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3 Things

3 Things artwork

C Raja Mohan and Pratap Bhanu Mehta on the Iran war and the new global order

Oct 27, 20261 hr 19 minAudio
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In this special episode of 3 Things, The Indian Express Group’s Executive Director Anant Goenka speaks with foreign-policy expert C. Raja Mohan and political theorist Pratap Bhanu Mehta about the Iran war, US-China competition, political upheaval across South Asia and the forces reshaping the global order and India’s place within it. Produced by Shashank Bhargava and Ichha Sharma Edited and mixed by Suresh Pawar Watch the episode here: https://youtu.be/00hFaC00Dj0?si=rTgU89ij8ybZAxoC

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

Speaker 1Hi, I'm Itchha Sharma and you're listening to Three Things, the Indian Express news show. Since the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on the 28th of February, the war in Central Asia has dragged on for eight months, disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, threatening global energy supplies and raising fears of a wider regional conflict. And despite attempts to secure a lasting ceasefire, tensions remain high,

Speaker 1with the conflict continuing to affect oil prices, trade and relations between major powers. But what does this conflict tell us about the world taking shape around us? And how are wars, competition between the US and China and political upheaval across South Asia changing the global order and India's place in it? In this special episode of 3 Things... Anand Goenka, the executive director of the Indian Express, is joined by foreign policy expert C. Raja Mohan and political

Speaker 1theorist Pratap Bhanumaita for a wide-ranging discussion on the forces driving this moment of global uncertainty and how they connect conflicts abroad with political change closer to home. To watch the video version of this conversation, click the link in today's show notes. Now here's Anand Goenka.

Speaker 2Blessed to have these two gentlemen with me here. Thank you both for being here. Really, so nice of you to start with you. Like I did the last time we spoke, BRICS summit happened. It was a decent resolution from what I hear, from what I understand. India's had some interesting role to play in that resolution and it was a good, something came out of it.

Speaker 3The wars, two wars are both not stopping. Iran-US, who's winning today?

Speaker 4I think the best way to describe it is a strategic stalemate. I think India See, I think, but we've got to distinguish between the two. The war is being fought on Iranian soil. America is a distant power. They've lost some of the bases, or they've lost some soldiers, a few, maybe counting in tens. What Iran has endured in the last two years, I think, is far more. So, it's not two equals fighting in from similar circumstances. Of course, the U.S. is the number one economy. Iran has been

Speaker 4battered by economic sanctions. And what has happened in this so-called Operation Economic Outcast actually makes it a lot worse. Now, second point is both countries are also internally divided. But there again, the comparison would be inapt. In America, look, OK, Trump might lose the election. Democrats might come back. But what Iran we saw in January this year, massive protests about the legitimacy of the regime. the need for change and the violence, the state violence against the protesters. People

Speaker 4are still being executed. So I think we are in, again, apples and oranges. But a strong nation went into an adventure, you can say.

Speaker 3But it can always pull back.

Speaker 4That is the advantage America has always had, right? You fight a war in a distant land, walk back as if nothing has happened. We saw it in Iraq. They've just vacated from Iraq after 20 odd years. They left Afghanistan two years ago without... So they can come and go. But I think it's what's happening here and what happens inside Iran. And I think we don't pay enough attention to that. There is an internal struggle in Iran, I think. What comes out of it at the end of the use of force and the internal contestation. I think that will be far more interesting because the regime and the revolution, 47 years after the revolution, it doesn't have the same credibility.

Speaker 2But do you think that the old guard, that hardcore conservative regime, has that gotten strengthened after the attack?

Speaker 3Absolutely.

Speaker 4I think the IRGC has become stronger. I think you had knocked off the supreme leader, Khamenei. The president is largely a figurehead. You removed people like Larijani who had the experience to negotiate, mediate. So it is IRGC now. It is IRGC that writes a letter to the American people, not Pejaskia, who was in the US for the UN meetings.

Speaker 3So it tells you who is in charge.

Speaker 4And I think if you go back to the attempted peace deal, the so-called moderate sections negotiated a deal. But it was IRGC that trumped it by shooting at the ship. So I think there we are.

Speaker 3But, and Dr. Mehta can obviously step in whenever, but... America can pull back.

Speaker 2That's what he kind of said whenever he was... But they're not. And obviously it's because of Israel. I feel like America wants to pull back, but somehow Israel's got a hold on them, which for the first time is making the relationship between America and Israel very complicated for the first time, in a long time at least.

Speaker 5See, I think it's... You're right, Israel is a big factor, but I think it's more complicated than that.

Speaker 3One... It's not easy for America to pull back.

Speaker 5Every time it's pulled back, there has been a future cost America has paid.

Speaker 3The Iraq adventure, misadventure, right?

Speaker 5In a sense, it, I mean, apart from the internal divisions it created within the United States, right? in some senses, it left the region and increased Iran's power much more, right? Now, think of the consequences of pulling back right now.

Speaker 3It left Iraq and made Iran more powerful.

Speaker 5It made Iran more powerful, right? The natural counterweight to, in a sense, Iran, right? It cleared the way for ISIS to gain strength. American withdrawal has always been accompanied also by a trail of devastation.

Speaker 3It's not costless, right? Interesting.

Speaker 5Now, in this case, who is going to bear the cost if America tomorrow pulls out, right? It's going to be America's allies, the Saudis, who are already bearing some cost. Their bluff has been called out about how much they can defend themselves, right? Are they actually a fully sovereign power in control of their own security? That's already been called out. I think the reliability of America as a negotiating partner has already been countered. It's true that the

Speaker 5IRGC scuttled the deal, but it's also true that America has been bombing in the middle of peace talks. If you're in Iran, just from a purely rational actor point of view, I mean, the Iranian regime is despicable, but just from the point of view of a rational actor, what guarantees do you have after the sequence of events over the last two years that you're not going to be bombed again, that this peace deal is not just America buying for time, right? So it has a credibility,

Speaker 5in a sense, deficit. None of its regional allies are going to trust it, right? If your allies can't trust you on your own security, there is a loss there. Now, it's true that America is a superpower. It's the world's largest economy. So it will absorb those costs. But I don't think it's costless in terms of reputation, in prestige, in terms of America's ability, and moreover, in this case particularly. What has America lost most powerfully in the last two years?

Speaker 5All international orders are hypocritical. All great powers are hypocritical.

Speaker 3We know that.

Speaker 5But this is the first time you have an American regime that is utterly nihilistic about international law. It says we don't care a damn. Absolutely don't care a damn. You have taken that bet. You have made the world a much, much more riskier place.

Speaker 4Right?

Speaker 5The incentive for Iran to produce nuclear weapons increases, the incentive for every country in the region, particularly Iran, to continue to use proxies and accelerate the anti-Ontario increases. Now, if under those circumstances you just turn around and say, sorry, bye-bye, we've broken the China shop and we are just leaving, I don't think it's going to be costless for the United States. And I think it's one reason why. Yes, there is political division in America. But the fact of

Speaker 5the matter is nobody has been able to stop Trump effectively from actually, in a sense, prosecuting or carrying out the war. The military-industrial complex still goes full force.

Speaker 3So I actually don't think it's just Israel.

Speaker 5I actually do think America has locked itself in a position where the consequences. Of leaving without some kind of victory are going to be great. Now, the risk in the situation, and that's my big worry, is that I don't see an equilibrium where we can simply say both sides will withdraw.

Speaker 3I think both have an incentive to accelerate.

Speaker 5Iran has not been able to completely control the state of Hormuz as it declared it wanted, right? I mean, depending on the counts, 50% to 60% of ships are going through. America has not been able to meet its strategic objectives of regime change. And I actually don't see an equilibrium where one or the other side will not escalate at some point.

Speaker 3I think we are being very complacent.

Speaker 5I think we are just assuming Trump's getting tired, Trump's getting bored, he wants a way out. The Iranian people have taken a battering. Iran's supplies will start running low at some point, 60 percent inflation. In fact, those are exactly the moments. where for the Iranian regime also, normal politics will return to Iran if this war ends.

Speaker 3And Raja is right. It is an internally divided society.

Speaker 5In fact, I actually think internal political change in Iran has been slowed down by this intervention, not accelerated by it. So if you are the IRGC, you have not fully established control over the states of hormones, which is your declared objective. you are then also vulnerable to a domestic challenge. So I actually think the incentives on both sides to escalate are actually still there. I think there's a lot of tactical circling of the wagons going on. And I

Speaker 5think the world would be, I think, would sleep better. Or at least we would sleep better if the world were not so complacent about it.

