Welcome to the securithy box, podcast 280. We're going to need to do this in multiple parts, so podcast 280 will be here for quite awhile with the intermediates a through whatever to finish the series. On this podcast, the Evolution of Cyber Security, part 3: Organized cybercrime and social engineering, part 1. We go right in to it and we know exactly where we left off. The whole series will take you from late 2000 through 2013. In part 1, we go through 2004 and will start with 2005. We hope you enjoy the program!
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The opinions expressed are those of the show hosts and may not necessarily be of any company in which the show hosts may represent. The following podcast may contain some strong language. Parental discretion is advised. The Security Box, Podcast
280, The Evolution of Cybersecurity, Part 3, Episode 1, Organized Cybercrime and Social Engineering, recorded Wednesday, August 26th, 2026. Welcome
to the security box program 280 the evolution of cybersecurity part 3 This is going to cover the evolution between The late 2000 period through 2013 to early 2014 when Target came out with
their breach which was the first major breach of the era which would become a particular Long -Term Trend This is Organized Cybercrime and
Social Engineering Part 1. Yes, it's determined that we are going to be on this topic for a while because it's a very large manuscript and we have a lot to cover. But it's going to be very worthwhile for those who are coming here and have never heard about how the landscape was before what
you are seeing today. I am Jared Reimer. You've got... Nicholas Jackson, Terry Ring, Preston Gaylor comes along. We are all about the topic. There will be no news this week. We will have intermediate podcasts covering news notes, the
landscape, breaches, and the like. But Program 280 will be here for a little bit. So we hope that you will enjoy the program. This is episode one of part three, covering social engineering and other big topics of 2000 to 2013. Enjoy.
submit links, files, and other pieces of information, including domains and IP addresses for analysis. It's a Google -ran product. And recently, they've changed their website a little bit. there is
going to be an unlabeled button underneath the enter URL, IP, or domain edit box, which will allow you to upload a file for analysis. No matter what you submit, the service in question allows you to get... Things analyzed. Is this safe? Is this website safe? Is the file that I'm dealing
with safe? My program I use on my computer didn't say anything, but I want to make sure. This website does just that. The higher the number, the bigger the problem. For example... If it says 30 out of 90, you should probably be concerned. If a website you want to go to says 1 or 2 out of
90, you could probably go to it. But just be careful and pay attention to what you're doing. The website, again, is Virustotal .com, just as it's spelled. V -I -R -U -S -T -O -T -A -L dot com. Find a link on emailhostsecurity .com on our resources page. Hello, everybody. Welcome
to TSB Program 280. The goal here is to cover as much of this as we can. We are packed. And maybe instead of renumbering things... We'll just do this in ABC format. We'll figure it out
as we go and the podcast will be told exactly what we're going to do. Before the program started, I've decided to pay a tribute. But you heard Islands in the Stream. That was actually done
by the guitar tribute players from their Acoustic Tribute to Dolly Parton album, a 2016 album, and Midnight String Quartet 9 to 5 from their MSQ Performs Dolly Parton album, 2021 release.
Dolly Parton died on August 25th due to... I
think we all need to catch up because I have. myself behind them a lot of them so my do we
want to just and see how far we get does anybody have anything for news notes I say we get into it unless someone does. I know I have my components added new entries, but I haven't really looked at much due to my other commitments and the heat and other odds and ends. So if you guys just want to get into this, we can. at each segment
stop and if you guys want a break we'll figure out what to do in regards to maybe we'll just do ABC etc if needed so that it stays in one episode and we'll just do intermediates Podcast
280, The Evolution of Cybersecurity Part 3, Organized Cybercrime and Social Engineering. Opening, From Viruses to Malware. In our last program, we continued our look at the evolution of cybersecurity by exploring some. Of the viruses and worms that
helped define the early years of personal computing and the internet. We talked about brain. The first known PC virus, which spread through floppy disks. We talked about the Morris worm, which demonstrated what could happen. When malicious or experimental code was able to spread across
the network. We talked about macro viruses such as Melissa and we ended that part of the story with I love you in May 2000. I love you is a good place to begin this program because by the In the beginning of the 2000s, something was changing. Computers were increasingly connected
to networks and to the internet. Email was becoming an ordinary part of everyday life. Broadband connections would become increasingly common. And malicious software... no longer had to wait for somebody to carry an infected floppy disk from one computer to another. Before we continue
the history, though, we need to straighten out some terminology. For many years, especially among ordinary computer users, almost anything malicious that got onto a computer was called a virus. But technically, not everything we've
been discussing is a virus. A computer virus is malicious code that reproduces by inserting copies of itself into another program, file, or other host. Like a biological virus, it needs something else to infect. A worm is different.
A worm is a self -contained capable of replicating itself. It does not need to attach itself to another program in order to reproduce. Some worms spread by exploiting vulnerable network services. Others spread through email or other mechanisms.
distinction is going to become very important during this program. During the early 2000s we are going to encounter worms that could spread across the internet with extraordinary speed. Sometimes without the victim deliberately downloading or running anything. Then We have the Trojan horse. Usually shortened simply to Trojans. And
by the way, this is T -R -O -J -A -N for those who want a spelling. Yep. Yep. The name comes from the ancient story of the Trojan horse. Something appears to be useful, harmless, or desirable. But what is actually inside is something very
different. In computer security, a Trojan is a program that appears to serve a legitimate or desirable purpose while concealing malicious functionality. Unlike a virus or worm, a Trojan does not necessarily reproduce itself. Instead, it relies... on getting somebody to install or
execute it, or on some other mechanism delivering it to the computer. And then we have a word that we're going to use quite a bit from this point forward. Malware. Malware. It's short for malicious software. That was one of our trivia questions
some many podcasts ago. Yeah, I do remember that trivia question. It is an umbrella term. Viruses can be malware. Worms can be malware. Trojans can be malware. Root. kits, spyware, key loggers, and many of the other things we're going to encounter
can fall under that much broader category. There wasn't a particular day when everybody stopped saying virus, worm, and trojan and suddenly started calling everything malware. The terminology changed In fact, in 2005, the National Institute of Standards and Technology published guidance specifically
dealing with malware and describing viruses, worms, and Trojan horses as different categories within the larger malicious software landscape. And that broader terminology became available increasingly useful because malicious programs themselves were becoming increasingly complicated. Something might arrive as a Trojan, install Backdoor,
steal information, download additional malicious software, and make the compromised computer part of a botnet. simply calling the entire thing a virus doesn't tell us very much. So throughout this program, we'll try to use the terminology that best describes what we're actually talking
about. But we'll also use malware when the broader term makes more sense. There's one other terminology problem We should mention before continuing, because you're going to hear it throughout the history of malicious software. The names are a mess. There have been attempts to establish naming conventions for computer viruses. and
other malware, but security companies have historically maintained their own detection and naming systems. As a result, the same piece of malicious software might be known by one name at one antivirus company and another name somewhere else. You may also see letters attached to a malware name, such as A, B, C, and so forth. Those letters usually
identify variants according to a particular vendor's naming system, but an A or a B from one antivirus company does not necessarily correspond perfectly with the A or B used by somebody else. We'll see an example of this later when we talk briefly about Bagel, also called Beagle by some vendors,
and the seemingly endless stream of variants that appeared during the mass mailing worm era. And, unfortunately, the naming problem persists. Completely went away. We'll leave the modern version of that problem. For a later program. Because once we start trying. To name. Not only
malicious software. But also the threat actors. That criminal groups. And criminal groups operating it. Things get even more interesting. For now, the important distinction is relatively simple. A virus infects something else in order to reproduce.
A worm can reproduce and spread as a self -contained program. A Trojan disguises or conceals its malicious purpose rather than necessarily reproducing itself. And malware is the larger umbrella under which these and many other forms of malicious software can fit. With that terminology established, Let's
return to where we left off. Now, folks, I want to tell you, this is 101 to 110 pages long. We're going to probably have to break this up, and I probably should have. But I wanted to get this done. We can figure it out. We can call the next program 280A. And continue on the 280 trek through
this series. Or we can call it 281 and I can renumber everything. We can talk about that off air. And then once we do that, I'll announce at the beginning what we're going to do. But we'll see how far we can get. By the way, I have lived through all of this. What all we're about to talk about... I've been through it. I've read about it. I've heard about it. I understand it
in principle. There is going to be a couple of terms even I learned in this research. I didn't try and go by memory because I don't exactly remember every single thing. And I wasn't blogging. And between 2006 and 2011, my blog moved from
site to site. I didn't know how to keep it until after 2011. That was part of all the learning process. So I don't claim to have historical history either. yeah so one of the biggest items after well there were there were several different
items That I can tell you. Okay, hang on, guys.
I will be right back. I want to switch over. Hold on. All right. Go ahead. That's what I was telling Chet. I have a hunch that all of you on the panel, including Preston, will be brand new to a lot of this. I am so sorry. It's 196 pages. Jeez. I didn't realize until we were building
this. I'm like, chat, it's 100 pages. Yeah, well, as I said off the air, I don't think anybody caught this. I thought it was a typing error. You know, a dictation error or something. It's not. It is absolutely not. Go to the end of your file. Find your page number. In 30 cell, it's
252 pages for you. Wow. Yes, I actually looked at it before I submitted it to you guys. 196 in 40, 252 in 30. And that's in UEB. In eBay, it was $192. I bet it would be about $240 something
in 30 cell. Because it's about four pages different. But we're using UEB because of the technological aspect of this. And since I was actually pressed for time and I did Braille this morning, because I was up until 1 a .m. doing the final polishing of this, it took two days of research. Wow. It
took two days of research, plus the fact that I was gone for a while on Tuesday the 25th due to a dental appointment. And then, of course, because it's been so hot, I would get tired. Then I'd take a nap, and there goes half the day. So, here we go. Okay. There you are. Dropbox. I got to open up the... TSB, it'll be 280. I
got it. And then it's going to be... We have a Word document and an RTF. It might be better for you to read the RTF. It'll be better structured for you. Or at least, I think it might. But either version... I didn't even read anything. It's reading all these weird numbers. Hang on. Why is it doing that? It shouldn't. It shouldn't.
