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Railway Conversations with Doc Frank

Railway Conversations with Doc Frank artwork

#112 – Why More Review Comments Make Railways Less Safe, with Andy Petrie

Aug 26, 20261 hr 9 minAudio
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Twenty people comment on a document. Nineteen of them have no expertise in it. Every comment has to be answered, and the two that mattered get lost in the noise. Andy Petrie has spent thirty years watching this happen and has stopped being polite about it. Andy is Director of Systems and Safety Assurance at ARCH in Sydney, with thirty years across rail, nuclear, oil and gas, and major civils. He has been Lead Independent Safety Assessor on Melbourne's Metro Tunnel, Director of Safety and Engineering Systems at Transport for NSW, and Head of Safety and Assurance for Network Rail Consulting in Australia. His stated mission is to cut the BS. In this conversation he sets out four stages of assurance. Value for money, where risk-based assessment confirms the work is good enough and you stop. Chasing perfect, where you push for more than you paid for. Admin overload, where twenty people comment on a document and nineteen have no expertise in it. And crossing the line, where the client starts instructing the designer and quietly takes back the liability they paid someone else to carry. We also get into why assessing a document is not the same as reviewing it, why "no comments" is the hardest review to write, and what happens to signalling design responsibility when the technology becomes a black box. The conversation closes on Australian interoperability and whether a single national standard is the answer, or whether the answer sits on the train. If you find this useful, share it with a colleague. For the best way to truly understand ETCS, CBTC and high capacity signalling, all vendor neutral, visit www.docfranktraining.com. New course addition from 1 September 2026: ETCS for Australia.

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

Andy, welcome to the show. Thanks Frank, pleasure to be here. You are specialised in system safety assurance, which is a niche in the industry. Let's just put it this way. How did you get there? Tell us a bit about your career background and how you ended up doing what you're doing at the moment. I think like most good careers, it was mostly by accident and a series of unfortunate events along the way.

So I originally studied in chemical engineering back in the 90s and started my early career working in oil and gas, a little bit of nuclear and mostly working in consultancy roles. And as the oil and gas market dried up in the UK in the late 90s, the consultancy work started coming from railways back at the time. So probably about 25 years ago now, I did my first ever railway job and I just participated in a hazard study with some human factors people and then progressed on there through a couple of consultancies. And the last 20 years, I've pretty much worked exclusively in the rail industry, working in Transport for London and the various guises of Transport for London, lots of different name changes and things have happened since then.

Working on a system safety aspects, looking at things like quantified risk assessments and modelling the railway from a safety perspective and asset perspective and a human factor perspective to work out where the risks are and to understand that if we change A, B can happen and vice versa. So in the fundamentals of system safety. Working on a lot of London Underground projects, livered the East London Line project, which I think is still one of my major projects I've worked on where we converted an old railway line into a modern line, put a new signalling system, new stations, bought new trains.

First time we had control of a whole railway system and again, working for the clients at that point in time. We were fortunate enough to work with some good suppliers and the Transport for London team. A little bit of time with Docklands Light Railway, again, working with my first CBTC system, which again, you'll know all about and did some work on that, again, understanding how CBTC works in an operational railway as opposed to a little bit of projects development. That was quite good. Network Rail, we were looking at, at this point, I think it was the Great Western Railway and the Crossrail surface works, again, looking at major railway projects, ETCS Level 2, new rolling stock, new stations, integration with the CBTC system that wasn't in our scope, obviously one of the big issues there.

And 10 years ago, I got an opportunity to come out to Australia, again, with Network Rail Consulting at the time. And we were, we got the job to be the ISA for the North West Rail Link, which is Sydney Metro Northwest now, for the early stages of the project. So I did that for a couple of years, again, looking at, looking at the work being done by others as an ISA, and I'm sure I'll touch more about that in what we're doing through the rest of the session. Spent a few years with Transport for New South Wales, working initially in the Rail Project Development Division. So looking at developing business cases for More Trains, More Services.

So again, buying trains, signalling upgrades, timetable changes, and understanding the system as a whole. And then some additional time, again, with them working in engineering and assurance, looking at safety assurance, but from the client side. And just over three years ago, I left Transport, I joined consultancy, I started working on the other side of the fence. So rather than being the party who says, I want you to do A, the party is actually doing CDE, because what you've asked for as A is nothing like what's actually happening in the real world. And again, that's where I sort of started dealing with the, why are we dealing with this BS, this is not necessary, and started getting into that journey of trying to work out of whose idea was this, and how do we stop it and push back to try and add that value into industry.

And again, that's what my little personal passion is at the moment. And again, there's articles on LinkedIn about trying to help people to sort of push back a little bit on the BS, yeah. So apparently you like that topic of safety assurance and independent safety assessment basically belongs into it well enough that you have now more or less specialised on that. Why do you think this is so important? Is it just challenging for you to solve the problems that you see there, or to basically clean up the mess that other people may have created, or what is it exactly?

I think for me, I like doing things the simplest way they can be done. I don't like writing 40 page reports if a four page report will do, and it just frustrates me personally to see people making careers and professionals actually spending time when they should be doing something important. Doing things that just add no value and just create waste. As a consultant, it's great that the government wants to spend all this money on the things that we do. But as a taxpayer, it's just really bad value for money and unnecessary.

So I have two hats on, but I would prefer to be a consultant who adds value and provides value to the taxpayer rather than just waste government money preparing pointless documents. So that's kind of my drive for this year. It's so interesting that you say it this way, because you have, you come from the UK, so you have a UK background. I did work for the signalling market in the UK for a number of years in the early 2000s. And from all the countries that I've ever worked in, the UK struck me as the one country or the one railway market with the most elaborate requirements on documentation and reviews and sign off processes, extremely complicated and basically creating a culture where everybody had at least half a dozen other people or other parties to shift responsibility to if anything went wrong. And at the end of the day, if everybody does that, then you end up with nobody really being responsible.

That means nobody can be taken to court or taken to jail or something like that. So having you saying even even though you have worked as a consultant yourself and you're now still working as a consultant or again saying that you basically in a nutshell, you don't like making more money than necessary by making documentation more complicated and reassurance is a beautiful area which you can like blow up beyond all proportions.

It's it's really, really interesting. So is that a personal thing or have you basically been fed up by your own profession saying, well, most of the people really drive it a bit too far? Well, it is a personal thing. I think there are lots of people out there like me who have a very similar feeling and the company I work for, Arch Artifacts, and our motto is adding value. You know, that's what we want to do as a business. And we've got a group of like minded people. And if you follow my LinkedIn posts, you can see on the comments that there's a group of people who completely agree with what we're saying and saying this is not necessary.