Speaker 2So, okay, so first you're saying that there has to be a binary winner here.

Speaker 3There has to be a winner and a loser, a clear winner and a loser.

Speaker 5Or at least a narrative where each side can present a victory.

Speaker 3That's how all wars end, right? Yeah, exactly. In this case, you're saying that it's tough to get that.

Speaker 5It's tough to get that. I think given the position the Americans have locked themselves in.

Speaker 3And so what's better for the world, if America wins or if Iran wins? No, no.

Speaker 5What's better for the world is if the war stops, if neither of them looks in the framework.

Speaker 3Of winning or losing, right?

Speaker 5Which is to say they look at it in the framework of long-term peace and development and the creation of a stable world order. I think winning and losing, the framing of winning and losing in this situation does not have.

Speaker 3A good equilibrium outcome.

Speaker 5I think it will take an immense act of statesmanship to say, look, whatever has happened has happened, but what we need to look at is the long-term well-being of our people.

Speaker 3Trump hasn't been able.

Speaker 5To get oil prices down below $ 100, right? Talk of strategic objectives. Yesterday, he said, it doesn't matter. We can sacrifice San Diego and Los Angeles. I mean, yes, he says a lot of things.

Speaker 3I missed this. Sacrifice and how?

Speaker 5Los Angeles and San Diego. This is some more of the collateral damage of the war.

Speaker 4Some election rally?

Speaker 3Right, in the election rally, right?

Speaker 5So, in some sense, I don't see how we can frame this as a win in any way. I think it's going to be difficult for him to. And remember, I mean, he also has even more hawkish people in the Republican Party.

Speaker 2So two questions, right? I think win, lose. What is a win? What is a loss?

Speaker 3We figured out.

Speaker 2But I think one thing is evident that Iran nuclear weapons now is like, is very tough to keep them from not having their own nuclear weapons, right? I mean, is that something that we are all... It's not assured at this point. No, but I mean, it's very likely that... It's not assured. It's possible that they will not end up with nuclear weapons now because now they seem to have the domestic push for it.

Speaker 4No, the IRGC would say, look, if you give up nuclear weapons, you're finished. And current tactical situations, if you don't make concessions on the nuclear issue, the pressure will continue on.

Speaker 3So, I think that's where it is.

Speaker 2So, it's not very clear that they will end up.

Speaker 3So, it depends on, look, what.

Speaker 4Is the final outcome... on this war? What does it do to internal change in Iran? Can Iran then accept some kind of a concession for other guarantees? I mean, it's not going to be just, I'm going to give up nuclear weapons. What is the regional security order? How will it relate to the Arab countries next door? So, those will be part of it. If there is a, you know, an anomaly after a great war like this, there will be peace settlement, the main parties will sit together. We're nowhere near that. So, we are still in the middle of the war. So, a lot would depend... So, you see this going on for at least six, eight

Speaker 4months more?

Speaker 3Yeah, I mean... The way it's looking, yeah.

Speaker 4But if there is a revolt tomorrow in Iran, it'll go. Or tomorrow, like the Democrats, if they come to power, assuming Democrats come to power, they pass a resolution in the House. No more excuses. Three months, we are leaving. Yeah. See, until now, the Senate has passed so-called war powers resolution without binding the president's hand.

Speaker 5Yeah.

Speaker 4Or leaving it, you know, up to his discretion. But a forcible action by the U.S. Congress could contain Trump's own room for maneuver. So we don't know. Then the Democratic Party... Pratap can talk about it now. There are more leftists in the party, just as in the UK, the opposition to Gaza, the whole Middle East involvement. Here, there is the new left-wing so-called DSA, which is challenging many of the conventional notions, just as on the Republican Party. The right-wing extremists challenging many of the old assumptions about

Speaker 4American leadership, America needs to take care of the world. Similarly, here they're saying, look, retrench, why we in this?

Speaker 3Let's move away.

Speaker 4So I think it depends on how that sentiment plays out in the US. But for now, I think the establishment is still strong enough to control the outcomes. But I think there's going to be new voices in the Democratic Party. And that's why anybody associated with the Biden administration who is associated with the Gaza issue, is absolutely unacceptable to the democratic left.

Speaker 3So, I think there are a lot of interesting things.

Speaker 2Biden administration also was, in a sense, supporting Israel's aggression to Iran.

Speaker 4So, the argument is, see, Gaza is the main issue, say, the popular issue in the left and the US. They're saying the Biden people were complicit. They didn't punish enough in Iran. But they were, right?

Speaker 3I mean, they formed... Yeah, I mean, of course. You see, U.S.

Speaker 4Under Biden was taking the traditional view that, look, Israel is our partner. We got to... They're saying we're trying to make them more reasonable, but they never put the pressure on them. They kept giving them weapons. People say, look, Biden was muttering under his breath and they had horrible phone calls with Netanyahu. But the fact is, in the end, they didn't do anything to stop. To some extent, actually, it is Trump who is putting some constraints.

Speaker 2Yeah, Trump seems more upset with Netanyahu than Biden did.

Speaker 3At least publicly, that's what comes out. Can I just footnote on that? So I think Raja is absolutely right.

Speaker 5And obviously the most important critical variable is domestic politics.

Speaker 3In Iran and in the US.

Speaker 5But I think it's a bit of a mistake to think that Trump has been softer on Netanyahu or there's more difference.

Speaker 3Look, the harder on Netanyahu, right?

Speaker 5What's the new issue in Israeli politics, right? Settlers in the West Bank. The fact is, even as we speak, it's not just that, you know, peace in Gaza is not fully returned or whatever. It's that Israel is actually expanding settlements in the West Bank. Now, if you're going to have any hope for some kind of regional settlement, right, even the Saudis have made clear, right, even if you don't believe in a fully Palestinian state, even if, you know,

Speaker 5as people showed, you want kind of Hamas removed, all of that, It is just very difficult to imagine a solution where Israel keeps continuing to.

Speaker 3Expand the settlements.

Speaker 5Britain has sanctioned or a kind of a sort of sanction on trade from, you know, things with the West Bank. Americans haven't really, really clamped down on it.

Speaker 3Right.

Speaker 5I mean, that's one very simple test to put to Netanyahu. OK, at least maintain status quo. don't expand the ambit.

Speaker 3Of territory as we speak. So, I don't think, I don't think the underlying.

Speaker 4No, no, I was only referring to the Iran policy. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Speaker 5No, no, I agree.

Speaker 3I agree with you. I mean, it's a.

Speaker 4Netanyahu wanted, you know, revolt, support armed, you know, Kurdish rebels, start the internal... Yeah. Which he rescinded and said, no, I'm going to negotiate.

Speaker 3I think that's what... Yeah. I mean, Israel is a guy who's broken the ceasefire, right? Not Iran. Yeah.

Speaker 4Right.

Speaker 3That's a separate issue.

Speaker 4In the Iran policy, Israel had a super hard line saying, look, regime change is the immediate objective. But Trump's saying, I'll negotiate, I'll get a deal. So he's kind of been wavering on that. People say, look, Erdogan is another friend of Trump who's prevailed on him from doing certain things in Iran, that is supporting the Kurdish rebels. Because if you do that, Turkey has its own concerns. So not in the internal what's happening in the Palestinian issue.

Speaker 5Agreed.

Speaker 2Isn't it true that Trump has been, has tried to make deals both with, I mean, I think with Iran, I'm not talking about Iran, and Israel has always come and, you know, violated the deal that Trump, I'm not talking about America's word.

Speaker 3No, there have been no deals with Iran.

Speaker 4I mean, it's really, I think Iran, see, what Pratap is saying is that whether Biden or Trump or any American administration has not been able to put pressure on Israel in general, Netanyahu in particular, of doing the kind of things he's doing internally. And that every settlement, even the, for example, the Gaza Peace Accord, which it's really favors Israel in some sense.

Speaker 3Even that, of course, Israel doesn't accept. But I think that is.

Speaker 4The I think the point that that is being made. But there also, I would say. Trump and Biden have gotten away with it because the contradictions within the Middle East itself, the Arabs are not. The only protests are in the Western capitals, in Western universities. There's no opposition to what Netanyahu is doing.

Speaker 3That's a great thing.

Speaker 2I want to understand what's happening in the Middle East and the whole region.

Speaker 3So the Arabs are saying, not our fight?

