this good opportunity. I mean, I can't pass it up. I mean, man. Why do you think that whole issue when we talked about - Well, Terry, that's where that whole issue of, okay, I'll be careful how I say this,
but smuggling U .S. citizens to other countries for supposed work, they never get paid for. And then they can't get out of it. Great, yep. Mm -hm. These are old, super old. Yeah, and then
they end up getting caught for customs because they're like, wait a minute, you're not supposed to be doing that. I'm throwing away old stuff that I don't need. Because there's all the... But they're actually told to travel with... The people who are paying to send them don't have
to care about customs or anything. They pay to get them over there. You don't have to pay that. At least the way I understand it. If I'm wrong, I could be corrected. That's fine. And more or less, if they can't, they end up just leaving them for them to deal with. And that's kind of crappy. Yeah. Yeah, I've seen like I used to
watch the border security and they had that's basically what it was. And they ended up Having to figure it out for them or send them back to their country. That's the sad part about all
of it. And that's what's going on today. But this is the beginning of that. Yeah. No. You're wrong. No, we do it all good. Right. The beginning of what we read about with those massive compounds where people are basically brought in to do that shit. Correct. They're paying for them to go.
Quote unquote. Quote -unquote. Quote -unquote, yeah. 1 -0 Washington over San Diego, top of the third inning. Yeah, top of the third. Yeah.
Let's take a file break, and when we come back, we will cover the next, and it'll be our last, and it will be Zeus. And this Zeus was not all that appetizing. More about the beginning of faking children in just a moment across the Jerry Weimer show. Radio Network. Malwarebytes. is
one of a few places where the disabled can actually use and buy a product that can be used with access technology. They also have different pricing plans for personal and business customers as well. The program is easy to use. And it comes with ransomware protection, browser protection,
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-E -B -Y -T -E -S .com. And you can find this company on our resources page on emailhostsecurity .com. All right, folks, we are going to do one
more section of this file, which will cover 2007. Zeus lasted a while. And this goes back to the same naming convention problems we've had. So, I will start and then we can take turns. Zeus
and banking malware. If Storm demonstrated that compromised... computers could become criminal infrastructure, Zeus demonstrated how directly that infrastructure could be connected to financial theft. Zeus, also known as Z -Bot, began appearing by at least 2007 and became one of the most...
notorious banking trojans of its era. A banking trojan is malware specifically designed to steal information associated with financial accounts or interfere with online banking activity. That might include usernames and passwords, account numbers, personal identification numbers, and
other information needed to gain access to an account. Zeus could do considerably more than simply record everything somebody typed. One technique associated with Zeus was keylogging, which turns into something we've been actually
talking about for a while now, and Mr. J cannot answer, but Mr. Ring, do you know what this upcoming term is? No answer? Scoping, maybe? No, no, no,
no. So we're talking about key logging. So it says one technique associated with Zeus was key logging. So what term came from this, which we've talked about in recent time? Hmm. I can't remember
what the term was now. Key logger. Oh, I forgot about that one. Key logger. Yeah, I got to take this off. A key logger records keystrokes entered on a computer. If someone types a username, password,
account number, or other sensitive information, malware monitoring those keystrokes may be able to capture it. Although, a keylocker captures everything. Everything. Everything. Weird. We're just gonna capture it every day. No matter what
you do now, every day is gonna be a capturing day. Yeah, like even if all you do is write some random message on your computer. Well, yeah. And it has nothing to do with business or anything remotely important. It's captured. I'm going to have to flip my mattress. I don't know. It's
like, I need to buy a new air mattress. Yep. Somebody who installed the malware on your system knows that you want to buy a new air mattress. Who knows what they're going to do with it, if anything. But it is being captured. Yep. The banking malware faced an obvious problem. Recording
every keystroke somebody enters produces an enormous amount of useless information. What I was just saying. Yeah. But... But we have companies even today that have been talked about that have done
