Operation Overlord was not one day. It took months to prepare for D-Day and, even then, D-Day fits within the context of the continuing, larger war, which was still very much going on. But D-Day remains a crucial hinge point in the war. Today, we explore its story. Western Civ 2.0 Free Trial
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Speaker 1Hello, and welcome to Western Civ, episode 564, Operation Overlord. I'm going to start in Southwick House. It stands on a low ridge a few miles north of Portsmouth, a white Regency pile with a pillared front. It had been
Speaker 1actually requisitioned from a family who had lived there for 200 years and filled instead with maps, tables, teleprinters, men who hadn't had a full night's sleep in weeks. In the library, there was a vast plywood wall map of the English Channel and the Norman coast. It had been built by two carpenters who actually worked full-time with a toy company in Birmingham. And they were locked in a room until it was finished. And then they were locked
Speaker 1out of the secret for the rest of their lives. At 4.15 in the morning on the 5th of June, 1944, in the mess room of that house, A Scottish meteorologist, who we'll find out is probably the most important person in this story, named James Stagg, stood in front of the most powerful men in the Western Alliance and told them about a ridge of high pressure. Outside, the weather was appalling. Rain had been going sideways across the lawn.
Speaker 1The wind was a forced five, gust six, maybe seven. Somewhere in the anchorages and sea locks and the invasion ports from Falmouth to Harwick, 150,000 men were sitting in ships and landing craft, many of them already seasick, most of them sealed behind barbed wire for a week or more, all of them waiting on a decision that had been postponed once already. Stagg told the room that a gap was coming— not good weather, just a gap— Somewhere late on Monday,
Speaker 1the wind would drop and the cloud would lift. And there might be, maybe, a window of roughly 36 hours before the next front came through. After that, the tides and the moon would not line up again for two weeks. And the next window after this one, on the 19th of June, would turn out to bring the worst channel storm in 40 years, though of course nobody in the room knew that at the time. The naval commander said, if he was going, he needed the word right now.
Speaker 1The air commander said the cloud would ruin his bombing. The ground commander said, we need to go. And the man in the middle, a man from Kansas who had never commanded troops in a single combat until 18 months earlier, sat and said nothing for a while. In a silence that the people present would remember for the rest of their lives, as being much longer than it actually was. This today, in this episode, is the story of how
Speaker 1the decision in that room became possible, and then of the roughly 24 hours that followed it. Now, we left the war at the close of 1943 in the last episode. And to understand what happens next, we have to go back a few weeks to a walled compound in the Persian capital, Tehran, where three men sat down together for the first, and as it turned out, almost the only time, Tehran. So we're back on the 28th of November to the 1st of December, 1943, exactly where we left last time.
Speaker 1And there's the big three, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Joseph Stalin. The conference is usually remembered for its atmosphere, for Roosevelt staying inside the Soviet embassy compound, which was either a sensible security arrangement or a diplomatic capture, depending upon who you ask. And for the moment, when Stalin proposed, possibly as a joke, possibly not, shooting 50,000 German officers after the war, Churchill just stood up and walked out of
Speaker 1the room. But the substance of Tehran was simpler and much, much harder than all these anecdotes. Because Stalin didn't want 50,000 German officers to die. Stalin wanted the thing that he had been asking for for two and a half years. He wanted a date. He had been asking for a second front since summer of 1941. He had been promised one in vague terms in 1942 and had watched it become a landing in North Africa instead. He had promised one in 1943 and had watched it become Sicily and
Speaker 1then the slow grind up the Italian peninsula. By November 1943, the Red Army had fought and won Stalingrad and Kursk, had retaken Kharkov, had crossed the Dnieper River, had entered Kiev at the beginning of the month. The Soviet Union was doing by any measure that you want to use. Divisions engaged, casualties suffered, German formations destroyed, the overwhelming majority of the killing and dying in the European war. Stalin
Speaker 1arrived in Tehran with that arithmetic in his pocket, and he used it. Churchill arrived with a different instinct. The British case for the Mediterranean was not, as it's been caricatured sometimes, simple cowardice about the channel, though the memory of the Somme set very heavily on a generation of British commanders who had been through those battles. The British case was that the Mediterranean was already being fought in, that Italy was tying down German divisions at low cost. that the Balkans were soft, and that an assault on
Speaker 1a defended coastline was the single most dangerous operation in warfare. The British had tried it at Gallipoli, and Churchill had owned that decision. They'd rehearsed it at Dieppe in August back in 1942, and a Canadian 2nd Division had been destroyed in a single morning. But ultimately, Roosevelt sided with Stalin. That's the blunt version, and it's basically true. Over the course of three days, the conference settled on the thing that Americans had wanted since 1942, a cross-channel invasion of
Speaker 1northern France. In May 1944, supported by a simultaneous landing in the south of France, with the Red Army committing to a major offensive time to coincide, so that the Wehrmacht could not shuttle reserves from one end of Europe to the other. And then Stalin asked the question that made the whole thing real. Who's going to command it? Nobody in the room could honestly answer. Roosevelt said the decision would be made within a few weeks. Stalin said
Speaker 1with the flat practicality that made him such an exhausting negotiator, that until there was a name, he didn't believe in the operation. Now, look, he had a point. An operation without a commander is just a staff study. It's just war games. That's all it is. And in fact, the planning had been going on for nearly a year in exactly that condition. Since March 1943, a British lieutenant named Frederick Morgan had been working at Norfolk House in St. James Square under the chief of staff to the Supreme
Speaker 1Allied Commander, a title abbreviated, by the way, to C-O-S-S-A-C, and a title for a job that didn't yet have a boss, believe it or not. Morgan used to say, with particular gallows humor of staff officer's, that he was chief of staff to a man who didn't exist. But the outline plan went in that July. It proposed a landing in Normandy, not the Pas-de-Calais, which was closer to England and closer to Germany and therefore obvious, but Normandy,
Speaker 1which was further, harder, and less obvious, and which had the enormous advantage of the Coatin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg sitting on its flank. The plan called for three divisions landing on three beaches on a front of about 30 miles. The commander question was resolved in December. Now, the obvious candidate was George Marshall, the army chief of staff, the man who had built the American army from a cadre of 190,000 into a force of millions and who
Speaker 1wanted a field command more than he honestly wanted anything. But Roosevelt decided he simply couldn't spare him. The story is that he told Marshall he would not be able to sleep at night without him out of Washington, and that Marshall, who was constitutionally incapable of lobbying for himself, accepted it without a word of complaint, and then handed the drafted appointment note to the other man. Now, if that's not duty, I don't know what is. And so on the 7th of December, 1943, at an airfield in Tunis,
Speaker 1Roosevelt turned to Dwight Eisenhower and told him he would command Overlord. And he made the announcement public on Christmas Eve. Now, Eisenhower is a difficult man to write about and talk about because the qualities that made him the right choice are the qualities that make for a boring narrative. He was not a great tactician. He had never, as his critics in the British High Command never quite stopped mentioning, commanded a division in battle. What he could do was hold an alliance together, could absorb Montgomery's condescension. and Patton's
Speaker 1tantrums and de Gaulle's grievances and the combined chief's interference, all of it, and keep a coalition of nations with genuinely different war aims pointed in the same direction. There's a real argument, and I think it's the right one, honestly, that no other officer in either army could have pulled it off. He took two decisions almost immediately, both of them at Montgomery's urging, and both of them more important than anything that happened on the beach. The first thing
Speaker 1was to make the thing bigger. Three divisions turned into five on five beaches over a front of 50 miles, not 30, extending west across the base of the Coatin Peninsula so the evasion would come ashore on both sides of the Vire estuary and then can move on and hit Cherbourg fast. Two airborne divisions became three. Montgomery, shown the original plan on New Year's Eve, said essentially that it was a plan for a beachhead rather than a campaign.
