Welcome to the security box, podcast 280. We're going to need to do this in multiple parts, so podcast 280 will be here for quite awhile with the intermediates a through whatever to finish the series. On this podcast, the Evolution of Cyber Security, part 3: Organized cybercrime and social engineering, part 3. Part 3 will cover Conficker which was 2008-2009 as well as the first payment card breach that was for its era. That breach was known as the Heartland breach. We also had a meeting with Regional Center, and I hopefully educated them on the aforementioned breach we covered in July, as well as the reprocussions. The person I met with is still relatively new, but the fact they could not answer questions that clients may have is not necessarily good,, especially because of the challenges the clients have which is why they need their services anyway. This is an extensive discussion which Preston partook in after the initial taping. The whole series will take you from late 2000 through 2013. We hope you enjoy the program!
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The opinions expressed are those of the show hosts and may not necessarily be of any company in which the show hosts may represent. The following podcast may contain some strong language. Parental discretion is advised. The Security Box Program
280 Intermediate B The Evolution of Cybersecurity Part 3 Episode 3 Organized Cybercrime and Social Engineering Recorded Wednesday, September 23, 2026 Welcome to the Security Box. This is episode
280, Intermediate B. On this episode, we are going to cover something I thought was very interesting in regards to the regional center incident. Yes, I actually met with my regional center counselor for a scheduled meeting. And we even later on taped a segment with... Preston Gaylor and Nicholas
Jackson was also still around for that taping and offered some thoughts as well. So we're going to get into a deep discussion about that. We allow people to talk to us about what's going on in the landscape, including the very interesting news that Facebook... Is apparently going through now. Where they're being sued. Again. This time
for. Metaglasses. And recording when it shouldn't be. I haven't read anything. But this is. Definitely. Something of interest. We are only going to cover two items. As part of the 280 series. We cover. Configure. And we cover the first major breach that ever took place. And that was Heartland.
So, I hope that you all enjoyed the program as much as we have bringing it to you. And please make it a great day. Email iMessageTech, T -E -C -H, at M -E -N -V -I dot org. Text or WhatsApp, 804 -442 -6975. Or call the comment line at 888
-405 -7524. Thanks so much for listening. Make it a great day. September 23rd, time for another
security box. I actually started the morning of September 23rd a little under the weather. Not like I'm feeling fine, but a little under the weather. I'm not coughing or anything, but just a little bit on the irritated side. the
security news. I was hoping that our crew was here. Saturday. Of course, how does it come in?
Like they usually do by email or other delivery methods. And interesting email dealing with search
engine optimization, otherwise known as SEO, that I'll be reading from. Those of you who get Braille, you do have 30 and 40 cell copies of these. And by the way, for those who want Braille copies of any of the show notes of any of the
shows, please let me know. Okay? Let me know if you want 30 cell or 40 cell. Or if you even need 18. On the 20s, we'll make you 18s. It'll make it easier to read. And we'll give them to you. So, that is... Where we are. We now are
starting to get people coming into Team Talk on the live edition. And I think we'll do introductions because I see two. Go ahead with who wants to do their first intro, please. I'm Terry, I'm part of the security box and I also do PSN and
my show on Tuesday nights, the jukebox. Mr. J? I had to set something up, but yes, I am Nick from Santa Barbara, otherwise known as Mr. J, and also part of the security box. Very good.
I want to start today's program with you, Mr. Ring. Please, Discuss. What we were talking about. On. Saturday. More specifically. The. Segment
you played from. The wires. Of cyber wire. Talking about the... Was it the malware that... What's the name of that malware now? It was like... Goddamn malware or something? Yes. Yes. Nothing
new with that. I mean, it's just all the same crap. You know, taking your bank info and... Everything we've heard before, it's just the new... They didn't say who the group was. But, yeah, it's basically the same stuff that we've heard before. Making you want to pull your hair out. Guys, I haven't started doing that yet.
For all the stuff. And I got another one of those prank AT &T calls too, Jared, just recently, today. 50 % off your bill. Yeah, okay. Yep. We're losing customers. You get 50 % off your bill. Yeah, okay, sure. Are you sure you're AT &T? Oh. Yeah, I got it. Are you sure you're AT &T?
Of course I'm AT &T. Are you sure? Of course. I am AT &T, sir. Then you should have access to all my stuff. You should not be asking me for it. But, sir, there was a computer problem. There was a glitch with the software, sir. That's why I need your information. Because nobody would be calling you if the computers were down. Not
only that, nobody would be calling you. It only affects the billing department. It did not affect the ability to call. Well, if it affected the billing department, then you still have access to my account. Sorry, don't buy that. Sorry, don't. And not only that, we get that shit in the mail for promotions. AT &T doesn't call you for that. Thank you very much. Yeah, they'll
mail you. At least I've never gotten a call for that. They'll mail you. Yeah, I've gotten stuff in the mail. Offer promos and things, and they'll tell you to call them if you want it. Mm -hmm. Yeah. They'll never call you. No, I've never gotten a call. That's how I knew it was fake. Well, I heard the scenario before. Oh, we're losing customers. Oh, it's 50 % off your bill. And then I knew what the guy was going to say next. Oh, you get a free phone, too, on top of that. Yeah, okay. I've already heard that. And
I've already told AT &T about this game. So guess what? That company already knows about it. Mm -hmm. I called him the last time. You are not supposed to do that, sir. Oh, I know. Speaking of that, I had a telecrap scam that was kind of entertaining. So somebody named Prem Kumar,
apparently. So the first message they send me. I don't know. Huh. Go ahead. So they start out asking, hey, what's on your bucket list tonight? Just curious. And so I wanted to mess with them. And so, again, not recommended, but I just wanted to. Yeah. So I go. Oh. I'll be climbing Mount
Everest. So just a normal night. And they reply. Oh, hey, babe, adult dating club. Whether you want a one nighter or something long term, we've got you covered. heart hands interested? Very
interested. Okay, sure. And then I replied... Then I replied, I want my meat in your mouth. I wanted to see what they would do with that. And then they go... If you are interested, please let me know the age range of the opposite sex you are looking for. And then I go, anyone between
300 and 400? I got one like that, but I did a really disgusting one just to see what they would do. It's not quite done, though. Unfortunately, I think this person... Unfortunately, I think this person figured it out because they go, are you talking about 300 to 400 years old? And I said, of course. And then I've never heard from them since. I like my grandma. I would have been
like, I like my grandma butts. All right. Well, I got some email. lately. Oh, boy. Oh. Um... From Danielle Murphy, interestingly. That was from Metro. But I've got two from Ong Vuong Kim
that were delivered to my email. Oh. one says hello I am following up to confirm whether you received the record details I sent last week I made them available through screen connect session for review before I proceed with finalizing
the settlement Please note that the entry on page 9 contains your information related to you. At your convenience, kindly review the details. Basically, let us know if they're accurate. And there's a download link that's going to view transcripts dot Now, .pw is a known PLV. It's
not common. It's not a common one. But... This is where this goes. And I ran the URL through the total of virus. And six out of 93 yelled
phishing and malicious. So this morning... This morning... Well, let's see. What time did this come in? What time did this come in? Yeah. I'm right. This morning, I get an invitation from the same email address. Ooh. And the... Message
body is editable. And apparently there's a card. I want to get ChatGPT to actually read this and tell me what's going on here. But, because I can't read the body. But the link is going to something called Evite info. E -V -I -T -E info.
Dot U -S. Okay. Uh -huh. Now, we need to talk about this email from Danielle Murphy. This is
so funny. Nick, I gave you a folder called 280B. Yep, I read it. And I gave you a 30 or 40 cell. I'm going to go ahead and read this. Okay, go ahead. But I think this is so good. So, ChatGPT,
by the way, put this document into my folder, into my Google Drive before Sports Lounge. And then it went ahead and added DKIM and SPF, and then I just did the Braille this morning. I was a little rough around the edges today. I woke up, and I was a little under the weather. I'm
feeling okay, but just a little, my stomach's kind of, I think I'm okay now, but don't know what's going on. Anyway. I had to tell it both of these, and then I have to update it on this latest from this Zhuang email, whatever this email is. But I want to give you guys a good
laugh because Danielle apparently can't count. Or there are only so many episodes in the feed. So there could be possibilities. But this is just wrong. Did I actually send the email to you, Nick? I think I did. Yes. I sent it to you
and Preston. Oh, wait, no. I don't think you did, actually, unless it's sitting in my spam, which I haven't really looked at. All right. Fair enough. Well, I think this is actually better read in the way we did this, because this is just this is too dumb. Podcast SEO email that cannot count. I got an email that is almost too
perfect not to talk about on the security box. It was sent to the correct address for my A Day in the Life of Jared at LA Metro podcast. And unlike some of the garbage podcast marketing email I have received, this one actually... actually identified the correct show. So before I continue,
I've talked about how I've gotten email over at The Mix about the technology blog and podcast. But that's actually not where I tell people to email. for that show. So that's what I'm talking about when I say they actually got it right.
The subject line said quote 85 episodes latest out September 19th. End quote. That was 96 episodes. Latest episode, September 19th. The message told
me that a day in the life of Jared at LA Metro has real momentum and then pitched software that supposedly optimized podcast titles, descriptions, and tags for YouTube, Google, and AI searchability. They wanted me to reply with one word. Okay.
And then they would send me a link. There is just one little problem with their research. I do not have 85 episodes. The episode I released on September 19th was episode 96. By the time I was looking closely at this email, I had released
episode 97 as well. Episode 97 covers tomorrow's board meeting. So if you listen to this, if we get this up Wednesday evening, we've got a board meeting again. This is the full board. on September 24th. If for some reason I don't get the podcast out in time because I'm gone and I end up taking
a nap and sleeping half the afternoon like I tend to do some of these Wednesdays, the board meeting would have happened, but that's what the episode was covering. Okay. Everything for this podcast is published. There is not some dozen episodes, episode unpublished backlog that
explains the difference. There's about that many for the duo feed of the spotlight, but those will be going out Within the next several days. If they haven't started going out already. I'm having about two a day. For the next. Three or four days. And catching them. They'll all go out by Friday. Maybe whatever podcast directory.
Or catcher their system. scraped was behind. Podcast directories do get out of sync. So 85 may have come from a stale source rather than somebody simply making the number up. But that makes the sales pitch pretty funny. You are trying to sell me technology that supposedly improves The searchability of my entire podcast catalog.
While the technology you use to research me cannot reliably determine how many episodes are in that catalog. Yeah. The email itself is also a useful security lesson. Looking at the full headers, this did not appear to be a simple case of somebody
typing a fake from address. The message authenticated successfully with DKIM for the sender's domain optimizifier .com. I'll spell it. O -P -T -I -M. I -S -I -F -Y -I -E -R. Wow. Optimistifier.
