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Consider the Constitution

Consider the Constitution artwork

The Madison Paradox: Empowering Government While Limiting Power

Jul 23, 202527 minAudio
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In this episode, host Dr. Katie Crawford-Lackey explores James Madison's constitutional philosophy with professors Eric Kasper and Howard Schweber, co-authors of "James Madison's Constitution: A Double Security and a Parchment Barrier." The conversation unpacks two key Madisonian concepts: "double security" (the idea that both federalism and separation of powers work together to prevent tyranny) and "parchment barriers" (Madison's concern that written rules alone aren't enough to constrain power).

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SPEAKER_02Welcome to Consider the Constitution, a podcast that cuts through the noise and provides insight into constitutional issues that directly affect every American. We examine the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Consider the Constitution is brought to you by Robert H.

SPEAKER_02Smith Center for the Constitution and James Madison's Montpelier.

SPEAKER_03Hello and welcome back to Consider the Constitution. I'm your host, Dr. Katie Crawford Lackey, here at James Madison's Montpelier. When James Madison drafted the framework for the U.S. Constitution here at Montpelier, he envisioned a system that would guard against tyranny through a careful balance of powers between states and the federal government and among branches of government themselves. But more than 230 years later, those constitutional structures are being tested in ways that Madison may not have anticipated.

SPEAKER_03In this episode, we're exploring some of the key principles James Madison believed were essential to protecting liberty, including the need for layered government power and the limits of relying on written words alone to constrain authority. We're joined by Professors Eric Casper and Howard Schweber, co-authors of the book James Madison's Constitution: A Double Security and a Parchment Barrier. Dr. Eric Casper is the director of the Menard Center for Constitutional Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire.

SPEAKER_03And Dr. Howard Schweber is a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is a professor of political theory and American politics. Welcome to the show, Eric and Howard. It's so great to have you with us today.

SPEAKER_00Great to be here. Thank you for having us. Yeah, thanks for having us.

SPEAKER_03Now I want to start with the title of your new book, which was released earlier this year in 2025. So the title references two phrases tied to James Madison. You mentioned this double security and this parchment barrier. For those of our listeners who might not be familiar, can you break down what those phrases mean and why they really matter today when we think about how government works?

SPEAKER_01Sure. Well, uh the double security line comes from Federalist No. 51. Uh that's a paper that Madison wrote that's primarily about the separation of powers, also about federalism. Madison says in Federalist 51 that in a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government, and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. He then goes on to say, in the compound Republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.

SPEAKER_01Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, and at the same time, each will be controlled by itself. So Madison is telling us that we're not just relying on the separation of powers with what at the time was this proposed constitution, but that federalism is also an important check on government overreach, and that both the different branches of the federal government as well as the different levels of government will help to protect us from the others, in a sense. The parchment barrier line comes from Federalist number 48 that Madison wrote, which is largely about or maybe entirely about the separation of powers, I suppose, where he discusses that it'll be sufficient to mark with precision the boundaries of these departments in the constitution of the government and to trust these parchment barriers against the encroachment spirit of power is a question that he asks.

SPEAKER_01And he has concerns that, as he puts it, a parchment barrier, something on paper, that that will be enough. Because as he talks about in particular in that paper, the legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. And so Madison's point is that just putting it on paper isn't going to be enough, that that's an important first step. But that in and of itself isn't going to stop someone in a position of power from trying to seize more.

SPEAKER_01And so you have to rely on the checks and balances and each of these different departments in the national government fighting it out amongst each other. Whether this works empirically and what the results are there is kind of another discussion we can have, but uh that's a theory that Madison is working off of when he uses these phrases double security and parchment barrier.

SPEAKER_00There's two things that jump out at me about the double security phrase. First, in Madison's view, federalism and the branches of government, the separation of powers, those weren't separate. Those were vertical and horizontal versions of the same thing. And the thing that they are is a vertical and horizontal version of preventing too much power from being concentrated in one place. That was the thing, one of the things, more than any other, that he was deeply afraid of. Too much power in one place would necessarily lead to bad results, even if the people were well-meaning. The second thing is we use the phrase separation of powers, but it's actually a misnomer because checks and balances are all about overlapping powers.