And I don't know, it's difficult to describe. I'll just go back a little bit to the UK sort of being more paperwork based than a lot of industries. And I think that was obviously coming from a lot of major accidents in the eighties and nineties. Lots and lots of people died on the UK railways the same time as they were privatising the industries. They were getting rid of the chief engineer roles were going. And, you know, that person who had their eyes over everything and signed things was gone. And you say you move to this culture of if you get enough people to sign it, then none of us goes. None of us are to blame if it goes wrong. And I see that to this day in a lot of client organisations in Australia where it's a case of if you have enough signatures on here, then if it goes wrong, it's fine.

Or, you know, if we did make a decision by committee and no one objected to something, then we've agreed to it. So literally it's watching people sit around and just not make a decision and things go forward because no one's got the cohones to put the hand up and say, actually, this should not go ahead. This is a bad decision. Sort of drives that. And again, having seen that from inside governments and outside government, I think that's that's the reason why I do those things. But again, there's lots of like minded people out there yourself. And again, I won't mention names here who actually disagree with this completely.

We're professionals. We want to do our job. We want to do it properly. We do not want to be wasting our time doing things that are irrelevant. We don't want our teams wasting time on things that are relevant. And these things have become culturally ingrained. You know, this this way of working when a graduate, a recent graduate joins our company from someone else, they just think that this is the way of working and you have to sort of reprogram and say, no, that's that's actually not necessary just because your last company did that way. It doesn't mean that that's the industry standard. And we have to sort of go through this process of retraining industry to do things smart and simple.

And I don't know, I don't know how it happened to get here, but we have to stop it before it goes any further. It's my personal mission. Yeah, yeah. Well, since you mentioned me, firstly, thank you for that. So that's quite a good observation without you knowing me very well or only from my some of my LinkedIn posts and what have you. But but I'm I'm kind of the same. If I can explain something in three or four sentences, I see absolutely no merit in writing three pages about it. Plus, I wouldn't know what to write in the first place. So I would probably start to get repetitive, which many of these reports are and and then put lots of fillers in, which doesn't really help.

And if anything, waters down the issue and confuses the reader rather than just saying, well, this is A and that's why we have B and C as a consequence. And then you're done. So we spend a lot of time actually teaching our staff how to review reports. And I've seen examples of 400 page reports. And I just take a page and I'll put it on the screen and say, right, highlight the bits that you think you can get rid of and we'll bring it down to everything apart from one sentence. And the rest of it is just waffle that just doesn't need to be there.

And you have to train people to understand that, you know, to try and get something across the simpler, the better. But simple takes hard work. It's like it's like writing when people say you write a board paper, you can't write a board paper on one page for the executive. Then you should you should go away and start again. But it takes weeks to get it down to one page for those right people. But again, it's about behaviors and training people to do this. Yeah, yeah. I actually worked on one of the projects you mentioned that I don't want to say which one, because that may, I don't know, look make look the project like negative or so. But what happened there was I was technical advisor and part of that was technical review. It's like reviews of the technical documents in my area of expertise.

And the the period for for delivering those reviews was two weeks. So then 10 business days, which often meant weekends as well. And the I think there were phases in the project where I had some 10,000 or so pages of documentation in front of me with two weeks to review. Now, that that sounds absolutely impossible. But what it was in most cases is that the design process was a multistage process.

And what happens with the documents was that they were basically written once. And then after that, there were only expanded or adjusted, amended. And that was it. Yeah. So so it basically turned out that of those 10,000 pages, I had read already about 8,500 or maybe I haven't read them all, but about 8,500 of that or maybe even 9,000 was the same as in the previous one.

So so you had to say a change ratio of about 10 percent. But then the trick was really to finding out which 10 percent have changed. And the only way to get there was basically a risk based approach where from your experience, you basically identified areas which were most likely to go wrong. For example, things around interfaces. And that's what you focused on. And other than that, basically checking whether your review comments from the last phase were actually implemented or whether the same the same shortcoming was basically proliferated through the stages.

But but I mean, with document volumes like this, it basically makes it impossible for anyone, speed reading course or not, to to review everything. And that basically leads us back where what you said, the the shorter and more concise documentation, the less you the easier it becomes to really get to the bottom of it, to identify, OK, what do I need to look at as a checker, as a reviewer and and identify any issues. And if there are no issues, you get faster to the point where you said, OK, all good. There are no issues.

So I think one of the saving graces you have now is track changes, and I will say I'm happy to review a draft version, but when you send me the next version, I want every single change tracked so I can just go down and actually look at the bits that I know have changed since the previous version. And we're chatting about Microsoft Word, but that is one of the great things about it is we're able to actually see what's changed between two versions of a document. Yeah, yeah. What I noted when I looked at your profile was that in the headline, it said right at the start, you help clients to cut the BS.

So I would like you to elaborate on that and explain obviously not what BS means. We're not going to swear on this podcast and most people will know that anyway. So basically things that are like a bit nonsensical and maybe superfluous. So so why why did you put it like this in such a clear way and what exactly do you what is your what is your approach to cutting the BS? And I'll maybe come to a couple of examples in a minute because I think it's some examples that will resonate with people.

But when you go into a meeting or you're doing a report and it's got all these pages of information, why is this in here? And trying to understand why why people have put things in documents is very, very tricky. And sometimes it's a management system process that it's just evolved over time. People trying to be helpful, but it's just evolved into a monster or sometimes it's an individual who just likes to, you know, just just just wants to earn money by putting things in a report that are not necessary. But as a client, my time and my client's time and it's it's valuable and we've got better things to do than doing this.

So just actually rather than being in a meeting and you've sat in these meetings where everyone everyone knows that we shouldn't be doing this, but no one's prepared to put their hand up and say anything. Just actually saying, actually, this is BS. We just don't need to do this. Just take it out. And everyone goes, thanks. I wanted to say that. I've been dying to say that for ages. I just haven't had the to do it. And if I go back to it, I was being coached probably about seven, eight years ago. And you'd know the name, but I won't say them. I was going through a I said, what do I need to do to get to the next level of my career? I don't I want to progress, but I don't want to piss too many people off in the process. He turned to me and he said, you're not pissing someone off, you're not doing your job properly.

And that sort of set the benchmark to challenge people who, you know, people have got these senior roles because no one's challenged them and people who put this process in place because nobody's pointed it out. It's a bit like the emperor's new clothes, isn't it? Everyone can see that they're not wearing anything, but no one's prepared to say anything. And by I just decided I'm going to do this now. I'm fine. I've done my career. I can get away with doing these things. And it's turned out that actually lots of people want to say these things as well, but they just needed a bit of a vanguard to do it. And again, all of those articles are just providing people with the ammunition to say, actually, it is BS, please refer to this article on LinkedIn, which explains why it's BS. Yeah, that's kind of helping the industry to say things that everyone wants to say and call out the people who are wasting time and money.

