Scam Tactics, Stalkerware, Pegasus, and Surveillance Reform, with David Ruiz from Malwarebytes
54 minAudio
Every major global event brings the same scam tactics wearing a new mask. In this interview, David Ruiz, journalist and privacy advocate at Malwarebytes, breaks down how to identify (and avoid) scams, stalkerware vs. nation-state spyware, and what privacy is actually about. ๐ SOURCES & LINKS โข Malwarebytes: https://malwarebytes.com/ โข Coalition Against Stalkerware: https://stopstalkerware.org/ โข Citizen Lab: https://citizenlab.ca/ โข Electronic Frontier Foundation: https://eff.org/ โฑ๏ธ TIMESTAMPS (00:00) - INTRO (01:31) - DAVID'S BACKGROUND (06:38) - POLICY BEHIND-THE-SCENES (09:18) - WORLD CUP SCAMS (16:58) - BEHAVIORAL VS. TECHNOLOGICAL DEFENSES (18:53) - SCAMS VS. MARKETING (21:49) - RESPONSIBILITY (24:35) - WHERE TOOLS FIT + MALWAREBYTES TOOLS (28:42) - MALWAREBYTES RELATIONSHIP TO BIG TECH (31:30) - ANALYTICS (33:56) - COALITION AGAINST STALKERWARE (41:46) - STALKERWARE VS. GOVERNMENT SPYWARE (44:32) - STALKERWARE IS MOSTLY ANDROID? (47:44) - DAVID'S TECH STACK (50:29) - FINAL THOUGHTS ๐ฅ VIDEO Watch on YouTube ๐งก SUPPORT TECHLORE Keep Techlore Talks independent & growing: โ Support this podcast โ
Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.
Transcript
From the show. Tap a time to play from there.
Anytime there's something global, anytime there's something big, anytime that something is on every single person's mind, scammers are out there trying to make money off of it. Right now, tens of thousands of fake World Cup websites are out there hunting for fans who are vulnerable. And my guest's team today is the one who found them. But that's not really what the episode's fully about because that same scam playbook really hits any major event and is a recurring pattern anytime there's something big. He also spent years fighting government surveillance at the EFF just watched a law reauthorized every six years for decades quietly fail to renew.
By the end, you'll know how to spot a scam before you click, how it might be almost similar to bad marketing for some organizations, and how to spot the difference between those, and overall privacy and security advice that's especially shareable with friends and family. I also want to apologize as David's camera had some kind of flickering issue, so if you're a video listener, you might see some of that, but hopefully the audio is still good and you get all the value you need from this interview. Let's get into it. Welcome, David. from Mauerbyte. It's awesome to have you here. And I know we've been going back and forth for a while. And so I'm really excited to finally bring you on. Thank you. Yeah. Thanks so much
for having me here. Thanks for carving out the time. I am thrilled to be here. Like I've said before, I run a podcast and so it is extremely cool to be it does that. I hate it. Look, we're off to a bad start with AI generated emojis. But I am very, very excited to be here. Very, very happy. Yeah. That feature is really annoying. Yeah. For audio listeners, we had the The macOS emojis come up there. So I want to hear about your history first before we dive into the weeds on the World Cup, the scam economy of the World Cup.
But I want to also zoom out of the World Cup because I think it's always whatever the next big event is that's targeted by malicious actors. I know you have some history in policy, stalkerware, et cetera. So I want to dive into a lot of these really good topics. But I just want to ask about you and your history first and how you're at Malwarebytes, what you do for Malwarebytes, but also what you did before. Yeah, absolutely. So I actually got my career started just as a journalist, right? I was a legal affairs reporter working for different papers. So that is as simple as it sounds, covering trials, right? Covering lawsuits. Because I'm based in San Francisco, a lot of the stuff I was doing was covering like worker violation lawsuits against big tech, right? Things that were dealing with like Uber and like DoorDash, Lyft, all that kind of stuff where, you know, we were worried about like, are they employees? Are they contractors? All that kind of stuff.
But during that time, while I'm covering the lawsuits that companies are facing, big tech is facing, Edward Snowden comes out and reveals the PRISM program, which is that the NSA was scooping up untold quantities of communications across the globe. And within those communications were Americans' communications. This program that's called Section 702, in trying to gather foreign intelligence, the NSA is also gathering messages that you and I could send to, you know, our friends who just simply live in another country. We are not suspected of a crime in that.
However, when our communications get stored in these massive databases collected by the NSA, the FBI can actually go in there and read my messages without a warrant. We believe this is a flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment, right? My information was collected even though I was not suspected of a crime. My information was read even though there was no warrant that was applied to access my information. And yet that's allowed as it stands right now. Like that is allowed. Our intelligence agencies do have that power. So I learned all about that. I became deeply interested in surveillance, deeply interested in government surveillance.
I'm trying to fight against it, trying to limit it. And so I went to Electronic Frontier Foundation, which is a digital rights nonprofit. I spent a little bit of time there just doing exactly that, right? I would go to Congress. I would try to speak to Congress members, to senators, representatives, to their legislative directors, trying to limit NSA surveillance. There is a law that, you know, we've called it Section 702 here on the show already. There's a law that extends that and like it gets reauthorized every six years. And so when I was there, it was a reauthorization year.
So I went to Congress and I said, this is wrong for these reasons. We want to limit it. We want to bring it back. If we're going to reauthorize Section 702, you know, that's a big, the way I think of it is like, if, if, if, I hope we don't, right? But if we do, can we get some warrant requirements? Can we limit the surveillance that captures Americans? Can we limit the remit? You know, we do know of violations that take place under Section 702. We do know of violations committed by the NSA and by the FBI because there's a secret court that actually publishes reports once in a while.
We know it's too broad a law. We know this. We've tried to rein it in. When you fight the surveillance machine, I will be honest, they win a lot. They win most of the time. So I was there, again, just trying to limit surveillance in any way possible. And fun fact, this is kind of weird. Section 702, as of two weeks ago, has lapsed. They just didn't extend it. This happens all the time when I was there. It is really down to the wire. You know, you're following, like, house proceedings at midnight.
