Welcome to Sans, episode 43 where your blood may decide to boil. I'm Jared, and this episode will cover the Newsletter that was released on October 13, 2026. On this newsletter, there will be some good news items that will really make you feel a hell of a lot better. But of course, it also comes with the bad. Do you want to read the newsletter? Here is the newsletter for October 13, 2026. Here is what is in the newsletter. We'll start with top of the news. The top of the news items are: Cyberattacks on Food Retailers: Ahold Delhaize Takes Some Systems Offline; Danfoss Freezers in French Supermarkets Sabotaged Patch Now: GitLab CE/EE Max-Severity Flaw CrowdStrike Investigation of Cyberattacks on South Korean Banks May Have Turned Up Information That Identified Hacker Here is the rest of the news items. They include: Let's Encrypt Certificate Life Cycle Change Schedule FBI Seizes Malicious Chinese Web Domains Related to Flax Typhoon iRhythm Breach Affects at Least 360,000 Individuals FBI Arrests Cyber Exec on Suspicion of ShinyHunters Conspiracy Qilin Suspect Extradited to Germany from Japan Judge Imposes 32-Month Sentence on Former Employee for Extortion and Damaging Protected Computer We hope that you enjoy the program, and thanks so much for listening and reading! See you next time!
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The opinions expressed are those of the show hosts and may not necessarily be of any company in which the show hosts may represent. This podcast
is for October 13th, 2026, Volume 28, Number 76, and its newsletter. Welcome to SANS News Bytes, Episode 43. This issue leads with cyberattacks affecting food retailers, including disruptions to ad -hulled... Delhace systems and the sabotage of supermarket refrigeration controllers in France.
We'll also cover a maximum severity GitLab vulnerability and an investigation involving attacks on South Korean banks. Other stories include changes to Lex... encrypted certificate lifetimes, the FBI's action against domains associated with Flax Typhoon, and several data breaches and cybercrime cases.
This file is transcribed into eBay and UEB by Jared Reimer in Woodland Hills, California. A link to the original newsletter is included in the podcast. For a Braille copy, email tech at menvi .org and request either eBay or UEB, along
with your preferred file format and cell size. The default is 40 cells. Each major news section begins on a new Braille page. Stories are numbered in the table of contents and in the newsletter itself. Reader's notes enclosed by the transcriber's symbol are transcriber's notes for the Braille reader and podcaster, if you're reading this
in Braille. They provide recording cues, including strong language warnings and need not be read aloud verbatim. I will tell you that we started the UEB transcription process with Podcast 42. We have always done this episodically in eBay starting with Podcast 6. And I'm actually leaning on going full UEB with this one. Even though
I can read UEB, I'm beginning to understand. why they made the change, even though a lot of us old -time readers don't like reading it. If I make a change, I will be announcing it right here on the podcast. But for now, you can get both copies. Here's the table of contents for
the newsletter we're going to talk about today. Starting off with top of the news, item number one, cyber attacks on... Food retailers at whole. Delhace takes some systems offline. Danfoss freezers in French supermarkets sabotaged. And this actually has an update on the whole ordeal. So this will
be continuing in podcast number 44 when we get... it ready for it to be podcasted item number two patch now git lab ce slash ee max severity flaw three crowd strike investigation of cyber attacks
on south korean banks may have turned up information that identified hacker Hmm, could he be, or she be, our bonehead award of the podcast? To keep things clean, we will make sure that we have notations when strong language will appear. But
for the most part, this podcast is pretty clean. We're going to use Rick Deez's bonehead award instead of our... TSB phrase. So I think that'll be more appropriate for this podcast. We're going to keep the strong language to a minimum for this one. The rest of the week's news. Let's
encrypt certificate life cycle changes schedule. This actually was talked about a long time ago through Security Now. but no real information was actually made available. Now we actually have some idea of what's going on. So again, the title is Let's Encrypt Certificate Life Cycle Change Schedule. Item number two. FBI seizes
malicious Chinese web domains related to flax typhoons. Number three. iRhythm breach affects at least 360 ,000 individuals. And no, it's not dealing with the equipment they may sell. It
is going to be your typical pieces of information that has been known. in most breaches. Ouch. Fourth, FBI arrests cyber exec on suspicion of shiny hunters conspiracy. Fifth, Killen suspect
extradited to Germany from Japan, and this This is spelled Q -I -L -I -N, and so I think I was pronouncing it on the blog, Q -U -I -L -I -N. You can search this out, but this was a new up
-and -coming threat. And so seeing something like this in the news is always great. And number six. Judge imposes 32 -month sentence on former employee for extortion and damaging protected computers. So, all of this is coming up on today's
edition of SANS episode number 43. And as always, email iMessageTech, that's T -E -C -H, at M -E -N -V -I dot org. Text or WhatsApp, 804 -442 -6975. Or, of course, you may leave a comment on the comment line at 888 -405 -7524. Now, without
any further ado, let's go ahead and get started with today's program. It starts in just a moment across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. All right,
let's go ahead and get started now with top of the news. And the first item is cyber attacks on food retailers. Delhaze takes some systems offline, Danfoss freezers in French supermarkets sabotaged. In a Monday, October 12th press release,
Netherlands -based food retailer Adhol Delhaze confirmed that it took some of its IT systems offline following a cybersecurity incident. While the company said its stores are open and serving customers, reports from its U .S. stop -and -shop supermarkets indicate that employees are experiencing
difficulty accessing schedules and pay stubs. and customers have reported they are unable to access websites, apps, and customer service platforms for Albert Heijen, Ethos, and Gal & Gal in the
Netherlands, and Delhasse in Belgium. So, let's stop and spell some stuff here. We've got Albert... Hygen, this is going to be spelled H -E -I -J -N. And then Etos, E -T -O -S, and Gal, G -A -L -L. So the Gal and Gal, this is all G -A -L
-L in there. And then Delhaze, D -E -L -H -A -I -Z -E, Delhaze. And then Adhold. H -O -L -D, Ahold. Okay, so, in November 2024, Ahold Del
Jose experienced a ransomware attack that affected its U .S. network. The attacker stole sensitive personal information belonging to 2 .2 million individuals. Alright, so... Yeah, I read this right. I wanted to go back because I wanted to
make sure I read that right. So in 2024, they experienced a ransomware attack. The company operates more than 9 ,400 retail food stores in Europe, the U .S., and Indonesia. Over the weekend, controller systems for... Danfoss freezers
installed in French supermarkets were remotely hijacked. This is the story that is going to be really talked about next time because this is bad. The appliance's thermostat settings were altered, resulting in spoiled food. The incident
has affected between 250 and 350 stores, including Intermarch, Cooperative, U .S. Carefour, this is C -A -R -R -E -F -O -U -R, Market, then it's
Monoprix, M -O -N -O -P -R -I -X, and Leckler, L -E -C -L -E -R -C. This is only the beginning, folks. When we get to next newsletter, based on my understanding, we're going to learn a lot more than what's discussed here. And if you did
not hear a throwback Saturday night for Saturday, the 17th. I read a press release specifically for that program that I put together based on what I'm understanding. And your Twitter and
other social media are talking about this now. And it's possibly hitting the local news in some Sachs writes, defrost function to cause physical
and economic damage across hundreds of stores. An important comality is the compromise of registration controls across multiple locations. I'm sorry, it says refrigeration controls across multiple locations producing physical consequences without
compromising the store's primary IT systems. The engineer inside of me would like to know why a remotely issued command is allowed to drive refrigeration equipment into an unsafe operating condition without an independent temperature
limit, alarm, or protective mechanism. Neely writes, We spent a lot of time talking about OT and critical infrastructure security recently. Make sure everything that can be remotely controlled and monitored is considered. It's no longer just
a vending machine or refrigerator. Are you up on your environmental control systems? How about the data center? CCTV? Double check that you've got remote servicing and support. Not only for the security of those devices, but also for the
security of devices which are reachable from them. Have you considered the security of a device the technician just plugs in to do their task? An action item from the Ahold Dalhousie attack, make sure, let's see, what happened here? No,
I read it correctly. Make sure you are clear about all the impacts from an incident. Transparency trumps future damage control. Alright, it seems a little interesting when I started reading this in Braille. It made sense when I was reading it through speech, but... We'll push forward,
folks. Having the same thing here as I do sometimes with TSB. Ulrich writes, We often talk about the risks of exposed IoT devices like this, but there are few examples of catastrophic exploits like this. It appears that in this particular case, the thermostat controls were not only exposed
to the internet, but also used a well -known password scheme. The current date? Yes, the password changed daily. We do not know the... motivations of the attackers yet, but the food supply chain has been considered a vulnerability for a long
time. Peskator writes, to paraphrase an old saying, if you decide to poke a hole in the basket that holds all your eggs, you really really need to watch what is coming through that hole. You can
easily understand why remote alarms from freezers might justify external monitoring. This is one of the classic examples for the data diode approach. Regular output. bound reporting without any inbound connectivity or as a minimum only with strongly
authenticated logon scoutus writes last friday in news bites we were discussing cyber informed engineering and the importance of keeping physical processes within safe limits, even when digital
controllers are compromised. Now attackers have reportedly manipulated refrigeration controls at hundreds of French supermarkets, spoiling enormous amounts of food. I find cyber attacks that damage the food supply particularly heinous. We rightly worry about attacks against hospitals,
but food safety and availability deserves serious alarm too. As Johannes points out, these controllers apparently had internet exposure and a painfully predictable password scheme strong authentication
and access restrictions matter enormously but so do independent temperature monitoring out -of -band alarms local overrides and physical safety limits that attackers cannot simply change through the compromised systems. OT securely isn't limited to power plants and factories.
