Welcome to Sans, Episode 42. Its been awhile, and this episode explains why. I hope that we can continue Sans, I'm going to start on the next issue very soon now. If you want to read the newsletter, please use this link to read the Sans Newsletter for October 9, 2026. Here is what was in the newsletter. Top Of The News: Google Warns of ccTLD Registry Hijacks and Counterfeit Certificates FBI and Secret Service Warn of Continuing FortiBleed Attacks Android Phones Shipped with Malware Pre-installed The Rest of the Week's News FBI Removes Contractor Whose Unpatched Platform Allowed Breach ASOS Discloses Breach After Hacker Sends Push Notification Critical Flaw Affecting Multiple Atlassian Products Is Being Actively Exploited SonicWall and Splunk Publish Security Advisories OT Coalition Urges CISA to Mandate OT Cybersecurity US Senate Passes Healthcare Cybersecurity Bill Universities Suffer Ransomware Attacks: Osaka Metropolitan University; University of Illinois Chicago College of Medicine I think the biggest stories are item 3 from Top of the News and item 6 of the Rest of the News. But you tell me what interested you. Looking forward to bringing this program back and thanks for listening!
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The opinions expressed are those of the show hosts and may not necessarily be of any company in which the show hosts may represent. Hello, folks. Welcome back. This is Sands, episode number
42. You're going, Jared, this is episode 42. This was supposed to be a twice a week podcast. Where has it been? Well, we have been working. And there have been other commitments. But more
importantly, this podcast is one of these that I actually take the time to actually do. And while... These episodes started rough, like all of these podcasts have tended to do. This one, I actually moved to Braille rather quickly. But
Jared, you would ask, you've been missing all of the Ouch! newsletters. Yes, I have. Part of the problem was that I was also working. I had technical issues, as we discussed. Back in May, I got those resolved, and then I had to keep going. But Jared, um, you had downtime. Well,
yes I did. But with downtime came sleep, right? I guess I needed more sleep than trying to get back into Sands. But then it became busy again, and then I had other... Outreach and things going on where I needed to do observations. But more importantly, I think I found a different workflow.
And while I am recording on Wednesday morning, the newsletter came out Friday and we already have a new newsletter. but I'm certain that the process will go a lot faster. Recording may not be as fast as I would like, but I think the process
that I have found to better assist me with getting the news bites into Braille and my thoughts organized and well documented, will be worth it. Remember that the intent of this program isn't to necessarily share the entire newsletter. It is to align my
thoughts to what's going on in the industry and headline some of the bigger items of what's going on in the particular newsletter. We do not do the Internet Storm Center because those are links to other resources across the web and their own writing. But if I could share the opening paragraph
and read my thoughts on the item as well as what the industry leaders are saying, i .e. the editorial board, even if I don't pick them all in the end, we can actually have a discussion. And that's the whole goal of the newsletter. To better align
with the technical aspect of this newsletter, I have decided... to make English Braille American Edition and Unified English Braille Editions available. We do not currently have a separate document for those who have print, but if you
would like one, I can make one available and it can be easy to do. So let's give this a try. If nothing else, then the SANS project can retire just like the technology blog and podcast did. And it was a nice run. So let's go ahead and
continue this file by talking about what is going to be coming up in this newsletter. This will be SANS News Bytes, Annotated News Update from the Leader in Information, Security, Training, Certification, and Research. October 9th, 2026, Volume 28, Number 75. Welcome to SANS News Bytes,
Episode 42. The lead story examines country code domain... We'll also cover continuing 40 bleed attacks, Android phones shipped with malware already installed, and other cybersecurity developments. Two particularly serious vulnerabilities also
deserve attention. An Oracle PeopleSoft flaw rated... 9 .8 and an Atlassian flaw rated 9 .3 on the CVSS severity scale. This file is transcribed into EBAE and UEB by Jared Reimer in Woodland
Hills, California. A link to the original newsletter is included in the podcast show notes. For a Braille copy, email tech, that's t -e -c -h, at m -e -n -v -i dot org, and request either e -b -a -e or u -e -b, along with your preferred file format and cell size. The default is 40
cells. Each major section starts on a new Braille page. Stories are numbered in the table of contents and in the newsletter itself. So we do a little bit of modification as we've started to do before the long break of SANS. So, let us go ahead and
now read the table of contents as part of the introduction. Top of the news. Google warns... of cc tld registry hijacks and counterfeit certificates two fbi and secret service warn of continuing 40 bleed attacks three android phones shipped
with malware pre -installed and folks This can't get any worse. And if you heard our podcast long enough, you might remember 40 Bleed, 40 Gate, and other similar names. Apparently, this attack
is still out there. And from what I've read, this is not. necessarily good and if your blood pressure ends up boiling while minded while reading the newsletter just end up taking a deep breath
because the industry to me in my honest opinion has not learned anything and Yes, I do have my thoughts, as I said, written down, and you will hear what I have to actually say when we get to some of these. Let's go ahead and cover the
rest of the week's news in the table of contents. Item 1 in this section is, FBI removes contractor whose unpatched platform allowed breach. Ouch! 2. SOS discloses breach after hacker sends push notification. 3. Atlassian Products is being
actively exploited. 4. SonicWall and Splunk publish security advisories. 5. OT Coalition urges CISA to mandate OT cybersecurity and we've talked
about CISA in 2025 and I've not really been keeping up on the landscape like I should but last I knew CISA had quite a number of problems and
It may not be looking so good for them. Five, OT Coalition urges CISA to mandate OT cybersecurity. I'm repeating it again so that people understand what the headline is and the fact that if you've kept up on this CISA ordeal, you might understand
what's going on. Six, U .S. Senate passes healthcare cybersecurity bill. Could it be a little bit too late for that? We'll discuss it. And finally, number seven, universities suffer ransomware
attacks. Osaka Metropolitan University, University of Illinois, Chicago College, of medicine so that is your table of contents and now strap
yourselves in because we are returning back to sands where the blood pressure may boil we'll get started with top of the news in just a moment across the jared reimer radio Network. Alright
folks, let's go ahead and get started with today's program. And we're going to start with top of the news as we normally do with this program. You may always send your emails to tech, that's T -E -C -H, at M -E -N -V -I dot org. Text or WhatsApp 804 -442 -6975. And... You may always call the comment line at 888 -405 -7524. We'll
go ahead and give this information throughout the program so that you can contact me. The first item is Google warns of ccTLD registry hijacks and counterfeit certificates. Google has disclosed a recent incident in which attackers hijacked
top -level Google domains for Ghana .gh, SierraLeone .sl, and AmericanSimona .as by compromising the third -party operators of these country -code
top -level namespaces. The attackers modified authoritative DNS records and obtained unauthorized HTTPS certificates covering several Google domains
as well as domains belonging to other organizations. including several leading global brands and widely used online services. Wow, can you imagine? This
compromise could allow an attacker to impersonate a legitimate website, on certificates. Google notes that this was not a compromise of Google's systems nor of domain owners' systems and that
the attack put all domains under these codes at risk. Google's position is that there was no wrongdoing on the part of these certification authorities, CAs, that issued the counterfeit certificates. Google worked with the CAs to ensure
all unauthorized certificates have been revoked and the company updated CRL sets to block the unauthorized certificates in Chrome, both for Google properties and for impacted organizations revealed in certificate transparency log data.
Chrome users do not need to take any action, but domain owners should take steps to protect users. Continuously monitor certificate transparency for all domains and once DNS control is restored, publish restrictive certification authority authorization, CAA, DNS records to control certificate issuance
and Protect against certain attacks. Neely writes, Effectively, a DNS hijack allowed certificate issuers domain validation checks to pass, allowing for bogus certificates to be issued. This leads
to three things you need to do. First, deploy. The updated Chrome slash Chromium, which is likely an automatic process. Second, monitor the domains you own to make sure they aren't getting hijacked.
