Post-Quantum Cryptography, Tamper-Resistance, and Secure Screens with Ledger CTO Charles Guillemet
17 minAudio
Ledger recently announced Ledger Atom, a mobile device that combines hardware wallet security with Android usability. In this episode of Techlore Talks, Ledger’s CTO explains what this device actually protects, where it stops, and what it means for privacy. 🔗 SOURCES & LINKS • Ledger hardware wallets (affiliate): https://www.ledger.com/techlore • Ledger hardware wallets (non-affiliate): https://www.ledger.com • Ledger Atom details (affiliate): https://shop.ledger.com/pages/ledger-atom?r=1fb45e5b9178 • Ledger Atom details (non-affiliate): https://shop.ledger.com/pages/ledger-atom ⏱️ TIMESTAMPS (00:00) - INTRO (00:09) - WHAT'S NEW? (00:34) - SECURITY COMPARISON (02:33) - SECURE MODE (03:40) - SECURITY VS. PRIVACY (05:08) - APPS USING THE SECURE ELEMENT (07:01) - GOALS FOR THE FUTURE (08:10) - THE IMPLANT ATTACK (10:31) - APPLYING TO OLDER DEVICES (11:45) - POST-QUANTUM (14:17) - USABILITY (15:39) - FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 🎥 VIDEO Watch on YouTube 🧡 SUPPORT TECHLORE Keep Techlore Talks independent & growing: ★ Support this podcast ★
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Transcript
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Even if your Android is fully compromised, your device is still secure because there is this independent second world that is in charge of security. I just wanted to start by asking what's new, especially when it comes to consumers. So yes, today we are at Ledger Op3n in Paris and we announced our new product is Ledger Atom. We wanted to fix the following problem. We wanted to have the user experience that you have on the Android-based device with the security of the Ledger device.
And we merged those two things in the same device. So if I, you know, a lot of people might hear this and they already have a Pixel or they have a Samsung device. What is the difference between the security that's typically found in a Ledger device and what's not in their device? Yeah. So if you want to have a very high level of security, such as a use case, such as crypto, you need several different properties. The first one is to have a secure enclave where you will be able to generate secrets with a very high entropy and so on.
The second one also is that the secrets must stay inside the enclave when you are doing cryptography. That means that you need to implement the cryptography within the secure enclave. And the last one is the display. You need to have a way to trust what is displayed on your screen. When you are using a Google Pixel, there are secure elements inside, but there is a first problem. The first problem is that we are not allowed to load our own operating system and cryptography
inside the secure element. You can use a StrongBox, for instance, on Android. What it will do is simply wrapping your keys, but as soon as you need to sign a transaction, you will need to ask StrongBox to give you your keys and then compute the signature in the rich OS side of things. So that means that your keys are exposed to any software attacks. And there was another issue, which is the display. Because, for instance, you might think about this kind of attack where you think
you are about to sign a transaction that is like sending 0.1 Bitcoin to your friend, while under the hood, this is another transaction that is signed. As you don't have a strong link between what is displayed and what is actually happening, then you cannot trust your display. So this is the two main things that are missing today on the current Android-based architecture, and this is what we are solving with Ledger Atom. So with the screen, kind of just to summarize that, what you're saying is that there's pieces
of malware, so if someone gets infected, the malware can essentially trick. It'll still show the send transaction, don't send transaction, or install this software, don't install this software, but it pretty much changes what it looks like someone is doing. Exactly. Got it. And so when that happens, when I looked at the demo device, there was a bar on the top. It's like this little ledger bar that says it's secure. Is that when that feature is activated? Yeah, exactly. So you have these two worlds that are running in parallel. You have Android that is displaying the Android application, and you have the secure zone that is displaying
the secure world, as if it would be like an individual independent device. And then you have this secure bar at the top of the screen that indicates what is displayed. Is it the secure world or is it the Android world? Otherwise, you might imagine a malware that makes you think that you are in the secure zone. So that's why there was this secure bar that indicates if it's Android that is actually displayed or if it's the secure zone. Got it. And so something on stage that you were talking about and many other people
as well that we're presenting this device is that there seems to be kind of two issues, right? There's convenience and the typical smartphone device that a lot of people carry in their pockets. It does a million things. It has access to their whole life. And then you have things that are very focused on high security, like a hardware wallet, like many of the previous devices you guys have launched. And the goal with this device is to bring those a bit closer together. Now, a lot of our audience I know is more on the, like they want a smartphone that's more private and secure and or open source and that's kind of what they're targeting.
