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Jared's Technology Podcast Network

Jared's Technology Podcast Network artwork

Our Sans podcast covers the NewsBites for April 28, 2026

May 3, 20261 hr 48 minAudio
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Just a note, if you use the transcript feature, there may be inaccuracies, especially since some companies and or people's names may not be spelled as it is in the newsletter. Hello folks, welcome to Sans, episode 40. I know its been awhile since we've done specific newsletters, and this newsletter is dated April 28, 2026. This is the link to the newsletter. While not at the top of the news, ADT and other breaches are covered in the rest of the news, and we've already written this up on our own blog. Here is what is at the top of the news. Cisco Flaws Exploited for Backdoor in US Federal Agency’s Systems CISA Adds Four CVEs to KEV; All Were Disclosed a Year or More Ago Here is what is in the rest of the news. Fast16 Cyber Sabotage Framework is Older than Stuxnet ADT Discloses Data Breach UK Biobank Data Listed for Sale Online Itron and Medtronic Breached Canada’s First SMS Blasters Confiscated, Operators Arrested FCC's Router Ban Now Includes Portable Hotspots Chinese National Extradited to US from Italy to Face Charges Related to HAFNIUM Campaign If you would like to read the coverage we wrote up after reading some coverage of the ADT hack, please read our blog post titled ADT, the alarm company, breached … again as we break down what may be true versus what is reported to be confirmed. I have not read the other in regards to Medtech and the other breaches mentioned in the Newsletter but saw it through Bleeping Computer. Please feel free to contact us through our contact page on the blog or my web site. Thanks for listening, make it a great day!

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Transcript

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the opinions expressed are those of the show hosts and may not necessarily be of any company in which the show hosts may represent This is

SANS, episode number 40. This episode will cover their News Bites newsletter. Annotated news update from the leader in information, security, training, certification, and research. For April 28th, 2026, volume 28, number 32. Welcome to SANS,

episode 40. This edition will cover several breaches, including the ADT breach, which actually should be top of the news, if you ask me. There are a few more within the newsletter that I did not read about that are also covered. All text. of the newsletter is included and comments by staff

are always quoted if you would prefer to read the newsletter a link is in the show notes or we can send you the braille for this show just send me an email by sending it to tech that's t -e -c -h at MikeEchoNovemberVictorIndia .org and request a format of Braille and the appropriate

cell size. I have available English Braille American Edition for 40 and 20 cell, but I can make you a 30 cell in this format, or Unified English Braille. in 40, 30, or 20. Also, each section of the newsletter will start on its own page.

Top of the News, the rest of the news, and the editorial team will start on new Braille pages if you decide to read the Braille. Now, let's get started with the table of contents so you know what's in each section of the newsletter. Starting with top of the news. Item number one.

Cisco flaws exploited for backdoor in U .S. federal agencies systems. Next, CISA adds four CVEs to KEV. All were disclosed a year or more ago. Here is what's in the rest of the week's news. 1.

FAST -16 Cyber Sabotage Framework is older than Stuxnet. That is going to get very interesting. Number two. ADT discloses data breach. We spend a lot of time on this one. That's the main write

-up for this past week. Three, UK Biobank data listed for sale online. This was supposed to be a private research -only repository. Well, not anymore. Four. ITRON and Medtronic breached.

Saw Medtronic on a bleeping computer. Fifth, Canada's first SMS blasters confiscated. Operators arrested. Great. That is awesome. I love good news. Six. FCC's router ban now includes portable

hotspots. And finally, Extradited to U .S. from Italy to face charges related to Hafnium campaign. I may have covered Hafnium in the past. Search

it out on the blog. H -A -F -N -I -U -M. If you're reading the Braille, all page numbers follow a podcast number format, i .e., podcast 40, page 1. We are using literary Braille page numbering, and the format taken was from the Unified English

Braille Code. but we are reading from an English Braille American edition code which supports this format. If you have any questions, comments, or concerns, please feel free to contact me at any time by sending an email to the aforementioned address I gave earlier in this file, tech, that's T -E -C -H, at m, as in Mike, e -n -v -i dot

org. Text or WhatsApp 804 -442 -6975 or call the comment line at 888 -405 -7524. Now, let's go ahead and get started with the podcast. I'm Jared Reimer. Thanks so much for listening. Let's

go ahead and get started with the first story in Top of the News. It's titled... Cisco flaws exploited for backdoor in U .S. federal agencies' systems. The U .S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, alongside the U .K. National

Cyber Security Center, NCSC is directing federal agencies to take new steps for threat hunting, mitigation, and reporting of persistent malware introduced by the exploitation of flaws in Cisco Firepower and secure firewall products. With.