Speaker 4They're acquiescing. You can say, look, it's not that formally they're still committed to two-state and all that stuff. But they've actually authorized Trump. to, you know, the UNSC resolution where he's one man who's in charge of the Gaza peace and he sets up the Gaza peace board, his son-in-law is in charge.

Speaker 3So, I think, you know, it's unimaginable that this would have gone on.

Speaker 2But the fact is down for us, all the Middle Eastern, I mean, the large, Saudi, UAE, all the Middle Eastern, the large Middle Eastern countries, they have always, I mean, they have in the recent past given full support to America, right, over Iran.

Speaker 3They've always supported Iran.

Speaker 2American alliance, they've said they're all friends of America, they've allowed bases in their country.

Speaker 3So, they have said, we're on Team America, right?

Speaker 4No, two things we're talking about. One is how you deal with the Israel-Palestinian question.

Speaker 3Which is an old question.

Speaker 4Yeah. But it's still there. I mean, I think when we talk about the Gaza issue. Other is the how to deal with Iran. I think on the Gaza question, I was saying, eight Arab and Muslim countries, including Pakistan and Indonesia. Yeah. supported giving Trump the full authorization of running Gaza for.

Speaker 3Two years at least.

Speaker 4So there, I think the rhetoric of saying we are for Palestine and their actual politics of willingness to you know wink and nod at what Israel doing or wink and nod at what so that is one part Iran has actually has had very few friends in the broader Arab world some of the friends have been ousted like in Syria and Lebanon these are under pressure So, these two are two different theatres in that sense.

Speaker 3But they are both supporting America, no?

Speaker 2In both instances, you've got these eight Muslim countries. Both these issues, you've got eight Muslim countries supporting American strategy, American policy, right?

Speaker 4No, but the two, I mean, on the Iran issue, I think the main Arab neighbours of Iran fear Iran's domination. 90 million people, I mean, it's not just now, when Shah of Iran going back to pre-revolution, I mean, Iran was bigger than all its neighbors, has a sense of great story. And that natural temptation to dominate the Gulf is there. And I think that has continued under the Islamic regime. And there, the Arabs always say they're feared, afraid, or you have to accommodate. But now what's happened is

Speaker 4Iran's capabilities have grown so much that if they support America too much, he's saying, I can bomb your oil infrastructure. I can bomb the American bases. So he's saying, Uncle Sam is far away. I'm here. You better deal with me. And the Americans are still not letting that logic go further. So that is what is open for contestation, I think.

Speaker 3Absolutely.

Speaker 5And just to add to that, I mean, you know, I think Raja's kind of spot on that. I think there are two other, I think, issues in this, right? One, I think, post-Arab Spring, right? There's the question of the kind of the legitimacy of the different Arab states. Iran, of course, had proxies, but almost all of those states were also funding transnational actors, right? The UAE and Sudan, Muslim Brotherhood as a kind of patronage of various actors in the region, right? Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. I mean,

Speaker 5everybody was engaging in this kind of massive sort of transnational proxy stuff.

Speaker 3Saudis in Yemen against Iranian Houthis, right?

Speaker 5And I think one of the recognitions that dawned on them is a lot of that transnational stuff might actually come to devour them at some point in the future. I mean, it's one-on-one logic, right? You flood a region with armed proxies. At some point, they're going to be hard to control. So I think the one thing you began to see over the last 10, 15 years is a kind of slow weaning back away from that kind of support, not completely giving it up, but at least in ideological terms. And I think the Palestine-Gaza thing was

Speaker 5part of that, because the one thing they feared is a kind of transnational support for Gaza or Palestine.

Speaker 3In the region.

Speaker 5The second thing was the big bet the Saudis were making, which is what's the post-oil future.

Speaker 3Of the region, right? It's finance and tech.

Speaker 5Finance and tech would require more integration into the American-Israeli ecosystem. Those were the kind of two mega bets in some senses. Now, one of the things I think Iran is managing to do a little bit is to say that, look, you can't make those two bets anymore. completely riding roughshod over us. A, we are actually in a position to do damage to you. So one of the odd things about UAE is supporting

Speaker 5the U.S., but it's also doing side payments to Iran to say, don't bomb Dubai. Don't bomb Dubai, right? I mean, it's, you know, this is like stuff, movies like Dr. Strangelove are made of, right? And partly because there are these kind of compelling contradictory.

Speaker 3Dynamics that they are caught in, right?

Speaker 5Which is there's a long-term one and then there's the immediate one. And the second one is this whole kind of big technology energy play, right? where, again, Iran sending the signal, look, we can actually make that play vulnerable, right? We can even make the finance play vulnerable.

Speaker 3So I think you are going to get.

Speaker 5And that's the context in which if America just walks away, you're actually going to get a pretty radical reset of each of these countries saying, who do.

Speaker 3We ally with?

Speaker 5And if your allies are then Pakistan and Turkey, right?

Speaker 3It changes... the credibility of the American posture in the region.

Speaker 4See, Middle East is not for the weak-hearted, nor simplistic categories.

Speaker 2Yeah, it's quite complicated, but they, I, okay, so from a very simplistic perspective, I understood that most of the Middle East has chosen Team America. Traditionally, the last, the modern 10, last 20 years, whatever.

Speaker 3And this war, I get a sense of making them take a.

Speaker 2Nuanced view to Iran, which they probably didn't have to do earlier, to both Iran and Turkey.

Speaker 4Because Iran's power has grown.

Speaker 2In spite of this war, Iran's power has grown because they've shown that they can do.

Speaker 4No, just see, having long-range missiles... in large numbers.

Speaker 3They always had, no?

Speaker 4No, no, not always. This is what they built up in the last 15-20 years.

Speaker 3Before the war, they had it.

Speaker 4So, they've been pulling them out bit by bit. That is, once you have long-range weapons that can't be defended against, I mean, that's the beauty or horrible nature of missiles, that there are no answers even with missile defense, etc. Some stuff will get through. So, deterrence has become impossible that Iran can today drop, you know, bombs on anyone. So, therefore, within its neighborhood, So, I think that is what has created the complications.

Speaker 3And now, that is a new reality. So, what, in fact, one of the arguments.

Speaker 4Arabs have is, look, if you do a deal, you've got to do something about the missiles as well. It's not just about nuclear weapons because his ability to disrupt, not through proxies, through military capabilities. I think this way, in a sense, if there is ever peace, the whole question of military capabilities, the regime to regulate it, all those issues will come. Proxies is the other issue.

Speaker 3So, I think Iran, the world.

Speaker 2is sort of waiting for that war to end because the repercussions are just tremendous because of oil prices primarily.

Speaker 3Is that the same with Russia, Ukraine?

Speaker 2Because I feel like Russia, Ukraine, in a way, it sounds terrible to say it, but in a way, the world had kind of taken it in its stride now.

Speaker 3Even Europe with all the energy prices and all.

Speaker 2I mean, I feel like there was a certain normalcy that kind of set in to that conflict.

Speaker 3And So I want you to respond to that. Other piece I wanted to ask.

Speaker 2Is, I don't know whether the American voter thought that America was worse off because of Russia-Ukraine. I mean, there was a view that America actually, you know, of course, technically has to defend Ukraine, but they're also friends with Putin. So, you know, American view on Russia American voters' view on the repercussions to America because of.

Speaker 3Russia and Ukraine also was, I think, a little bit nuanced.

Speaker 4I'll be brief. I mean, basically, I think the world is getting used to it. Human capacity to absorb pain and deal with the consequence of unexpected action. We saw it in the COVID as well. So for all the talk about oil hitting 200, it's still only 800. that there are issues in terms of what is doing to pump prices in the U.S., for us in particular, because we are a big importer. What is the forex, food, fertilizer, finance and all this stuff? It has been affected, but not by the expectation that the assumption of Iran that

Speaker 4by simply making Hormuz unsafe, you can bring the world economy down or you can bring the global oil industry down.

Speaker 3That has not happened.

Speaker 4And in fact, Americans have also shown, like just as Iran's power, single-handedly, their navy alone, there are no Europeans this time, cleared the mines, they opened a route in the south, some oil is flowing out. But that's not good enough, I mean, for the prices. And second, the Russia factor, you know, is not as important of the oil scenario, but it is becoming one. Trump is openly telling Zelensky, why are you hitting diesel in Russia as a major producer of diesel? Because finally what you pick up at the pump is a diesel, like for all the trucking industry in the U.S. So in a way,

Speaker 4you know, Russia is another major producer of oil and oil products. But it's not in terms of the immediate impact, but now what's happening, what Ukraine is doing to Russia's production of oil products, that's beginning to have an effect on the pump, on the directly. In fact, the European decision to release 100 million tons is under Trump's pressure. He's saying, look, release the reserves.