It does. Hold on. Well, one of them, one of the RTF is the percent coded one. You want the one that just says show notes. That's what it says, show notes. When I open it, you can't read anything. It keeps giving me all these codes. 0, 2, 0,
F, T. You don't have WordPad? I don't know where it's opening it in. Let me see. I think I do. It should be opening it in WordPad by default. Um... No, it says Notepad. That's why. That's
why. It won't. Notepad doesn't understand RTF files. There is a percent coded text version if you'd like to use that. Just understand that the percent codes are there. Yeah. I don't know
what you mean. Just use the percent coded text file. Yeah. You'll understand it. There's not many percent codes in there. It'll make sense. Mr. Rich, are you familiar with a lot of this, or are you new to it? I've heard I love you.
I think I've heard, I know I've heard a code read. Okay. Yeah, the ones so far that we're talking about in this section, totally new for me, like I said. I love you, I have heard of, but that was last time around. Well, that was last time, correct. But before last time, if somebody mentioned I love you before 279, would
you have ever understood what it was? I think I would have. Vaguely. I have heard of Code Red, but I haven't heard of NIMBA, though. They were two very big mass mailers. We're about to get into that. I'm right at the paragraph, so... Alright, Mr. Chang. Would you like to do the honors? Yes. Cut. Code Red and Nimda, 2001. In
2001, two worms demonstrated just how dangerous an increasingly connected Internet could become. Code Red and Nimda. Code Red appeared in July 2001 and targeted systems running Microsoft's Internet Information Services, commonly called... IIS is Microsoft's web server software, meaning that these weren't necessarily ordinary home
computers being attacked. These were machines providing websites and other internet services. Code Red exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability. in an IIS component associated with Microsoft's indexing service. Actually, wait. Buffer overflow. That seems very familiar in the worst way. Oh,
yeah. We've talked... And... But this is... By the way, for those who want spelling, Code Red is typical two words as spelled. Nimda... is N -I -M -D -A. D -A. Okay. Where we can, I would like us to try and spell these, not for the transcription itself, not for the automated transcription itself,
but for the user, because some of these terms, some of these names, we're going to talk about something called Netsky later on in the 280 series, whether it's this program, whether it's this program, or whether it's in an ABC as we continue.
But the screen readers were pronouncing it Netsky because we find out that it's one word okay um this was the beginning of one word naming conventions sure um so this is the beginning of what became
So with Netsky, was that actually spelled phonetically? N -E -T -S -K -Y? Yes, sir. We'll talk more about what it is later. But to answer your question, the answer is yes. Okay. But I want to make sure that people are understanding what the spellings were. Especially since I didn't know a lot of the spellings. I knew what they were. And I've
heard people talk about them, but I... You... Never read a lot of it in Braille. I would hear it through speech. Right. Right. Okay. And by the way, bagel is your common bagel spelling. Yeah. B -A -G -L -E. And B -E -A -G -L -E. And we'll review that later on. Yeah. But this was
the beginning of the buffer overflow problems that unfortunately still plague us today. Yeah. I don't do a lot of Windows Update coverage these days, but if you read the articles through Krebs or through Bleeping, you'll read about buffering
problems. So... Go ahead with the definition, Mr. Ye. A buffer overflow occurs when software accepts more data than an area of memory was designed to hold. Under the right circumstances,
carefully constructed data can overwrite other information in memory and allow an attacker to execute code. so that's what it means for those who have never heard it basically memory has only so much space but you can go ahead and you
can overflow that By the way, if you hear background noise, my guy's here today to assist. He's moved to Wednesdays to better help him deal with other commitments. Sure. Oh, I don't hear anything, so you're fine, Jared. No, my phone just rang. Well, yeah, yeah, yeah. No, that's... Yeah, okay.
Gotcha. That was my door that just rang. Ah. Gotcha. Okay. Okay. Does anybody have any questions before I send Mr. J to continue to read? I don't
think so. I mean, I kind of get the concept, but basically, it fails. Okay, think of pouring one of your beers or a Coke or even coffee. Yeah, right. The cup can only hold so much. Afterward, it what? It spills. It leaks. Yeah, it spills.
It leaks and it overflows and spills everywhere. That's what a buffer overflow does. So instead of your pop overflowing, it is your code, right? Correct. Yep. Yes. I got it. That's okay. And then it will eventually crash the entire thing. Yeah, it will spill. Got it. So instead of you having to clean up your coke, your coffee, your beer, whatever you might be drinking, no worries.
It doesn't matter to me. But the point that we're making here is that instead of cleaning up that mess, you're cleaning up a computer which basically crashed. Because It's trying to do something that it doesn't have memory to do. Doesn't have memory to do. Yep. That's crazy. So this is the beginning of that problem, which we still have
today. Yep. Go ahead, please, Mr. Ye. Sure. That sounds complicated, but the important part for our purposes is much simpler. A vulnerable IIS server could receive a specially constructed request over the network, and that request could
result in code running on the server with extremely powerful privileges. Microsoft had already released a security bulletin and patch for the underlying vulnerability on June 18, 2001. Code Red began spreading about a month later. Oh. So microcrap didn't even fix it. Oh, wow. No, microcrap fixed it. Well, they did. They did, but they didn't.
No. No, it's that people didn't. People didn't get the patch. Got it. Remember something. Remember something we've talked about in our other programs. Remember when we used to do Windows Update on a regular basis on this program? And then we would find out that we have unpatched Windows software. That's a user problem. So people wouldn't
always get the updates. That's what this is. This is the beginning. This is the beginning of what we have today. Microsoft fixed it, but people didn't update. Because at the time, Windows Update was not automatic. We actually talk about that within this section. Within this section,
we will be talking about when Windows and MicroCrap decided that they needed to do what is now known as Patch crap day. I mean Tuesday. Don't remind me about patch fucking Tuesday. I remember doing that without automatic updates. What a fucking
bitch that was. That was a bitch. That was a bitch. So for Nick's benefit, every time we would read about Windows needing to be updated, we had to go to windowsupdate .microsoft .com by hand. Yep. Yep. And then we would have to select the updates from the catalog package. Yep. Wait
a second. I vaguely remember this. And tell it to go get... our updates. Yep. And then it would take forever to freaking install. Yeah. Because we're still not on fast connections. Well, yeah. This is early 2000s. It was only about 144k. Yeah. Oh, jeez. No, it was. It was not... Your
dial -up could be up to 56K, depending on how close to the switching station you were. Yep. Yep. Broadband was slightly faster, but not as fast as we have today. So, I dreaded Patch Tuesday,
especially when that happened. I had to do that on one of my mom's old Windows Vista computers when she had Vista. Oh, my God, that's horrible. And it could take a couple hours. I'm saying,
yeah, no kidding. Because you had to sit on the update page until it said, I'm ready for a reboot. Go reboot and then come back and let me see if there's anything else. Yep. If you didn't keep that open and you closed it, you're done. You don't get your update. Start all over. Are you
sure? Are you sure? You're closing it, so you're sure. Okay, cool. Nick, it was bad. It was bad. I accidentally did that once. I'm like, it'll be fine. I did that too. Didn't get my update. I'm like, what? Oh, man. Did that too? So. I
did that too. Yeah. That's how we learned. Yeah. That's exactly how we learned. There was no training material there. Nope. Nope. Alright. Go ahead, Mr. Trey, with the next paragraph. That timing
illustrates a problem we're going to encounter repeatedly throughout this history. A vulnerability can be discovered. A security update can be released. But unless administrators actually install that update, vulnerable machines remain on the internet waiting to be found. Code Red found them automatically.
The worm scanned the internet looking for additional vulnerable IIS servers. When it found one, it attempted to exploit the vulnerability and infect that server. The newly infected machine could then begin looking for still more machines. This is fundamentally different from something such as I love you. Nobody needed to receive an email from somebody they trusted. Nobody needed to
become curious about an attachment. Nobody needed to double -click anything. By the way, double -click is the same as pressing enter on, say, an icon or a file. Go ahead, Mr. J. The vulnerable server merely needed to be reachable. And because
every newly infected server could begin searching for additional victims, the number of machines generating scanning traffic could grow very quickly. During the July 2001 outbreak, more than 350 ,000 systems were reportedly infected. between July 12th and July 19th. Yes, I know. And that's only the first ones. When we get to SQL Slammer,
it was larger. Oh, boy. Go ahead. The resulting scanning traffic was significant enough that government and industry organizations publicly warned that code red could degrade internet performance. And we were already on slow connections already. I mean, they weren't as slow as dial -up. Some
may still have been on dial -up, but for those of us on broadband... Welcome. You've got mail. You've got mail. Oh, there's that whole, oh gosh, that special ed crank yankers thing. I got mail. Yay! Yeah, I remember that. You've got mail.
I got mail. You've got mail. I got mail. Do you have mail? No. I got mail. All the time. I'm like, oh my god. Yeah, but I don't run through Microsoft. I mean, AOL. I don't run through AOL. Why don't you use Microsoft? Because I have standards. Are you saying I don't have standards? Okay,
well, anyway. Some versions of Code Red also... defaced websites with the message hacked by Chinese and were programmed to participate in a denial of service attack against a particular internet address associated with the White House. Oh, that's lovely. That's not surprising. So that began another problem. And we still see some
of that today. We don't see a lot of that. today. No. Not as much. A denial of service attack or DOS attack attempts to make a computer, network, or service unavailable to legitimate users. One way of doing that is to overwhelm the target
with more traffic or requests than it can reasonably handle. When many compromised computers participate together, we call it a distributed denial -of -service attack, or DDoS attack. We're going to encounter DDoS attacks repeatedly as this history continues. Unfortunately, we will. And that, by the way, is D -D -O -S. But DDoS is
fine, but I want to make sure that people understand that it's D -D -O -S. And it was pronounced both ways. Oh, okay. Code Red was followed by variants, including Code Red 2... That's the Roman numeral, too, which behaved differently and could leave compromised systems with a back door. A back
door provides a way of getting into a system while bypassing its normal access controls. We still see those, unfortunately. I actually had that happen one time on one of my computers. We're actually seeing more of those. In fact, we're actually seeing more of those because that's what the government wants. Uh -huh. It's like, why can't... Apple, you need to provide a backdoor for us. You need to provide a way for us to have access. They wanted to do that with iOS, too,
remember? Wasn't it... It wasn't our government. It was... No, it was UK. UK, yeah. London, yeah. They wanted access, yeah. Yes, they wanted basically... for Apple to break the encryption for UK citizens. But if they broke it for them... Everybody. You
can't have it both ways. Nope. It's not like it's two different companies, guys. It's only one company. It's Apple. Apple 1 and Apple 2, you know. That was just a part of their products. Ah. But 2001 wasn't finished. Nope. On September 18th, another worm appeared. It was called Nimda.