That's interesting. Dot com. The envelope sender was on that same domain. The headers also showed that the message had been submitted through Google's
mail infrastructure from an Amazon EC2 address. That doesn't necessarily mean anything. They could have their own infrastructure. We know nothing about it. Okay. Sorry, trying to take a drink. Um... Paragraph. SPF, or Sender Policy
Framework, lets a receiving mail system check whether the server sending a message is authorized to send mail for the domain involved. in that check. DKIM or domain keys identified mail uses a cryptographic signature added by the sending
domain. So the receiving system can verify that the message was authorized by that domain and that signed portions. of the message were not altered after they were signed. Neither one tells me that Daniel Murphy is a real person, that
the company is legitimate, or that I should trust the sales pitch. They authenticate They authenticate aspects of how the email was sent. They do not authenticate the human being making the claim.
That does not prove that Daniel Murphy, the name on the message, is a real person. Email authentication authenticates infrastructure and domains. It does not hand us somebody's driver's license. What I can reasonably say is that whoever sent this appears to have been authorized to send mail for that domain. That is very different
from proving that the person, company, product, or sales pitch is trustworthy. There were other things worth noticing. My spam assassin report identified the front domain as having been registered only 7 to 14 days earlier. Oof. And they're a
software company? Uh, yeah. They're supposed to be well established? Um, yeah. This reminds me of another email we got some time back that I did well before we used chat. Where I actually looked up the domain. Remember this? I think so. I got an email to management or something
and I was doing a lot of the management stuff. You know, email over at the mix. And I looked at this one email and they claimed to want something. I forget the entire details. We talked about it at the time. But the domain was only registered a week prior or something. Was that the Safari people? That might have been the Safari people. Like the ones who said... I think it was like
less than a week though. Wasn't it like four days or something like that? We want to confirm that we're going to do this. Can you confirm this? Whatever it was. And they sent an SHTML file. An STHGML file, yeah. That when you ran it on the computer actually ran a redirect and
then asked for an email address and password instead of giving you an itinerary like they wanted. But that was a different one. I think this other one wanted us to get into something. It was like another software or something. I
forget the entire detail, but it was like several days old. Yeah. Let's see. The headers also contained a consistent I'm sorry, an instantly .ai abuse reporting reference, which is consistent with automated cold email infrastructure. None of
those things by themselves prove malicious intent, but together, they are reasons I am not going to blindly engage... With an unidentified product. And then we get to my favorite part. They asked me to reply okay. I did not reply at all. My
cPanel autoresponder did. My autoresponder thanked the sender. for contacting me and said I would respond within 24 to 48 hours. It also supplied my normal phone number and text contact information. Because this particular mailbox is associated with my Los Angeles Metro material, The autoresponder
additionally explains that my site is a fan site and that I do not control Metro's policies or procedures and gives the actual Los Angeles Metro switchboard and customer relations numbers. So... Their automated sales system. Asked for okay. And instead. Received. An automated explanation.
Of how to contact. Jared Reimer. And if they were actually. Trying to reach Los Angeles Metro. How to contact Metro. Now. I am curious whether their automation can tell the difference. If the next message says something like, great, here's the link I promised, even though nobody
ever replied okay, that tells us something else about the quality of the automation behind... this campaign. If nothing else happens, that is fine, too. I have no reason to click anything or pursue the offer. The larger lesson is not that every cold sales email is phishing, and
I do not have evidence to call this one phishing. The lesson is That passing SPF or DKIM does not make an email trustworthy. Those technologies help answer questions about whether a message was authorized by a particular domain. They do not tell you whether the business is reputable, whether the person named in the message exists,
whether the product is authentic. worthwhile, or whether you should follow the requested call to action. And if you are going to email a podcaster to sell technology that supposedly makes podcasts easier to find in Google, YouTube, and AI search, there is one other recommendation I can offer
free of charge. Before you tell the podcaster how many episodes they have, make sure your technology can fucking count. Oh, yeah. Right. Right. I can't agree more on that one. My end of file came on the top of page six, but that's just the way it goes. I put it there because I wanted to make sure I knew where I reached the end,
but that's okay. I thought this was a great read. I couldn't pass it up. I could not pass it up. I could not pass it up. That was too good. I'll take comments now. I don't know if I have anything else to add, but you're right. Alright. If you
all want to comment on it, email iMessageTech T -E -C -H at M -E -N -V -I dot org. Text or WhatsApp 804 -442 -6975 or call the comment line at 888 -405 -7524. So, Jared, did we hear anything more on their breach from the gentleman? Did they release the... The answer to your question
is no. We know nothing. We don't... Of course. We have not heard that the gentleman have released anything. We have not heard Metro respond. I even sent my blog post to staff last week on Friday because I happened to mention it to them.
And, of course, they still have not confirmed or denied their April slash May slash what the fuck went wrong happened during that period either. Yeah. Well, you're a little, they're a little like way too late on that. Oh. So, speaking of
late, I had my quarterly meeting with the Los Angeles Regional Center of the San Fernando Valley yesterday. And I am not blaming my service coordinator because my service coordinator, as they call
them here in LA, is relatively new to the company. Okay. I'm not going into detail about who they are or how long they've been here. But I basically gave them a lesson yesterday on how bad this is. As we talked about in July, I think it was
July. Was it July? When was that blog post posted? I think it was more recent. I'm about to go look. I started out okay and now I'm coughing. That's how it goes on these days, huh? Yeah. I never
learned my lesson of going and getting drops ahead of time and bringing them up here. July 21st. So, I was right. We talked about, in July...
Wait, is this the right one? Hold on. I have two different articles. Let me just look real quick. Oh, no, this is... No, you're right. You're
right. It was July 21st. It was July 21st. I was looking at a second one in August because I'm like... Yeah. Because it sort of matched what I was looking at, but I want the one in July. Okay. So... Back in July, we talked about... And blogged how the regional center came out
with a letter. And they basically gave the proper PR. what they should do, right? You know, we had an incident. Here's what we know. We are
taking steps to do. We have a phone number established for those of you who have questions. But here's where I draw the line, folks. As I told my counselor,
I appreciate what you guys have done for me. You've paid for stuff for me when I needed it. If you're able to, you, you know, sent me to different things. You've, you know, whatever, even though. I personally don't think they do a whole lot, but I was trying to be nice at the time, right? It's like, thanks for whatever you guys have been able to do for me, but we've got a big problem. I said to them, I understand this
This is what I do. The clients you serve don't even understand what a breach is. Let alone simple adult things. Yeah. I said... You and I can go
do adult things, but the majority of your clientele can't do that. And yes, the last girl I had was able to do adult things, but they had other limitations. I said, I'm not asking for anything. I'm just
making a point. But I also said... The problem here is that... The majority of your clients... They call them clients in this industry, so let's use the right terms. The majority of your clients... If they can't even understand adult things, they'll
never understand your letter. No. And I said, what has regional learned? Do you have to change our identifiers? You know, are you, you know,
do you guys, you know, basically, how long do you guys keep our stuff around for? Because if you look at my file, you probably have stuff around as long as I've been with you. I said this isn't just a regional center problem. I said this is a company problem. I said if you look at the stories of all of the big -time breaches,
you will see that they've had data going back many, many, many, many years. I said I don't have any idea how long you – What info you have on me? I said, you know, you probably have everything going back to when I was having issues with my teeth. I said, whatever. But I said, does Regional
Center have to change my identifier? And what have they learned? And what's the response that... What are they telling you to tell your clients who have questions? They pretty much said, I don't know anything. And if you've got questions, to call the number on the letter. And I said,
If one of your clients called the number and they asked what a ransomware attack is, is the people that are answering the phone going to be able to tell them what that is? Because I can. I don't know. This is bad. Your... Coordinator...
Should... Be... Your point of contact. And... They... Uh... Should be the one the client... Has to call. Yeah. For sure. They should not be calling. A call center. Who probably has.
No. Idea. About. What. Is. Happening. Yeah, probably a call center that's not even in California, but anyway. No, I... No, I... Well, even if it wasn't in California, I would believe that this
is all... This would all be U .S.-based customer service. I don't believe they would outsource it. I don't know. At least, I would hope not. Thank you for calling Regional Center Call Help Service. How can I help you today, sir? My point
is, and I wasn't even going there about the call center. Where is it based out of? I mean, I have questions. I got lots of questions. And I did. Send them... This blog post. Use it as a guide. Learn from it. Pass it along. Let's get some answers. I'm... Speaking... For the two... Hundred...
Thousand... Clients... You have. I said... I can tell you already, there are lawsuits. They are looking to sue you. I already contacted a company who did not take me as part of the class action. But if you search on the internet for
your breach, everything you will find will lead... to companies that will explain what you already did in your letter and that you and that they are looking to sue. Ladies and gentlemen, Regional
Center has Everything on you. Any behavioral issues? Any medical issues? That's just for what? L .A. and California, right? Or is that for the U .S.? Every... Yeah. Even Preston's company. Even Preston's company in his state. has this
dossier of info on their clients that they keep because part of your IPP or individualized program plan makes sure that you are doing what you need to do. You're going to program You're going to things that they assign you to do, whether it's
a class or what have you. If it's things at home that you need to improve on, like brushing your teeth or taking a shower, no judgment. Okay? This happened to me. This happened to me. This was all part of the IPP. Because I'm going through the blind bureau services for work. That's a different... That's a work... That's different
than what we're talking about here. To the state. This is different. That's different than this. I gave them credit, though. I said, you should have given us this letter six months to a year
from now. But I said, At least you sent us something. Unlike LA Metro. Who has absolutely said jack shit. And I did explain what their latest issue was. Yeah. So... I gave them credit where credit
was due. But if most of your customers can't understand adult things, maybe they do do adult things, but they have help because they don't... understand it, but this is what they want to do. Yeah, so this is more for people who are
kind of lower functioning, right? That's what this company does. They're more for getting help with daily skills. The guy that comes to me that just showed up, He actually is a subscriber of this podcast. But he is the one that Regional Center will pay to help you with that as part
of your IPP. Regional Center is a warehouse of places That can help you do things like having IHSS, the in -home support services, you know, people, whatever company they contract with,
you know, come to your home and help you with, you know, the laundry, your mail. If you need to go somewhere, they drive you. If you have a relationship, they will take you to the other party's home. They will let you two do whatever.
Whatever that may be. And then they take you home. Some people need 24 -hour care. The regional pays for that. And they pay for people to stay around the clock. Yeah. That's what they do. Yeah, so I got it now, yeah. Payee. Yeah, so
for people who need more help than, say, like me or, you know, like, yeah, I get it now. Like, I don't need a lot of help, but it's nice to have somebody to just go to the store, get what I need. Oh, yeah. You know, they go through my mail. Make sure I know what's going on. And I
don't have to pay somebody for that. I've got somebody that I can pay if that really needs to be. Oh, yeah. I mean, if you could do that instead and not have to pay for that. Yeah, that's...