Speaker 5I think, I mean, I can completely agree with Raja.

Speaker 3I think, I think, two things, right?

Speaker 5One, on the absorptive, because I disagree. I think the Ukraine-Russia war had been normalized in a way. It's part of the fabric of the universe. The stalemate will continue. Honestly, I have no way of knowing. A, none of us, I think, know how Putin thinks, what the kind of threshold of sustaining this war is. But I do think there is a kind of nervousness still, I think, which also applies to Iran, which is you can actually be just one accident away from an escalation. So imagine a

Speaker 5civilian strike on Moscow, and even accidentally perhaps, that Putin has to respond to, or vice versa. I think the Baltic states, in a sense, are, in a sense, nervous. If Putin cannot declare victory, I mean, one of the other things that's happening both in Iran and Russia is, so this curious paradox that it's turning out that Russia's nuclear threat is kind of being seen as empty at the moment. But it also makes everything else more dangerous,

Speaker 5which is does he then resort to other kinds of proxies to create instability? That's the European paranoia. It's not that the Russian armies will come marching. But in a sense, Russia starts behaving even more aggressively as a kind of using proxies of all kinds, disinformation, cyber, whatever. So I think the risk levels are still high, and I think that's the issue in both countries. The other thing about Russia, right, which is just as a little aside, that the one

Speaker 5consistency in Trump, you have to give him that, absolutely consistency.

Speaker 3He absolutely loves oil, right?

Speaker 5I mean, this is like we want the oil economy, fossil fuel economy to thrive, right, against climate change. Interestingly, what's the play he's making with Russia, right? I will pick up your overseas oil assets. Right.

Speaker 3So I picked up Venezuela.

Speaker 5Now having Russian kind of state owned oil firms in a sense.

Speaker 3Right.

Speaker 5Now, underlying that is a kind of big premise. And this is going to be a big question for America. Right.

Speaker 3Which is.

Speaker 5Is Trump's being vetted to the oil economy? And it's kind of going back to almost the 1950s, that what America is primarily interested in is controlling basically oil production as much as it can around the world, not just domestically. So we've got Venezuela locked up, you know, potentially the architecture. Now, if we can get Russian overseas assets.

Speaker 4Even with Iran. He's selling the Iranians. He's selling the Iranians also.

Speaker 3Because they need.

Speaker 5That's a big shift, because one of the things we did think, right, 10 years ago, was that, objectively speaking.

Speaker 3There's no reason to have wars for oil.

Speaker 5Right. I mean, America was self-sufficient. It really does not need imports. We thought that's one reason why the U.S. would actually, in a sense, withdraw from the classic mercantilist race for oil. Suddenly you have opened that race up big time. And I think that's going to have repercussions. And it's not clear to me that the Democrats have any plan to roll that back easily.

Speaker 2Because he also got voted, the drill baby drill was very popular in this round, right?

Speaker 4Some sections.

Speaker 5Yeah, I mean, I think what matters is, in a sense, the price of energy, right? I don't think the issue is people want oil.

Speaker 3Yeah.

Speaker 5And I think the gap in the kind of Biden's green energy transition... Which in any case was going to be long term.

Speaker 3It takes a while to actually kind of get there. But also the execution flaws in that.

Speaker 5So that left this kind of interim gap where people began to say, okay, the price of energy is being hit by all these climate change types and woke energy types.

Speaker 2But China, on the other hand, made it a commercial opportunity. They doubled down on everything sustainable energy as a commercial opportunity.

Speaker 5Yeah, so China is doing both, right? I mean, it's not that kind of China scaling back on coal.

Speaker 3At least as of right, right?

Speaker 5But I think what China is promising to the world. So in the Biden administration, there were two poles to the technology competition. There was the AI pole.

Speaker 3The other was the green energy transition pole.

Speaker 5And the assumption in the Biden administration was, that it's not an international agreement, Paris Accord, UNFCC, that's called carbon taxes, that's going to get you to green energy transition.

Speaker 3You can actually use the mechanism of competition to get there.

Speaker 5So the best thing that can happen to the world is China and the US get into the race for technology innovation and green technology, which then lowers the cost of green technology for everybody, right? That was the Biden administration's thinking. So it wasn't as valid to the UNFCCC process. Now, in a way, Trump has kind of put that assumption aside. He wants to do it in AI because AI is a tool of dominance. But he doesn't want to do it in green energy where he says, I want to

Speaker 5position the U.S. as the technological leader and supplier of low-cost green energy technology.

Speaker 3That doesn't mean that there isn't innovation happening in the US.

Speaker 5I mean, it's a more complicated system. There are states, there are cities. So I don't think the climate change agenda has gone. But that is one very monumental shift that Trump has actually brought about.

Speaker 3And that's where the Chinese saw the opportunity, right? Which is that... If you.

Speaker 5Think green technology is a technology of the future, double down on that so you can have a lead on that.

Speaker 2Doesn't America feel insecure about losing the green battle to China? I mean, why aren't they feeling more competitive about that? Because, as we get to the AI piece, on AI piece, right, we're seeing very interesting. On the AI piece, for the first time, you're seeing an industry of people who don't like each other coming together and saying, please regulate, this.

Speaker 3Is going to blow up and we can't control it.

Speaker 2And you have the regulator, Trump, saying, I'm not going to regulate it because I don't want to lose to China, or paying attention to you know, AI safety, the way that the industry is saying, please, like, you know, please be careful. And the reason they're not is, I guess, a fear of China dominating. So, they're feeling that insecurity with AI and they're feeling as, they're feeling competitive with China with regards AI, but with regards to sustainable energy and with regards to anything sustainability, they don't feel China's competition.

Speaker 3So, how does that.

Speaker 4I think on AI, they seem to have found it via media, right? I mean, when the second Trump administration came into power, you know, the Paris summit of the AI conference, J.D. Wan said, look, regulation is nonsense. You know, we're not going to do any regulation. We're just going to give complete freedom to our tech capital to do what it wants. And Biden people constrained them. We're going to let loose. What's happened in the White House summit? I mean, we saw the pictures of the Tech Bros summit. I think, as you said, the technology companies are saying, look, we want some regulation. So what happened at the White

Speaker 4House summit was the so-called White House declaration. that there will be some attempt at self-regulation. The companies themselves will draw it. It's not mandatory, but it is a broad set of guidelines for self-regulation. And he's also announced AI, so not AI anymore. It's super intelligence force to monitor it. So I think they've taken one step in a way different from the traditional demands that complete regulation or complete freedom. And then he says, as you said, these guys hate

Speaker 4each other, so therefore they're going to police each other. So there will be constraints on them. But I think it's a step towards more regulation. And how they do it, I think the debate will evolve as the dangers evolve.

Speaker 3You don't think they're being as slow on regulation?

Speaker 4No, because by sheer circumstance, as you said, look, he said China argument erases. Look, we are in competition with China. We're not going to. But at the same time, the companies, he's telling the companies, come together, let's find some way of at least you draft some rules.

Speaker 3I'll have someone monitoring it and regulating it.

Speaker 2I mean, the Pope is writing in an American newspaper that, you know, we want AI, but not at the cost of.

Speaker 3I mean, the Pope is... I mean, when has that happened? When has the Pope gotten involved in anything like this?

Speaker 4Popes have become liberal in on climate change, on genocide in Gaza or in... So, I think popes have become more reflective and generally in a sense towards a more liberal side, I would say all the successive popes of the last many years.

Speaker 3Do you think that he's being at the right pace with regulation over here?

Speaker 5So, I think a political economy hat on this would be a little bit more sceptical of what's going on in the US. It's a bit more sceptical in the sense, in the following sense. First of all, how serious are these companies about regulation? I mean, as critics have pointed out, you keep saying regulators and self-regulators, do it yourself. Right.

Speaker 3There's no teeth in this White House declaration. Right.

Speaker 5So that's one source of cynicism, which is how much of this is kind of performative.

Speaker 3And I don't even know how to start. Well, well, so so so so there are different things. Right. One is. Are we even clear on what the objective of regulation is? Right. So there's a bunch of garden.

Speaker 5Variety threats that you can fix with court law, liability law. you run an AI program, it does something to your company, you can claim damages, right? Then there are the more sort of disruptive things like cyber attacks, bioweapons, AI safety, right?