Speaker 1and that a narrow landing would produce a congested lodgement that the Germans could contain. And honestly, he was right, and Eisenhower backed him on it. Now, the second decision followed from the first. A bigger landing needed more landing craft, and there were not enough craft anywhere in the world. And so D-Day slid from the first of May to the first week of June to buy one additional month of production from American and British yards. Churchill remarked that the destinies of two great empires seemed to be hung
Speaker 1up on something called an LST. We're getting into that, don't worry. Tehran had produced a promise. Finally, and I'm sure Stalin was relieved, the promise had a name, a date, a shape, and a shortage. It's very easy when you tell the story of 1944 from the direction of the
Speaker 1English Channel to make the six months of the year look like a long, purposeful countdown to the 6th of June. It did not feel that way at the time, and the other fronts, we have to remember, were not a backdrop. They were at the war, and they were consuming exactly the resources that Operation Overlord needed. Let's start with Italy, because Italy is where the argument about strategy turned into an argument about landing craft. By the end of 1943, the Allied advance had gone up the peninsula and had
Speaker 1stalled at the Gustav Line, a belt prepared positions anchored on the mountains behind Rapido and the Gagliano Rivers, in a country that might have been designed by a malicious god for defense. River lines running across the axis of advancement mountains overlooking every road, and a winter of rain and mud and freezing fog. Churchill's solution was to go around it. On the 22nd of January 1944, Operation Shingle put two divisions ashore at Anzio, 35 miles south of
Speaker 1Rome and 100 miles behind the German line. The landing was almost unopposed and very nearly decisive. Almost. The Corps commander, the American general John Lucas, chose to consolidate his beachhead rather than drive inland immediately. And there is a genuine historical argument about whether he was a fatal ditherer or a professional who correctly judged that two divisions could not hold a dash to the Albin Hills against a counterattack that was definitely coming. What is not arguable is the result.
Speaker 1the German commander, Kesselring, reacted with speed that made him one of the war's finest defensive commanders. And within a fortnight, the Allies at Anzio were not besieging Rome, they were besieged themselves, on a flat plain overlooked by German artillery in an enclave so shallow that there was no rear area at all. The field hospitals were shelled, and men were killed in their beds recovering from wounds. Churchill, who had championed the operation, complained bitterly that he had expected
Speaker 1to fling a wildcat ashore, and he instead beached a whale. He had, and it was his whale. And behind Ancio stood the monastery. Monte Cassino was a Benedictine abbey founded in the 6th century, the mother house of Western monasticism, sitting on a mountain that happened to dominate the road to Rome. The Germans had not occupied it. They had declared a neutral zone around it, and, this is important and still argued about, the available evidence indicates there were
Speaker 1no German troops inside the Abbey walls before the bombing, only monks and several hundred civilian refugees who had fled there for shelter. On the 15th of February, 1944, the Allies destroyed it with more than a thousand tons of bombs, in the belief that it was being used as an observation post. Between about 200 and 300 civilians were killed. The Germans then moved into the ruins, which made superb defensive positions, and it took until the middle of May
Speaker 1in four separate battles, fought by Americans, British, Indians, New Zealanders, Poles, and some French colonial troops, to finally take the position. Polish soldiers of the Second Corps raised their flag over the rubble on the 18th of May. Rome finally fell on the 4th of June, 1944. It was the first Axis capital to be liberated, and it was the culmination of 11 months of bloody, unglamorous fighting, and it got
Speaker 1roughly 48 hours of headlines before it was completely erased from the world's attention. The Italian campaign had been the war's neglected theater ever since, and honestly, it started being neglected almost immediately. But let's go east now. Because throughout the winter of 1943 into 1944, the Red Army didn't stop what it was doing. This is the part of the year that most Western accounts compress into one sentence, and frankly, it deserves a lot better. In January 1944,
Speaker 1the siege of Leningrad was finally broken after nearly 900 days and something on the order of 800,000 civilian deaths, most of them from starvation. In February, at Kasarun on the Dnieper bend, two German corps were encircled and mauled. Through the spring, the Soviet front rolled west through Ukraine in a series of offensives that ran almost without operational pause. The Germans quickly lost the whole of the Dnieper line,
Speaker 1lost the land bridge to Crimea, then lost Crimea itself in May, and by April, Soviet troops had crossed the pre-war border into Romania. And Stalin had promised at Tehran that when the Western allies landed, he would launch a summer offensive to pin the German reserves. He kept that promise. On the 22nd of June, the third anniversary of Barbarossa, with Operation Barashin, which over the following weeks destroyed Army
Speaker 1Group Center more completely than any formation on any front was destroyed in the entire war. Now, I'll get into that in the next episode. But it's worth planting that seed now. because the two operations are halves of the same design, and because the proportions matter. On the 6th of June, the Germans had something like 58 divisions in the West, of which a fraction were first line. They had well over 150 on the Eastern Front. Finally, and briefly,
Speaker 1let's talk about the Pacific, where in six months, the American drive across the Central Pacific went from the first bloody proof of concept of Tarawa in November 1943, to Kajawan in February, to the neutralization of Truk, and then the assembling point for the Marineras, where by an accident of scheduling that nobody planned, the landings on Saipan would begin nine days after Normandy, and the Japanese carrier force would be destroyed in the Philippine Sea 11 days after that.
Speaker 1June 1944 is honestly the month where, if you look at it, the Axis lost the war in three places all at the exact same time. And again, like I said with the Eastern Front, we're going to come back to the Marineras next time. I mention that here only because what you have to understand is, believe it or not, D-Day and Operation Overlord wasn't the only thing going on in June 1944. And it certainly wasn't the only thing going on in 1944 in general. But all of that
Speaker 1brings us back to the landing craft. Every one of these operations wanted the same flat-bottomed, slab-side, unglamorous ships. Anzio took up a bunch of them. The Pacific ate them in droves. The southern France landing, Anvil later renamed Dragoon, was supposed to go simultaneously with Overlord, but it couldn't be resourced. And then it was postponed to August over furious British objection. The allocation of tank landing ships for
Speaker 1the first half of 1944 was argued at the level of the heads of government repeatedly in writing. It is the least romantic thing in the story, but it actually shapes everything about it. Now, let's start to set the stage for the channel crossing. And first, let's stand on the other side of it. In the German imagination, and much more importantly in German propaganda, the coast of occupied Europe was sealed by something called the Atlantic Wall, a
Speaker 1running from North Cape of Norway to the Spanish frontier, 1,500 miles of interlocking fortresses. Newsreels showed enormous gun casements, gleaming optics, confident gunners. Hitler had ordered 15,000 strong points garrisoned by 300,000 men. Now, think about it was, it was not real. It was in places extremely real. Calais was genuinely formidable, and the
Speaker 1fortified ports were so strong that several of them held out until the end of the war. But the continuous system? That didn't exist. Construction had slowed after 1943, as concrete and labor were diverted to repairing German cities and to the V-weapon sites. Long stretches of the Norman coast had bunkers only at the exits from the beaches, with nothing but wire and a few mines in between. And the troops holding it were in many sections, certainly not the
Speaker 1Wehrmacht of 1940. By 1944, a significant portion of the coastal divisions were what the Germans called static divisions. No transport beyond horses and bicycles. Older conscripts, men downgraded for wounds or frostbite from the Eastern Front. And this is one of the genuinely strange facts about the campaign. A substantial number of Oost Battalions Eastern battalions made up of, believe it or not, Soviet prisoners of war who had
Speaker 1accepted service with the German army rather than starve in camp. There were Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles in German uniforms on the Norman coast defending Adolf Hitler's Europe against an invasion they had no earthly reason to care about. On the 6th of June, quite a lot of them surrendered at the first opportunity. And the Allied troops repeatedly reported the disorienting experience of capturing prisoners who spoke no German. Now,
Speaker 1into all of this, in November 1943, came General Erwin Rommel. Rommel is a figure this series has already had to handle carefully. You know, I've talked about him a little bit. I'm going to have to do it again. Because the post-war reconstruction of the clean desert fox, chivalrous, apolitical, well, that was substantially the work of British authors, honestly. with an interest in a worthy defeated opponent, and of German generals with an interest in a Weimar untainted by the regime.