So that's the update. The staff know nothing. They want you to call the phone number, and I bet the phone number knows very little. They might know enough. Yeah. But... I couldn't resist, though. Thank you for calling the regional support. How are you? May I help you, sir? All right, so let me confirm that you're calling about this letter that you received in the mail. Is that
correct, sir? Yeah. It may not even be that, but still, I couldn't resist. You know what? I wouldn't be in disagreement if it was, but the point is that... The people that are supposed to help you don't even know what the hell is going on. Yeah, that's a problem. But this reminds
me of the customer service people at most companies. Oops. Uh -huh. Frontier. Immobile. Oops. Did I just say that? Oops. Oh, you did. And we expanded on it. Are they here? All right, so let me understand and confirm that this is what you say your problem is. So when you try to make a call, you have
no dial tone. Is that correct? Yes, I just told you that. Yeah, I knew right away. That AT &T was a fake thing. I'm like, oh, I heard this before. Click. Not going to get me. Didn't get
me the first time. Not going to get me this time. Losing AT &T's losing customers. Sure. Sure. Yeah, sure they are. They're really losing customers. Even if they were, they would send you. I'm surprised T -Mobile hasn't lost any customers. Oh, they
probably have. You just haven't heard anything. Maybe. Well, that's what I'm looking for. I'm looking for the fact they've lost their ass because nobody wants to deal with... Somebody who's had eight breaches in nine years. Yeah. And who I can log in and mess with other people's accounts kind of thing. Did they have another breach this year? I don't remember. I thought that was in...
I don't know if it was last year. They're about to. It's due. We're way past due for... Yeah, they're overdue for another one. They're going to have one. But yeah, let's see. I can log in and let me add an international world plan to Jared's account that he doesn't want, but I can do it. So here you go. Let me add a line and
just start racking up the bill. All these countries and stay on the phone for hours. You know. Yeah, and call all these random chat lines. Why is my phone bill $16 ,000? Financial advisor. I think he made 15 calls yesterday to South Korea.
Yeah. Why is there ten calls to Australia at 1am? What's going on here? Right. Then there were five. That's what I'm saying. Yeah. And then there were seven calls to the UK at 2am. What? What the hell? And then you got a bunch
of international text messages. It's like $4 .50 a minute to call the UK. The only reason I know that is because I actually had to call the UK once. Oh, boy. It depends on the carrier. When I was looking, it was... $2 and something, but I bet today it's gone up. Oh, with AT &T,
the last time I called them was like four or five years ago. It was like $4 .50 a minute. Wasn't that high for me. Well, back then, I was using other services to do that. I knew better. And I was paying $2 .30 a minute. Well, I straight up told the dude. I'm like, hey, man, I'm calling the UK and this is very expensive. All right, mate. Take care of it. Take care of it. And I
hung up within like three minutes. So I went to pay like 12 bucks. So I just wanted to give
that update because it was time. We don't know anything. I haven't heard anything new about any potential lawsuits. I pretty much wanted to let them know that this is what was going on. I have questions. Your call centers probably
have no idea how to answer them. I basically told them, I said, our info's probably long gone by now. We just don't know it yet because they sit on it trying to figure out whether they're going to use it or not. And I sort of explained what the dark web was and talked about how you sort of need to know where to go. I have no high
hopes with this company. Yeah. Then they asked me whether I got the computer fixed and how much I had to pay, and I said, yeah, you all didn't want to pay me for it. I had to pay $600 and do my whole infrastructure. the cane? Well, that's
another 50 bucks that I need to go buy a new one because I haven't gotten a new tip on it. So if you all want to cut me a check for that too, that'd be great too. Yeah. But I don't expect them to give me anything. And because I get over $1 ,000, And I'm not giving an exact amount,
but I get over $1 ,000 a month through survivors. Yeah. They don't pay me to live on my own like they pay others. So I don't even qualify for that program. Whoa. So I have bills of $2 ,000
a month only because I've been doing a lot of eating out because I've been doing work outside of my home where I'm traveling and then I have to stop and eat. Yep. So that's why my bills have been expensive as of late. So, I thought
I'd give an update, folks. It's crazy. The people who are supposed to help us know nothing. Yeah. It's usually always how it is, isn't it? Yep. Like, I knew they had those types of services, Jerry, but I didn't actually know who did it
until you were mentioning it last time. That's why I asked a little bit more. Yeah, they outsource to other companies that provide these types of services. So if you have a girlfriend, they'll take you to your girlfriend. They'll let you do your thing with your girl. If you need help, I'm sure they'll help you. Right? I mean, that's what they're supposed to do. They probably wouldn't take me four hours away, though. Well, okay,
but even... I mean, if you had a girl local, sure. They might. They might, but the point is is that they would take you to your girl. You and your girl decide you want to do something if you need help and the girl can't quite figure it out they'll help you right cause that's what
they're supposed to do yeah they'll let you do what you're gonna do with your girl and then when you're ready to go home they'll take you home That's kind of cool. Different. Some of them will do it. Others may not, but it depends on who you get and the rules of that particular company. What else has been in the industry since
I've not been reading? I meant to go through and get stuff from the last time I went through because I saw some stuff and wanted to do news notes, but then I got caught up in that email fiasco yesterday. As well as Sports Lounge and other things. Haven't heard anything else on FaceByte. Last thing I heard was third. Yeah, what do we know? Because you asked a question
to the group and you said FaceByte is apparently getting in trouble. What do we know and what are we looking for? So, apparently, and I know we had the discussion on ESN. Apparently, it's recording without... people knowing, which I don't understand how. I don't think it's gonna hold up in court because there's supposed to be some kind of a light on it. And apparently
it's recording people in the restroom and in bedrooms and stuff that I guess they don't know or the person doesn't know. But I don't think that's gonna hold up in court. I just don't - Hey, cold ball. That's what I'm saying. I mean, I don't know if it's going to hold up. Preston has one of these and he says this is not how that works. Yeah. And if anybody should know how it would work. It would be him because he
has glasses. Yeah. It would be him. So all of us on the panel last Saturday called bull. Mm -hmm. You're not going to hear anything else on it. I don't think it's going to go anywhere in court. And if it does, I'll give an update. But that's about all I've heard on it. And I
haven't heard anything more about the LA Metro bus either as far as what I saw on the news. So the last update we got on the LA Metro bus is that Bailey Lynn Rios is getting medical care. Okay. There are medical issues. Chat told me what was going on, but I'm not disclosing anything that isn't public. Right. I mean, it is public,
but I chose not to disclose it when we released 96. And we found some of this out after 96 was released. Apparently, I guess I'll do the apparently, because we don't really know what's going on, but apparently Miss Rios has some broken bones and other... issues going on that need treatment. The last court date was supposed to be on this
past Monday. That was postponed. We do not have any further news. We also know that the crash site has been moved to San Diego. Where they will evaluate it and determine what's going on.
They've got the black box. Yeah. And they'll do audio sampling and determine what they can get out of that. So right now we're in a holding pattern. Yeah. I know the pilot and was it his passengers? They were all deceased? The pilot and the girl who reported for NBC and Telemundo
are both gone as well as a passenger on the ground. I would urge you to listen to episode number 96, which was released on September 19th. We read several articles, and then I talk about my reaction, including the fact that I've been
on these buses one more than the other. Metro actually described this bus as being T -boned, gentlemen. Yep. This bus is cooked. I expect them to send that fucker back to El Dorado for repair. I don't think they can do it in -house.
They're going to have to. Even if they can repair it. I mean, that bus was wrecked when I saw it. It showed the bus on the news the other day. And I'm like, I don't think that bus is going to even be able to be repaired. It might, but. They'll probably ship it back to El Dorado or what's the other company we use? I think we get buses from two companies these days. But they'll ship it back to the company they got it from
and go, uh, this bus got its bus. If I was LA Metro, I would write it off and call it good. Well, they're going to have to get another bus to replace it. That's what I'm saying. Yeah.
To be honest with you, I'm an outsider. I know nothing about what they're going to do. This is up to the divisions. Because we have two divisions that serve the San Fernando Valley. I do not know what they're going to do. It's really not my... It's not my lane. It's not really my lane. I don't even know. I suspect they're going to
talk about it on Thursday. They're going to, just like they did last week, they'll... I'm sure we'll find out something. Yeah. We do know we had two killed on the bus. We had six injured,
including the operator who will survive. This investigation will go for a while. Well, the NTSB is involved. Yeah. And the FAA is involved. Because if it wasn't for the bus, okay, the helicopter
probably would have crashed anyway. Because something happened with that thing. We think it was a fuel problem based on what chat's giving me. Because they said it was fine earlier in the day when they were doing stuff. Like they were doing news. And they said we had no problems. They were actually just over there. They were actually over there. Yeah. And then they must have fueled back up and came back. And the two actually have been
paired up since 2023, according to the article I read. So, that's that. Is there anything else
in the tech industry that I have not been paying attention to that we need to cover before we do a file switch and get going on? I don't really think so. I mean, iOS 27 was released, but... People are saying all kinds of different back and forth things about it, but I don't really know. The Siri thing, it needs help still. It's
kind of sluggish at times. It needs help. Then I'll stay where I am. I'm in no hurry. Definitely need some... Okay. I think we're good. Otherwise,
do a file switch. Yep. Let's do a file switch, and when we come back, we're going to continue on with 280, and we're going to continue with Configure. And we'll see how much we get. Yeah, I was going to say, I kind of have a bit of... more of a hard stop today, so yeah. Okay. That's
cool. Like three at the absolute latest, but yeah, not really longer than that. Alright, three o 'clock it is. Three o 'clock it is. It's 1240. Let's go ahead and see how far we can get. We will continue with more of... Maybe I need to change the program to the security bytes. Maybe.
Or security does bite. Really hard. It's hard. Yeah. We will continue with more of the security box in just a moment across the Jared Reimer radio network. IPDB is one of the best services
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we talked about during today's program. Preston Gaylor, welcome to TSB. Hello there. Thank you as always for letting me contribute and for having me help you with this program. I mean, it takes a village. Folks, the reason why I... Turn that down a little bit, please. You meant my tablet?
I hear us in the background. Oh, my bad. I paused it. Turn that down a little bit. Okay. In hour number one, we talked a little bit about my... IPP meeting and my discussion with Regional about their breach in July and the response I got and
you said you had comments on it. So I'm going to turn off my mic and let you go ahead and yap. Yay. Well, basically, I was listening to this while I was, you know, working on my duties here in my role and essentially with the company that I work for. Essentially, it was beyond repair.