Speaker 3And then at the kind of upper end of it is, in a sense, the extinction risks, the AI going rogue, super intelligence stuff, right?

Speaker 5Now, first of all, you need some consensus on where you are, in a sense, on the spectrum. The people who are resigning from open AI are at the third level of the risk, right? They actually think there is potentially serious existential risk. Bill Gates thinks there is serious existential risk. Now, if that's the universe you're talking about, then you actually need very many different solutions. Then none of this stuff is going to work. I mean, I think Bill Gates was right in his interview, right?

Speaker 3Which is... You're talking about the interview? Yeah, the interview with Ezra Klein. Ezra Klein, okay.

Speaker 5A long interview with, you know, there's a long discussion in AI that he says, look, you don't rely on normal thought stuff Right. That works for small liabilities, manageable damages. It doesn't work when you, in a sense, have existential risk. Oh, figure it out. If you do damage, we will sue you.

Speaker 4Right.

Speaker 3That's not going to work for AI.

Speaker 5So that's, I think, one story, which is the discrepancy between the accounts that people who are resigning from these companies are giving about the potential risks. And frankly, the potential of what has already happened. How many agents have gone rogue? What have they been able to hack? Even that information is coming out in triplets. There's no transparency there, right? So that's one reason why I think people are kind of confused. What are we meant to be regulating for? Are we just meant to be regulating for ordinary agentic mishaps,

Speaker 5misleading information, or existential risk?

Speaker 3The second reason to, in a sense, be cynical here, which is....

Speaker 5One simple way of slowing down AI is everybody is talking about regulating the.

Speaker 3Models, as it were.

Speaker 5But many scientists are arguing the way you slow it down is actually regulate the hardware, which is easier to regulate. Just say the number of chips and amount of energy you have available to innovate is actually going to slow it down. That's actually easier to regulate, because that's literally nowhere on the agenda. Third, and I think this is the point I think Adam Tooze, Bradley Long, I think serious thinkers about the American economy have made, which is now given the scale of investments in the sector, the financial.

Speaker 3Risks are massive.

Speaker 5The American headline growth number looks good. The stock market looks good.

Speaker 3Right. Very good. You take AI out of the picture. It actually doesn't look that good. In fact, wage rate is negative, right? Yeah.

Speaker 5So you have incredible amounts of debt built up, in a sense, or whatever these complicated financial arrangements are, right? And I think there's a lot of skepticism about... can you actually do this regulatory stuff? How do you square that with this bet people are making in the financial world on masses and masses of quick innovation?

Speaker 3There's a real tension between them.

Speaker 5And the cynics are saying, in part, these companies are actually putting out there, partly it's just kind of window dressing, partly it's to kind of cover themselves. Oh, we told you so, but we actually... Now, what's interesting in the American public is... The American public's reaction to AI is being rooted through one channel right now, which is there seems to be a much more growing momentum against data centers.

Speaker 3These are energy guzzlers. Some of it is don't build it.

Speaker 5In my backyard kind of story like you have against nuclear power. But it's interesting that that's actually the kind of the hardware channel through which a lot of that angst is, in a sense, being.

Speaker 3But that's a tree hugger kind of... Well, it's green.

Speaker 5It's partly, if you're cynical, you say energy cost, right? They're just raising the price of energy.

Speaker 4That's exactly one of the themes in the Tech Growth Summit, where he's telling them, guys, go and do something. Take care of your communities, where you're building a data center. Do something, social work. Like CSR type of work you do. And I think some of them saying they're already doing it. I think Pratap's larger point about cynicism and opposition, they will be in power if Democrats come.

Speaker 3To the White House.

Speaker 4If you take the Biden guidelines and Trump guidelines, they're two different ends. I think tech growths have moved it a little bit. So tomorrow they come to power. They have every one of these options to regulate more. I think this is a very classic American right. I mean, I think eventually it will come to somewhere in between and they still could make mistakes. But I think the Biden people are for much more regulation. You see, if the Democrats win, the entire, not just the left, but everyone in the Democratic side say, look, we've got to control this technology, not just in terms of hardware or software values. It must support the workers. It should have

Speaker 4the right political values. All that was included in the Biden thing. So I would say it's up for debate. How it will actually fall depends again on the political outcome within the U.S.

Speaker 3Itself.

Speaker 2So China is not being viewed as competitively with regards sustainability as it is with regards AI.

Speaker 3Is that still an accurate statement I've made?

Speaker 4On AI.

Speaker 3On AI.

Speaker 2But the insecurity of China winning AI is much more than the insecurity of China winning sustainability.

Speaker 4I think on sustainability, see, they control all the supply chains. The American effort, whether it is on rare earths, whether it is on the other areas where the Chinese are, they're trying to plug that gap or to put in the effort, industrial effort, to be able to break total Chinese control. It'll take some time. But at this point, there's no way. On the sustainability, Chinese are sitting on top. On the AI issue, they keep saying six months, we got a six months lead. I mean, I don't know if this is an accurate way of saying it.

Speaker 3Chinese are doing very.

Speaker 4Well on AI. They're going to keep putting it. I think the American advantage is really in the kind of innovation they have. But what the Chinese are focused is on diffusion, that you take it to the industry level, focus on robotics. Yeah. change the industrial production. So, they're also partly going in different ways in terms of how actually they'll use AI.

Speaker 3Actually, they can coexist.

Speaker 2We can imagine a world where Chinese AI and American AI coexist. So, you were saying something earlier which I wanted to talk about was, you know, we had an adab with Ruchir Sharma a few months ago where she said, and he said it many times in the past that, you know, there are some people who believe AI is a bubble and some people believe AI is not a bubble from an economic perspective.

Speaker 3But the people who believe that.

Speaker 2Whichever side of the spectrum you are on, the truth, as Richard said, will come when the interest rates rise. When interest rates go up, all bubbles burst. It's happened all the time. Interest rates have gone up as if yesterday was the next round. And the markets in America got hit, but not by all that much.

Speaker 5No, no, no. A, I'm not competent to talk on the economics and finance of AI, and certainly not after Richard, but I think everyone kind of looks at the politics of finance.

Speaker 3So one, I actually don't think... even people.

Speaker 5Who worry about the financial bubble necessarily think it's going to be a spectacular implosion, right? A kind of single event in some ways, right? I mean, there's, you know, there's still, and a lot of the U.S. 's problems are in part the kind of the public debt story in some ways. That's the real kind of issue on the credibility of America, right? Which the bond yield is going up on American treasuries. I think the worry is

Speaker 5not that, you know, with half a percent or one percent interest rate hikes, you will just see this bubble burst. It's just that given the kind of capital that's going into it, do you in five, seven, ten years expect the productivity gains to actually justify those investments?

Speaker 3Right.

Speaker 5And I think the story, the skeptical story is just much more of kind of accumulated problems that at some point manifest itself differently. So it may not be that the whole thing explodes. It's just that, you know, first a couple of companies go down, you can kind of backstop them. I don't think, at least of now, there's any reason to think you're just going to get a kind of spectacular financial blowout. in the next year and a half. I mean, we've known, as Raj has rightly said,

Speaker 5the world has turned out to be a lot more resilient on that score. I think there's a lot of kind of headroom in some senses on taxation. You can do all kinds of things to backstop that. But I think the mega story here, which is the U.S.

Speaker 3And China are both.

Speaker 5Taking the bet that what can get them out of their current relative economic stagnation?

Speaker 3China also has a problem, right? I mean, it's not like the Chinese economy is, right?

Speaker 5Is this bet on the diffusion of AI and the productivity gains it brings? And somehow those productivity gains translating into a form of.

Speaker 3Distribution, which keeps people happy.

Speaker 5And I think the skeptics are worried that that story may not actually pan out. I think that's the time scale on which to see it rather than.

Speaker 3Because the amount of money being put in.

Speaker 4I think, you know, just a small parallel. I mean, parallels are never fully accurate. But we had a dot-com bust, right? That didn't stop the internet revolution or the digital revolution taking place. Similarly, I think the technological revolution, what it is doing... as one of the more fundamental transformative technologies. I don't think anyone is doubting that.

Speaker 3Correct.

Speaker 4The finance of it, how that will play out, and then how does the system adapt? That's where it is. But I think the logic of the technological change, I think that will continue.

