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The official Ryan McBeth Substack Podcast

The official Ryan McBeth Substack Podcast artwork

Global Warning 35: Money, Munitions, MacGyver

Nov 1, 202628 minAudio

Want to advertise on Global Warning? Contact me and receive a media kit. Intelligence product for paid subscribers at the bottom of the page. This will unlock for free members on Sunday. Or get it from Perks. This economy sucks so become a paid member for only $2.50. In this episode: * Why military innovation won’t be solved through acquisitions alone. * The Boat People are looking to change the missile game * China takes a different approach to innovation when competing with the United States. * And, finally, a story about tulips. Free members can listen to Global Warning every Sunday on: Spotify Apple Podcasts And YouTube Intelligence briefing below: This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ryanmcbeth.substack.com/subscribe

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SPEAKER_02An American dog, a Russian dog and a Chinese dog meet up to talk about their lives in their home countries. The American dog says at home, if I bark at something random in the house, the owner gives me a big treat and calls me good boy. The Russian dog looks confused. He tilts his head. What's a treat? The Chinese dog looks equally confused and asks, what's bark? In this episode of Global Warning, I discuss why military innovation won't be solved through acquisitions alone. The boat people are looking to change their missile game.

SPEAKER_02China takes a different approach with innovation when competing with the United States. And finally, a story about tulips. And why don't you put your tulips right here.

SPEAKER_01Let's get started. As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. There are also unknown unknowns. The ones we don't know, we don't know.

SPEAKER_00Global Warning with Ryan McBeth.

SPEAKER_02This is Global Warning's 35th episode. Instead of the traditional format where I read the news to you, let me explain something here. We're going to do some original research. So if you enjoy this content, consider subscribing to my Substack at ryanmcbeth.substack.com. It's only $2.50 a month. It is cheaper than a gallon of gas. A pack of cigarettes are those gas station burritos that you probably shouldn't eat. Your YouTube subscription helps me produce new videos, podcast episodes, white papers, and Intel briefings. And look, if you can't afford the $2.50, you can still join my Substack as a free member.

SPEAKER_02At least you'll get notified when new episodes come out. First story here, the military needs to conquer military innovation. Again, you know, look, if you've been living under a rock, you might have missed that the United States military is trying to kickstart innovation. And I know, I know this whole thing, right? But this time it could be different. Money is sloshing into places it never has, like, oh, I don't know, small vendors instead of prime contractors. And the military's leadership seems keen to avoid the slow death

SPEAKER_02the Russian military has suffered on the battlefield. U.S. military leadership, at least it appears, wants to avoid a Ukraine and defeat China. So how does the United States pull off innovation? Well, in the words of Mark Watney...

SPEAKER_01We're going to have to science the shit out of this.

SPEAKER_02Or to borrow from an older TV show, you know, we need to learn how to MacGyver at scale. In a recent article featured in War on the Rocks, Cogs of War, that actually sounds like an awesome video game, doesn't it? George M. Dougherty writes that there's plenty of advice on how to accelerate meaningful, meaning effective, military innovation, but we must decentralize it, identify it, and communicate operational needs faster. Establish really tight feedback loops between the warfighter and the developers of the tech.

SPEAKER_02We need to prototype quickly and iterate based on operational feedback, leverage off-the-shelf commercial technologies and agile startups, and standardize, which can enable the scaling of success. Mick Ryan, writing for the Lowry Institute, argues that Western militaries suffer from a term he calls learning deficit, something that prioritizes the exploitation of existing competencies over exploring new solutions. Western militaries seem to fail to innovate very effectively.

SPEAKER_02Outside observers have found that in Ukraine... User's requirements drive innovation and any technology that reaches the battlefield is evaluated immediately under harsh battlefield conditions. And this can work really, really well since almost every brigade has their own drone factories. The problem with this, though, is getting that information out to other brigades. So, you know, my recent video on Autonomous Warfare Command, one of the handful of initiatives proposed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hankseth aims to do just that.