And third, this is the likely new for you. Implement CAA records. that limit which certificate authorities can issue certificates for your domains to include specific accounts and validation methods. CAA records are DNS records, so during a hijack,
they are not available. When the service is restored, it'll help, by not allowing cached validations to work, stopping additional certificates to be issued. Otherwise, as written here, additional certificate issuance. So you could say it one of two ways here. These steps are defense in
depth. None is a 100 % fix, but you're raising money. Ulrich writes, This keeps happening to country code TLDs more often than other TLDs. CCTLDs were established in the beginning of the Internet and do not always obey the modern rules
of how TLDs are operated. With DNS often being used as a proof of ownership of a domain, DNS tampering can also affect the issuance of TLS certificates, which in some ways is supposed to be a backup for DNS in establishing if you
are connecting to the correct site. Scoutus writes, Johannes' point about the way some ccTLDs are operated is a good reminder that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and attackers are relentless about finding that link and exploiting
it. Many of the other links here are pretty darn strong, but compromising the registry layer let the attackers change authoritative DNS and then obtain certificates through the normal validation process for names they had temporarily taken
control of. You can secure the site and can and still lose the name. Certificate transparency monitoring matters here, but so does treating registrars, registries, DNS, and certificate issuance as one connected trust chain. Domain
security does not stop at the domain owner. So, These are interesting thoughts, right? I mean, I know I've talked about my own domain and how I lost it in the past and how companies were
trying to sell it to me. That's completely different because the domain actually lapsed. But I think this is bigger. So I want to now read what I wrote. in the newsletter and if you read the braille with me you'll see it's the paragraphs start with my thoughts and that allows you to
know what I'm thinking so it actually says my thoughts are but for the podcast I'll make a distinction that this is now going to be me talking instead of me reading My thoughts are, I'm going to just tell you now here's what I'm going to say or something of that matter. So we are making
some slight changes on the way this is done so that everybody knows who's talking. So now let's read what I have to say here. Here's what bothers me about this story. When I make significant changes involving a domain, particularly transferring
it to another registrar, there are authorization procedures involved. So why shouldn't there be an additional approval process when somebody requests a certificate for that domain? Let's use... Menvi .org as an example. If somebody
requested a certificate claiming to represent Menvi .org, I think the legitimate domain owner should receive a notification asking whether that certificate request was authorized. If I
requested it, fine. Approve it and move forward. If I did not request it, I should be able to reject it, stop the issuance, and have the request investigated. Someone temporarily controlling
DNS should not automatically mean that I authorized a certificate. Right? I mean, am I losing my mind here? It's crazy. There is another distinction
here. automatically mean i own menv .cn a certificate for one domain should not be treated as authorization
for the other and i think that is very important right if i actually own both domains That's one thing. But I don't have Menvie .cn. Somebody
apparently wanted to buy it and they contacted me and told me they needed to contact me because I own Menvie and would I like to buy it because it was in probate. We talked about this. and domains don't enter probate. But that's a whole different story than, say, somebody owning the
domain, then coming and pilfering menvy .org's cert and calling it theirs, which seems to be what I'm getting out of this. If somebody wants both names covered, each... needs to be independently validated and authorized. So when I bought emailhostsecurity
.com, the system that does all of the certificates now went out and got a domain validated cert. When the system saw that I bought more domains, it went and Had to go get those too. Even though
I put the domains on the same active account. Even if they were hosted in different accounts, the process would still have to happen this way. And that is why I think talking about owning a domain and talking about... a domain I have
no interest in, which doesn't mean anything to me, and these certificate discussions is valid. I understand that registrar procedures may differ, and that the procedures I learned about 20 years ago may have changed. The concept is what matters to me. If the legitimate owner approves the request,
it can proceed. If the owner rejects the request, should be blocked and investigated. So, if the owner rejects it, the request should be blocked and investigated. Period. End of story. In the
registrar process, I remember, no response could also allow a request to proceed. I don't know how that would work for certificate authorities today, but I think an independent authorization check deserves serious consideration. So, what
do you guys think? Am I right? Am I wrong in my thinking? Yes, I did write my thoughts down, but then I could turn around and add my perspective on top of it. So I think this is actually working out quite well. We'll continue with the FBI,
the Secret Service, and 40 Bleed. Oh boy, that's still out there, and we'll learn more about it as the podcast continues across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. All right, folks. Hope you are
enjoying the revamped version of SANS, and we are going to always improve our workflow. We want to apologize again for not having any kind of SANS, even though the ouch would have been easy enough to do. We're going to push on now to another story. This is story two of Top of the News. This is going to be another interesting
one because the Secret Service is actually involved in this one. The title is FBI and Secret Service Warn of Continuing 40 Bleed Attacks. And I don't know about you, but before I read this, do you actually... that the Secret Service has a reason
to warn anybody about internet attacks? I know the FBI has gotten involved in internet stuff, but what about the Secret Service? Read and...
I want to hear what your thoughts are. The FBI and the U .S. Secret Service have published a cybersecurity advisory warning that the 40 Bleed campaign, a credential harvesting and access broker operation that began in June, is continuing to affect organizations with some being locked
out of their Fortinet devices. According to the advisory, the campaign exploits reused or leaked credentials and legacy SHA -256 password storage, enabling threat actors to harvest and crack authentication
data at scale. SockRadar has verified that the campaign has compromised more than 86 ,600 devices in 194 countries. That is a hell of a lot of
devices. If you think about it, right? 86 ,000. Not one. Not two. Not five. That's a big number.
The advisory notes that the 40 bleed operations international workflow became visible after the threat actors unintentionally exposed their own backend server, providing, and that is in brackets,
A rare end -to -end view of how the operators identified targets, validated stolen credentials, and expanded access inside victim networks. The advisory offers related indicators of compromise, IOCs, MITRE, ATT, and CK tactics and techniques,
recommended incident response actions and mitigations, which include restricting external device management, terminating admin and VPN sessions, resetting credentials, and requiring phishing -resistant
MFA on all remote access and administrative accounts. Neely writes, go back and read those numbers again. 86 ,600 plus devices in 194 compromised. Yes, this is an attack. on the SSL VPN service,
which does need to be exposed to the internet, but the management interface does not. We must make tight restrictions to management interfaces SOP. At this point, if you've got any form of
remote access, make sure that all accounts, with no exceptions, for special accounts users, require phishing -resistant MFA. If you're a Fortnite shop, hunt for the IOCs in the IC3 advisory and verify all the mitigating steps. were completed
murray writes continued reliance on replay able uh replay able so replayable uh credentials is reckless all of our readers should already know
that it's crazy absolutely crazy 86 000 In 94 countries. No wonder I really needed a break
from the newsletter, huh? This is absolutely crazy. And this is why I want to bang my head
on the chair. Could you blame me? If I wanted to blame my head for a huge injury? Because this
has to be... Done through a reusable credential ordeal. I still want to bang my head on my chair after reading something like this. Seriously? We're still dealing with this? I want to bang my head on the back of my chair. On June 22nd,
2026, I published an article on my technology blog titled, 40 Bleed Shows. Why old credentials remain dangerous. We've also discussed the broader problem of stolen and reused credentials repeatedly
on the security box. Back in June, we were talking about roughly 74 ,000. Fortinet devices associated with exposed credentials. Now we're reading another warning about the same campaign with reports involving more than 86 ,000 devices across 194
countries. Numbers aren't necessarily evidence of thousands of new compromises since June. But the fact that we're still discussing this problem is frustrating enough. I said something in June
that I think bears repeating. Working credentials are working credentials. Attackers don't care whether they came from an old breach, a leaked configuration, password reuse, or brute force activity. If those credentials still work, attackers
will use them. This is not just a technical problem. It's a human and organizational problem. We know what needs to be done. We know that administrative interfaces shouldn't. be unnecessarily exposed to the internet. We know that multi -factor authentication
matters. We know that compromised credentials need to be replaced and old sessions terminated. And yet, here we are. You can patch a device, but if an attacker still has the valid credentials, what? Have you really accomplished? I don't honestly
see this changing until organizations stop treating credential security as an optional maintenance task and start treating it as a basic requirement at some point. We have to stop asking. Whether the technology can protect us and start asking why we're not using the protections already available.