So it was very clear though, and you even said to set expectations, that this is coming more from that security perspective first and then you're trying to build that in later. Is that kind of a correct way to phrase how you guys are handling this? No, this is a correct way to present it. However, privacy is also something that is very important for us. On the Android porting, we are putting a specific attention to privacy, for instance. We won't go as far as GrapheneOS, for instance, but we are taking plenty of ideas from Graphene that will
be inside the porting of Android. On top of this, we also have a privacy switch. This switch is able to cut directly the access of the microphone and the camera to the power line. That means that when you switch it off, like in hardware, it's switched off. And we have this kind of small privacy features. Nice. And so let's say I use, like I love to use Signal, ProtonMail, a VPN. It sounded like there's almost a new platform or a new way, potentially
in the future, for apps to be able to use that secure element of the phone. By default, they probably don't or won't, but apps can choose to use that. Is that correct? Yeah, exactly. This is totally correct. On the secure element, we have our operating system that provides plenty of cryptographic primitives. And it's possible to anyone to load its own application on the secure element. On the Android side, so if you think about Signal, so Signal is great. It does like end-to-end encryption from you to me so that if anyone is trying
to spy the communication, like everything is encrypted, it cannot deduce any information. However, if I have a malware on my phone, whenever I read my Signal message, the malware is able to read my conversation. And by the way, that's not science fiction. There are Pegasus and all the software that are doing this. And unfortunately, those attacks cost even less now with AI. So what we could do is to do a porting of the Signal so that the message is
actually decrypted within the secure zone. So as soon as you receive a message, you could click on the message, it would switch automatically to the secure zone, and then the message would be decrypted and displayed by the secure world. So this is a part of the primitives. We don't do the porting of signal, but technically it's possible. Yeah, that's very cool. I mean, I think the way that it was presented on stage was end-to-end encrypted to the element. So like theoretically, if two people have like a ledger phone, they're both using Signal. And theoretically, if there's a Signal
that goes down to the secure element, even malware installed on both people's devices wouldn't be able to access, which is a pretty impressive thing. Because even Meredith is very public about the fact that Signal doesn't really target endpoint security. It's something that users kind of have to handle. Exactly. Very cool. So in the future, do you hope to prioritize more of that like consumer market? or is this always something that you guys see as a niche product for high security individuals? I think security and privacy shouldn't be a niche. I think everyone is becoming
very aware that, especially with AI, that the stakes become really higher when it comes to security. So the retail market is our first market and I think it's not a niche and I think the needs for security are growing over time. So I think that there will be a big success for this product. Crypto is definitely an important use case because this is a use case where security is so paramount, but security is important for many different use cases. Messaging is one of them. At the end, we are creating
like a security platform. It's a technology platform. So targeting a go-to-market that would be more enterprise-focused or government-focused is totally possible. It's more about creating the go-to-market and getting the certification, for instance, if you target government and this kind of thing. This is a part of the thing that we have in mind, but we are definitely starting with the retail. Very nice. And I know it's really bad timing with all these things because in the last few days, there's been that implant attack where people were reading the screens and kind
of getting around the secure enclave. But you guys mentioned on stage that you're planning to pretty much extend the protections of the device so that even if someone tries to tamper with the screen or get into the device at all, it would still trigger. What does that look like? Let's say I'm an attacker. I intercept this phone as it's being shipped out. I try to get in and let's say I somehow got in and changed something and then I got it to the person's door. What would actually happen to that person now? So for this kind of attack, there are like two main ways. Either you make your device so simple that anyone can verify
that it's the one that is expected. So our current devices can be opened and so on, so you can inspect. And the second solution is to create a solution that is robust enough so that if someone is trying to probe, modify or anything, it would be detected. And for Atom, we went through that route and we worked for months because the problem of this solution, of this path, is that it's much more difficult. Creating a solution that is robust enough so that a very motivated attacker,
that like a large criminal organization, wouldn't be able to break, that's something that is not easy. So we worked during months with the Donjon team that is doing offensive security and the the hardware team that was designing this shield in order to make it robust and resistant. So we also filed patent because we did plenty of innovation. And the idea is to create an active shield so that if ever you are trying to move the shield, it would be detected directly and send a bit directly
to the secure element explaining that the shield was removed. And also there was a mesh circuit that is active. And if you're trying to drill into this shield, the circuit is sending a signal every few microseconds. And you have like a monitor that are verifying that the signal arrives at the right time and so on. So if you drill into this, like you would break the circuit and it would be detected directly. So that means there is also like a small cell in order to have battery, even if the big battery is drained.
So this is all that we have built. It's much more complicated than this, but in the main line, this is how it works. Very cool. And you teased very briefly that you're going to retroactively apply that to your current products as well. What does that process look like? That won't be the exact same mechanism because it completely depends on the design and so on. And we won't take the millions of devices that we created to put this inside and that wouldn't fit, by the way. So that won't be the same techniques.
