Episode Description What does it actually take to gain an edge in financial markets? In Part 1 of our conversation with Mike Bell, CFA, Mike joins Alan to explain the investment framework he has developed over more than two decades in markets - beginning with a front-row seat to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Mike explains why investors need to both "zoom out" and "zoom in": zooming out across more than a century of financial history, politics, economic cycles and market crises, while zooming in on the underlying economic data that headline numbers can often obscure. They discuss the lessons of the 2008 Financial Crisis, the role of fear and greed in financial bubbles, why economic fundamentals matter more than sentiment alone, and how historical data can help investors identify turning points. The conversation also explores the interaction between interest rates, inflation, unemployment, credit and fiscal policy, the difference between short-term business cycles and long-term debt cycles, and why demographics and productivity could make the decades ahead very different from the past. Topics include: · Mike Bell’s experience investing through the 2008 Financial Crisis · How financial history can improve investment decisions · Why bubbles form - and whether markets are in one today · Finding an investment edge by "zooming in" and "zooming out" · Using leading economic indicators to identify turning points · Interest rates, inflation, unemployment and the business cycle · Short-term and long-term debt cycles · Monetary policy vs fiscal policy · Geopolitics, energy shocks and the Ukraine war · Why demographics and productivity matter for long-term growth · How economic regimes influence stocks, bonds and gold The Most Important Thing brings together leading investors, economists and thinkers to discuss the frameworks and ideas that matter most when making investment decisions.
Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.
Transcript
From the show. Tap a time to play from there.
SPEAKER_02Starting from that very bad point where I remember at times in late 08, it felt like capitalism itself was going to come to an end. For me, the most important thing is thinking about how do you get edge. How do you do better, not than the best hedge fund managers in the world, but just than the money-weighted average view. And I think in my mind, there's two ways that you can get edge. And I kind of term it zooming in and zooming out.
SPEAKER_02I just think that understanding that even extremely smart people are vulnerable to that human feeling of not wanting to miss out. People hate seeing their neighbor or their friend get rich and just ignoring all common sense and valuation. And I've seen, I think we've seen several examples of that in recent years. And in fact, I think we're living in a bubble right now.
SPEAKER_00Hello and welcome to another episode of this great podcast, The Most Important Thing. It involves me, Ivan Yates, and main man, Dr. Alan O'Sullivan of Pre Air Wealth Management, who has traveled the world to interview leading experts in their field. And what you've got is all sorts of experts on what topic?
SPEAKER_01Okay, so the world is full of noise. Um we need to speak with experts about their most important thing. So in terms of topics Ivan, we're looking at geopolitics, investment, finance, economics, across mainly those four headings.
SPEAKER_00And this episode is coming to you from a Duban South Dublin, very cozy, but it's also historic 1859 room owned by celebrity rugby players. So let's get on with today's episode.
SPEAKER_01My guest today is Mike Bell, one of the most recognizable investment strategists in the UK and Ireland, and someone who has spent his career trying to understand an interaction between economics, politics, financial markets, and crucially financial history. So Mike began his investment career in April 2008, about as dramatic a time as you could possibly choose to enter financial markets. And that experience helped shape investment philosophy built around understanding why markets behave as they do across different economic regimes.
SPEAKER_01I think this is a fascinating conversation. We talk about why Mike believes investors need to both zoom out and zoom in. Zoom out by looking back not ten or twenty years, but sometimes a century or more, and zoom in by going beneath the headline economic data to understand what is really happening. We discuss bubbles, market cycles, geopolitics, inflation, the limitations of traditional 6040 portfolio, and why genuine diversification means owning assets that behave differently when you actually need them to do so.
SPEAKER_01But we also go much further, we talk about the extraordinary debt burden now facing developed economies, aging populations, financial repression, and why governments may ultimately have very few politically acceptable ways out. Finally, we discussed AI not simply as an investment opportunity, but as a potential source of enormous economic and political disruption. Huge amount in this conversation. This is Mike Bell, and this is the most important thing. Okay, so I'm delighted to say joining me now is Mike Bell.