And again, spelled N - I -M -D -A. Yep. Nimda is admin spelled backward. And it demonstrated something particularly important about where malicious software was heading. Nimda didn't depend on one method of propagation. It used several. It could spread through email. It could
spread through network shares. It could attack vulnerable Microsoft IIS web servers. It could use systems that had previously been compromised. And infected websites could be used as part of the process of infecting visitors. This kind of threat is sometimes described as a blended threat, because it combines multiple techniques
rather than depending upon one particular method of attack. That made Nimda considerably more difficult to contain. Yeah. And it was. Yeah. If you blocked one route, another route might still be available. And notice what has happened in barely more than a year. I Love You depended
heavily on social engineering. It needed somebody to receive an enticing message and interact with the malicious attachments. Code Red demonstrated that a worm could search the internet and compromise vulnerable servers without waiting for that human interaction. Then Nimda combined multiple propagation techniques into a single outbreak. Email was
still important. Human behavior was still important. But now, vulnerabilities, network connectivity, and shared... Yeah, network connectivity, shared resources... And previously compromised machines were all becoming part of the equation. This also introduced another uncomfortable lesson that will follow us throughout the rest of this
history. Installing security updates wasn't merely a maintenance task anymore. It was becoming part of defending a computer against... An internet that was actively searching for vulnerable machines. Well, unfortunately... And it still is. Yeah, I was going to say. Wow, that's an interesting one. I had not heard of that one, so that was a new one for me. Same here. Admin spelled backwards.
Well, that makes sense. Admin spelled backwards. That's a little bit scary, considering all the stuff it could do. Uh -huh. And by the way, the naming convention issue is another problem. It was called NIMDA dot something with one antivirus, and it could be called NIMDA dot something else. Someone else. But... Yeah. But they... they were,
you know, naming them as like Win32 .Nimda or Win64 .Nimda to differentiate between 64 and 32 -bit. And 32 -bit systems, yep. I don't think 64 early on was as common, though. I'm making a point, though. I'm making a point because you can see a lot of good ones. You'd see a lot of
the write -ups in the old days that were called Win30. Some of them called it Win32 .Nimda. Some just called it Nimda. Some called it Nimda .A. You know, or what have you. That's the point. But I'm bringing Win64 into this to demonstrate. what it could have possibly been made. Not saying it existed. Go ahead. And in 2003... I got it.
And in 2003, we were about to see just how quickly that searching could happen. And that ends that section. Yep. And it became faster. Much faster. In fact, I was actually affected by this one. This one I have not heard of. My whole website,
the whole website was down. Yes, I started in the best environment. I, uh... I did, but I didn't really understand, like, the virus security side. No, I mean, I started... No, I started in DOS, but what I mean is, when I built Superior Software,
and I built Menvy's first webpage, it was on a Windows server. Yeah. What we're about to talk about affected Windows servers. Oh, boy. SQL Slammer. All right. You want to take a look? I'm ready. If you need help, I'll help you. January 25th, 2003. Yeah. A worm known as SQL Slammer.
Or Simply Slammer simply demonstrated more than previously. Something that had been previously more theoretical than practical. A worm could spread so quickly that humans didn't even have time to react. human beings. Yeah. Slammer targeted
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and the Microsoft SQL Server desktop engine or MSDE. MSDE. 2000. It exploited a buffer overflow. There we go again. Vulnerability in the SQL server. Microsoft has
released a security update. Resolution services. Resolution services. I have service on mine, but yeah. This was a very different issue. Something I've never seen. So it says Microsoft had released a patch. A security update for the vulnerability
in 2002. Approximately six months before Slammer appeared. Oh, yes. So that's interesting. So in July of 2002, they found... the issue that was reported. And they fixed the issue that was
reported. But us mortals didn't have to do anything because that didn't affect us. Not directly. Anyway, not until we went to go to our own websites and found that it was down. Yeah. Once again, the patch existed. But many vulnerable systems
have not received it. Slammer was remarkably small. Its entire exploit and... And propagation code can fit into a single UDP package. Wow. And we're about to find... UDP or user data... User datagram protocol. User datagram protocol, yeah. Protocol. Does not establish a... Does
not establish a connection and perform the... kind of back and forth handshake before TCP associated with TCP associated with TCP yeah with TCP before before sending data. Slammer can simply send its packet towards a potential victim and move on to a potential another potential address. Holy crap. So all it did was send its packet?
And move on. And move on. Yep. That's it. When Slammer success... Let's try that again. When Slammer successfully infected a vulnerable system, the system began to... Generating. Generate random addresses. Internet. addresses. And sending copies
of the worm to them as quickly as they can. As it could. The result was extraordinary. So hold on a second. So you understand now when I said it was going to get worse? Oh yeah. It has. It has. Definitely. Because Code Red and Nimda spread. Yeah. But all this had to do was send its payload,
buy a packet, and move on. Done. And the number you're going to see... I believe there's a number in this section. I didn't really read every little thing because I was trying to get everything prepared, so... I'm not saying there isn't a number here, but if there is a number here, you're going to be surprised. I think we're leading.
I think we're coming toward one. Okay. The result was extraordinary. Go ahead with the next paragraph. Researchers studying the outbreak. found that during this initial growth, the infected population doubled every 8 approximately .5 8 .5 seconds.
Approximately 8 .5 seconds. That's what it just said. Again, 8 .5 seconds. So right there is just... That is wild. All it did was drop it and go. That is nuts. Not minutes. UDP is not
a response type of thing. It's not like connecting to a web server that has to respond to you. And say, yes, I know who you are. Yes, this webpage exists. You know, do you want HTTP, HTTPS? What do you want? And back then, there was no consistent HTTPS unless you logged in. So... Within about
three minutes, infected systems were generating about... Let's see. So, hold on. Collectively, we're generating... Hold on a second. So... Hang on. Okay. It's not minutes. Seconds. No. Seconds. Yes. Now, within about three minutes, go ahead with that paragraph. Okay. Within about three minutes, infected systems... Collectively, we're
generating about 55... More than... More than... More than 55 million scans a second. Not a minute. Wow. Per second. That's what it says. Per second. Yes. And within approximately... 55 million scans a second. Million. And that's... That means... I mean, we didn't really have numbers on Code
Red and Nimda, but you could tell just by reading this alone that this became faster. And within approximately 10 minutes, Slammer had infected
more than 90%, more than 90 % of the vulnerable systems it was going to find. Say goodnight. Say goodnight to our internet. Say goodnight to our websites, Terry. Yep. Yeah. Over 90... Over 90%. Terry, say goodbye to our websites.
Right. Right. Yep. Goodbye. Goodbye 98 .6 The Mix. Goodbye Mix. Goodbye Jukebox .show. Goodbye... Whatever. Could you imagine... And I'm not... saying this is going to happen, but could you imagine if they did this today for Linux machines? Oh. Holy crap. That would be even worse. That
would be even worse. Could you imagine them doing this for Apple machines? They're not going to do it for... Terry, it's not... It's meant to take down the internet. It's not meant to take down your personal machines. Yeah. Apple doesn't run the internet. They have their own servers.
Just like we do. That got on Apple's servers? Have a good night. But hold on. Remember that this affected if it affected Linux like it affected the Windows servers back then. There would be
Practically no internet today. Not for a number of days. Nope. Or months. Yeah. It would take more than just days. I mean, jeez. They would have to... Yeah. It would take a while. We'd have internet because they don't go after our connections. per se. No, but you wouldn't have
very many pages. Yeah, you just wouldn't have... We wouldn't have email. We probably wouldn't have streaming in a lot of cases. Well, yeah. In most cases, yeah. Your smartphones would basically cease to work because it runs off the internet. Actually... Terry, it's... You know, so... Cellular data is a different network. It wouldn't cease
to work because you still have your Wi -Fi connection. It would be limited. Let me just rephrase that. It would be limited. You'd still make calls. You could still probably text, all that stuff. Going to your browser or opening an app may or may not work because if you didn't have... So,
I mean, it'd be limited. Like, your smartphone would be limited to basically... Because opening apps connect to other infrastructure. Your phone would almost cease to work. Like, you really wouldn't be able to use it for... What we use it for now, you have to use it in the 90s. Because everybody would be gravitating toward the cellular networks and those would go down now. That's my point. You basically would really not have
a phone to use except for maybe calling and texting. Even if that. That's what I'm saying. It would almost cease to work because people would try to use the data and it would overflow that. Good luck. On the network side, not on your side. No, but on the network side, it would almost like come to a halt almost. You'd be able to
use the simple features, but... Anything more advanced, you wouldn't be able to do. Correct. It'd basically be a regular phone. You might as well just go back to using a touch phone keypad until it's fixed. That's basically all you'd be able to do. This next number is absolutely astonishing. Alright, let's continue reading.
Researchers observed at least 75 ,000 infected hosts, and the actual number may have been considerably higher. Think of that number. 75 ,000. But that's
the early days. I mean, look at the breaches that we talk about today. Millions. We're in the hundreds of millions. Yeah. So this is nothing. This was a high number due to that time. It's nothing compared to now. Yes. But they're not infecting web servers now as much. They're going
after our data now. I mean, you'll see the occasional DDoSing, but that's just people being stupid and wanting to take down servers, but you don't see it as much. Oh, botnets still do it. Well, that's what I'm saying. People still do it, but it's not as rare. Or it's not as common. That's what I meant to say. That's the word I meant. It's very rare is what I meant to say. Compare
that with Code Red. Code Red demonstrated frightening had demonstrated had demonstrated frightening automated propagation in 2001 but scammers but slammer Slammers spread mainly two orders of... Magnitude. Magnitude. Faster. Faster. Wow. By
the time a human administrator realized what had happened... What was happening? Investigated the strange traffic... Figured out what was needed... Needed. Needed to be blocked. Blocked. Blocked and started responding. The worm had already started spreading. Done most of its spreading. The worm had already done most of its spreading.
Most of its spreading. Yep. So, by the time my guys in Los Angeles were able to figure out what the hell... and why we were down, it was done. Just call it done. It was done, yeah. More or less. It was done. Talk about a catastrophe.