Yes, it's a double edged sword on the one hand, it's something that I like doing myself very, very much. On the other hand, I am well aware that that may have gotten me in strife with a number of people that felt, I don't know, personally offended or criticised as professionals or whatever. So it's probably a rather fine line how to can call somebody out without making an enemy. And I'm pretty sure with all the stuff that I've said over the years, which probably most people will agree with me on, have made me very unpopular in certain parts of the country with certain projects and so on, because they feel criticised.

And most often those people, they just never want to be criticised. They can basically, they are used to get away with pretty much anything they do. And if anybody says, well, that wasn't actually the booming success that you're trying to project here, it was, well, it was over budget, it was way over schedule. And the outcome in terms of what was promised as benefits was only a fraction of what initially was planned.

So, I mean, being happy that the project is done, that's nice. That's one thing. But pretending it was the best thing since sliced bread, yeah, that maybe takes it a bit too far. Yeah, I think the term hero managers, and again, these can be hero directors as well, applies that they get things done and they get a pat on the back and 50 percent of the time they'll have done the right thing and they'll get a promotion, 50 percent of the time they'll have done something absolutely terrible and made a really poor quality project or blew the budget, but they've got it delivered on time and they'll get a promotion. And that report from the Institute of Civil Engineers in the UK, their systems thinking one calls out, Professor Andrew McNaughton at the time calls out that we can't work with hero managers anymore.

We need competent people who know how to make decisions, who actually can weigh up the risks and take it forward. But yeah, you're speaking about hero managers and. You said in your profile that you have worked for a number of industries, you mentioned oil and gas, but that was probably more in your in your earlier days. But my understanding was that even in the in the field of safety assurance and risk management, you worked across a variety of industries. I was curious how you see rail would compare with those other industries.

Are they all more or less the same or just depends on the people? Or have you seen any commonalities where you said, OK, well, rail in comparison with those other technologies is, I don't know, rather better, rather worse, more thorough, more complicated over to you. So having worked in oil and gas and nuclear before coming to rail, you can see a lot of similarities between them, and the reason there's a lot of similarities is because the people who joined the rail industry in the UK, where a lot of us have come from in the late 90s and early 2000s, came out of those industries like myself.

And some of them had a lot more experience than I did. So the processes and the principles of, you know, identifying your system, identifying the interfaces, doing a hazard study, making sure you got the controls in place, writing a safety assurance report. That's the same on every industry. And whether you're doing a project change or a licence to operate change, it's pretty standard. And what's different? I think it's easier to comprehend a hazard on a high hazard site. You know, nuclear sites release radiation or go boom, that's fine in people's minds. A chemical plant as well, it's going to go boom, it's going to release some nasty chemicals, it's going to set on fire.

So it's probably easier for people to understand the safety impacts of those. It's probably easier for people to say there's a fence around that and I get there's a fence around it. So whatever's happening in that fence, we can manage. It's a very, very confined system. If you look at the rail industry and again, just based in Sydney, our trains go to Melbourne, they go to Brisbane, they go to Broken Hill. There's trains that go all the way to Perth on the Indian Pacific. We've got how many service operators, how many interface with ARTC and with the Country Rail Network.

It's a massive system. It's very, very difficult to work out, get your brain around it. And even with 20 years in the rail industry, I miss things all the time. So somebody coming into the industry can't really appreciate what happens at one place and how it affects the other. And I think another thing that happens in rail, and I think this is possibly one of the causes, most railways are government owned bodies and government owned bodies for some reason finds the reason to do restructures about every three to four years and change all their staff about every two years. So there's just no one here who knew what was happening five years ago, certainly not in the same role.

Someone who's been in the same role for more than five years in the rail industry, certainly the arm wear is a very, very rare thing. So there's just no continuity. There's no structure. It's constant change. If you went to a nuclear plant, the chief engineer would have been the chief engineer on that plant for 20 years. And he'd probably have been waiting. But I shouldn't say that they'd probably been waiting for that promotion for a while as well. So it's it's just the size and the complexity and the constant change, I think, is possibly the cause of what of what the issues are. The principles are exactly the same. Someone can come from nuclear and I can teach them how to do safety in railways in about six months just by just understanding the difference in the technology.

But teaching them to stay in the same job and actually develop those skills is the tricky bit. Yeah, I think so. I think that's it. I think it's just the size and the scale and the constant change that's different in the rail industry. Yeah, well, those those moving bits in the railway system are certainly a problem. Those trains would be much safer. They just wouldn't move at all. And and it's interesting when you often say this, the safest railway system is one where we stop the trains and make everyone walk across the. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The other thing that you mentioned was the was the changes of staff or staff changing their positions every few years.

Unfortunately, that seems to have become the norm in order to make a career. I remember and I'm a I'm a culprit myself. And when I was at university, I I did like some some some holiday works as a power plant, which were part of my study. So I needed this for for getting my degree. And and I must have convinced them so much that I'm a useful potential employee that they basically said before left that the electrical engineer of the power plant is going to retire in two years.

So they basically said, well, you finish your study at the university, you come back to us, we train you up for like 18 months or so, and then you can basically inherit the role of electrical engineer for the entire power plant, which was one of the biggest in the area where I used to live back then. And as an electrical engineer, you're basically the number two person in the entire power plant. So traditionally, the number one is always a mechanical engineer, maybe because of turbines and what have you.

But but number two, the electrical engineer is always number two. And he is basically a king in his own kingdom, in his own right. So and and the the scope of electrical engineering in a power plant is enormous. It really goes all the way from microelectronics to high voltage stuff of several thousand volts, which is generated and then basically sent out via transmission networks. So but I rejected at the time because I basically could see reaching the end position of my career after only 18 months and then having another, I don't know, 39 years to go. And I decided that I didn't want that at the time.

In hindsight, I must have thought, well, maybe I should have given that a bit more consideration. But but I I decided to go to the railway industry. And I mean, mind you, I whilst I had quite a colorful career, both in the countries that I worked in, the different kinds of railways I worked on, I stayed the entire career in signalling, which is now more than 30 years. So so from from that perspective, at least there was definitely some kind of continuity in my in my career as well.

You have published an article on LinkedIn, which caught my attention where you were talking about four stages of assurance and one statement. I would like to go a little bit into it because I think it was quite a defining piece of work. Maybe for you it was like business as usual, but but I found it quite outstanding. And one of the statements that that piqued my interest was that you said risk management activities can increase risk. Can you explain what you meant by that and why that is?