SPEAKER_01Mike will be very well known to a lot of you, a very well-known uh macro strategist, investment strategist uh with a story career. And Mike is going to talk to us today about his most important thing. But first of all, as we do with all of our interviewees, we get some background information. So be very interested to know, Mike, please, how you initially became interested in financial markets.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I guess uh when I first uh was at university, I actually wanted to be a news reader. I was kind of interested in the politics. I studied mainly political philosophy with a bit of economics, you know, reading Keynes and Marx and Adam Smith and people like that, but mainly from the kind of ideas side rather than the equation side of economics. And I was always fascinated as a kid, sort of growing up watching the news about politics around the world and the wars that would break out and how that would, you know, it just seemed a very real thing that influenced the world and influenced people in a very meaningful and important way.
SPEAKER_02And then as I sort of grew older, I sort of started to study the interaction between the politics and the economics. You know, for example, at university I studied some of the causes of revolutions and saw how economics was part of that. Um and so just and also I I saw throughout my life, I saw people losing their jobs and what a profound impact that can have on them and how important the economy really is to people's lives. And so that's really kind of what got me interested in it.
SPEAKER_02Uh, and then over my career, I've just kind of learned more and more about how that interaction between politics and economics functions.
SPEAKER_01And what was your first role then, Mike? Maybe, maybe talk us through that because I know you you're in markets about 25 years, uh, two decades, over two decades. So everyone says we live in interesting times, but I mean, you've got the tech rec, you've got 9-11, you've got 2008. It was a pretty eventful decade. So, what was your kind of early formative years like?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, so I started in the finance industry in April 2008, which was uh certainly an interesting time to start out. Uh, and I started on the investment team for a private bank in London called C Horinco. Part of a team of four straight out of university. I was obviously the junior on the team, and we were trying to work out what was going to happen to markets so that we could invest on behalf of the bank's clients. Um, and so we were essentially analyzing: do you want more in the US?
SPEAKER_02What do you want more in Europe? Do you want more in stocks or bonds or alternatives? So these kind of top-down macro tactical allocation calls. And so, you know, within months of me joining, we were in the heat of the 2008 financial crisis, got to see markets going down 5% a day, day after day, and living through what that feels like. But then also, so as I say, I was sort of just starting out. So, really, one of the first big bits of analysis that I did in my career was to, with the markets falling, we'd position so that we weren't overweight risk.
SPEAKER_02Um, and then the question was basically well, at what point do you want to go overweight and put more money into equities on the view that actually this crisis is over and it's gonna be an opportunity, and then where do you want to invest? And so we did a lot of work on looking back at historically what were some of the key indicators that told you it was a good time to be investing after a sell-off. And actually, you know, the analysis played out pretty well, and we were, you could argue, maybe a few months late, but I think it was around June 2009 that we ended up going overweight equities, um, both US and if I remember rightly, sort of UK mid and small gaps.
SPEAKER_02Um, and those were trades which then played out nicely for clients over the coming years as markets recovered. Um, and a lot of, you know, starting from that very bad point where I remember at times in late 08, it felt like capitalism itself was going to come to an end. Um, but of course it didn't. And sort of looking back through history and working out that actually eventually there are bailouts and when there's sufficient fiscal stimulus, enough of a bailout, when they start printing money, when valuations are very low, and when a lot of the sort of more near-term macro indicators start to bottom, historically that's been a good time to buy stocks.
SPEAKER_02And when we sort of put that framework into place, uh it enabled us to go overweight stops pretty close to the lows for markets, and then benefit from that over the coming years.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, it's very interesting talking to somebody that had a front row seat during that period and was actually putting money to work. But just in terms of the indicators, you mentioned indicators there for Mike. What were those indicators that you were looking at? I'm I'm just guessing maybe ISM type type leading indicators, or what am I right there? What kind of indicators?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, so a whole variety of things. As you say, so and it depends which country you're looking at. Um I mean, one thing I remember back then in 2008 that we looked at, just very simply, which is actually historically only a good indicator at extremes, but was just looking at simple valuation metrics like a forward price to earnings ratio. No, so we looked back, and stocks got very, very cheap in 2009 when everyone was really very depressed about the economic outlook, unemployment was extremely high.
SPEAKER_02And basically, we looked back and thought, well, how many times in history, if you buy on valuations that are this beaten up, and when unemployment is this high, do you go on to lose money over a two to three year view? And the answer was hardly ever.