So, what gives? What's happening here? This is crazy. I don't have any good answers. I just
don't get it. This is crazy. We will continue with Android. What can possibly go on? in Android. We'll talk about it as SANS 42 continues across
the Jared Reimer Radio Network. If you've been with my technology programming for a while, we've talked about Android more than iOS in this ecosystem. I don't really understand why, except for the
fact that we know that Android is more open than iOS when it comes to different flavors, what software may be on each phone, and what the mobile providers may give their customers. This may actually top off the cake when it comes to your
particulars. What is happening? on Android. Because story three of Top of the News is going to be titled Android Phones Shipped with Malware Pre
-Installed. Think about that a minute, folks. Does that scare you any? I think it would. And I am actually pausing on purpose. To give you
a moment to think. Researchers at Bitdefender have discovered a malware campaign involving inexpensive Android phones that ship with the malware pre -installed in the device firmware. I'll say it again. The device's firmware. Which
means... folks, that we can't thing it does not
matter if you use any AT or not. And in this case, AT stands for assistive technology. The
issue affects certain low -cost Android devices built on media tech platforms. Bitdefender writes that the malware runs with system -level privileges that allow it to silently install and remove apps, grant permissions, and load arbitrary code supplied remotely. We know in practice that AT
software, including screen readers and magnification software, need this type of permission in practice. I don't know exactly if it needs every single piece of permission, and I don't claim to know how the inner workings of this works. Because
the AT software, by nature, needs to allow you to have access to the device. What's on the phone? What's it saying? Is all of my contacts in my phone? It has to be able to read it to you. So it has to have access to all of that. That's a different type of permission. But we know in
practice that malware can actually exfiltrate that data. And since it's already in the firmware, Before you even turn it on, it's dangerous. The pre -installed malware silently deploys a rotating family of at least 32 unique disguised apps that
focus on generating revenue for the criminals through advertising and click fraud. Bitdefender researchers also discovered 13 apps currently present on Google Play that communicate with the same servers that control the malware. Scotus
writes, Ouch! This one is painful to read and it worries me well beyond this particular malware campaign. The user did not install the malware. It arrived in firmware as a platform signed system
component with privileges ordinary apps can never obtain. And again, I would say that AT may have some similar permissions as the malware would have, but we know, as I said earlier, that malware can exfiltrate. The screen reader's job and the
AT's job in general is to go ahead and tell you what's there. It can't give it back to the manufacturer unless it was programmed to exfiltrate it, but... We would know if that's the case. It would have already been out there if it was. The attackers
have a foothold before the owner ever turns on the phone. And it does say the attacker, but you could say attackers. Because you never know. You really never know. At that point, App Store
Hygiene carefully permissioned apps. or as it says here, careful permission choices, and all the other things we teach users cannot fix the root problem. If we cannot trust the software installed first, before boot, everyone above
it inhibits a compromised foundation. Supply chain trust has to reach all the way back to firmware. And the manufacturers building the device or else were cooked from the get -go. Neely writes, Inexpensive Android devices, whether
smartphones, car infotainment systems, or streaming devices, continue to come pre -installed with malware. And, The other. Unexpected. Features. We're done. This is a supply chain challenge.
Or a supply chain challenge. And. We know the. Malicious apps are. Embedded. Preloaded. On the firmware. Possibly. Firmware. To the OEM. And there isn't much you can do. Where are we here?
There isn't much you can do to eliminate or even detect it. Do yourself a favor and stick with mainstream devices. Recording the shenanigans of the malware consume the cost difference. Dukes
writes, The old adage, you get what you pay for, pretty much sums this up. The interesting part is figuring out where the threat actors managed to compromise the Mediatek chips. Did they slip in through Mediatek's configuration troll, the OEM? Or an outside design house? Hopefully, MediaTek
and the OEMs dig into this together. But when you stop it all by finding out who did it, then you gotta start wondering if it's worth prosecuting. I'd just say bring him back to see me wherever
he lives and let him pay the consequences there. But when you strip it all away, it was about cashing in. How much money could you get? I really agree with Scottus on this one. One of my biggest concerns is for the blind and visually impaired community I serve. Many people have no idea what
software is running on their phones. let alone whether something malicious was installed before they even purchased the device. Depending on the Android device, accessibility technology may already be available, or someone may need to help install and configure it. That can make the initial setup process challenging enough
without. about malware embedded in the firmware. Normally, I would recommend purchasing a device from a reputable merchant and sticking with established manufacturers. But if the malware is already installed before the device leaves the factory, how much protection does that really provide?
We tell people not to to install these suspicious applications to keep their devices updated and to pay attention to permissions that is always
good advice and one to follow that's good advice but none of it necessarily addresses malware that arrived with system -level privileges. I didn't know exactly where this particular compromise occurred in the supply chain, and I don't want to speculate. What I do know is that consumers
shouldn't have to become cybersecurity experts just to purchase a phone they can trust. And for people who depend on accessibility technology, this adds another layer of concern to an already complicated process. And that is the end of the
week's news for Top of the News. Holy smokes, folks. Holy smokes. We'll continue with the rest of the week's news. in just a moment across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. Welcome back is SANS
episode number 42 covering SANS News Bites for October 9th, 2026. I am Jared Reimer and thank you so much for coming along the ride with me. We're going to now redo the numbering, start over at one, and cover the rest of the week's news as we have seven more stories to go. For story number one in this section, the FBI is
also involved, but this is something that might get people thinking when it comes to contract work. and updates. What? FBI removes contractor whose unpatched platform allowed breach. Following
a cyber incident that involved the defacement of FBI jobs dot gov and claims that over two terabytes of FBI agents' sensitive personal information had been stolen. The FBI has stated that a third -party contractor has been removed due to their
role in the breach. Brett Leatherman, the head of the FBI's cyber division, explained that The incident occurred as the result of a security failure of a platform managed by a third -party organization after a contractor failed to implement
a security patch explicitly issued to secure the platform and that The FBI has removed the contractor and taken all necessary steps to both mitigate any further risk and protect our workforce.
of Accenture. And the vulnerable software that went unpatched was Oracle's PeopleSoft platform. This information correlates with Google Threat Intelligence Group's September 25th warning of shiny hunters using URL encoding to bypass Web
Application Firewall, WAF, rules to target PeopleSoft with renewed mass exploitation of CVE -2026 -35273 CVSS score 9 .8. A missing authentication flaw
enabling unauthenticated takeover of PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools for which Oracle published a patch in June. Since SANS originally published this edition, we've learned something else about this incident. On October 9th, 2026, the FBI
announced another arrest of a suspected shiny hunter's co -conspirator connected to the FBIjobs .gov breach. The investigation is continuing and further details about the suspect and charges were not immediately available. SCOTUS writes,
We were just talking about this PeopleSoft vulnerability in recent Newsbytes issues, including why a WAF rule is a compensating control rather than a substitute For fixing the underlying flaw. Now comes the painful case study. A patch existed.