It's in the grocery store aisle too. Bishoping. This is a new name. He may be... reading these or doing some editorial work for sans so we're we may be seeing this name just like we see sax from time to time his name is mark sax so i'll
be interested to see who this guy is uh bishoping writes any attack on critical infrastructure to include where we source our food and water is an attack I think this also illustrates the supply chain's impact on the kinetic world. Intermarch,
U .S. Liqueur, and others don't share a computer network, but they could. share a refrigeration vendor or maintenance provider and intermarsh pointed to a service provider that manages refrigeration systems this means that sometimes spray and prey
attacks or unintended overflow beyond an original intended target can have widespread effects. It also reminds me of what I said about NCSC advisory last month. About the NCSC advisory last month, exposure is rarely a decision someone
approved. More often, it comes from vendor remote support that nobody owns. Ed's point about independent monitoring is born out here too. One employee
reported that the on -call alarm never rang while staff who were alerted overnight were reportedly able to fix things by hand if you run facilities with remote managed equipment one ask your service providers how and from where they access your
controllers so you can update your monitoring accordingly two push on those vendors to use secure access solutions, and just -in -time access over less safe methods like old -school VNC or RDP. And three, make sure you have disaster recovery
and business continuity plans that include on -site manual procedures for systems. typically managed remotely. So those are all of the comments we decided to take, and I'm honestly thinking that in an upcoming newsletter, we may decide
to tell you how many of the editors and contributors contributed to a story and how many we're taking from. I used to only take one or two, if any, but I think the way I'm doing it now makes sense. There are great comments, and I am liking the
decisions that I'm making because we get different sides of the overall problem. So now, what are my thoughts? about other internet connected devices over the years. Why the hell do refrigerators
and freezers need to be connected to the internet? I understand that there are legitimate reasons for remote monitoring. A supermarket might want to know when a freezer is malfunctioning. when temperatures are rising, or when equipment needs maintenance. I don't have a problem with that
concept. What I have a problem with is allowing somebody somewhere on the internet to access equipment and change settings that could destroy thousands of dollars worth of food. As Steve Gibson might put it, What could possibly go wrong? We've seen this kind of problem before. Think
about baby monitors, smart light bulbs, and other internet -connected devices. Just because something can be connected to the internet doesn't necessarily mean that it should be. And this isn't the first time we've had to talk about contractors and building management systems. Remember the Target
breach in 2013? Attackers obtained access through credentials associated with an HVAC contractor. That access helped them move into systems they had no business reaching. Now, We're talking about refrigeration equipment in supermarkets. The circumstances aren't identical, but the underlying
question is similar. Why are these systems accessible in ways that create opportunities for attackers? I've also wondered about traffic lights and other infrastructure that can be remotely monitored or controlled. What happens if somebody compromises those systems? Are there independent safeguards?
Can operators regain control locally? I'm not suggesting that every piece of equipment needs to be disconnected from the network. Or from every network, for that matter, as it's written here. But I do believe we need to distinguish between monitoring something and allowing somebody
to control it. If a refrigeration system needs remote monitoring, fine. Why not design it so that temperature information can be sent to a monitoring center without? allowing unauthorized
commands to come back. And if technicians need to remote access, that access should be restricted, authenticated, monitored, and separated from the rest of the business network. Most importantly, there should be independent safeguards. If somebody attempts to raise a freezer's temperature to
a dangerous level, the equipment should have a way to reject that command or alert somebody through a separate mechanism. There's another issue here too. Who is responsible for keeping these systems secure? Is it the supermarket, the equipment manufacturer, or the contractor?
who maintains the refrigeration system. Some of the equipment involved in these attacks reportedly had reached the end of its life, or, as we have it here, its supported life, otherwise known in this industry as EOL, by the way. End of life.
It's not getting support. Think about that. If a device no longer receives security updates, why is it still exposed to the internet? Well, I could probably ask that question about operating systems. Technically, those who are not keeping their operating system up to date should move
on to the next operating system. In my case, my machine works just fine, but... It may not support 11. I've had mixed results. But I've also heard bad things about Windows 11. I've read it. We've covered it. So this is a choice I've made, and I take responsibility for that.
But I'm one individual in a home network that doesn't have all of these variables to worry about. that insurance may not even cover all the spoiled food. So the damage doesn't necessarily stop when the refrigeration equipment is repaired.
This is why cybersecurity can't be treated as somebody else's responsibility. If I choose not to keep my system up to date by running the latest operating system, That is my choice. But I'm one individual running a one -man business. But a retailer who is responsible for everything,
right? The food, the checkout process, the pricing of everything. That's a little different. Keeping one computer on the internet. That doesn't have anything to do with a lot of this stuff is one thing. But keeping it online when it does a whole lot more, which is what we're talking about here,
is a lot different. The retailer, manufacturer, and service provider all have roles to play. And somebody needs to make sure those responsibilities are actually being fulfilled. We're not simply talking about somebody losing access to a website. We're talking about spoiled food, economic losses, and potentially serious consequences for the
food supply. At some point, we need to stop connecting equipment to the internet simply because it's convenient and start asking whether the benefits justify the risks. Because when somebody can remotely turn a freezer into a heater, something has gone seriously wrong. This is an ongoing
development. If we learn more about these incidents, we'll report on it. And we will. It will be in a future newsletter, i .e. the next available podcast when it becomes available. You have got sans news bites. This is episode 43. Now it's
your turn to talk to me about your thoughts based on what we know so far. Tech at menv .org, 888 -405 -7524. The comment lines await. Oh, yes. I should give you the text number too, 804 -442 -6975. We continue with more of the program in
just a moment. All right, folks. I know that we need to be pushing along for SANS 43. We've
already got our next podcast ready to go and the next newsletter after that. is even staged. And speaking of patching, since we're going to be a little bit behind, you might as well get patching. And you can learn more by going over to the blog so that you're as up -to -date as
you can be while we try and get Sans all caught up. I've now got this episode. And then I've got 44, which will be coming up. That'll update you on the first story we just talked about. But I'm not going to go into any detail right now about why you need to patch. But our second story is talking about patching. So I might as
well get you notified that we are covering... Stuff on the blog dealing with patching. And something that happened. Or two things actually. But one big huge thing that happened. The week ending October the 23rd. And so we do want to make sure that you're up to date. So please go check out the blog. And hopefully you will learn.
And of course we'll... be talking about this in the coming days, what happened, because that's going to be a big, huge thing. But this item we're going to talk about is patching GitLab CE slash EE max severity flaw. And the bug, by
the way, that you will need to patch for the week ending the 23rd, also is a maximum severity bug, which is why I'm mentioning it in this file, even though I'm not going to go into a lot of detail about it here, because this newsletter doesn't cover this. This newsletter will not cover this particular item. It'll be coming up in two podcasts, but this is why we've got...