SPEAKER_02Now, in Ukraine, both sides are in this dizzying race to stay ahead of one another, and the dynamic is most acute in electronic warfare. Each side has found new ways to jam drone signals, and the other side has found ways to get around that jamming. It is spy versus spy. Mike Rye, on writing on his Substack, Future Doctrina, says that Ukraine war exemplifies the concept of fast following, in which both nations have fast followed each other, repeated at the technical, tactical, and institutional levels simultaneously.

SPEAKER_02The imitation cycles that took months or years in the 20th century have contracted to weeks and, in some domains, days. I'm actually kind of reminded of the interrupter gear. That I believe was on a French aircraft from World War I. Back then you had to mount the machine guns above the propellers and then someone in France figured out, hey, if we just have this gear that only allows the machine gun to fire when the propeller of your plane isn't in front of it, then heck,

SPEAKER_02we can fire straight through the propellers and it's going to be a lot easier for the pilot to shoot. And I think a plane crashed in France and the pilot was unable to destroy the plane and their interrupter gears on German aircraft shortly afterwards. So in a situation like Ukraine, when a drone crashes inside of Russia, they're going to take that thing apart and they're going to look for any kind of new tech. And it's these kind of vicious cycles that we're going to see in a future conflict

SPEAKER_02between the United States and China. And I'll tell you, artificial intelligence will play a key role in fast following, and it will likely change the face of large-scale comet operations. In Israel, innovations have already focused on high-speed information processing. During the Gaza War, Israelis came to rely on AIDSS, or ALS Decision Support Systems, allowing commanders to generate more targets than traditional means, which was good if you were an Israeli commander, and not so good if you were a very low-level.

SPEAKER_02Jado pairs a massive shooter sensor web with a state-of-the-art artificial intelligence algorithm processing and decision-making support to create a storm from hell. And it works. The U.S. military tried this against Iran. And at least at a tactical level, we were able to run circles around Iran and target thousands of military and government assets in a matter of days.

SPEAKER_02And this has really given China something to think about. In fact, Chinese PLA strategists have hailed artificial intelligence as a game changer in military affairs. Future conflict between the U.S. and China is likely to be deadlier and easier. So here it goes.

SPEAKER_02The United States military is actually no stranger to innovation. If it were, history would be a heck of a lot different today. It would probably be speaking German. American military personnel and their leadership have proven to be innovated during World War II. Soldiers innovated in the field to solve problems with the hedgerows in France. Rhino tanks, as they were called, were field innovations where you essentially welded a scoop like a bulldozer onto the front of the tank to kind of push through these low planted hedgerows that were

SPEAKER_02in Normandy. And, you know, through much of the Cold War, innovation was key to America's success in countering and eventually defeating the Soviet Union by the late 1980s. The Cold War innovations included Admiral Rickover's nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, General Bernard Shriver's intercontinental ballistic missiles, Admiral William Rayburn's Polaris submarine launch ballistic missile system, and Undersecretary of Defense William Perry, the F-117A stealth fighter. However,

SPEAKER_02like many military organizations in the post-World War era, the U.S. military has become used to these small counter-insurgency operations during the global war on terror. In fact, following the war in Kuwait in 1991, the United States' national security strategy, written by George H.W. Bush's administration, believed that large-scale destructive wars between global powers were essentially a thing of the past. Those conflicts had died, essentially, with the death of the Soviet Union. So while the Department of War's shift in how

SPEAKER_02the military adopts new military environments of the 20th century is absolutely welcome, we should note a few cautionary points. Thayne Clare, writing for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, reminds us that performing acquisition alone... Claire further argues that from the 1950s to the 1980s, one approach that has paid consistent dividends, which is centralizing authority in one leader responsible for fielding

SPEAKER_02a new military technology at an operational useful scale, is, well, needed. Wait a minute, it didn't already just tell us a decentralized military innovation. He did. And it's important to hold on to that. The prerequisites for successful military innovation have nothing to with loosening up acquisition, though it can be a bonus. Claire exposes numerous Cold War era case studies that share four prerequisites. You got the assistance for an operational problem without the existing solution. You got top-level leadership who's willing to protect and support innovators.