SPEAKER_02So, you know, one thing that I remember looking at was initial jobless claims in the US. Historically, initial jobless claims, when they start to rise, has been a warning sign that the economy is showing cracks in the labor market and stocks tend to react badly to that. But likewise, on the other hand, when initial jobless claims start to peak, that's often been a good indicator that actually the economy is starting to recover. And indeed it was in that period in early 09.
SPEAKER_02You saw a peak in jobless claims, uh, and that pretty much coincided with the lows for equity markets.
SPEAKER_01Okay, so you mentioned financial history there, so you're obviously using uh a financial history framework because all we have is historical data really, and assess the behaviour of that data during stressed environments. So how important is uh looking at financial history to your own framework, Mike?
SPEAKER_02I think it's absolutely crucial. I think you know, there's the whole compliance thing of the past doesn't guarantee you the future, and that's of course true, and I think you always need to think about well, in what ways could the future be different to the past? I'm sure we'll get on to talking about that. But really, the past is the best guide that we have to what might happen in the future, and so I certainly focus a lot on history in terms of using it for trying to predict the future.
SPEAKER_02What I try and do is look at all the different economic indicators that are out. I mentioned just one simple one of jobless claims, but there's lots of different indicators that I monitor and try and see, well, I mean, one of the first things I did, so as I said, I mainly studied politics at university. One of the first things I did in the early years of my career when I had access to the data from a Bloomberg terminal was to pull all of the different indicators that exist and just plot them against each other and work out, well, which moves first?
SPEAKER_02So, you know, does the National Association of Home Builders Index, for example, move before building permits in the US? And is that a good what about historically? So it turns out that that would have been a good early warning sign by a lot of the troubles that were going on in 2008. In fact, it started to flank a lot of the problems as early as 2005. And I looked back through history and said, well, what new home sales and building permits in the US would they have helped predict previous housing busts and recessions?
SPEAKER_02And in fact, it turns out they would have been very helpful in predicting many of them. And then looking at, you know, what's the interaction between jobless claims and interest rates and inflation, what goes first? Kind of chicken and egg type discussions and just looking at that uh to get in my mind a solid framework of what are the key lead leading indicators, what are the lagging indicators, and how do they interact and what should I be most focused on to try and get an understanding of, and basically what I've done throughout my career is look back as far as I can get the data, you know, at least to the 1900s and often prior to that, and try and work out could I, with the benefit of hindsight, explain what went wrong every time the market went down a lot.
SPEAKER_02And also, indeed, like what were the preconditions for the big bull markets? So that at least I can explain, well, this is why the market went down a lot in 1929, and why returns in real terms were poor during the 1970s, and you know, why nine the recession in the 1990s happened, or the big bust in Japan in the 1990s, what went wrong in 2000 with the dot-com bust and the 2008 financial crisis.
SPEAKER_02I think at least if you can explain all of those big busts, as well as the emerging market crises, etc., etc. Basically, if you can explain everything that went right and everything that went wrong over the last 125 years, and ideally looking back even further than that, then you've got a better chance, I think, of saying, well, what's going on at the moment, how is that similar and how is that different to the past?
SPEAKER_02What does what's going on, how does what's going on now remind me of some of the things that happened in the past, and therefore, how might it be similar or different? And that's broadly speaking how I've tried to approach uh forecasting over micro.
SPEAKER_01I think what's very interesting about financial history is that you know, the past uh what's that famous uh Mark Twain quote? History doesn't repeat but it rhymes. But uh what's con as constant through financial history is uh human behaviour. You know, I asked my students, and sometimes I said I teach at MBA in Dublin Business School, and I say, you know, what's the common denominator between 1929 and 2008? And you get the usual uh, you know, policy mistake, um collapse of the banking system.
SPEAKER_01Um but at the obvious one is it was human beings driven by fear and greed uh that that uh were reacting to to what was going on in the markets. How do you uh use the sentiment cycle, Mike, in association with your framework or you know what what indicators do you look at? How does that inform your process as well?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, so I slightly disagree with the idea that some people have that it's all about sentiment. I think it's an important part of it, but I think the and it's part of the reason why you get the big swings and why you get bubbles, which then bust. But I think that those things would happen anyway, right? So the way I think about the cycle, it is driven in partly by sentiment, but it's wrong when people say, oh, well, the reason the market went down was because some journalist broke the story that there was a problem in the banking sector, and that caused people to panic.