TSB as well and the item I'm going to be talking about will be on 280 episode E which is the 280 series intermediates dealing with the security landscape so we'll talk more about what to patch then but since we're talking about patching you need to know that there's yet another 9 on top
of everything else we're covering within this particular newsletter. So let's talk about GitLab and its item. GitLab's critical patch release on October 12, 2026 released GitLab Community Edition CE and Enterprise Edition EE. 19 .4 .2,
19 .3 .4, and 19 .2 .8, including a fix for one maximum severity and five high severity flaws. CVE -2026 -97229. CVSS score 10. So this is the common vulnerability scoring system score of
10. So we're seeing a lot of 9s and quite a number of 10s. And 10, by the way, is the maximum for this scale. This one allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. on the GitLab server by using a specially crafted regular expression
to exploit insufficient regular expression validation in a CI slash CD configuration. GitLab credits this is a joke scar for reporting the flaw. Through
the company's bug bounty program with HackerOne, three high severity flaws affect both GitLab CE and EE, a cross -site scripting issue allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution, CVE -2026 -92883. an improper authorization issue allowing unauthorized
execution of CI -CD pipelines, CVE -2026 -16301, and a permissive regular expression issue that could cause targeted CI -CD pipelines to execute
specially crafted content and could lead to exposure of protected environment variables, CVE -202614814. The other two high -severity flaws affect just GitLab EE, an incorrect authorization issue allowing
on... authenticated arbitrary execution of a transferred project's CICD pipelines with the new group's privileges CVE -2026 -81839 and improper neutralization of input for LLM prompting that
could cause unintended command execution attributed to other users in the GitLab Duo Agent Platform CVE -2026 -96893. GitLab strongly recommends users upgrade affected installations to the latest
versions as soon as possible. And again, this is why we need to keep up on things. If you're using this type of thing, and it doesn't matter who you are, you should be paying attention to such things. Because no software is going to be 100 % secure. And the item that we are going
to talk about on the security box for Program 280E and eventually for SANS is just as bad. Although we're going to be continuing to learn more about that. But this needs to be patched too. So, you know, lots of different vulnerabilities.
I know, I know, it's a lot, but that's part of the business of using this type of software. Neely writes, GitLab .com is already running the patched versions. GitLab dedicated customers
do not need to take action. The flaw impacts all types of GitLab deployments. In other words, just update all your instances now. For security fixes, GitLab releases the details of each vulnerability publicly 90 days after the release in which they are patched. Ulrich writes, has patched several
vulnerabilities recently. This issue is particularly severe as it does not require authentication and allows for code execution. Bishoping writes, Here we go again. How many GitLab criticals in the last few months? I'll say the same thing I always do. This system holds your source code,
your pipeline config, and your secrets. So it needs to be at the top of your patch list. To be fair to GitLab, there's no report of exploitation yet. GitLab .com is already patched, and the advisory says the RCE... works under certain
conditions which they haven't spelled out. The bug I'd ask you to look at twice is CVE -2026 -96893 in the Dual Agent platform. It's rated lower, but an authenticated user can inject content into AI agent instructions that results in unintended
command execution attributed to other users. That last part should worry anyone doing forensics because if the audit log says Alice ran it but an agent did it because of something Bob Planted, your investigation starts from the wrong person.
As an industry, we must consider that agent plugins and skills are now a patch and hygiene service. Attribution is getting messier. in this agentic attack world. And I don't see that trend going
away anytime soon. Scoutus writes, Yowza! This list of GitLab vulnerabilities reads like a whole set of sans core slabs. Unauthenticated RCE CICD authorization flaws. Potential exposure of protected
environment variables and prompt injection that could use an AI agent to execute commands attributed to other users. In a training lab, that would be a blast. On a production system that builds and deploys your software, it's a nightmare. Johannes is absolutely right to highlight the
unauthenticated code execution, but the breadth of issues here deserves attention too. CI -CD systems. often hold source code, secrets, and deployment privileges reaching deep into the environment. Treat that infrastructure like the crown jewel it often is. Patch this one, folks.
So, what might I say about this one? Holy shit. We're on fire. I say between the last few episodes, the one I'm taping now, 44, which will be coming
this coming week, 45, which is Sans News Bites for Friday. That'll be October the 23rd. And then, of course, if... They go back to an every Tuesday, Friday release. You know, we'll be a
little bit behind, but we're going to try and release as quickly as we can. This is probably going to be the worst that we're going to talk about through everything that I'm aware of to date. Besides the 9 .x I talked about briefly and pointed you to the blog to learn more. The problem is, is I don't see this actually getting
any better. And this is before I actually read the thoughts that I have written down. I think we are on fire, and I think it's going to get a lot worse. That's pretty much my reaction when I see a vulnerability with a CVSS score of 10 .0. which is pretty much a flat 10, but they're
pointed because it starts at 0 .0 and it goes to 10 .0. That's the highest possible rating, and it's not something you want to see in software responsible for managing source code and deployment applications. We're talking about a vulnerability that could allow somebody to execute code on
a GitLab server without even having to authenticate first. In other words, under the right conditions, the attacker doesn't need to log in before attempting to compromise the system. That's hair -raising. If you're running an affected GitLab installation
yourself, This is one of those situations where you need to stop what you're doing, review the advisory, and update your systems. GitLab .com has already been patched, and GitLab dedicated customers don't need to take action with this particular release. For self -managed installations,
The corrected versions are 19 .2 .8, 19 .3 .5, and 19 .4 .2, depending on which supported branch you're running. But there's another aspect of this story that caught my attention, and that's the AI component. We spent a considerable amount of time on the security box discussing artificial
intelligence, what it can do, and what happens when people place too much trust in these systems. I don't personally use AI agents to build or deploy software, so I'm not going to pretend I know all the details of how GitLab's dual agent
platform operates. What concerns me is the possibility that somebody could manipulate an AI agent to execute commands that appear to have been issued by another user. Are you fucking listening, people? This is bad. Having things run under you is one
thing. It being malicious and ran under you is one thing, but we're seriously talking about something that is ran under the auspices of other people who may not even know what the hell hell
is going on and as i write here think about that for a moment right if an investigator examines the logs and sees that a particular employee executed a command how can they be certain that that employee actually initiated the action what if an ai agent performed it because somebody
else manipulated its instructions. Now, you've got a security problem and an accountability problem. We've talked before about prompt injection, where an attacker places malicious instructions into material and AI system processes. This vulnerability
illustrates why those attacks deserve serious attention, especially when AI systems are given access to tools capable of changing things. AI agents should have clearly defined permissions and organizations need reliable ways to determine
what actions were taken, who authorized them, and whether an AI system was manipulated. The bottom line is that we have two concerns here. First, a maximum severity vulnerability that demands immediate attention from affected GitLab users. administrators. Second, an AI -related
vulnerability that raises important questions about trust and accountability. Neither should be ignored. If you're running an affected GitLab installation, patch it. And if you're using AI agents in your development environment, make sure you're understanding what they're allowed to do and how their actions are recorded. So
yes, we're talking about 9s and 10s here. I mentioned a 9, which you need to make sure you read the blog when this comes out, unless TSB 280E comes first. But regardless of how this all comes out, this is all bad stuff and every single item needs
to be looked at. When Program 43 continues, we're going to talk about a company called CrowdStrike. cyberattacks on South Korean banks. Like the Koreans have any way to talk because they have
been known to do things in the past. But wait till you hear this one. This hair -raising story is coming up as the SANS News Bytes episode 43 continues. Is your blood boiling yet? I usually
have great admiration for, because when they investigate stuff, they come out with it. And I admire those companies in this field that do exactly this work, including Trend Micro, ESET, F -Secure, and others who have been around this space for a very long time. CrowdStrike may be
relatively new in this space within the last several years, but they definitely have been doing a good job. And this next story is going to be good. Because its title is CrowdStrike
Investigation. of cyberattacks on South Korean banks may have turned up information that identified Hacker. And if I remember this correctly, this might actually be our bonehead award of the podcast.
CrowdStrike was founded in November 2011. More specifically, November 7th, 2011. I've only heard of them until recently, but I know they were talked about in books and other things, so they've been in this business for a long time. 15 years, just about. And the story is going to get interesting.