SPEAKER_00Truly separated powers. I mean, imagine if Congress could make spending bills, and that was the end of the story. The president had no veto, the executive branch had no role in distributing the money, right? Genuinely separated powers are silos and they don't have any checking function. And that's true on the federalism side as well. So in Madison's vision, the federal government and the state governments would have overlapping powers, and the branches of the federal government would have overlapping powers. And that's how vertically and horizontally the system of checks and balances would be maintained.

SPEAKER_03I think when you both mention this structure that Madison is trying to create here, he is someone who is very focused on designing systems and institutions rather than focusing on the individual rights that people should have. And I think that may surprise some of our listeners that he, again, is more focused on creating these frameworks. Can you explain why he is so focused on that versus maybe listing, again, kind of all these individual rights?

SPEAKER_00It's important to remember that in Madison's draft of the Constitution, there are extensive rights protections that would have limited states. He lost that argument. But he was quite concerned with protecting rights and using uh he proposed a council revision that would re uh to be formed of senior members of the federal government that would review every law passed by states or the Congress and strike them down if they infringed on rights or simply were unwise. So Madison believed in a very extraordinarily powerful version of what we now call judicial review, combined with a very wide set of rights protections.

SPEAKER_00He didn't get those things in the end. The other thing, and he lost a lot of arguments. There's a wonderful article somewhere that lists all the arguments that Madison lost in the creation of the Constitution and calls into question, as does one of the chapters in our book, his identification as the father of the Constitution. He certainly played a key role, but if you look at the actual design that came out of the process, as I say, he lost an awful lot of arguments. The other thing is that Madison did indeed depend on structural arrangements, ambition to counter ambition is one of his famous Federalist 51 phrases.

SPEAKER_00But he also separately believed that you needed to have virtuous leaders. He relied on both. So his defense of elections in Federalist 10 is all about the idea that the people are basically wise enough to choose the most virtuous from among them, and that's what elections are for. Elections come from the word elect. It's about choosing the best. And Madison believed in that strongly. He did not believe that was sufficient, however. So his big innovations, one were these institutional arrangements to supplement the hoped for relatively, relatively virtuous leaders.

SPEAKER_00And secondly, representation. In Federalist three, he declares that the discovery of representations of principles, the thing that was missing in all ancient republics, and that the Americans have invented as the new science of politics. So everywhere you look in Madison, you know, you ask why is it one thing rather than the other? The answer is almost always that it's both. He wants to have rights and structures, he wants to depend on institutional arrangements and virtue, he wants to have self-rule by the people, but also removal of the people from any direct role in the operation of government. That's a line from that same Federalist paper I just mentioned.

SPEAKER_00He was the champion of trying to have things both ways all the time.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, I would say uh Madison's one way to describe him as you know, he's an all-of-the-above type of guy when it comes to how do we make sure that these rights are going to be protected. Now, it it is true. I mean, uh the systems and structures are very a very important way for Madison of doing that. Uh something we alluded to a little bit in the answer to the first question was a line that Madison had in Federalist number 47, where he talks about the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny, right?

SPEAKER_01And he wants to make sure that this power is going to be overlapping, it's going to be shared, but it's going to be shared by these different groups. Now, it is true that Madison did oppose the idea that George Mason had at the Constitutional Convention to propose a Bill of Rights to be added to the draft document. There are some caveats with that, though. I mean, one is that this proposal came relatively late in the convention. There was, I think, some concern on Madison's part, as well as on the part of a number of other delegates, uh, that this could reopen a lot of questions that were settled at this point.

SPEAKER_01It could extend the convention for perhaps an extended period of time. And so I think part of the thinking there by Madison is let's take what we have with this constitutional draft and move along and get this thing approved. Madison also, during the ratification period after the convention, is either in his letters is either lukewarm or very much questioning whether there should be a Bill of Rights added in. But I think a lot of that concern also stems from the fact that the anti-federalists, some of them at the time, were moving to try to get another convention and to reopen all these questions and kind of use a proposed Bill of Rights or the fact that the proposed constitution didn't have a Bill of Rights as a way to do that.