I mean, Jared did all the educating he could do and whether they're going to. take obliged to it is going to be their decision. And essentially just what the response that they gave him was definitely outrageous. And I just believe that
they should have handled it better. But, you know, like I said, we got to give them credit. At least they sent the letter out when things unfolded. Well, I think it was well after. And yes, you know, there are companies who still have not even done the bare minimum. I do have
to give them credit where credit is due. So... Yep. Now, to the employees' credit, they're only a couple years old in the company. So this is not their fault. No. But the fact they know nothing and they tell you to just call a phone number.
I'm like, your customers are going to call you. They're not going to call a phone number. Because most likely that phone number is staffed by people who also don't know anything. Now, I do have to give OPM credit, gentlemen. What I called OPM, they actually knew what the hell was going on and explained it to me. Because I didn't know
what was happening. And I didn't even know who they were because I asked who they were. And then once I authenticated, they were telling me how they knew of me. So I do have to give them... A lot of credit. Yeah. They knew. So they were on top. And they also understood all
that. It was good on their part. I'm just appalled at the fact that your own, you know, people that you have that are supposed to take care of everybody's cases can't tell the consumer anything. Definitely
sad and unfortunate. And I mean, being in the profession I'm in now, going on nine months, I feel that this should have handled better. Do we? I'm not saying I'm going to do this, but do we need to start reaching out to companies
like yours and talk about the potential response that needs to be given? I mean, look, we're dealing with people who can't even understand basic adult functions, whether it's cooking, whether it's cleaning, whether it's, you know, other things
they actually need help with. That they can't do it alone? Maybe they understand it, but they can't do it alone for whatever reason. Right. That's why sometimes, of course, it depends on our clients, but some people still live at home with their parents, and their parents are their staff and their employer. But their parents aren't
going to say, oh, by the way, son, we're now involved in a breach that, you know, regional, we'll just say regional because that's what this is, that regional center just sent us a letter about and it's two years old. And this is what it means for you. You know, a lot of the consumers,
when we drop them off, we drop them off in group homes. Those people never had any adult activities of any kind. They don't deal with money on a regular. They don't do cooking. They don't do much of anything. Whether they're capable or not, we don't know. But we do know that they
live in group homes. And they may or may not have money to do anything. And they may or may not be able to go out on their own. And they may or may not be able to enjoy what life has to offer. Yep. And they will never understand
a ransomware attack. And they will never understand what this means. Yeah. And the counselor, like you, has to tell them, oh, just call the call center that's responsible for this. Their number's in the letter. But half the time, you know, the
agents probably will know what is... They don't know what's going on in this spectrum of the industry. But they have to protect all of our data, just like you do. Right. I know of one boy's name, but that's only... Because you were using JAWS and I was talking to you about other stuff. But I don't remember his name now. But
the point is, I heard what you were doing. And I didn't have my headphones plugged in. But that's beside the point. Okay, but I didn't go out there and publicize what I was hearing. Right? Yeah.
This is basically what happened. And they may have a point. They'll say, well, we don't know. It's like, well, what if your forensic people say we can't discuss it? What do you mean you can't discuss it? Why is there a call center in place if you can't answer my questions? I'm probably the smartest one in this place that understands. kind of what's going on, and you know nothing. How are you telling consumers who
don't even understand what this means? Right. And I'm wondering if... We need to have a conversation where we bring people together. I'll pay for a Zoom. If we can get people involved in having
this discussion, as I was saying, During the recording, the agencies like yours just pay for outside people to come in and do. That's all well and good. So if you have a girlfriend and you guys wanted to do your adult things, they'll help you with that. But Preston, as a... As an
employee of Regional, I think you, as a counselor, or whatever they call you in your state, have to tell the consumer, if they call you, what this means. And what you are doing to make sure that their information is safe as possible. Because we know, As we talked about on this podcast,
there's no such thing as 100 % security. We know that. Yeah. That's very true. So what... In your case... Let's pretend that I called you and I
knew nothing except for what the letter told me. What do you think you would tell me? I would say, well, we were involved in a breach. A lot of our clients' info did get confiscated, the
addresses, the DOBs, the names and stuff like that. And here's what we're going to do to prevent it from happening again. We're going to install our various scanning. to detect viruses and Trojans on the machines. We're going to do mandatory
updates on all systems as soon as they come in. We're going to train our staff on how to check for verifiable updates and how to understand the different systems and spectrums of the PII. And we will have mandatory classes on how to prevent specific exploitation and infiltration
from happening again. How's that? Pretty solid. I like that. That seems reasonable, but I'd be careful about calling it viruses because now the term is actually malware, but I like it.
And I know I'm still here, but there are a few things I'd be careful about too. Go ahead, please. This is a segment that's going to go in between the first hour and the second hour. We're just taping a separate segment with him so that we can have his thoughts in the podcast before we release. So go ahead, please, Mr. Chen. So I think that some of the steps you talked about
are good. But my concern is we... Unless I'm missing something, we don't entirely know how the breach happened. We don't. Which is why some of this is good, but I think you have to understand your infrastructure. So... If you had software installed, but it wasn't up to date, you would
want to tell your client, we had software. It was out of date. We are making sure that we're taking steps to keep that up to date, which may prevent this from happening again. timer mode. It's never going to be 100 % accurate. But 1,
5, 10, 15, 20 minutes. That's a long time, Presley. 20 minutes, 0 seconds. Oh, I'm fixing pizza. 20 minutes before his brain goes Brain goes off. I hope your microwave doesn't do that because I didn't think that... No, no, no, no. I have it in the timer setting. I know better than that.
No, it's just I've never seen anybody... I've never heard of anybody cooking anything in a microwave for 20 minutes. No. I don't think there's such thing as... Cooking that in 20 minutes. You can do... Yeah, I think you could, actually. You could. I mean, I wouldn't recommend it, but you probably could. After probably about a minute...
Yeah. But I think be careful of what you say because you don't... Unless you're confident... in saying all of that because you were told all of this, then I would be okay with it. But you don't want to go out and say this is going to solve every possible problem. Yes. And yeah, for all we know, not that what you said isn't
valid, but for all we know, The systems are up to date. It could have very well been that somebody, it could have been that, it could have been that, or this would be the worst scenario, but somebody clicked on an email and said, hey, your winnings are here. And unfortunately, they did it on their work computer. So I would say, depending on the
situation, now let's take, Mr. J's example because that's probably what they're doing these days. Here's what I'd say. Because antivirus and anti -malware can't by nature prevent these because they're text or HTML email. So I would say we
learned that one of our employees did something that caused software to be installed that we didn't want. This software was built to do X.
Now, I wouldn't use terms like exfiltrate. I'd probably use something like steal. So, this would be something like this software. would be used to steal information from us, which may have included, because remember, we don't know anything.
So we do know that it may have included your unique identifier. Your name, your address, your phone number, your date of birth, your social security number, and information that was included in your file. After the incident, we brought
in people to... Examine the computer system and make sure that we were okay. And they fixed what went wrong. Because they can do that. They can
fix what's wrong. No. And we are going to train our company on what to look for so that this doesn't happen again. I think if we're going to dumb it down for somebody who doesn't understand, that's probably the better. way to go. What do
you guys think? Yeah, probably so. Dad's more like it. Because we want... We want the client to, or family rather, to know what we have and
what we're going to do. Not just have them sit on silence until we have the actual pieces of puzzle put together. Okay, I think there's... Alright, I'm sorry I jumped in on top of you, but I think there's a big, big thing. that hopefully this will do. Go ahead. Families and clients need to know that they can trust you. That's the biggest problem when a thing like this happens.
Yeah. Because right now, I know my info's already gone. What is the company going to do to make sure this doesn't? happen again? And I got an I don't know. I got an I don't know. What do you mean you don't know? Yeah. How do you not know? You work for the company. What did they tell you? Right. We can't talk about it. We are
told to tell you to call the number in the letter. That's what we're instructed to do. Gee, that's helpful. Not. like it'd be one thing if it was like you know the target breach that happens like because everybody shops it well not everybody but a lot of people do it's like yeah my info got stolen okay it's a pain in the ass but but
you know oh well didn't include Your name, your address, your phone number, and all of your file information, which included any of your behavioral issues, Nick. No, Jared, that's just where I was about to go. That's just where I was about to go. That's why this is so much worse and why, you know, probably a lot of people are thinking, I mean, probably if they even know what's happened.
Can we trust these people anymore? I agree. Yes. Because of that very personal information that, like you said, and you mentioned, they have compared to, say, a place like Target. I mean, that was a bitch with Target. I mean, our credit card information was pilfered. Okay, go get another card number. It cost the credit card company
$2 for a card. Maybe a couple of dollars to, you know, priority mail it. You know, because it needs to get to you within a few days. They do it from headquarters, which is probably across the country from you. Or not. But it's probably so... Yeah, but it's probably so routine. It's like, okay, new card. Yeah, here's a number, whatever. Here we go. But it's part of them doing
business. Right. And unlike your behavioral issues, that shit can be changed. No. That's already in the ISP. A lot of the stuff in this file... if this is what they have, you can't just call the Social Security Administration and say, oh, I need a new Social Security number. No way.
There has to be a real good reason for them to do that, and I don't know. I'd be curious in finding out. Maybe I... If we could find a way to get them a note and say, what would be the way for you to administer a new social security number to somebody without giving any details?
What's the criteria for you to do that? Let them explain that to us, because I don't know. Yeah. But I mean, if they... You know, if you were
allowed to do adult things, and part of what they... have to do is write down where they take you and why. That's part of your file. It doesn't have to be detailed on the fact they helped you with whatever. They could just go and say, I took Nick to his girlfriend's. They don't really
have to go into a lot of detail beyond that. Yeah, that's true. But I still think there has to be a lot to be learned. You can't just say, call the call center and they'll help you. I
mean, I don't think they... be able to answer any of my questions. No. I feel the same way. I just feel that they they do understand, but I know they don't understand because it's like a lot to take in. They're not in this industry
like we are. But that's not the point. The point is that they need to tell their consumers what the company is doing to make sure that this doesn't happen again. Basically, you are their customer service agent. You're who they're going to call.