Adaptive. Security. Appliance. ASA. Or. Firepower. Threat. Defense. FTD. Software. While. Investigating. Suspicious. Network connections. CISA discovered.

Line. Viper. Malware. And a back door. Called. Fire starter. On an unnamed. Federal civilian. Executive. Branch. Agencies. FCEB's. systems allowing a threat actor to maintain persistence.

Well, does this mean that somebody made a mistake? I'm not going to sit here And criticize somebody for making a mistake. Although we have. Because you would think they would know better. But seeing

how this continues to happen. Maybe it's time to figure out whether they've gotten training yet. Although Cisco's patches addressed the vulnerabilities, devices compromised prior to patching may remain

vulnerable because Firestarter is not removed by firmware updates. FCEBs must consult V1 Ed 2503 for mitigation, which includes instructions

to collect and submit core dumps to the malware next. generation platform report the submission and await further direction from CISA yeah they're already pilfered alright we'll wait for an agency who apparently can't keep their own house clean

because they're no different than the rest of us FCEB, or otherwise. All other organizations are urged to hunt using provided YARA rules against a disk image or core dump. Report findings to

CISA. or the NCSC and conduct incident response if compromise is confirmed. Cisco's concurrent advisory strongly recommends re -imaging and upgrading the drive using the fixed releases as well as Checking for the malicious line a

cs. So I believe this is l -i -n -a underscore c -s process as An indicator of compromise. ILC. Cisco first disclosed. And released patches. For CVE. 2025. 20333. CVSS score 9 .9. Buffer

overflow. Allowing remote code execution. And. 2025. 20362 CVSS score 8 .6 missing authorization allowing privilege escalation in September 2025 so great we have a 9 .9 which is just as close

to a 10 as you could get and then an 8 .6 which is the second closest to a 10. And 7 and above in this metrics means that you don't really need to do much of anything to get this stuff onto a system. And we still have agencies who've not patched, either because they can't or they don't

know. Not sure. At the time, the flaws were added to CISA's Non -Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, CEV, with a 24 -hour mitigation deadline for SCEBs. Both had reportedly been exploited since May. Exploitation continued and CISA updated

its guidance in November, also warning that several agencies had incorrectly reported vulnerable devices as patched. Well, that goes to my question then. How can you incorrectly report something is patched if it hasn't been? Do you just tell

them, yeah, we patched it, even though you did nothing? You should be held responsible. The products affected regardless of configuration are Firepower 1000, 2100, 4100, and 9300 series, and secure firewall 200, 1200, 3100, 4200, and

6100 series devices. Without reading the editors yet on this newsletter, lots of different products affected here. I write, this should be concerning if you use these. Why CISA is getting involved is concerning. That is a governmental agency who may also have their own issues with keeping

things up to date. No shaming, just mentioning it in passing. Why would I go by what they say if they may not be keeping their own house clean with their software or hardware when there are vulnerabilities? All four editors, Neely, Frost,

Murray, and Dukes, have plenty to say whether you're an individual. an FCEB, or another business, please make sure you read these comments within the newsletter and apply their guidance. And really, that's all I'll say. This can't necessarily

be good. I know ChatGPT said that's a little strong, but it needs to be in this case. I'm not swearing, and I'm not going ape. This podcast I'm trying to keep clean. Not necessarily trying to swear. And I do know TSB has some... but it's

not explicit we don't say it constantly to the point where I feel we need to deal but you know if CISA and other governmental agencies can't keep their house clean they should not be telling other branches of the government or anybody else

what they should do. Am I missing something? Or is this becoming the norm now? Oh, uh, we've determined that this is a problem, so just take care of it. And you'll be alright. We're helping

you. But yet, do you have these same problems in your infrastructure? That's going to be the bigger question I'll ask you, Sissa. I'm not saying you do. I'm not saying you don't. I'm asking. Do you have Cisco appliances that are

affected? If you do, did you follow your own advice? Get in touch. Let me know. No shaming.

So, item number two of this particular episode for Top of the News says, Sissa adds four CVEs to Kev. All were disclosed a year or more ago. On Friday, April 24th, the U .S. Cybersecurity

and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, added four CVEs to the known Exploited Vulnerabilities CAV catalog. All four have mitigation deadlines. of Friday, May 8th, 2026, for Federal Civilian Executive Branch, FCEB, agencies. Two of the

vulnerabilities affect Simple Help Remote Support Software, V5 .5 .7, And earlier, a Critical Privilege Elevation Vulnerability, CVE -2024 -57726, and a High Severity Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability,

CVE -2024 -57728. Both initially disclosed in early January 2025. The third is a high -severity improper limitation of a path name to a restricted directory vulnerability. CVE -2024 -7 -3 In Samsung

Magic Info 9 server version prior to 21 .1050. Initially disclosed in August 2024. The fourth. A high severity command injection vulnerability.