And they're going like, well, it's going to lapse. It has lapsed. You know, we don't have this authority for two hours, three hours, four hours. But they always get it done. They always extend surveillance. This is the first time I've honestly seen it. I want to say here, I am shocked. This has never happened. I've never seen something like this. We just do not have a surveillance authority right now in the United States. Does that mean that surveillance isn't happening? Probably not. Probably not. There may be a retroactive law that is passed. There are tons of things. There are tons of machinations that Congress can conjure up.
But right now, as it stands, Section 702 has lapsed. It is not in effect. That was a dream six or seven years ago when I was working. Now it feels like it's just a product of chaos, to be perfectly honest. So that's what I was doing. I came to Malarbytes. When you work at a digital rights nonprofit, you just fall in love with cybersecurity. You fall in love with online privacy. So I joined Malarbytes to do a lot of the same stuff. Write about privacy, advocate on privacy, get to learn a little bit more about cybersecurity. There's that whole other angle. I think they're deeply intertwined topics.
And really, it is just to get a chance to make the Internet better for everyone. We just want to make it better online. That's what I'm trying to do. Yeah, really. I was going to ask you about your thoughts on the recent lapse of Section 702, but you beat me to it. Do you, before we get a little bit more into the World Cup stuff here, what does the behind the scenes of policy look like? Very briefly, I hear this a lot too back here. It's like, hey, I work on policy.
And I feel like it's this big umbrella term that to regular people who haven't worked in policy like myself can mean a lot of things. And so what does that look like a day in a life? Excellent question, right? And I can't stand myself. I think the sort of gatekeeping that policy workers have within the realm. So really simply, you know, policy is stuff that affects how you and I get to interact with one another, right? It really is. It is the rules of the classroom. It is the rules of what you say, what you can say, what you get marked for.
I know that we call it policy. I know that there's a ton of policy think tanks that, you know, are situated in Washington, D.C. I know there's a ton of people with policy jobs and we don't really know what they do in the most basic sense. What I was doing is I was reading laws that were being proposed by Congress saying, you know, we want to do this with electronic communications. And I would read those and I would say, this is bad for reasons A through Z, you know, and also trying to activate the public. You know, writing blogs is a big part of it. Going to speak, you know, is a big part of it.
I would visit classrooms, you know, I would visit like high schools and middle schools talking about this stuff. And it's great. Like whenever you can get someone in the teens to care at all about government, it is a fantastic win. Really, what we're doing is we're trying to read proposed rules. We're trying to read how the government wants to change your life. They have a massive amount of power. They can change, again, the way your messages are stored, the way your messages are retrieved, the requirements for asking for your messages. And that also includes things like your location.
That includes whether or not it's okay that when you visit a website, when you click around, you know, your behavior can be gathered into a data broker bundle and profile, and it can be used to target you with ads somewhere down the line. It can include the fact that you may not use Facebook. You may not log into Facebook, but Facebook sure knows a lot about you because other companies are telling Facebook about what you've done. All of that, all of that can be controlled, can be limited, can be made better for you because of policy.
And again, at a very basic level, it's what is the government trying to do? Who's looking out for the everyday person? And how do you get those changes made? That's policy. It's got a lot of people. It's got too many people, I would say. And it has a lot of visits to offices with people who are dressed in suits, who maybe take a day off, please. You know, just, it's okay. Yeah, and so, you know, for the World Cup, I know that you, and or Mauerbeitz, maybe we can dig into how much you did or if you did all of that there.
But you guys have been doing some coverage on the World Cup, not like you're doing commentating for the games. I wish. I'm actually, you know, the US game is going to be, like an hour after our call. So I'm going to watch that. And I watched Spain and Portugal. So I am following along here. I don't know if you read that crazy blog article of somebody who actually was able to get internal access to the FIFA systems and they had complete access to everything. They could have streamed anything to it. They had access to all the stream codes. I would really look into that
because it was a very interesting oversight in their security. But you covered this more from the end user's perspective. People who are going online, they want to watch the World Cup. And you found some interesting stuff. And so I think it'd be interesting to unpack that a little bit. And then we can dive into the details and some takeaways to keep people safe, not just during the World Cup, but any major event where probably the same attackers are targeting people who are looking for something. Yeah, yeah. So what we found, and it's similar to what we find for any major event.
You were kind of alluding to it earlier in the show. Anytime there's something global, anytime there's something big, COVID actually is another really good example of this. But anytime that something is on every single person's mind, scammers are out there trying to make money off of it, right? And so the World Cup is the world's news right now. And so we found plenty of examples of, for example, we found fake websites being just kind of drawn up overnight. And they were promising simply high-definition streams to matches, right? Hey, don't pay for anything.
You don't have a TV. Just click on this and you can find a high definition stream of your team, of the match you want to watch. They're scams, right? In the sense that like sometimes it's not even a stream. Sometimes it's nothing. You click on these things and you get nowhere. But most of the time you're just getting ads. You're getting ads. You're getting malicious ads. You're just getting pop-ups. I think we're all pretty accustomed to this as someone who went to college and tried to watch streams, you know, just through ads. That's kind of what it was. They're annoying.
They don't deliver what they're supposed to deliver. It's a way to generate ad revenue for a bunch of clandestine sites. And again, they're extremely easy to spin up. A lot of this work was done by my colleague, who's a threat researcher here. And pretty much what he's doing is he's looking online for people who are running campaigns to try and scam people. Some of the more interesting stuff we saw, though, was a couple of weeks ago. We saw websites being spun up for things like applying for a FIFA passport, right? So let's say you want to come to the United States to watch like an actual game, a match in person.