Yeah. Yeah. Alright. That led researchers studying Slammer To a disturbing conclusion, defenses against worms capable of spreading at this speed couldn't depend on entire human reaction. Entirely. By the time people responded, it could already
have been too late. And it was. Yeah. And it already was. Yeah, and it was. Slammer is also interesting because it didn't need a destructive payload to cause damage. Substantial damage. Substantial damage. It's primary purpose was
propagation but infected systems were sending enormous numbers of packets as quickly as their networks could carry them. The resulting traffic saturated multiple systems or disrupted systems. Network connections and distributed systems. And distributed systems. Disrupted systems. Disrupted
systems, sorry. That depended on those networks. So basically... The effects extended... So basically goodbye. It's basically goodbye. Goodbye. Yeah, you're owned. Have a good one. Buffer overflow crash. Bye -bye. Boom. Gone. Boom. Gone. Yep. Yep. And then the tech support people were getting
calls and they're like, Should be up. I don't know. Yeah, well, it's not. It should be going. It's not online. I don't know. Okay, I see something weird, but all right, we can block that. Let's just block it, but we don't know if it's going to work. It's still not going. We'll be offline for a few weeks. Shit. Well, there goes my business
for a couple weeks. Thanks a lot. Actually, I think it took several days to get us back up. But yeah, it took days to get us back up and running. Goodbye, RedRobin .com. So, the effects. Extended far beyond infected databases. The effects extended far beyond infected databases. Servers.
Database servers. Servers. Associated reports. Reports. Associated with the outbreak. Okay, I've read a little ahead. This is actually fucking scary. ATM failures. Ooh, that's scary. Go ahead. Airline disruptions. And interference with government and other services. Like I said, good night.
Good night. Good frickin' night. We were all affected. Sleep tight. Don't forget to put the covers around you, Terrence. Yeah. Right. I mean, you definitely need a case of diapers for this one because, man. All right. We're not even halfway done. We're not even halfway done. I know. I
know it. The worm wasn't necessarily attacking those things directly. It was consuming enough network resources that other things stopped working properly. This is a good place to introduce another term that has been useful to security researchers. A network telescope. Okay. By the way, this is
something I never heard of until chat brought this up. So this is one of those I've never heard of. I've never heard of this one either. A network telescope? Yeah. Never heard of it either. We should put that under our terms and stuff. Yep. An optical telescope. An optical telescope lets us observe light from a portion of the sky. Arriving.
A network telescope observes traffic Arriving at a portion of internet address space where little or no legit traffic should be arriving. Ooh, that's interesting. Should normally be arriving. So, your 192 .168 based address space is normally
used for networking. It's not meant for somebody to go browsing unless you open something up to allow that. It's not meant for the general public to go looking around. Supposed researchers monitor thousands of Internet addresses. Of unused. Of
unused. Of unused internet addresses. Nobody is running a web server. Database server. Database server or computer at those addresses. Home. Yeah. So they're just basically like parked addresses. Parked domains. Or used internally. Internally, yeah. Could be any of those. Okay, next paragraph.
Under normal circumstance, there should be not much reason for somebody on the internet to be contacting... To contact them. Contact them. Yeah. All you have to read is kind of as fast as my screen reader will, but that's about it. But a worm such a slammer... No, I got it. I can finish it. But a worm such a slammer doesn't know such addresses. Which addresses contain
computers. Okay, so it doesn't know which contains computers. What contains a computer? What contains a server? A server or any of that. It just sends... It just sends a packet to that address. Yeah, it just sends a packet there hoping for the best. It generates addresses. Seeing what it can do. It generates addresses and sends probes. Some
of those probes inevitably hit the unused address by researchers. address being monitored by researchers. By observing those packets, researchers can infer information about what is happening across the larger internet, how quickly something is spreading,
how many effective systems may be generating traffic. which ports are being targeted, and how behavior changes over time. How the behavior changes over time. So they were learning as we went. Yeah. That's about all you could do. I mean, that's about all you could do. For this
time period, this was as bad as it got. Yep. Until it got worse. Uh -huh. Network telescope and other passive monitoring data became particularly valuable for studying outbreaks such as slammer because the worm moved far too quickly for research
to watch. Each infectious machine at a time. To simply watch infections. One machine at a time. One machine at a time. For me, SQL Slammer also was an entire abstract story. Entirely an abstract story. Yeah, an abstract story. By this point, I have gotten the first music Menve. Education
Network for the Visually Impaired. Yeah. Yeah, Menve. I wish we could say Menve. It was hosted by SSI and the Windows Server. So, at that point, we had gotten it up and running. Richard asked me to build a webpage. I said I would build a webpage. We'd see how it would go. And he asked me to build it. And so that was the beginnings
of the website. But we got enough of it up and running where we were taking apps and processing subscriptions to our email lists. And then all hell broke loose. When Slammer hit in 2003, SSI was affected and they had to figure out what
was happening. Let's see. It was hosted by SSI on a Windows server. I was administrating their SQL server and I wasn't sitting there analyzing Slammer packets. I was just... Simply running a website that depended on infrastructure someone
else maintained. But that's precisely why the experience matters. A worm attacking database software somewhere in the underlining infrastructure could suddenly become a problem. For somebody who is concerned with simply keeping a website
online. So that was me. Keeping a website online. That's an increasingly important theme as its history continues. We depend on layers of technology that we will never see. That we may never see. A vulnerability several layers underneath the surface several layers underneath the surface
we are actually using can still affect us when something goes wrong. Slammer also reinforces the patching that lesson we saw in Code Red. The vulnerability was known. A security update existing months before the outbreak. Yet enough vulnerable systems remained exposed for Slammer
to demonstrate something the internet have never experienced in this scale and speed. And 2003 was not finished with worms. While Slammer demonstrated just how quickly malicious software can move through vulnerable network services, another major outbreak that year would demonstrate that
email remained An extraordinary way, effective way for reaching people. Reaching enormous numbers of people. Sorry about that. You're good. The mass mailing era was about to get noisy. Very. Very noisy. And that ends the section. Alright, that ends that section. We appreciate your efforts. We know it's difficult without something, so
we're glad you were able to participate. We'll help you where we can. Who is familiar with the mess worm mailing era? I might be, but I'm not totally sure. 2003 to 2004. Maybe distantly.
Well, that would have been, I would have been in high school, so I probably wouldn't have really known too much about it. I mean, I had email, so. I mean, I had email, but yeah, I could have been hit, but I don't know. I mean, I remember how many years ago that was. I'm just asking a question. How many remember it? I'm not. This isn't a, you know, I'm not. Okay. I'm not sure.
Trivia question. Like, right. I'm not sure that I do remember. Remember it. Not sure I do remember it. Yeah. Maybe as we read on, you know, something may connect, but I'm not sure I remember it. Maybe. Yeah, that's, yeah. Then let's do this. Let's take a file break. And when we come back, we're going to cover the mass mailing worm era.
As 2000 to 2013 continues on the evolution of cybersecurity across the Jared Reimer Radio Network. The Security Box. Welcome back to the program.
I'm Jared Reimer. Terry Ring. Nicholas Jackson are here with me with breaking news. Before we move along, we'll try and get this into the news desk when we do the news desk next. But it sounds like from one of Nick's sources, They are reporting that Facebook is settling for $18 billion. I'd
love some of that. I was just going to say, I will take some of that, too. You know what? The last payment I got from that settlement thing was like $45. I mean, they're paying cheap. Yeah, I'll take a... You know, because the three of us are on here, we could all... Hey, I'll take, you know, the... No, I think we should split it. three of us, so each of us gets six billion. Yeah. I'll be set for life. I'll be set for life.
Yeah. I don't have to worry about my bills for a hell of a long time. You would have to worry about your bill. Yeah, I know. You would have to worry about taxes when that comes up because that's really where you're going to get paid. And you're going to get bitten badly. Oh, well, yeah. Alright, so I'll pay my $150 ,000. In California,
they're trying to make it more than that. It's probably going to be more than that. I don't know about Illinois taxes, but... They're bad. They're worse than ours. Okay. Take that out of what I'm getting. Send me the rest. Yep. Alright. I mean, I would have loved to have an even $6 billion, but I'm still going to have $5 ,900 ,000 ,000. Yeah, even if it was like $200 ,000
,000 for taxes. You know, even if Illinois was like $300 ,000 ,000. I don't think you're going to need to pay that much, but it will be high. But the point is, we'll take the majority of that each. The majority. Yeah. And then we'll call it good. We'll take $5 .8 billion and call it good. Oh, absolutely. Even if it was $5 .8
billion. Cool, I'll take 5 '8". I could pretty much buy any possible piece of property I want here in Santa Barbara. Anything. More or less. Yeah. I can go downtown and buy like a luxury flat and spend a few million, like 10 million. Fine, cool here. Well, here's the thing though. Michigan Avenue, you know. Hopefully, though,
you'd get some financial advisor who'd say, yeah, I get the temptation, but we're not doing that. Well, if you're investing in a property, you can, you know, then... But if it's like for you, and you want a place to live, I mean, I guess you can get like just a cheap house. I mean, it doesn't really matter. I guess you can go and get something that's not going to be in the
millions. What I think they would suggest is that you set a good portion of it. You put it in a CD or IRA. For sure. Or a high interest or a trust fund or something like that. Oh, I would sure do that. I wouldn't just spend it all. I would do something where I could maximize
my potential. I'd take a billion of that and put it into a CD or something or something where I'm going to make more money. I'd take a good portion of that and do that. They'd probably want you to put at least I'm not sure. Maybe perhaps a good one billion of that to be set aside in some account that collects interest,
that earns interest. That's what I would put. I'd put about a billion into a high -yield savings account or something like that. I don't think you could put that much into an account, though. You'd have to do probably a CD. You couldn't. You'd have to have separate accounts. I think the limit is quarter million, I think, per account. I know Chase is a quarter million. I'm not sure
what the... No, what am I... Jared, do you know? Is it per institution or is it a federal thing? I don't know. It's not per institution, I don't think. Where's Chad? I don't actually know. Because there's an actual limit you can have in your checking account. There's a max limit. And I
thought it was like a quarter million. So if something happened, you're federally protected up to a quarter million. Oh. Per account. Right. Per account. So you would have to have like, I don't know. probably 20 accounts to even actually more than that because 250 per account, 10 accounts would be 2 .5 million. You'd have to have probably
like 100 accounts or something. Oh, and then you'd be flagged, of course, because that's pretty freaking shady behavior. Or it would be something where I don't know how that would work, having that kind of money. I would imagine, well, you know you'd be a Chase or whatever private client, which means you get more perks. Probably you
get more stuff that you could probably invest in or put money into. Because I don't know how Chase private client works. I know my brother's ex used to be, or was, but I don't know how that works. Oh, you'd be flagged unless... I mean,
at that point, you might as well have a financial advisor, like Nick said. That'd probably be required at that point. To help you with your money. Yeah. I mean, I would just get one from the bank. I asked the bank one time how much one was. They were like, oh, it's like $500 a month. I'm like, that ain't bad if you can afford it. $500 a month for a financial advisor? That's pretty good.
