Peter Apps is a journalist and author, as well as the deputy editor of Inside Housing. His extraordinary, devastating new book, Show Me The Bodies: How We Let Grenfell Happen, looks at the evidence of the public enquiry into the circumstances leading up to, and surrounding, the fire at London’s Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017. Unpicking evidence heard over the course of 300 public hearings and 1600 witness statements, he paints a deeply disturbing picture of the historical, systemic, and practical failures that took the lives of 72 people, telling personal, tragic stories with a deep sense of empathy combined with journalistic rigour. Show Me The Bodies also shows in stark detail why materials - and the stuff that literally surrounds us and is usually specified for us - really do matter. In this episode Apps illustrates: how combustible materials came to be wrapped around a 24 storey building; the relationship between big business and government; the role the Cameron administration’s austerity policy played in denuding vital services; and the mistakes that were made on the evening itself. He also asks how important the issues of class and race were to the disaster and describes Grenfell's shocking aftermath. This isn’t an easy listen but it is vital. Support the show
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SPEAKER_00Hello and welcome to the final episode of Material Matters with Grant Gibson for twenty twenty two. I've been doing this for four years now, would you believe? But for listeners who might be new to the show, the idea is that I speak to a designer, maker, artist or architect about a material or technique with which they're intrinsically linked, and discover how it changed their lives and careers. This episode is slightly different, and I should warn you it tackles some difficult subjects as I'm talking to writer and journalist Peter Apps. Peter is the deputy editor of Inside Housing. He's also published an astonishing, devastating new book, Show Me the Bodies, How We Let Grenfell Happen, which looks at the evidence of the public inquiry into the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the night of the fire on the fourteenth of june twenty seventeen.
SPEAKER_00Unpicking evidence heard over the course of three hundred public hearings and sixteen hundred witness statements, he paints a deeply disturbing picture of the historic, systemic and practical failures that took the lives of seventy-two people telling personal, tragic stories with a deep sense of empathy combined with journalistic rigour. Show me the bodies also illustrates clearly why materials and the stuff that literally surrounds us and is often specified for us really do matter. It is without question the most important book I've read all year.
SPEAKER_00Peter, thank you very much for doing this. Thank you for that introduction. Um appreciate that. That's a complete pleasure. I mean it's um an extraordinary difficult book. In the introduction you say that writing it had always felt personal. Can we explore a little bit of why?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, you mentioned in the intro that I work for a magazine called Inside Housing, which is a sort of professional publication for people who work in the social housing sector mostly. And there'd been a fire before Grenfell, which I talk about right at the start of the book called Lacnell House in South London in 2009. Um and that was in a social housing block as well, and it killed six people. As a magazine, obviously that was a big issue for us and for our readers. And so in the years after that, we continued to follow that story and that issue. The question being, are tower blocks safe?
SPEAKER_01It's the state put advice that we give appropriate, are we using the right materials to sort of insulate and clad these buildings? And I just finished a kind of fairly major piece on that in May 2017, where we got hold of some information about a cladding, sort of it's not quite cladding, but almost like cladding on a um another building which had been involved in a serious fire, which had been very, very nearly fatal. And we've kind of done this big sort of warning about the fact that we hadn't learned the lessons of Black and all necessarily, and there were probably lots of other buildings out there where there could be other risks.
SPEAKER_01And so then to sort of see sort of just a couple of weeks later, what happened at Grenfell Tower, I just immediately had this feeling of, well, this is something which didn't have to happen. I sort of felt a need to communicate to people that fact, really. Um so yeah, so we started from there, and I mean it's become more personal in the years since because I've got to know some of the people involved, and the inquiry was such a kind of all-encompassing thing, it sort of dominates your life to an extent.
SPEAKER_00So yeah. Yeah, yeah. In terms of the public inquiry, we've now heard all the evidence and we're awaiting the final report from the inquiry panel, right? That's right. You decided to publish now rather than wait for the report.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, so there's a couple of reasons for that. Some of them practical. Uh a lot of arrests would introduce sort of quite serious legal restrictions on journalism in this country. So once people are arrested, it's going to be very difficult to sort of write openly about what happened at Grandfield Tower without risking prejudicing any future trial. Once the report is published, I think the arrests could follow quite fast. If you waited until the report came out, you wouldn't be writing a book until the end of those criminal trials, which could be five, six, seven years in the future, assuming they happen.
SPEAKER_01I mean, the report will be probably about a year from now, if we're lucky. And every year that goes by, Grenfell becomes less of a kind of current affairs story, and to too many people really starts to feel more like history was something that happened in a slightly different era with different politicians. Also, I think that people need to understand the context of what's been heard at the inquiry before the report comes out. If you're going to understand it, I mean the the first phase report ran to nearly a thousand pages. This one will be much longer, and the reporting of it won't necessarily make the important bits clear.