Oh, just apply for this FIFA passport. Not a real thing, right? Not a thing whatsoever. That's not how it works. That's not how tourism works to enter, you know, the USA. You know, these sort of, again, FIFA passports or like FIFA visas or World Cup visas, all these kinds of things kind of being advertised. Pure scans, absolute pure scan. Not something that you need to apply for. Not something that exists. Not something that you're going to get your money back on. And we also saw a lot of obviously like cryptocurrency scams where there are sites that are alleging that they have a coin that is affiliated officially with FIFA or with any of the teams or with any other countries.
And it's the same. I mean, a crypto scam is a crypto scam is a crypto scam, right? They're trying to gain your money. They're trying to get you to invest in something. That coin may exist. It may not exist, right? The entire infrastructure of the website may be fraudulent and it's just something to take your payment information. So we saw a lot of that. And then kind of usual, I think this is kind of almost almost endearing, you know, because you can see this kind of scam in person. It's rare to see in-person scams be recreated online. Just fake merchandise. Right. There's like that's like that's a classic scam. That's totally fine. We understand that one. There's no no crypto involved. There's no like shady website redirects. There's no adware being installed on your device. Just a fake piece of clothing. You know, why not? That's that one works in person. It probably works online as well.
So we've seen a lot of that stuff. And again, all of it is, like I said, very much attached to a global piece of news that people are paying attention to. And my goodness, there's probably nothing better than the World Cup right now for a scam because it lasts weeks, right? It's not something that's happening one day. You know, like Black Friday, we do see scams based on Black Friday, fake sales from like real retailers, decoy websites made to look like real retailers. That kind of stuff lasts a week, maybe two at the most. The lead up to World Cup, World Cup itself,
that's such a long period of time that you can run a lot of fake websites. You can run a lot of scams for quite a bit of time. Yeah, so if somebody's hearing this, and let's try to keep the advice universal. We can still use the World Cup, of course, because that's what's in right now. But this has been common in AI. I know when AI really blows up, you start seeing all these campaigns come out all at once, targeting people, searching for AI. So how does someone know they're about to engage with a scam? Like, what are kind of the telltale signs?
How does someone recognize that? What should they do in those situations? Because I think it's easy to tell people it's happening, but no one really knows it's happening until after they've been scammed. Right. Such a difficult problem that I think most of the cybersecurity industry deals with. The folks who know what a scam looks like are not the folks that need the most protection in scams, right? Like, they are aware. We're trying to help people away from, like you said, just look out for World Cup scams. So really, really basic top, you know, top to bottom kind of list of stuff.
Something that seems too good to be true is likely too good to be true, right? We see this also as like job scams, right? You get a text and boy, we're getting a lot of these these days, right? You get a text that says, hey, you can work remotely. You can make $5,000 a week. You can work for six hours, you know, a week. Like you're good to go. Too good to be true. There's a reason for it. It's because it's scam. Too good to be true is such an easy, easy, reliable thing to lean on for might be a scam. Urgency, number two, right? Something that is trying to get you to do something, either because there's like a fake time limit.
I mean, sometimes you'll even see on a website, there's like a clock, there's a countdown. This deal is only good for so long, or this deal is running out, or any type of urgency language. Baked into urgency also is honestly threats. Like, we don't think about that all the time, but a lot of these scams have threats baked into them. Threats like extortion scams, right? Someone alleging that they have photos of you, that they have footage of you, they have webcam recordings of you. That's a threat, right? A threat to publish that kind of stuff.
That's a threat. And it's baked into urgency, right? If you don't send this payment at a certain time, we're going to publish these photos or we're going to tell everyone in your contact list. That's something to also watch out for. And then I would say, as we were talking here again, anything based on like a global event, unfortunately, we do just have to have a heightened awareness around it. Because something, again, I go back to COVID for the last time that I think the world was thinking about the same thing, right? The scams are very different in the sense of they were like philanthropy scams. It was preying on that goodness in you, which was, hey, we're taking donations for a hospital.
We're taking donations for the Red Cross, you know, for known organizations. That kind of stuff, again, we just have to watch out for anything that is globally relevant. We have to be aware of who's actually doing it, where it's coming from. So if you're being urged to do something, watch out. If it's too good to be true, watch out. If it's globally relevant, watch out. Yeah, I have a few follow-ups there. I mean, the first one, is there a reason you mentioned behaviors and not technologies as all of your defensives? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yes, because the technology changes, right? This is kind of wild.
To my understanding, the first piece of ransomware that was ever developed and sent was sent via floppy disk. And it was sent as though they were asking people who were working in AIDS research at the time. I believe this is the late 80s. If they would contribute to a research, to like an international effort to combine research to find out more about the AIDS epidemic as it was happening. And when you put this disk into your computer, after a certain number of reboots, you would get hit with, again, I believe this is the first case of ransomware.
It's a different kind of ransomware, right? It's super rudimentary, super basic. But after a while, it just pops up like a text file. And the computer is like, I don't even think there's a way to undo it. I think it was just like, yeah, you're kind of done for. That was an earlier technology. And yet the behavior is somewhat the same there, right? preying on someone's like with COVID, right? Preying on how good they are, hoping that they can do something. But again, that was a global problem, still is a global problem. The technology will change. It will look different. You know, the messages that we used to get over email,
right, those have moved to text messages. And I'm sure that the messages we get over text messages, those will one day change and they'll arrive, they already are, in social media inboxes, right? We see a lot of scams that don't come through text at all. They come through LinkedIn. They come through Facebook. They come through Instagram. They come through Signal. They come through any preferred communication platform. So, right, we can say, watch out for URLs with this, you know, instead of.com,.xyz. We can say that, and that's likely true. Tomorrow, that will be out of date. So instead, we're looking for behaviors.
Yeah, so, I mean, this is a funny question, but it's a real question, because I think some people who might struggle with this a bit more than others, a lot of things you're describing can also be hard to separate from good marketing. You know, like people, like, let's just use a generic, very in your face, high marketing VPN. They're going to have countdowns on their website. They're going to be urging you about the threats out there. They're going to be talking about the World Cup. So they actually fit all of the criteria you listed out. So how can someone look at high marketing VPN A versus a scam VPN?