Because what they probably do is they take it out of the private account. They probably don't, you know, charge the checking or savings. Yeah. I'm sure they have accounts that are... Oh, I mean, if they might do that, I don't know how they would do that. I'm just going to vaguely...
I thought we should touch on it. If you come into a substantial amount of money and you needed a financial advisor from a bank, would they take it out of your bank account or a private account? Let me check that out. In most cases, no. a financial advisor usually can't just take money from your bank account if they're charging a fee you might
authorize a payment by check or occasionally a card or a set withdrawal you agree to if they're managing an investment account their fee is often deducted from that account You should always get a clear agreement up front so you know exactly how they get paid. So I guess depending on what accounts they're using, they would take it from that account. So if you're using an investment account and you have them managing it, they would
take the money from your investment account. Right. Yep. So it depends on what they're managing. But what if they're managing... All right. I have so many questions for this thing. Well, no. Here's how I think it would work, Terry. They wouldn't really touch your checking or savings account. Not in that way. That they would leave alone. That's your business to do with what you
want. If you wanted to make a transfer from that account, that's when you'd probably contact them. Like, hey, I want to transfer X into checking or savings account. Most likely, they would be managing the private account, and that's where the money would be drawn from to pay them. That's what I'm wondering, too, with multiple accounts.
I wonder what chat would say for that. How would multiple accounts be managed by a financial advisor and how would the payment be taken out? Let me check. If an advisor is managing multiple accounts, they'll usually have access only to the accounts you authorize. These are often deducted directly from the investment accounts they manage. Or you might pay by check. Yeah, so it comes... Yeah, so you're right. It would come from the
investment account, not your private checking receipts. Yeah. Okay. Right. That's interesting. That's what I was saying. That's interesting. Hmm. Hmm. So you take about a quarter million, you put it into an investment account, have a
financial advisor. Investment accounts, I think the limits are different. Yeah. I don't think those are as... rigid as checking or savings accounts, maybe. What is the maximum deposit
you could put into an investment account? One sec. It depends on the account type of the provider. For example, a regular taxable brokerage account usually doesn't have an IRS contribution limit. You could invest thousands, hundreds of thousands, even millions. But the brokerage may have its own procedures for verifying very large deposits. But would that be, how would that be protected
federally? Is there a federal limit? I know for checking and savings, it's a $250 ,000 limit. Okay, thank you, chat, for not helping. It died. It died. And now it completely died. So now we'll
never know. Is there a federal limit on investment accounts? Let me check. There's no federal limit on regular taxable investment accounts. There are contribution limits for tax -advantaged accounts like IRAs, but... not for a standard brokerage account. So for a standard brokerage account, there's no limit that you can have in your brokerage account. Okay, cool. Interesting. Alright. That
was kind of... I know we got off track, but... Well, the story broke, so I figured we'd cover it. Might as well learn a little bit about investment accounts. That is something. Well, that $18 billion is probably going to go mostly to litigations.
Lawyers and... Oh, yeah. And everybody else will see pennies on the dollar. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Because they're cheap. 90 % of that, yeah. Yep, 90 % of that will probably go to litigation and attorneys and fees and court costs. Yep. The mess? And
also... Go ahead. And also, the tax issue would be more confusing because it would depend on how that wealth was classified. Like, is it investment? Is it earning? Like, are there capital gains on it? That makes it even more confusing. Are you collecting interest on the account? Yep. Yep. Mm -hmm. Yep. I think some of those you
can actually collect interest on too. Depending on the type of account. Alright, the mass mailing worm era. 2003 to 2004. Alright. I'm ready. If SQL Slammer demonstrated how quickly a worm could spread without waiting for a person to do anything,
the next wave demonstrated that email was nowhere near finished as an attack vector. By 2003 and 2004, inboxes were being hammered by mass mailing worms. One of the major outbreaks of 2003 was So Big, spelled capital S -O -B -I -G. So, So Big, but all one word. And by the way, this is
what starts the naming convention problem that we talk about. Yes, So Big was one. It was called So Big A. Or so big dot A. But others called it other variations of this. And this is so big was only one of several in this era that we're about to talk about. Go ahead. Several versions
appeared during the year, culminating in so big. And that's just a capital F in August. So big spread by searching infected computers for email addresses and sending copies of itself as attachments. It could obtain addresses from files on the computer rather than depending only on a traditional address
book. That detail matters because it helped create one of the most confusing characteristics of the mass mailing era. The address shown in the from field wasn't necessarily the address of the infected computer's owner. A worm could find one email address on an infected machine, use that address as the apparent sender, Find another
address and send the infected message there. This is email address spoofing. I don't know if we covered this, but I think it used its own SMTP server, but I'm not 100 % accurate on this. But basically, guess what started with SoBig? What do we call it today? Oh, email spoofing?
Email spoofing or email address spoofing is correct. Great. Just great. Go ahead with the paragraph. Okay, so again, this is email address spoofing. Imagine that an infected computer contains addresses for Alice, Bob, and Charlie. The worm can send an infected attachment to Bob while making the
message appear to have come from Alice. Alice's computer might be perfectly clean. Alice might not even know Charlie, whose computer actually generated the message. But as far as Bob was concerned, the infected email appeared to come from Alice. That created two problems. First, it made malicious email more believable. Uh -huh. An unexpected attachment appearing to come from
somebody you recognize was much more convincing. then an attachment from a completely unknown address. Second, innocent people could be blamed for sending malware they had never sent. I'll read this paragraph. I experienced something very much like this during the mass mailing era. Clarence Whaley... who worked for GW Micro Company,
known for the windowized screen reader, once told me that infected material had apparently been coming from me. I didn't know which worm was involved. And there is no way today to establish Exactly what happened. My computer appeared. To be clean. And I wasn't in the habit. Of simply.
Running unknown attachments. But the behavior. Of mass mailing worms. Provides. A very. Plausible. Explanation. For experiences. Like that. If my email address existed somewhere on an infected computer, malware could use it as the apparent
sender without my computer having anything to do with the message. And by the way, it also used address books. Mainly, what major email client? Outlook? Outlook would be correct. Back then it was Outlook Express, but Outlook I will take. I think my grandfather had something similar
because I think he believed one of those... Clarence, by the way, said he was receiving stuff from me too, but I knew that I wasn't sending anything. I even checked my sent items. And that's what I was about to say. So my grandfather, when he was still alive, unfortunately fell for one of those Microsoft, we're going to fix your computer scams. But I think this might have been connected
to something that he experienced. He was telling me when he came to visit one time, like, have you been sending me weight loss emails? Is there something you've been trying to tell me? It's like, no, but no, probably something found my email address, you know, that was on an infected computer and was sending that shit to him under
my name because I looked too. I had no sent emails like that. That was one of the lessons of this period. The from field of an email wasn't proof of where that message had actually originated.
Sobig .f spread extraordinary quickly. At the height of the outbreak, Email providers and antivirus companies were dealing with an enormous volume of infected messages and the worm became one of the most widespread email threats seen to that point. But Sobig was hardly alone. In January
2004 came MyDoom. This is one word, just as it's spelled, M -Y -D -O -O -M. My doom arrived as an email attachment and used enticing or deliberately vague messages designed to convince recipients to open it. Once executed, it searched the infected
system for email addresses and sent copies of itself to additional victims. I'm hearing hmm over there. Does that sound familiar? Yeah, it does sound familiar. Maybe it does. I'm wondering what kind of messages people get. My doom spread at extraordinary speed and generated so much
email traffic that it became one of the defining outbreaks of the mass mailing era. But my doom is important to our larger story for another reason. It didn't merely spread. My doom also installed what on an infected, on infected systems?
A backdoor? A backdoor is correct. That's correct. Again, another instance of an idea. That would basically become an ongoing discussion many, many years later. This was 10 years or so before
the 2015 or 16 issue, whatever year it was. Was it 15 or 16? Where Apple was first confronted with getting at somebody's phone, even if that meant installing a backdoor on it. Oh, that was 2015. Very early end of 2015. Yep. Yeah. End of 15, early 16. Yeah, I do remember that. So
this happened 12 years or so. They were messing with... Back to it. Isn't that crazy, gentlemen? Yeah, yeah. No kidding. We were trying to help
people. We tell you. That's right. We want to help you, and if you have more problems on the system, we want to be able to fix it. That's right. In order to help us fix it, though, you need to give us... Well, back in those... Back in the early days, though... Back in those days... Back in those days... They would take credit
card payments. Because there wasn't anything else. Nope. And then it went to gift cards in mid -2000. Back in those days, it was gift cards or credit cards. Credit cards. Or Western Union, actually. Yeah, or that. Western Union, yep. And they gave you an address to send it to, yep.
Now, they unfortunately do still take credit crowd payments today. Yeah, but nowadays it's more crypto than anything. I mean, Nick, you're not wrong, but I think nowadays it's more crypto. I believe it's more crypto. I think Terry's more correct. That's what I was... I mean, I'm not saying they still don't. I mean, they probably still do, but... It's not as common. Yeah, I
would rather say it that way. Yeah, it's not as common. Nowadays, it's crypto, but yeah. I mean, they probably still do, but it's not as common. Remember that a backdoor provides a way of accessing a compromised computer while bypassing its normal authentication or access controls. Now the infected machine wasn't useful only because
it could send another copy of the worm. It could potentially be accessed later. Some MyDo variants were also programmed to participate in what? type of attack against particular targets. Uh... Is there a DDoS attack? DDoS is correct. Correct.