So what we are doing is mostly two things. So first of all, strengthening the supply chain security. So on the manufacturing, on our supply facility, everything is very well controlled and so on. When it comes to our authorized reseller, we will strengthen the requirements and audits and so on. So this is the first part that we are doing. So it's ongoing and we will continue. And on the device side, we will add an additional countermeasure in order to give higher guarantee to the user
that the device that he receives was not tampered during the transport. I won't explain how it works yet because we are accelerating on this. We have several different tracks, and it's not completely settled which one will be chosen, but something will happen, yes. Got it. Just a couple more questions here. Post-quantum, I feel like it's shared a lot, and there's been a few algorithms now that have been advertised as post-quantum, and then we found some pretty severe vulnerabilities in those, and NIST actually had to roll them back. So how can we right now in 2026 confidently say that a device
is post-quantum for the next... because we don't know when Q-Day happens. So what kind of confidence do we have in the post-quantum right now? So what you refer to is the attack that happened on Hawk and others, and they are part of the second wave of standardization. We have the first wave of standardization that have standardized ML-DSA, FN-DSA, and hash-based cryptography. And on these three, we have strong
confidence that they are secure. At the end, you never know because this is how our asymmetric cryptography works. It's just a matter of putting all the cryptographers working on those trying to break them doing cryptanalysis. And if after like 30 years, this is what we are talking about for lattices, if after 30 years, like nothing progressed and the best attack still requires several times the age of the universe to break it, then we think it's secure. So this is how like cryptography works.
And for the ones that are already standardized, this is where we are. We never know, especially with LLM where like mathematical like research is going so fast. So we never know, but we think confidently that these three at least are secure. For the second wave, it will take a few more years where cryptographers are trying to attack each other. And we need a second wave because the first wave was very conservative and we ended up with quantum algorithms that are producing very large
signatures and so on. So there are plenty of engineering trade-offs that are not so good. So that's why we are trying to do lightweight, more lightweight post-quantum cryptography. This is the second wave. And at the end, maybe the solution is crypto agility, meaning that when you build the system, your system must be able to be upgraded to another quantum signature algorithm just in case the previous one would be broken. And on our side, we have an operating system that can be upgraded. So when we say we are quantum-ready,
that means that we are integrating the current standardized post-quantum signature algorithm. But if they are new to be added, we can also upgrade our system. Very cool. And the last question I have is just on usability. I feel like if someone's interested in the phone, I feel like the main thing for the regular person to decide, is this a phone I should buy at all? Is it a secondary phone or is it a primary phone? Is app compatibility? So I kind of heard that it might be GMS compatible, but I know a lot of people might not like the privacy implications
of going with just regular Google Play services on the device. So I know it's a bit early and the device isn't fully decided yet, but what are your guys' thoughts on kind of app compatibility and the different approaches to doing that with, is it Ledger OS or Atlas OS? We have a Ledger operating system on the secure zone, and for the Android Zone, this is a regular Android, and we target to obtain GMS. So for now, we don't have it. So we cannot say that we are GMS compatible because we primarily target the support of every single Android
application rather than the privacy feature that you have without GMS, which are more like the tracking provided by Google that would be removed. So the trade-off that we've chosen was more to have like more compatibility with more apps and so on because more and more, like the apps, for instance, like banking apps and other apps do not run on Graphene because of the requirements and so on. So we prefer going to GMS for this reason.
Makes a lot of sense. Do you have any, I know it's tough because you want to make this a high security phone. Is there any thought or like maybe down the road you'll allow like unlocking a bootloader to flash something else and then relock the bootloader? Or is that, I know these questions are very speculative, and just wondering. So we don't really plan to unlock the bootloader, but at the end, the device architecture is such that even if your Android is fully compromised, your device is still secure because there is this independent, autonomous second world that is in charge of security.
So even in our model, like your Android is fully compromised. As long as you verify that you are on the secure mode and what you do on your secure mode is exactly what you want, all the assets that are in the secure world stay secure. So this is really the power of this architecture. And I won't ever say that the Android part won't have vulnerabilities. Plenty of vulnerabilities, plenty of maybe exploits. We will do the secure updates all the time. But at the end, it doesn't really matter
because the security is on the other side. Yeah, I mean, I think the way to put it is if someone doesn't have that secure side of the operating system, if malware gets on your phone and you unlock your password manager, sometimes you don't have to unlock your password manager. All that data is gone, all your messages. But if someone theoretically has that element, they'll never get the actual hard things. They're not going to get your seeds from your cryptocurrency wallet. They're not going to get your password. So it's a cool system. I hope it gets adopted by other phone companies as well. So I think it's pretty revolutionary stuff. So thank you guys for everything. And thank you, of course, for your time. I know you guys are crazy busy right now. Thank you.
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