SPEAKER_01So I feel like the more people that know what's been said and heard in the inquiry by the time that report comes out, the better chance there is of kind of properly understanding the significance of it. And also just the fact that the story was there, it was out there, it was in the public domain. You know, a lot of the evidence speaks for itself. There's some quite important areas where the panel have to make judgments, but a lot of this stuff is essentially admitted by the witnesses and proved by documents. So it felt more sensible to go now rather than wait.
SPEAKER_00And the book's title, Show Me the Bodies, where does that come from?
SPEAKER_01It's a quote. Um it's fair to say an alleged quote, the the guy who um is said to have said it denies using those words, but a couple of witnesses to the inquiry say that he did. He was a civil servant, a guy called Brian Martin, who was responsible for a period of decades for the regulations covering fire safety in residential buildings, particularly with reference to Grenfell, the rules around what kind of cladding and insulation you could use on the outside of them.
SPEAKER_01Um and after Lacanell House, there was a coroner's report which said that those rules should be reviewed and that we should be doing things like installing sprinklers in these older buildings because their fire safety was deteriorating and none of those things happened. The government didn't get around to it by the time Grenfell caught fire. And an architect called Sam Webb, who very sadly died recently, but had been a very long campaigner on the issue of tower block safety, said to Brian Martin, Why aren't you doing more to prevent a repeat of the Lacanel House fire? Why aren't you following up on these recommendations?
SPEAKER_01And and Brian Martin, Sam says, responded by saying, Where's the evidence? Show me the bodies. And uh, as I say, another witness has has also heard him use that phrase in a different context. What he meant by that was the government was very anti-regulation, didn't believe in what he called red tape, it didn't think it should impose what he called burdens on industry, and it it was very reluctant to do so throughout the last 30 years, but particularly at that point.
SPEAKER_00You kind of date it to Michael Heseltine in 1984, right?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, right. I mean, it starts from there and we can get into that a little bit, but particularly in that kind of coalition era under David Cameron, they had what they called a war on health and safety, and there was a real emphasis on not imposing new rules on industry. Civil servants could only really convince ministers that it was necessary if they could point to really compelling evidence of the fact that people were dying without these regulations. And in fire safety, fire deaths were falling and had fallen since the 1980s. And so Brian's comment show me the bodies meant I don't think there are enough people dying to justify these burdens on industry.
SPEAKER_01In some ways, I think that the reason I pulled that quote out and it kind of stayed with me from the first time I heard it, which was quite a few years ago, it kind of explains the attitude of the British state at that time that they just didn't think it was important enough, that the other priorities, the sort of deregulation and industry lobbying were given higher prominence. They just did not think that it was worth doing. And if you say you're not going to act until you've seen a major disaster, you sort of guarantee yourself a disaster. Show me the bodies, it almost became a prophecy rather than an explanation for not acting.
SPEAKER_01Like I say, I think it gets to the heart of what the government wasn't doing and why.
SPEAKER_00Peter, we have listeners around the world, many of whom won't be as familiar with the Grenfell disaster as a British audience. So can we provide some context? Where is Grenfell? Can you give us a sense of the community that lived in the tower? Yeah. Because I mean it became kind of horribly clear there were issues around the refurbishment of the block. But many of the residents loved living there, it seems to me.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, that's right. So Grenfell Tower was a it was a 24-story building in West London, part of West London called Kensington. There's quite a few areas like this in London, but Kensington's probably one of the most extreme in that it has very, very rich people in it. Some of the richest people in the world actually live in Kensington. And it also has very, very poor people, and they live very close to each other. And that's a really positive thing in some ways about London and something it has which other cities don't. But it also creates these tensions and difficulties in local politics, particularly where you have a local council which is elected primarily by the kind of richer residents, but has so much power over the lives of the poorer ones.
SPEAKER_01In this instance, it wasn't just the structure of local government, it was also their landlord. So Grandfall Tower itself is what we call social housing or council housing in the UK, is public housing, so it's built by the state with government subsidy to make it cheaper over the long term for people to live in. So it's it's designed for people who wouldn't be able to afford to get hold of private housing for whatever reason. And the tower was a real mix of people. It was a real real mixed community. There was a huge North African-Moroccan community in there.
SPEAKER_01There were lots of people from Spain and Portugal. There was sort of British, Irish people, Caribbean people from the sort of South Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran. So it was a huge mix of people from around the world because it's public housing, because it's social housing, that people think Grenfell was poverty and people who had very little. And for some people that was true. I think there were some flats where you had very recently arrived refugees from Syria, for example. But there were other people who'd got a council flat in the sort of 80s and 90s and they'd really built up thriving, successful lives.