Speaker 1What is clear is that Rommel was a superb tactical soldier with an instinct for the decisive point, and that in the winter of 1943 to 1944, he applied that instinct to the Atlantic coast with tremendous energy. He was initially sent just as an inspector and and then given command of Army Group B, covering the coast from the Netherlands to the Loire River Valley, under the theater command of the West. Field Marshal Gerard von Rundstedt, 68 years old,
Speaker 1immensely senior, deeply cynical, and privately of the view that the whole Atlantic Wall was a propaganda fantasy and that the war was lost. Rommel toured, and what he saw appalled him, and he began to build. In roughly six months, his troops laid something in the region of four to six million mines. He wanted 50 million and said so. He designated and installed the beach obstacles that would define the morning of the 6th of June. Belgian gates, these are hedgehogs of welded steel and angle iron, stakes driven
Speaker 1into the sand at an angle and then topped with mines, all sited below the high water line, so that a landing craft coming in at halftime would be gutted before it touched the shore. He flooded low-lying ground behind the beaches by wrecking the drainage systems. He had poles planted in every open field that could take a glider. The troops called him Rommelspargel, Rommels Asparagus. And underneath all that work sat the argument that actually decided the battle— Everyone
Speaker 1in the German command agreed that the invasion would have to be defeated quickly, but they disagreed profoundly about where the armor, the tanks, should be when it came. Rommel's position came out of two years in the desert being bombarded by the desert air force, and it was this. Allied war power was so overwhelming that German reserves stationed inland would not be able to move by daylight. They would take days to reach the coast, and they would arrive piecemeal and be destroyed. Therefore, the Panzer Division should
Speaker 1be placed right up against the beaches within a few hours' march, so that the landing could be hit on the first day before the beachhead was consolidated. He believed that the battle would be decided in the first 24 hours. The opposing position was held by Leo Gar von Schweppenberg, commanding the Panzer Group West. And it was the Orthodox one, and the aforementioned Rundstadt shared it. You do not scatter armor along a coastline you cannot possibly hold everywhere. You
Speaker 1concentrate it inland, you wait to identify the main effort, and then you deliver one massive coordinated counter-stroke that throws the invaders into the sea. Committing panzers forward, they argued, meant committing them to whichever landing the Allies chose to show you, which could be a feint. Both arguments were serious. Both were, in their own terms, more or less correct. What happened was the worst possible outcome, which is that Hitler heard both proposals and then he split the difference.
Speaker 1Under the arrangement that was in force on the 6th of June, three panzer divisions were given to Rommel and moved forward. The rest were held back as a reserve that could not be committed without Hitler's personal authority. So the German armor in France was neither forward enough to intervene at once nor concentrated enough to deliver the single hammer blow. And the release authority for the strategic reserve sat with a man who worked at night, slept late, and was several hundred miles away in Bavaria. Two more
Speaker 1things about the German dispositions, because they matter, and we need to know them right now. The first is that the German high command had convinced itself that the landing would come at Calais. And that was actually not stupidity at all. It was by far the shortest crossing, the shortest route to the Ruhr, and the location of the new weapon that the Germans had been building, the V missiles, which we'll get into. Rommel personally thought Normandy was a real possibility, and his beach obstacle program reflected that. But
Speaker 115th Army in Calais was the strong army, and the 7th Army in Normandy was the weaker one. And that allocation was a decision that had been made and reinforced and defended for over a year. Now, the second thing you need to understand is the weather. The Germans had lost their Atlantic weather reporting. The weather ships had been hunted down, the Greenland stations captured or destroyed, and the U-boat reporting net gutted. Allied forecasters could see a front coming across from Newfoundland days in advance. German forecasters were
Speaker 1working largely with what they could see over their heads. On the 4th of June, German meteorologists assessed that the sea state in the channel would make a landing impossible for at least a fortnight. On that assessment, the 7th Army's alert level was relaxed. Naval patrols in the Bay of the Seine were cancelled the night of the 5th. A substantial number of senior commanders were were scheduled to be a way to map exercise at Reims on the 6th. An exercise whose scenario, in the kind of coincidence that
Speaker 1makes historians a little uneasy, was an Allied airborne landing in Normandy. And Rommel, who had said the first 24 hours would decide everything, got into a car on the 4th of June and drove to Germany, His wife, Lucy's 50th birthday, was the 6th. He had a pair of shoes for her in the back of the car that he bought in Paris. He also wanted to see Hitler and argue again for two more panzer divisions. Germany's best
Speaker 1commander wasn't going to be there for the battle. Now let's talk about the other half of the operation, because Operation Overlord was not only an amphibious assault. It was also the largest and most successful deception in the history of warfare, and it's not clear that the assault could have survived without it. The strategic deception plan for 1944 was called Bodyguard, after a line Churchill is supposed to have used at Tehran about truth in wartime needing a bodyguard of lies, a remark which may well be a
Speaker 1later polish on something he actually said. And You know, which I flag just because, I mean, let's try to stick to the facts, am I right? Operation Bodyguard had many parts. The two that matter are what are called Fortitude North, which threatened an invasion of Norway from Scotland, and Fortitude South, which is the one that everyone's heard of. Fortitude South told the Germans a story. The story was that the main Allied invasion would land at Calais in July, delivered by an enormous formation in the southeast of England
Speaker 1called the 1st United States Army Group, or FUSAG, commanded by George Patton, the one Allied general the Germans genuinely feared. and who was at that moment unemployed and disgraced after slapping two hospitalized soldiers in Sicily. In this story, any landing elsewhere in the spring would be a diversion designed to pull German reserves away from the real thing, which would hit Calais. Note what the story is engineered to do. It's not designed to stop the Germans reinforcing Normandy on
Speaker 1the 6th of June. It's designed to stop them reinforcing Normandy for the six weeks after the 6th of June, to freeze the German army in place north of the Seine, waiting for a second, bigger invasion that would never come. And that is exactly what it did. There were still German divisions sitting in Calais in late July, staring at an empty sea, while the battle for Normandy was being lost 50 miles to the southwest. But how was it done?