this with what major operating system? Sucks. Didn't they do it with iOS? Didn't they do it with iOS? They may have. I mean, it was considerably
more difficult, I think, to do it with iOS, but yes. They were capturing everything, say, that somebody was doing on their phone and then they were exfiltrating that. More specifically. I got to flip my mattress because my whole mattress smells like that too. I didn't know. I got to
flip my mattress because my whole mattress smells like that. Okay. Yeah, I want to flip my mattress. I'm going to have to flip my mattress. Because the whole mattress smells like pee. Oh, dear. We'll flip Terry with it. Ow! Left parentheses,
left, right parentheses. Criminals don't necessarily care what somebody typed into a word processor or what they searched for five minutes ago. They care very much about what somebody types when logging into a bank. Zeus could monitor a victim's activity and begin capturing information when the victim visited targeted financial or e -commerce
websites, otherwise known as what type of website? E -commerce is known as a shopping website. Your Walmart, your Target. Okay. It could also use
a technique known as form grabbing. So, anything you've typed into a form... Even a contact form could be pilfered. No. You lie. When you enter
in for... information into form on a website, that information eventually has to be processed by the browser and sent to the website. Form -grabbing malware attempts to capture the information entered into those forms. This can be particularly dangerous because theft can occur before Encryption protecting the information during transmission
becomes relevant. That was broken. Broken. What might that mean to somebody who may be new and hearing this for the first time? What might that mean, Mr. Che? So you go to your, say, your banking site, and the way I interpret this is your shit
gets intercepted. That's one aspect. But then the other aspect is the form grabbing. So you're on your shopping site. You're on a checkout page. And you're putting in your... Your credit crad. Correct. And yes, that's a long -standing joke.
Credit crads. Yes. Because we found that in an article, in a published article, no less. If by the next thing you know, you get a nice... And the next thing you know, you get a... It was an email. It was. It was an email. Yeah, I do remember that. It was an email. Also, Netflix. Yeah, my Netflix. That still has to be... I know.
Need to pay for my net filks with, yeah, this credit crad. With this credit crad. Next thing you know, you start getting charges on your credit crad. Oh, no. The connection between your browser and the bank may be securely encrypted. And in those days, by the way, those... That portion of the internet was encrypted. When you were
on your bank, or you were on your e -commerce webpage, those were always encrypted. Had to be. There was no question about that. The bank's website may be legitimate, but if malware is already running... Inside your computer. And can observe the information. Before the browser encrypts. And sends it. The encrypted connection.
Doesn't. Solve. The problem. The attacker. Has moved inside. The trusted. Endpoint. And this is where. Zeus. I believe change everything forever. No. We tell you we try to help you. We help you buy. For yourselves. No. Not for ourselves. No.
For you. Zeus could go further still. Okay. Are you scared shitless yet, gentlemen? If that wasn't the end of it. Yeah. Oh, crap. Yes, unfortunately.
Go ahead, Mr. J. I'll let you take over. I'll take a little bit of a break. Go ahead, please. Next paragraph. Variants could modify what victims saw inside their web browsers, including injecting additional content into legitimate banking pages. This technique... Okay. So what do you think when we were talking about when we said... Sometime back when you guys started coming here, right?
What do you mean they could do this? So let's say you're on a shopping website. Let's say Walmart. So then while you're on Walmart's page, you're filling out the information to check out. But then you see... Social security number. Bank account. Routing number. Added to the list of shit that you're giving the website to check
out and purchase all your shit. But you don't know that the whole page just got modified. So now it's asking for your name, your address, your phone number, your email address if you're not logged in, your bank account number, credit card number, CVV, your routing number to your
bank. Out with anything else they want. And they could just sit there and go cha -ching, cha -ching, cha -ching, cha -ching, cha -ching, cha -ching. In those days, unfortunately, yes. That's what I mean. That's the point he's making. In those days. Yep. Yep. That's what we're talking about.