CVE -2025 -29635 in D -Link DIR -823X 240 ,126 and 240 ,802, which was disclosed in early 2025.

The Akamai Security Intelligence and Response Team, SIRT, this vulnerability being actively exploited. You're telling me that there are 2024

and 2025 vulnerabilities that have still not been patched even though the companies have them out by now yes I know that when I ran this through something earlier it did tell me that I should add vulnerabilities I'm adding it vocally if

you're reading the file I just remembered this while reading This is absolutely crazy. This is not good, and getting them added to Kev's

list now is probably okay, but I bet... There are people who will never find out because newsletters like this one need to be subscribed to or searched out. More must be done to reach those customers who are vulnerable so they are notified on what

they need to do and why. Be clear on what the issue is. The path to upgrade or patch. And be clear about cost. If any. Alright folks. Let's go ahead and move on. With our next item. And

this starts. The rest of the week's news, and this is Fast 16. It's titled, Fast 16 Cyber Sabotage Framework is Older Than Stuxnet. Back in my older days, we did cover Stuxnet. And I don't know if any of that coverage may still be available

on my blog. Because at that time, we were not aware of how to keep everything in our systems. And we've learned since then. So some things are forgotten. But Stuxnet was a huge deal. And you can learn more about Stuxnet by reading the books about it. You can search Stuxnet on Amazon

and find tons of things about it. We have one book about Stuxnet, I believe, in our list of books on emailhostsecurity .net. With that being said, we'll read this, and you guys are welcome to comment on it if you want. Researchers from Centene One's Sentinel Labs have deciphered a

cyber sabotage framework they are tracking as FAST -16, which selectively... targets high -precision calculation software, patching code in memory to tamper with results. The Cure components of FAST16 date back to 2005, making it at least

five years older than Stuxnet. Remember, if you've been around the internet a while, that all of that coverage on Stuxnet was 2010 -2011. Because it was so new at the time that tons of people were calling it out and asking questions. S -T

-U -X. N -E -T is how you spell it if you want to go look this up. So when the malware propagates across a facility, it will produce equivalent inaccurate calculations on all affected systems. The effect could range from tainted research

to serious physical damage. The researchers Vitaly Kamluk and Juan Andres uh this is guero hyphen

sade s -a -a -d -e initially set out to trace the earliest sophisticated use of an embedded l -u -a in Windows malware. LUA is a term I am not familiar with. The existence of Fast16 code

first emerged in the Shadow Brokers 2017 NSA leak. That would have been 12 years later. And we've covered the shadow brokers on the blog, and our current version of the blog should have it. This is interesting, I write. The shadow brokers were a very interesting group, and they

were covered in the blog. Search shadow brokers with or without capitalization to learn more from our coverage. on the blog. Neely writes, This resets our understanding of how far back this type of state -sponsored covert exploit was developed slash deployed. The good news is

the Sentinel Labs story includes both ILCs, and YARA rules to detect the malware. While the signature for the svcmgmt .exe binary was uploaded to VirusTotal about 10 years ago, there appears to be almost

no detections. Regardless of past categorizations of the malware, we need to find and neutralize FAST16 if present. The fact there are no detections, even some 9 -10 year old potential issues, is

quite concerning. Ulrich writes, data modifications are often overlooked in breaches. There are few documented cases in part because they are hard to detect. For example, a breach of an ERP system may not steal data but instead or in addition

modify data to suddenly distribute business processes or disrupt excuse me disrupt business processes not distribute My mistake. These changes are often undiscovered as it is difficult to audit

the data for accuracy. Well, I say if you don't run things that you're not sure what it's even supposed to be doing, that would be part of your solution. The fact that people trust everything that gets onto their system makes me wonder. Even when I got this machine back, I got a very interesting file attachment, which I've only

seen in a couple of instances. But, in all actuality, It's not a common file extension. I asked something like ChatGPT about it. It told me exactly what it was, and that while I definitely don't have Excel installed, as it is an Excel extension, and I'm not here to give out scary details, but

I never ran the Excel file. Because number one, I don't have it. And the way that chat explained it to me, it could possibly still run even without Excel. I'm not going to give you the file extension. I talked about it in passing on throwback. And I'm not going to mention it here because it doesn't matter. But the fact that I have received...