SPEAKER_01To Howard's point, once Madison is introducing the Bill of Rights on June 8th, 1789, in the first Congress, he does talk about how if these amendments are added, he says they will have a salutary tendency. They will have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community that this is going to have a very positive effect amongst the population. And in particular, he says if they are incorporated in the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a particular manner the guardian of those rights.

SPEAKER_01They will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive. And so writing these rights down is going to help to protect them above and beyond these kind of structural protections that are already built in. And you only have to look at what the Supreme Court in particular has done over its history in terms of looking at the Bill of Rights and interpreting that as its own check on congressional and executive and also state powers over time, right?

SPEAKER_01And if there's no Bill of Rights, that is a much harder thing for the courts to do.

SPEAKER_00You know, when we look at Madison's statements and writings, especially the Federalist Papers, it's important to remember he was a very strategic actor. He was not by any means always sharing his deepest and most personal sincere thoughts. He was trying to accomplish things at different times. The Federalist papers are written to try and get people to ratify the Constitution. When the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention agreed to ratify the Constitution only on the condition that a Bill of Rights be added, Madison turned around. You know, his view of the desirability of the Bill of Rights changed. So there's a lot going on.

SPEAKER_00And as Eric pointed out, the anti-Federalists who are pushing the Bill of Rights were doing so primarily in the hope of scuttling the entire project, calling into being a new convention, which they understood and Madison understood perfectly well, would have no chance of producing a new Constitution at that point. So it's important in viewing Madison's actions and writings to recognize that strategic environment and to also recognize how unsure a thing the Constitution was. Eric said earlier, you know, Madison's attitude can be described by let's accept what we can get, and that's right, and there were limits to what they could get.

SPEAKER_00But just to reiterate the point, I think it's very clear that Madison personally, and in his drafts and provisions and in his writings, was a strong believer that there should be rights protected by courts, uh, that limited states as well as the federal government. Again, he didn't win all those arguments. Or in the case of the last one, not until the 14th Amendment in 1868.

SPEAKER_03Let's talk about power. Madison seemed deeply concerned about how power operates, how to control it, how to balance it, how it could be abused. How did he think about power in this new structure of government and what can we learn from that today?

SPEAKER_01I think when it comes to power in Madison, what uh sometimes might get lost is his concern with making sure government has enough power. We talk about Madison's concerns about uh government actors having too much power and how we prevent that. But the fundamental problem to be addressed under the Articles of Confederation was that the national government didn't have enough power to be effective. And so when Madison talks in Federalist number 51, he's got that line: if men were angels, no government would be necessary.

SPEAKER_01If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. But in framing a government in which it is to be administered by men over man, the great difficulty lies in this. You must first enable the government to control the governed and then the next place oblige it to control itself. So there is this kind of balance that Madison is over these years trying to work out. How do we make sure that we have a national government that has enough power to do the things it needs to do when it comes to questions about national security, when it comes to questions about being able to regulate the economy, all these sorts of things, but then make sure that nobody in the government can grab more power than they need to be effective and to start doing really bad things with it.

SPEAKER_01And so that's why we see these designs in the system the way we do. You know, Congress is given this massive list of powers in Article 1, Section 8, but then we see it broken into two chambers, and the president has a veto over legislation, and the courts can review what Congress does in terms of their constitutionality. So we empower, but we put these limits on it. And so I think that's a key thing to understanding Madison. It wasn't just about limiting power, it was about making sure that the national government in particular had enough power to be effective in the first place.

SPEAKER_00That's absolutely right. We started to talk about the constitution of rights and the constitution of powers. Very, very often, both in law school and in colleges, the course on the American Constitution is divided into two semesters, one on structures and systems of power and one on rights and liberties. And the students are always much more excited by the rights part. But Madison was much more concerned with the powers part. And Eric is exactly right. It's again one of these all of the above things. He wanted limits on powers, but he wanted generously empowered national government with good state capacity. There's a really important essay that he wrote in 1787 called Vices of the Political System of the United States.