While investigating a series of AI -assisted cyberattacks targeting South Korean... financial institutions, researchers at CrowdStrike identified infrastructure associated with a targeted campaign that resulted in exfiltrated data. The campaign ran from late September through early October 2026. CrowdStrike writes that the threat actor
leveraged Artex, a recently released open -source agentic penetration testing pen testing tool developed in China alongside large language models, LLMs. CrowdStrike also discovered evidence that could help identify the individual responsible for the intrusions. AI session logs revealed
a request to compose a resume which may contain details that point to the actor. Korean officials are investigating the attacks which have compromised personal data belonging to at least 68 ,000 individuals at multiple financial institutions. The compromised
information includes borrowing history, incomes, phone numbers, and names. Neely writes, This reinforces the observation that financially motivated threat actors are actively using AI to speed their attacks, increasing the tempo. Our defenses remain essentially the same. What has changed
is our response window. You need to have a risk -based tiering of systems where most of them fall into automated updates and where security controls are implemented as SOP. This way, you have resources to throw at analysis, regression,
testing, and planning on high -impact, riskier -to -the -business systems. Don't forget to use the AI capabilities for your existing toolset. Even your CFO, who begrudgingly gives you 11 .58pm to 12 .01am downtime, appreciates that
you don't wish to join the list of victims, but may miss that you're trying to stack the deck. in their favor to avoid future awkward conversations. So, tell them so. It's easy to forget you've got the same business goals in mind. The better
your relationships are with other parts of the organization, the easier it will be to talk about implementations you need. and for them to talk about their business mission requirements and come up with cool ways to achieve both. Bishoping writes, The resume request was amusing, but the
other evidence, session histories, configs, memory files, in the actor's open directories, is more interesting to me. Ejective tools generate abundant state. Whoever finds the right evidence and can piece it together first wins. That's the attacker
finding the evidence needed to pivot through your environment or you finding the evidence of the back and forth and iteration on activity in real time. Economically, open -source agents plus cheap APIs let low -skill actors launch
rapid intrusions, which has already been observed widely. Barriers were low with RAAS and access brokers, but cheap and prevalent AI lowers them further. Overall, AI attacks are faster, but leave far more noise and artifacts. Therefore,
parsing them demands equal AI skill from investigators, and leaves minutes, not hours or days, for preservation and analysis. Preserve evidence quickly and comprehensively. TMP files, network requests, timestamps, and
heartbeat cadence can reveal agents' thinking patterns. that I personally find really interesting and look forward to further research on. Monitor east -west traffic as attackers use agents internally. AI attacks differ not just in speed, but in artifact
type and noise, requiring new sleuthing to distinguish success. noise, or deception. I'm optimistic, though. This is forcing a shift in how we think about real -time IR capabilities. Skotus writes,
a resume request in an AI session log that might help identify the attacker. Yeah, gotta love it when attackers mess up like that. We spend plenty of time talking about how AI can amplify offensive capabilities, but poorly secured AI
tooling can also leave an enormous trail of artifacts for investigators. Prompts, tool calls, session histories, and intermediate files can become a treasure trove of evidence. Kudos to CrowdStrike for finding and analyzing this material. And
remember, automation can amplify attackers' operational mistakes too. Murray writes, It is essential that we hold the user Not the tool responsible. And I think first I gotta ask, who is the user
in this case? Yes, you can hold me accountable if I were to do such a thing. I think that would be appropriate. Well, ladies and gentlemen, I start my thoughts. I think we may have a candidate
for the bonehead. We've talked extensively about artificial intelligence on the security box, including the ways criminals can use these tools to carry out attacks more quickly. But imagine using AI to help conduct a cyber attack, only to have investigators discover That you've apparently
been asking the same technology to help prepare your resume. Now that's what I call a bonehead move. Of course, we don't know whether the resume information actually identifies the attacker. Investigators still have to establish that. But
the possibility alone makes this story rather amusing. And it raises a serious question. How much information are these AI tools retaining about the people using them? We've discussed logging, accountability, and the importance...
of understanding what AI systems can do. Here's a situation where those records may become valuable evidence in a criminal investigation. But there's another side to this. AI tools can help attackers work faster, and that means defenders may have less time to recognize suspicious activity and respond before damage occurs. At the same time,
if the tools are recording prompts, commands, and other activities, those records may give investigators a better understanding of how an attack unfolded. Of course, the existence of a log doesn't automatically mean everything in it is accurate. Investigators still need to verify
what they're looking at, establish who was responsible, and preserve the evidence properly. And I agree with Murray's observation that we need to hold the user responsible. Not the tool. An AI system doesn't suddenly become responsible for a criminal act simply because somebody used it to help commit
that act. The person directing the activity is responsible for what they do. I've said before that AI can be used for good purposes. and bad purposes. This story illustrates both sides of that discussion. Criminals may use it to assist
their attacks while investigators may use the evidence it leaves behind to help determine what happened. If there's one lesson here, it's that attackers shouldn't Assume using AI makes them invisible. Sometimes the tools you're using to cover your tracks may be the very tools that
help investigators follow them. And if the resume turns out to be the clue that identifies the attacker, well... I think we found ourselves a deserving recipient of the Bonehead Award. We'll have to see what the investigation reveals.
And that will end the week's top of the news for the episode we're dealing with. And yes, I think we do have that. Bonehead Virus Tool
is a website that allows you to submit links, files, and other pieces of information including domains and IP addresses for analysis. It's a Google -ran product and recently They've changed
their website a little bit. There is going to be an unlabeled button underneath the enter URL, IP, or domain edit box, which will allow you to upload a file for analysis. No matter what you submit, the service in question allows you to get... things analyzed. Is this safe? Is this
website safe? Is the file that I'm dealing with safe? My program I use on my computer didn't say anything, but I want to make sure this website does just that. The higher the number, the bigger the problem. For example, if it says 30 out of 90, you should probably be concerned. If a website
you want to go to says one or two out of 90, you could probably go to it, but just be careful and pay attention to what you're doing. The website, again, is virustotal .com, just as it's spelled. V -I -R -U -S -T -O -T -A -L dot com. Find a link on emailhostsecurity .com on our resources
page. Folks, well, here we go now with the rest of the week's news. And this is going to talk about Let's Encrypt, which has been around a
number of years. The exact number doesn't matter in this case. But what's interesting is that they are handing out completely free domain -validated certificates. Whether they actually charge for their services, I honestly do not know. But as part of my web hosting over at JaredReimer .net,
Email hostsecurity .com and its properties and menv .org. I can tell you that the cPanel company has teamed up with Let's Encrypt to deal with certificate handling. It used to be that those who wanted it had to go into the manager dealing
with certificates. to buy them. Boy, things have changed. But as you'll learn in this particular item, the fact is that these certificates are going to be changing in duration of time that
they are available. This is going to get Very interesting. And now we've learned a little more than what we have back many years ago when this
was first talked about. So what exactly am I talking about? I am talking about the fact that each certificate has a lifespan. And this is
changing. So let's talk about it, shall we? The title of this is called Let's Encrypt Certificate Life Cycle Change Schedule. Okay, so Let's Encrypt Certificate Life Cycle Change Schedule. Open
Certificate Authority, CA. Let's Encrypt will be shortening the life cycle of its certificates starting early next year. Currently, Let's Encrypt certificates have a 90 -day life cycle, or as written, lifespan. As of February 10, 2027, all certificates issued by Let's Encrypt will expire
after 64 days by default, and subscribers will have the option of choosing shorter lifespans for their certificates. Let's Encrypt writes that it, quote, will switch to issuing 64 -day certificates in, in brackets, its. staging environment on October 14th, 2026 to enable testing in brackets
and recommendations or as written here recommends in bracket S testing in staging before changing takes place or before the change takes effect in production. That's the end of the quote. The last 90 -day certificate is expected to expire on May 11, 2027, and Let's Encrypt will not revoke
any certificates as a part of the lifespan change process. The change to 64 -day certificates is a step toward a planned certificate lifespan reduction to 45 days in 2028. Let's Encrypt also notes that the authorization reuse period will shrink from 30 days to 10 days in February 2027.
In 2028, the authorization reuse period will be further reduced to seven hours. So, lots of changes coming, and of course, this has been discussed for many, many years now. I remember Steve Gibson actually talking about this, but at the time, there wasn't really much since,
although there were several episodes where this was discussed, and we'll get to that in a little bit. Neely writes, At this point, you should be using automatic processes to keep your certificates updated, making the process of keeping them updated transparent regardless of certificate lifespan. Some of you are saying you are already using
their 45 -day certificates. This is not a concern. My point is, that the days of manual certificate update and deployment need to be long past. Make sure that your automated renewal processes don't hard -code the renewal interval. Look for values
like 83, 80, or 60 days, and that you have not specifically configured your ACME client to rely on validation reuse. Fix issues now. Don't wait for May. They'll just get forgotten or skipped.
Pescatore writes, let's encrypt has been ahead of the curve in shortening certificate lifespans, which is a good thing. The certificate issuers should all focus on increasing the strength of registration authorization in certificate issuance processes. Scotus writes, Johannes' suggestion to test with very short lived certificates is
a good one. When doing so, make sure to exercise the entire certificate lifecycle, not just renewal. Does the new certificate actually make it to every endpoint where it needs to be installed? Do services reload? Does monitoring catch failures
before users do? If one step breaks, can the automation recover? Shorter certificate lifetimes can improve security, but they'll all expose brittle handoffs in our operations. A certificate that renews successfully but never gets deployed
to production isn't doing you much good murray writes as ca's go the representation made by let's encrypt domain ownership validation is already fairly weak on the other hand let's encrypt's leadership has encouraged the pervasive use of encryption at the transport layer. My thoughts?