But Walmart would get what they needed. They processed you. But Terry's absolutely correct. Cha fucking Ching. Ching. Yup. Yup. Go ahead, Mr. Ye. This technique. This technique became
associated with what is sometimes called a man in the browser attack. The victim might actually be connected to the legitimate bank. The address might look correct. The encrypted connection might be functioning normally. But malware running inside the browser could alter the interaction.
And that's what we just talked about, you know. And now, as Chet loves to do, because I asked it to do this, we'll actually take a fictitious story. And you'll see how this works in practice. Mr. Ring, before we read, do you... Have anything you want to contribute here? No. Well, it's called
clicking on shit. Especially in those days. Not in this case. Not in this case. Not now. So Terry, let's back up a minute. So you're on the mark of wall. You okay? You go and you buy a bunch of shit. Okay? When you click checkout, that's
when the page got modified. And the site then could say, okay, Mr. Ring, you know, We got your name, your address, your phone number. We need your bank account, including your routing number. We need your credit card and its info and your social security number to proceed. And, of course,
if I didn't know better, I would put it in and, okay, leave us a son, you know. But, Terry, it was modified upon you going there. And they could have made that required like they do for some of these. So you had to give it. Yeah. And they
injected that in real time. That's what we're talking about here. Go ahead with the next imagined paragraph. Mr. Gay. Imagine logging into your real bank. and suddenly being asked for additional information. Perhaps the page asks for an account
number, pin, security answer or another credential. You might provide it because you aren't looking at an obviously fake phishing site. You're interacting with the bank's real website. The malicious software is manipulating what happens inside your browser. That represents an important evolution from traditional fishing. With a conventional fishing attack,
criminals frequently try to convince you to visit a fraudulent website that impersonates a legitimate institution. With malware such as Zeus, the criminal may not need to impersonate the entire bank. I don't need this anymore. Yep. The victim's own computer can betray them while they're visiting the real one. Yep. That's the key. That is the
key. gave you an example in shopping and we're giving you an example here in writing of banking. It asked for a pin or maybe something else to prove who you are. So when you logged in, it could say, okay, give us your email address, your password, your pin, and your social security number in a broken pouch. There have been several
of those. Once criminals obtained banking credentials, they needed some way to turn those credentials into money. That created an entire supporting criminal ecosystem. Stolen credentials could be used to initiate unauthorized transfers from
victim accounts. Transferring stolen money directly into an account belonging to the person operating the malware would make investigators' jobs considerably easier. So criminals recruited intermediaries known, yes. Yes, so criminals recruited intermediaries known as money mules. Yes, yes, I've heard about
this. Yes, on our favorite show that we like to make fun of, they have talked about them. Correct, and unfortunately this is still happening today. Which I honestly am shocked by, but not surprised. Well, think about it. If you're laundering crypto and you use an intermediary to hide the
activity of what the proceeds are for before you cash it out as we discuss this crypto works the intermediary has no idea they just put it in and take it out as they will please. A money
mule receives or transfers money on behalf of somebody else. Oh yes, this is one of the so -called quote -unquote work -from -home jobs that I think was also kind of big around that time. Obviously, that's not what you were told. Oh no. I remember all these notes we're getting. Oh, gosh, yes. Terry's gotten these. I've gotten
a few. You've posted a few of them. Most likely, you are being recruited to be a money mule. And that pays pretty handsomely from what I... And I'll say that cautiously, but from what I could gather, they wouldn't still be doing this if it didn't pay cautiously. Uh -huh. You're tremendously well. Uh -huh. Well, that is until the bank starts
to maybe have some questions. Yeah. Some mules knowingly participate in criminal activity. Others are recruited through fraudulent job advertisements, yes, what we were just talking about, or other schemes, yeah, or other schemes, and may initially
believe they're performing legitimate financial work. Right. But they don't know any better. Think about it a minute. If you didn't know me and I told you that I needed you to help me... You know, with a $50 ,000 transfer. And I sent it to you. And I told you where to put it. If you didn't know any better, you'd do it. And
then I'd let you take a percentage of that for yourself. And transfer the rest. Yeah. Okay. Mr. J, take this $50 ,000, take 10 % for yourself, and transfer the rest to this bank account for me. Yeah, details I will give you. Right. But
the point is, as we illustrate, that's how this could be done. You pocket son. You forward on the rest. Yep. But you have no idea because you're actually making money. Right. I mean, yeah, I've got $5 ,000 in that example, so it's like, hey, that's great. Right. I made the math easy for
a point, but you understand... We did this as an example to show what could, in theory, have happened these days. It's a little harder with crypto because it's all electronic intermediaries, but it's the same concept. And the value is so volatile that it could change from minute to minute. Correct. And that's the distinction we
need to make. From today versus the, Nick, I'll give you $50 ,000, take a percentage and transfer the rest example. Yep. Go ahead, please. Money stolen from a victim's bank account could be transferred into a mule account. The mule could then withdraw the funds or transfer them onward, often keeping a percentage as payment, i .e.