SPEAKER_02You got an open-minded organizational culture, and you got innovators who are supported and rewarded for their efforts. So the current system of innovation within the U.S. military creates what Clairso calls the Valley of Death, where you sandwich innovations and innovators between research and development on one side and acquisition and sustainment on the other. In other words, by defusing responsibility, the United States military has effectively killed its ability to innovate at scope and scale. So to speed successful innovation, the main task of senior defense officials,

SPEAKER_02secretary of defense, service secretaries, is to select capable innovators, then grant them the darn authority to operate unimpeded on both sides of the valley and everywhere in between. So why does this matter? I mean, the U.S. military doesn't have an innovation problem. It really never has. Soldiers are coming up with new ideas all the time. Sergeant Curtis Collin, the inventor of rhino tanks, wasn't waiting for the U.S. Army to approve his design. He just welded it onto the front of the vehicle and let's go.

SPEAKER_02Neither are the Ukrainian drone teams waiting on someone in Kiev to rewrite the rules of war for eastern Ukraine. People improvise. Yeah, that's the MacGyvering part. That's the easy part. The hardest bit is to do it at scale. Distribute that information to other people. And on the surface, it would seem that the experts I cited today seem to disagree with one another. Doherty and other Ukraine watchers say to decentralize it, push the problems out of the warfighter, tighten the feedback loops, iterate fast. Gleyer says to centralize things, but one leader in charge of carrying capability from the lab to the fleet to

SPEAKER_02the squadron or platoon. And they both have two halves of the same military problem here. Discovery should be decentralized, right? Because that's where the problems are felt, at the soldier level. That's where the duct tape is being applied. Scaling has to be centralized. This requires someone with real authority to seize on good items and drag them across the valley of death and put them in the hands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians before the enemy adapts. Admiral Rickover didn't invent nuclear propulsion, but he did put it out to sea.

SPEAKER_02And right now the U.S. mostly gets both sides wrong here. Field fixes stay local. Bureaucracy spreads responsibility so thin that nobody actually owns anything. And throwing money at an acquisition doesn't really do much to change the lack of innovation. It buys more prototypes. All right. But it also buys more legacy systems. And then that innovation dies in the valley. So what does this mean for the U.S. military and future conflicts will fight? Well, fast following. I mean, if Mick Ryan is right that the adaptation cycles have shrunk from years to months,

SPEAKER_02weeks, days, then whoever fields the best system from day one won't win a war with China. It's the person who can field the best system on day 30, day 100, day 200, and so on. The strikes that knocked out thousands of targets in Iran were the opening move, but didn't give us a permanent advantage. And the PLA is studying and developing countermeasures to JADO. And this kind of war, the decisive weapon isn't a drone, it's not a missile, it's not a frigate. Frigates would be nice. It's not artificial intelligence either.

SPEAKER_02It's the institution that can turn a sergeant's innovation into a force-wide fix before the other side knows that we did it. So the question for the Department of War isn't whether its people can innovate like a MacGyver. They can. They will. The question is whether Secretary Hegseth and his service secretaries will do what worked during the height of the Cold War. Select those proven innovators, give them authority, support them in operations, and get the heck out of their way. And if you're walking the dog, it's time to turn around.

SPEAKER_02The second story here is that Navy hopes to change the face of missile acquisition to prepare for future conflicts. According to a breaking defense article, an avian Raytheon have inked a $24.4 billion deal to accelerate the SM-6 missile. The SM-6 is a shipborne missile that can defeat a range of targets from supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles to threat surface ship, among others. We put them on F-18s. We put them on F-18s to launch them in the sky. According to the U.S. military, the SM-6 consists of three variants, Block 1, Block 1A, and Block 1B.