Or, you know, this can be completely different. I want this to be universal. How can someone tell the difference in that situation? yeah this is something that bothers the hell out of me because you're absolutely right i particularly enjoy a band called the mountain goats right and uh on instagram they run promos and it says if you want if you want the promo code to just dm us the number of scams that start with unsolicited dms that should not be your approach to speaking to your real customer base about getting a promo code
on a website right just put the promo code on the website it's not that secretive folks like It's okay. I'm not getting 70% off. I particularly hate, as you've identified here, that legitimate companies are now speaking to us with a level of urgency and a level of sometimes even like FOMO, fear of missing out, that is similar, that is akin to scam tactics as to how people can recognize, right, whether one is legitimate and one is not. Unfortunately, we do have to rely on things like
Is that the real website? Does it have the padlock, you know, next to the URL? You know, is it an encrypted connection? I think a lot of people also sometimes they don't know if the website is legitimate. So they resort to a thing like an app, right? I know a lot of folks don't know whether it's safe to do their banking on Chase.com or the Chase app. And I think this delineation only exists because of the way that we talk to people. You know, there should be the same level of assurance within customers to reach either
you know, portal for an established provider. I kind of hate this, right? Because the answer depends on the person doing so much more management, right? I hate things where we have to manage more security. We have to manage more privacy. But unfortunately, it does feel like that is the thing where you have to know if the provider is legitimate. And you said here, right, like the VPN provider, like these kinds of tactics, you know, this is running out, this won't be back, you're going to lose out on this. I would say, and this is my recommendation to like a lot of things,
just buy less things, just buy fewer things. I know that's not realistic. I know that's not what we can all do. I know that modern society makes us buy these things and I hate that. But if you do see that your provider is using those types of tactics, I would even say punish them a little bit. You can vote with your wallet. That's it. Yeah. Do you think that there is some responsibility for the people hosting software, hosting websites, and the developers in terms of how they present
and where they're reaching their... Because that's kind of what you're speaking to there with the band on Instagram. You're kind of saying that it's their responsibility as well to help reduce the amount of scams. And actually, this is nowhere near that kind of scale. And I have a huge amount of respect for them. But one of the things I don't like about Signal is that they don't really get their foot in the door for so many Linux distros. And so what happens is we have all these community-built, unofficial signal packages out there for the Linux community. And I feel like that's a very dangerous position to put a signal user in.
A very rare not-W, I think, from the signal team, in my opinion, of course. But is that kind of what you're saying? There's some responsibility that the people running stuff needs to have? I'm not saying signal specifically. That's my opinion. I don't want to put words in your mouth. Right, right, right. No, I totally understand. It's just a good example to have, right? It's on hand. Unequivocally, yes. I do think that it is up to the folks who are running these platforms, who are selling the software to recognize that some of their tactics are mirroring the tactics of scammers.
I'm also going to go out and say that I never, you know, this is the classic thing, right? I don't ascribe malice to what could simply be like ignorance. Right. And I mean that in like the plainest, like non malicious sense. I think a lot of folks just may not know that this is what is happening, you know, through these social media platforms. They may not know that this is how scammers reach people. This is a very good example of this. My goodness. A few weeks ago, maybe a month or two ago, I saw an email in my inbox.
I believe it was from Macy's. Macy's, I apologize if it wasn't you. No ill will here. But the subject line of the email was spaced out in between one letter, what, like letter, space, letter, space, letter, space, letter, space, all caps. And it was like 40% off like Macy's this weekend. I don't blame anyone at Macy's for not realizing that, you know, maybe 15 years ago, that was like the scam subject line. That was like, that was the way that we received scams. And realistically, there's probably just someone who wrote a subject line at Macy's who is
20 years younger than I am. And that's okay. And that's like, they have a different internet. They have seen a different internet. So again, I think a lot of this is just folks don't know what scams look like all the time. They don't know what the scam tactics are because they're not in it every day. And so I'm not putting anyone on blast here. Again, like I said, I'm not ascribing malice, but I do think there is a responsibility. Absolutely. I think there's a responsibility to treat your customers in a way that it shouldn't mirror the way they're treated by scammers. What have you kind of learned during your time at Mauerbytes about this kind of issue?
I believe you all, if I'm not mistaken, and I'm not a Mauerbytes customer, but I believe you guys have the free tool, which is more offline. It's not offline. You guys have to download the definitions and everything, but it's more designed to run locally on your system. And then you have more active scanning tools. How do you feel about those tools fitting in somebody's workflow, whether it's Mauerbytes or any other tool out there? Or do you think that this is more behavioral, like you were saying? Yeah, I think that we always want, and I think this is cybersecurity in general. We want to help people either before a crisis occurs or as a crisis is occurring, right?
And so a crisis occurring can be, I replied to a scam message, you know, I sent money, you know, which is hard to come back from. Or I downloaded something, I opened a PDF, I clicked that link in the email. And so something like the free scanner, right, that Malwarebytes has had, you know, since day one, that's supposed to help with a very, very classic problem, which is a piece of malware has showed up on your device. We're just going to find it. We're going to take it off. We still do that. That is still free. And I think that still plays a big role in like just day to day cybersecurity.
Right. But as we've seen, right, cybersecurity threats have evolved dramatically. Right. It is not just malware gets installed on your device. It is you reply to a message on LinkedIn or you believe something, you believe an email, you believe that this website actually is taking donations for, again, let's say like the Red Cross. At that point, we need to help folks when they're seeing the thing, right, before they've engaged with it. And so the millions of ways you can land on a bad website or receive a bad message, that just means we have to do that
much more. And so we have things, right? We have a VPN as well. We believe that like the VPN is part of just like a larger approach towards online privacy. You know, I don't, I personally don't want my internet service provider seeing what I do online. I think that's, I think they have no business there. You guys use Azure servers for that, right? That we do. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Love them. Entirely RAM-based servers. So we can't store any data. Like physically, we cannot store data. And so if we get a request for data, it's not that we say, no, you can't have it. It's more,
no, the data doesn't exist, right? And that's like a lovely, lovely thing. We've been audited by a third-party provider as well, a group of researchers, to just simply prove that we are saying what we're saying. I think that kind of stuff is so important because it's so hard to just trust. I added Azure to our VPN chart recently and it kind of shocked because I hadn't heard of it before I added it. And when I added it to our chart, I'm like, oh wow. And I had to look at the history and I was like, oh, because in my head, you guys were still using Mulvad, but then you guys switched over to Azure. but it marks off pretty much all the same stuff.