These different file extensions that I've never known what they are and me not opening it saves me a lot of headache because I can prevent all of that by not running these things. Peskator and Murray also have comments worth reading. Find those in the newsletter. And that's how

I end this segment because if I took every single comment from the newsletter, I would be reproducing it word for word. And I don't want to do that. I want to take those that are of value, comment, and call the podcast my own. So, that's exactly... What we're doing. I'm Jared Reimer. Coming up next. As the program continues. ADT. The biggest

breach. That should have never. Happened. This is SANS episode 40. Across the Jared Reimer. Radio Network. Alright, folks. Buckle your seatbelts.

This is going to be lengthy. And this is going to be long. And I did everything I could not to go completely ape. Now, I learned a few things in regards to stuff, and we are going to talk about it as part of the discussion. So... We

are going to see what happens. And we're going to push forward because this one covers a company that has been in business longer than the oldest person alive today. Item number two in the rest

of the news says ADT discloses data breach. On April 24th, 2026, home security provider ADT confirmed that it experienced a data breach on April 20th. The company detected unauthorized

access to certain cloud -based environments containing data belonging to current and prospective customers responded by immediately activating response protocols, quote, terminating the intrusion,

launching a forensic investigation with leading third -party cybersecurity experts, and notifying law enforcement, end quote. This actually is the best that we can ask for, folks. This is

the best we can ask for. Within days, confirming the incident, getting it mitigated, taken care of, coming out with... what the numbers are, even if it's preliminary and then confirmed later. But there's a lot to this particular story besides the picture -perfect way that this particular

incident took place. The data accessed included names, phone numbers, and addresses, with a subset also including dates of birth and the last four digits of social security numbers or tax IDs.

And all affected individuals have been notified. Like I said, this is picture perfect. But wait until you get to the comments and what my problem overall is. It's not that the breach took place.

That's not what my problem is at all. ADT characterizes the scope of the attack as, quote, limited, end quote, and has not verified any threat actors' claims, but the breach listing on Troy Baker's Have I Been Pwned estimates the affected at 5

.5 million. Okay, so that actually ends the write -up. And the first thing is that we need to correct the record. Sands wrote, ellipsis, but the breach listing on Troy Baker's Have I Been Pwned estimates the affected accounts at 5 .5 million. The correct

name is Troy Hunt, not Troy Baker. That kind of mistake can happen to anybody. But since I know who Troy is, I can correct it. As for the last item that we talked about on the program, Centene 1 should have been Sentinel 1. ChatGBT

corrected me, but I showed it that that came directly from the newsletter, and I was not going to correct it or even verify it as a mistake because that... was actually written. But correcting names is more important than correcting a company name like Sentinel -1. Now, I continue. We linked

to our write -up on the blog and we've also released an intermediate TSB podcast about this. We'll have to see what happens. Okay? I haven't heard anything more, but hopefully we'll find out exactly what happened and find out if the number is more

or less. Sometimes they come back and update things. But here's something else I write. This company is 151 or 152 years old. To have one breach is understandable. Two breaches could be okay if it was different than the first. I'm

a little concerned about three breaches, although... This was definitely something that could happen to anyone. Voice fishing, or vishing for short. Let's see what happens, and do read the blog.

Its link is in the show notes. Neely writes, while reputation risk is not the factor, it used to be protection to include customer information is core to ADT's service offering. The good news

is this appears to be a limited breach. They are being transparent and have remediated the issues. And you know me, he writes. Make sure that you've taken steps to protect your information slash identity regardless. of who you're sharing

that info with. It really is a relief when you get a breach notification that offers protection and you can say, thanks, I've got this. But do you? Breach notifications come after the fact. Ladies and gentlemen, the offerings that are

offered to you only help you after the fact. There is nothing that can be done to prevent it except for you not to give it out in the first place. But we might as well kiss that goodbye. Because we have already done it. We've already

given out our information. So you can all kiss our privacy goodbye. The fact that this is a 151 or 152 year old company makes this even worse. Because while we don't have an exact date the company opened, ADT is now the longest run company

besides Target. to still be in business. Trivia question. What is the name that ADT used when they opened their doors? It was called ADT but

There's actually a name. And if you want a bonus trivia question, what year was Target founded? So I'm looking for two answers if you want to participate. Email iMessageJA. R -I -M -E -R

at 986themix .com if you are listening to this because I do play these podcasts on my internet radio stream when they're available. If you just listen on the podcast, you may use tech. That's T -E -C -H at M -E -N -V -I dot org. But I've got more to read here. While I agree with Neely

on transparency, and yes, that does matter, I completely disagree with calling this a limited breach. This is the third incident in roughly two years for a company that has been around for over 150 years. That's not just bad luck.