Speaker 2I thought we should just spend a few minutes on one thing that we got on the... Again, going back a little bit to the Middle East part, the whole fly Dubai incident, let's just talk about that a bit. How do you read that in terms of dynamic between India, Israel, and in a sense, Middle East?

Speaker 4No, I mean, I don't like conspiracy theories. There are too many of them floating around. But I think I would say the core issue that has come up is at what point do you draw the line for airline safety? That is, initially you trusted the pilots. You kept the doors locked.

Speaker 3There were airlines that said, no, he's looking too radical.

Speaker 4So, that's what, you know, the mental health. I mean, how do you monitor mental health? I believe the airlines do have fairly severe tests. So, in the end, I think you're not going to have absolute safety. But in this context, look, Israel is in the middle of elections. So, Netanyahu can claim things. But it also tells you that this flight is going from Abu Dhabi to Dubai to Israel. It tells you the new relationship that exists. But beyond that, I wouldn't draw some dramatic conspiracy here or this is about, you know, some way of project. I mean, we also

Speaker 4were getting into the anniversary of October 7th. I mean, uh today is the anniversary but the the sole idea that look something big would do would happen so i would say all that provides the context but the actual incident as you know you know it's very difficult to actually figure.

Speaker 5Out from outside yeah the only thing i'd say is like i agree with raja i think there's too much kind of conspiracism around it and anyway but It actually just highlights to you how much the world is hanging.

Speaker 3By a thread. Yes. Imagine if the attack had succeeded. Yes.

Speaker 4Right?

Speaker 3What would Israel's response and the U.S. response have been? Yes.

Speaker 5No matter who they are, I mean, that's a kind of second order question, right? And I think this is the part about the Russia-Iran, Russia-Ukraine-Iran story that we are. It is literally hanging by that, you know, that one slender thread, literally that one cockpit door that got open, right?

Speaker 3Or, you know, because of this pilot, right, from the inside.

Speaker 5In this world of technology, not just airlines, but you can also think of accidents through drones, right? And particularly in a context where you actually don't have global cooperation for any kind of risk mitigation and management. Now the US and China are talking a bit, but again, very rudimentary. That talk, those talks are not going to happen unless you're willing to actually share information, which neither of the countries that's the frontier of technology is going to do

Speaker 5it in a sense, right?

Speaker 3But increasingly with drones, right?

Speaker 5Drones are being used in third party conflicts by proxies. Will countries have protocols saying if you actually get attacked by a drone, there's an international mechanism to arbitrate where the drone comes from? Or does somebody just jump to a conclusion that for my security, I need to.

Speaker 3Wipe out this, right?

Speaker 5So I think it's just, I mean, that's the worrying part of this incident, that we actually came close to an escalation that maybe nobody would have wanted.

Speaker 3Maybe none of the states actually wanted it. But you are there.

Speaker 2Tell us a little bit about Saudi's... you know, inability to fight on its own and its dependence on Pakistan. And what is, how does that actually, how dependent are they on, how vulnerable are they independently?

Speaker 4I don't think they're still dependent on Pakistan or Turkey. They've just, I believe now they're moving in. Historically, they've just depended on the Americans, the kind of capabilities Americans gave them. But they never had a kind of fighting force that can actually do things on the ground. I mean, I think that was a well-known fact. But I think what's happened is we moved from an interstate conflict and the larger geopolitics that will give you some way of deterring. I mean, you have the now proxies. You have the Houthis. You know, there was always a problem between Yemen and

Speaker 4Saudi Arabia and the border was never been much of a regulated zone. So you have a force, the internal conflict in Yemen, once it spills over, How do you control them? And given that, you know, in the beginning, we talked about the transnational, supranational connections of these groups. I think the vulnerabilities have increased. The pressure from Iran. You have the pressure in the Yemen side. And you have the Americans becoming unreliable as well. So, every time Trump comes, he collects money. The question is now, he's

Speaker 4putting pressure on Saudis to normalize with Israel. So, I would say, but last two days, I mean, I mean, There is actually now, Saudis have stepped up. Iranians have, sorry, the Turks and the Pakistanis seem to have sent in some support. And American advisors are still there, helping. Almost there's one report which said 200 American military advisors are sitting there to help the campaign against the Houthis.

Speaker 2Any like proper profound change in the Middle East's place in the world after all of this?

Speaker 4I would say, I mean, a couple of things. I mean, I think one, it was really the UAE that offered this alternative first, starting with Dubai. Today, if you look at UAE, I mean, I think, what, 180 nationalities, relatively more openness in terms of, you know, compared to the other societies. They have a ministry of tolerance. I mean, a lot of other countries could do with it. That they invited Pope. to their country. Probably the first time that Pope had visited in the Arabian Peninsula. So, in

Speaker 4a way, the UAE was saying, look, there is an alternative model to the Islamic radicalism or this anti-imperialist, left-wing, Baathist notion of, look, fighting imperialism was the primary objective. To one of saying, look, we can make money, we can live well, and the fact that they accumulated oil revenues since the 1970s gave them a chance to do things which nobody thought was possible. You have American universities, New York University in Abu Dhabi, you have the French,

Speaker 4you know, museum sitting there, you have design institutes, you have AI centers. So, anyway, they've showed with money and then getting talent. You know, when I was in Singapore, many people were moving from Singapore to Dubai because they were giving even better terms for They've changed the rules to give citizenship even a little bit. But otherwise, Saudi Arabia are doing something similar. Saudi Arabia is a late entrant.

Speaker 2But they're all looking at Dubai as a model, right? Yeah, that's a model. And then Qatar, you saw holding the World Football Games or becoming a convention center for the world.

Speaker 3So I think they found a model.

Speaker 4But I think what this war has shown is that the shakiness of it, that is the pessimistic view. But I would also take the optimistic side, which means that, look, they survived. that Abu Dhabi is still standing. Dubai is still standing after receiving 300 or 3000 or more incoming projectiles from Iran.

Speaker 3So they're still there.

Speaker 4So I think it is, whoever it is, for India at least, 10 million workers there, we want the damn thing to succeed. And it's also, don't forget, it's a model that South Asia can learn from, of religious tolerance, of positive view of science and technology, of greater liberalism, Which actually, can you believe that it is Arabian Peninsula showing parts of it while South Asia is going the other way?

Speaker 2I mean, that's a, that's, that's, I mean, which, I mean, you know, like Malaysia and stuff, maybe, but the rest of South Asia is, the DNA of it is so liberal compared to.

Speaker 4I mean, I was talking about our own subcontinent. I'm not talking about South Asia, Southeast Asia.

Speaker 3Okay. Yeah. I mean, so I agree with one part of it. Raj has said which is I think the jury is.

Speaker 5Out I think they very may well may come out of this well and and certainly a lot will depend on what are the alternatives what are the cap you know uh uh uh how much capital they have how much they can continue to invest uh I wouldn't go as far as to say it's a model of liberalism or tending towards a model. It's a very controlled, in fact, ironically, going back to this, the one country which is the hardest to write about Palestine is actually that region. So, you know, let's be clear. There are still very few

Speaker 5political rights. There are still very few freedom of expression rights. This is a benevolent, it's a millet system model of a kind of religious toleration.

Speaker 3Okay, we'll let you build one temple. We'll let you build one church.

Speaker 5It's a small showmanship. And it's not a small achievement. I don't want to belittle it in some ways. I actually think it is the stepping stone to something.

Speaker 4It's a direction of travel, which is different.

Speaker 3In a sense, direction of travel.

Speaker 5But in a sense, the question is how much of that direction of travel will be sustained. It requires regime stability. And I think one of the things, I think, whatever the settlement of the Iran story is going to open up, It's always been the core issue of that region, which is that whole state building.

Speaker 3Story, right? Which is, can you build a state.

Speaker 5With a kind of thin layer of an elite and lots and lots of capital, right?

Speaker 3How resilient is a state like that? I think the.

Speaker 5Novelty of these states is precisely that they say, look, this is a very different kind of model. You can actually have 10 million expatriates who are not kind of citizens in the conventional sense, and yet it can be an effective.

Speaker 3Functioning state, right?

Speaker 5I think one of the things the war is going to do is kind of test some of that stuff in the long run.

Speaker 3Right.

Speaker 5I think particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, the stress test of what actually happens when serious reforms kicks in. We know historically countries are most vulnerable when reforms begin to succeed.

Speaker 3What the intra-elite bargain is.

Speaker 4Right.

Speaker 3I think I think that. Test is yet to come. I'll just add one.