It's a really good provider. So it was a good choice. Yeah, just to kind of wrap it up on that question about what we provide. Because again, like I said, there's so many different ways you can receive a threat and you can encounter a threat. We have all these different things that we hope, right, are non-intrusive and that we do the work for you, right? That includes such a growing list of products and features. We have something called Personal Data Remover to help you remove yourself online, you know, but a lot of that is we're supposed to be doing the work, not you. I think we had this promise
many years ago that it didn't matter who you were online, right? The earliest internet said it didn't matter what your name was. It didn't matter what your real name was. It didn't matter where you were born. It didn't matter how much you made. And I think we've really seen that over the past 15 to 20 years. It extremely matters. I think there's a group of companies, big tech companies, that that's what matters most. It matters most what my zip code is. It matters most what my salary is because that will help an advertiser target me with an ad. And that will give money to a large company like Meta.
I don't think that should be the internet we keep making. I don't think that should be that at all. And so we do have to make some tools that I think are honestly adversarial against the modern surveillance economy. And so we're trying to do that as well. Yeah, I was going to ask you about this later, but you brought it up now, so I'll start now. but what's your guys' relationship with big tech companies? I think I was exposed to this concept for the first time in Cyprus when I was with some of these ad-blocking people from Brave, from Ghostory, all these common ad-blockers. They were talking about the overall principle
of first versus third-party tracking. I think it's DuckDuckGo specifically in their app tracking that they do on Android. They actually block Facebook, but only when it's a third-party tracker. If you download the Facebook app, DuckDuckGo won't block the Facebook app. But if you download a totally unrelated app and it has a Facebook tracker, they will block that. So there's this overall idea of trying to reel in those big tech companies. And so I was curious what your guys' relationship was with that. Because a lot of times these big tech companies also aren't part of keeping someone safe online for reasons you just cited.
So is there a role where you're with the companies, against the companies, or is that something that you're somewhat neutral to and your job is just keeping people's cybersecurity safe? Yeah, I think that's a lovely way to think about it, right? Are we with the companies? Are we against them? Are we neutral? The cleanest answer I can give is that we're with consumers, right? And sometimes being with consumers is being anti-company. Like there's no way to torture that concept. We have a product, right? Browser card, which is a browser plugin entirely free, and it blocks third-party trackers by
default. It also helps you find out if you're on a scam website or if there's anything that's kind of suspicious going on at a URL. But it's a third-party tracker blocker, right? And when you make something that blocks third-party tracking, there is a part of you, again, that is protecting the consumer against a company, against a big tech company. Those are one and the same thing. We also have analyzed our own website before to answer, can we get rid of some of this stuff?
Can we get rid of some of the tracking? The way that we record a visitor. I think so many of the tools that exist for running websites right now have tracking baked in that getting rid of some of that stuff is actually much harder than we would assume. I actually, I run a site on something called Ghost. And Ghost is, I think, one of the only publishing platforms. Yeah, right. It's one of the only publishing platforms that I know of, period, that lets you turn off tracking. So I don't know who visits my website. I don't know how many people visit my website. I don't know who opens the newsletter.
I have no clue. And I'm allowed to make that decision. Whereas I used to have a site on WordPress and it's like, here you go, man. Here's every single person who visited. Here's what it looks like. Here's what country we think they came from. Again, Malwarebytes has analyzed our own use of trackers before to limit them. We believe in being like, again, sometimes being on the side of the consumer is being against a company. And that's totally fine. That's what we need to protect people from. If that's what they need, that's what they need. Yeah, just because I know there's going to be some people wondering, can you expand on, I guess, from your perspective,
necessity for having at least some analytics and what it looks like to do those more privately versus not privately? Because I think some people just think it's either not private or private. So do you mind expanding a bit? I feel like it'd be incomplete if I didn't ask that. Oh, yeah, absolutely. Yeah. So there are things, right, where we have to know, I think, particularly things about malware, right? We do have to know how many people are being affected by a certain type of malware. And so this is actually getting into like malware statistics, you know, malware like data and telemetry. When we know what threats are hitting a populace,
a user body, we can make our product better. It's honestly just that kind of simple. Now, can I go in and can I look up a user and can I see what they were hit with? Absolutely not. Like, absolutely not. The most I've ever been able to see is detection counts, right, for types of malware. That's my understanding of our, you know, how we look at what is important for making our product better. I think we're always going to need that, right? And I think a lot of websites, if we
want to relate to websites, are going to feel the same way, right? They're going to need to see something as simple as like, are they getting traffic from a different country? And should they start supporting, let's say, translation services for that country, right? Are they getting a number of like errors from a certain region? And why is that? There needs to be some level of basic reporting to see both, you know, what's going wrong and what's going right. I work on Mauerbytes Labs, which is the blog. We need to know what the people read. Like we need to know, like, did this do well? Because that helps us become better journalists. Like it helps us see,
okay, this is a story that's important to the people. And this is a story that isn't. And sometimes, right, a story that doesn't get clicks is still deeply important for news coverage. That doesn't lead 100% what we're doing. But we want to know if we're being useful. We want to know if we're being helpful. And we have a comment section, right? But who the hell wants to comment sometimes? That's another bar that you have to go through. So yeah, there are just some certain forms of analytics where to know that your website is functional, you do have to measure how people reach it and when and the experience they're having. Yeah, I think the analytic company is
also really important. I saw you guys use Plausible, which has a much better privacy policy than Google or some of these other companies, which I think is pretty cool. Kind of the next big thing I want to open up here is the coalition against stalkerware, which I know is something that you guys have worked on. I only learned about this recently right before the interview. So do you want to touch on it a little bit for somebody who hasn't heard of it before? Yeah, absolutely. So stalkerware is this term that the public have agreed to use for mobile apps, particularly on Android, that can spy on a user non-consensually.