Well, they're coming up right now. As I said before that I remembered Steve Gibson talking about this, and that's exactly how I'm going to start this section of the discussion off on. I remember Steve Gibson discussing shorter certificate lifetimes. on Security Now, episode 998, and
again in episode 1005. At the time, I wondered what this would eventually mean for those of us who operate websites, but rely on our hosting providers to handle certificate renewals. Now, we're beginning to find out. Let's Encrypt is moving from 90 -day certificates to 64 -day certificates
in February 2027, with another reduction to 45 days planned for 2028. Are people really going to want to deal with that? I understand the security argument, and I agree that certificates should be renewed automatically. But I've also had first -hand experience with cPanel and AutoSSL, and
that experience has taught me that automation doesn't necessarily mean everything will work perfectly. I've received AutoSSL error notifications involving a special host name associated with my hosting provider. Those messages have sometimes indicated that a problem existed even when my
actual websites were operating normally. But it actually says that the messages have sometimes indicated a problem even when my actual websites were operating normally. Now, I could probably turn those notifications off, and you're probably saying, why don't you? Well, there's a real good reason why I don't. The errors that I'm seeing
are due to configurations that were made, and that's all I will say publicly. Whether those configurations stick around or not remains to be only known. to the company that set it up. But if I didn't know that there was an issue that I actually had to deal with, like we couldn't
validate your domain, jaredreimer .net, and it didn't have, you know, either a secondary host name or something that the provider set up for, you know, whatever their reasons were, then I'd have a little bit more to worry about. As I write here, but I don't want to because I want to know
when something goes wrong. I'd rather receive a notification that turns out not to be a serious problem than discover that one of my website has an expired certificate and nobody told me because these days you may not get told they'll just be told the site's not secure and they will never come back now I could be lucky and I could
be told but then it's another five or ten hours to get that taken care of There's also a question of how frequently certificates will need to be renewed. If a system currently begins renewal approximately 29 days before expiration, a 90
day certificate gives you roughly 61 days between renewals. With a 64 day certificate, that interval could to approximately 35 days. That means after every 35 days when it's fully installed, then you're getting notice from the date that it was
issued. So let's say that I have a certificate that'll expire on December 31st. Now let's just say that they moved forward. Around the 1st of December, I get an email. I say the certificate was installed for X domain, where X is the domain. Let's use example .net. There were issues because
of the example that I'm giving where the provider may issue some domains that... allow us to continue to work while we get moved or something else so if there's an error because whatever that infrastructure is pointing to doesn't work it says we'll try again and if we continue to get
the error then we're going to issue the certificate without this domain and I'm not going to publicly give out the link. That's why I didn't put in the notations exactly what this is, because it is complicated, and a lot of people would be, well, I don't understand what that means. Well, that's why I'm not doing that. After so long,
that would actually drop off. The other domains would drop off within two days. So, let's continue with the discussion. And with a 45 -day certificate,
it could be as little as 16 days. So, after the date, everything takes effect. So, if the issuance is January 1st of 2027, in the first set, it'll be, you know, February, let's call it 5th. In the second example, it'll be January 16th to
17th. Depending on the day, because we know some days have 31, some days have 30. February always has 28 or 29 days. So there's going to be some variance. Now, those are illustrative calculations based on the current renewal threshold I've observed. Not a projection of how cPanel or AutoSSL will
actually behave in 2027 or 2028. And again, in 2026, I'm giving you these examples as illustrative. The software and its renewal schedule may change, but the point remains. Shorter certificate lifetimes can mean more frequent opportunities for something to go wrong. And that brings me to SCOTUS's observation.
It's not enough for the certificate authority to issue a replacement certificate. That certificate also needs to be installed in the correct places. the appropriate servers or services may need to reload and somebody needs to know when any
part of that process fails. I also agree with Duke's observation that shorter certificate lifetimes provide a way to reduce certain security risks, mechanisms don't work as intended if a compromised certificate expires sooner that limits how long
it can remain useful for an attacker and that's always good and as i wrote here that's a legitimate security benefit and i don't dispute that My concern is what happens operationally when certificates have to be renewed and installed more frequently. For me, the important words are automation, validation,
notification, and accountability. Automation should handle the renewal. Validation should confirm that the replacement certificate is actually working. Notification should tell somebody when there's a problem. And accountability means somebody needs to take responsibility for fixing it. So
if it's not right, you, as the person running it, or your provider, needs to get involved, depending on, you know. how you are comfortable handling these things. If you know what to do, and you know how the interface works, go for it. If you're not sure, and you'd rather ask for help, do that. That's what I did when I got
the error, and I'm like, what does this mean? And they said, well, when we moved you, we developed this, and this is what it means. Whatever it may be, then that's that. As website operators, we shouldn't have to babysit every certificate
renewal. But we also shouldn't be left in the dark when something breaks. I want my hosting provider and its software to handle this properly. Tell me when there's a genuine problem and keep the site secure without requiring... somebody to come and to become an expert in certificate
management just to keep it running. And for the most part, it runs itself, right? It does. But when there's an error and it's something you're not familiar with because maybe, as I stated in my comments, your provider did something, you're allowed to ask. there's something we need to do, you'll go into SSL and tell it, disregard
this, or just let the cert figure itself out. If it can't resolve to whatever backdoor setup, then it'll be installed without all of those domains. Oh, and by the way, on email host security side, when I bought, the .net, the .org, the .us, the thing went out and added all of these
TLDs once I brought everything over. So, I have all of that on one account, but I have jaredriver .net on one, menv .org on another, I have email host security, and it's properties. org .net .us .com all in one place, so one account handles
all that. But it's automation, and of course, like I said, when I see the errors, I was like, wait, what does this mean? Why am I getting this error? If it's a valid error that, you know, will just go away because it'll see, oh, the domain doesn't exist, or whatever. is happening with it doesn't exist then it then it is signed without those issues and that's that's what this
is about right you want things to make sense you don't want things not to make sense because if they don't make sense why are you running it just some thoughts when we come back the fbi is Getting to work. And we also have. Some good
news. Within these sections. Of the newsletter. So. Let's just step on it. We might have a bunch of good news. Coming this program. That always makes me happy. So the FBI. Is first. As they are going to be. Seizing malicious. Chinese web domains. Related. to Flax Typhoon. And that's
coming up as the program continues across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. Right, folks, it's time for us to start getting into some good news. And I always love good news. So any type of particular
publication that wants to give me some good news is going to be worth covering. This is item two of the rest of the news, and this one is titled, FBI Seizes Malicious Chinese Web Domains Related to Flax Tycoon. The U .S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, has seized seven domains that support hacking
tools used. and operated by Chinese security firm Integrity Technology Group, Integrity Tech, which has ties to the government of the People's Republic of China, PRC. The tools have been used to scan and, in some cases, break into critical
infrastructure and other networks around the world. Court documents indicate that the threat actors created and used a network of internet -connected devices infected with a variant of Mire malware. to conduct scans of targeted networks with one of those tools known as Microscan. The
other tool, FishHub, was allegedly used by the threat actors to facilitate the exploitation of computer networks through spear phishing. The threat actors involved are known as Flex Typhoon. And remember, we've talked about Mirei a long time ago. M -A -I -R -I -A -I... Let's
see, what is it? M -A -I... No, it's not M -A -I. What? What is it? I don't remember now. What,
uh... How we, uh, how we spell that one. That is not good. But the fact is, is that China itself has never really been playing nice on the internet.
Oh, here we go. M -I -R -A -I is how we spell it. So, Mirei, M -I -R -A -I. We've never talked about Fish Hub. So that's definitely something new. But we have talked about the various types of phishing. And I don't think we actually talked
about Flax Typhoon very much. In related news, the U .S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, along with cybersecurity -related agencies, In Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and the UK, published a cybersecurity advisory last week warning of FLEX typhoons activity
and providing technical details about the threat actors activity. And of course, last week would entail the week prior to the newsletter's publication. The document includes a list of CVEs. The threat actors are known to have exploited indicators of compromise, IOCs, and key actions users are advised to take. Neely writes, The 58 -page advisory
lays out a lot of familiar mitigations regardless of the threat actor. two pages so you can digest this over coffee. You need to review the entire list for areas you may have missed or skipped. Make sure they are all covered. Don't just say,
got it, and move on. The majority of the document, 38 pages of it, is the IOC's. Get those to your threat hunters to see what they come up with. Some of these are older and you're only going to find them in your offline logs, if at all. So, our apparel, right? We always talk about
the threat actors. What they're doing. And when I read this, I was sitting there going, Wait. Did you just say 58 pages with 38 of them IOCs?