Yeah, I mean, I'll put it in a railway context, but this applies to it, to anything as well in the railway. We we have clients and again, I will use the government, those clients start major projects, those clients pay for projects and those clients are usually plotters, a railway infrastructure manager under the rail safety national law, and they've got duties under Section 52 of Rail Safety National Law. We engage a designer, a constructor, all those are the parties. But I'll talk about the clients and the designer because it's just it's simple and most people get it. As a client, you engage a designer, the designer is responsible for ensuring the safety of the railway so far as is reasonably practicable.

That's their job. It's the same as the Work Health Safety National Law for designers anywhere. The designer then takes on the liability if that goes wrong and it's their job to ensure the safety of the railway. But. As a client, as the RIM, your role is to ensure that the safety is done in a way that manages safety, so it's about managing a process. You have to check that the process by which the designer are doing their job is fit for purpose. I use the term good enough, not so far as is reasonably practicable, good enough, you know, they've got to do a job that's good enough.

If you then start poking too hard and start telling the designer, I'm not happy with that over there. Can you just move it? Can you make can you move that? You write this in your report. You start taking on the designer's liability because you're actually providing them decisions and instructions. Unless you've done a risk assessment, unless you've actually done what I'm instructing that designer, I've ensured that my change is safe so far. You're actually instructing your designer to do something different and they've got they pretty much obliged to do what you say. So what you're doing as the client is you're taking on their risk.

So you've paid someone to do the risk on your behalf, and then you actually start taking back that risk by instructing them what to do and crossing the line. And a great example here, if you buy if you're buying a new house, you go to a builder, you say, I want this house, build this house, give me that house when it's finished. And you wait three months, four months, whatever your builder is. And they might say, I've got a problem here. Which of these two options would you like? And you say, I'd like that over there. And they give you an option, you select one. But that builder is responsible for designing, designing and building your house and they're responsible for getting the trades in, they're responsible for the electrics. If you ever watch Grand Designs, which is that show where people decide they're going to start telling their builder what to do, you know, I'd like that moved over there, actually knock that down and rebuild it, put those wires in, those projects blow out, their budgets blow out, their schedules blow out.

And most people often lose massive amounts of their wages and their income, have to take on loans and sometimes even go bankrupt by trying to manage other parties job. So why is it when it's a taxpayer funded business that we're paying our builder to build a house, then paying him to make change, paying the builder to make changes and actually bringing all the risk on us when it goes wrong. So it's simply when I say when you start trying to manage risk, there's a line. And if you cross that line and start instructing your designer what to do, you're now actually taking on the risk that you've paid them to manage and that risk now becomes yours. And the risk for the overall project goes up.

When that's a safety risk, that becomes even bigger because the lines get blurred. And again, my article, I talk about crossing the line in there. You, when you're actually saying, you know, I've instructed the party to do this. They, they now are doing things that you've said. Their duty to manage safety as far as it's reasonable is now you telling them what to do and it gets blurry and you get to that point where I, he said, she said kind of you've ended up with an outcome that neither party wanted.

And you get to a point that if there's an accident, there'll be an inquiry and, you know, the client will be largely to blame for providing ambiguous or direct instructions to the, to the other party whose job it was to ensure safety. So that's kind of what I mean with that. Does that, does that make sense? A quick word about something new on the 1st of September next week, I'm launching my new training course, ETCS for Australia. It's in self-paced online course about four hours of content, 16 video lessons over four modules, and it explains the basics why Australia has chosen ETCS.

What ETCS is of course, how it works and what can be done to apply it in Australia as good as possible. It's a course that's suitable for any railway professional in Australia, signalling, non-signalling, technical, non-technical. I put a lot of effort into this course with a pilot cohort that gave me more than 500 feedback comments that I'm currently working in. I'm very excited about the outcome and I'm sure you will be too.

You find the information about this course on my training platform docfranktraining.com. I say it again, that's docfranktraining.com. Hope to see you in the course. And now back to the show. Yes. Yes. It makes a lot of sense. It takes one of my, my next questions away, which was about that term crossing the line. So it's, we already explained that, um, what, what I found specific in my area of expertise, which these days has to do everything with modern advanced digital signalling technologies like, uh, CBTC.

We talked about that briefly Communications-Based Train Control, which you have at Sydney Metro, for example, uh, also here in Perth soon. Um, and the European Train Control System and what, what's the, what's the same with both these technologies is that, um, they are much more software based than conventional signalling. And that requires a big change in the design responsibilities. Whereas in the past for conventional signalling, the railway organizations had their design departments either in house, uh, in which case they were, they as an organization were responsible for the design themselves.

And that was fine because they knew what they were doing for decades, or they had, uh, like a design house, something like that, doing the work for them as a contractor. But again, because it was so much business as usual, everybody knew their roads, everybody knew how to do it safely. And the, the glitches were very few and far between. Whereas for these digital systems like ETCS or CBTC, you have, um, customised component, or you have, you have specific components that can only be handled and designed by the supplier of those components themselves.

And, and the, the customer organisation, nobody in the customer organisation actually understands the intricacies of the internal functions of this, of this box and, and even, even if they were given the design tools, there would be a big risk that they're doing just something wrong, that they tried to design something, which the functionality of the tool gives them without really understanding the side effects that they're creating in that, in that computer system.

So if Railway is still, uh, maintain the same mindset that we are responsible, we, the Railway is responsible for the design and they try to apply that mindset on those new technologies, then all kinds of hell breaks loose from the point that the supplier refuses point blank to let them anywhere near the design. That's probably the best outcome, even though it may create some, some, some conflict there to the point where the, the supplier will be, will get twisted their arm to basically hand over design tools with all the due warnings.

Like you, you touch this design and it's yours, it's your liability and everything. Um, but it still happens and then problems occur or suddenly somebody gets cold feet and said, yeah, I'm not quite sure whether we really should be doing that. And when you then try to wind back the clock and basically hand it back over to the supplier, the minimum you will have is a massive delay, a massive cost overrun and so on and so forth. And we, we've seen that here in Australia, in regards to those new technologies, and I'm trying very hard to explain, um, that change in the design responsibility.

And I have gotten a lot of flak for it to the point where somebody accused me as I'm talking design engineers out of their profession. I said, well, I explained to them how the future will look like. And I give them ideas what they could do instead if they want to keep their job or what they, how they need to pivot. Um, if they still want to work in the industry, but they can't work any longer in their traditional role as a supplier of, as a designer of conventional signalling systems.