They hide themselves from view. Sometimes they're disguised as like benign settings apps or photo editors, but their capabilities are rather extreme. They can see photos. They can see videos. They can retrieve deleted photos. They can record calls. They can keep those calls and make them accessible to another party. They can see GPS location. They can see GPS location history so they can show where someone has been for over, you know, I think about two weeks. I've tested them on test devices I have owned to kind of get a view into me, which is a bizarre experiment to run.
But it's funny knowing that I have this type of app on my own dummy device and seeing what it can access is still shocking, even though I know 100% I'm the person running the experiment. And I'm still shocked at the level of invasion into my own life. They can turn off Wi-Fi remotely, which I think is horrid. I think that's terrible. I think that's a way to limit someone's communication capabilities. They can look at a screen as it's being used. They can hijack a camera to take photos without a person knowing. They can listen to a device's microphone, the audio that's being patched in.
So if you have a phone on a table during a conversation, they can kind of listen to what's happening, what that conversation is. These, again, these apps are dubbed as stalkerware because, lo and behold, they are used in situations of stalking and domestic abuse, domestic violence. So many years ago, well, I say many, but maybe about six years ago, several cybersecurity companies, Malarbytes included, we got together with the National Network to End Domestic Violence, with Electronic Frontier Foundation, with a couple of other nonprofits. And we created a coalition, the Coalition Against Stockerware.
And it was a simple, simple premise. What if someone could download any of our apps and they could trust that we would find whether or not one of these types of apps, you know, these invasive mobile apps was on their device, right? We know how to improve the detection capabilities of everyone. That way, protect everyone better and really just get the word out, right? Get the word out. Talk about this. Communicate it. I present every single year at a tech summit run by National Network to End Domestic Violence. Just telling people about what this threat is, what it looks like, what it can access and how they can stay safe.
I think it's just a good thing. It's like a wonderful thing. It's like one of the things that you launch and you're happy about it and you're proud of it. And if people have questions about this, like if they have a question, honestly, about anything StockAware related, we have an email partners at StopStockAware.org. You know, StopStockAware.org, the website as well. Legitimately, if you just email us, we love that stuff. We love answering questions. We are so about just answering questions, helping people out, pulling our minds together. I think the organization is huge now. The coalition is at least 20-something members.
One of us will have an answer about whatever it is. Whatever it is, we're going to have an answer. That's the coalition. We're still in effect today. We meet when we can, once a month on a good month. We are in so many countries that we sometimes just can't meet. Like, you can't meet at 3 a.m. The time differences are insane. But that's what we do. We're very, very happy with it. Yeah, it's great. I'm such a fan of it. Yeah, so people hear about this, and I'm sure they go, oh, that's spooky, imagining just pretty much the equivalent of someone standing behind them secretly their entire day. And it's easy to start, like, let's say someone's driving right now,
listening to this, they're going, oh my gosh, is this on my phone? How can I know? It's easy to get in your head when you hear about it. So what are kind of the signs that someone can look for, or if they really just want the peace of mind? Or maybe you can also talk prevention, kind of what are the main things, maybe the top three in all these areas that you think people should know about? Yeah, absolutely. This is something I've been talking about for so long, Right. And it's such a good opportunity to get to talk about it. One of the most difficult things I'd say for someone who's worried about this. And I completely understand. Right. You hear these capabilities. They are scary. They are frightening.
I think a lot of the problems, though, with, let's say, diagnosing whether or not someone has this on their device is that you cannot diagnose this based off of symptoms. Right. The symptoms here really, really plainly that we hear about directly is that someone knows something they're not supposed to. Right. Someone knew a conversation I had that I thought was private. Someone knew where I was that I thought was private. Someone knows that I visited my mom, that I went to my sister's last night. Someone knows that I was at a bar. All of these things. Right. It's someone knowing something they shouldn't and kind of using that information for control.
What makes this so difficult, again, to diagnose strictly as, oh, there is stalkerware or a stalkerware type app on your device, is that a lot of that information can also be stolen through things like Bluetooth trackers, right? We know that tiles and Apple AirTags, that they're abused, right? We know that there are precautionary measures by these companies, but we know that these are slipped into purses, into jackets. They're hidden behind license plates on cars.
We know that they're abused to reveal location. We know, as Malwarebytes has done a lot of this research before, we know that accounts are abused. Abusive exes know the passwords of their ex-partners. And you can find out so much from something as simple as, let's say, your Gmail password. Because some people, it's not just their email. It's also where they store their photos. And you can also know a lot from an Instagram password. You can know a lot based on the fact whether or not you were tagged in someone's photo the night before, whether or not you're in someone's story.
Your privacy is not managed only by you. It's also managed by your friends. So there are so many ways that this information can be revealed, can be exposed through so many different means. Right. It's not just a stock aware type app, a monitoring app that we say, hey, let's not race to conclusions. Let's not worry. There's so many things we can do. So if you do want peace of mind, right, our free tool has a scanner. And I always say that if someone is in a situation of domestic violence, to not run the scanner immediately before they have a safety plan.
Because if we go in there and we find this type of app and we withdraw it, if we remove it, the abuser also loses access to the device. That could cause anger. That could cause another emergency, right? So we're not in there saying, hey, do this for your safety planning. We are a cybersecurity company. We do not have those kinds of guides and rules. However, the National Network to End Domestic Violence is phenomenal on this. The National Domestic Violence Hotline is phenomenal on this. They know about these threats. They know about tech-enabled abuse. They know about stalkerware. So we always say, again, if you are in this situation,
please, please, please have a safety plan in place first. In terms of preventing, in terms of, you know, hey, how do I make sure this doesn't happen on me? Every single case of a stalkerware-type app I've seen before, Every single case is installed locally, is installed on the device, has access to the device. It is not remote. We implore people to always have device passcodes. Like that's it. Now, I know that's easier said than done in a lot of situations. Some people share devices. Some people in abusive relationships are coerced into not having a password or into having a shared password.