Well, ladies and gentlemen, here's some good news for a change. The FBI and the Department of Justice have seized seven domains associated with tools used by the Chinese state -linked hacking group known as Flax Typhoon. And I say,
good for them! We've discussed other typhoon groups before, including Vault Typhoon and Salt Typhoon. I remember reading about Flax Typhoon as well, although I couldn't find a specific article about them on my blog. It seems like every time another typhoon makes the news, we're hearing about more malicious activity. And let's
not confuse the difference between typhoon versus hurricane, i .e. typhoon in the eastern hemisphere, as it's 179 east. So they use south and east as we use north and west as our coordinates for
the GPS and other odds and ends. You probably hear something like 118 .5 west or north and 45 .3 west. Those are coordinates. specific to a location, and so they use south and east in that portion of the world. But this time, we're
talking about law enforcement taking action against the infrastructure these attackers use. According to the report, the seized domains supported tools known as Microscan and FishHub, which were never used for vulnerability scanning and spear phishing operations. Actually, it says, according to the
report, the seized domains supported tools, not what I said earlier. So, sorry about that. I am reading a little faster these days. And there's more. CISA and its international partners have published a joint advisory providing technical information that organizations can use to identify
and defend against this activity. And of course, that's all of what we were talking about earlier in the story's paragraph. That's the kind of international cooperation I like to see. The advisory is 58 pages long with approximately 38 pages devoted to indicators of compromise
and other technical details. It describes more than 1 ,300 vulnerability testing scripts associated with the activity. You heard that correctly. We're talking about more than 1 ,300 scripts. The advisory also discusses attacks involving
email systems, misuse of VPN software, and the theft of sensitive information. For those who aren't familiar with the terminology, an indicator of compromise or IOC is evidence that may help identify malicious activity on a system or network. TTP stands for tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Those are methods attackers use to accomplish their objectives. That information matters because taking down seven domains doesn't necessarily mean the entire operation has been dismantled. The attackers may try to establish new infrastructure or change their methods. That's why organizations
need to review the advisory, examine their systems, address vulnerabilities, and watch for suspicious activity. And that's the important lesson here. Taking down malicious infrastructure is only part of the solution. Still, I want to congratulate the FBI, the Department of Justice, CISA, and
their international partners for the work they've done. We spend so much time discussing successful attacks and data breaches that it's refreshing to talk about the authorities disrupting an operation instead. Let's hope we see more of this kind of cooperation and enforcement. Let's see what
else is... going on here. I see the next item coming up is going to be another breach, but I sense that we will have some more great news like the last file coming up later in the program. This one we've never heard of. In fact, I know I've not covered this. This is iRhythm with the
i lowercase and rhythm is the capitalized word so iRhythm Breach affects at least 360 ,000 individuals and this one was one of these that I sort of was not necessarily surprised about but it's
completely different than what I thought it would be iRhythm, a manufacturer of cardiac monitoring devices, says that a June cybersecurity incident compromised personal information, including protected health information, PHI, belonging to at least
360 ,000 individuals. The company has filed breach. in several U .S. states, including California, South Carolina, and Texas. The notices say the incident occurred in June 2026 and that the data compromise was the result of unauthorized access to third -party systems. Of course! Of course
it would! Why else would there be a breach? Because you decided to pilfer it yourself? Well, we've seen some of those, but it's not common, and I'm not going to say that it doesn't happen. The compromised data include patients included, but it does say includes, but it would include,
of course. And it did include, of course, patient names, patient contract information. Well, a contract being the types of things they're being treated for, maybe. But contact information is the appropriate term here. iRhythm patient account numbers. iRhythm device service serial numbers.
insurance numbers, dates of service, and, of course, stop me if you've heard this before, dates of birth. What could possibly go wrong, eh? An iRhythm spokesperson told Recorded Future News that the incident did not affect iRhythm
clinical systems or medical devices. and did not result in a loss of service or disruption to operations. An investigation determined that the intruders had access to the compromised system between June 3rd and June 8th of this year. They gained initial access to the system via... Social
engineering. Yeah. Somebody calling them up or sending them an email telling them that there was some type of problem somewhere, more than likely, and that they needed to click on something to fix the thing. A June 10th filing with the U .S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC,
demanded payment for not disclosing the stolen information. How many times have we seen that crap? Then the company pays, and the actor or actors do that crap anyway. Neely writes, Third -party system access using credentials obtained
via social engineering. I'll take MFA for $1 ,000, Alex. We're not going to stop social engineering. What we need to do is double down on comprehensive MFA, ideally fishing -resistant MFA, to reduce
its effectiveness. Don't forget to include training on not providing MFA tokens slash codes to anyone. The idea of phishing -resistant MFA is there are no codes or other shareable components avoiding this scenario. Murray writes, while one now recommends
the use of strong authentication in all multi -user systems, the failure to use it on enterprise internet -facing applications is reckless. And, of course, well, ladies and gentlemen, here we go again. Should I be surprised anymore? This
time we're talking about iRhythm, a company that provides cardiac monitoring services and a data breach affecting at least 360 ,000 individuals. We've discussed security vulnerabilities involving pacemakers and other medical devices before.
that these devices can have security weaknesses, and that's concerning when people's health and safety may be involved. But I want to make something very clear about this particular incident. According to iRhythm, its clinical systems and medical devices were not affected. This wasn't a case
of somebody remotely taking control of a patient's heart monitor. Instead, attackers obtained sensitive patient information from third -party hosted business applications through social engineering. And that brings us to the part of this story that sounds painfully familiar. Stop me if you've heard this before. The information that was stolen
includes, but may not be limited to, the following. Patient names, mailing addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, patient account numbers, cardiac monitoring device serial numbers. Health insurance identification numbers. Dates of service. There you go. Another collection
of personal information that patients entrusted to a healthcare -related company. And we're not talking about a handful of records here. 360 ,000 people. is not a small number. Think about what somebody could potentially do with that information. A criminal who knows a person's
name, date of birth, insurance number, and details associated with cardiac monitoring services could use those details to make a fraudulent communication sound convincing. They might pretend to be contacting the patient from a medical provider, an insurance company, or a billing department. That's why
protecting this information matters, even when the medical devices themselves continue operating normally. Now the report indicates that the attackers obtained access through social engineering involving third -party hosted applications. Neely and Murray raise important points about stronger authentication, including phishing -resistant multi -factor authentication.
I agree that organizations should be using strong authentication and appropriate access controls to protect sensitive information. but we don't know exactly what authentication protections were in place for the affected applications.
So I'm not going to assume that MFA was missing or that any particular safeguard would definitely have prevented this incident. What we do know is that Sensitive patient information was accessed and downloaded. And here's something else worth remembering. Outsourcing an application doesn't
mean outsourcing responsibility for the information stored there. If a company entrusts patient information to a third -party service, that company still needs to understand how the information is protected. who can access it, and how suspicious activity will be decided. It also needs a plan for responding
when something goes wrong. iRhythm has said it has no evidence that the stolen information has been used for identity theft. That's worth noting, but it doesn't make the exposure harmless or guarantee that information won't be misused later. Patients shouldn't have to worry that information
associated with their medical care could become material for identity theft, insurance fraud, or targeted phishing. And while I'm glad the company reported no impact to its medical devices, clinical systems, or patient safety, the theft of patient information is still a serious cybersecurity incident. This is another reminder that protecting
healthcare involves more than securing the equipment used to treat and monitor the Patients. Or as it says here. Patients. It also means protecting the personal information. Collected along the way. And I tell you what folks. This is bad. I mean. Go look up medical stuff. Even the particulars.