Speaker 4I mean, I think when we were, you know, at least 20 years back, 30 years back, when India was engaged, beginning to engage in the post-independence period, our preference was for the republics, that guys in suits, guys who would talk the language of nationalism, progress, socialism, anti-imperialism. The Baathists, whether it's the Nasser or whether it is, you know, Saddam Hussein or whether it is the Assad family. So that's your... People who thought these were the guys who were going to bring progress to the Middle East. But

Speaker 4every one of them ended up in far worse dictatorships than what the guys in robes or the sultans where we said, look, these guys are a bunch of pro-American, you know, little tin pot, you know, sultans with, you know, countries, tribes with flags. But what they've achieved in the last 40 years, I think that is something that today takes out Asia, subcontinentally. We have 10 million people. Pakistan has 5.

Speaker 3Bangladesh has 3. So, where is the employment?

Speaker 4I mean, I think for South Asia that you have not been able to generate the employment.

Speaker 3All of us together, South Asia. It's all money, no? No, no, whatever it is.

Speaker 4No, no. People, you can squander that money.

Speaker 3That you... So much money. But the fact that, look, today... How many Lamborghinis can you buy?

Speaker 4No, no, that's okay. But where are your young people going to the Gulf, right? Where are your business people? Where are your exports today? One of the biggest destination of exports is the UAE. So, I think we got to give them credit for within the constraints of that they've been more open than the so-called republics. And they've created opportunities certainly for us.

Speaker 3Republics? Do you define republics? No, republics means, you know.

Speaker 4They're not defining in terms of religion. That they're actually so-called, you know, there's no, you know, citizens selecting their own, constituting a government nation of their own.

Speaker 3So, who you combine them to?

Speaker 4Monarchies. The so-called monarchies. The monarchies and the republics. That was seen as a divide in the Middle East. the monarchies have done much better in some sense if you look at the Gulf monarchies.

Speaker 2One small story because I always think about it. Election time I was in Bengal for this election. I met a guy who went to the government school there and he was at a shop with his neighbor same age who didn't go to who didn't finish college. He finished the government college this guy didn't go to college. The guy who finished college is in Dubai working as a delivery boy for whatever Dubai's version of Swiggy is.

Speaker 3He gets paid 6 lakhs a year. Okay.

Speaker 2Free food, free housing, and he gets a bike to do the delivery with.

Speaker 3And free fuel for the bike.

Speaker 4I'll just give you an example. In Pakistan, I'll just... How do you compete with... Just take Pakistan case. Pakistan exports 30 billion dollars annually. The remittances are 50 billion. See, it shows how backward we have fallen and that this is actually one of the few sources of optimism for the subcontinent's people.

Speaker 3I completely agree with Raja.

Speaker 5One, I actually think historically constitutional monarchies are underrated. Actually, even in Europe, the ones that did well, where if.

Speaker 3These regimes can actually... Nobody would have thought you would say that. No, no.

Speaker 5Actually, arguments for constitutional monarchy have always been more sophisticated, where if you can actually have a regime that can engineer a transition to something like a constitutional monarchy, it'll be a huge achievement in political terms. But I agree with Raj on the economic terms, that you can have oil revenues and squander them.

Speaker 3Look, so many states... have had this natural resource curse, right?

Speaker 5Where in a sense, the natural resources have been cause of civil wars, complete misappropriation, all kinds of things, right?

Speaker 3So at least to take that and actually build something.

Speaker 5And I think that the interesting pivot at this moment was there was thinking about what comes after oil, right? That you actually have to think of science, you have to think of technology, you have to think of finance. But I actually do think, I mean, I think Raja is right. We just underestimate how much we depend on them. I mean, our Kerala model, our shining Kerala model is so dependent.

Speaker 3Even now. But we achieved literacy well before.

Speaker 5No, no, but sustaining that model, sustaining that model has been so dependent on actually remittances from the Gulf, right? So, one, I actually do think in technology and economics, if nothing else, a certain kind of pragmatism and focus.

Speaker 3Saying, look, if there is an opportunity, let's say.

Speaker 5I mean, I was in Abu Dhabi once and there was a senior minister who at dinner jokingly said, he said, I thank Jawaharlal Nehru every day because Jawaharlal Nehru made us So I was thinking of, you know, old British Empire connections. They were officially governed by India. I said, no, no, Bombay could have been us. By putting all of these restrictions, you made sure that we got the advantage of finance, trade, everything.

Speaker 3Partly said as a joke, but I think that part I think is important to focus on. Guys, last piece.

Speaker 2Similarities and differences between all the youth activism in our subcontinent. You started, I think Sri Lanka was the first place we saw, then Bangladesh, then Nepal.

Speaker 3And then I find it.

Speaker 2A little hard to believe that the Indian, what we saw, the CJP thing was... sort of have anything to do with other ones, but it's kind of freakishly happening almost like by the clock every year in some part of subcontinent.

Speaker 3Is it a coincidence? Is there anything connected? Is there anything?

Speaker 4We see something in Pakistan as well. I think poor Imran Khan has been waiting for it to happen. But I don't know, this is Pratap's domain, but I would say, I think, we've seen this actually most, you know, where stagnation in society, where the traditional channels of communications are blocked the traditional forms of mobility are constrained. At some point, the street comes into play. And I think what we've seen happen is really the old elites, comfortable. They think

Speaker 4they've got everything taped. And suddenly, you have like Hasina. I mean, she believed that, look, she had the ideology. She thought she had the hegemony. She had the dominance.

Speaker 3But it just disappears.

Speaker 4Same thing happened in Colombo, where a newly elected government, which massive majority... Because it's again, the elites have not adapted to the change and they're not willing to, you know, recognize the problems below.

Speaker 3I think that I would see that as a source. There's a couple of things. One, we know historically.

Speaker 5These movements actually come in global waves, whether it was the 1960s student movements. And you can now add France to the mix, which is actually the French student movement is more massive, more violent, more assertive than anything going on in India right absolutely extraordinary what's happening in France, right? 400 schools burnt. I mean, it's literally, and there it's like high school students. It's not even like college students.

Speaker 3No, I didn't know it was high school. Yeah, yeah, no, no. And they're all demanding better schools.

Speaker 5They're protesting against the fact that France's PISA scores have dropped.

Speaker 3So the French education system is no longer competitive. I mean, it's really quite extraordinary. Now the teachers are joining.

Speaker 5So at one level, I think Raja is right that, you know, historically, whether it was the late 60s.

Speaker 370s, you actually do see global waves.

Speaker 5In a sense of these happening where there are kind of underlying accumulated problems in the global economy that kind of convert. So we do know anxieties about employment, even though the headline numbers are looking decent, 7.8% growth, are absolutely serious across the board. And I think particularly in this case, the new middle class, the anxiety that they might actually fall back again in some ways, right? Because that whole liberalization euphoria in terms of job creation has disappeared. And,

Speaker 5you know, there's also, I think at this moment, a point of which is, so in 2014, we changed political parties, right? We switched from Congress to BJP and a lot of people thought, okay, this is radical change.

Speaker 3You also thought the same? I did not think the same.

Speaker 5I actually, I mean, just to kind of clarify, I did think that the accumulated problems in the old regime had reached a point where it was going to implode and collapse.

Speaker 3And the only question.

Speaker 5Was whether this one can actually, in a sense, address them or exacerbate them, right? I think right now, one of the reasons you have this wave is, one, Rajasthan's conventional political channels are not working. You've, in a sense, clamped down on civil society. You've clamped down on political competition. The old elite is too comfortable. But I think one of the other reasons is there is a kind of deep underlying note of pessimism around these movements.

Speaker 3Now we've seen every political party, right?

Speaker 5If this is the best Vixit Bharat is going to give us, you know, I think historical memories are short, but think of the euphoria.

Speaker 3In the mid-2000s. There was a kind of growth narrative about India.

Speaker 5Now the numbers are not looking half bad, but the underlying sense of confidence about trajectory.

Speaker 3We've now seen every political party.

Speaker 5We've even given absolute majority to a political party. We've given them every damn power they wanted. And still this is what you get. So I think underlying this movement is a certain kind of darkness. I think it's a kind of breakdown of hope, and it is a breakdown of normal politics. I think the second thing to say, which is, I think, interesting in the Sri Lanka-India case, and I think maybe a difference with France in a way, which is, in India, what you're now beginning to get

Speaker 5is you're conjoining two particular strands which so far were operating separately. So one was the democracy bachao strand, which was not getting electoral traction.