SPEAKER_02Blocks 1 and 1A are air defense weapons designed to counter anti-ship cruise missiles and aircraft threats. Block 1B is a modification of the Block 1A missile. The Navy intends to extend engagement range by developing a new second-stage rocket motor. So the SM-6 has four primary missions consisting of offensive and defensive operations. Per RTX's own press release in the deal, and RTX is the manufacturer and subsidiary of Raytheon, the SM-6, well actually Raytheon is a subsidiary of RTX,

SPEAKER_02strike that, reverse it, the SM-6 is the only combat proven weapon that can perform anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, and ballistic missile defense. The Pentagon argues that the deal will give faster production, increased manufacturing throughput, and significant cost savings across the defense industrial base. So why does this matter? I mean, the good news is this. The deal attempts to fix the scale issues the U.S. Navy has faced for years. Raytheon says the new deal will produce more than 500 SM-6s per year, about four times the current rate of production, 125 missiles per year.

SPEAKER_02Not bad, Raytheon. Not bad at all. But the urgency here is easy to understand. The Congressional Budget Office has calculated that during Red Sea combat operations, the U.S. Navy expended about 80 SM6s. Since June of 2025, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the U.S. has expended over one-half to two-thirds of its combined inventory of high-end missile interceptors. The Pentagon and Raytheon haven't really disclosed how many missiles this deal will deliver, and they never do. But without proper investment from Congress,

SPEAKER_02many missile producers in the United States are going to languish as they try to ramp up production. Now, the problem here, missile programs are all being surged at once, and this is going to create bottlenecks that aren't Raytheon's fault. Instead, they come upstream from the manufacturing process. Pig iron used to make steel, rocket propellant. If more of those items aren't produced at scale, we're going to have a major problem because everyone's vying for the same parts or the same inputs into their systems. Missiles are really sexy.

SPEAKER_02Propellant, nozzles, igniters, pig iron, not so sexy. And it's hurting the entire military industrial base. Like, you know, try walking into a bank and getting a loan to open a mine now. Now try going into a bank and getting a loan to open up an AI data center, right? Like, what are the odds you're going to get that loan? You know, even under perfect and ideal conditions, the CBO believes it'll take some five years for the United States to fully replace what has been expended.

SPEAKER_02Another problem here is the cost. The SM-6, it ain't cheap. These missiles cost more than $5 million each. I mean, I don't know my gripes with the missile mafia within the U.S. Navy, but this shows... There's something inherently broken in the acquisition department. Yeah, we need to replenish the magazines, absolutely, 100%. But we also need to start looking for something cheaper and equally effective against cheaper targets that the Chinese are going to mass when they target our Navy in the Indo-Pacific. And maybe Andrew Steelefin is a solution, maybe it's not, but we need to freaking figure it out.

SPEAKER_02A multi-year contract as acquisition reform, something St. Clair reminds us, doesn't always lead to innovation. And the SM6 purchases might refill the magazines, which will buy us time. But the question is whether the Department of War uses this time to field something cheaper and attributable, keeping the SM6s handy for only the things that it can kill. Next, how China MacGyvers for the next war. All right, so we're talking about the United States learning to MacGyver at scale. China's done the exact same thing for years, but not by choice.

SPEAKER_02Cut off from American chips and wary of the American dollar and facing a military that it can't match head on, Beijing has turned constraint into a strategy. Chinese policymakers call it strategic substitution, building a homegrown alternative to every Western system that China depends on. That includes finance. It includes computing. It includes industry. Of course, it includes the military. Beijing sees this as a window that it has to seize. One Chinese assessment puts it pretty bluntly here.