Of making sure. That you not breached is not going to help you here. Because chances are, you are already breached. And just because we're
seeing a 360 ,000 number here doesn't necessarily mean anything anymore. Your devices may be okay, they say, but do we know that? Do we honestly know that? I don't know what the problem is,
folks. I don't know what the solution is. It can't work both ways, iRhythm. The information is already out there. You are just the latest to be part of the bigger problem. But we still
don't honestly know whether or not the material of your devices have been breached. So I have
to say that I think we need to be very cautious. And we will see what happens, right? I mean,
that's all we can do. So, that's what we're gonna do. We're gonna see what happens. So, yeah. Not necessarily impressed, folks. When we return,
we are going to have three great good news stories in a row. We will continue with more of the program. In just a moment, across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. The program and the rest of this is
going to be good news. I know it. I promise you, we need some good news in our lives. And these items are definitely things that we don't get a good chunk of. No matter... Where we turn to any type of news. This is going to be items 4,
5, and 6. Not in this one particular recording session. But that's what's left of the rest of the week's news. And this file will cover item 4. And we'll go straight in order. And the item.
is titled, FBI Arrests Cyber Exec on Suspicion of Shiny Hunters Conspiracy. Now, Shiny Hunters, we've talked about for many, many years. They've been around for a while. And of course, it's
probably not the first name you would probably think of. When it comes to the various groups causing havoc. And of course, we're always happy to hear some good news. Even if it means that the organization in question, like Shiny Hunters,
is disrupted. And they gotta go figure out how to rebuild their infrastructure or find new members or whatever it might be. And it gives us a respite. But not everything is all hunky -dory. They could
still be doing stuff even while they might be rebuilding. So let's read what the FBI has been up to. And you tell me what you think by sending me an email at tech, that's T -E -C -H at M -E -N -V -I dot org. text or WhatsApp, 804 -442
-6975, and or commenting through the comment line at 888 -405 -7524. Following a threat actor's defacement of FBIjobs .gov, the claimed theft
of FBI agents' sensitive personal information and the Bureau's termination of a third -party contractor whose unpatched system may have allowed the breach, FBI Director Kash Patel, and this is K -A -S -H, by the way, announced on social
media on October 9th that another suspected co -conspirator had been arrested. While the announcement does not give additional details, Brian Krebs uncovered information indicating that the individual arrested was 54 -year -old Edward Dubrovsky,
Cyber steward. Canadian. Cyber security firms. That specialize. In cyber risk. Consultation. Incident response. And. Ransomware. Recovery.
Krabs. Sites. Indexed. Court records. And. Sources. to the matter to show that Dubrovsky appears to have been arrested on October 8th while attending
the Net Diligence Cyber Risk Summit in Philadelphia, PA on charges of to threaten to impair the confidentiality of information with the intent to extort money
before the case was transferred to the Eastern District of Texas, which Krebs' sources allege is the epicenter of the epicenter of the FBI's Shiny Hunters investigation Dubrovsky announced
the publication of his book Cyber Extortion Strategic Response on October 4th whose stated thesis is that communicating with a criminal is not the same as negotiating a payment, and negotiating
is not a commitment to pay. Engagement can serve other objectives, including testing claims, gathering information, creating time, and preserving. while
the organization evaluates its next move. Neely writes, Anybody else recalling last year's incident at Digital Mint? Ransomware remains lucrative,
which is why it's still going strong, and the temptations are a sufficient lure to cause one to change roles. If you're hiring such a negotiator, regrettably, many private companies do pay the ransom, and you're going to want to carefully
verify they are reliable. On the other side, this emphasizes the need for ongoing reliability checks in my background we had positions which required human reliability checks regular screening
testing and required codes of conduct to conduct certain roles these are up requirements in positions where temptation to cross the line is significant. Temptation is real and people make bad choices.
Do what you can to detect and deter these actions. Dukes writes, this is an interesting development. Although details remain limited beyond what Krebs on Security reported, previous cases have shown ransomware negotiators becoming complacent in
cybercriminal activity. The cited book reference suggests that negotiators frequently build rapport with a dynamic that can sometimes be a telling indicator of deeper involvement. So, here is
what I have to say. Well, ladies and gentlemen, here we go again with Shiny Hunters. I think I'm going to start calling these people the group that keeps on giving. Because it seems like every
time we turn around, there's another story involving them. We've discussed shiny hunters on the security box before, including reports of breaches, stolen information, and extortion activity. We've also watched shiny hunters -related breaches appear in Have I Been Pwned? Sometimes the initial reports
are allegations or claims made by the attackers. But when HIBP obtains and verifies the exposed data, we... have something more substantial than the group's word alone. And we've seen that happen repeatedly. And now we've got something particularly
interesting. A cybersecurity executive who has worked in ransomware negotiation and incident response has been arrested in connection with an investigation reportedly involving shiny hunters. Edward Dubrovsky, a 54 -year -old Canadian cybersecurity executive associated with Cypher and CyberSteward
was arrested in Pennsylvania on October 8th and Where was he reportedly attending an event? A cyber security conference in Philadelphia. You've got to be kidding me. Now, the charges reportedly involve a conspiracy to extort money by threatening
the confidentiality of information and interfering with commerce. I want to be very clear about something. These are allegations and an arrest is not a conviction. We don't know everything
investigators have uncovered and some of the court documents remain sealed. But the circumstances certainly raise some interesting questions. Here's somebody who has worked in an industry where organizations turn to professionals for assistance
from ransomware attacks and other cybersecurity incidents. If the allegations are eventually proven, that would represent a serious betrayal of the trust those organizations place in cybersecurity professionals. And there's something else worth remembering. In SANS News Bytes, episode 42,
we discussed FBIjobs .gov breach and that particular breach itself. The contractor who reportedly failed to apply a Critical Oracle PeopleSoft
patch and the FBI's decision to remove that contractor. I questioned whether holding one individual responsible was sufficient or whether the company supervising that person should also be held accountable. Well... Now we're getting additional information
about the investigation. The FBI announced another arrest on October 9th and reporting has identified the individual as an executive associated with companies involved in cybersecurity incident response and ransomware recovery. That certainly makes this case even more interesting, but as always, an arrest is not a conviction, and we'll
have to see what the evidence establishes. We've covered other cases involving executives who allegedly crossed the line into criminal activity. And I keep coming back to the same point. It doesn't matter whether you're an employee, a
manager, or an executive. Your position in a company doesn't put you above the law. participates
in cybercrime, they should be held accountable for their actions. And if the allegations in this case are proven, I think we may have another candidate for the Bonehead Award. But I'm not handing out that award based on an arrest alone. For now, i'm glad to see investigators pursuing
the people they believe are responsible and i'm interested in seeing what comes out of the court proceedings as for shiny hunters will undoubtedly continue watching developments involving this group because at this point they really do seem to be the group that keeps on giving. And coming
up, we're going to talk about Killen, a group that we've heard of, may or may not have covered in a lot of detail, but we have a suspect apparently from this group extradited to Germany. We will
talk about it. In just a moment, across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. Folks, episode number 43.
And we are almost done. I believe there are two more stories to go. And then we'll start recording 44, which has been ready to go. But we need to do these podcasts one at a time. And even if I do a podcast and it's ready to go, we are going to release these in order. So... Don't worry. I'm not going to release a podcast before it's time for it to be released. I know that I've
talked about a day in the life and that we do have a numbering system, but those podcasts, some of them could be time -sensitive, like talking about meetings and so forth, whereby these podcasts... you know, are needing to go out in order and we're doing the best we can with that. I'm liking the workflow that I'm using now and maybe on
a future tech program or TSB. We'll talk about what I am doing differently, but I am pretty much liking what's happening. There have been a few corrections that needed to be done done as we've recorded this file which is why it's taken me a little bit longer than usual but I think we actually have the workflow in regards to this so that's some good news to go along
with the rest of the good news the podcast may be a little bit behind but there's only so many hours in a day so I'm doing a lot more than just preparing this, so we're going to get them out as soon as we can. And speaking of good news, we're going to talk about a group I don't think we've really talked about called Killin, or Kian, maybe. I think ChatGPT is pronouncing this Kian,
but it's spelled Q -I -L -I -N. And I think I was spelling it Q -U -I -L -I -N. And this is what I get when I don't look at spellings. And I really need to get better at doing that. So, that is where we are. Anyway, we've got some good news in regards to them. Killen suspect
extradited to Germany from... A 28 -year -old Russian man arrested in Japan on suspicion of involvement with an attack by the Killen ransomware gang against a German company has now been extradited to Germany. In May 2026, the Cyber Special Investigation
Department of the Japanese National Police Agency, NPA, collaborated in an investigation with police departments in Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto to initially determine the suspect's whereabouts after learning
of his plan to visit Japan As a tourist, the suspect was detained in Osaka under a German arrest warrant and has now officially been turned over to German authorities under Japanese extradition law, according to a press release from NPA. We're
going to pronounce this Kian, unless we're told otherwise. If anybody knows the pronunciation of this, please let me know. This is Q -I -L -I -N again, but we're going to pronounce this Kian. Is believed to have carried out disruptive attacks on large organizations such as Nissan, Asahi, Koala... Lempur International Airport,
Lee Enterprises, Australia's Court Services Victoria, the U .S. City of Sugar Land in Texas, and the U .S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. This is huge. And a lot of these
companies, like the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, to get an arrest on an attack with a company that assists in dealing with making sure that those who want to drink can drink because there are rules on how alcohol... can be consumed and made and various things that,
you know, this agency does, including tobacco consumption, firearms handling, and, of course, explosives. They do a lot of work. I'm no expert on exactly everything they do, but I know that they probably have a hand in a lot of this type of thing. Neely writes, Given Killen's alleged attacks on Japanese companies, I'm surprised
the suspect was not kept in Japan. Kudos to German law enforcement. The Killen Ransomware Gang attracted law enforcement's attention in 2024 and one of the most ransomware one of the most active ransomware gangs in 2025. This continues the trend of successfully
arresting members of ransomware gangs, hopefully changing the risk reward equation in that industry. Even so, given the financial scope of ransomware, it's not clear there will be a lot of change quickly. So, we need to continue to be diligent,
resilient, and vigilant. Here are my thoughts. Well, here's some more good news. We've discussed Kian before, and this isn't some ransomware operation that suddenly appeared out of nowhere back in august 2025 i covered a reported nissan breach
involving kian just two days later on the security box podcast 252 we discussed an edr disabling tool reportedly used by multiple ransomware groups, including Kian. Now, more than a year later, we're talking about a suspected participant in
the Kian operation being arrested in Japan and extradited to Germany. That's a development I certainly like to see. Good for the Japanese and German authorities. This is exactly the kind
of international cooperation I like hearing about. We're talking about a 28 -year -old Russian man who reportedly traveled to Japan as a tourist. Japanese authorities located and arrested him under a German warrant, and he's now been extradited to Germany. Just because you crossed an international
border doesn't mean you're beyond the reach of law enforcement. We've discussed how ransomware groups operate internationally, how they attack organizations, and how they use tools designed to disable EDR protections. But the people allegedly
participating in these operations can also become the subjects of international investigations. Of course, there's an important distinction here. This individual is a suspect. being arrested and extradited does not mean he's been convicted of anything the allegations must be established
through the legal process and he's entitled to due process nevertheless I think this is encouraging ransomware operations have caused tremendous damage and International cooperation is essential if we are going to hold the people responsible accountable. If the evidence ultimately establishes
this individual's involvement, I hope the case sends a message to others participating in ransomware operations you may be operating across international borders but that doesn't necessarily mean you can hide from law enforcement forever coming
up next a judge imposes a 32 month sentence on a former employee for extortion and damaging protected computer equipment. So, good news? Is it enough? We'll leave this up to you. The
program continues in just a moment across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. Alright, gang, let's...