SPEAKER_02You know, the famous kind of all we have to fear is fear itself. I don't really agree with that. I think that when you look back through history, there are fundamental things that have gone wrong. You've had a build-up in credit, for example. People have borrowed more than they can afford. And that is what causes the cycle. But you then do very much need to think about sentiment in terms of the timing of that. So, as I say, if you think back to 2008, if you were watching new home sales or home building data in the US, it was really quite clear that there was a pretty major problem in the housing market in the US.
SPEAKER_02Certainly by 2006, it was clear. By 2007, the charts were aligned. And yet the market didn't really catch on until 2008. So I think you do need to look at sentiment, and part of that is just looking at some technical indicators and momentum. Because if you went short the market in 2005, when those indicators first started to turn down, you would have probably got carried out and not been able to still be in the game by the time the market finally worked out what was going on.
SPEAKER_02So I think it's about thinking what's actually going on, what are the drivers, and then thinking about the sentiment in terms of more tactical timing indicators. But I do think the sentiment is part of the reason why you get bubbles, right? And I did a post on LinkedIn recently. Part of my kind of study of history where I've looked further back is looking at all the bubbles that I could find in history, going all the way back to the tulip bubble and many, many centuries ago.
SPEAKER_02But also looking at the Mississippi bubble and the South Sea bubble and you know, going all the way back through history. And some of those, yes, often there was debt involved, but a lot of it was just greed, right? Basically, humans not wanting to miss out that what you'd nowadays call phobus. And, you know, famously, even Isaac Newton, one of the smartest men who's ever lived, got caught up in that. And didn't want to miss out on some of those gains at the time, and famously invested near the top and ended up losing a lot of his wealth.
SPEAKER_02So I just think that understanding that even extremely smart people are vulnerable to that human feeling of not wanting to miss out. People hate seeing their neighbor or their friend get rich and just ignoring all common sense and valuation. And I've seen think we've seen several examples of that in recent years. And in fact, I think we're living in a bubble right now.
SPEAKER_01Okay, I I'd like to frame out the bubble that you see. Uh this is uh an supposed to be an evergreen conversation. That's what makes this podcast different. Experts like yourself uh are talking about the most important thing. And the idea is that maybe three, four, five years from now, a young graduate, young professional might stumble across this interview and it's still relevant. That's a high bar to set in finance where everything is time variant and dynamic, but that's what we're trying to do.
SPEAKER_01So I'm I'm gonna stumble in then, Mike, to your most important thing. It's an intriguing uh set of uh teams you're talking about. So can you just frame out what for you uh is the most important thing when it comes to managing money and investment strategy?
SPEAKER_02So I think if you're trying to invest, you're ultimately trying to beat the market, right? So the market is essentially just driven by the flow of money, right? So it's a kind of money-weighted view of what's going to happen. So there's this kind of I think misconception that you can't beat the market because the smartest hedge fund managers out there are placing their bets, and how could you possibly hope to be that?
SPEAKER_02But you know, the smartest hedge fund managers run a relatively small amount of money. So, yes, they can do well if they're right and better than other people are predicting what's going to happen, but they're often not the ones driving the markets because that's driven more by flows of money that are bigger. So, and particularly over recent years, a lot of that flow is retail investors sometimes buying individual stocks, and and then passive money as well, which is just kind of following that flow blindly without even thinking.
SPEAKER_02Thinking about fundamentals or valuations. Um so for me, the most important thing is thinking about how do you get edge, right? How do you do better, not than the best hedge fund managers in the world, but just than the money-weighted average view. And I think in my mind, there's two ways that you can get edge. And I kind of term it zooming in and zooming out.
SPEAKER_02So to just explain in a little bit more depth what I mean by that. So the zooming out is kind of a bit of what we've just talked about. It's looking further back and also looking at the bigger picture than most people are. So without going into too much depth, there have been numerous examples throughout history where incredibly smart people have lost a lot of money by not looking far enough back.