Not the number in some letter that's only going to be around for six months to a year. That's not going to help. I just looked this up and I only got it through the AI Gemini overview, so take it with a grain of salt, but I found some of the circumstances that would allow you
to be issued a new social security number. Here's what we've got. First one. Harassment or abuse. That's every day. Domestic violence. Harassment and abuse, that's every day. I was harassed for years on the phone lines, but that's not enough for me. But go ahead. But I get the sense that
it has to be, I mean, really, really serious. Not, you know, like we're talking domestic violence type situations from what I can see here. All right, go ahead. Harassment or abuse, domestic violence, stalking. life endangerment, that kind of thing. Yeah, harassment on the phone line is a pain in the ass to deal with, but this is elevated to a whole new level from what they're
saying. Okay, so along with that, identity theft, but suffering continuous unresolvable harm, After other methods have been exhausted. What's going to take years? Oh, yeah. Exactly. And, yeah. Okay, your identity was stolen in a data breach,
but see, the thing is, I'm getting the sense that they wouldn't accept that because you didn't have any control over that, i .e., you didn't potentially cause it. Of course we didn't cause it. It was the company that had the breach to begin with. Yes, but therefore, I think in their stupid bureaucratic logic, well, you didn't do it, so it wasn't under your control, so we can't
fix that, sorry. That'd just be my guess. That would just be my guess. I don't know, but... Oh, yeah, I second that. What's next? Duplicate numbers. Having the same number assigned to more than one person. Family confusion, which is...
Yeah, I don't know if I've heard of that either. Family confusion, sharing two similar numbers with family members. I don't know why you would do that. That's dangerous. And why would you share each other's? I don't even know my sister's number. And I don't even know her kids' numbers. And I don't even know my full father's number.
I see... four digits, but I don't know if that's actually the last four of his or what. I don't know. What I think actually, what I think it actually means is if two people have numbers that are very, very similar in their system and that screws things up and causes loads of confusion, that kind of thing. I don't think we're talking about, you know, like if somebody had a number that ends in a seven and a family member had one that ended in a five, but every other number
was... Frickin' the same. Okay. That's what I think that probably actually means. But I could be wrong. That's fair. And then this is the weirdest, most absurd one. Religious or cultural objections.
Holding documented objections to specific digits. Backed by an established religious group. Oh my gosh, really? Okay, yeah, let me get this straight. My social security number has 666 in it. Can that be changed? Yeah, because the Jehovah's Witnesses believe that that's the mark of the
beast and it's the Antichrist. Yeah, I think that's got to be the weirdest one on the list. I think I'm speechless. So am I. Yeah. laughter commences among the group during this segment right parenthesis it's like actually there are
a lot of people who would well some of the more fundamentalist traditions yeah they would say 666 it's the number of the it's the monk of the beast I need my social security number changed And they probably could get some random pastor somewhere to actually document this. That's the scary part. I wonder if this has actually been
done. I really hope not. Do we not have SSNs ending in 666? And if so, are they... Are they all changed and they're not doing any more sixes anymore? I highly doubt it, only because there's only so many numbers. Right. Is there anything
else in that AI tool? Those were the only ones that I saw. Okay. I think I'm speechless. So am I. Is there anything else that you gentlemen
want to add to this segment before I cut? you all loose, and then after this segment, of course, we'll return back to the podcast, because this is being taped after the original taping, because I wanted Preston to have a chance to talk about this. Right. I don't think I have anything to add. Yeah, I was going to say, definitely, all of this is important to think about, and I feel
like Keeping on educating and also learning and learning from experience is something to master. And like I said, whatever, if you're going to take it all in, that's their business. All I can do is try. Yes. That's all we can do. If
they learn, they will, if not, well, like we always say on this program, it's on you, wherever you want to take what we give you. I agree. So, there you go. So, as always, Jared, thank you for letting me... you know, contribute and help Alvarez as always, and I feel like our work is
still continuing. I agree. More of TSB will continue in just a moment. This is program 280 Intermediate B across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. Security
Awareness Training is a company that does just that. Started by somebody who could take down phishing sites, this company has been known to do training on various types of things, including phishing. popular attack methods in this industry,
whether it's by email, text, or voice. They are a global company, and they've also had clubhouse rooms in the past where ordinary citizens like you and I were once able to go in, listen, and participate. There may be some things that the
average citizen may be able to take advantage of. So check them out today. The website is K -N -O -W -B -E the number four dot com. Or get a link on our resources page at emailhostsecurity
dot com. Folks, during the break, the team was
thinking of sending old Danielle some very... I actually was going to respond with a few of my own. They want to send some gross stuff and very interesting content her way. Like, oh, yeah,
we can find the blah, blah, blah. I'm like, oh, my God. Wow. So let's bring everybody on air. Go ahead with that story, Mr. Ring. Oh, so it was a telecraft message, and they send me a message saying, oh, we can find girls in your area. So I'm like, oh, I'm in. I gave him just a fake. I mean, it's a real town, but, you know, it wasn't,
like, actually my area, but it was in my state. Yeah. And they go, okay. And then they found, like, but I have a fetish. And they go, oh, well, we could find a woman that likes it. And I'm like, I like a woman that eats and drinks my functions. They go, oh, well, we could find you a girl that, like, oh, my God. I think there's
a few of those types of people on the phone lines. I know, but I was doing it mainly to see what would happen. I don't like that sort of thing. I'm telling you, there are people who do that. I'm sure there's people that would. Plus the people who really feel the need to give out their credit card information, their credit cards. And their passwords. I'm sure those are there.
Yeah. But I didn't expect that. I'm like, oh my gosh. Okay then. No, one time I actually had a scammer basically push back and say, I... Will not engage with sexual comments. It's like, wow. Well, you're the one who's asking, so... You're the one who's asking, so... What are you expecting?
I mean... Yeah, what are you expecting? Exactly. You come to the security box, but you don't come to my show, Jet. Why? I don't understand. I guess you like security, Jet? Are you a security cat? Are you a security cat now? Okay. We're going
to be in a time crunch if we don't get going. Let's continue with 2008 -2009. And... I will start with Configure. And, of course, if you have comments or questions or whatever, we'll
take them on. And, of course, if you want a copy of this file, you can let us know. Start, Mr. Ling. Mr. Jay. Mr. Ling. Yeah, go ahead. Mr.
Ling. Mr. Lay. Hello, this is Mr. Ling. All right. All right. In late 2008, another Windows worm appeared that would become one of the largest... and most closely watched malware outbreaks of its era. It was called Conficker. And this is
spelled C -O -N -F -I -C -K -E -R. And naturally, because malware naming remained a mess, You may also have encountered it under names such as Downadup, D -O -W -N, Down, A -D -U -P, or Kaido,
K -I -D -O. I think mainly I've seen it as Configure. You may have also seen letters under the Downadup name, It's Possible To. that I could have gotten something in that letter naming convention like downadapt .abc etc. That's also a possibility. Because that's how they were doing things then.
Configure exploited a vulnerability in the Windows Server service that could Allow remote code execution. How many times have we talked about that since then? Right. Or if you really wanted to get mad,
you had an electrical thing. Could you just imagine every time you get mad, you had this electrical thing going. So it goes something like this. How many times have you heard this throughout the years? You're breaking up badly on Team Talker. You were. He is, actually. Yeah. What? You're breaking. Yeah, badly. Like a bad relationship,
Jared. Team Talk and I have a bad relationship. Apparently so. Uh, don't look. You're fine now. At the moment. Microsoft considered the vulnerability serious enough that it didn't wait for the next
regular patch Tuesday. On October 23rd, 2028, Microsoft released security... 2008, you mean? 2008. October 23rd, 2008. I was going to say, how can they release an update three, like two years in the future? That's a little odd. I said 2008. I heard October 23rd, 2028. That's what
I heard too, yeah. I said eight. At least I thought I said eight. Maybe my connections in the future. I think so, yeah. Microsoft is going to push out an update two years from next month. And we're all going to need it, so get ready. Yeah, get ready. October 23, 2008. Microsoft released
security bulletin MS -08 -067. And that's... MS08 -067. That's how these are usually written. As an out -of -band security update. Remember what we said earlier about Patch Tuesday. Microsoft normally released security updates on a predictable monthly schedule. An out -of -band update is
one released outside that normal schedule because circumstances justify getting the fix to customers sooner. Although that's not normally the case. Usually it takes a week or two or five or six for the computer to go, oh, there's an update?
Yeah. The patch was available. Then can picker arrive. So probably within days, if not a week. Okay. Once again, malicious software was exploiting a vulnerability for which Microsoft had already released a security update. could scan networks
for vulnerable Windows systems and exploit the MS -08067 vulnerabilities to infect them. But Conficker... I need a smaller one. But Conficker didn't rely exclusively... on that vulnerability.
Different variants incorporated additional propagation techniques including spreading through network chairs and removable media. Guess what comes up next? Hang on guys, I'll be back. Just a second. Guess what comes up next, Mr. J? Unfortunately,
I just read it. But... Would you be surprised if you didn't just read it? Were you possibly surprised? No. Me neither. Weak password. So,
Mr. J, Mr. Ring, could you guess what would be coming next? That's an email password. I'm going to say... Without even knowing it, you just guessed it. Yeah, so weak passwords. And you just got it right. You just got it right. Weak passwords. Could also help the worm move through networks.
The result was an enormous population of infected computers. Estimates vary, but millions of machines around the world were infected. Microsoft has subsequently estimated at configures peak approximately 9 to 15 million computers were infected. affected.
But by this point in our history, we know the questions to ask. What were the operators going to do with them? Configure was capable of downloading and executing additional code. That meant the worm itself didn't necessarily have to contain every capability its operators might want. Compromise
the machine first. Decide what else to install later. But the operators needed a reliable way of finding their infected computers. And the infected computers needed a way of finding infrastructure controlled by the operators. And we're still
fighting that. Although it's a different ecosystem nowadays. Configure approached that problem with
something called a domain generation algorithm, commonly abbreviated BGA. A domain generation algorithm allows malware to calculate or generate domain names according to an algorithm rather than depending entirely on a short, thick list of command and control addresses. Why would malware
do that? Anybody have any guess on why it's more difficult to take down? Yeah. Good. I mean, my only question then remains, how did these domains...
come up because if they were randomly generated this means you could not register them ahead of time. So was it generated, registered, and pointed automatically at some piece of infrastructure?
I never understood this aspect of it. What are you doing? Yeah. I am cooking, sir. Cooking burgers. Ooh, burgers. Sir. I like the sound of burgers.
Um... Mr. J, would you like to read? Or do you want me to continue? Um... How about I'll pick up in the next section? Okay. Suppose... A botnet is programmed to contact badguycommandserver .example. Defenders discover the domain. They
block it. There you go. That's what I'm saying. Yep. Yeah. law enforcement seizes it. The botnet loses an important part of its command and control infrastructure. Now, imagine that instead of one fixed domain, every infected computer contains an algorithm capable of calculating the same
list of apparently random domain names for a particular day. The attacker knows the algorithm. The infected machines know the algorithm. The defender can reverse engineer the algorithm and learn it too. But now the problem becomes a race. The attacker doesn't necessarily need to register
every generated domain, the attacker may only need to register one of the domains the infected computers are going to try. Defenders, meanwhile, have to prevent the attacker from gaining control of the domain the bot might contact. Early consicker
variants generated 250 candidate domain names per day. Security researchers to predict those names and coordinate efforts to register or block them before the consicker operators did. Then the malware changed. A later -considered variant dramatically expanded the domain generation system.