A contractor failed to apply it. And the FBI was breached. You can outsource administration. But you cannot outsource the responsibility. To carry out the security. obligations you've accepted based on what has been publicly reported.
I applaud the FBI for taking decisive action here. Removing the contractor sends an important signal to the broader government contracting community. Cybersecurity obligations are actual obligations and failing to carry them out can have real consequences. Pescatore writes, It
should not be news when a contractor is removed for enabling a breach. It should be standard term in contractual agreements. Failure to patch and other common causes like use of embedded passwords or lack of strong authentication for
admin users are evidence of lacking the essential security hygiene that should be required of all supply chain partners. Murray writes, Accountability is an essential control. It is necessary for privileged entities and may be the only one that
really works for them. Now, let's talk about what I wrote. And of course, if I want to add more, I can. about this incident? Was the problem really just one contractor? Or does it reflect a larger failure by the company responsible for
managing the system? If I'm the FBI and I've hired a company to maintain my infrastructure, I expect that company to apply critical security patches and verify that the work has been completed. Removing one individual may be appropriate, but
what about the company responsible for supervising that individual? Who was checking that the work was actually getting done? I'd be inclined to examine whether the entire Contract should be terminated. Secure and patch the affected systems and consider hiring another reputable provider
with a demonstrated record of accountability and transparency. That doesn't mean another company could guarantee that a breach would never happen. Nobody can promise that. But I would expect a provider to be transparent about security failures, explain what went wrong, and demonstrate how it intends to prevent a recurrence. The question
I keep coming back to is this. Are we holding the organization responsible? Are we simply removing one person and calling the problem solved? And before I move on, I would like to add something else. Let's take a non -security problem. I hired
somebody. Name will not matter, and it doesn't matter who it is. I asked them to go into the Music Education Network for the Visually Impaired's email lists and add the names to the subscribers so that I could easily find people. I was promised that it was done. I had a check sent. The money
is not the issue. But I later found out by looking that it was not done. and I had somebody go in with a current copy of the roster at the time, tell me who was missing, who I needed to add based on applications and so forth that I also sent along, as well as do what I asked to be
done. All of that work was done. They did not want to get paid, but the overall rule was I needed to do something for the accountability. I asked why. They said, well, whatever. Whatever it was. It doesn't honestly matter the exact words. And I said, why didn't you just tell me that you were having issues or that you couldn't
do it? I'm not blaming people for whatever the issue was. I was sick. I'm depressed. I'm not feeling well. I'm whatever. I wasn't even yelling at the person, but I was showing them responsibility and taking control. When something wasn't done
when I asked it to be done. And they were not capable of that. So, I let them go from the project. In recent times, that particular individual did come back to the project as a member. But then they were changing their email address on a regular
basis. And we couldn't keep up. Eventually, no matter what we had, it bounced. And we finally told them we couldn't have this. Pick an email address and let's stick to something. I don't care what the email address is. You know, there are all kinds of providers. But we can't have
you filling out an app. and an update for a change every week. That'll just never happen. And we had to remove them again from the network. It's taking responsibility. Again, no names. I'm not shaming anybody. I'm talking fact. Our next story
is another breach. But this time, besides there being a breach, the hacker ended up sending a push notification. Why? Because he had access to it. We'll talk about it and those potential
consequences as the podcast continues. This is episode 42 of SANS. And I am Jared Reimer. We are going to talk about ASOS now. This is A -S -O -S. And they are disclosing a breach. That's
not really what interests me. I mean, we see breaches every day. And even though I've been sort of MIA, not blogging a whole lot, not reading a whole lot. We know that this is the way of the world. But you'll find out what happens even after the breach. The article from SANS is titled,
ASOS discloses breach after hacker sends push notification. Around 9 o 'clock UTC on October 6, 2026. Users of the official app for UK -based fashion retailer ASOS received an unauthorized
push notification with a message addressing the company's IT staff and data protection officer threatening to leak data from an allegedly compromised Snowflake instance. I'm going to stop here a moment and ask listeners who've been around here
long enough, do you remember Snowflake? That may be the biggest thing because we don't know who else was affected. Later that day, the company
released a statement to the London Stock Exchange disclosing unauthorized activity involving third -party platforms used for the communication upon discovery of the activity. The company restricted access to notification platforms and launched response efforts alongside internal and external
specialists and authorities. The company has updated news sources since its initial statement to specify that the attackers compromised an ASOS employee's account credentials through I'll Wait. And no, that is not in the script, the
I'll Wait. but I want you to take a second to guess what it may have been through. I'll give you a moment. Again, the sentence is, the company has updated news sources since its initial statement to specify that the attackers compromised an
ASOS employee's Account credential through... And now your time is up. Social engineering. Impersonating a trusted contact. And that is in quotation marks. ASOS stated to the BBC on
October 8th that names, addresses, phone numbers, email... addresses or emails, customer numbers, and dates of birth were accessed by the attacker. ASOS notes that the company has cybersecurity insurance with a large global provider, including
business contingency or continuity insurance, but that It is too early to quantify any potential impact on trading. Well, the fact that you've got cyber insurance is a proof of where we need to be these days. Unfortunately. But, I personally
do not know how much this will cost is the biggest
issue. As of the time of this recording, have I been pwned? One of the leading places to find confirmed breaches does not have this listed yet. That doesn't mean that it hasn't happened
yet, i .e. the verification process. Since the last... TSB News Desk, there are now six new. But ASOS is not in this list as of this moment. The company has reportedly contacted customers
to apologize for the unauthorized notification to urge against clicking on or engaging with the link contained in the notification and to recommend that customers exercise caution with any communication claiming to be from the company noting that ASOS will never ask you to share
passwords security codes or payment details through an unsolicited message or call The website and app are operating with no current disruption to any aspects of ASOS operations. So that's good news. If you look at the scheme of things,
right? You want everything running. Yes, there was an issue, but you want everything running. Scotus writes, one detail here deserves attention.
The attacker used a legitimate customer communication channel to send the malicious message. Once someone can push notifications through your official app, they're borrowing your brand's trust at scale. Treat? Customer messaging platforms like high -impact production systems, phishing -resistant
MFA, tightly -controlled administrative roles, approval workflows for mass sends, and alerting on unusual campaigns. The message may be fake. But the channel is real. Neely writes, This was
a multi -pronged compromise. Credential theft and third -party service compromise. An ASOS employee's credentials were obtained via social engineering, and the credentials were used to access information on third -party platforms. You know what I'm going to say. You need to make
sure that you're requiring phishing -resistant MFA anywhere. Be sure to close any gaps, including updating less secure MFA implementations. Ad hoc access is granted, for example. Do you provide a remote support desk admin with reusable credentials
so they can just log in and figure out the problem you reported? Have a policy on how those engagements are handled? And now, it's my turn to speak. as I want to bang my head on the back of my chair again on this story. That's the second time today
I write. Oh, for crying out loud, here we go again. When I first saw this headline, my immediate thought was, LastPass and the problems we've discovered. and discussed, I'll add discover, but the word in the script is discussed, involving
push notifications and authentication. Now, I understand that this incident is different. These weren't necessarily MFA prompts being sent to employees. These were notifications delivered to customers through an official company application.