the example you just gave. Correct. That's what we just talked about. But I wanted to make sure to lay the groundwork before we read that so that people weren't saying, oh, you're a mule, you just told him to do. No, I didn't tell him to do anything. In fact, we're reading. From a script. Right. We're just adding. Context.
To. That. So that people understand. What. Is. Exactly happening here. And the script allows us. To do this. It's written but we can intervene. And add our own contextual. And I want it done this way. I don't want to just read a script and call it good. That's too robotic for me. Why not discuss what we're reading and give examples
if we have examples of that? Go ahead, please, with the result. Sure. The result was no longer merely a piece of malware. It was an operation.
Someone developed or obtained the malware. Someone distributed it. Compromised computers collected financial information. Command and control infrastructure received stolen data. Criminals accessed victim accounts. Money mules moved the proceeds. And money eventually flowed toward the people operating
the scheme. This is organized cybercrime. Zeus also became important. Because it wasn't limited to one attacker controlling one botnet. Zeus was available as a toolkit. Criminals could obtain Zeus and create their own botnets using the malware.
That changes the economics considerably. Yes, it does. So it's not just... We didn't just have, say, Zeus .a or Zbot. We had all kinds of Zeus, especially after we found it in 2007, and it became popular in 2008 as one of the biggest
items that was covered in that era. Yeah, like soon it was Zeus .p and, I mean, as an example, like Zeus Party or, you know. Right. Or Zeus Slam. Well, but the letters were mainly used for family, you know, distinction. Just like, you know, A, B, C, D and some of these other
malware families. If there were that many, then they could call it zeus .p if they wanted. Yep. And sadly, given how easy it would be to modify, we could have that many families of a malware. But I don't think we knew that as factual, so we will digress. But in theory... No, that's... But in theory... that could be the case right
an attacker no longer necessarily has to invent every component of an operation from scratch someone else can develop the malware someone else can distribute tools someone else can provide infrastructure different criminal groups can specialize in different pieces of the operation.
By 2010... And... Go ahead. And that's what we need to insinuate here, right? Like, now this is infrastructure today. Yes. Go ahead, please. By 2010... Okay, one second. Okay, here we go. By 2010, law enforcement was publicly describing
international fraud schemes using Zeus to steal millions of dollars from bank accounts. So this has been around now for freaking 16... We're going on three years. Yeah, at that point. From 2007... So that very paragraph, that's now our third year into this thing. And it lasted a little
bit longer, if my memory serves me correctly. But if it doesn't, we'll find out. Investigators described victims. whose computers were infected with malware that captured account numbers, passwords, and other security information as they logged into online banking. The stolen information was
then used to make unauthorized transfers with money mule networks helping move the proceeds. That's exactly what we were talking about earlier. When we stopped and discussed, you know, specific dollar amounts and things. Right. But no, proving again, the other point. Yeah, go ahead, please. That was just being, yeah, that was just made.