SPEAKER_02They put into their risk models five or ten years of data. And then something happened that had happened many times throughout history, but just hadn't happened in the last five or 10 years, like house prices go down, or there's a default in an emerging market country, et cetera, et cetera. And because that wasn't in their model, it blows the whole thing up. So I think it's very important to look back, not just people talk about long-term, as if 10 years is long term.
SPEAKER_02When I talk about 10 years, long, sorry, long-term looking back, I'm talking about at least 100 years. Most things that have happened have happened in the last 100 years. But, you know, it can be helpful to look even further back. Think about COVID as an example, right? If you've hadn't looked back to the late, well, basically the Spanish flu, you wouldn't probably have in your model that sometimes pandemics cause major problems for the economy and markets.
SPEAKER_02And so I think you've got to look back a long way. So that's one thing. The other thing about big picture is not just focusing on economics and markets, but thinking about politics as well and how different disciplines interact. So at university I did a kind of multidisciplinary subject. And so I remember very clearly, mainly because it was Valentine's Day in 2022, I was on Bloomberg and the Anker at the time said to me, So we're getting reports that Putin is amassing tax on the border of Ukraine.
SPEAKER_02What do you think that means for markets? And we now know, obviously, with the benefit of hindsight, that it led to the invasion of Ukraine, and with that, a big inflation shock. And so the question is, could you have seen that coming? And I think the answer is yes. And basically, what I said at the time on that interview was, well, look, I don't know for sure. But when you, you know, a lot of people in markets say you should broadly ignore the politics. And there's charts I've seen where people sort of put on political events and against the stock market that's broadly going up and say ignore it.
SPEAKER_02But I'd look back through history and worked out that, well, which political events should you ignore and which one should you focus on? And the broad takeaway I had was you should not ignore the ones which involve wars with major energy producers. Okay, and Russia obviously is a major energy producer. Most of those wars that you didn't want to ignore historically were ones in the Middle East. But it seemed clear to me at the time that if there was going to be a potential war in Europe involving the supplier of energy to most of Europe, and indeed Ukraine, who was the supplier of a lot of the food in the world, then that could create an inflation shock that would be bad for both stocks and bonds in a way that at the time wasn't priced.
SPEAKER_02And that's basically what I said at the time. And of course, with hindsight, that turned out to be true. And so, you know, thinking about the politics rather than just focusing on the economics because they're fundamentally linked. So that's the kind of zooming out. And then the zooming in is trying to get an edge by looking at the data in just a bit more depth than most people do. Right? So most people, it seems, basically focus on the data that kind of pops up on their Bloomberg terminal.
SPEAKER_02So you're looking at Bloomberg, it's available, to be honest with you, on just various economic calendars that get released. So think about non-farm payrolls. It's probably the most watched number in financial markets. And most people will say, oh, the latest non-farm payroll showed the X number of jobs well in the US economy this month. How can you get an edge over that? Everyone in the world who is investing in is watching that number. Well, like one of the things I do is each month I break down the sectoral composition of that.
SPEAKER_02And look at how much of that, for example, is coming from cyclical sectors and how much of it is coming from less cyclical sectors like health and education. And if you do that, you can see, for example, that over the last few months, the cyclical employment has been much weaker than just the headline number suggests. So the broad market narrative is that you're seeing a slowdown in the economy, but you're still seeing positive labor market growth. But actually, when you dig deeper into that number, most of the job gainers have been coming from health and education.
SPEAKER_02And the cyclical sectors, things like manufacturing and retail and construction, have been much weaker. And so that's just one example. I do the same when it comes to the different component parts of inflation, etc., where I think just going a bit deeper than a lot of people do, allows you to have an edge, which is ultimately what you need to try and outperform.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. I think it's very interesting what you spoke there in relation to the geopolitical side of the strategy. You look. I studied political science myself in the University of Galway. It was the first degree I did. And I still say one of the most interesting subjects I studied. And I know a lot of hedge funds, you know, hire financial historians, investment pe people that look at investment philosophy and politics.