But that brings me to a question. If attackers can get into a system and start sending push notifications, whether they're authentication requests or ordinary customer messages, How are people supposed to know which notifications they can trust? Think about that for a moment. You
download an application from a legitimate company. You sign in, you use the application, and you receive notifications from it. Naturally, you're inclined to believe those messages are coming from the company. Then an attacker compromises the credentials needed to access a third -party communications platform and uses that legitimate
channel to send unauthorized messages. The notification is real in the sense that it came through the company's application. But the person controlling the message isn't authorized. That's a serious trust problem. We've talked about social engineering,
stolen credentials, multi -factor authentication, and third -party security over and over again on The Security Box. And here we are discussing them again. I agree with SCOTUS that companies need to treat their customer messaging systems
as important production infrastructure. I also agree with Neely about phishing -resistant MFA and controlling who gets access to these systems. But I'd add another question. Why should one compromised account be able to send a message
to customers without another person or system verifying that the message is legitimate? I'm glad ASO restricted access and investigated the incident. But the damage to customer confidence doesn't disappear just because the company says
the application itself is safe. If I were a customer, I'd be wondering whether I could trust the next notification. And that's what really makes my blood boil. We keep telling people to trust legitimate applications and official communication channels.
But when those channels are compromised, the customer is left trying to determine what's real and what's not. I've covered variations of this problem on my technology blog for years. We've discussed LastPass. fake support operations, multi -factor authentication, stolen credentials,
and even the question of whether websites and applications should be trusted with notification permissions in the first place. These incidents aren't identical, but they have something important in common. Attackers find ways to exploit systems
and identities that people already trust. And that's what concerns me most. We can teach people to recognize suspicious messages, but what happens when the suspicious message comes through the very application we've told them is legitimate?
How exactly are they supposed to do that? Let's hear your thoughts. And when we resume... We're
going to talk about a critical flaw affecting multiple products. And is it possible that we have yet another nine and maybe possibly a ten coming up? These questions will be answered as the program continues right here across the Jared
Reimer Radio Network. So rumor has it that there's a possibility of another 9 and maybe a 10 coming up. I wonder where it might be hiding because
our next item says critical flaw affecting multiple Atlassian products. is being actively exploited. On Monday, October 5th, Atlassian released a
security bulletin to address a critical arbitrary file access vulnerability, CVE -2026 -21589 -CVSS - 9 .3 and to urge users to update to fixed versions
of affected products. Bucket Data Center Confluence Data Center Jira Service Management Data Center Jira Software Data Center Bash Boo Data Center,
Crowd Data Center, Crucible, and FishEye. Within hours of the vulnerability's disclosure, reports of its active exploitation begin to emerge. Users who are unable to patch immediately are advised to remove affected instances from the internet
They are able to patch or apply mitigations, apply a web application firewall rule, rewrite Valve, and add a rule to rlrewrite .xml. Neely
writes, You know that guy who was pushing for moving to Atlassian cloud versions of These services. Maybe revisit. That. Proposal. As Atlassian. Is favoring. Development. Of these services. Seriously. Looking at the mitigations. For the
flaws. To include. The option. Of taking your. Atlassian services offline. Applying the update immediately looks like significantly less work and lower risk impacting. Make sure you're subscribed to Atlassian Alerts. My thoughts could be the
fact that when I read this, my blood pressure has continued to rise. or as written here as a stage direction, blood pressure continues to rise. Are you kidding me? This is the second vulnerability in the 9 .x range that we've covered
in this edition of Sans News Bites. I remember doing an earlier Sans podcast where we had three vulnerabilities in the 9 .x range, In one episode. I don't remember which episode that was. But I certainly remember the feeling. No wonder Sansa and I stopped being friends. Seriously though.
These scores are nothing to ignore. A vulnerability in the 7 .x range is already serious. When we're talking about. 8 .x, 9 .x, and even 10 .0, organizations really need to pay attention. And in this case,
we're not simply discussing a theoretical vulnerability. Reports of exploitation attempts started appearing within hours of disclosure. This isn't a vulnerability to put on the calendar for next month's maintenance window. This is fire time. Atlassian is telling
affected customers to take immediate action and SANS is reporting exploitation attempts within hours. Patch now. If you can't patch immediately, restrict exposure and apply the recommended mitigations. Don't wait for somebody to compromise your system
before deciding this is urgent. I agree with Neely about subscribing to Atlassian's security alerts. If a software provider offers email notifications, security advisories, or RSS feeds, take advantage of them. You can't respond promptly to a vulnerability
you don't know exists. We've discussed Atlassian vulnerabilities before, including a January 2... 2024 incident or as written here including in January 2024. This isn't the same vulnerability but it's another reminder that keeping enterprise software security requires ongoing attention.
I'm also hoping that the new workflow I'm developing will let me resume producing Sans News Bytes podcasts more regularly. Ideally, every five days or so, as I originally intended. Work commitments and computer problems introduced the series interruption,
or as written here, interrupted the series before. But I'm hopeful that this approach will make it easier to keep up. Of course, if every addition contains multiple critical vulnerabilities, Sans and I may have to renegotiate our friendship. All joking aside, patch your systems, subscribe
to your vendors, security notifications, and... Don't wait until attackers have already found your vulnerability and, of course, your vulnerable server. Oh boy. Well, we haven't found the 10, but my hunch is that we're going to possibly find a 10. I remember there's a 10 in here, but
we found the second 9. And if your blood's not boiling yet... Then you'll have to wait until we get to the ten. My hunch tells me it's coming. I thought it was coming soon. And it may still be. The program continues in just a moment. Okay,
folks. You might have waited long enough. Because I think that your ten will just make your blood boil. And this cannot necessarily be good. So, item number four in the rest of the week's news
talks about SonicWall and Splunk. These are two completely different products, and we've seen this in earlier newsletters. Well, they're disclosing vulnerabilities. So the full title is SonicWall and Splunk publish security advisories. And it's always good to publish security advisories, especially if it makes your product better. If you're not
sitting down, maybe it might be time to do that. SonicWall has published a security advisory addressing four vulnerabilities. in its MA -1000 series appliances, including a critical pre -authentication
server -side request forgery SSRF issue. CVE -202610 -2255. CVSS score, 10 .0. In the SMA
-1000 appliance workplace interface, due to an unintended alternate access path, this vulnerability could be exploited to direct the appliance to issue requests on an attacker's and reach internal
functionality and perform unauthorized operations. The other vulnerabilities addressed in the advisory are an OS command injection vulnerability, CVE -202610 -2256 -CVSS, 7 .8 that could be exploited
to achieve remote code execution a post authentication zip slip vulnerability cve 202610 2257 cvss score 7 .2 that could be exploited To achieve remote
code execution. And a post authentication. Stored. Cross site scripting. XSS. Vulnerability. CVE. 2026. 10. 2258. CVSS. Score. 5 .5. That could. Enable a remote. authenticated attacker as administrator
to store and potentially execute arbitrary Java script code in the appliance management console. SonicWall urges users to update to the most current fixed released versions. Splunk has published five advisories addressing Multiple vulnerabilities in Splunk Enterprise MCP server and add -on for
Amazon Web Services. Four of the advisories. Third -party package updates in Splunk add -on for Amazon Web Services. September 2026. Then
we've got... Third -party package updates in Splunk Enterprise September -October 2026. Security hardening in Splunk Enterprise September -October 2026. And security vulnerabilities in Splunk Enterprise September -October 2026. Addresses multiple critical vulnerabilities. The fifth,
Advisory Security Vulnerability in Splunk MCP Server, September -October 2026, addresses a medium severity vulnerability. I think my podcasts have covered these types of things before in
various forms. Maybe not the same bug set here. And Neely writes, looking at the SonicWall site, it looks like AI -assisted firmware analysis was used to find these flaws, which means that you need to be on the lookout for more updates