Yeah, so if I, not that I would, but say I wanted to get into this. I mean, now, and even actually back then. I mean, yes, it would have taken some technical know -how, but at that point, I wouldn't have had to do everything from, you know, from scratch. There would be other, you know, groups. It's like I could go to this place and, like, I could get this aspect of it. And, you know, I can get my, you know, the page ready if I use.
That's right. That's right. And then this other group. Go to another group for a page. Yeah, and they can give me a very convincing Apple lookalike page. Correct. Yep. That's right. We give you page. We give you page. That's right. That's right. Oh, good. We give you page. Now, you just need to pay a fee for this page. It's
like, okay, that's reasonable. That's reasonable, bud. Yeah. Like how much we talking? Yeah. And only because this is the beginner page. We only require $250 there. Okay, that sounds reasonable. That sounds reasonable for development. That sounds reasonable for development. Absolutely.
I got some of this. This is an enormous change from brains sitting on a sloppy disk in 1986. I mean, this was what? 22, 3, 4, 5 years later. We're 24 years later now, yep. Yeah. It is also
an enormous change from SQL Slammer racing across the internet in 2003. So already in seven years. Shit changed. And it wasn't getting any better.
Slammer's extraordinary achievement was propagation. Zeus didn't need to win a race around the internet. It needed to remain on the victim's computer quietly enough and long enough to steal something valuable. And back in 2005, I wasn't really doing...
Online banking. I think I was doing some credit card stuff. But not full online banking. Even in 07 -08. Maybe around 10 it was a little more. But... It really depended on the individual and how they were working in those days. That changed
what successful malware looks like. If malware's purpose is simply to spread, being noticed may not prevent it from accomplishing its primary objective. If malware's purpose is stealing bank credentials, being noticed is bad for business. The attacker benefits from persistence and silence.
The victim may continue using the computer normally. The bank May continue operating normally. Nothing. Necessarily. Announces. Your computer. Has been compromised. Then. Somebody logs into online
banking. And the malware. goes to work. Zeus would continue evolving and variants of the malware would remain important well into the next decade. One of those later descendants known as Game Over Zeus, and by the way, that's going to be
capital game and capital over, and then Zeus, will become particularly important later in this program, before this program is finished. And I just see it put a period. It did. That's an oversight. That could have been my doing, actually.
That might have been my doing, so that could have been my error when looking at something. So, that's fine. It's okay. But before we get there, another worm was spreading across millions of Windows computers. It exploited a vulnerability MicroCrap, I mean Soft, had already patched.
It built an enormous botnet. It used a remarkably clever mechanism for finding its command infrastructure. And for a while, nobody was entirely sure what its operators intended to do with all those infected machines. Its name? was Configure. C -O -N -F
-I -C -K -E -R. And that is where we are going to stop for today. Configure 2008 -2009. It is 2 .33 broadcasting and taping time. I think that is an appropriate place to stop. I would agree with you. So we're stopping at cunfucker, I'll name cunfucker. It was a fucker. Cunfucked her.
So then I did say it right. Okay, cool. Yeah, cunfuck her. Yeah, if your computer's a female, it certainly would fuck her. Yeah, it would. Another cord I could use. But it was, but that was an interesting time too. If you want, Mr.
J, give them the first paragraph as a preview where we will pick up next week. We'll repeat it, but just give them the first paragraph of the section, will you? Sure. In late 2008, another Windows worm appeared that would become one of the largest and most closely watched malware outbreaks of its era. It was called Conficker.
And go ahead with one more. Okay. And... Naturally, because malware naming remained a mess, you may also have encountered it under names such as Downadup or Kaido. And just to give you guys an idea, Downadup, it's all one word, capital D -O -W -N -A -D -U -P. And then Kaido, also
capitalized, capital K -I -D -O. The very problem of naming, and we still have that today, by the way. Yep. Yeah. And it was bad. If I remember this correctly, this was back. This became worse.