Speaker 1Here we have to do a little bit of myth correction because popular memory has fastened onto the least important part. Sure, the inflatable tanks were real. There were dummy landing craft in the Thames estuary, plywood aircraft on dummy airfields, inflatable Sherman tanks in Kentish fields. There were also, in the judgment of most historians who have looked at the archives, close to irrelevant for a simple reason. The Luftwaffe could barely fly over England at 1944 at all. Very few
Speaker 1reconnaissance aircraft got through, and the ones that did were mostly permitted to get through. And so we have to maybe keep in mind, an elaborate deception is only theater if no one can actually take a picture of it. But the two things that actually did the work here were the radio and the human beings. Radio because an army group is audible before it's visible. Specialist signals units generated the wireless traffic of formations that did not exist. The routine chatter of divisions reporting in, supply requests, exercise orders,
Speaker 1from transmitters positioned where they were supposed to be. German signals intelligence built up an order of battle from the air, and every single unit in it was a ghost. Now, human beings matter because of a British counterintelligence achievement so complete that it actually sounds like an invention. By 1944, M15 had identified, arrested, and in most cases, turned essentially every German agent operating in the United Kingdom. Not most of them. Honestly, effectively all of them. The entire intelligence
Speaker 1picture of Britain that was being sent back to Berlin was actually being written in a committee room in London. The 20 Committee, named for the Roman numeral XX, which is also a double-crossed. which is the kind of joke that the British intelligence office just loves. Now, the star of the system, believe it or not, was a Spaniard by the name of Juan Pujo Garcia, codenamed Garbo by the British and Alaric by the Germans, who had begun his career as a freelance fraudster. He offered his services
Speaker 1to the Germans, was accepted, and then proceeded to invent an entire espionage ring in Britain while sitting in Lisbon. filing reports based on a tourist guide, a railway timetable, and a magazine he had come across about the Royal Navy. He was so good at fabricating intelligence that the British, who were reading the German traffic and could not work out who this extraordinary productive agent was, eventually tracked the guy down and hired him. By 1944, Pujol was running 27 fictional sub-agents, had been awarded a German decoration, and
Speaker 1was drawing a German salary, that his British handlers turned around and used to fund their operation. And then there was the one piece that made it all safe, Ultra. Because Bletchley Park was now reading German signals, the deception staff could see, almost in real time, whether or not the Germans had swallowed what they were being fed. Deception without feedback is always a guess, but with feedback, suddenly it becomes a well-engineered plot. When it comes to all
Speaker 1of this deception and backroom channels, the thing to hold on to is that the Germans were not fooled about Normandy in the narrow sense of the world. Hitler himself had moments of intuition about it. And in the spring, the German command reinforced Normandy meaningfully, moving the 352nd Infantry Division to the coast behind what would be called Omaha and moving the 91st Air Landing Division into the Coatine Peninsula. exactly where the airbornes of the Americans were going to drop.
Speaker 1What the Germans were fooled about was priority. They never believed that Normandy was the main effort. And that belief actually went beyond the 6th of June and the 7th and actually the whole of the rest of June, which is the single most valuable thing any intelligence agency achieved during the whole war. Now, in the spring of 1944, there was a joke in Britain going around that the only thing keeping the island from sinking under the weight of the American equipment was the barrage balloons. It's hard to actually honestly convey the scale of the buildup for D-Day,
Speaker 1so let's go at it a little bit sideways. By May 1944, the southern counties of England held somewhere around 2 million Allied servicemen. Ammunition dumps ran for miles along the verges of country lanes, stacked under camouflage netting on either side of the road. Whole villages were requisitioned and their populations evacuated. Hospitals were empty and held empty. Tens of thousands of beds were cleared and reserved for casualties
Speaker 1the planners hoped would not fill them. Something like 17 million maps were printed. Several hundred thousand tons of ammunition and stores were stockpiled. The coastal counties from Cornwall to Kent became one enormous parking lot with a fringe of barbed wire. Around one and a half million Americans passed through the United Kingdom during the war. And their arrival was a social event as much as a military one. The stock British complaint that the Americans were overpaid and
Speaker 1oversexed over here was affectionate about 90% of the time and not affectionate the rest. And it's worth being honest about one particular part of it because it is generally left out. The United States Army that came to Britain was segregated. Well over 100,000 African-American soldiers served in the European theater, overwhelmingly in service units, ordnance, transport, engineering, the port battalions, doing the logistical work without which none of
Speaker 1this was possible. It mostly barred from combat arms. And the U.S. Army attempted with some success and considerable friction to export Jim Crow, to separate the pubs, separate the dances, separate passes. But it did not take. British civilians who had their own very complicated relationship with race and empire were not remotely innocent, nonetheless found the really specific American arrangement baffling and oftentimes refused to cooperate with it. There
Speaker 1were also a few riots, one in Cornwall, in Bristol, at Leicester, in which white American military police and black American soldiers shot at each other in the English streets. The British government suppressed reporting. It is a part of the buildup that the anniversary coverage usually doesn't get to, and the men involved did not forget that. But now we should talk about the hardware, because Operation Overlord generated more improvised engineering than any operation in the war. Now,
Speaker 1the central problem was the one that had been identified from the very start. The invasion needs a port. and every port on the coast of France was a fortress. The conclusion was honestly audacious to the point of almost being laughable. If you can't capture a port, try to bring one with you. The Mulberry Harbors were prefabricated artificial ports. Outer breakwaters made from block ships deliberately scuttled in line.
Speaker 1Concrete caissons the size of five-story buildings called phoenixes towed across the channel and sunk in position, floating steel roadways on pontoons, running out to pier heads that rose and fell with a tide that in part of the channel can get 20 feet. Two of them were built, one for American beaches and one for British. Getting them there required towing several hundred structures across the channel in the days after the landing, which is an operation that honestly
Speaker 1could be a whole episode on its own if I really wanted to. Alongside them was Pluto, pipeline under the ocean, a flexible submarine pipeline to carry fuel from England to France. And here's the correction, because Pluto turns up in every documentary as part of the D-Day story. It was not operating on the 6th of June, of course, or anywhere near it. The first line to Cherbourg did not deliver until August. and the system only became genuinely significant much later. In the critical weeks, fuel came ashore the hard way,
Speaker 1in cans and by a ship-to-shore hose. And then there were some inventors. There was Percy Hobart, who was a brilliant, kind of difficult armor theorist, so specialized in tanks, He had actually been fired before the war, and he was serving as a corporal in the Home Guard when Churchill rescued him and happened also to be Montgomery's brother-in-law, by the way, and was given the 79th Armored Division and told that he needed to solve how the beach was going to be mounted. I mean, you can't just drive a tank directly onto the beach. And what he produced
Speaker 1was just a ton of different specialist armor. Crab flail tanks with rotating drums of chains to beat a path through the minefields. AVREs carrying short barrel mortar that could fire a 40-pound demolition charge, nicknamed the Flying Dustbin, for cracking concrete. There were crocodiles towing a trail of fuel for the flamethrower. Bobbins that unrolled a carpet of matting over soft clay. Bridge layers and ramp carriers. He invented all these things. And then there were the DD tanks,
Speaker 1the duplex drive, a Sherman with a collapsible canvas screen around the hull and propellers to drive off the transmission, which would float badly and swim ashore so that the infantry would find armor already on the beach instead of arriving 20 minutes later. Now, there's a story that the Americans essentially refused any of these designs, but that's kind of more of a caricature. The Americans did adopt the DD tank enthusiastically, but declined most of the rest for
Speaker 1reasons that were reasonable, even if the decision might have been wrong. The vehicles were based on British hulls that American crews had never been trained on. The training time did not exist and the shipping space was finite. The relationship between that decision and the casualties at Omaha I think is genuinely debated, and I don't want to push too hard into it. What is clear is that the flail tanks and the AVREs did a great deal of work on the British and Canadian beaches, and that those beaches did go better. And of course, all of this