due to more frequent vulnerability discovery. If you have an SMA -1000, Model 6210, 7210, or 8200V. Apply the platform hotfix to get on the latest firmware. No workarounds. Get this done
before your coffee gets cold. Elgie writes, Apropos of nothing. Do customers ever go to sites like cvedetails .com to look at vulnerability trends
before investing in a particular vendor? And that's an interesting question because I've never heard of this website. So I'll answer Nealey's question and say no, I don't because I've never heard of this webpage until I read your newsletter on the 9th. Or was it the 10th? It honestly doesn't matter. But the point is, is that I've never
heard of it. There are lots and lots and lots and lots of sites. Wouldn't surprise me if it would make the list of EMHS resources. By this
time, if you are and have been reading the newsletter as long as I have, even though I took several months and not read newsletters, but I was reading Sans before I even started the idea of this podcast. So now, it's my turn to growl at Sans. Because
now, we've reached a 10. A 10 .0. That's the highest on the CVSS scale. And CVSS is a term... That is on EMHS's terms section of our resources page. We had multiple vulnerabilities in the
9 .x range earlier in this edition, and now SonicWall managed to hit the maximum score? No wonder I had trouble keeping up with these podcasts. The workflow was part of it, but the constant stream... of serious security problems certainly didn't help. For listeners who are new to this, let's
explain a few terms. Server -side request forgery, or SSRF, is when an attacker tricks a server or appliance into making requests it shouldn't make, Internal services. OS command injection happens when untrusted input is treated as an
operating system command. Zip slip is an archive extraction flaw in which malicious file paths can use files to be written outside their intended folder. Cross -site scripting or XSS allows malicious
scripts to execute in a user's browser through a vulnerable application. We've covered SonicWall before on my technology blog and we've discussed command injection, and cross -site scripting in other incidents. Zip slip is a newer term
for me, and it's worth explaining rather than assuming everyone knows it. To be clear, a critical score does not automatically mean a vulnerability is already being exploited. But a 10 .0 involving a network security appliance is not something to ignore. SonicWall customers need to identify
affected appliances and apply the fixed firmware promptly. The fact that some of the other flaws require authentication doesn't make them harmless. And Splunk has its own. collection of advisories in this same story. That's another reminder to subscribe to Vendor Security Alerts instead of
waiting for a podcast, a blog, or a breach to tell you there's a problem. I agree with Neely about applying the SonicWall hotfix and ElGee raises An interesting question about checking a vendor's vulnerability history before buying. A long list of vulnerabilities can reflect security
problems, active research, or both. So the number alone doesn't tell the whole story. How quickly and transparently a vendor responds matters too. Maybe the wings tonight will help me make peace with Sans. They're doing their job by reporting
these problems, and I'm doing mine by trying to explain them. But could we please have one edition without another critical vulnerability? This next item does not actually make sense.
any sense to me. And there is a strong language word, if my memory serves me, within this section. My goal is really not to use strong language unless it's absolutely necessary. So when you
hear it, I probably find it a necessity. I want to hear what you think about this one. So feel free to send me an email or an iMessage at tech, that's T -E -C -H, at M -E -N -V -I dot org, text or WhatsApp 804 -442 -6975, or call the
comment line at 888 -405. So, what seems to be the reason why I am going to possibly use a strong language word in this segment? Well, this is
item 5 of the rest of the week's news, and it's called OT Coalition. urges CISA to mandate OT cybersecurity. The Operational Technology Cybersecurity Coalition, OTCC, a group representing critical
infrastructure experts and stakeholders in industry and government, has published a white paper calling upon the U .S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to issue a Binding Operational Directive that would establish security requirements
for operational technology. OTCC acknowledges the importance of frameworks like CI Fortify published in May 2026 but believes that a mandatory security posture is overdue for OT and urges
the creation of a BLD that would require federal civilian executive branch FCEB agencies to implement defined continuous diagnostics and mitigation, CDM visibility, pragmatic micro -segmentation,
enforceable remote access documented incident preparedness, process, established configuration baselines, and verified backup and recoverability capabilities. And that's all sounding well and good. I like the idea. OTCC has identified three
core systemic challenges that a BLD could address. One, Widespread risk to OT across many sectors of critical infrastructure without holistic visibility to CISA. Two, inconsistent implementation of
cybersecurity practices, especially for OT. And three, unacceptable consequences of cyber incidents. affecting OT, threatening human health and safety, essential services, and continuity of government operations. OTCC emphasizes that the policy must
be both responsive in a crisis Defensive, calling worst -case resilience planning only half of a complete cybersecurity architecture. The white paper makes three recommendations to CISA for
drafting a BLD. 1. Establish clear organizational ownership and accountability for OT environments. Two, review existing federal requirements that could be included and require compliance with previously applicable guidance. And three, align the new BLD with relevant cybersecurity performance
goals, CPGs. The paper closes with a recommendation. that CISA engage with cyber -informed engineering, CIE, principles, learning from national labs and industry advocates, CIE insurers, and this
is E -N -S -U -R in bracket E -S, close bracket, that know cyber pathway, regardless of access level, can produce physical destruction by what the engineered safety envelope permits. OTCC notes that VLDs are necessary when voluntary
guidance alone proved insufficient to address systemic cybersecurity problems. risk across the FCEB. Now before I start reading comments, including what was written initially, this is all well and good in practice, but do they really
know what's been going on with CISA in recent times? I'm not completely up to date now, and maybe things are okay. I, know that I have some concerns about this. Neely writes, looking at this, you are probably saying, wait, there are
already NIST standards for control systems, OMB policy requiring implementation security controls before systems are authorized, to operate as well as BODs about risk -based approaches and resiliency. So what's up? In short, the OTCC
is saying that agencies are not voluntarily implementing needed security controls for critical infrastructure. Publish a BLD that requires standards to be met and includes required reporting, monitoring, and consequences against those goals. The OTCC memo makes good points about how we should be
securing and improving resilience of our critical infrastructure. operated utilities and critical infrastructure it's not clear that the issues are at FCEB operated systems the hard part once a path to required implementation is established
is having this viewed as an unfunded mandate rather than reinforcing needed security best practices. Next comes Skouras, who writes, I'll leave the specifics of whether a particular regulation or binding operational directive is the right
mechanism to the policy folks, but the architectural principle here is extremely important. The cyber -informed engineering goal that no cyber pathway, regardless of access level, should be able to cause physical destruction beyond the engineered safety envelope deserves attention. For generations,
engineers have used things like pressure relief valves, mechanical interlocks, and physical damping systems so that a failure does not automatically become a catastrophe. We need to preserve and strengthen analogous, independent safety mechanisms
as physical systems become increasingly digitally controlled. Cyber controls should reduce the chance of compromise but engineering should also constrain what a promised digital system can
physically make happen. Assume some cyber controls will eventually fail and engineer the physical processes so that it still stays safe. And, of course, Mr. Spanser, uh, Spanser, uh, Gauss Spanser,
S -H -P -A -N -T -Z -E -R, takes this opportunity to write, and I don't know what... Particular thing, when Gal speaks, he always has something good to say. He doesn't comment on most things. So, Spansner writes, Having worked on a lot of
segmentation projects, both macro and micro, the phrase pragmatic micro -segmentation is a bit of an oxymoron. These projects are notoriously difficult to actually implement due to the amount
of upfront work required if one wants to avoid blocking legitimate east -west traffic. Think of your worst asset management and networking projects, then slam them together. Macro segmentation
is hard enough, and micro segmentation at an org below the security poverty line is not a realistic expectation. It's not even a realistic expectation at many well -financed and staff security teams. L. Gee writes, Many industry
professionals know what needs to be done, but resource and political roadblocks are real. Hopefully, this effort will help. Some practitioners in critical infrastructure get leadership emphasis to raise the minimums for security practices.