Written as distributed denial of service. Denial of service. Against particular targets. But I will accept DDoS. Mm -hmm. We're beginning to see an important change. The infected computer itself is becoming what? Well, I have it in front
of me, so I can't really... I think we all do, actually. Alright, the answer I'm looking for is an asset. A compromised machine has processing power. It has a network connection. It may contain useful information. It can send email. It can
attack somebody else. And if an attacker can retain access to it, that computer can potentially be used for something long after the original affection occurs. Go ahead, Mr. J. During 2004... During 2004, my doom... was joined by two other
names that became extremely familiar to antivirus companies and computer users. Bagel, spelled B -A -G -L -E, sometimes called Beagle, B -E -A -G -L -E, and Netsky. And again, one word, N -E -T -S -K -Y, that screen readers would call Netsky. Next paragraph, please. And there were
variants. Okay, yeah. And there were variants. Lots and lots of variants. Bagel .a was followed by additional bagel variants. Netsky went through its own alphabet soup. MyDoom produced variants as well. This is where... the malware naming problem we mentioned earlier becomes very visible.
Different antivirus vendors didn't necessarily use precisely the same names or variant designations, so reading reports from several security companies could sometimes make the situation appear even more confusing than it already was. Okay. I remember that my antivirus software detecting what I believe was identified as bagel .a in an email sent to
me. I didn't remember who sent it or exactly who sent it or exactly which antivirus product caught it. And more than two decades later, I'm not going to pretend that I do. But back then, it was probably Vex Ira from Central Command. Because that's what I was using and recommended
after Norton became the piece of shit that it's become. Yeah, well, anyway. What I remember is the experience that matter. What? Experience that mattered. Yes, that's what you wrote. Something arrived. The antivirus software identified it
as bagel .a. And it was stopped. So basically, as the email came in, the antivirus popped up and said, hey. You just got an attachment. This is bagel .a. What would you like to do? Quarantine it? Delete it? Leave it alone? Not recommend it? Yep. Yep. Right. Not recommend it, yep. And I'm like, whoa. That was... Ordinary computer...
That was ordinary computing during this period. You didn't need to be researching malware. The malware came to you. Bagel and Netsky also became part one of the Stranger Episodes. In malware history. Go ahead, Mr. J. Mr. J? Their authors
appeared to be computing or competing with one another. Variants contain messages insulting the authors of competing worms. Oh, wow. Yeah. So they were basically going after each other besides trying to infect us. Go ahead. Some variants attempted to remove or interfere with rival malware. Security researchers began describing what was
happening as a worm war. Which it was. Which it was. And security now actually talked about some of these worm wars after it happened. started in 2005. It wasn't right away, but they did talk about it. No. To the people receiving infected email, of course, it didn't particularly matter
which malware author was winning. Their inbox was losing. And there is another reason this period matters. Yes. And losing bad because we would get 5, 10 emails at any given time. Go ahead. And there's another reason this period
matters. Mass mailing worms demonstrated. demonstrated the value of scale. How fast can we fuck you up? More or less, yep. How fast can you get owned? How fast can you... And this wasn't destructive.
I mean, all it did was install itself and or spread on its own. If it wasn't meant to be destructive. One compromised computer wasn't particularly impressive. 10 ,000 compromised computers were something else. 100 ,000 compromised computers
could come infrastructure. And that leads to what term? If you had 10 ,000 machines. It leads to a butler. Correct. They could send spam. They
could participate in distributed denial of service attacks. They could distribute additional malware. They could provide remote access. They could be coordinated. That collection of compromised computers would increasingly be described, as Terry said, As... A botnet. A botnet... Is a
group of compromised... Devices... Controlled... Directly or indirectly... By an attacker. Each infected machine... Can be thought of... As a bot... and the attacker can issue commands that cause many of those machines to perform tasks together botnets are going to become enormously
important as we move through the rest of this history the objective is beginning to change Earlier malware often seemed designed primarily to reproduce, demonstrate a technique, cause disruption, or simply announce that it existed.
I'm surprised that they didn't... Oh, go ahead. Go ahead, please. No, just... Okay. Yeah, just an example of one that would be really annoying that existed. Like, somebody gets a malware strain that plays the virus, virus, viruses all day long. You have a virus, tell your computer so long. Like, it plays that. Unfortunately, we didn't have that. No. But... What you're going
to see as you continue to read this document is that it just doesn't get any better. In fact, after this series is done, this needs to go to multiple episodes. I think it will. I think this one will. Yeah, I think this one will. When 281
eventually hits, which I will work on show notes well before, because I want to italicize terms, and I want to do things that will make things easier so people know what terms are. I want to make it easier to read, too. So, you know, a blank line between each paragraph, things of that nature. I just lost my train of thought.
You're going to see it's going to get worse. And this was before and during the beginning of my podcast era. I started podcasting in 06, as you guys know. I covered a lot of this in practice. I just don't have the blogs to back it up. But that's okay. Go ahead, Mr. J, if you're
ready. Increasingly, attackers were discovering that an infected computer was valuable precisely because it could be controlled. But before we leave the great worm outbreaks of the early 2000s, there is another important reminder that email attachments were never the whole problem. In April 2004, Microsoft released a security update
addressing several Windows vulnerabilities. Within weeks, one of those vulnerabilities would be used by a worm called Sasser. Yep, the one we were just talking about. S -A -S -S -E -R for everybody for the spelling. Thank you. And once again, no problem. And once again, opening an infected email attachment wasn't required. And that ends the segment. And by the way, there
were two of these. And they were completely different. One was called Sasser. The other one was called Blaster. And the two were out around the same time, give or take. Not exactly at the same time,
mind you, but in the same period of time. Yeah. We'll take a file break, and when we come back, do we want to cover this segment, this section? And then we'll see where we are in time? I think
so. Yeah, we can. We can, yeah. All right. We'll take a final break. And when we come back, Sasser and Blaster as the evolution of cybersecurity continues across the Jared Reimer radio network. The Security Box. Hello everybody, welcome back
to TSB 280. This is going to be the last section we're going to read from this massive document, and it's going to be good. I'm glad we're actually doing this, even though it's going to take multiple parts to do it. doing this in multiple parts.
And we will. But we'll keep it under the 280 series because that'll keep our series in check. I'm going to bring on Team Talk in just a moment. Don't mind any background racket. Terry is...
also joined us. So before we continue to read, we'll get his thoughts. I'm going to push the button now. Gentlemen. Yep, I'm here. Welcome back to the Security Bytes. To teach you. That's
right. And I'm glad I stocked up on snacks this week. And more frozen food. To make. But yeah, folks. So as I was saying off air. actually started my computer journey in 2003. People from the state did come over to teach me how to work JAWS and OpenBook and all those. I was a little familiar
with Trojan virus because I think my XP got some sort of thing back in 06. But I wasn't too familiar with the email viruses that we talked about, the MyDoomThings, because I didn't really get the email until 2008. But I did start dial -up.
And, you know, my mom was pretty much doing her basics with computers, so she would tell me, you know, not to, you know, Click on bad links or not to mistype web addresses. And always be careful who you talk to online. Okay. And I would
say I got into more of... The ins and outs of stuff. Well, the malware. I know my Vista got a malware thing back in 08. So I was without a computer for Christmas that year. But thankfully, with the terminology and with what I downloaded for this taping, I feel like I'm going to be
more educated. And you will. Your file is 252 pages, so you can read it on your own time. It is well packed, but I wanted to do the podcast this way, although I should have done it a lot differently. But I didn't realize how much was going to be covered in 10 years, in a 12 -year
period. But I think it's worth it. Yeah. So I think people should understand what's been out there. And I don't think anybody's done this type of retrospective. They covered it as it happened or even when podcasts got started. They researched stuff and talked about it after the fact. But I think something like this is kind of cool. Oh, yeah. Definitely cool and definitely
well -needed. And if I really wanted to, I could look at it while... Oh, come on, Giant. Sweep the red. Sweep the red. Come on. Sorry, Preston. Oh, you're good. Even if I wanted to, I could read along when we replay this on... Well, the... On Saturday. 29th. And I'm giving it to you just to give it to people that are listening to this
later. All right. So now we got to do sweep the reds. Sweep the reds. Sweep the reds. Sweep the reds. Sweep the reds. Sweep the reds. Sweep the reds. Yes. Well, they're in the bottom of the fifth, and they're leading four to two. So, I mean, there's a chance. I mean. The Giants are
leading four to two, I mean. Yeah, I mean, at least they're trying. Put them down a little. I don't know about a World Series. I don't know about a World Series in the future, but, hey, at least they're trying. Well, they got to get past the Dodgers. No World Series. Right now, the Dodgers are the team to beat. Yeah. With all the injuries and crap they've had this season,
I think it can be done. Not this season, but... Well, once they lose Shohei and other big players, because apparently they're... That's going to be soon. Yeah. But nobody's going to want Shohei. Maybe the Yankees, but... Maybe. Nobody else, I don't think. Those damn... Those damn Yankees.
Where you going now? Of course, damn Yankees. That's why I had to do that. Oh, I found a great way to mess with these telegram scammers. Uh -oh. You should send them the history book. Send them the print copy of the last... I'm talking
about the print copy. The main Word document or RTF in your folder. Just send them back here. Oh, I should. Here's something to read. Here's something to read. It's a hundred pages. Good luck. Yeah. So this latest one, though, somebody claiming to be like, you know, revolving hearts,
sweet sprinkles or something. Oh, geez. And so, yeah. And so they go, you know, hi, what's your name? And I gave him a Paul Simon reference. You can call me Al, which they, you know, at first they didn't do anything with it. And so I'm thinking, oh, they're going to respond. Well, yesterday they respond and they go, hi, Al, it's nice to meet you. It's like, you really didn't get it. And then I continued it, though. So they
wanted to know, where do you live? And I said, Mexico. And they didn't get that either. They're like, what U .S. state? What state in the U .S.? And finally, what I did, you know, it's like, I can't make this any clearer if I tried. I sent them a YouTube link for the Mexican National Anthem. And I haven't heard from them since. Oh, wow. That's funny. That's great. Oh, and
then there was another one. Jessica Lucas was another one. And I wanted to put more effort into this one, but I didn't. So they start out with, hi. And then they start out trying to be all flirty right away. Honey, are you from America? And then I write back, I'm from Mars. And unfortunately, she got the joke because she writes back, ha, ha, ha. But I've never heard from her since. Oh, my. I know. Why, don't you want a guy that
can screw you from Mars? Right. Maybe. I guess. Oh, boy. Yes. Mr. Ye. Um... Alright. This will
be our last section. Blaster and Sasser. 2003 to 2004. Okay. Blaster and Sasser. As you just said, I know you read it. 2003 to 2004. And spelling -wise, the words are exactly the same. No... No weird, you know, Blaster and then Sasser, S -A -S -S -E -R. While SoBig, MyDoom, Bagel,
and Netsky were filling in boxes with infected attachments, another class of worm was demonstrating that users didn't necessarily have to open anything at all. In August 2003, Windows users encountered the Blaster Worm, also known by names including MS Blast. Really? Because that's... Yeah, MS Blast. And Lovesan, spelled L -O -V -S -A -N.