on to our next item, and I believe if my memory serves me correctly, this is our last item, and another piece of good news. Judge imposes 32 -month sentence on former employee for extortion and damaging protected computer. Daniel Rine,
this is R -H -Y -N -E, to 32 months in prison for intentionally damaging his former employer's IT networks and attempting to extort his coworkers by threatening to shut down servers. Okay, so
basically, He wanted to do harm. Ryan was employed as a core infrastructure engineer at a U .S.-based industrial company headquartered in New Jersey. Court documents indicate that between November
8th and November 25th, 2023, Ryan remotely accessed his employer's network without authorization using an administrative account and deleted domain admin accounts, changed passwords for multiple domain user and admin accounts, and effectively
blocked access to hundreds of servers and thousands of workstations. So basically, folks, this gentleman wanted to destroy the business. That's what I got out of it when I read this. In April 2026, Ryan pleaded guilty to charges of extortion in...
Relation to a threat to cause damage to a protected computer and intentional damage to a protected computer. Neely writes, The investigation highlights the value of collecting logs for analysis. Remember to investigate options like a data lake. for
offline log storage over longer intervals. This guy started setting things up in 2023 before pulling the trigger in 2025. Now that you have comprehensive logs, are you catching the right things? For example, could you have triggered an alert? At the deletion of domain administrator
accounts or broad -scale password changes? How about detecting unauthorized changes or sessions? New tools make this analysis easier. It's worth pulling this thread as well. Dukes writes, Justice served. Cisco's ought to leverage this outcome
as a real -world case study in their annual cybersecurity training programs. Murray writes, the lesson for the rest of us is that when terminating an employee, it is as essential to terminate all privileges, and authorities as it is to remove them from the payroll. I write, well, ladies
and gentlemen, we've got another case where somebody decided to do something incredibly stupid, and this time there's a prison sentence to go along with it. 32 months. We're talking about a former infrastructure engineer who had the technical knowledge or technological knowledge, if you
will. So you could use either word, technical or technological knowledge. And access necessary to cause some serious damage. Instead of using those skills responsibly, he accessed his former employer's network without authorization, deleted administrator accounts, changed passwords, interfered with access to hundreds of servers and thousands
of workstations. And then there's the extortion. You've got to be kidding me. Unlike some of the other stories we've discussed in this newsletter, we're not just talking about allegations against somebody who has been arrested. Daniel Ryan pleaded guilty and a judge has sentenced him to prison.
I agree with Murray's point about terminating access when somebody leaves an organization. if an employee no longer has a legitimate reason to access your systems those privileges need to be revoked but i also agree with neely about monitoring if administrator accounts start disappearing
or large numbers of passwords suddenly change somebody ought to be asking questions. Where are the alerts? Who's reviewing them? And how quickly can the organization respond? Also, like Duke's suggestion, that companies use cases like
this in security and awareness training because this isn't just about somebody clicking a malicious link, or falling for a phishing message. It's about somebody with technical knowledge and privileged access deliberately abusing that position. And here's the lesson. Just because you know how to do something doesn't mean you have the right
to do it. If you abuse your access, damage systems, and try to extort people, there can be serious consequences. In this case, those consequences include 32 months in federal prison. I'd say that's a pretty extensive lesson to learn. But, then again, I'd say what we do here... is similar
in nature. For Menvi, if somebody has access to Dropbox, which includes all of the applications that may be stored within it, and directories including passwords, we make sure that they do not have access to it anymore by removing them from the folder. I do not have access any knowledge
whether it actually deletes the folder from Dropbox but I am assuming that that is the case if anybody knows this for sure then I would love to hear from you to just tell me yes this is the case or no this is not the case and tell me what it
does, because I'm not 100 % sure. If it is not removing access to the folder when the administrator does it, why? I believe when I removed people from folders before, it's asked me whether I want to allow them to continue to have access or not. and if they are continuing to allow access,
then this is the time that this gets changed. Because if there are files in those directories that are sensitive, such as passwords, which we, you know, do the same thing. Dropbox maybe that's not the best way but the folders in question
are not linked to the internet and if I find out that they are and they shouldn't I'm going to go fix that but just because that's the case doesn't mean it's a hundred percent secure and there are better ways to handle that But knowing that we deal with a bunch of people with different types of technicalities, whether they are good at technology or not, we want to make sure that people have the access, regardless of whether
they can use a third -party application to get at the passwords needed to do their job. Whether it's an internet radio station, such as 98 .6 The Mix, whether it's Menvie, and... The fact that I need to be able to access these passwords for mailing lists and other Menve -related activities. It's all the same. And I want people who work
for me to have access to that. So, I'm adding these comments besides what I've already written into the newsletter. To show you. How I would handle things. And I would make sure. That if. This is. Not the case. That this be changed. But I thought I remember there being a checkbox.
That did state. That you should. You know. That states in practice. Allow the user. To keep. The items. If yes, you check the box. If not, you uncheck the box. And if you then remove it, and they're not allowed to keep the items, then everything is removed. I believe that's how it
works. But if I'm wrong, then somebody needs to let me know, and I am willing to correct the record. Just let me know, and I will be happy to do so. I'll give out my contact information one more time after we go ahead and go through
and give out the editorial board as we normally do. This is Sans, episode 43 across the Jared Reimer radio network. Let's go ahead and hand
out some contact information. By starting with the editorial board of SANS Newsbytes. Josh Wright,
Kathy Bradford, Lance Spitzner, Lee Neely, Mark Weatherford, Moses Frost, Suzanne Vautrinot, and William Hugh Murray. SANS is located at SANS Institute, 11200 Rockview Pike, Suite 200, North
Bethesda, Maryland, 20852. Email support at sans .org or call 301 -654 -7267 for assistance with subscriptions. If you would like to contact me and have any thoughts of your own about any of the stories you have heard on any of these particular programs, including earlier SANS and or TSB content,
you may contact me by email at tech, that's T -E -C -H, at M -E -N -V -I dot org, text or WhatsApp, 804 -442 -6959. Or you may call the comment line at 888 -405 -7524. So that'll complete this episode,
everybody. And we hope to have another episode out very soon. And of course, we'll start working on the next episode and we'll get them out as quickly as we can. And of course... will have plenty more for you across the Jared Reimer radio network, including a 280E, which will cover a very big security issue that we have been made
aware of that will end the week of October 24th, which will then be available when we get to, the 23rd's newsletter so I will catch everybody later and thanks so much for listening make it a great day everybody
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