So, so I, I think there's a lot of potential for crossing the line that has a lot to do with not really understanding the new words that you're getting yourself in and, and trying to basically handle those new technologies in exactly the same way as you did for the last, I don't know, 50, a hundred years in the old technology. I mean, I was like a metaphor. So if you take an example of when, you know, from when we were younger, we had a car, if the car broke down, we could take the engine, open the bonnet.

We could have a look. We could hit it with things. We could try things that would make, would make the engine work. We could strip the engine. We could replace the cylinder head gaskets. If you've got a car now and you would lift the bonnet, I can barely work out where the oil goes in the water. It's got, you've got to take it back to Mercedes. You've got to take it back to Lexus. They plug it in and a computer in Germany or Tokyo tells you what's wrong with your parts. You don't then say to the mechanic, Oh, by the way, I appreciate you. You've lost your job now because you used to strip, strip the engine. So, you know, I'll just let you mess around with my car and fix it if you want, because then, you know, you're driving down the street, your brakes suddenly fail because you've, you've pulled out a fuse or you've tripped a circuit or something.

It's, it comes to your fault. You've just killed your family and potentially the road users. So again, it's, it's very similar to that, that changing technology that you have to understand you're buying a product that's a black box and that is assured by the Alstoms, the Hitachis, the Thaleses, whatever it is that you've got around it, Siemens for the purpose of being here, you've got to leave it alone. You can configure it. It can work in five ways. You pick the way it works. If you don't, if you don't want one of those five ways, you should have bought something else. And again, it's, it's a different world, but you have to work in it.

And that's the other thing. I quite like your car examples because I quite like using them myself. So, so if you, if you basically want to have a car that, that performs like a Lamborghini, but you only want to, to spend the money to buy a Holden, then you, you can't, you can't really say to the, to the Holden manufacturer, well, I actually want the Lamborghini, but I'm only buying a Holden, but, but can you get at least the motor of the Lamborghini into the Holden? Because that's just not how it works. Yeah. Because the, the whole chassis, everything would not be able to hold that, that high performing, that high performing thing.

And yeah. And, and the other thing, what you mentioned was the cherry picking. This is, this is just the same. You can't in a, in a procurement process of say a CBTC system, you can't say, well, I, I quite like the, the Alstom system, but that one function I like much better over there with Siemens. So, so Alstom, can you please replicate that Siemens feature? And I'm, I'm a big fan of actually asking the suppliers what they can do. Like what they are actually comfortable in doing, because if you have a requirement specification that only includes things that the supplier is comfortable with and has already done in the past, so it's basically a proven product, the risk for your own product reduces significantly.

Plus not to forget, especially we here in Australia, we are sitting at the end of the world from the perspective of a global signalling headquarter, which is based somewhere in Europe or maybe in North America. And, and, and if we, if we make it too difficult for the supplier, that's not going to help us at all. Yeah. Quite the contrary. It's point to the markets where they can, they can just sell their standard product, isn't it? At the end of the day. So yeah, they, they just weren't competitive tenders until, so.

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, and, and even if it, and we've seen that as well in the country several times, yeah, where the client said, well, we want, we want a standard product and that's what we bought, but now we want the standard product to do the same thing that the old product did, which was absolutely not standard at all. Yeah. And, and we, we've seen that and the outcome was always inevitably big problems in the project all the way to termination of contracts and, and, and what have you.

So we, we, we talked about four stages of assurance. What are those four stages? Have you just started at the beginning with, with stage number one? What, what is that? So when I'm talking about assurance here, I'm talking about the client getting assurance from their supplier. So again, the third party or the designer, I'm not talking about the designer assuring their product. That's, that's a different thing. So if you're providing, if you're, if you're Alstom, Siemens providing your signalling system and you've got your product ISA providing that, that's your assurance and that's separate.

So I'm talking here about the clients. So again, the person buying the house and this applies to safety, it applies to engineering, it applies to all sorts of assurance activities. So the four stages, again, I included in my article, the first one is value for money. This is where this is assurance when it's done properly. You do risk-based inspections and risk-based assessments to make sure that what is being delivered is good enough. And again, I'm using that term good enough there because that's all we get. We all, we, we just pay for good enough terms I use here.

And again, one of the things that's come out of previous ones, as a client, you're doing an assessment of what's been provided. You're not reviewing it. As a party providing it, the designer, you're reviewing those documents because you have to make sure there's nothing wrong with them. You have to make sure that what you're providing hits all the boxes. When you're the clients and that's where you have the client or technical advisor or an ISA working for the client, you're actually assessing that document and what you're doing to see is it's good enough. You're looking for the good in there to say, is there enough good in here to make sure it's, it's hit that bar.

And if I can see enough good, I can tick the box and move on. And you don't have to read every line when you're doing that. You can look at a document. When you've got the experience and the knowledge to look at it, you can go through and say, yeah, it's the hazard to identify the processes followed, the human factors reported and the risks I expect to see being there controlled. That's good enough. I'm happy to tick that box. And that's it. That's assurance in a nutshell. That's when you stop. Um, so that's what I call adding value. The next stage beyond that is what I, what I term the chasing perfect or the gold plating. This is where it's like, we know, we know we went for good enough, but could you just give us a little bit more?

Could you just go a little bit further? And effectively what you're doing is you're trying to get things for free. This is, this is Zach for want of a better word. You you've paid, you've paid for the Holden and you say, you want the Ferrari engine in there, uh, but you're not going to pay for Ferrari engine. You're just going to keep making holes in it until they just say, I'll flip this. I'm going to give you a Ferrari engine and take the hit myself. So that's the gold plating. And again, everyone's seen that, you know, the, the one I pull out is there is the person who says, you've demonstrated so far, but I want it more so far.

All right. See, that's just nonsense in its own right. But you know, how, how can we get something for free? Um, so that's where I call the chasing perfect. You then get to what I call admin overload, and this is where chasing perfect can make things better. And if you want to pay for it, please pay for it. We'll make it better. That's when you kind of, your peak safety, you start coming down the other side, admin overload. And you know, this, this isn't the initial assurance stage. This is when people are raising comments for the sake of it. Now, comments are the bane of my life, the bane of every project.

Since we started getting electronic means of reviewing documents, the electronic means of doing comments, comments have got out of control. I would imagine 30, 40% of many projects nowadays are reviewing comments that aren't necessary. And when I talk about unnecessary comments, you know, you can send a document out and it's not unusual to get comments from 20 people on a document, which I would happily say 19 have no subject matter expertise in that document whatsoever. So you can send out a 20 page document. That's fine. You know, there's a couple of tweaks in there.