Speaker 1had to be rehearsed, and rehearsals had a cost. On the night of the 27th to the night of the 28th of April, 1944, Exercise Tiger was running at Slapton Sands in Devon, a stretch of gravel beach and lagoon chosen because it kind of resembled Utah. A convoy of eight tank landing ships carrying men of the 4th Infantry Division and engineer units was intercepted in Lime Bay by nine German E-boats out of Cherbourg. Two LSTs were sunk and one was badly damaged. Men went into cold water
Speaker 1carrying full combat loads, many of them wearing lifebelts around their waists instead of under their arms, which flipped them face down. Around 750 American servicemen died in a training exercise in an English bay. More than would die on Utah Beach itself. A separate live fire incident during the same exercise killed more. Totals are sometimes given that approached 950 people. Now, the conspiracy version says this was all covered up permanently. Of course, it was not. It was
Speaker 1classified at the time. Ten officers with full knowledge of the Overlord plan were missing. And until every one of their bodies was recovered, the invasion was potentially compromised. They were ultimately all accounted for. The survivors were ordered to say nothing before the invasion. The story was released in official form after the war and was written up in the U.S. Army's own histories. What is true is that it is not commemorated, that the families of the dead were often told very little, and that the memorial at
Speaker 1Slapton exists because a local man spent years in the 1970s and 1980s raising a Sherman tank from the seabed and refusing to let it be forgotten. Now, let's move on to the next facet of Operation Overlord, because nothing on the beaches was survivable without control of the air. And control of the air was won in the first four months of 1944 in a campaign that has no beaches and no anniversary and therefore gets mostly forgotten. Through 1943,
Speaker 1the American daylight bombing offensive had been losing. The unescorted heavy bomber, which pre-war doctrine had insisted would always get through, was being shot out of the sky over Germany at a rate that just couldn't be sustained. Things came to head at a raid over Schwyfort in October 1943 that was costing 60 bombers a day. And at that point, the 8th Air Force effectively suspended deep penetration raids. But two things changed this. The first was the P-51 Mustang,
Speaker 1a mediocre airframe transformed by a British engineer with a range that, with drop tanks, let it escort bombers to Berlin and fight when it got there. The second was a change of orders. When Jimmy Doolittle took over the 8th Air Force in January 1944, he removed the requirement that fighters stay tied to the bomber stream. The escorts were released to hunt, to go down after the Luftwaffe on its airfields to chase it home. The mission was
Speaker 1no longer to protect the bombers. The mission was to kill the German fighter force, and the bombers were the bait that would bring it up. This was a brilliant piece of math and it worked. In the last week of February, big week, the Allies flew thousands of sorties against the German aircraft industry and lost heavily and forced the Luftwaffe to defend. Through the spring, German fighter production actually rose. What collapsed was the supply of pilots. Something
Speaker 1on the order of 2,000 German pilots were killed in the first five months of 1944. Training programs were cut and cut again, New pilots arrived at squadrons with a fraction of the flying hours of the men they were replacing and were killed in their very first attempt, and replaced by men with even less training. It was a death spiral, and once it starts, it can't be stopped by just building more airplanes. Which is why, on the 6th of June, the Allies flew roughly 14,000 sorties over Normandy,
Speaker 1and the Luftwaffe flew something on the order of 100 fighter sorties over the beaches, a figure so lopsided that it produced one of the day's most famous vignettes. One fighter pilot, a certain Josef Pips Priller, and his wingman, Heinz Woodark, flew one sortie over the length of Sword Beach at wave height, fired everything they had in an invasion fleet of several thousand ships, and then turned around and went home. That was the sole appearance for the
Speaker 1Luftwaffe in daylight over the British beaches. The film version has the pilot Priller delivering a bitter line about this being the whole German air force. Now we come to the difficult portion of Lisa's part of the story. To isolate Normandy, Eisenhower's staff proposed the transportation plan to systematically destroy the French and Belgian railway network, marshalling yards, locomotive depots, bridges, repair shops, so that German reserves could not move by
Speaker 1rail into the battle area. It was opposed inside the Allied command by Karl Spatz, who wanted the bombers used against German synthetic oil instead, an argument that was also strong and was eventually pursued as well. But it was opposed on completely different grounds by the British War Cabinet and by Churchill personally. The objection was that the targets were in the middle of French and Belgian cities, and that the people who would die were French and Belgian citizens,
Speaker 1allies under occupation, whom this operation was supposed to be liberating. The estimates circulated in Whitehall in April ran to the tens of thousands of dead. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt, asking him to intervene. Roosevelt declined, on the grounds that he was not prepared to impose any restrictions on military actions that might increase Allied losses. De Gaulle's Free French, consulted, supported the bombing. And so it went ahead, with some mitigation.
Speaker 1Warnings broadcast, attacks waded towards the yards on the edge of town, and a delivering scatter of effort, so that for every ton dropped in Normandy, roughly two were dropped elsewhere, mostly north of the Seine, again, to protect the secret. Bomber crews were not told which targets were real and which were misdirection. Now, the figures here are contested, so I'll provide them as a range rather than pretend a precision that honestly I can't find in the sources. French
Speaker 1civilian deaths from Allied bombing in the months before the invasion are usually estimated in the region of 15,000. In Normandy itself, during and after the landings, something around 20,000 French civilians were killed by Allied bombing and shelling, around 3,000 of them in the first 48 hours, when the towns of Cayenne, Lisieux, Saint-Louis, and Viret were effectively destroyed. in some cases for reasons that are hard to justify militarily
Speaker 1even now. Now, over the whole war, Allied bombing killed something between 50,000 and 75,000 French civilians, which is comparable to the number of British civilians who were killed by German bombing. But the reality is the transportation plan worked. By the 6th of June, rail movement across northern France had been reduced to a fraction of its January capacity. Bridges over the Seine below Paris were down, And German divisions ordered to Normandy found themselves draining far short and
Speaker 1then moving by night under air attack. It was actually probably one of the most important reasons that the beachhead we're going to talk about soon did hold. Both of those things are true at once. And this series is not going to resolve that for you because it does not resolve. The men who planned it knew exactly what they were choosing. Lee Mallory wrote about it. Churchill wrote about it. Then they did it anyway, and the liberation of France began with the death of thousands of French people. Now,
Speaker 1I want to pause for a moment here and again shift to Eastern Europe, because while the invasion fleets loaded in English ports, the largest single deportation operation of the Holocaust was underway in Hungary. Now, Hungary had been a German ally, and its Jewish population, roughly three-quarters of a million people, had been subjected to discriminatory laws and forced labor and massacre, but they had not been deported, largely because the Hungarian government refused. In March 1944, with Hungary
Speaker 1visibly maneuvering to leave the war, German troops occupied the country. Adolf Eichmann arrived in Budapest with a small staff. Between 15 May and 9 July 1944, Something on the order of 440,000 Hungarian Jews were deported, overwhelmingly, to Auschwitz at the rate of several trains a day. The majority were murdered on arrival. To handle the volume, the railway spur
Speaker 1was extended directly into Birkenau, and the crematoria were run continuously. This was the period that the camp's own personnel would later describe as its peak. And this is the part that belongs in an episode about June 1944 specifically. In April, two prisoners, Rudolf Verba and Alfred Weitzler, escaped from Auschwitz and produced a detailed report. The layout of the camp, the method of the killing, the numbers, and the fact
Speaker 1that preparations were being made for a large influx of Hungarians. The report reached the West in early summer 1944. So the deportations of Hungary's Jews were not in the way earlier phrases of the Holocaust arguably were, hidden from Allied decision makers. The argument about what could have been done, about bombing the rail lines to Birkenau, about the gap between knowing and acting, honestly, it begins here. And it's
Speaker 1an argument I'll take up later. in much better detail rather than in passing. But again, in the interest of being somewhat chronological, it was kind of worth talking about at this point. Because on the 6th of June, while the world's attention turned 50 miles off the Norman coast, we have to remember the trains from Hungary were still running. Now, by the last week of May, the operation finally had a date, the 5th of June. The date was not chosen by generals. It was chosen by astronomy. And the
Speaker 1constraints are worth laying out here because they explain why the decision was so brutal. The landing had to come at low tide and rising so that Rommel's beach obstacles would be exposed and could be cleared by engineers before the water covered them. And so the landing craft coming in later in the day would have a rising tide to lift them off the sand. It had to be shortly after first light. so that the naval bombardment could see its targets, but the approach would be made in darkness.