SPEAKER_01The one question I have, Mike, on the zooming out part where you say we focus on long horizon data, time series data. How then do you account for the validity of the data? Can you trust the source of the data? Can you trust that it's still relevant, given the technical terms, structural breaks? And how do you account for that in your models?
SPEAKER_02The further back you go, the harder it is to get data, and then you've always got to kind of query quite how reliable it is. And you know, that's one of the problems with investing is that you know the detailed data often only goes back to, yeah, it's sometimes not even before 1945. But there are data sources which I think are relatively reliable that give you at least the big picture that allow you to go back further.
SPEAKER_02And so you can obviously only use the data that's available, but I try and use as many sources as possible to get data going further back. For example, there's a brilliant piece of data on the Bank of England's website, which is called a Millennium of Macro Data, and it's just for the UK, but it looks at data going back about a thousand years. So you can see inflation data, and they've taken all sorts of different sources and spliced it together.
SPEAKER_02So you can see inflation going back over the last thousand years for the UK. You can see unemployment going back a very long way, et cetera, et cetera. And then there are other sources which allow you not as far back as that, but to look at unemployment in the US going back to at least the 1900s, and debt to GDP ratios going back to the 1800s. So you can see that there have been these kind of big cycles of government debt, for example, where, you know, for example, government debt goes to high levels during the Civil War in the 1860s in the US.
SPEAKER_02And then what is it that causes that to come down? And then again, you get very high government debt levels during the first and then second world wars, and then what causes that to come down? Um, and then of course we've got very high debt levels again. So if you only look back to the 1980s, you'd think, oh, well, this is the first time we've had high levels of government debt. And I would argue that therefore you're blind to how this plays out in the future. Whereas if you look further back, you can see, well, actually, this has all happened before, not in exactly the same way, and not for the same reasons.
SPEAKER_02You know, historically, the reason we ended up with high government debt was nearly always because of wars rather than because of spending on pensions and social benefits. But it doesn't really matter why you end up in that place, it's more we've we've been in here before. How did we get out of it in the past? And therefore, can you use that as a framework to try and predict where we may be going from here? And I I think you can.
SPEAKER_01I recently interviewed Professor Campbell Harvey, and to your point about looking back and how useful records could be, and he he he released a pretty famous paper talking about inflation and how inflation is an excellent uh hedge against purchasing power over the long term, not so great over the short term because it's volatility. But he went back and looked at the Romans kept great records, and he looked at the uh wages of centurion guards and uh compared them to modern day US uh captains, and it's virtually the same, and it's fascinating that that that that those records can be used.
SPEAKER_01You mentioned cycles there, and there's l people meant talk about cycles, but we've got the business cycle, you know, volatility cycles, inflation cycles. How do you use cycles and turning points more specifically, I suppose, uh to inform your your your strategy as well?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, okay. So it's a big question, but let's think about sort of the main short-term cycle first. Okay, so the short-term cycle is an interaction between interest rates, inflation, unemployment, wage growth, and credit. And very simply and quickly, you know, unemployment starts high after a recession, interest rates get cut because wage growth comes down and therefore inflation comes down.
SPEAKER_02And that combination of lower interest rates, normally plus some fiscal stimulus, starts the economy into a positive feedback loop. And lower interest rates also allow people to borrow more, which means there's more spending. And so that creates a kind of positive feedback loop where unemployment comes down, people are borrowing more, there's no spending, which means that then more people get hired, so unemployment falls some more, et cetera, et cetera, in this positive feedback loop where unemployment comes down, normally in a pretty straight line.
SPEAKER_02And it depends how high the unemployment rate got, will often be a good indicator of how long it takes for you to get towards the end of that cycle. Although, as we saw post-COVID, sometimes it can snap back very quickly. Although that's been that was a very unusual historical example. Um and then, you know, unemployment gets to a low level, that gives workers more bargaining power, wage growth picks up, um there's less capacity for the economy to expand in a non-inflationary way because the output gap is closed, and therefore inflation starts to pick up.
SPEAKER_02And so central banks react to that by putting interest rates up, which then slows credit growth, it slows spending, and with that, eventually the economy normally starts to tin to a point where you then get less spending. Less spending then can lead to job cuts, which can lead to even less spending, and that positive feedback loop becomes a negative feedback loop, and you go into a recession and the cycle starts again, right?