But Game Over Zeus was actually bigger for its day, and I believe that's around 2011 or 12. So that will be coming up later on in the series. But, boy, gentlemen, 2005 to 2008. Yeah. That's
okay. We'll take our time through this. I think it's worth doing. What is that? From outsiders, what do you guys think? I think I actually, unfortunately, ran into that on my system. What, configure?
Yes. I got Zeus. Geez, how though? It was sent by email. Right. As a lot of those were. All of those were. Or better yet, I'll say most of them were. As an outsider, between the original
280 and 280A, which is where we are now, what intrigued you? Oh. Well, I think just some of these new terms and groups that I've certainly
never heard of before. 5 -2 San Diego, bottom of the fourth inning. Oh, boy. Ha, ha, ha. Did I tell you we're going to take you on a history lesson? I think I told... Yep, you weren't kidding. But even going back to 278 when we started this
whole series... I mean, some of this was new to me, too. Like, some of it I knew, some of it I didn't. And so, I wonder how much of it, I probably would have followed the majority of this from 14 onwards, so there may not be a lot of commentary from the peanut gallery over here. Except the common, this fucking doesn't surprise
me. Yeah, that probably will appear a lot. Yeah. Yeah, with Confuckter. Confuckter. But when you read more about Conficker, for that time period, it probably was bigger than everything you've
probably ever read. It seemed to always get bigger. Mm -hmm. That's because we're making our work a lot easier. We got to make money, you know. We help you. That's right. That's right. We help you fix your computer. That's right. Errata time.
I might as well add errata to this. And then if we don't have any errata, I can add a few files and make this program say bye -bye. I don't really think I have anything to add. I mean, other than those stupid telegram things that I've been... Sometimes I like to mess with them by, and I think I told you this, giving them
song titles that sound like they're plausible places, like where I live. It's like, oh, that's fun. Yeah. Yeah, I think the funniest, though, and I may have told you about this one, was, what was it? I think their name was, quote -unquote, Sprinkle Heart or something. Oh, gosh. And, you
know, they asked me, like, so where do you live? And so I write in Mexico. And it's like, what state in the U .S. do you live? It's like, did I make myself clear the first time? That's my number. I took my number with me. I actually live in Mexico. Well, they didn't ask that because I think they're just stupid scammers following a script. They don't look at that, I don't think.
What should I play today? What tracks would fit today? Hmm... 24 -year -old looking for a short
-term room. Mm -hmm. Yeah. Sure they are. I bet they are looking for a room. I'll play Chris Harvey's elation sedation from the other way. I'm sorry, the Whitesail album. It is a... Oh, I don't have a year on this. Magnetoon sometimes
had issues with years. Alright, I don't have a year on it. Let's see. Let's see. Day of the Dead. Emily Burridge. From the 2002 album Footsteps
in the Sand. Let's see. Rambling on. Eric Kamen.
Eric 2. A 2007 album. And I think I will play one of my favorites from Etherfish, which might
have you put yourself in, like, a different type of realm. He titles it Orange, but you'll understand when you hear it. It's a 2004 track or album called Box of Fish. I think that'll be enough for tracks for this week, huh? I think so. Okay.
I will play Preston's file, but I'll give out my contact information. One more time, even though he'll do it. Email iMessage, either J -A -R -E -D -R -I -M -E -R at 986themix .com or tech at m -e -n -v -i .org. Text or WhatsApp, 804 -442 -6975. Or call the comment line at 888 -405 -75.
I think I did pretty well today. It's just hot and miserable at 3 a .m. It's only going to be about 70 -something degrees tonight. I think you did pretty good. I think we did good today, too. I mean, I was a little bit late, but I... Got here, so... Do you have any errata before I do a final file switch, Mr. Ring? I do not.