That's a pattern. Let's look at what we actually know. Around 30 ,000 records were exposed in August 2024. We know this. We covered this. The October incident didn't have a confirmed number and was more employee focused, but it still counts.

Yes, we know this and we covered this too. Search ADT on the blog. Now, we're looking at approximately 5 .5 million records confirmed through have I been pwned with some reports even going higher than that. That is not limited. Not even close.

We're talking about names, addresses, phone numbers, and in some cases, additional sensitive data. Now I'm going to ask a question. And ChatGPT said not to put it out in writing, but I'll just ask it anyway. And this could be a rhetorical question. Because some people might say, well,

probably not. There was probably other forms of identification back then. But do you honestly think, in your opinion, that ADT collected all this information when it opened for business in 1874? I highly doubt it. Doubt it. Maybe a name and an address. I know phones were probably

new in the day, or if they weren't invented yet, they were invented soon after, and then, of course, you were giving them a number. And I know times were completely different. So I get why ChatGPT told me not to include it in the initial write -up. But I want people to think about this. Even

though it's not in my write -up, it's my program. And I have the right to ask, do you think, even by the time we had phones and everything else implemented like we do today, that they started? By collecting all this info because they could. I'm curious. I continue writing. Once that information is out, it's out. It gets sold, reused, combined

with other breaches, and exploited in ways most people won't even realize. until it's too late and this is why i get frustrated because we keep hearing the same thing we've remediated we've contained it we're offering protection meanwhile

the data is already gone. Companies like this should be setting the standard, not showing up in breach headlines again and again. I'll repeat what I said earlier. One breach, okay. Two, maybe.

if it was completely different than the first. But three, in such a short period of time, in this case, not even two years, that's a problem. If it was three in six years? Four in ten years?

I could have a little bit more sympathy. Because at least it's not happening on a regular basis. But three in two years is a little concerning to me. I continue. Until there are real consequences

for the actors involved and, frankly, stronger accountability across the industry, this is going to keep happening. Because right now, there's still money to be made and not enough deterrent To stop it. So no. I don't see this. As limited.

I see it. As a large. Scale. Problem. That the industry. Still. Hasn't figured out. How to get right. Stepping back for a moment, this is not new. We have seen this pattern play out across industries for years. From large retail breaches

like Target, to repeated incidents in hospitality, to what we are now seeing here, the same underlying issue. remains, protecting data consistently over time. What stands out here is not just the

size of this breach, but the context. This is a company with over 150 years of history. And yet, it is now part of the same ongoing cycle. Age, size, and brand recognition do not appear

to provide any real insulation from these types. of incidents after following the space for over two decades it becomes hard to accept terms like quote limited end quote at face value the numbers may vary from incident to incident but the outcome

is often the same. Data is exposed, reused, and monetized, while the burden of response shifts to the customer. Meaning, it's our responsibility to keep our data private, but the company Asks us. We need it. Some of us in recent times say

why. They say we want to verify. Whatever it is they want to verify. It doesn't matter. Want to verify age. Want to verify. You know. Status of residency. We want to verify. whatever it might be, whatever the social security number might want to be used for because these companies are asking for it. They are. But does it help

you on a day -to -day basis? Your name, your address, your phone number is vital for service. Your email address is vital for service because they need to have some way of contacting you if there's an issue. Social security numbers? The birth certificate? Use the birth certificate

as proof of citizenship and then destroy it. Fine, I'm cool with that. I'm cool with giving you a credit card, you run it, you know I'm of legal age. Okay, cool. If you're paid service, you use the credit card or debit card, you bill it, whatever. But some of the information that we continue to see out as part of these breaches,

including this one. are the same. Somebody doesn't need to tell me twice that it isn't. I continue. At some point, the conversation has to move beyond response and into prevention that actually holds over time. Until then, we will continue to see

the same stories repeated just with different names and larger numbers. And that, folks, is the end of this item. I want people to think about this. I want people to think about this, folks. This is no longer something. This is huge.

This is not something we can't ignore anymore. We have to start figuring out how to hold these companies accountable. Some have gotten fined, even multiple times, like Google. But they still

do. the same thing. In our show notes, you will find a link to the newsletter and the various comments within it, as well as my write -up of the aforementioned issues. and my thoughts. And