Speaker 1And the airborne drop the night before needed a late rising moon. Darkness for the transportation aircraft crossing the coast, but moonlight over the drop zones. Low tide near dawn, a late moon, and a short period of daylight after landing to get inland. Those conditions came together on three days in June 1944. The 5th, the 6th, and the 7th. Miss them, and the next title window was the 19th,
Speaker 1but then you didn't get the moon. Miss that, and it was July, with 150,000 men who would have to be unloaded, unsealed, and somehow then kept secret. From the 26th of May, the camps were sealed. Barbed wire, armed guards, no mail-out, no passes. Men who had spent months training were finally shown what they were training for. sand tables and scale models accurate down to individual houses and church steeples with the real place names replaced by code words.
Speaker 1British troops were given a 150-page guide to French customs. Everyone got seasick pills, a life belt, a gas mask, and a small bag, which many of them were skeptical about and almost all of them would end up using. The loading began on the 1st of June. Eisenhower issued the Order of the Day that every one of them would carry, a short, plain document telling them that they were about to embark upon the Great Crusade. It was
Speaker 1printed and distributed in the hundreds of thousands, and in the photographs you can see men reading it in the landing craft, with the expression of people who were not really reading. Now, on the 3rd of June, The forecast turned bad. Remember, the guy who's forecasting this last name is Stagg. He was one of the more extraordinary people in the war. Stagg was a Scottish meteorologist, a civilian in uniform, and he was the chairman of a committee
Speaker 1of forecasters, American and British teams working with different methods and different theories, who often loudly disagreed with one another. It was Stagg's job to reconcile them and give one answer to Eisenhower. And both the Americans and British were furious with him at various points for what he did to their findings. And you could look at pictures. He aged visibly throughout this process. On the morning of the 4th of June, with a substantial part of the fleet already at sea, Stagg forecast low cloud and a force
Speaker 15 wind for the 5th. Now, the aircraft they decided would not be able to see. The sea state would swamp the landing craft and make the run-in unmanageable. Montgomery, characteristically, said, who cares? We should advance anyway on the 5th. Eisenhower postponed 24 hours, and convoys already steaming for Normandy had to be turned around and brought back into port against the weather. some of them refueling at sea in a
Speaker 1rising gale. The men stayed aboard. They had been aboard in many cases for days. The smell in the tank decks of the landing crafts were, by any account, indescribable. That evening at 9.30 in the mess hall at Southwick House, with rain rattling the windows, Stagg told them about the bridge, the break in weather coming through, arriving late on the 5th holding perhaps into the 6th with better conditions than anyone had the right to expect in the middle of
Speaker 1a run of gales. The Navy warned that if the landing was about to go on the 6th, then they needed the order within half an hour, because the American task forces for the far beaches had to sail immediately. Eisenhower gave the provisional yes to be confirmed at the dawn conference. which brings us all the way back to 4.15 on the morning on the 5th of June, where we started this episode. Now, Stagg, the meteorologist, then confirmed it. The break was still there. The Navy was ready and
Speaker 1Montgomery wanted to go. You know, only the Air Force was a little bit upset because it seemed as though there'd be higher casualties under the given conditions. But Eisenhower sat and rocked slightly in his chair and then was silent. Then in the version that everyone present more or less agreed on afterwards, he said, all right, we go. He's reported to have added that the question was no longer in his hands, that whatever he did now, the machine
Speaker 1would run. And then the room emptied in under a minute because everybody in it had somewhere to be. Later in that day alone, Eisenhower wrote something on a scrap of paper and put it in his wallet. It was a press statement for use if the landings failed. A few sentences saying that the troops had done everything that courage could do, that the decision to attack had been his own, based on the best information available, and that if there were blame, it was for him alone. He
Speaker 1misstated it, actually, to July the 5th. He found it in his wallet weeks later and gave it to an aide who kept it. That evening, Eisenhower drove to Greenham Common and walked among the men of the 101st Airborne as they blacked their faces and checked their kit and talked to them about fly fishing and about tech and stood in the dark watching the aircraft take off until the last of them was gone. A driver said he had tears in his eyes. He turned to no one
Speaker 1in particular and said it was very hard to send men to die. At about ten past nine on the evening of the 5th of June, the BBC's French service broadcast its usual stream of personal messages. The nonsense sentences that have been running for years, some meaningless, but some carrying instructions to resistance networks. One of them was a
Speaker 1line of Verlaine, the first line of the poem about the long sobs of autumn's violins, had gone out at the start of the month as a standby signal, telling certain networks that the invasion would come within a fortnight. Now, the second line went out, calling for action within 48 hours. Now, this story has been mythologized in both directions. Certainly, the Verlaine signal was real. German signals intelligence at the 15th Army headquarters had it, understood roughly what it meant, and
Speaker 1put the 15th Army on alert. But the 15th Army was in Calais. The alert was not passed to the 7th Army in Normandy, where it would have mattered, because the Germans, for reasons I spent a lot of time on, really thought the attack was coming to Calais. the line was also not a general invasion signal to the whole resistance. It went to a particular network, and a great deal of the sabotage that followed was set off by other
Speaker 1messages entirely. What the resistance did that night was significant, and it's usually undersold. The sabotage plans had names. Plan Wirt for railways, Plan Violet for telephone and telegraph cables, Plan Tochu for road movement, plan blue, for power. In the first days, somewhere approaching a thousand rail cuts were made across France. Cables were cut, forcing German traffic onto radio, where, of course, the British were listening. It did not stop
Speaker 1the German army. It slowed it in a hundred small places. At the moment, slowness was fatal, and it was done by civilians who would be shot if caught and whose villages would be burned. Meanwhile, over the channel, the largest airborne operation in history, to that date at least, was in the air. More than a thousand transport aircraft and several hundred gliders. The British went in on the left flank, east of the River Orme, and their first task was
Speaker 1the most precise work of the entire night. The invasion beaches were about to have an exposed eastern flank, and between that flank and the German armor lay two bridges, one over the Cayenne Canal at Beneville and the other one over the Orne, a few hundred yards away. If the Germans blew them, the airborne east of the river would be cut off. If the Germans held them, the panzers had a road straight into the beachhead. They had to be taken intact at once. Six Horsa gliders carrying
Speaker 1a company of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry under Major John Howard were cast off at 6,000 feet and flew in silence. Three of them landed within about 50 yards of the canal bridge at 16 minutes past midnight. The leading platoon was across in minutes. Lieutenant Dan Brotheridge was shot leading it and is generally counted as the first Allied soldier killed by enemy fire on D-Day. Both bridges were taken in about 10 minutes and held all day.