You could reword and you'll get hundreds of comments back. And those comments have to be addressed because, you know, in this world we live in now, everyone's comments are equal. So you have to respond to them all. I tell my staff, if you just see a comment, just put noted next to it. But now the client wants you to have to respond to it. And then the response has to be agreed. And you're spending, you know, to close out a comment can take several hours of your time and can take weeks in some cases. If I'm reviewing that hundred comments, I'm probably going to miss the two important ones in there that actually make it better.

And then we've got, instead of one person managing our process, we've got three people managing a process, all trying to deal with irrelevant comments or make tweaks to documents, you start diluting your safety argument. And then again, the one I talked about previously, stage four is crossing the line. This is where you're providing instructions to your supplier and not formal instructions, not variations where you say, I would like you to make this change. I please provide a variation and tell me it's safe. It's where you're putting comments in saying, I would like it done this way or I'd like it done that way. And again, it's one of the terms I use here is you're providing closed expectations.

And if they don't meet that expectation, they can't go to that, you can't close their comments. So you're forcing them to make a change. But people phrase this, no, I'm just providing a comment, it's up to them where they deal with it. But if they don't deal with it, they're not proceeding to the next stage case. So you get all these hidden comments, which are hidden instructions. And, you know, you get, well, this is our independent safety assessor, they don't work for us. Well, they do work for you, you're paying them. And you are holding up your designer's process because your independent safety assessor is putting clear expectations on them to do things that they want to do.

They are defined instructions to the party that you've told them to do. And again, I don't think people understand the risk with what they're doing here. Not only from a safety perspective, but there will be a point very soon when someone puts a very big claim in against one of these different organisations for all of these unnecessary comments and directions that have been done. And I don't think I've have a leg to stand on when it comes to trying to defend it. So, yeah, that's my four stages of assurance. And you'll see a nice diagram on my LinkedIn page if anyone wants to go and have a look at it.

It is probably easier said than done because there are a lot of human behaviours in the game. And I know this full well, having been a reviewer or an insurance person myself, be it quality assurance, be it project assurance, what have you. As a consultant, you get a decent amount of money, which is probably a lot compared to anybody working as an employee in that railway organisation, which may be government controlled.

So and there is certainly a temptation or a strong drive to prove your value. So if you say you basically spent, I don't know, a hundred hours on reviewing a bunch of documents and then you come back with like two or three comments, you could be concerned that somebody may think you're not worth your value as a reviewer, because otherwise you would have certainly come back with more than just three comments.

And the trick is to basically say, well, look, if the documents were OK, there's no need to comment on it. And my role as a reviewer was to find out the two or three things which were really not OK, which would have created a problem if not addressed. And leave alone the rest of it, the rest of it, which is fine or, as you said, good enough, doesn't have to be commented on other than maybe saying, well, these documents were good enough or, I don't know, sophisticated, met the requirements, whatever the official term might might be.

Yeah, but but but I think there's a there's a real it's almost an art form to identify when is good enough, good enough. Or as you as you said it in your article, know when to stop. So so how how do you do that? I mean, I think you called out a very good point there that people feel the need to add comments to prove they're doing their job properly or prove why they have a job. Now, I often tell people that the hardest thing to do is to review a document. So I have no comments on this.

It is fine because someone say, well, what have you spent hours doing that for? Well, I've spent eight hours not spending another 24 hours doing comments on the back of it. So again, it's it's it's it's it's going by something I said about assessment. I'm not reviewing it to find faults. I'm reviewing it to find the good. And I need to find enough good in there. And that's judgment and experience at the end of the day. It does that. That's why a subject matter expert. As this competence and the education and the skills, the experience to look at a document and know what it looks like, if you're reviewing a document and you don't understand the scope of what it looks like, you should not be reviewing that document. Sorry. At the end of the day, just don't review it.

It's better you don't review it than you'd look at it and bring back comments. Yeah. And then it's going through and weighing it up. And when we're doing ISA gigs and there's some major, major ISA reports going through for major signalling systems, sometimes a couple of us will review a document and assess a document now. We'll look at it and we'll have a discussion between it. Well, I thought this was good, but I wasn't sure about this and I thought this was good. And actually between the parents will say, no, we're not satisfied. It was good enough. We need to go back. And we say you need to improve your hazard log and you need to go back and look at yourself. So that's it.

We're not going to those kind of high level comments. You need to go back. These are the two areas that weren't good enough. Or if you go, actually, you know what, I think in the balance of probabilities, what they did was good enough. We'll say, OK, we'll support this going forward. But I say you're looking for the two or three, you're looking for the one or two things that just aren't good enough. You're not trying to fix it. You're not going, I've got 47 comments on your hazard log. These are out of date. This reference is wrong. No, you've identified all the hazards. You've got controls in place. I'm going to be ticking the box. You can have as many quality errors as you want in that because you actually did the safety on this about two years ago.

And any comments I'm going to come back with is just you doing admin in there and actually makes no difference whatsoever to your safety. Yeah. Yeah. I'd like to have progressive assurance. It would be great to be invited to a hazard workshop a couple of years so I'd have confidence that you're doing it right. But I can look at the end and get a good get a good feeling about it. Yeah. Yeah. The thing is, with those with those additional comments that don't really add value, they actually destroy value because not only do you as a reviewer need to spend more time to create those comments, those additional comments also need to be addressed, which will take more effort on the on the supplier side and may may even lead to a delay of the of the project.

And and then something may happen that that people basically throw out the kid with the bathwater to the point where they basically said, we stop all commenting all together in order to finish the project on time. And if it comes to that, that's that's really, really bad because that has the risk that the one or two or three comments that were really critical are just no longer made because people have stopped the have stopped the reviewing. So and if you if you basically if you flip it around, if I basically assume that I have spent a lot of money to to select the most suitable contractor for a certain job. And I'm assuming that on behalf of the contractor, there are professionals, professional designers also doing their work, that they have a decent internal checking process, which, of course, I need I need to verify whether they've got this process in place. But but if everything works to expectations, I shouldn't find anything as a reviewer because they've done such a terrific job.

That's why I hired them for. Yeah. So so if you if you turn it around like this, you can basically say, well, it's it's obvious that I don't come up with like 250 comments because that would basically mean if all those comments were justified, that the contractor was completely useless. Right. So, yeah, I mean, that goes that goes back to what's the role of a RIM? You've got to apply due diligence to make sure that you're following your processes to look to. And what you do, you set the expectations for your client and for your supplier in the procurement phase, you make sure that they are competent to do their job, you make sure they've got the experience, you check their references, you check their individuals, you say these are the processes I want to follow.