SPEAKER_02The international environment is complex, but time and momentum are on China's side. Xi Jinping made the same point at the Fourth Plenum in October 2025, urging the party to seize this window of opportunity, remove the development bottlenecks, take the strategic initiative. Chinese social scientist Wang Wen argues that the American division, Western infighting, and rising weight of the developing world give China the strategic space to do it. Money is the slow substitution here. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the U.S. and its allies froze roughly $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves,

SPEAKER_02and they cut off Russian banks from SWIFT, the international payment system. Beijing took a look at that and said, oh, hell no. China already had its own cross-border interbank payment system, or SIPs, back in 2015. But the substitution is slowest where the network effects roll, so only about 2% of transactions are denominated in one. And Chinese banks still dominate SIPs. So you can build the infrastructure, but it doesn't mean everyone will come, right? AI is fast flowing in real time here. Artificial intelligence is where substitution looks more like Ukraine.

SPEAKER_02Export controls are the measure. Chinese labs keep finding countermeasures. Some Chinese labs have been accused of distillation attacks, training their own models on the outputs of more advanced Western ones. Anthropic, OpenAI, they both named DeepSeq, DeepSeq Models. The Chinese have shown...

SPEAKER_02That they can turn industry into a weapon. Huawei shows the long tail version of this playbook, right? Copy, adapt, innovate, export, often to the very places that Western sanctions are meant to isolate. In the same pattern, it runs through solar panels now. Oh, God, it runs through rare earth refinery where Chinese overcapacity has become a tool for leverage. This matters militarily. Remember, the SM-6 problem, man. America's bottleneck isn't money. It's propellant, pig iron, igniters, production capacity, gallium.

SPEAKER_02China's strength is precisely its ability to produce at scale. The CBO warns that China has far more ballistic and cruise missiles than Iran had, and it can produce them faster, and God knows, probably knows how to use them better. Catch here is that the PLA isn't tested, which, you know, once they start shooting, it's going to be tested. China's military has real capabilities, including advanced missiles and cyber forces and the world's largest navy. Of course, they haven't fought a war since 1979. But look, you know, peacekeeping deployments are one way that China tries to make up for it.

SPEAKER_02And you can make up for it with training, right? Right. So why does this matter? I mean, put two powers side by side. Each side has half the machine they need to win. China has what Thayne Clare says American innovation lacks. Top-down authority that can drive a single strategy across finance, industry, and the military all at once. I mean, that is one advantage of authoritarianism. What it lacks... Is what Ukraine has in abundance, battlefield feedback that shows which innovations could actually work. The United States has the opposite problem. Its forces are learning under fire in the Middle East,

SPEAKER_02but its institutions can't scale to what they learn. The question is which side completes its wind machine first. Wind machine? Oh, wow, that almost sounds like my book, The Wind Machine. A book about a hedge fund manager named Mike Malloy, whose AI-based supercomputer finds out there is likely going to be a war with China, and now he's faced with a decision. Should he tell the American government, or should he profit from it? Win Machine, now available on Audible or Amazon. You've probably heard this story here. One final thing, the tulip that broke the Dutch economy, maybe.

SPEAKER_02I published this story on Substack back in spring, and I wanted to talk about it again since there was that AI crash just a couple of days ago, at least the crash in the stock prices here. In the winter of 1637, the Dutch lost their freaking minds over tulips. Like weavers dropped their looms, chimney sweeps mortgaged their homes. A single tulip bulb could sell for the price of a house. And then almost overnight, the market collapsed and it ruined a nation. It is one of the most famous financial disaster stories ever told.

SPEAKER_02Every time a bubble forms, whether it's dot-com or housing or AI or crypto, someone calls the same label tulip mania. There's only one problem with that. A lot of that story probably isn't true. Start with the flower itself. Today you can grab a bag of tulip bulbs at a hardware store. Can you? I don't think I've ever bought tulips before. I figured you'd go to like the florist or something. All right. Well, you know, Michael says it's a hardware store, so I'm taking his word for it here. But the tulip actually began in the Tenshan mountain valleys of Central Asia over centuries.