Don't tell anyone, but a sizable portion of pen testing happens for very similar reasons. Murray writes, And now, if I haven't mentioned it, I
believe, that either this item or the next item might include the strong language, but I do know that it will be coming up. But my thoughts, regardless of language, for this one is, I've been following CISA for years, and one thing that concerns me
is the turnover in leadership. things about cybersecurity, but the agency still faced challenges. She departed when the administration changed in January 2025, and we've seen acting directors and other leadership changes since then. I covered the proposed CISA
funding cuts on my technology blog back in May 2025. Now we're discussing a coalition asking CISA to establish additional mandatory cybersecurity requirements for operational technology. I understand why the coalition wants stronger requirements. We're talking about infrastructure that can affect
people's health, safety, and essential services. But who's going to oversee compliance? Who's going to provide the technical expertise? And how do we ensure that agencies actually implement the requirements instead of simply producing another document? You can issue all the directives
you want, but without consistent leadership, adequate staffing, funding, and accountability, what have you really accomplished? And there's another issue here. We already have cybersecurity standards and guidance. Neely raises the question of whether agencies are following what already
exists, and Spatner points out just how difficult network segmentation can be in the real world. Writing down a requirement is one thing. Having the people, money, and technical capability to implement it is another. I also agree with Scotus that physical safety matters. If someone compromises
a computer system controlling essential infrastructure, the engineering safeguards should still help prevent a cyber incident from turning into a physical disaster. Murray makes another important distinction. A binding operational directive applies... to federal agencies, but a great deal
of critical infrastructure is privately operated. A federal directive by itself won't solve every problem in those systems. And before I read the next paragraph of my comments, I'll say, what about the servers that power our websites? Forget JaredReimer .net. Menvee .org, EMHS, and other
properties of mine. What about websites, for example, like the Department of Water and Power that is in your state or territory or country? What about the power company in your state or territory? What about the gas company in your state or territory? The information they must
get out to you if there's some issue has to be somewhere, whether it's on social media like Facebook, LinkedIn, or even a separate page using such tools or a website. So this could fall in
some ways. onto our laps, but it seems like this may not necessarily directly affect us, but I guess we'll have to see how it goes in the long run. I'm not saying it is, and I'm not saying it will, but if the federal civilian executive branch has to do it, then so should big companies that run our power. systems, our internet systems,
so that if there's an issue, we are notified. And of course, what about the telecoms? And as I continue to read what I wrote, I say, there's at least some effort to rebuild CISA's workforce. In September 2026, Acting Director Nick Anderson said roughly 250 prospective employees had tentative
offers and were awaiting clearance. That's worth acknowledging, but hiring plans don't automatically resolve staffing gaps overnight. So my question remains, are we going to put the resources and accountability behind these requirements? Or are we just going to add another directive to
the file? Or is it to the pile? The correct word here is pile, but you might as well say file here. Okay, the strong language tag may not necessarily be in this one, but... Somehow I still call Bull,
but it's not in here. Maybe I might see a glimmer of hope in this one. Yeah, I think our strong
language section will be coming up next. I was off by a section, but I wanted to give you a heads up that it's coming. Stay tuned. The U .S. Senate is passing. a healthcare cybersecurity bill. That's segment six of seven from the rest
of the week's news, and we will continue with that in just a moment across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. All right, folks. I actually was looking at this, and I actually wanted to try
and find if I had covered something like this before. Because I remember covering something where something was supposed to be implemented, but it wasn't going to be an automatic approval by law and enactment. But I'll let you do the research because this one might anger you like it angered me. And this is the one with the strong
language tag. Even though I only use one word in it, this podcast tries not to use strong language unless it has to. U .S. Senate passes health care cybersecurity bill. On September 30th, 2026,
the U .S. Senate passed the Health Care Cybersecurity and Resiliency Act of 2026. for the Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, to work together to strengthen the healthcare and public health sector's cybersecurity posture.
According to the record, the bill directs HHS to require All private healthcare -related entities adopt minimum cybersecurity standards like multi -factor authentication, expand and update biannually, and specified plan that details cybersecurity
protocols for HHS personnel, provide training and best practices, to support expansion of the healthcare cybersecurity workforce, provide guidance on cybersecurity readiness to rural entities, and designate one representative to lead oversight and coordination of cybersecurity activities
within HHS. The bill. was introduced in 2025 in the wake of the Change Healthcare ransomware incident. And by the way, folks, I know this is my second time reading this, but sometimes the second time may be better than the first. But we covered Change Healthcare on this podcast,
whether it was Sans itself at the very beginning, or whether it was TSB, or TSN for that matter. That was one of the worst incidences we've ever dealt with besides the Germany case, which you're going to learn more about a little bit later
on, because I didn't know whatever happened. I knew there was talk about a death, and there was a death, but you're going to find out more about that. a little bit later on in the reading. It will now move to the House of Representatives for consideration. Dukes writes, This is a positive
move by the Senate, though the House is unlikely to take it up until after the new year, rather than tasking HHS with defining minimum cybersecurity standards lawmakers should simply mandate the top two or three globally recognized frameworks, i .e. NIST CSF, ISO 27001, CIS critical security
controls. Any of these would easily satisfy the baseline requirements outlined Several states have already adopted this approach in the data protection law, meaning private health care entities in those regions are already measuring themselves against these established frameworks. Murray
writes, HIPAA privacy and security was well -intentioned. In an effort to not be prescriptive, it asked covered entities to do a risk assessment and act accordingly, something that many, not to say most, were not equipped to do. But here's
the thing. If they were not equipped to do it, why couldn't they ask CISA? or an agency to help. Because, especially during COVID, healthcare breaches practically became the norm. So, not
only have all the bad things that it was intended to prevent happened, the writing continues, but the uncertainty that it created delayed the implementation of electronic healthcare records by more than a decade. I don't want to go that far. That's not who I am. I'm not going to go that far, but
people who are more following this will know more than I, and I will gladly take their opinion and read it here on the podcast when it's appropriate. And I believe... These guys do. I'm no practitioner at all. I know one thing. We're in a hell of
a lot of trouble right now with all these breaches. Perhaps at the time of HIPAA, which is the Health Care Portability and Affordability Act, HIPPA, adoption, we did not know enough to prescribe, but we do now. This bill seems to authorize and demand that we do so. Neely writes, With all
the health care breaches, we need to raise the bar on their security. With luck, this bill will get passed, given some ammunition health care facilities can use to leverage raising the bar versus continuing to push back. With luck, this will lead to programs where facilities can apply
for grants or other help to get there from here. Pescatore writes, Despite many healthcare -related breaches, there's been a lack of progress raising the bar in healthcare security over the past several years. While this bill does not go very far, it would be good to see legislation finally
passed to nudge the bar higher. But I say that I call bullshit. How many times have we discussed health care breaches on the security box? How many patients have had their information exposed? How many hospitals and healthcare providers have struggled with ransomware? And now, in 2026,
we're talking about legislation requiring basic cybersecurity protections, such as multi -factor authentication? Don't get me wrong. I'm glad somebody is trying to address the problem. But where has the accountability been all these years? I've covered healthcare cybersecurity problems repeatedly on my technology blog. We've discussed
ransomware, stolen patient information, and the consequences when organizations don't adequately protect their clients. Now the Senate has passed legislation that would establish minimum cybersecurity standards. That's fine, but the legislation still has to get through the House and become law.