So, again, this goes... This goes back to the naming issues. So MS Blast was shorthand and some of them called them Love San. Okay, go ahead. Baby Love San. Sorry, just had to do that. That's alright. Go ahead, please. Blaster. Blaster exploited
a vulnerability in Microsoft's implementation of Remote Procedure Call, or RPC, involving the Distributed Component Object Model, or DCOM. And how many times have we seen this since we started TSB? Too many. Too many abusing RDP,
which I think is similar. Or at least, you know, sort of in that family, if not the exact same thing. Right. But... RCP has also been abused. Lovely. Yeah, I think a handful of times remote procedure calls a handful of times, unfortunately.
Just look at the Windows updates posts while I was posting those and I bet you you'll find RPCs all over the place. Yeah, I agree. Oh, boy. Go ahead, please. Okay. RPC allows software on one computer to request services from software on another computer across a network. DCOM extends
Microsoft's component technology so software components can communicate across machines. For our purposes, the important part is considerably simpler. A vulnerable Windows computer exposed to the network could be attacked remotely. And how many times have we seen that? Too many times
for me. Right. Microsoft had disclosed the vulnerability and released a security update on July 16, 2003. The company rated the vulnerability critical and warned that a successful attacker could execute
code with local system privileges. Effectively giving the attacker extensive control over the machine. Blaster began spreading on August 11th. Once again, the patch existed before the worm. The problems exposed by outbreaks such as Blaster
were also forcing Microsoft to reconsider how security updates were distributed. Well, it's about time. I knew that was going to be added. I knew that was coming. I knew that was coming. Yep. Yep. I knew that was coming. Go ahead. October 2003. In October 2003, Microsoft moved to a predictable monthly schedule for releasing most security bulletins and updates. Rather than having administrators
constantly watching for security updates that might appear at unpredictable times throughout the month, Microsoft would normally release them together on the second Tuesday of each month. the schedule became widely known as Patch Tuesday. Well, that's... Preston, that's only because
some people don't always patch. I know. Why did you think I added that extra insanity in there? Although... Although, to be fair, sometimes the patches introduce things we really didn't want, i .e. my system won't even boot anymore. Thanks, Microsoft. Yeah, right. And what operating system do we see more of that problem? Windows 11. Windows
fucking... Excuse me. Excuse me. Windows fucking 11. 11? It still works. Ha ha! Windows fucking 11. Yeah. Yeah, and the fact that... What was it? I think Sean... Before I do, though, I'm pretty sure I read this. Didn't Sean post a thing
recently where basically Microsoft admitted that... Windows 11 was basically a marketing campaign to get people to freaking upgrade their systems. I mean, really? Yes. The answer to that question is yes. Yeah. That's what I thought I read. That's what he said. I read a little. I read a little. The idea was to give organizations a predictable cycle in which security updates could be evaluated,
tested, and deployed. Microsoft would still release an emergency update outside the normal schedule when circumstances required it. But administrators now knew when to expect the regular monthly batch. Patch Tuesday didn't solve the underlying problem. A security update could be available, but somebody still had to install it. Sasser would demonstrate
that only months later. But the creation of a predictable update schedule... shows how much the security environment itself was changing. Patching was no longer something administrators could treat as occasional maintenance. Vulnerabilities were being discovered, patches were being released, and attackers were increasingly turning those vulnerabilities into working exploits and worms.
Security updates were becoming part of the regular rhythm Of operating an internet connected computer. Blaster scan networks. Looking for vulnerable Windows computers. When it found one. It exploited the RPC vulnerability. Caused the victim to retrieve. A copy of the worm. And then continued the process. From the newly infected computer. For many Windows
users. One of the most visible symptoms wasn't an antivirus warning. Windows started shutting down. Users could encounter a message explaining that the remote procedure call service had terminated unexpectedly and that Windows needed to restart. A countdown appeared and the computer rebooted. Then it might happen again and again and again.
And again. Basically, rendering your system unusable. Yeah. That's the gist of it. For somebody simply trying to use a Windows XP computer, there wasn't... Do you want to say something, Preston? Yeah, I'll make it quick. And then basically, you'll be without a device for a bit, like I was that one Christmas. Go ahead, Mr. J. Okay. I noticed
he wanted to say something. Okay, yeah. Go ahead. For somebody simply trying to use a Windows XP computer, there wasn't necessarily an obvious connection between a strange system service failure and a worm scanning the internet. Well, right, because it had other stupid error messages. You know, other stupid error messages. This computer has performed an illegal operation. I remember seeing that one. Well, that wasn't because of
a worm. That was because of software in general. That was the way software crashed then. It was either that or the blue screen of death. Depending on the... Oh, yes, that one. That one. That's what my one computer had. Because Tim went to go look at it. He said, yep, you have the B SOD.
You're going to be without a computer for Christmas. I was like, oh, dang. Yeah, I've gotten that a couple times. The scary one that happened to me actually was... An older system that I think I put into hibernation and it came out of it. And it kept restarting and restarting and restarting. And this weird message popped up on the screen. And yeah, basically, thankfully, I was at Stanford
at the time and our RCC, the basically our tech. guy in the dorm pretty much had to reinstall Windows from a freaking CD. Oops. Oh, God. Oh, God. Yeah, which I thankfully had, which I thankfully had, but yeah, before that, it was just randomly rebooting a bunch of times. I don't know why it did that. We were trying to fix it. We were
trying to fix it. I don't think there was a hibernation or something screwed it up. I don't know what. We know what we're doing. Don't contact your professor. That's right. No scammers reached out. No, it was nothing like that. Okay. I didn't have that to deal with. Oh, gosh. Now, if you
thought these were bad, what Nick's about to read will make you want your diapers. Yes. Blaster also contained code intended to launch a denial -of -service attack against Microsoft's Windows Update infrastructure. Holy shit. Although, we
shouldn't be surprised. I knew that was coming. Did I say? Did I not say? Did I not say that you all were going to need your diapers? Oh, dang, Jared. Yeah. Oh, you did. Yes, you did. You did. And, I mean, we shouldn't be surprised. Nope. It makes sense if you think about it. It does make sense. Wow. It does make sense. Basically forcing people who needed updates to go. Not
to get them. It's down. Can't go get updates. Yeah, I can't update. Oh, man. But the larger lesson was already familiar. Microsoft had published a patch weeks before the outbreak. Enough computers remained unpatched for an automated worm to find them. And less than a year later, Windows users
were about to learn that lesson again. Microsoft published Security Bulletin MS04 -011 on April 13, 2004. Among the vulnerabilities addressed by that enormous security update was a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, or LSASS. And we've
seen that. And we've seen that targeted. It's not commonly targeted. But what we'll eventually get into, or maybe it's in this section, I forget now. But it will be defined here. But what I'm saying is it's not common. But they were trying all kinds of different things. So that's what
we need to take away from this. Yeah. Yeah. All sorts of different mechanisms to get through. Yes. LSASS. LSASS. LSASS. Well... Yeah, that works. That sounds too much like Alsace, the province of France or Germany, though. I know, but it can be spelled out or named. I know. Go
ahead. Well, Alsace is probably what people or stupid error messages would probably say. Alsace is an important Windows component involved in security and authentication. The vulnerability could allow remote code execution. Oh, how many times have we seen that before? How many times do we still see that? In all the fun windows
update every single month. Yeah. All the, all the news, you know, for windows update bulletins, there's always, at least it seems like. 15 remote code execution vulnerabilities supposedly being fixed. Yeah. Maybe more. The majority of them. Yes. And... Yeah, the vulnerability could allow
remote code execution and on vulnerable Windows 2000 and Windows XP systems. An anonymous attacker could potentially exploit it remotely. And that's the key. Yes, they could exploit it remotely. That is the key. It is and was, for that time, one of the worst things we could ever see. Not
only could you get infected by it, But they can then do this remotely. Yes. Oh, God. Then, at the end of April, Sasser appeared. Sasser scanned for vulnerable computers and attempted to exploit
the LSAS vulnerability automatically. a person didn't have to receive an infected email. There wasn't an enticing attachment to open. There wasn't a document asking somebody to enable macros. The computer needed to be vulnerable and reachable. Once compromised, the machine could begin searching for additional vulnerable systems. Like Blaster, Sasser became particularly memorable... because
infection could cause Windows services to fail and systems to restart. And Sasser spread widely enough to cause disruption far beyond people's home computers. Organizations around the world reported problems as infected or unstable Windows systems interfered with ordinary operations. The timing was especially ugly. Microsoft had released the update fixing the LSAS vulnerability
on April 13th. Sasser appeared only a little more than two weeks later. That shrinking period between disclosure of a vulnerability and widespread exploitation created an increasingly serious problem for system administrators. It wasn't enough to say, we'll install the patch eventually. eventually might be too late. Sasser also gives
us an interesting connection to something we just discussed. The person later identified as Sasser's author was Sven Jaskin. How's that supposed to be pronounced? Jaskin, I believe. Jaskin. Jaskin. Okay. Jeskin, an 18 -year -old student in Germany. And mind you, I'm learning this during
research. We never learned that the guy here, Sven, was ever picked up or anybody else for these attacks. Wow. Wow. Wow. We didn't learn this. I think, though, it's... Yeah. I think it's Yaskin, though. I believe so. I believe it's Yaskin. Yaskin. Or Yaskun. One of the two,
yeah. Yeah. Yaskun wasn't only connected to Sasser. He was also responsible for variants of Netsky, one of the mass mailing worms we encountered in the previous section. So two apparently different parts of our story intersect. On one side was Netsky spreading through email during the strange
competition among mass mailing worms. And you're laughing because now you see even all these years later the reality we went through and that was like the beginning of all hell breaking loose.