Caught any attention that you heard since I haven't written a whole lot? I do not. So I guess we could close this out here. Okay. All right. You delete program like we tell you to do. No. You don't do a lot, though. No. No a lot, though. You're really short. That's all right. I'm sorry
our pee -daddy Gaylor's not here today. He usually shows up about now. Mm -hmm. But the heat must have grabbed the cat's tongue, too. He is on, as they say. Although that cat of yours had plenty to say. Oh, yeah. He's a good boy, though. Kind of like Jet. You can't get him to get vocal on
your show, huh? I should try and listen to your show and see if we can't get him to say hello. I know. I keep trying, but... It doesn't work. How does it work over here? I don't know. Maybe it's just because I'm in a different. Maybe it's, I don't know. There it goes. There it goes. I
hear you talking about me. He knows. He knows. Yeah. You're talking about me. Well, gentlemen, the NFL will be starting tonight with the first
game at 8 o 'clock on your XM radio and on NBC, I believe. You know, they're still talking Bears news, and I don't know where they're looking on. I think they're going to end up moving to Indiana. That's what I think. What would they call themselves if they're planning to move to
Indy? They're still going to call themselves the Chicago Bears because geographically it's so close to Chicago that most outsiders wouldn't really know the difference. Yeah, they said it was like 10 -15 minutes from Chicago. It wasn't that far. Really? Yeah, it was like Right outside Indiana. It was right, right, wasn't too far from Chicago. Well, then there's no point. Yeah,
it's like the New York, yeah, like the New York Giants who play in New Jersey. Right. I never knew that until I heard that somewhere, and I'm like, wait, the New York Giants, but you're fucking in Jersey. But again, Jersey's like right across the river from New York, so it makes sense. Well, that part of it is, yep. I agree. That's what I mean. Part of it is, yeah. I agree. If it makes
sense, then so be it. I mean, they're trying to keep them in Illinois. They have two sites. I don't think it's a problem. I don't know. I don't think so either. I think they're going to be going to Indiana. What's the radio people in Chicago saying? They're thinking Indiana. They have the Arlington Heights site, but they
haven't done much construction, so I don't know what they're going to do. And when are they scheduled to move? It's going to take a few years, that I know, because they've got to build the stadium. I can't remember when they were scheduled. I can't remember. I think it was 30 or 29, but I can't remember. I can ask the boys. I can ask
the boys. Sports Lounge. They'll know. Oh, yeah. I don't remember either. I know they did have a date, but I can't remember. And they did say, but I can't remember. I wonder why they can't just sign a long -term lease and be done with it. I mean, what is Illinois looking for? They
want more, I guess, incentives, and Illinois is not giving them. So, all right, it's nice, but they're, and Indiana's willing to help pay for the stadium. So, I... That would mean sensitization enough. If the whole goal is for them to move stadiums and Illinois is not wanting to flip
the bill... That's... That's like the whole thing. Illinois, i .e. the taxpayers. It's the same shit that happened with the Chargers. It was part of the reason they fucking left San Diego because... Yeah, the taxpayers were not willing to basically finance a new stadium. Well, that's like Indiana, the taxpayers, they're going to finance it. It's coming out of the taxpayers,
a lot of it. We can talk a little bit about transportation here since we're in Arata, but this is the same as LA Metro winning the Measure M, Measure R sales tax ordeal we started around the same time we're in. During the security landscape. During the same time. Transit. Was wanting to build. And they. Were asking for sales tax measures. Like M &R. In California. And at least in LA.