And here's something else that bothers me. The bill gives organizations 36 months after enactment before the new minimum security regulation takes effect. Three years! And as I said at the beginning of the second try of taping this, something tells me that I've covered something like this before,
where something was going to take 36 months or three years. And now, I don't honestly remember what that might be offhand. If we find it, we'll definitely bring it up as part of comments. But,
yeah. We'll have to figure out what's going to happen. As I continue to write... I understand
that healthcare organizations, especially smaller and rural providers, need time and resources to implement changes. I also recognize that the bill includes provisions for training and financial assistance. But attackers aren't going to wait three years. I've been writing about ransomware attacks on hospitals since at least 2020. In
September of that year, I covered a German hospital attack in which a critically ill patient had to be diverted to another hospital. Investigators initially considered whether the attack contributed to her death, although they later determined that the delay did not cause the fatality. And that's the update on that German case. I never heard anything since... the initial charge of
whoever created the ransomware and sent it to the hospital would be charged with murder. We never learned anything. Now we have something. I also covered other reports raising concerns about deaths associated with hospital ransomware attacks. The point is that this isn't simply about somebody stealing patient records. We're
talking about hospitals losing access to systems, emergency departments being disrupted, and medical professionals having to find alternative ways to care for patients. We've known about these dangers for years, and now we're talking about waiting another three years for minimum cybersecurity requirements? to take effect. The criminals aren't
going to put their attacks on hold while the government and healthcare industry get their act together. I agree with Murray that we've learned a great deal since HIPAA was introduced. I also agree with Pescatore that healthcare security has not improved nearly enough. Neely hopes the legislation will help healthcare organizations
obtain the resources they need. I hope he's right, but I keep coming back to the same question. How many more healthcare breaches are we going to tolerate before organizations implement protections that we've been discussing for years? Passing legislation is one thing. Actually protecting
patients and their information is another. And until we see meaningful implementation and accountability, I'm going to remain skeptical. And I am going to sit here every single time and call bullshit.
Alright folks, our final story is here. And if your blood's not boiling, then you haven't been with my group or you have not been reading my blog long enough. This last story is one I hope we can really learn from. We've been covering
quite a bit of... what we're about to talk about so strap yourselves in it's going to be a wild ride the final story is universities suffer ransomware attacks Osaka Metropolitan University University of Illinois Chicago College of Medicine Japan's
Osaka Metropolitan University has disclosed a ransomware attack prompted the school to cancel classes and shut down roughly 500 servers. According to the record, the outage affected systems used for academic administration, educational support,
financial accounting, payroll, human resources, and library services, as well as the university's website and internal network. Data belonging to more than 130 ,000 current and former students,
Others affiliated with OMU may have been compromised. OMU plans to resume classes on Friday, October 9th. So when the newsletter was being pushed out, they were looking to resume classes. A ransomware attack disrupted IT systems. at the University
of Illinois Chicago UIC College of Medicine. While the incident did not affect patient care and system availability has been restored and investigation has determined that the attackers accessed data on UIC College of Medicine servers. The type of data Or, shall I double check this
and see that it says the types of data that were compromised have not yet been determined. UIC has reported the incident to authorities and continues to coordinate with them. Neely writes, It appears the UIC incident was the work, Of
the. Booba ransomware gang. Leveraging. A rebranded version. Of the. Frag ransomware. Which renames. Encrypted files with the. Dot booba. Extension. The malware has both. Windows and Linux. Variants. The good news is that UIC. Has. pretty much restored
services and is now focused on determining what the what the hell I would say what the hell but what was exfiltrated followed by notifications to affected parties hopefully this process will be as rapid and I gotta say, oh god, university
ransomware, here we go again. We've covered this problem repeatedly, haven't we? In 2025, I spent considerable time discussing power school, including the fact that the breach affected schools in both the United States and Canada. we were talking about sensitive information belonging to students
and teachers, questions about when the attackers gained access, and whether the company was bringing securely the data, but it actually says a company was being sufficiently transparent. But why weren't they securing the data, first of all? This wasn't
some isolated problem affecting one school district. It crossed international borders. Then in May 2006, we had devoted an entire special edition of the Security Box, Podcast 272A, to the canvas breach involving Instructure. We discussed the
impact on thousands of educational institutions, compared the situation with PowerSchool, and questioned whether the criminals could really be trusted when they claimed stolen information had been destroyed. And here's something else that bothers me. Power school wasn't limited by the United States. Canada's schools were affected
as well. Then we had Canvas, where I learned that I had to question, and I did question, whether nobody could genuinely verify that stolen information had been destroyed. In both cases, we're talking about services that educational institutions
trusted with sensitive information. When those services are compromised, the consequences can spread far beyond one school or even one country. And the students, teachers, and families affected didn't necessarily have any choice about where their information was stored. Now, we've got
Osaka Metropolitan University shutting down approximately 500 servers, canceling classes, and investigating the... Possible exposure of information belonging to more than 130 ,000 people. It was more than
the, what was the number? I think it was 80 to 120 ,000. Meanwhile, the University of Illinois Chicago College of Medicine has suffered a ransomware attack of its own. Fortunately, Patient care reportedly wasn't interrupted and systems have
been restored. But as Neely points out, restoring systems is only part of the problem. Investigators still need to determine what information was taken and who needs to be notified. And this... is where I start getting frustrated. This just
boils me to no end. Schools and universities hold enormous amounts of information about students, faculty, employees, and sometimes patients. They depend on their systems for classes, communications, payroll. records and other essential operations
power school canvas and these two universities and their incidents aren't necessarily the same type of attack but they illustrate the same larger problem Educational institutions and the services they depend on remain attractive targets. We've
talked about protecting this information for years. We discussed accountability, security practices, and incident response, and what happens after criminals get their hands on data. How many more times do we have to discuss the same problem? I'm glad UIC has restored its systems.
I hope Osaka Metropolitan University can recover fully. And I hope everyone affected receives accountability. Okay, so... Receives accurate information about what happened. And I'll add
accountability. The school should be accountable and they should be held to that high standard. So receives accountability. Receiving accountability by the staff to the people involved maybe should be how I want to phrase it if I'm doing this live. But I also hope these institutions and the educational sector generally learn something
that helps prevent the next incident. Because at this rate, I have a feeling we'll be talking about another school or university breach before very long. Am I wrong to be? Fuming about now.
I mean I haven't done sans. Since I don't know when. And we're still. Talking. About the same. Vulnerabilities. Give or take. And the same. Types. Of breaches. I might have to rename this.
To sans. Where your blood. and your blood pressure may boil. Contact information, including the editorial board of SANS, and my contact information, is coming straight up. This is Jared Reimer, and this is SANS, episode number 42, where your blood may boil. Wrap this up. This is the editorial
board of SANS Newsbytes. Brian Honan, Kurt Dukes, Chris Elgee, David Holzer, Ed Skoudis, Gal Spichner, Jake Williams, Dr. Johannes Ulrich, John Peskitor, Josh Wright, Kathy Bradford, Lance Spitzner,
Lee Neely, Mark Weatherford, Moses Frost, Suzanne Voltronaut and William Hugh Murray. SANS is located at SANS Institute 11200 Rockview Pike Suite 200 North Bethesda, Maryland 20852 Email support
at sans .org or call 301 - 654 -7267 with subscriptions and assistance with them. My contact information is tech, that's T -E -C -H at M -E -N -V -I dot O -R -G. Text or WhatsApp 804 -442 -6975 or you
may call my comment line at Area code 888 -442 -6975. Again, that's 888 -405 -7569. And, boy, I'm wondering if it's time to change the name
of the podcast. We'll have to see. Let me know what you think. I am Jared Reimer saying thanks so much for listening. I hope to be back next time with another edition of the program. And I hope your blood doesn't boil too fast. Stay well, everybody. Please patch. Please stay as safe as you can. And we'll see you next time.
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