Instead of generating 250 possible domains each day, it could generate a possible 50 ,000 domain names per day across 110 top -level domains. And we only talk about five. Right, there's probably
weird ones that we've never heard of, like .br or .xk or .zmp. If you've been on Namecheap enough, you can see an entire list. of these planes. I mean, it's pages and pages and pages and pages long. Oh, yeah. And maybe one day there's going
to be a dot ooh if there isn't already. And a dot ooh. Dot ooh. I wonder what a dot ooh is. Dot UH. Yeah. Yeah, dot UH. Dot UH. And dot R. Dot RUH. Yeah, dot R. Yeah. And dot B. B, B,
B, B, B. Or dot buzz. Dot buzz. Got that biz, so... Yeah, I got dot biz, yeah. Dot buzz. And some of them dot biz. I wonder if they have a dot med yet. I bet the majority of dot biz is malicious. Yeah, I'm thinking so. I don't know too many. I mean, I know of a few legitimate ones. They could have dot zit. We could have,
you know, dot pop. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. That'd be like a porn TLP. A porn one. Yeah, .t. Yeah, .t. And .boob. .boob. .veg. V -A -G. Oh, yeah. .p -e -n. .p -e -e. And P -O -O -P. Oh, God.
Oh, wow. Or dot poop. Dot P -O -O -P. Yeah. P -O -O -P, yeah. Let's see. Dot flush. That's a long domain, but... We all have those. I bet. Yeah. An infected computer would attempt to contact only a portion of that enormous pool. That changes
the economics of defense. The criminal doesn't necessarily have to control 50 ,000 domains. The defender has to worry about where... Among those 50 ,000 possibilities, the criminal might establish a rendezvous point. And this is where
the response to the sticker became nearly as interesting as the worm itself. Security companies, researchers, domain registries, Microsoft, and other organizations began coordinating their efforts. And this is why I think things like this need to continue today. They were not supposed
to do that. No. Wait. We were not doing nothing wrong. This lie. Yeah, lie. We do nothing. The collaboration became known as the Consider Working Group. ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers, also became involved in coordinating efforts across the domain name ecosystem. Again, I think ICANN needs to do a lot more. Mostly with most, and I want to say this carefully, most of the ELDs we see today are abused. I don't know anybody who's using valid domains in most of these PLDs you get email from these days.
I don't know any .zzz's that are valid. I don't either. I knew one, but that service is long closed. But now I don't know many. There was one. It was called, what was it called? It was called, no, I don't think that, well, it was called, don't forget, but I don't think that was XYZ. I think that was .com. There was one
.XYZ, but now I don't remember what its name was. It was a messaging delivering service like Snooster and Waker Upper and some of these others. But they need to do more. Researchers reverse
engineered configures algorithms so defenders could predict. which domains the malware would attempt to use. Registries and others could then cooperate to block, reserve, or otherwise prevent those domains from falling under the control of Configure's operators. For a while, defenders
were essentially trying to stay ahead of the worm's calendar. What domains will Configure generate tomorrow? What about the day after? Can we make sure the criminals can't get them first? The Configure Working Group became an
extraordinary example of cooperation among organizations that ordinarily competed with one another. The threat was large enough that competitors shared information about everybody. Information because everybody had the same immediate problem. But
my question, Nick, is why aren't we possibly doing the same thing? Do we not have the same immediate problem or they just don't care these days? I think it's more that. They just don't care. It's like, there's so many. It's like, whatever. Why even try? All right. I can accept that. We not do nothing wrong. There no problem,
we tell you. We try to help you. The domain tell you how to fix the problem, sir. Sure it does. That's right. It does. Now you of compromised
computers were waiting for instructions and nobody knew with certainty from certainty what those instructions might eventually be. That uncertainty became particularly intense around April 1st, 2009. One configure variant was programmed to begin using its expanded domain generation mechanism
on that date. News coverage naturally turned April 1st into something approaching a countdown. What was configure going to do? When millions of computers suddenly... and attack something? Would data be destroyed? Would another massive outbreak begin? If it first arrives and the internet
did not explode, Microsoft reported that infected systems had begun using the new domain generation algorithm as expected, but there was no dramatic new attack associated with the date. That didn't mean Consicker was harmless. The infected computers were still compromised. The botnet still existed.
And shortly afterward, we began getting an answer to the question of how at least some of those compromised machines could be monetized. Configure began downloading additional malware. One of the payloads was associated with Walladeck. This is another one of these well -known older pieces
of software. This is W -A -L -E -D -A -T. Malware capable of turning infected machines into spam sending systems. Another payload was fake security software products called called spyware products. 2009. Spyware Protect. You're correct. Spyware
Protect 2009. And that gives us another term. Scareware. Scareware is software designed to frighten somebody into taking an action. by falsely claiming that the computer is infected, damaged, or immediately in danger. A classic form is rogue
antivirus software. This is exactly what happened with me. A program suddenly announces that it has scanned your computer and found a terrifying collection of viruses, malware, trojans, and other threats. Perhaps the screen flashes warnings.
Perhaps alarming messages appear repeatedly. Then comes the solution. Pay us. Buy the full version. Give us your credit card information and we'll remove all these terrible infections we've supposedly discovered. The scan results
may be exaggerated or completely fabricated. The software supposedly protecting the computer may be useless, unwanted, or itself malicious. That is scareware. And there was something particularly absurd about Conficker distributing rogue antivirus
software. The computer really was infected. It was infected with Conficker. And software delivered through that infection could then frighten the victim with claims about Computer inspections in demand money to supposedly solve the problem.
You almost have to admire the audacity. Almost. Configure therefore gives us several pieces. Of the changing malware landscape. In one. Enormous outbreak. It exploited. An unpatched vulnerability. It propagated. Automatically. It used. Multiple infection mechanisms. It built a botnet. Numbering
in the millions. It incorporated. Increasingly. resilient mechanism for obtaining updates and instructions it forced security companies researchers, domain registries and others into an unprecedented coordinated defensive effort and eventually Portions
of that infected population could be used to distribute additional money -making malware. The worm was no longer necessarily the final product. The worm could be the delivery system. That distinction is going to become increasingly important. Because while configure was building
an enormous population of compromised Windows machines, criminals were demonstrating that stealing payment card information at scale could produce enormous profit. And in 2008 and 2009, one of the largest payment card breaches ever disclosed
would show just how valuable stolen data had become. The next part of our story is Heartland Payment Systems. And now, before we get into the heartland, this becomes where breach becomes
the biggest term. And it's still used today. Because this is the first of what would be known later as a data breach. Let's do a file switch,
and when we come back, we'll check in with everybody and see where we are and see if we would like to continue with one more section. Thank you. Before we do that, though, do you guys have any comments on this section? These are still big today. They are. Agreed. What, configure? No,
the methods that it used to infect. Vulnerable systems. Uncatched systems. That's still a thing today. Yes. What else are you gauging from this section? Unfortunately, again, it doesn't seem
like a lot has changed. That's what I kind of meant by that. I agree. I agree. When we come back, we're going to check in with the group and see where we want to go. This is TSB. Podcast
280 Intermediate B covering 2008 through wherever we decide to stop. We will continue in just a moment across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. is a website that allows you to submit links,
files, and other pieces of information, including domains and IP addresses for analysis. It's a Google -ran product, and recently... They've changed their website a little bit. There is going to be an unlabeled button underneath the
enter URL, IP, or domain edit box, which will allow you to upload a file for analysis. No matter what you submit, The service in question allows you to get things analyzed. Is this safe? Is this website safe? Is the file that I'm dealing with safe? My program I use on my computer didn't
say anything, but I want to make sure this website does just that. The higher the number, the bigger the problem. For example, if it says 30 out of 90, you should probably be concerned. If a website you want to go to says 1 or 2 out of 90, you could probably go to it, but just be careful
and pay attention to what you're doing. The website, again, is virustotal .com, just as it's spelled. V -I -R -U -S -T -O -T -A -L dot com. Find a link on emailhostsecurity .com on our resources page. All right, folks. We are here. We are back.
I'm going to turn this over now to Mr. J to go ahead and read. First, major breaches. All right. Heartland Payment Systems, 2008 to 2009. By 2008,
criminals had demonstrated that malware could steal banking credentials from individual computers. But there was another way to steal financial information. Instead of compromising customers one computer at a time, why not compromise an organization through which enormous numbers of payment card transactions already passed? That brings us to Heartland Payment Systems. Heartland
was a major payment processor. When customers used credit, and debit cards at businesses served by Heartland, transaction information passed through Heartland's systems as part of the process of obtaining authorization and completing those payments. That made a payment processor an extraordinarily attractive target. One successful intrusion could
potentially provide access to payment card information associated with enormous numbers of transactions. On January 20th, 2009, Heartland publicly announced that it had discovered a criminal intrusion into its payment processing environment. The intrusion had occurred during 2008. Yeah. Heartland said
investigators had discovered malicious software inside its processing system. That malware had apparently been collecting payment card data while the information was moving through Heartland's network during transaction authorization. This is important. And this is interesting because I was saying off air. Ouch. Just before that paragraph which was just read. Can you imagine?
Nick? Wow. I'm just finding that. Yeah. And it's not necessarily their fault it took them whatever months to find the intrusion. That seems to be how things seem to go these days. But that's
not the biggest problem. The biggest problem is they were the first major company to have This problem. And I don't even think we know exactly how many millions of customers, if that,
were infected. And I think Heartland's long gone, and now we know one of the bigger companies is Stripe. But there are other third -party merchant services out there. I know one company used... I don't think Heartland's gone, unfortunately. They're not? I don't think so, because I'd have to go look, but unfortunately, there's somebody...
who has the name of Heartland, who processes property tax payments. Okay. Interesting. But I'm talking about the payment processor itself, not the name itself. That's what I'm saying. They may still exist. Under that name. Right.
Okay. I know one company that was using a third party. That third party ended up closing its doors. So now they're moving to PayPal to do all their payments, which is really what... I mean, either them or Stripe these days. Although... Stripe ended up being a part of that huge breach,
which they never said anything on. So Metro's not the only one that hasn't confirmed or denied anything within the last year or two. Go ahead, Mr. Ye. Okay. Oh, very nice. But anyway. This
is important because the criminals weren't simply stealing a database containing a fixed collection of old records. They had positioned malware where payment information was flowing. As transactions passed through the compromised environment, information could be captured. Heartland said the affected information included card numbers, expiration dates, and certain information contained in the
magnetic stripe on the back of payment cards. So basically everything that a cyber criminal needs, they've got. Yeah, pretty much. For a small percentage of transactions, the cardholder's name was also included. Oh, that's great. This was the beginning of, and I remember a store some years back. I don't think they really knew
who I was. I mean, I know I signed my name on the receipt, but they come back with my credit card and said, thanks, Jared, for coming by. I was like, how did you know my name? It's like, our machine told us. And I'm like, wait. It does that these days? Yeah, I think you can probably look up credit card info and tie it to its owner.