And we. We have it. So it's the same. It's the same process. Except. There's a key difference. I'm not saying it's exact. I'm not saying it's exact. Well, I know that, but in my view, there's a key difference why that won and why the Chargers didn't. That won because that is considered more
essential. I agree. I think that's probably the reason, yeah. I agree. And I don't know what the interpretation is like in San Diego, but... It's there, but... It's different. Yeah, they
have Amtrak. Yeah, they have... I think the trolley that's... And I've done that, too. Yeah, they've got the trolley, I think. There are some other things they have there, too. But, see, here's the difference, though. Indiana taxpayers and Illinois taxpayers, substantially less they're
having to fork over. So, yeah, of course they'd be willing. What is Illinois looking at if they were to fund it? Wasn't it like a couple billion or something, Nick? I can't remember. I know it was in that number range. It was expensive.
They wanted to have other stuff. They wanted to have concession stuff, stuff. Pops, all this other stuff that, you know, maybe they shouldn't. Just like Dodgers Stadium, right? Yeah, they wanted it kind of like that, yeah. And Illinois taxpayers were like, um, I don't know about that.
Yeah, we already have to pay some of the highest fricking taxes in the fricking country. Yeah. So, yeah, we're not okay with this. Sorry. Right. You know, I mean, I get that. I can understand it. That makes sense to me. I understand it. Like, I wouldn't want to pay for a stadium that, you know. billionaires can pay for on their own? Barely. Well, more to the point, a stadium that
I may not even attend and I have to freaking finance it? My point, yeah, exactly. I mean, yeah, it's pretty closer to me. I mean, sure, I could probably go, but I wouldn't go all the time because they're expensive. Tickets for games are... More expensive now than they were in the past. I'm cooking myself some of the spaghetti
that was in there. I'm hungry. Oh, eat something. So eat something. Five o 'clock somewhere. Always five o 'clock somewhere. Is there anything else,
men of the gentle? Um, I don't know. Well, another PSA from Malwarebytes and the other articles. Update Chrome. They've fixed some fairly major vulnerabilities. I have to do that. Yeah, I think I'll go launch Chrome. I don't think I launched it. I launched it the other day and it updated,
but if there's another update, I don't normally run it, so I think maybe I better. Maybe I better. It sounds like I think I got her. Yeah, I think that'd be a good idea, yeah. Might be good. Okay, will do. Okay. Crap. That down, I forgot to grab
my spoon. Good job. Good job. Good job. Do we have any stupid morons before we leave, Mr. J? I don't believe we do. I don't believe so. Well, if Mr. Um... Indian... Mr. Arkansas boy, because
that's where he is now, my one guy, Michael, who's been on this program either as a recording session or here on the program, records a session. I've got something big for you, but I'll let him tell you guys the story. I think we've got another live wire stupid fuck. But I want to let him tell the story. Oh, not another one. Another one? Oh, my God. Yeah, we've got another
one. But I'll let him tell the details. When I get the file, we'll make sure it airs. And we'll give it to you guys for listening. Yeah. So that'll be coming when it's feasible. Mm -hmm. But we should close it down then. Yeah. Blessings. Yeah. Then I will let Preston Boy take us out
and we will continue with 2008 to 2009 as program 280 continues. in two weeks. Two weeks, right? Yep. For all of us here at TSB, we've got Terry Ring in Chicago, Nicholas Jackson in Santa Barbara, and I'm just outside of Los Angeles. I'm Jared
Reimer saying thanks so much for listening and we'll see you In two weeks time. Until then. See you all later. Good night everybody. See you next time. ExpressVPN is one of many VPN
services that are out there, and this one is easy to use. All you have to do is push a button that says Connect, and it connects to their network. Using a VPN is definitely recommended. but not required. And it can, depending on your VPN,
give you better protections, as in protecting you from adult websites, advertising, and more. ExpressVPN offers a monthly and yearly subscription, although the yearly subscription has gone up. And I'm not sure about the monthly price, but that's something you can check out. I've used it for Windows and iOS, and both are accessible.
Learn more about ExpressVPN by visiting their website, just as it's spelled, expressvpn .com. Hello there, and thank you for listening to Security Box. This is Preston Gaylor, contributor and one of your announcers for this program. We hope you enjoyed today's program, and we hope it brought
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