SPEAKER_02So very as a very kind of simple and simplified explanation of the kind of short-term business cycle, as I think about it at least. But then you've got to overlay that against a longer-term cycle, right? Which is you get these kind of little wiggles up and down in credit, but built against a backdrop of the overall debt to GDP ratio, and then you've got to look at it for each sector.
SPEAKER_02Right? So I talked about the big cycle for government debt, right? How you often during wars government debt levels got up to very high levels, and then broadly a period of growth plus inflation, often with some financial repression, helped to bring those government debt to GDP levels down to more sustainable levels. And then government debt to GDP starts to rise again. And how does that interact with the debt cycles for the household sector and the corporate sector?
SPEAKER_02So, you know, you look back to the 1980s and you had relatively low levels of household and corporate debt, and then those built up, household debt built up meaningfully through till around 2008, which led to the 2008 financial crisis. And then since then, we've seen this kind of shift where households have been deleveraging. So household debt relative to incomes have come down, but at the expense of governments, because the government's had to step in and beggle out the banks and support the economy, um, given the retrenchment that's been going on in the private sector.
SPEAKER_02And that's now led to a situation where government debt levels are very high again. So, what does that mean? So I think you've got to think about debt cycles that are short-term debt cycles, the kind of business cycle, overlaid on top of the long-term debt to GDP ratios for both the government, household, and corporate sectors and the financial sector. And then overlaid all of that against the really big things that drive long-term growth, which simply put are technological advancement and hence productivity growth, but also demographics.
SPEAKER_02Right. And that I think is absolutely fundamental in the and one of the ways I think the future is going to be different to the past, in that we have lived through many centuries of populations that have just grown. So most people just extrapolate the past and they kind of assume that the future will look like the past. But actually, when you look at it, the future is going to look really quite different to the past. And one of the ways in which that's the case is the demographics. So I think you've got to think about productivity growth, innovation, demographics, then the long-term debt cycles, and also the short-term business and credit cycle.
SPEAKER_02And if you understand all that, I think you've got a much better hope of being able to predict where the world's going.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, that's very interesting. I'm thinking about Dalio's economic machine there as I was listening to you, short-term cycles, long-term debt cycles, and the productivity growth. And I also interviewed Professor Bob Gordon, Northwestern University, who released a famous book in 2016, uh, The Rise and Fall of US Growth, where he was very early in saying that US had peaked productivity. And there is evidence that that 2% core rate is under pressure.
SPEAKER_01Uh, and the technologists then will say, well, AI is gonna improve productivity. That's that's up that's up for debate. Just in terms of the the cycles, then to I know I asked a very broad question, but if we get into the portfolio construction side of it, Mike, you're really kind of trying to see where the the puck is going to, aren't you? And I think it's watching central banks across that regime. Like, for example, if if if you if you're in a in a Goldilocks environment where growth is trending upwards and inflation is trending, is not is just neutral.
SPEAKER_01Uh central banks are less likely to cut, but in a stagationary environment, central banks are likely to raise and you know bonds aren't a good idea. Um I kind of skating around at a very high level uh how you use the economics and then what central banks are going to do?
SPEAKER_02So I think the central banks are key because ultimately, so the framework I described, but there's a few things to think about there. Partly, I think, massively underestimated is the importance of momentum. Okay, so economies, I think, are largely driven by momentum. So one of the simplest forecasting tools is just understanding positive and negative feedback loops.
SPEAKER_02Because most of the time the economy is broadly getting better and markets, stock markets are going up. Right? So just understanding why is that the case, it's because of that positive feedback loop that I described. But the central banks are important because you know when you think about turning points, what tips that positive momentum into negative momentum? And central banks play a key role in that, but also when you're in a recession, what tips the negative momentum back towards a positive momentum?
SPEAKER_02And I think really there are kind of two key levers, one of which is central bank policy, monetary policy, in other words, and the other is fiscal policy. So what governments are doing with taxes and spending. And so, and then you've also got the other things I talked about, like potential wars and oil price spikes and that. So if you understand monetary policy and fiscal policy and its interaction with the economy, then that's absolutely crucial to understanding what's going to happen next.