Unless the credit card company was sending it back with the approval. Which I think they were. But that was the first and only time, and it wasn't malicious, it was a place I went to eat all the time. I just found that interesting. That, and this was, I think this was after Heartland.
The company said addresses and social security numbers weren't part of the cardholder information it processed, and it believed unencrypted PIN information had not been captured. But payment card information was exactly what the criminals wanted. And eventually, the scale became staggering. Federal prosecutors alleged that data relating
to more than 130 million. That's right. 130 million credit and debit cards had been stolen in attacks involving Heartland and other corporate victims. And that's nothing today. Yeah, unfortunately.
At the time, prosecutors described the case as the largest alleged credit and debit card data breach ever charged in the United States. Okay, I'm sorry, but today, that would look like a Tuesday. I knew that was coming. That would look like a Tuesday. That would look like a weekend heist. No, it'd be, you know, a Tuesday. Nobody's
on duty. Nobody cares. Everybody just sort of shrugs their shoulders is what it would look like now. Oh, okay. $130 million. $130 million. Yeah, okay. Nick, that'd be more like a Monday. You're just coming home to work on Monday. That'd be a Monday. Okay. Yeah, Tuesday afternoon. Tuesday afternoon, yeah. Okay, yeah. $130 million. When
are we going to dinner? Where are we going for dinner? Oh, we're getting fried chicken. Oh, sounds good. Fried chicken and biscuits. Fried chicken and biscuits. Yep. But what about the $130 million? Oh, whatever. That's nothing. Do they use Heartland? We have no idea, but we're fucking hungry, so... Yeah, I don't really care. You know... So what? It's their problem. So,
yeah, let's just... Let's just... No, but in all seriousness, that seems to be what a lot of companies... That seems to be their attitude these days, unfortunately. Oh, we're not going to fix it. That's your problem. It's our problem that we shopped at your establishment and my credit card just got pilfered. Yeah, that's pretty
much what we're saying. You... I don't even think we ever learned whether anybody got charged. I mean, I haven't read this all the way through, but I don't think even then we ended up learning. If anybody got charged with this, I guess we'll find out because that's why we're doing this
history. We learned something new. And for those who never heard of this, we will learn something new. I think I hear a door opening and a P. of Chi is on the way in. That's right. Hello, I'm reporting for TSB duty. It sounded like you find
it quite painful. Yeah. I was trying to imitate the sound of That machine making that sound in the 2000s. Yeah, because what you had sounded more like a... It's like, no! So there are questions
coming up. Well, there's at least one. There's at least one question coming up. Yes. I understand we got an inquiry from a day in a life. Okay. We did. But this particular file is what we're talking about. But yes, we did. Oh, yeah. Go
ahead, Mr. J. How did the attackers get there? According to federal prosecutors, Albert Gonzalez and his co -conspirators used SQL injection attacks while targeting corporate networks. SQL stands for Structured Query Language, a language commonly used to communicate with databases. An SQL injection
vulnerability occurs when an application improperly handles information supplied by a user and allows that input to become part of a database command. Instead of the application treating what somebody entered purely as data, carefully constructed input may alter what the database is instructed to do. Depending on the vulnerability and the
environment, SQL injection can allow an attacker to obtain information, modify data, bypass controls, or help gain deeper access to systems. The important idea is that something intended to accept ordinary input can instead become a path into the underlying database or network. And that was huge for its
name. Oh, yeah. For that time period, that was fucking huge. And that's how the Code Amber blog got infiltrated. It was an SQL injection somewhere. And when we had server issues many years ago,
we found out that that was, we believe, through SQL injection, mainly through websites that run systems like WordPress, the CMS platform. Which is why it's very important to keep it up to date. As up to date as you can. No, you get it wrong.
We try to help you. You don't understand. That's right. No, we try to help you. You don't understand what we are putting down. Oh, he got mad. Oops. I think he just got mad. Uh -oh. Uh -oh. In the Heartland case, prosecutors alleged... Okay, actually, I'll go back to normal. That's the first time I've ever attempted that, to read
as the scammer. Could the scammer actually do that in a straight face? Let me see if I can read a phrase in his voice, a full phrase, and then we'll see. In the Heartland case... Prosecutors allege that the attackers used SQL injection as part of their effort to penetrate corporate networks. He didn't laugh. That's a bad sign.
But I think all of you would rather hear normal me read that. So let's try this again. In the Heartland case. Prosecutors alleged that the attackers used SQL injection as part of their effort to penetrate corporate networks. I was actually waiting for him to go, no, that's not what we do. This is completely wrong. No, that's
not what we do. That's completely wrong. That's right. That's completely wrong. That's what I was waiting for. That's what I was waiting for. In the transcript, left parenthesis, laughter erupts, right parenthesis. Once inside heartland. Okay. Once inside heartland. Malware was placed
into the payment processing environment. That malware could capture card information as transactions move through the system and send stolen data toward infrastructure controlled by the attackers. This wasn't smash and grab malware. The longer the attackers could remain undetected, the more information potentially passed through. the compromised environment. Again, stealth had economic value.
And the stolen numbers themselves became commodities. They still are. More so today, I think. Criminals could sell payment card information to other criminals. Stolen card numbers could be encoded onto the magnetic stripes of counterfeit cards. That's... Yep, we've seen that. We've seen that.
Those counterfeit cards... Go ahead. Go ahead, Bruce. Yeah, we've definitely seen that. All too often, yes. Those counterfeit cards could then be used to make purchases or withdraw money. Different people could specialize in different
portions of the operation. One group penetrates networks. Another develops or installs malware. Someone maintains servers receiving stolen data. Someone sells card information. Someone manufactures counterfeit cards. And someone randomly has SiriusXM go off in the middle of a sentence. Oops. Someone else cashes them out. And someone else just got
a Nick Espinosa notification. Uh -oh. Wow. I don't know the YouTube bottom of my word, folks, because I'll take a look in an hour. Left parentheses, left parentheses. Once again, we're no longer looking merely at a malicious program. We're looking at a criminal economy. Heartland also
gives us an important security lesson that extends far beyond this particular breach. Before the intrusion became public, Heartland had been assessed for compliance with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, commonly called PCI DSS. And this is a hyphenated term, which is a compliance
thing that all merchant processors must go through. We, as people that use the service, don't need to worry about... If we will take a valid card
and charge it as we should, we must understand how to store things securely, i .e., if Nick were to actually need services from me, he could buy a domain on his own. He could then... ask me to set up an account, and then I could go in and I could bill him for whatever services
he needed. He would enter his payment information online, and between the two systems, they both have to be in compliant by storing the card information securely. making sure you were updated when you were expected to expire, allow you to update that before you expired, among other things,
without too much difficulty. And there's things they have to do. Maybe we need to do an episode one day on PCI DSS. I think it would be good.
But we do talk about it a little bit in the next paragraph, but maybe going in more detail, maybe. of interest. Yeah. I think so. PCI DSS establishes security requirements for organizations that store, process, or transmit payment card information.
Heartland reported that it had received confirmation of PCI DSS compliance from a third party assessor each year since the standard had been announced, including an assessment in April 2008. Then Heartland was breached. That doesn't mean security standards are worthless. It means compliance and security aren't the same thing. An organization can successfully
complete an assessment against a particular set of requirements at a particular point in time and still contain vulnerabilities, configuration problems, or weaknesses that an attacker later exploits. A compliance report isn't a force field. Attackers don't care whether a checkbox was checked.
But we do care about the checkbox. Yeah, right. Well, if you do care about the checkbox, then you shouldn't have been doing that stupid shit to begin with. No, let me just educate all of you about what they really do care about, because that's mentioned here. They care whether they can get in. That's right. We care about the checkbox,
but we have to get in so we can help you. Uh -huh. Sure, sure. Yeah, right. We have to help you. Uh -huh. Okay, yeah. Whatever you say. Heartland also demonstrates something we've been seeing repeatedly throughout this history. Organizations don't always discover an intrusion themselves.
Heartland said Visa and MasterCard alerted it to suspicious activity surrounding transactions it had processed. inside its environment. In other words, evidence of the compromise was showing up elsewhere in the payment ecosystem. Something
was wrong with cards. Investigators worked backward. Eventually, the trail led to Heartland. That kind of indirect discovery will become very familiar as we continue through the history of data breaches. The investigation also led to one of the most notorious cyber criminals of this period. Albert
Gonzalez used online names including Segvec, spelled Segvec. capital S -E -G -V -E -C, and Soup Nazi. Wow. Interesting name. That is one word. S -O -U -M -A -Z -I. Yes. Oh. And guys,
there's more. I don't know what to give you guys. And Heartland wasn't his first major case. By the way, this is the first time I've actually, when I actually was doing this, and chat was... was telling me about this. This is the first time I've heard that there was a name associated with this breach. So when we put this section
together, this was the first time I heard anything since that breach. This is why it's interesting for us to go backwards. Because we're going to learn something. Okay, I want some food. We're going to learn something about what actually happened in this case. He's hungry afterwards.
Gonzalez and associates. Okay. Gonzalez and Associates, which, by the way, sounds like a law firm, funny enough. Yes. Yeah. We're connected to compromises involving major retailers, including TJX, BJ's Wholesale Club, OfficeMax, Boston Market, Barnes & Noble, and Sports Authority. And TJ Maxx...
Let's see. TJX is what it's... TJX was also talked about then, but it wasn't a big... We didn't know much about it then. And I don't really... We didn't cover it here because it wasn't huge. But it... It definitely sounded familiar to me when the names... The only other one that really
sounded more familiar was Boston Market. That's the market I used to eat at in Van Nuys. They've got great meatloaf, by the way. Holy crap. But I think I eat there after... I prefer their chicken, but... I've eaten there after, well after that breach. Barnes & Noble, everybody should be familiar
with. Oh, yeah. And, of course, one of the biggest sports places to get sports stuff. I used to be a frequent customer at Barnes & Noble. Yeah. And one of the biggest sports places for its time was Sports Authority. Yep. Yep. Earlier
attacks had involved techniques including war driving war driving Yes, war driving, which I've never heard of. In which attackers searched for vulnerable wireless networks and packet sniffing software that captured payment information moving across compromised networks. So basically, drive
by, find a wireless network, park outside the establishment, and see what you can get. Ooh, this person's going to porn sites. Oh, there's a credit card number! There's a credit card number!