SPEAKER_01I think, you know, one of the guys on the top floor who sadly died in a fire was come over from Afghanistan, he'd fled the Taliban and he'd set up a um chauffeuring business which had really kind of like made real success and really sort of high-end clients around West London. And then there's others, people who just did sort of, you know, for want of a better word, ordinary jobs, people who sort of worked in IT. There was a guy who worked for an airline, so he was off in Singapore on the night of the fire, but his wife was home. Obviously, in this country, again, something that might not be familiar to your overseas readers is um people can buy their council home at a discount.
SPEAKER_01So you had some of the flats had gone through right to buy. So you had people in there who were leaseholders who actually owned flats that were worth because of the place in London it was, you know, more than half a million, getting up towards a million pounds. And some private tenants as well. There was a pair of architects in there, Gloria Ren Marco, who lived on the top floor and again very, very sadly died in a fire. Both right at the start of their career. Gloria was involved in the refurbishment of historic buildings they'd met at Venice School of Architecture and were just sort of starting their lives in London. It was a huge mix of people, different lives, and as you say, there was a real community spirit in the tower.
SPEAKER_01Families got to know each other, kids got to play together on the landings. You know, London can be quite a cold and impersonal city sometimes. It's not a place where people tend to get to know their neighbours, but high-rises are different, especially council high-rises in that regard. People do tend to form a community, and particularly for Grenfell, because of the difficulties which surrounded the refurbishment, that had actually brought the community closer together. So there were a lot of friendships going back 20-30 years, groups of people who knew each other, loved each other, and and you know, it's a it's a sort of a bit of a cliche sometimes, but they were a genuine close-knit community.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. You know, obviously it only adds to the tragedy, really. I mean, that sort of thing happening anywhere to anyone would be horrendous, but the people who've lost their home in Grenfell Tower have also lost their community, and that and that certainly makes moving on and coping with it that much harder.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. You've structured the book by juxtaposing chapters that look at the personal stories and pivotal moments of the disaster with others about the history of the tower and how the disaster came to pass. Interestingly, that history begins for you with Ivy Hodge lighting a stove in a flat in Ronan Point in Canningtown, East London, in May 1968, the blast that caused a corner of the building to completely collapse. So, how does that relate to the incident that happened, what, fifty years later?
SPEAKER_01In some ways, there's not sort of like a direct line, as in Grenville was a very different kind of tragedy to that. There was a like, as you say, it's a gas explosion, which caused the partial collapse of the building. And if the building was fully occupied, it was quite a new tower. They hadn't not many people had moved in yet, it would have killed a lot more people. It could kill four in the end. Grenfell was different. It was actually built in a different way to Ronan Point. It didn't collapse during the fire, which is in some ways a testament to the fact that it was originally built quite well. But what I think Ronan Point showed was at the time when Ronan Point went up, there was a lot of pressure on governments and and local authorities to build as much new housing as they possibly could, especially as much new council housing, which sort of feels weird to us now, but that was the world then.
SPEAKER_01As a result, they were taking shortcuts with this new methodology of system building where they prefabricated concrete and stacked it and then bolted it together. And it was very obvious to some architects. I mentioned the name Sam Webb earlier, and that's kind of where he made his name that that was unsafe. And there were clear warnings up to the highest levels of government that that was unsafe and it could lead to a disaster. But the other priorities were placed ahead of that. You know, no one wanted to hear about the bad news of a looming disaster.
SPEAKER_01What they wanted to hear about was another thousand homes ticked off into the housing target, the local authorities uh happily getting their grant, the builders are making quite a lot of money out of it. No one wanted to know that what was happening was dangerous. And Ronan Point, like Grenfell, was social housing where a lot of these disasters tend to happen in social housing because that's where, you know, even though you get dangerous cladding all over the place, you get sort of poorly built buildings all over the place. It tends to be the kind of combination of factors, poor management as well, and that real kind of like lack of care in terms of delivering a safe and secure home.
SPEAKER_00It is a story from Ronan Point to Grenfell of a it's a story of lack of care, fundamentally, isn't it? That's the thread.
SPEAKER_01Exactly. And so it shows that other things being given a higher priority, lack of care for the people who are ultimately going to have to live in those buildings.
SPEAKER_00I mean, we're a podcast ostensibly about materials, but we talk about lots of other things as well, obviously through materials. This is a story where obviously materials were a matter of life and death. Can we talk about what aluminium composite material ACM is?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, so fundamentally it is a sheet of a very thin layer of aluminium and then bonded to polyethylene, and then another thin layer of aluminium, so it's sort of like a sandwich panel. It's a cladding material, it looks sort of like sleek and quite neat on the sort of architectural finish on a building. It can be painted to all kinds of different colours, it's it can be fabricated very easily and bent very nicely, so it's quite a um versatile product for the external face of a building, which is one of the reasons why it's been quite widely used.