SPEAKER_00And it wasn't his model of a constitution, but it was his public statement as to why we needed one. And there are really two themes in there. And one of them is the federal government simply doesn't have the power to do the things it has to do. And the other one that gets overlooked is multiple references to we have to control the states. The states are violating people's rights, the states are engaged in terrible acts of lawmaking, the states are not paying their debts, the states are not cooperating with national programs. He was very, very angry with the states and very mistrustful of the states. And that goes to the concentration of power and the federalism question, but that's one of the reasons he thought we needed a much more powerful national government than we had had previously.

SPEAKER_00And that informs his understanding of federalism, which was yes, there should be areas that are left to the states to control. But for example, in that 1787 document, he said one of the really profound problems we have is the false notion that states have sovereignty, which he considered at that time to be an absolute error. You get to the Federalist papers and he changes his tone a little bit, but as I said, that was a strategically written set of essays. All of these things come into play. I really think it comes back over and over, and Eric got it exactly right with all of the above. Madison is always trying to balance things.

SPEAKER_00He's always, I want states to have certain powers, but right now they have too much. We need a national government to restrict them and make them behave better. We need a federal government that can do lots of things, but not too much, and the power needs to be distributed, so it won't be gathered in one hands. We need checks and balances, but we also need virtuous actors. It really is, I can think of no better way to describe it. He wanted everything, and he thought we needed everything.

SPEAKER_03Howard, Eric, I think you're really getting at the heart of the big challenge that the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, what they were facing, you referenced, Eric, the Articles of Confederation, the structure of government that existed before the U.S. Constitution. And the lack of power or authority that the national government had. Essentially, the government couldn't regulate tax trade. There was a real moment of is this new country going to crumble because we don't have a strong national government?

SPEAKER_03And I think Madison in particular saw that. That's why he was preparing so thoroughly for this convention, creating the Virginia plan, which he brought with him to the convention. And this ties into one of the big themes that comes up throughout the book about decision making. How does this new government not only balance the powers as we've been talking about, but how does it make decisions? And how is this group of delegates going to decide who makes the decisions?

SPEAKER_00We have Madison's notes from the convention. They're notoriously unreliable in some places. We do know that while there were divisions, there were nothing like the sort of deep, viciously partisan divides we've seen in other periods of our history, arguably including the present. There weren't parties, and that was crucially important. The participants in the convention were able to make exactly in accordance with Madison's visions, free form constantly shifting alliances. You'd form an alliance on this issue in this way and a different alliance on another issue.

SPEAKER_00This was his part of his theory of factions, that there should never be fixed factions. You can read Madison's discussion of factions to say the existence of national parties will be fatal for American democracy. As Eric said earlier, whether that's empirically true or not is a different question, but he was deeply, deeply worried about what he called fixed factions. It's the same reason he wanted religion kept out of politics, because if you have a party or a voting bloc based on a religion, that block will be unified. People will not freely join and leave and vote for other blocks.

SPEAKER_00Over time, I think the Constitution moved closer to Madison's vision. I'm thinking particularly of two things: uh the extension of the Bill of Rights to the States and subsequent amendments that limited the states, and this is perhaps the contentious part, strong judicial review. The Supreme Court and the federal courts, over the course of the 19th and especially the twentieth century, quite controversially took on the role of exercising judicial review in a very substantive way. And that is something Madison absolutely wanted, whether or not he specifically wanted it to be the courts or a separate body.

SPEAKER_00His vision is actually closer to the Chelsenian model we see in Europe of a separate constitutional court, that is a separate entity to review legislation and determine whether it's appropriate or not. But the aggressive use of judicial review by federal courts and the extension of rights to bind states as well as the federal government were both modern moves and both moved the Constitution much more closely toward Madison's vision than the version that was in place from 1787 until the post-Civil War era.

SPEAKER_01If you look back to Madison's proposal introducing the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, he had that proposed amendment in there to protect freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, uh right to a jury trial at the state level. And Madison comments during the debate that that's the most important one on the whole list that passes the House, but it is rejected by the Senate, which of course, the in particular the way the Senate was structured at the time, with senators being appointed by state legislatures. You can see why that got removed there and not in the House.

SPEAKER_01But the U.S. Supreme Court's incorporation of much of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment in the 20th century, I think definitely matches a lot of Matt Madison's vision in both making sure rights are protected in the federal constitution from state infringement and also ensuring a role for the courts to have those rights be protected.