I'm sure that this will be talked about in future programming across the Jared Reimer Network, whether it's Throwback Saturday Night, a future TSB with the whole gang, or if there's a significant update in Intermediate TSB. This is bad. It probably

could get a lot worse. And luckily, as far as we know, payment information was never taken. That's good. Your footage from your cameras were not taken. That's good. But it could have been a lot worse. Did I mention this was going to be a long segment? I think I did. Please feel

free to comment if you happen to be listening to this from a future point in time. If you're listening to this, email imessagetech, T -E -C -H, at M -E -N -V -I dot org, or J -A -R -E -D -R -I -M -E -R at 986themix .com. Both work because this could go between multiple programs. Text

or WhatsApp 804 -442 -6975. Or call the comment line and leave your voice message and let me know what you think. If you want your comment aired, I can air it on a future TSB, or if you want it aired through Throwback or any other security program we do, please let me know. I

will continue with our UK story, which is another interesting case. In just a moment, this... is Sans, Episode 40. Across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. Alright, folks. It's time to move along

with our next item here on SANS Episode 40. I'm Jared Reimer. This is UK -based, and the title is UK Biobank Data Listed for Sale Online. Personal health data of more than 500 ,000 UK Biobank volunteers is being sold online. Biobank is a

biomedical research database that comprises sequences detailed blood work results data gathered from scans and monitors and details about lifestyles

and habits the organization says it is the world's most detailed study for tracking the long -term health of people as they age. Biobank volunteers had agreed to make their data available for research. The de -identified information is used by more

than 22 ,000 researchers around the world. participating researchers are prohibited from publishing and there's a bracket next to the egg part of this so they're not supposed to publish any material which could lead to the identification inadvertent

or otherwise of an individual. The breach has been traced to researchers at three participating institutions and their access to biobank data has been suspended. Biobank is temporarily suspending access to all their data while they put more

stringent protection measures in place. I chose not to put any of the commentary from the editors, not that they don't have anything good to say, but I chose to make this my own. And I will publicly say this. Biobank, you're doing the right thing

in making sure that this unauthorized sharing episode is dealt with. Whether it was accidental or malicious, we'll never know. The fact that this is supposed to be a closed database and now info is being sold online on almost a million people who wanted you to do research on them

is a little concerning. And that's because, as we talked about with ADT, Once this information is out, there is no way you can get it back. It honestly doesn't matter what you do. Because, as one of the phone lines said on one of its

intros, once you give out your information, There's no getting it back. So be careful on who you give your name and number to, and don't just give it out freely. This was the early days of the phone lines, but I don't want to make this about just phone line issues. We're talking about

medical data, which is a lot more... sensitive than your typical phone line caller even though they could in theory give out their name, their address, their phone number, their SSN, whatever they want. It's uncalled for and it's actually discouraged but people do it anyway. The fact that Biobank is taking this very seriously And

the fact of the matter is that they're going to get to the bottom of this. Makes this program worth watching. Even though a mistake was made. The fact that they revoked access. They're trying to figure out how to better protect the data they already have. And restore access. properly

is the right thing to do in my opinion I think this is textbook and the best you could ask for Here's two in one. And the companies are Itron

or Itron and Medtronic. Both of these were breached. Two major suppliers of technology and utilities and medicine, respectively, have disclosed cyber attacks, both filing Form 8K with the U .S. Securities

and Exchange Commission, SEC. ITRON is based in the U .S. state of Washington and offers services and technology to support utilities and infrastructure for energy, water, gas, transportation, and other

resources, counting over 8 ,000 utilities and cities in more than 100 countries among its clients. its Cybersecurity Response Plan on April 13, 2026, upon being notified of unauthorized third -party access to its systems and also notified

law enforcement and engaged external advisors to assess, mitigate, remediate, and contain the unauthorized activity. Since removing the unauthorized access, Itron has not observed any further such activity in its corporate or customer -hosted

systems. The company reports that its contingency plans and backup systems have allowed operations to continue and anticipates that direct costs will be reimbursed by insurers stating that the incident is unlikely to have a material impact.

Well, the good news, then, is that they're insured, and hopefully they're right that insurance will just pay for it, seeing that it is unauthorized, although it really, I think, would depend, in my opinion, on how that unauthorization took place. I guess we'll see over time. Medtronic

is a medical technology company headquartered in Galway, Ireland, and Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is the largest medical device company in the world by revenue exceeding Johnson & Johnson, Medline Industries, Siemens, Healthineers, and