SPEAKER_02And then so I think about all of that and try and use it as a framework for predicting what's going to happen to the economy. And then I think, okay, well, now, now that I think I have a good understanding of what the key drivers are of the economy, what drives GDP and what causes recessions, but also, as you kind of talked about, what drives inflation, right? Why was there lots of inflation in the 1970s, but not after 2008, even though they printed lots of money?
SPEAKER_02Are you enough to understand that? If you don't understand why there was lots of inflation in the 70s and not lots of inflation in the period after 2008, then you don't understand inflation, and therefore you won't get it right in the future. Or if you do, it's pure luck. So if you then understand how those things work, then just overlay, okay, well, let's look at, again, not just the last 10 years data, but let's look at data going back as far as I can find.
SPEAKER_02And, you know, there's great data available, for example, from Robert Schiller going back to the 1900s to some of the US market data. Um, and look at, well, when GDP did this, or when home sales did that, and when Unemployment did this, how did that interact with the stock market? How did it interact with the bond market? Did bonds always act as a good hedge to equities? And the answer is no, they didn't.
SPEAKER_02Why didn't they? What was going on differently in the 1970s that meant that they didn't react? The correlations were different to how they have been at some points in more recent history. And, you know, if you'd understood that, it would have helped to predict that in 2022, for example, both bonds and stocks were going to go down together. But also to think about asset classes beyond just traditional stocks and bonds, but to understand that, for example, why is it that at some times throughout history gold has done very well?
SPEAKER_02And at some times throughout history, gold has done very badly. People often talk about gold as being an inflation hedge. Well, it was a fantastic inflation hedge in the 70s. In the 80s, it was a very bad inflation hedge. Wow. Do you understand the interaction of, for example, real interest rates with the price of gold? And I think that's what I've tried to do is look back throughout history, understand the framework of what causes recessions, what causes economic expansions, when are those inflationary and when are they not inflationary?
SPEAKER_02And then if you can understand are we going to have a recession or not, and are we going to have inflation or not? And then think about things like real interest rates. I think if you can understand all of that and also think where are valuations for stocks and bonds, like in very simple terms, if bonds are yielding nothing or they have a negative yield, your future return is probably going to be pretty poor. If stocks are at the highest valuation they've been at in over 25 years, then your forward-looking return over the next 10 to 15 years is probably going to be worse than if you were buying stocks on 10 times earnings, like you could after the financial crisis.
SPEAKER_02So just think about the overlay of valuations with the economy and how asset classes have reacted in different points throughout history, and then ask yourself: well, if it worked this way before, does that mean it's more likely to work in the same way in the future? And I think more often than not, the answer is yes. But you've got to really understand all the different dynamics of that.
SPEAKER_02Because sometimes I hear people say, like, for example, I hear a lot of people at the moment talking about concern around stagflation. I think that's completely wrong. And if you muddle up what's going on now with what went on in the 1970s, you could end up positioning portfolios wrongly.
SPEAKER_01So I'm going to press pause on the first part of the conversation with Mike Bell. Stay tuned next week, where we conclude our conversation, a fascinating interview where Mike goes into more detail regarding his framework for zooming in and zooming out. Stay tuned next week. See you on the other side.
Ivan & Alan are back this week. Do central banks really control the economy, or are the Federal Reserve and ECB reacting to forces beyond their control? In this episode of The Most Important Thing, Ivan Yates and Dr....
Are we heading towards a debt crisis, an earnings downturn and a major shift in the stock market? In Part Two of The MOST Important Thing, Dr. Alan O’Sullivan is joined by contrarian investor and former hedge fund...
Is the AI bubble about to burst? Contrarian investor Jesse Felder joins Dr. Alan O’Sullivan on The MOST Important Thing to examine NVIDIA, Big Tech’s AI spending boom, rising US Treasury yields, stubborn inflation, and...
Is the global economy entering a new inflationary era - and could rising government debt make the next downturn even harder to manage? In this conversation with Dr Lacy Hunt, Alan O’Sullivan examines the forces...
WARNING - This episode should be viewed given the educational content and graphs referred to during the episode. Anyone tells you they "know" what the market is going to do is as dangerous as a one-legged man in an...