SPEAKER_02It traveled west and it became a prized flower in Persian gardens and then later Ottoman gardens. The Dutch acquired it in the late 16th century and under the Dutch the tulip became something new. It stopped becoming a thing of beauty and became a commodity in one of the world's first fully capitalist economies. People bought and sold and eventually traded tulip bulbs on paper while they were still buried in the ground. Now that's the setup for the legend here. The version we most know comes from a Scottish journalist named Charles McKay.

SPEAKER_02In 1841, he published a book later titled Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. McKay filed tulip mania under national delusions. In his telling, the whole country went mad. Rich and poor alike poured fortunes into bulbs. Ordinary work ground to a halt. Nobody seemed immune. Great story, but it's also a terrible source. Economist Peter Garber in the famous first bubble points out that Mackey did almost no additional research. Most of his account came from a German writer named John Beckman, and it was basically lifted with very little change.

SPEAKER_02Behind both were Dutch pamphlets from the 1630s, and a lot of them were moralizing satires written to mock speculators. In other words, the most famous account of Tulip Mania may be a copy of a copy of tulip propaganda. Later historian Garber found the prices for the rarest bulbs fell only modestly, and wall swings happened in mostly Cheap common bulbs traded by people with little money. A corner of the market serious traders largely ignored.

SPEAKER_02They didn't care about the cheap tulips. And he found no evidence of serious economic distress afterwards. The decades that followed are still remembered as the Dutch golden age. Economist E.A. Thompson went even further. He argued that tulip prices weren't irrational. They reflected how contracts in the new market actually worked. Then historian Ann Goldar wrote Tulip Mania, probably the most important book on the subject. And Goldar dug through notary records, found almost none of the ruin that these pamphlets described. In her words, the image of artisans abandoning their tools to gamble on bulbs is largely fantasy.

SPEAKER_02I mean, if it was true, you would likely see that when it came to the deaths of people and their estates. Are they bequeathing tulips to people and what was their value? For Goldar, tulip mania was less an economic crisis than a cultural one. Socially conscious about a new country, a new social order, a new kind of money kind of told itself as a cautionary tale, although not everyone is convinced here. Economist Doug French points to a rise in bankruptcies in Dutch cities between 1635 and 1637. He argues that the Dutch monetary environment,

SPEAKER_02which was flush with Spanish silver and loose coinage rules, created exactly the conditions for a speculative bubble. Charles Kinderberg and Robert Alber in manias, panics, and crashes still count tool mania among history's greatest bubbles. They note that buyers committed money to bulbs they couldn't even see and financed sellers on credit, and that hardship basically lingered until the 1840s. Popular stories kind of land somewhere between Mike Dash's tool mania is a vivid read and captures how paper notes replaced actual bulbs.

SPEAKER_02So you have literally... Paper currency representing bulbs, which kind of created something like an early futures market. But Dash keeps reaching for comparisons to the 1929 crash, and that's kind of the trap there. So why does this matter? Well, ever since McKay, people have mined tulip mania for lessons about their own markets. They'll first ask me what it meant to the Dutch who actually lived

SPEAKER_01through it.

SPEAKER_02Was it real economic mania? Maybe. Was it the nation-wrecking madness of legend? Probably not. But the most useful lesson isn't about bubbles at all, it's about sources. For nearly two centuries, one of finance's most repeated stories rested on a journalist copying another writer who was summarizing satirical pamphlets. Nobody checked because, you know, the story was too good. So the next time someone actually calls something tulip mania, it's worth asking the question whether the Dutch case actually teaches this story best,

SPEAKER_02or ask where did this story actually come from? Thank you for listening. New episodes of Global Warming appear weekly at ryanmcbeth.substack.com, where you can also find the companion intelligence briefing. Sources or citing uses embedded and active links to ensure transparency and applications. [music]

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