Stryker. I believe the word here is Healthineers. H -E -A -L -T -H and then I -N -E -E -R -S. Medtronic disclosed on April 24th that its corporate IT systems were accessed by an unauthorized third

party prompting the company to contain the access, activate incident response protocols, remediation with external cybersecurity experts. The company will notify and offer support services to any

individuals whose personal information may have been accessed. There has been no identified impact to products, patient safety, connections to customers, manufacturing and distribution, financial reporting systems, or service to patients. Well, I suppose

that's all good, but it would not surprise me If it came out, that something else happened. It always seems to. Medtronic does not expect the incident to materially impact its business

or financials. And again, I chose not to put anything from any of the editors. They definitely wrote, but I chose not to put them in. I think this speaks for itself, and only time will tell whether this is going to be 100 % or not. This

one is a piece of interesting but good news. Canada's first SMS blasters confiscated. Operators arrested. Now that's the part I like. Operators arrested. That's the best part of this whole

story. I guess I could, in theory, just say, here, have it, and not bother reading, but I'm not going to do that because that would defeat the purpose of the podcast itself, right? You want a story. Told you we got a couple of good ones of these. On March 31, 2026, Canadian authorities

arrested three men and confiscated three SMS blasters believed to be the first known use of this technology in Canada. As described, In the Toronto Police Service TPS press release, an

SMS blaster works by mimicking a legitimate cellular tower, intercepting mobile traffic by tricking devices in range to connect to the SMS blaster instead. allowing attackers to send fraudulent text messages that appear to come from trusted

organizations, including links for conducting SMS phishing. A TPS investigation dubbed Project Lighthouse began in November 2025. and led to the discovery of vehicles operating SMS blasters in multiple locations in the Greater Toronto

Area. Detective Sergeant Lindsey Rydell established that tens of thousands of devices had connected to the blaster, causing over 13 million network distributions in legitimate cell tower connections,

potentially impacting access to 911 services. TPS seized a large quantity of electronic evidence quote unquote in addition to the blasters themselves and arrested the two suspects. The third suspected

conspirator turned himself into the police three weeks later. TPS credits the work of the Coordinated Cyber Center within its Intelligence Unit, as well as assistance from the Royal Canadian Mounted

Police, RCMP, National Cybercrime Coordination Center, RCMP's Ontario Division, Regional Police. Wait, is that correct? Well, it says York Regional Police. Alright, so it's not New York. York Regional Police. Hamilton Police Service and Financial

Institutions and Telecommunications Providers. The press release reminds the public to never follow links or share personal information in unexpected text messages, to be weary of messages

requiring payment, to access known apps and type trusted websites directly and to report fraud incidents to the police great all right some good news for a change I know I've bookmarked

some good news items to be blogged I just haven't had the time. With as much cybercrime as we've covered, even without this newsletter, I love covering good news. Comment on this one if you want. Dukes writes, With any form of emission, the Beast Protection simply stop and think take

the moment to resist clicking on that link or responding to a payment request and never ever share your login information we continue to push this message on TSB and other related that we do as part of the JRN. And this can't be more

true if this type of thing is out there. Others who commented here have plenty to say. Go and read them and the newsletter. A link is in our show notes. and talk about good news. I love the good news. I know I haven't read Sands for a majority of the year, but I'm here now, and

I'm looking forward to getting some more good news. This next item is dealing with the FCC. This one is titled, FCC's Router Ban Now Includes

Portable Hotspots. The U .S. Federal Communications Commission, FCC, has clarified that the agency's ban on routers made outside the country includes mobile hotspots. While the FCC made no formal announcement, it did add information to the Is

My Device a Consumer -Grade Router under the National Security Determination section on an FAQ page dedicated to the ban. The section clarifies that consumer -grade portable or mobile Wi -Fi hotspot devices for residential use and LTE 5G

CPE devices for residential use are considered consumer -grade routers. Well, there goes probably most of what you own, I suppose, depending on the brand. Mobile phones with hotspot capabilities do not fall under the designation. Well, that's practically every phone. Your Android and your

iOS device qualify for that, right? They both have hotspot capability. Companies that manufacture mobile hotspots will be required to apply for an exemption if they wish to import and sell devices that have not received prior... governmental approval. Well, we're talking about the government

here. The same government that can't even keep their own infrastructure secure. And I'm not saying the FCC has never had an issue. I'm not saying that at all. But the FCC is a governmental agency. So, you can't say that they probably haven't had an issue because we know the government

has had issues. So, this is going to get very interesting. The device ban applies to consumer -grade devices, but industrial Enterprise and military equipment are not subject to the ban. If there is an issue and it was never resolved,

fine. I support the ban. But I really don't understand what is going on and why these devices are being banned in the first place, I write. Please read the comments within the newsletter for perspective. I'll decline further comments from the JRN. Finally

today, ladies and gentlemen, Chinese national extradited to U .S. from Italy to face charges. Related to hafnium campaign. Authorities in Italy have extradited a Chinese national to the U .S. to face charges of wire fraud, aggravated identity

theft, and unauthorized access to protected computers. Zhu Zui, Z -E -I -W -E -I, and the first name is spelled X -U, appeared in U .S. District Court in Houston, Texas, on Monday, April 27th, 2026. A November 2023 indictment alleges that Zhu,