Or you say, actually, your processes are good and then you leave them to do their job. And then depending on the nature and risk of that, you might do an audit. You might say, actually, this is a high risk report. I'm going to look at this one. I'm going to do those ones. It should be a really light touch to have that confidence that they're doing their job properly. And I very rarely see that for some reason. And I just can't understand why there's this constant stream of people wanting to review documents, add comments, attend meetings. You know, it's not uncommon now to chair a hazard workshop and hazard workshop should have eight people at the most.

Six is ideal to have 60 people participating in a hazard workshop meeting on teams of which eight people are talking and 42 people are just watching for three hours just to make sure that we've done our job properly on the basis that if I'm a maintenance person, I haven't sat there for three hours to check that you said maintenance. You might not have said maintenance. This can't be value for money. This can't be making things safer. But this is what happens across the board. Yeah, it's probably a matter of inclusion that they feel like, I don't know, excluded when you're not part in the meeting.

And I mean, maybe there could be something that is related to maintenance at the very end, like two minutes when we are about to wrap up anyway. What about maintenance? Oh, yeah, yeah. Here's something about maintenance. And then they felt it worthwhile that they sat through the entire meeting, the four hours beforehand. It's yeah, it's difficult. And it's really about cutting. You call it cutting the BS. You can also say cutting away the fat that you really you focus on the on the essentials. And you say, well, how can I get away with the minimum amount of effort, the minimum amount of oversight without neglecting stuff, without without letting things go haywire.

It's and it requires experience. And I think experience is really, really important in common sense. It is, and it's very rare. And what happens again when you call some of these things out and this is way more than it should, people will start arguing with you, you know, you need to do this because something, something, something and you go, well, where does that come from? Please show me. There's a great journalist, James O'Brien. And he has these books about how to be right, how not to be wrong, largely based on Brexit. And when someone says something, he says, where does that come from?

Where does that come from? Where does that come from? And he just challenges them every single time. And eventually they put the phone down and go away. And if you follow that process again, where does that come from? Where does that come from? And they'll say, but where does it come from for you? So it's here in the RISSB guideline. It's here from the regulator. It's this is a piece of case law. This is this is. And then we'll just double down and argue with you and refuse to back down. And these are the real people who cause the problems are the ones who will argue things that are blatantly wrong. And again, I won't say any names.

There's a few there's a few people who I could call out. They've made the last 10 years of their career basically selling BS. And when you call it out to them, they just refuse to back down. They'll double down. They'll find some of the reasons why they'll say, hey, I respect what the regulator says, but I think you're wrong. And if you buy my latest copy of my book, you'll understand why. And it's these people have had influence over the rail industry for 10 years in Australia. And lots and lots of people believe them because they went on their training courses and they bought their books.

And it will not just their mind that these people are wrong and talking BS. And again, it's important that we have this culture of challenging things, pointing to the facts, pointing to what the regulator says, pointing to the standard and saying this is what we need to do. And yeah, common sense isn't isn't common at all. Frank, we all know that. Yeah. And I'm mindful of your time. I really enjoyed this conversation. I have one semi personal thing that I wanted to ask you towards the end. I mean, you have been involved in in signalling projects as well, including modern signalling technologies like CBTC when you work for Sydney Metro.

We have this big initiative in Australia at the moment regarding interoperability between railway systems across the entire nation. And signalling interoperability is certainly a very important aspect because people now notice that by introducing digital signalling technologies in in in differing ways, you may create something that's called a digital a digital gap.

Or incompatibilities between the different railway systems that may be more severe than what you had before. Now, there's a lot of talk. Oh, well, we just need a national standard for everything. So all the signalling will be the same and then that will be applied in the same way everywhere. And then the problem will go away from your perspective and your experience as a system safety assurance person. What potential problems could you see coming from that interoperability?

I'm not saying these are the problems, but what could go wrong or how should that be framed in order to avoid any major risks? And the digital break of gauge, I think is what they talk about with the with the government, with the radios right now, haven't they, where someone going from Brisbane to Melbourne has to gauge break. Yeah, I did the gauge break. That's like three or four. Yeah. Three or four different times. I think the signalling is interesting because obviously ETCS Level 2 is based on the principles of interoperability.

So Brisbane and Sydney are putting that in place. It'll be about 10 years before it's really rolled out. So you have, in theory, a mix of ETCS standard, then you get down to Melbourne. And we know that they're doing CBTC down there, only on a small line. And obviously Perth as well are doing CBTC. So we've got the problem where it's already too late. We've started to do two different systems. And obviously, the one that ARTC are doing as well is different again. We'll get to a point where if we're not careful, we'll again have a lab full of digital signalling systems and different ways of working.

And the human factor takes over at this point because you get there, you know, which one am I following? So then the system safety requires the train to know exactly where it is and which one to use and to use an engineering control to switch over. And this, you know, if you look at Crossrail in the UK, they knew in 2011 that they were going to have problems getting their CBTC and ETCS level systems to work. And nine, 10 years later, they still hadn't got it to work. And it's only now and again through lots of delays and possibly COVID help that they got that technology to work.

And that was with a concerted focus, one project working on it for over 10 years to have disparate states doing the Australian approach of interoperability. Of course, we'll have a common process. Just do what I do kind of approach. So if everyone says, yes, we're going to have a common interoperable process and we can agree on the technology and ETCS sounds obvious because it's already designed to be interoperable. If people don't agree with it, then it's going to be a missed opportunity. There's other things associated with that, like the skills training and then having conversations about training a signal engineer in Melbourne's field to work in Brisbane or Sydney.

That's great when you have the traditional signalling systems that you can cross still without having to retrain and get another license in another state and pay more money. But again, if you've got, we talked earlier about the complexity of modern signalling systems that actually you're specifying things from a supplier. You can't really train someone to work on CBTC in any way without actually working for one of those suppliers. So it's understanding where the wins are in that and trying not to over complicate the process, I think. So it's a big opportunity, but I really hope that all states work together to take it.

Yeah, and I see a risk that a national standard, which is kind of new and which is very likely to differ and go away from the existing solutions, will require changes like amendments of systems that have already been designed, that may already be in service at that time.

And to me, it also bears the risk that what you call crossing the line, that basically you try to force a new solution, a new national standard on those local existing solutions. And by doing so, forcing design changes that may compromise the integrity of the existing system.

And that's not to say there is no solution to that. I just, I'm just not sure whether the enforcement of a national, of a unified national standard will be that solution. It's certainly not the solution that you would have elsewhere with similar problems. So if you look at ETCS interoperability, obviously Europe comes to mind. And in Europe, you also have different implementations of ETCS in different countries that you find have some differences in there.

You even have different implementations within the same country with differences, because projects were done at different points in time, according to different versions of the ETCS standards and what have you. And the trick really is there to achieve interoperability between the different applications of ETCS without having to throw them all away and replacing them with the one European application of ETCS, which I don't think will exist.