Speaker 1And the canal bridge today is called Pegasus Bridge. The rest of the British 6th Airborne had a tougher night. At Merville, a battalion was tasked with destroying a coastal battery believed to threaten Sword Beach. 600 men were supposed to make the assault. Because of scattered troops, the commanding officer, Terence Otway, went in with roughly 150 men. No heavy weapons at all, no mine detectors, and no gliders. But they did it. They took the battery. Now, the guns
Speaker 1turned out to be smaller than feared. That doesn't make the operation pointless, and we're going to need that principle again in about 10 minutes. Now, the American drop was pure chaos. The 82nd and 101st Airborne, around 13,000 men, were going into the base of the Koh-i-Tin Peninsula to seize the causeways behind Utah Beach, which ran through the ground Rommel had deliberately flooded. Their transport pilots, most of whom had never flown in combat, hit thick cloud crossing
Speaker 1the peninsula and broke formation. Then they hit flak. Aircraft climbed, dived, accelerated, and scattered. Paratroopers jumped too fast, too high, too low. Some drowned in the flooded fields under 100 pounds of equipment in water three feet deep. Sticks were landed miles from their drop zones. By dawn, a large share of the two divisions were not where they were supposed to be, and many units were operating at a fraction of strength. And here is the strange thing. It may actually have helped.
Speaker 1German reports that night described parachute landings across an enormous area of the Koh-i-Tin Peninsula in dozens of places and could not construct a coherent picture of what was happening. That confusion was deepened by Operation Titanic, which scattered hundreds of dummy parachuters, burlap figures named Rupert, rigged with firecrackers to simulate a firefight across areas from the real drops. Germans wound up chasing ghosts for hours. What the scattered
Speaker 1Americans did instead was just improvise. Small, mixed groups of men from different regiments, often led by whoever happened to be senior, cutting cables, ambushing vehicles, seizing crossroads. The famous 10 cricket clickers, one click challenge, two answered. These were issued to the 101st and genuinely used, though not by the 82nd. And the men also used a spoken challenge password. At Saint-Denis, a town on the way through the Coatin,
Speaker 1helmets of the 505th Parachute Infantry took their place in the small hours. It is actually usually described as the first French town that was liberated. Some of the drop came down directly into the town square, where a house fire had drawn the population out to fight it under German supervision, and the men were shot in their harnesses in front of the villagers. One trooper, John Steele, caught his canopy on the church tower and hung there. He survived, and he was there for a couple of hours rather
Speaker 1than the whole day that film versions have given him, basically deafened by the church bell. And actually, the church in that town still has a parachute on the tower to this very day. Now, of course, behind all of this was the main invasion force at sea. 5,000 ships were moving into position in the dark through channels that minesweepers had cleared hours earlier. an operation of navigation and timing, all run under Admiral Bertram Ramsey, who had also run
Speaker 1the evacuation from Dunkirk four years earlier, and who is one of the war's great, most unfamous professionals. It must have been poetic for him, after having evacuated the entire British Expeditionary Force, to now be returning. Nearly 7,000 vessels in total, Battleships from the last war, cruisers, over 200 destroyers, 4,000 landing craft. It was and remains the largest amphibious operation
Speaker 1ever conducted. Around two in the morning, the German coastal radar and observation post began to report ships. At the 7th Army Headquarters, the reports were contradictory and the weather was still bad and the Corps commanders were half of them away. But somewhere between 5 and 5.30 in the morning, the bombardment began. Now, Rommel was supposed to have told an aide that the first 24 hours of the invasion would be decisive, that for the Allies and that for
Speaker 1the Germans, it would be the longest day. The remark comes to us secondhand, and the exact phrasing is uncertain. But the judgment was his, and it was correct. And it gave the film and the book their title. So there will be five beaches, east to west. Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juneau, Sword. Two American, two British, one Canadian. And the beaches are the reason that the popular memory of D-Day is so
Speaker 1badly distorted, because one of the five was a catastrophe, and it's the one that everyone has seen. Utah Beach. The 4th Infantry Division came ashore on the eastern base of the Coatin Peninsula and almost immediately discovered that the current had carried them roughly 2,000 yards to the south of the intended landing point. The control vessel had been lost to a mine. The assistant division commander on the beach was Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 56 years old, arthritic, walking
Speaker 1with a stick, the eldest son of the president who had badgered his way into being the only general to land with the first wave. He looked at the landmarks, worked out where they actually were, decided the new beach was better than the planned one, and said they would start the war from, you know, right there. The follow-up waves were directed onto him. The sector was lightly held. The preliminary bombing had been effective. The D-Day tanks launched in close, and nearly all of them made it. Fewer
Speaker 1than 250 men of the assault force became casualties on Utah on the 6th of June. It was very nearly a perfect textbook amphibious assault landing. And that's actually the reason that you've probably never heard about this, because nothing went wrong. Now, Omaha Beach, 10 miles to the east, well, everything went wrong. The beach itself was the problem. Omaha is a crescent about six miles long, backed not by dunes,
Speaker 1but by a single bank, a seawall in places, and then bluffs 150 feet high. cut by five draws, narrow valleys that were the only ways off the beaches for vehicles, and every one of which the Germans had fortified. There was no flank at all. Any attacker had to cross 300 yards of open sand at low tide and then climb under fire from positions cited to sweep the whole length of the beach. Then, of course, the preparation also failed.
Speaker 1The bombers, afraid of hitting the landing craft in the cloud, delayed their release by a few seconds and dropped their loads inland. The beach defenses were essentially untouched, and the craters the infantry had been promised for cover did not exist. The naval bombardment was short, around 40 minutes on the American beaches against two hours on the British. The armor also then drowned. The D-Day tanks of one Battalion were launched around 6,000 yards out into a sea running well
Speaker 1above what the canvas screens could take, and of the 29 launched, 27 floundered, some with their crews. A second battalion's commander looked at the water decided against it and drove his tank straight into the sand for the landing craft, which is what everybody should have done. Then the tide and the current pushed the assault waves east of their landmarks, So the companies landed in front of the wrong objectives, mixed together without officers who had studied that ground. And
Speaker 1then there was the 352nd. Allied intelligence had placed a static division on this stretch. In fact, the 350th Infantry Division, a proper field formation with combat veterans in it, had moved into the coastal sector in the spring. Whether this is an intelligence failure is genuinely disputed among historians. there are indications that the move was detected at the high level and equally clear evidence that the assault units were not told. Either way, the men coming ashore on the
Speaker 1Omaha met a better enemy than they had been briefed for. I'm not going to dramatize the first hour of the landing because every dramatization makes it actually more bearable than it was. Landing crafts were dropping their ramps directly into machine gun fire. Whole boat sections were killed in the water. Engineers sent in to blow gaps in the obstacles lost most of their equipment and a huge proportion of their men. Only a handful of the planned gaps were cleared before
Speaker 1the tide came in over the top of the obstacles. Men who reached the shingle lay behind it and could not go forward, and men behind them, the tide rose and pushed the wounded up to the beach and drowned some of them where they lay. Offshore, senior officers looking through binoculars at a beach full of wreckage and stalled men began to seriously consider abandoning Omaha and diverting the follow-up waves to the British beaches instead. What broke it was not a plan. It was the discovery by junior
Speaker 1officers and NCOs in dozens of separate places that the draws were death traps and the bluffs between them were not. That if you crawled through the wire and up the slope, you could get behind the strong points and then take them from the rear. Norman Cota, a brigadier general who walked the beach upright while everyone else was flat, is credited with a line about the rangers leading the way. The rangers of the 5th Battalion blew a gap and went straight up. Destroyers, then, came so far in that
Speaker 1they were scraping the bottom of the ocean at ranges of a few hundred yards and fired directly into the bunkers over the heads of their infantry. By early afternoon, there were men on the high ground. By nightfall, the Americans finally held a lodgement at Omaha, about a mile and a half deep in places, nowhere near their objectives, and at a cost usually put somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 casualties, but they had fought through it nonetheless. D-Day is filled
Speaker 1with stories of heroism, and sometimes heroism with fatalistic results. Take the story of Pontahook between Utah and Omaha. This is a story that gets kind of told as futility. 225 Army Rangers under James Rutter scaled a 100-foot cliff on rocket-fired grappling rinds under grenades to destroy a battery of six 155-millimeter guns that could range both American beaches and then found the gun positions empty that the guns
Speaker 1had moved. That's actually usually where the story stops, but it shouldn't. Two sergeants, Leonard Lommel and Jack Kuhn, pushed inland on a patrol, found the guns camouflaged in an orchard beach about a mile back, fully surfacable, with ammunition stacked and crews nearby, and destroyed them with thermite grenades. Then the Rangers held the position against counterattack for two days. Of the 225, around 90 were still able to fight when relief arrived. The assault was not pointless at all.