Speaker 3Up till this point.

Speaker 5Last election also, constitution in danger, democracy in danger, maybe had marginal effect at the side, but it didn't. And then there's the education unemployment strand. What you've seen happen in the last few days, and what you've seen happen in Sri Lanka in some senses as well, was those two strands are now beginning to come together, which is people are beginning to see that the anti-authoritarian story, it's not sufficient to get you a good education.

Speaker 3System. Who knows, the other parties may do as badly, right?

Speaker 5But one of the necessary conditions is of even have a fighting chance against that is to actually put up a fight against authoritarianism. And I think this is the, in that sense, this is what makes it a more kind of interesting movement where both the students are kind of now walking both lines, right? Which is we want accountability over education, meet exams, all of that, but actually it has become SIR. And the political parties are actually, in a sense, beginning to join those strands. So this

Speaker 5has more the characteristics of a kind of 70s kind of social movement. Again, it's still very limited yet. The political fallout is uncertain. I mean, elections have a logic of their own. Who knows kind of how much the opposition remains united and all of that. But I think it's very clear that this current regime cannot continue to govern in the style and manner that it has been. Without alienating Gen Z. Without alienating Gen Z. And I

Speaker 5think allowing people who are on the democratic side of the fence to actually pile on to that social discontent.

Speaker 2I'll end on one last thing. Actually, what I wanted to get at, and maybe you can say this, Raja, was foreign hand involved in Bangladesh seeming to be quite well accepted.

Speaker 3That America was involved in what happened with Hasina and Bangladesh. How do you know that?

Speaker 4I don't know. No, no. I think, look.

Speaker 3No, is it a conspiracy theory? It's again a conspiracy theory. Where would you put it.

Speaker 2On the spectrum of conspiracy theory to maybe.

Speaker 4No, no, I would say that, look, all countries, as we said earlier, everyone tries to take advantage of a situation. But to say the regime changed or the revolution that's happened in Bangladesh is because of the foreign hand.

Speaker 3I think it's fundamentally unfair.

Speaker 4To the people who believed that the regime was getting oppressive, that it was not listening to them, elections were rigged. Then after, on top of all this, you say, no, no, the Americans did it. I mean, look, it's easy way out. No, in India, we didn't ask the right questions. What was our assessment? Could we not see what was going on? So, I think this is, you know, now the Americans are also taking the same thing. Look, Republicans say Iran is interfering in American elections. But I would say that, look, we intervene in other countries.

Speaker 3So, it's not that. I mean, I think... And I'm not saying good or bad, but I'm saying is it there or not there? No, I think that's marginal, assuming there it was.

Speaker 4The centrality was, look, in Nepal, in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the regimes became unpopular, unacceptable.

Speaker 3That is the principal cause.

Speaker 4Now, the moment you try to run away from that and frame it, or Americans did it, or US Embassy was training some people, or CIA was helping them.

Speaker 3And I think we've been through this, right, in the past.

Speaker 2No, actually, I want to understand this better. Because how much of foreign hand is actually there? How much of it is just like us watching too many CIA movies?

Speaker 4No, I mean, I think, look, all countries would want to get levels of interference from manipulating television, news, to actually supporting political parties. I mean, our history... I mean, the support for Indian political parties from outside. Now you're saying, look, you're collecting money from NRIs. Is it interference or not? So I would say, look, there are levels of this way. But I think that should not let us lose sight of the principal question of why these three Gen Z movements exist. Why established political parties were overthrown? I think

Speaker 4there were enough local causes, you know.

Speaker 2But obviously, America did have some, or you're saying that they might have been a fringe supporter.

Speaker 4No, but I say this, you and I won't know that kind of a thing, right? I mean, a level of support or, but what is.

Speaker 3You're saying our history, what's our history of America? No, no, I think look on the.

Speaker 4The CIA's involvement, you know, in Congress party. They say, no, no, Indira Gandhi in Kerala elections or the Soviet influence in India. I mean, I think it's well documented. They had huge influence in this country. But in the end, is Indian politics a history of foreign intervention? No. They can at best play a marginal role. But the real story is, like all great powers interfere. Look, we know the history of Europe. In France, Italy, without the CIA intervention, the communists would have won.

Speaker 3Maybe same thing they did in Japan.

Speaker 4But let's not make a fetish out of American intervention when actually the root causes are inside.

Speaker 3That's all I'm saying. Sir, I agree with Raj.

Speaker 5And historical perspective, right? If you look at the historiography of the 70s, the same thing was said about India, right?

Speaker 3So, now... What was that about India?

Speaker 5Which is, you know, in fact, Jay Prakash Narayan was a CIA stooge. By implication, Indian Express was as well. I mean, look, these stories have been part of, in a sense, this... But I think Raja's core point is right, which is, I think you have to distinguish between two or three kinds of cases, right? So, there's a history of foreign intervention... the kind the US has had in Nicaragua, Chile in 1973, Iran deposing the Shah in 1953. But actually, they're literally almost engineering regime change. Short of that, everything

Speaker 5else is in kind of the realm of ideas and dissemination. And as adult mature societies, you kind of live with it. I feel about foreign intervention the way about I feel about the political science literature on vote clientelism, right? There's this enormous literature on how particular politicians can deliver votes. Honestly, no evidence for that. You don't know what happens in the voting booths, right? So the underlying causes were palpable.

Speaker 5It's political science 101. If the opposition has not been participating in election for 10 years, all civil society channels are closed. At some point, that regime is going... And economic stagnation is looming. At some point, that regime will explode. Political science explanation 101 in Nepal, which is they were willing to tolerate a lot of corruption. Remember what was the trigger? The immediate trigger was kids of ministers tweeting about their foreign vacations.

Speaker 3And at some point, these young kids said... You know, this is rubbing it in our face, right? So the underlying.

Speaker 5Structural conditions were so palpable, so palpable, everybody who knew Bangladesh was saying six months before it happened.

Speaker 3That it's a matter of time, right? Now, yes, at the margins, are they.

Speaker 5Helping disseminate some information or some groups involved?

Speaker 3But I think it's an insult to the agency of people.

Speaker 5And frankly, actually quite dangerous for democracies to start believing this. Because fundamentally what you are saying, it's the worst version of the British argument that people are incapable of deciding for themselves.

Speaker 3No, but is there money?

Speaker 2Are governments giving money to the opposition?

Speaker 5Lots of people might be taking money. I think even if they are taking money, you can't infer from that that actually affects the outcome.

Speaker 2It might compromise decision-making for the country after the change happens.

Speaker 3But that is always publicly observable, right?

Speaker 5The point about Raja is that first let's concentrate on the publicly observable evidence.

Speaker 3And publicly,. Nothing of that.

Speaker 5I mean, it's acting like a normal Bangladesh transition regime has acted for the last 25, 30 years. Similarly, with the government, I mean, the literature on the.. And we also know in the dissemination of money, there are lots of interests. The first rule of how you read intelligence reports. Somebody who worked for intelligence once said, look, it's in the incentive of every intelligence officer to claim that they're having more influence. I'm a CIA guy, posted here. And

Speaker 5there used to be this classic story, right, where the KGB guy would report Pranab Mukherjee has given a speech denouncing the CIA.

Speaker 3It's because we gave money, right? Second, there's a political economy interest.

Speaker 5In fact, often business interests are far more influential than actually geostrategic government.

Speaker 3The reason the KGB and.

Speaker 5CIA were so active in India was in part because of the political economy of the rupee-ruble trade and.

Speaker 3The control of the tobacco flows.

Speaker 5It wasn't these grand regime change ideas. So I think, you know, the easiest option, and frankly, I think it is actually dangerous for democracy. to just prematurely get into this mindset of this is all foreign influence.

Speaker 3The problems are so glaringly obvious.

Speaker 5The miracle is that it's taken so long for these protests to happen.

Speaker 3It's not that they've actually happened.

Speaker 4Thanks, guys.

Speaker 2Thank you so much. Long, as always, interesting conversation. So much to learn from. And I look forward to doing it again soon.

Speaker 3Thank you.

Speaker 1You were listening to Three Things by The Indian Express. Today's show was edited and mixed by Suresh Pawar and produced by Shashank Bhargav and me, Itchha Sharma. If you like the show, do subscribe to us wherever you get your podcast. You can also recommend it to someone you think may like it, with a friend or in your family. This is the best way for people to get to know about us. You can also tweet us at Express Podcast or write to us at podcast at indianexpress.com.

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