SPEAKER_03As we close our conversation today, I want to reference something we talked a little bit about earlier. This Federalist 10, you both talked about the idea of almost an expectation or responsibility that leaders of the country will be virtuous leaders. And Madison entrust the people to choose those leaders. When we think about today's political landscape and the fragility of democracy, we think about civic trust, public virtue. How does Madison's conceptualization of what this should look like, how can we take a a note from his book and move forward?

SPEAKER_00I think that's a fair statement, regardless of one's political preference. You may approve or disapprove of the extraordinary chance, but there's definitely something happening. There's been a generation-long project by constitutional conservatives to create a constitutional revolution that would reshape in certain ways the constitutional structure, most notably the unitary executive, empowering and concentrating power in the executive, and limiting the ability of Congress to check the executive and of courts as well, and in other ways. But precisely on these institutional arrangements areas, the civil service, the authority of the president to dismiss officials, all of these are areas that did not come out of nowhere, you know, with Donald Trump and the current political situation.

SPEAKER_00They started in the 1980s and were part of a long-standing we use the word conservative. It doesn't mean quite what it means when you're talking about, say, economic policy, but judicial conservatives have been engineering this constitutional revolution and with great success. The point I wanted to observe is it's a very un-Madison revolution. The moves that we're getting from the U.S. Supreme Court, from the Trump administration, going all the way back to the 1980s, the conservative revolution, people like Scalia and Bork, this was all a very much an anti-Madison move away from his model of checks and balances and toward a much greater concentration of power in the executive, much more policy-making discretion in the executive, much more direct control by the executive over the creation of law and policy as well as its implementation.

SPEAKER_00This is a very long list. But I think it's interesting to note that the debates at the convention, the ones that Madison won and the ones that Madison lost, are the very same debates about constitutional design that we're having right now. And it is interesting to note that the group that's doing really well right now in the last few years, uh in the Roberts Court in particular, have a very distinctive and very un-Madison vision of how the structures and systems of government should work.

SPEAKER_01If Madison were around today and kind of looking at, you know, how much Congress doesn't do, part of that, in all fairness, since the beginning has been because we do put these extra limits on Congress and these extra hurdles for Congress to be able to pass legislation, for instance. But for Congress to just kind of seed that away, and I think also Madison would kind of be surprised by the public being so comfortable with so much governing by executive order, for instance.

SPEAKER_01Madison certainly studied history. He saw examples of powerful executives around the world, even living earlier in his life as a British subject, as a colonist. He understood that there's this thing we call powerful executives, particularly once the Constitution is established and we have these things not only on paper, but uh we have these structures that are moving to not see some sort of momentum build over time in the legislative branch to do more, to seize back power, I think would surprise Madison quite a bit.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think there are two really huge illustrations of that. So one is in the 20th century, the creation of the administrative state. And it's not that Madison would have been shocked by the existence of all these agencies and rulemakers, but he would have assumed they were all under the control of Congress. I don't think it would ever have occurred to him that Congress would create these kind of entities and then give them to the executive to run. Although, to be fair, to a great extent Congress tried to keep these things independent from executive control, but the Supreme Court, for many decades now, has been pushing them more and more toward control by the executive. The other thing goes back to the very, very beginning of what we were talking about.

SPEAKER_00Madison assumed that people would have institutional loyalties. Ambition to check ambition. He thought members of Congress would care that Congress is powerful, so their ambition would be fed. He did not foresee a situation in which members of Congress rely for their political success on their party and their president rather than on the success of their institution.

SPEAKER_03Well, I want to thank you both for providing these really insightful thoughts on Madison, his priorities as he was preparing for and going into the convention, and then what was actually implemented in reminding us that things were left out. Madison didn't win every argument, but he did really inform the structure of the Constitution, and you really brought it forward to today, and how we can kind of continue to live this legacy, Madison's legacy. So thank you both.

SPEAKER_00Our pleasure. Thank you for having us again. Thank you.

SPEAKER_03And I want to thank all of you listening today. I hope you'll share this show with your family and friends. And join us again in two weeks as we consider the Constitution.

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