Speaker 1It was, in fact, exactly the outcome the operation was for. Now, in the Gold Beach, the British 50th Division landed in the center into heavier surf than the Americans, but with a much longer naval bombardment behind them and some of the specialist armor coming in in the first wave, flailing lanes through the mines and blasting the seawall. The fortified village of Le Hamon held out for most of the day, and the cost was heavy. By evening, the 50th Division
Speaker 1had pushed inland several miles and within sight of Bayeux, which would fall the next day and become the first substantial French town liberated, and which, almost uniquely in Normandy, survived the campaign undamaged. On Juneau Beach, the 3rd Canadian Division had arguably the worst beach after Omaha, and it is the one least known outside of Canada. Offshore reefs destroyed the landing, which meant the tide had risen and the obstacles were underwater, so the landing craft came in
Speaker 1among them and many were hauled. Some assault companies took casualties approaching 50% in the course of minutes at some points, and then got off the beach and kept going. And by the end of the day, the Canadians had advanced further inland than any other Allied formation. patrols reaching the Cayenne Bay Road. It cost them somewhere around 1,000 casualties, of whom around 340 were killed. The Canadian contribution is routinely just kind of folded into the British beaches in
Speaker 1some accounts, and it definitely should not be. Then on the eastern flank at Sword Beach, the British 3rd Division landed at Ostraham, including 177 French commandos, under Philippe Kieffer, the only French ground troops in the landing coming ashore in their own country. And they quickly took the strong point in the local town. One of the craziest stories of the landing I always find is the story of Bill Millen, and he is with this Sword Beach, so let me just tell it. One group of commandos landed
Speaker 1with a piper. His name was Bill Millen. And so he is essentially playing the bagpipes. And he played them ashore because he was asked to. And the commander in this case took the view that war regulations against pipers in action were an English regulation and didn't apply to him. So Millen walked up and down the waterline playing his bagpipes and he survived. German prisoners are said to have told him afterwards that they had not shot him because
Speaker 1they assumed he was insane. That brigade then actually marched inland to Pegasus Bridge, where the paratroopers have been holding it since midnight, and arrived early in the afternoon with the pipes still going, by the way. But Sword Beach is also where D-Day's biggest failure lies. The objective for the 3rd Division of the 6th of June was Cayenne, a city nine miles inland, the hinge of the whole campaign, sitting on the road network the Allies needed to break
Speaker 1out into open country. The advance was slow, congestion on a narrow beach, a strong point inland at Hillman that held for hours, and a costless handling of reserves. And late in the afternoon, the 21st Panzer Division arrived the one armored formation close enough to intervene, which had spent the morning receiving and losing contradictory orders, put a battle group in the gap between Sword and Juno and drove all the way to the coast. For a short time
Speaker 1on the evening on the 6th of June, there were German tanks on the beach between two Allied landings. Then they looked up. Coming in over their heads at around 9 in the evening was Operation Mallard, several hundred gliders bringing in the rest of the 6th Airborne, filling the sky from horizon to horizon. The German battle group, without infantry support and believing it was about to be cut off by a landing behind it, withdrew. It was the only German armored counterattack to reach the sea on the
Speaker 16th of June, and it was turned around by essentially an optical illusion. Cayenne was supposed to fall the first day, but it was not taken until July, and when it was taken, it would be largely destroyed and around 2,000 of its citizens would be dead. So what happened in
Speaker 1Germany while all this was going on? Well, the version that gets told is that Hitler was asleep and nobody dared wake him, and so the panzer reserve sat still and the invasion succeeded. It's not quite right, and the true version is actually worse for the Germans. Hitler was asleep, and he was not woken early, and that is true. But the decisive refusals happened before anyone got near his bedroom. In the early hours, German commanders in France ordered asked
Speaker 1for the release of the Armored Reserve, the 12th Panzer SS Division and the Panzer Lehr. The staff at high command declined to pass the request up, on the grounds that it was not yet clear that this was the real invasion, rather than the diversion everyone had been told to suspect. Hitler was actually briefed late in the morning and was in an excellent mood about it, He had been saying for weeks that he wanted the invasion to come so he could destroy it and release the divisions
Speaker 1in the early afternoon. By then, it was daylight in France, and the roads belonged to Allied fighter-bombers, and the panzers moved at the speed for the transportation plan, which was not fast. Panzer Lehr Division lost a substantial number of vehicles on the road to air attack before it ever even saw an enemy. Now, what about Erwin Rommel? Well, Rommel heard about all of this at around 10 in the morning at home and was back at his headquarters
Speaker 1on the Seine by late evening. And the thing he had said would be decided in 24 hours would be decided without him. So here's ultimately the ledger, I guess, for the end of the 6th of June. Around 156,000 Allied troops came ashore or were dropped by air. Allied casualties on the day are usually given as around 10,000. Major and really careful work over the decades on the names of all the dead has put the confirmed Allied
Speaker 1dead at 4,414, of whom about 2,500 were American, a figure notably higher than the totals that were used for decades. German casualties are much less certain. Somewhere between 4,000 and 9,000 is the usual range. And somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 French civilians were killed in those first 48 hours, most of them by Allied bombs. A number of the same order as the invaders dead in the country being invaded.
Speaker 1And a fact that Normandy has never forgotten. And by any measure against the plan, the day was kind of a failure. Cayenne was not taken. Bayeux was not taken. Carrington was not taken. The five beachheads were actually not linked. Omaha was a separate, shallow, precarious enclave. And the gap between the American and British lodgements would not close for two more days. Not one D-Day objective on the map had actually been fully achieved. But what was achieved was
Speaker 1actually the only thing that mattered. At the end of the 6th of June, the Allies were ashore in strength, and on a coast the Germans had been for years fortifying, and now they were not going to be pushed off. The failure of the assault was the one outcome that could have lost the war in the West, and the Germans had one day to produce it, and they did not. From the 7th of June onward, the problem was no longer whether the Allies could stay. It was how long
Speaker 1it would take them to get out. out of the beachhead, out of the flooded fields, and the sunken lanes, and the hedgerows of Normandy, which almost nobody on the Allied planning staff had thought seriously about, and which were about to cost more casualties per mile than the beaches did. The men who came ashore that episode thought that the hard part was over. They had 11 weeks, though, of the worst fighting of the Western War in front of them, and it all started in a field with a hedge
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