And in Australia, I have the same doubts. I, it would basically mean that you have to define common signalling principles that are acceptable in Sydney, in Melbourne and Brisbane. I just leave it with those three cities. That has never worked in the past. Never. You speak to somebody in Brisbane and they will find, they will fight teeth and claw that their signalling principles have their justification and the differences to what they do in Sydney and in Melbourne also have their justification. And it's not that the people in Brisbane are particularly stubborn.

You go over to Sydney and they will tell you the same thing about their signalling principles being better than everything else. So, so trying to squeeze them all into the same format and then basically inform that one centralised solution on everybody else. I don't know. Firstly, I don't know whether they really get to a common standard like this, which is really agreed by all the parties. And then secondly, the implementation of that standardised approach to everything else.

We're not sure. I think obviously with interoperability, I've said this a lot, you know, if Germany, Poland, France, Italy and the UK can get together and agree with different languages and not the best history over the last hundred years. Why can't these three states in the same country speak the same language actually get together? I just, it puzzles me why, why we can't agree to that solution where Europe did, China adopting the European solution, the rest of the world adopting that European solution. But these three states, for some reason, will argue. Yeah, but it must be different in a state.

But that's exactly the thing. The solution in Europe is not that the Italians adopt the Polish signalling principles or vice versa. The Polish will have an ETCS implementation that reflects the Polish signalling principles and the Italians will have something that reflects the Italian signalling principles. And that was the intent of ETCS in the first place. What I think where the solution is, is to focus on the theory of ETCS, which says the onboard system on the train should be able to work with all those different track site implementations of ETCS.

If that onboard system was really fully standard compliant, meaning in Europe, for example, that it has all the functionalities from Poland, from France, from Germany, from Switzerland, from Italy and so on and so forth, which is not necessarily the case for practical, for practical reasons. So I think the approach for Australia and it should be easier in Australia because we have fewer, fewer parties than Europe. So we have fewer states in Australia than member states in Europe by far.

Well, here we are basically talking predominantly three states. If you can align Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, you're almost there. Maybe South Australia, if you're generous and what they do over there in Perth or over here in Perth, just just keep five signals and you're fine for the Indian Pacific. Right. But so you only have to align three, maximum four states compared to like, I don't know, 26 or so member states in Europe. So that that should be possible.

But but I think the trick is not to enforce a harmonisation of the trackside applications, which means trying to squeeze all the different signalling principles into one pot, but rather making sure that you've got an onboard equipment on every locomotive train travelling the country, which is smart enough and standard compliant enough that it actually complies with the stuff in Queensland and the stuff in New South Wales and the stuff in Victoria and everything in between.

I mean, if you're talking of high speed rail in Australia, it seems almost a no brainer that this would be ETCS Level 2 as well. Yeah, because you have it in the two endpoints anyway or the three endpoints. And well, we will see what's happening in the with the freight network in the in the future, whether they create an interoperability solution between ATMS and ETCS or whether the solution will be different in the future. So so we'll see. But but I think the the approach really should be the onboard approach. And I mean, that's that's early days.

They just start thinking about this in this national interoperability initiative. And I just want to use opportunities when I talk to knowledgeable people in the industry like yourself to basically just, yeah, chew the fat or bouncing off opinions and say, well, what do you think? Could that work? Where do you think difficulties from your specific discipline and stuff like that? From a system perspective, I think that the onboard solution is the only real pragmatic one that we can work with over here.

The train has got to be able to move seamlessly between those three. And as you say, the signalling principles in in Melbourne are very different from Brisbane. And when I found out that drivers go past red lights in Victoria, I was like, well, I still can't understand that. That's that's part of it. But that's not going to change because it's worked for 100 years and that's what they have to work with. So, again, how can we make it simple on the train driver such that they've got one radio system, one signal system for when they're in an interoperable area? Obviously, it won't be everywhere because there's just too vast distances between them that do all of those.

And again, that's a that's going to require at least two suppliers to work together to do that. And, you know, our team is also going to touch. You're going to sit down and say, let's develop an onboard solution that works interoperably. It will if someone pays them. But, you know, that's the thing is it's all about the cash at the end of the day, isn't it? Excellent. Well, thank you very much for for playing along in that in that extra topic that I that I had in mind, which which may be only loosely related to to system assurance, or maybe it will be more in the future.

We will see about that. I think it will be when we get into it. Yeah, for sure. Andy, thank you very much for your time. Really enjoyed the conversation. And yeah, maybe we'll catch up in the future again if there are some exciting new developments or maybe exciting new failures in that field. Let's see. That's a pleasure, Frank. Thanks for inviting me now. I enjoyed chatting with you. Thank you. Bye bye. Hi, it's Doc Frank again. I hope you enjoyed this conversation.

If you like the content, then the best way you make sure that you don't miss out on any of the future episodes, just subscribe to the channel. By doing so, you also get access to all the previous episodes, which I'm pretty sure there will be many that are of interest to you. Another thing that you can do to help not just your own environment, but the entire industry is to share this episode with friends and co-workers because it helps more people in our industry to get educated and an educated rail signalling industry is a better industry.

With that said, thank you very much. Hope to see you again soon. And bye for now.

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    What links Toby the Tram with a train control seminar in Beijing and the age profile of today’s rail workforce? Stephen Allday, who joined the railway 55 years ago and marked the anniversary in China. Stephen grew up in...

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  2. #114 – Why a Year Late on Brownfield CBTC Is a Good Result, with Mike Palmer

    Sep 23, 20261 hr 12 minAudio

    A brownfield CBTC project that lands a year late is a good result. Not a consolation prize. That is what the record actually looks like once you take the press releases out of it. Mike Palmer spent 29 years at London...

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  3. #113 – Why ETCS Is a Change Program, Not a Tech Project, with Cara Cohen

    Sep 9, 20261 hr 2 minAudio

    Fit the locomotives, commission the trackside, write the rules, and ETCS can still stumble on the day a driver decides the old way was better. The technology is the measurable part of an ETCS introduction. The people...

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  4. #111 — Fitting ETCS to a Freight Railway, with Craig Evans

    Aug 12, 202655 minAudio

    Freight is where the ETCS business case really gets tested. Many freight locomotives were built long before anyone drew a European Train Control System (ETCS) fitment design, and there is no factory fit to fall back on....

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  5. #110 — Why Digital Signalling Never Got Cheaper, with Andy Harrison

    Jul 29, 202636 minAudio

    Twenty years ago the promise was simple. Digital train control would get cheaper, and ETCS and CBTC would become the default for every new scheme. Neither happened. Costs keep rising, and the system knowledge keeps...

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