But again, device access is like the first step. So device passcodes are super, super important. After that, we're getting into situations of like, how do you stay safe against an abuser? And again, we're a cybersecurity company, so we're not the pros on that. But I can tell you that device passcodes are super important. I know it sounds really basic. I know it sounds really simple. It is that simple. It is that basic. It's a powerful, powerful gate against this stuff. I assume that you guys treat this separately from government-based spyware, things like Pegasus,
or do you kind of group this in the same bucket from your perspective? This is different, 100%. Thank you so much for asking about it, because I do think that I know this. I know that some folks will come to us with questions about Pegasus specifically. I've done presentations, again, for these audiences, for domestic violence, like advocates for support groups and networks. And I get questions directly about Pegasus. Things like Pegasus, which is a nation-state surveillance program, right?
I think it's best to not think of Pegasus as an app. I think it's best to think of Pegasus as like an economy at this point, a clandestine surveillance economy that is supported by oppressive governments. Like, that's it. They're oppressive governments. You never read a story about like Pegasus was used to stop a credible attack, right? You read stories about, this is true, Pegasus was used to spy on health scientists in Mexico who personally came out against or they personally favored us attacks on sodas.
they're like yeah so does bad we we support attacks on it hit with pegasus that doesn't make any sense you see pegasus used on daughters of royalty uh again in oppressive regimes who are trying to escape you see pegasus used against journalists against human rights dissidents you know um activists that's the reputation pegasus has from public reporting and again that is something that we classify to be perfectly honest i don't know if we find pegasus like and i you know I say that like as nakedly, honestly, as I can, because the folks I do know who find Pegasus, right, Amnesty International, and there's a lab out of the University of Toronto.
I think it's Citizen Lab. They do very, very difficult technical work in identifying whether Pegasus is on a device. And that requires a sort of iCloud backup process where you create a copy of your device and then Citizen Lab is able to analyze that backup. Pegasus is installed without a click. You know, Pegasus is installed without anything. Like, it is a devil of software. It is absolutely dreadful. It is highly technically capable. It exists in the margins of what we understand of, like, computing.
And they just keep doing it. You know, we keep finding exploits. We keep shutting them down. And I say we, I mean, all credit to, again, Citizen Lab, Amnesty International, to Google Project Zero. All credit goes to these insanely capable researchers. But NSO Group, who makes Pegasus, has funding to keep finding and keep purchasing exploits. So yeah, that's a different class. That is world surveillance, man. That's a different, different caliber. It's such a beast. Yeah, before I get a little bit more into your own privacy stack here,
you kind of mentioned it's mostly on Android devices, these stockware apps. Do you want to expand on that a bit? Yes, thanks for the opportunity there. So it is mostly on Android devices. To be clear, also, I have never personally seen a stockholder type app work on iOS natively. Like, I just haven't seen it. I've seen some that require jailbreaking a device. What I've seen more often is an install path. I've seen apps that say, you know, this works on Android and iOS. And when you get down into like the nitty gritty, the install, the requirement is that an iCloud password is required to install.
I'm sorry, man. Once you have an iCloud password, that's not like a monitoring application. That's just account abuse. That's just, hey, you have access to someone's account. And yeah, okay, you can see their photos, their videos. If they back up their messages, their messages. If they back up their notes app, you know, you can see their notes. That's a very different type of, it's still abuse. It's still surveillance in a way, but it's a different kind of install. We do see it, however, on Android. And I actually think one of the reasons for that is actually a lot clearer than some people might think. Android is the number one operating system in the world.
Actually, by the number of devices that it runs on, Android is the number one operating system in the world. And that's it. Like, these developers are trying to make a quick buck off of a terrible piece of software. They're going to make this piece of software for the biggest, you know, they're going to cast the widest net for the most fish, right, to put a dreadful metaphor on it. They're going to keep making it on Android. Also, sometimes these apps get shut down. I've spoken to a researcher before who said that they have personally, like, investigated multiple of these apps before. And they said the code base is pretty much a copy-paste job, right?
It's just the same. And so they're like, I think what people are doing, what developers are doing, is that they are copying and pasting and they're republishing as many times as possible. And if they get one taken down, oh, well, that's fine. They have 12 other shops in 12 other countries with 12 different websites. They're just going to keep doing that. And they're going to get the scraps of payment that they can through a numbers game, a pure numbers game. So it runs, again, we've seen it only in the strictest sense on Android. So you don't think that there's technical differences,
like sideloading being a little bit easier on Android, and also maybe how it's a little bit easier to get system-wide access on Android? Do you think that's also a part of it, or do you think it's mostly just popular? Yeah, that's a part of it. I think I always front-load with Android being popular, because I think a lot of our audience, when we talk about this stuff, they just want to know if they're safe. And I am always so worried about saying, The message being anyone in this audience who has an Android, you're not safe, right? I don't want that to be the message that they get. And so I try and front load with like, actually, there's financial reasons.
There's logistical reasons. But you're right. Android is a more open environment. I used to have an Android. I loved it. You know, but the level of access that you can have and the ethos, you know, of like what you're allowed to load, like you said, side loading for everything I love. I love that environment. It does allow strictly third-party apps not listed on Google Play. I mean, you can drag and drop the stuff. That's it. You can drag and drop the stuff, and it's very easy to load. Double-edged sword, yeah. Do you want to just quickly touch on kind of your own tools you use behind the scenes,
whether they're privacy, security-related, just to give people some insight on what you do behind the scenes and maybe some recommendations you have to share with people before we head out? Yeah, absolutely. So super basic, right? I tell everybody to do this. I tell just everybody, if you're using Google Chrome, please stop using Google Chrome. I use Brave. I also use Mauerbytes' browser plugin, BrowserGuard. Any third-party tracker blocker, right? That's what I'm trying to also use with my browser. I know it's silly that those are like the two things that I recommend because they're so simple, but I do think most of our audience is looking for like one thing to do.