That's what that... That's basically what that... What that means, what we're driving is they're driving by trying to capture data. And the business doesn't even know they're there. They'll see a car and they may see somebody in the car. But they see thousands of people in cars every day. So who's even going to bat an eye? Correct. By
the time of Heartland, this wasn't somebody experimenting with a worm to see how far it could spread. This was organized theft on an extraordinary scale. Gonzalez eventually pleaded guilty to charges arising from multiple hacking and payment card fraud schemes. And the consequences for Heartland itself... continued long after the malware had been removed. There were investigations. There
were lawsuits. There were claims from financial institutions and payment card companies. There were settlements. By the end of 2010, Heartland reported approximately $146 million in expenses associated with the intrusion. before accounting for insurance recoveries. The cost of a data breach wasn't limited to replacing a compromised
server. There could be forensic investigations, legal expenses, card replacements, fraud losses, regulatory consequences, settlements, remediation, and reputational damage. And those costs could continue for years. Heartland, therefore, marks... And some of these things we see today match what
we are reading here, correct? Yes. I mean, we still don't know much about Snowflake. I still wonder if there are companies that... I do, too. Yeah, me, too. I mean, it's probably going to be one of those things where five years later, some random company that we've never heard of
is going to come forward. Oh, yes, we were hit. We were part of that. Well, how come you didn't fucking say shit five years ago? And this goes back to my discussion during our first hour. Yes, my thoughts exactly, because when I heard that, oh, that hit me right in the soul. I knew it would. I knew it would. That goes right to
the discussion that he had, yeah. Exactly. I'm kind of doing stuff here too, so that's why I'm here. Oh, you're good, Terry. Especially since I work in the profession now, that's definitely a long repair. The company's got a lot to learn. I think I gave them an education they were not ready for. Yeah, I could not agree more. Go ahead,
Mr. J. Heartland, therefore, marks another. And I don't know why you're stuck. Important point in our story. The infected computer is no longer necessarily the victim we're most interested
in. Malware can sit inside infrastructure and quietly collect information. belonging to millions of people who never interacted with the compromised computer at all. I haven't seen you all day. Those card holders didn't install Heartland's malware. I don't understand how you can sleep in your room all day. Terry, knock him out. Terry, your mic's on. What? Your mic's on. Oh, fuck.
I'm sorry. Oops. You okay? I didn't mean it. I'm glad you reminded me. Let me mute it. Okay. Go ahead. They didn't open Heartland's malicious attachment. They didn't fail to patch Heartland's servers. Many of them had probably never heard
of Heartland payment systems. They simply used their cards. Their information passed through somebody else's infrastructure. And somebody else's security failure became their problem. And that's what Stripe is. It's a payment processor. We use it on websites that have it. But we don't
necessarily know that unless they tell us. But even then, as far as we know, we're clicking a button, which is fine, on their page. We complete the payment just fine on their page. Right. Then Stripe became part of the Snowflake breach. And we still know nothing. So, just... I don't think
we even ever will, to be honest with you. But for this period of time, this was the first of this. Mr. Che. That idea is going to become enormously important in the modern data breach era. But
while organized criminals were penetrating corporate systems to steal information and money, another kind of attacker was becoming increasingly visible. These attackers weren't necessarily interested in selling stolen credit card numbers. They wanted information, corporate secrets, source code, intellectual property, access to communications,
and sometimes intelligence useful to governments. In 2009, Attacks against Google and numerous other organizations would help bring that kind of targeted intrusion into public view. The operation became known as Operation Aurora. And that is where this ends. Yep. 2008 to 2009 will be what
this will cover. This way, Nick can go when he's ready because he's on a time constraint. Thank you so much, Mr. J. Before we let you go, what? What do you think? as I said, it's only gotten worse and more high -tech than before. I mean,
now I don't think we have war driving. Now it's way more stealthy than that. You can do it clear across the world now. That's what I'm saying. And to be honest, I think it's only going to get worse. Yeah. I had the same feeling. I'm going to get worse. When we see different things
in the field, nothing surprises me. So I feel like the more names will come out, the more intense it's going to get. So yeah, I agree with Terry's findings. Although, one caveat. I think credit card numbers, unfortunately, are still a commodity. But I think at least some of the attention and
focus is shifting to getting banking info so that they can just take your money. No third party necessary. Why do they need a payment card when they can get access to the bank? That's what I'm saying. Exactly. Exactly. Yeah. Just, you know, create a really clever social engineering campaign, which it really doesn't take any technical
know -how to do. Not these days. Nope. Then have somebody visit... Thank you for calling Capital One. How can I assist your call today, sir? Well... That's going to happen after they've already made contact at first, though. I know, but I'm saying... Yeah. Although, I don't know that Capital One, the legit Capital One, has a call center
in the U .S. It might actually be overseas. No. That's what I'm thinking. No. They have... Call centers around the U .S. Oh. And they're headquartered in Virginia. I know Chase is headquartered in Manila, Philippines. Thank you, bud. Nice to see you. Drive safe. Just get somebody to click
on that link. Go to some website that probably somebody else in the operation has designed that looks exactly like their bank. And, you know, that person, they're panicking like, oh, my gosh, irregular activity. Oh, gosh, I'm going to fix this. Instead of usbank .com, it's usbank .top. Or it could be usbank. but maybe a U .S. with
a little symbol that's in between or some other kind of differentiation that nobody, even a screen reader user, might catch. Well, screen readers have issues with those types of things. Because it's... We've learned that they've put like UTF
-8 characters which make it look like a letter. So it's like... MR. So it's like USMR Bank. But it's not actually USMR Bank. It's actually some UTF -8 character to make it look like something else. Or there's like an underscore that isn't
in the normal URL that's put in there. Well, it's in the GTA Fate set. Instead of it being an English character, it's some other character that a reader won't read. Nope. Nope. But of course, that person's not thinking about it. And chances are... But the link itself is going
to say, click here to resolve this, and it's not going to show it to you. Nope. Yeah, unless maybe you start looking. It's like, wait a minute. This doesn't look like U .S. Bank. But you can't because it actually does look like U .S. Bank.
And the URL will say U .S. Bank. It won't even show you that character. Great. Because it's decoded. Oh, right. People will actually think, oh, I'm on my bank account. Okay, cool. Welcome in. Welcome in. Yeah, so that's crazy. That is
definitely man, oh man. But yeah, and so chances are, I mean, most banks basically require you to turn on MFA now. There's not really a way to avoid it, which is good. Or if not require, they highly encourage. Yeah, that's how it should
be. They need to require it. I think the days of encouraging it are over. Yeah. Yeah, it should be required. But even then, I think the social engineering people would have a way to get around it. Because, of course, they'll want you on the phone with them by this point. Yeah, by this point, yeah. And then, of course, you'll enter in. I agree. That's right. You tell us the code
when it gets to your cell phone. No, the way around that, though, is you can just give them a fake. Instead of giving them the code that you got. Instead of giving them the code that I gave you, you just give them a fake one. 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1. Or you could be like, I didn't get this code. What code are you talking about? I didn't get anything.
Sure, try it again. Try it again, then. It's very important that we get the code. I've been going there brother a long time ago. Preston, you might want to mute up friend. I kind of hear stuff in your background. Or just turn off the.
Whatever it is. Sorry, I turned it down. There you go. I don't know. I think he's listening to his... We need to be more cautious of this so that we don't... Yeah, I know. I wasn't thinking. That's why I... You're not supposed to think. You just do. You just do. You just do. Yeah,
you just do. You're supposed to let us do the work. Oh, crap. And then, what at least some of them would do, yeah, once they're in your account, all right, sir, I take out the amount to get This fixed. Oh, okay, sir. I make error. I'm so sorry. I supposed to take out 1 ,500.
I move 15 ,000. All right. What I need you to do, I need you to log back into your account, sir. You need to transfer the 14 ,850 to me, sir. That's right. I need this because if I don't do this right, I'm going to lose my job, sir. Sir, I'm going to lose my job. I have no support
for family. I have no other income. Sir, sir, please do this. Oh, you don't have an income? You're just fucking me over? Okay. Click. No. Oh, that's what should happen. Well, you fucked me over. I'm fucked over too. Oops. You just fucked me over. Yeah, you moved $15 ,000 out of my savings account. And now I don't even have
the money you want me to transfer back to you, so... Alright. Yeah, and now I don't have the money to get my new couch, you stupid fuck. Sir, you need to fix it. I don't want to lose my job. It's in your account already. I don't have it. Yeah, we send it to you, you stupid... I can't
send you money you already have. You logged into my account. Right. You took my money. You send me back that money. I don't want to hear it. I cannot do that, sir. I cannot do that, sir. You took... You got me to log into... You got me to give you code to log into my bank. You took the money out of my account. So how about
I report you to my bank? Go ahead, sir. Not much they can do. Unfortunately, the scammers... The scammer is somewhat right on that point. Well, they could, if I give them a name, I give them a number they call, they could go figure out where the money went and figure it out with the
opposing bank. True. Just I don't know if he is willing because on their end it looks like, oh, that was a transaction you initiated. What's the problem? The problem is I got pilfered. Because I actually wasn't the one that logged in. That's the problem. And yes, you are absolutely right.
Unfortunately. We don't see a difference. It looks like you. Was that my IP that logged in? Well, it looks like it's from the area because we're assuming this person used a proxy server of some sort. I'll give you my IP and If it doesn't
look for my IP, then you know it's fraudulent. I'm telling you the truth. Here's my IP. Now the question is, would they be that willing to listen to you for that long? I hope so. I would hope so too, but probably not. Yeah. To them, it looks pretty open and shut. It looks pretty...
There's no open end for them. You send a transaction, it's gone. We have no interest. Yeah, it's a big amount, but oh well. You were the one that gave them the code. Therefore... Therefore... It's your own damn fault. Yep, therefore it's not our problem. Sorry. We protected you, but...
Yeah, we protected you, but you gave that code, so... In our eyes, you know what you're doing, so... Yeah, this conversation's over. Bye. What
else do we want to cover before I kick everybody loose? Well, I have no updates on the FaceByte. suit thing that I'm aware of. I'm trying to monitor that. I don't think it's going anywhere. No. I don't think so either. What else? Let's see...
I don't think I have anything. I don't think I do. Terry, do you have anything interesting? Oh, boy. Um, okay. Let's take me out then. We
shall. We'll be back for 280 number three as we get into the 20 teens. Oh, Lord, help us all. So, folks, I shall say this has been another interesting and informative episode of Security Box. We hope you enjoyed today's program and what it brought you value. And as always, you can go back anytime in your preferred podcast app and look for Jared's Technology Podcast Network
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