XU, had a role in cyber intrusions that were part of the Hafnium campaign, which infected thousands of machines worldwide. and intrusions targeting COVID -19 research. And this was big back then. COVID -19 hit while the rest of us

were stuck at home. People were doing research. Great. But so were the actors. They were doing research to interrupt that so that apparently... they could try and keep us home and basically make it where we were going to have lots and lots of problems later. We might have had issues after the ban of us staying at home lifted, but

it probably could have been a lot worse. The Hafnium campaign... exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. Well, I suspect if you still look at the news sites every day, Exchange is no better off as it was then either. The indictment also alleges that while working at a company called Shanghai PowerRock, a network

company limited, Zhu was directed by intelligence services in the People's Republic of China, PRC, to conduct these operations. That means he was paid for that. Zhu was arrested in Milan in July 2025. Zhu's alleged accomplice, Zhang Yu, Z -H

-A -N -G -Y -U, remains at large. The question is going to be, what will be the punishment for this crime? Italy, have extradited a Chinese national to the US to face charges of wire fraud,

aggravated identity theft, and unauthorized access to protected computers. If that's the case, I write, it could be at least a decade or two. But we know that cybercrime is not the same as a regular crime, so my question still stands. It's time that prosecutors come to terms about what these crimes should be punished by, especially

because it's different in person versus online. backbone and sticking to it in the guidelines should be critical so actors understand what the maximum could be since I am not seeing any type of time mentioned I'm skeptical because

what might be the case about what might be the case Although, then we learn that Neely writes, Another win for international law enforcement cooperation. But who is Hafnium? Hafnium is also known as Silk Typhoon or APT40. Exchange server

breach. 2022. Task. I'm sorry. Tarask malware. T -A -R -R -A -S -K. Then. They. Were in the news. In March 2025. When 12 members were charged. With. Attacks. On the treasury and other. U .S. government agencies which led to Zhu's arrest

in Italy last July. If convicted, he faces 77 years in prison. I'm going to stop reading from Neely for a moment and say he faces 77 years in prison. Will that mean that he'll get 77 years? I don't know. I'll continue reading what he says now. It says, this is another case where you

want to consider carefully. It's 2026. What services are you running? On -premises versus hosted? Look at hosted. cloud services as a partnership, allowing your team to focus on fewer manageable controls rather than a one and done. Learning this is interesting, I write, but something tells me that he won't get even close to that. I think

this is going to be something to watch, and if I see anything else, we... We'll bring it to you. 77 years is definitely a long time. And for the crimes, if convicted, this will be the first time and probably the longest sentence that we've ever seen in cybercrimes. So we'll see if we learn anything new. Here is the editorial

board of SANS News Bites. And contact information to reach SANS if you have any technical issues with subscriptions or other questions. Ed Skoudis, Gauch Spitzner, S -H -P -A -N -T -Z -E -R, Jake

Williams, Dr. Johannes Ulrich, John Peskitor, Josh Wright, Kathy Bradford, Lance Spitzner, Lee Neely, Mark Weatherford, Moses Frost, Suzanne Vautrinot, and William Hugh Murray. SANS is located at 11200 Rockville Pike, Suite 200, North Bethesda,

Maryland, 20852. Email support at sans .org or call 301 - 654 -7267 for assistance. If you would like to contact me, you can email or iMessage me at tech, that's T -E -C -H at M -E -N -V -I dot O -R -G. And I will be happy to answer any

questions if I can, or you can leave me feedback. You may also text or send a WhatsApp message to 804 -442 -6975. Or you may go ahead and...

feel free to check out the blog and comment on anything that interests you. The blog is jaredtech .help, and we'll be back to blogging and doing other things. So that's that. SANS Institute

is cool because they go ahead and give out what's pertinent, what's of value. They know what's happening. They've been in this space. And as long as you give them credit, they'll be all right. We're going to have another Sands Reel

soon. I think I'll go see if I have any ouches and see which ouches might be of value. So we'll have more content coming soon. I am Jared Reimer. Thanks so much for listening. And make it a great day. This completes Sands. Episode 40. By the way, before I go, if you're looking at this just

by transcription, I know that a lot might be wrong because, well, a lot of this stuff may not be picked up correctly in automated transcripts, but I'm not going to go through and fix every little thing. I'll be there all day. So, it's best to listen by audio if you can, and the transcripts

are there to assist. They can't replace a human transcriber. News like this, especially with, you know, different... companies and the way that they spell things and even you know suspects when we talk about good news it may become a problem and I'll try where I can to spell them

so that you can see it in case it doesn't get it right but don't expect that every single time see you all later everybody

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