And I think that's fine. But if you're trying to do more, absolutely. This is something I've been trying to do for, I'd say, a year. I am trying to just get rid of Google, like in my life. I have gotten rid of Chrome. I've gotten rid of Google search. I do not use Google Maps anymore. I am trying to get myself off of Google Drive. So I'm taking all of my photos and relevant information that I can. I'm trying to put them on Proton Drive. Also trying to get rid of Gmail and move to ProtonMail. That takes time, right? And it's okay that this process takes time. It's okay. It's like, that's entirely fine. I have deactivated what I can for my socials.
I have like removed my data that I can. You can do a data removal, a data deletion request from Facebook. I recommend that. I think that's great. I also use Mauerbytes as tools, right? I use our personal data remover to get my name, my biographical information off of what are called like people search sites, right? So if someone wants to find my phone number, I think they could have very easily have done that maybe a year ago. Now, a little bit harder, again, because Mauerbytes goes through and it makes these requests and says, hey, David's making a request to pull that information down.
I think that stuff is lovely. I think that's wonderful. Yeah, that's, I'd say, the technological stack. And it's a super basic stack. Again, right? I just use a different browser. I use a different search engine. I don't think that's that crazy. Behaviorally, I ask every single person if I can post a photo, you know, about them. Like that's, I think that, I think they have a right to privacy. I don't post a lot of photos. I do not share my location with anybody. My wife does not share her location with me. We do not believe in that level of monitoring in a romantic relationship. We just don't. I know a lot of people do. We don't. we have conversations about what is private and what is not private.
Behaviorally, it's really just trying to be a privacy maximalist. I think it's important that people have the agency to be who they want to be. And I think that, I know this kind of sounds kind of crazy, I think even posting a photo of someone without their consent, even if it's on Instagram, I think that carves out a little bit of their agency. And so I try not to do those things. I think it's just everyone should own and act on who they are in their own right. And privacy is the path towards that. So yeah, it's just, that's it. It's just not telling people what I do. That's it.
Cool. Well, do you have any final words, David, before we head off? Yeah, I would say thank you so much. Obviously, thank you for this time. But for folks at home, I would say that one of the most annoying things I hear is that people think that privacy is about having something to hide. I just try whenever, whenever, whenever possible to help people understand privacy is not about having something to hide. Privacy is about having the opportunity to choose who you are. that that's it. There are so many things at play that want to determine who you are for money,
right? Targeted advertising wants to determine who you are for money. There are governments that want to determine who you are for their own purposes. There are family members who want to determine who you are, sometimes maliciously, sometimes not. There are romantic partners. Privacy is the space where you're allowed to be who you are. And importantly, privacy is the space where you are allowed to be wrong about something and to grow from it. So I think, you know, some of the things that we do and we did is like maybe 13 year olds. It's okay, you know, to be wrong about something as a child. And I worry that we're removing that period of time where you can be
an oaf, you can make some blunders, you can be silly, you can be embarrassing, you know, you don't have to be on video to be like, I think it's too high a price. And I'm not even saying about like, I'm not even trying to like talk about kids who are on like, video games, like, doling out hate speech. Like, it's not even that. It's just like, you know, you see a kid who's dancing awkwardly at a high school dance and the internet blows up on him. And it's like, why are we doing this? Everyone is afforded privacy to be a little silly, be a little oafish, be a little you in a way that does not bring judgment so immediately.
So yeah, that's all. Got it. Well, thank you so much, David. There was a lot of good insight here. And I hope that people, I like the way that you spoke on privacy is just a broader mission, but also more the specifics like the scam advice, which is universal, not just the World Cup. I know it's huge right now, and I know you guys are seeing that back there. I really appreciate you coming on and sharing all this good advice, and I hope that it's useful for everyone who listened. I want to thank you for your time as well, David. Thank you for everything, and I'd love to have you back on sometime. Thank you.
That's great. Thank you so much. Thanks to all your listeners, my goodness. What really stuck with me here in this interview with David is how a lot of the things he focused on were behavior-based. I think it's always a good reminder that when technology changes, the humans behind the technology typically don't. And so even when we see these scams get more and more sophisticated, ultimately the same fundamental truths are overall true. And I think that's why David really leaned into those for his advice on avoiding these things. And it's also a lot easier to share that advice with friends and family.
It was also great to hear about his advocacy work and what it looks like to actually be involved. And I hope that can inspire some of you to get involved locally in your issues as well. If you want to stay ahead of things and get ahead of whatever's going on digital threats out there. I recommend checking out the surveillance support newsletter down in the description. It's built for doing just that. It's free. I publish it every Wednesday. There's no ad network deciding what you see. So you just get that email newsletter inbox with just the news you need to know and what to do about it to stay active in the fight. Thanks so much for watching,
Ledger recently announced Ledger Atom, a mobile device that combines hardware wallet security with Android usability. In this episode of Techlore Talks, Ledgerโs CTO explains what this device actually protects, where it...
System76 creates premium Linux computers, but they also helped draft the open source exemption language for Colorado's age attestation bill. In this interview, System76 CEO Carl Richell explains how it happened, why...
DNS quietly reveals everywhere you go online - even on encrypted sites. In this interview, John Todd (CTO at Quad9) provides a DNS masterclass: how DNS works, the privacy implications, how to change your DNS, why Quad9...
Josh Summers spent a decade living in western China before 14 police officers showed up at his door, accused him of espionage, and confiscated every device his family owned. This Techlore Talks interview covers what 17...
Flock Safety is one of several companies quietly building a searchable database of everyone's car - no warrant required, and no way to opt out. In this Techlore Talks interview, Bob from DeFlock breaks down how ALPR...