Yes. Yes. Exactly. On the other was Sasser exploiting a Windows network vulnerability without requiring somebody to open an attachment. The same malware author was experimenting with both worlds. Yaskon was identified shortly after the Sasser outbreak and arrested by German authorities. Microsoft
had offered a reward for information leading to the identification and conviction of those responsible for malicious attacks against its customers. That story is worth remembering because the people writing malware during this period didn't all look like the organized cybercriminal operations we're going to encounter later. Some malware was written by individuals seeking notoriety. experimenting, competing with other malware authors,
or demonstrating what they could make computers do. Yeah, like, maybe I can make somebody's computer just suddenly start making fart sounds. Oh, no. Yeah, they're trying to work. Oh, it's really annoying. Well, yeah, maybe in the very, very early days, that's what malware would have done. Well, that's what... Well, in the early days, brain... And some of the other early worms we talked about in 279. The early viruses. That's
what they were doing. They were doing shit like that. Or there was some other thing I heard about. I don't know if it was a real virus or whatever, but there was some kind of thing that maybe was being distributed. It was supposed to be a joke sort of thing. And some of the things you get were Joke .flipped. Like it would flip all your icons. Supposedly. I don't know how true it was. And the other one I remember was joke. I was
going to say, you can definitely ask chat. Describe what you're remembering. And I bet it could go and look. For sure. Yeah, and the other one I read was joke .scared. Where it would pretend to do something like, you know, erase your hard drive. Yeah. Right. We not do things like that. No. That's right. We not do that. We not make
computer make fart sound. That's not what we do. Well, that isn't what you do now. That is correct, unfortunately. But that's what you did. Yeah. Early on, that's the kind of stuff you did. And you caused all kinds of mass mailing havoc. Havoc, yes. Big time havoc. No, we not do that. We not do that. People really could get password to adult website. No, no. They go
click on sex pistol shit. No. We send those attachments. They click. They get the password for the adult website. Right, scammer. I don't think the adult website era. was around... There may have been
small websites, but... Right. I don't know if it's as... If it was as widely available as it is now. Yeah. Only drinking one. I'm not gonna drink a lot. You sure, Terry? Yeah, I'm sure.
I'm not gonna drink a lot. All right, I'm just checking. No, no, no. Yeah. That doesn't make the consequences harmless. Blaster and Sasser disrupted real systems used by real people and organizations. But the motivations and economics of malicious software were changing. Increasingly, criminals were going to recognize that compromising
thousands or hundreds of thousands of computers wasn't merely an impressive, well, it wasn't that either. I must be allergic to this section because, man. I think so. I guess. Oh, God. It wasn't merely an impressive technical accomplishment. Those computers had value. They could send spam.
They could attack websites. They could conceal other activity. They could steal information. They could install additional software. And they could be controlled as part of botnets. That transition from malware as an outbreak to malware as infrastructure is one of the most important changes in this entire history. Yeah, so that basically started malware as a service more or less, right? No! Well, that came later. Not entirely.
Entirely right away. It took many years later before the infrastructure could turn into. That was basically the start. That was like the start. It was a test run to see how it worked in practice. But the infrastructure was too iffy because we
were all on various types of connections. Some were on dial -up, some were on ADSL, some were on DSL, some were on... I know what I'm saying is that was the beginning of it, more or less, of malware. It wasn't fully out there yet. It was the beginning of the malware era. But as we put it under the do this as a service model,
that came... years later, I think the SASS, the things as a service model came on around the pandemic. Yes. Sounds about right. Yep. That is right. Oopsie. Oh, no. Okay. But we'll find
out for sure when Because we'll be reminded of this when I develop the next section before we do what we learned. Yes. What just happened? Whoa. The heck? You just logged in. That's what just happened. Yeah, but I wasn't doing anything, so that really doesn't make any sense. Not me. I didn't do it. I'm just sitting here eating
my juicy steak. There he goes. No, I'm still here. That was my stupid ghost or whatever that was. That was your ghost. It must have been. Hey, it's not Halloween yet. The hell's going on over here? I don't know what's going on with Team Talk. It's done that kind of shit occasionally. Yeah, it does. I've had it happen. It does. It
does. Yeah. And now Terry's sounding awful. And now Terry's breaking up. Big time. Oh, that's better. He'll probably come back. There he goes. He'll probably come back and stabilize. I hope so. Oh, there he is. Let's see. We not do nothing
wrong. You all lie. That's right. We not do any of this, all of this good. All right. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I had to reconnect. You're good. Much better. But before we get there. 2005 gave the security industry one of its strangest controversies. This time, the questionable software didn't arrive from an anonymous worm author. It came on commercially
purchased music CDs. Oh, yes. That is where we are going to stop the podcast for today. Yes. Yeah, that makes sense. That's a good stopping point. I told chat when we were working on Braille, I said, we will make sure to stop at a logical heading point. And so this is a logical heading point. And by the way, the company mentioned
here is mentioned multiple times in this segment. Between 2005 and 2013, can anybody, I know Nick is reading, so he cannot answer this, but can anybody else tell me it might be? Oh, let's see.
LimeWire, maybe? No. You are somewhat on the right track because this particular company was very much involved with music and gaming. Oh, damn it. labels. Yep. Big machine? Huh? No. They're
one of the big four. Right. The big four. Metro -rate record labels. Oh, wait. Oh, I got it. Very movies. Warner Brothers? No. You're in the right field. You're getting warmer. You're in
the right field, though. Warmer. Warner. Oh, no. You're getting Warner Brothers on your radar? Uh -oh. That can't be good. Warner Brothers did movies. This company did... Well, they... I think they did do... movies, music, and gaming. Oh,
yeah. Right. Oh, it's on the tip. Xbox? No, that's a Microsoft product. Right. But they did make another really, really popular gaming console, though. Nintendo, maybe? Preston started to say
one word. He started to say one word and that was going to get us closer to it. Sony. Sony is correct. Preston was going to say PlayStation. Which would have been correct. Which is also going to be Talked about in this series because they had a major. I remember. Problem. Yeah,
I remember. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. You will not. No, you're not. He wanted to go behind our stove, and it's a gas stove, and if he hits that line, we're in trouble. That's his ass? Yeah, right. It's more of his ass. It's more our ass. Your ass? Yeah. See,
how come you always talk during the security box, but you don't do it during my show, Jack? Well, you're supposed to, because you're the tail scout cat. Yeah, I remember that one because I was on, I think, PS2 or something. And I remember the day when Sony was out for like, what was
it? A couple of weeks. It was a while. I do remember that. I remember that one. I can tell you that. I think it was out for like a week or more. I know it was a while. That's when I started playing PS2. I was actually online. I got a PS2, though.
Two or three. I think it was two, though. But I believe PlayStation. I thought it might be. I thought PlayStation was in here, but maybe it's a different one. This paragraph is not really about that per se. No, I just searched for places,
but I'm not finding it. But I thought maybe it's another company we're thinking of. Well, I do remember Sony getting owned at one point. Jared, this is one I do remember. I do remember Sony getting owned. I do remember that because it was down, their store was down for quite some time. That was six years later. PlayStation was
six years later. Damn, that was close. Okay, oops. That was six, but PlayStation is Sony and Sony's in here twice. Well, you said the right, I mean, you basically said the right company. I mean, you just said one of their products, so you're fine. You got it correct. You got it. You're fine. Good job. Yeah, you got it correct.
Yeah. Well, maybe both pretty much got it correct, but you had the right idea. Yeah. Terms? What major new term that we'll be talking about next time? Hmm. I think it's in front of me, so I
can't really... It is in front of you. That's what I thought. Gentlemen, the term I'm looking for is rootkit. Uh -huh. Oh, jeez. This was the first sighting of what would be then known as
a rootkit. Rootkit. Oh, God. whether it's going
to be, now we are going to continue this under 280s branding. Yep. I'm not going to - I say you just do 280A. So we're going to do ABC. Yeah, we'll do 280A. Yep. Well, I'm going to try and get something out for news notes. So I can keep everybody updated on the breach stuff. So we may be B. At this rate, the way we're going,
I think we're going to have probably a 280D. That's fine. That's what they're there for. I think that's what we're going to be heading for. That's fine. As long as... I had in my early tech days, I did a 21A and B. So... This will
break a record. Yeah, I mean, if we get through 43 pages per episode, I mean, we're looking at, let's see... That could... Holy shit, that could actually take us, like... If I'm... Thinking where if I've got this right, this could take us like five weeks. But that's fine. Okay. You
know, we're going to take as long as we can to find a national stopping point. I didn't realize until after it was built. I'm like, Chad, we're not going to be able to do this in one day. Yeah, there's no way. Hell no. Even I knew that when I was going through it a bit. But when I looked, I seriously thought, when he said 196, as I've said before, I thought that was a dictation error. Or a typing error. If you don't believe me...
But it's not. Oh, no, I'm believing you. I'm believing you now. I'm believing you now. I believe you now. I actually kind of perused it, but... Yeah, it... Does anybody else Have anything else
They would like I would have stuff if I were to listen to the cyberware, but I haven't been behind, so that's why I don't have much. I mean, I do have something un -security related. I mean, Dolly Parton passing away, but that was about it. That's the big news of the week. That's why we did a little tribute at the beginning of the
show. Well, I did a tribute yesterday. The day she passed, I did a tribute on my show. I still have to upload it, so I can upload it, and then if you want me to let you know, I can. But yeah, I did like an hour tribute. I don't have any... of her material. There are two albums. One by the guitar tribute dudes and one by... I can give you... I can put it in our folder if you want. And one by Midnight String Quartet. Yeah.
I mean, I can give you all of what I have of hers. Okay. I have a lot, so I can give you... Yeah, that's Jet meowing again. I don't know why I fed him. I don't know what he's bitching about. Jet. So vocal. You can kill us. Maybe he likes security. I don't know. I don't know.
Well, he came on starting when we did tailscales. Tailscale, tailscale. Tailscale. Tailscale kills. Fires. all these guys' old eyes. So, yeah. Dude,
some more tributing. Yeah. I mean, people are probably going to be doing tributes all week, so. Yeah. Oh, dude, we'll do one on throwback. I did some yesterday. So, I'll play a couple more from the card tribute dudes. Yeah, just do that. I mean, yeah, just do that. I mean, I can give you more Dolly Parton when I go upstairs for the night. If you want to do something, you know, on the show next time, I can give you what
I have. Okay. Mr. J, did you spot anything? think so i mean yeah it's a lot of the same kind of stuff we've already discussed you know nothing really new nothing way out of the ordinary crazy
that needs to be reported i think no yeah i think i agree so in that case we will save we will save this file and our respective devices and we'll let Jared get back to work. And it's all gonna be okay. So. This has been Security Box, where we take a bite out of security and give
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