SPEAKER_01The problem is that polyethylene that I mentioned, which holds the two sheets of aluminium together, is a plastic, obviously, and it's a plastic derived from the same oil with which we use to um make petrol, so that it is sort of sometimes said this burns like solid petrol, and it does burn like solid petrol because it actually is solid petrol, that's the material. And polyethylene melts at quite a low temperature and it ignites at quite a low temperature as well. So if that material is exposed to fire, the polyethylene will melt, it will drip downwards, it will ignite even before the aluminium has melted or fallen away, and so it can burn inside the aluminium.
SPEAKER_01And it takes, therefore, if you've got that stacked up in a vertical line, it's going to take fire upwards very rapidly. But also because it melts and drips, it's going to take fire downwards as well, and it's going to spread laterally. So it's a very, very, very dangerous material because of that combustible plastic in the middle of it.
SPEAKER_00So the obvious question, Peter, is how did it end up being wrapped around a 24-story tower block?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, and in some ways, I mean, that's the question which the book asks, really. I mean, for certainly the first few chapters. One thing to emphasize is yes, question is why was it wrapped around a 24-story tower block? The question is actually broader than that, why was it wrapped around 500 tower blocks around the UK and a number of medium and low rise buildings as well? A big part of that comes back to our regulations in the UK. Get into the longer story a little bit. We used to have rules, quite prescriptive rules and regulations around what you could and couldn't use, which demanded, especially in London, non-combustible materials on the outside of a tall building.
SPEAKER_01Margaret Thatcher, Michael Hesseltine in the 1980s wanted to sort of free architects and designers to innovate and not be restrained by the um rigorous rules of the state. And so they swept away all of our old regulations and gave us what are known as headline standard, performance-based regulations, which I'm sure many of your listeners are familiar with. Um so the legal requirement in the UK was just the walls of the building must adequately resist the spread of fire, and that's it. And then we had sort of guidance which told the industry how to achieve that, and that guidance was out of date and underscrutinized, and it contained this standard called class naught, which is not appropriate for a composite product, so a product which is different on its surface from its interior, because it primarily looks, it's very small scale, it's quite short, it primarily looks at whether or not the flame is going to spread across the surface and whether that material is going to propagate fire.
SPEAKER_01And if you've got something like ACM where the core is horrendously combustible but the surface isn't, it can get through that test. You can also get through it if you've got lots of fire retardants, or if you've got a foil facer on a plastic insulation product, for example. It was an easily passed test, and it wasn't appropriate for modern building materials where the kind of question of fire performance is just more complicated than it is for bricks and wood and concrete. So Class Nort was in our guidance for 30 years or more before Grem fell.
SPEAKER_01And there were lots of warnings throughout that time, which I recount in the book, which said that that standard should be removed. I think the most shocking is in 2001 the government was actually testing cladding products. It wanted to make some assessment of new large-scale testing methodology, and they ran a test on a mock cladding system which used aluminium composite material, same material it's later used on Gremfell with the polyethylene core. It was a 30-minute test on a nine-meter high rig, which had to be stopped after six minutes because the fire reached 20 metres above the top of the rig.
SPEAKER_01And they were afraid that were they to carry on that test any longer, it would endanger the facility in which the test was being carried out. And the report that then went to government following that test was this material has a class naught rating, it's on the market, but it could be used on high-rise buildings. And yet that standard was not revised, it wasn't removed. There was some sort of some fiddling around with language to maybe suggest that the interior part of the cladding material should be banned, but nothing definitive to say this class zero standard is out of date, we need products to meet a higher fire standard.
SPEAKER_01And there was a lot of industry lobbying which surrounded that it would have disadvantaged certain manufacturers. The government were maybe worried that they'd get a legal challenge or that sort of thing. It just got shoved onto the back burner, and warning after warning after warning followed. So that's from the government side, the standards were too low, they allowed these kind of products, but the manufacturer of the ACM also holds some responsibility because they an organization called Arconic ran a fire test on the ACM material in 2004 and then several more later, which all repeated the same result, which revealed that you could present this ACM on the the outside of a building and fix it as a flat sheet where you just drill holes in it and rivet it to the outside of the building, or you can bend it over into what is in the industry called a cassette shape and hang it onto a rail.
SPEAKER_01Kind of an L shape, isn't it? An L shape. You sort of have to make an L-shape bend in the material and then it can hang onto a rail, and that avoids the need for rivets on the external face of the building.
SPEAKER_00Makes it look better, in other words.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, with a cassette shape, you get a nice, completely smooth facade with a riveted one, you you have rivets in it. That rust, presumably. That rust and that will therefore stay in the paintwork when when they rust and all that sort of thing. So the problem is when you bend it over into the L shape, that polyethylene gets a really kind of if you can imagine, sort of if you bent a sandwich over, you're going to get lots of jam at the bend. And so at that bend you have a real concentration of polyethylene, and that means that when it does catch fire, it really goes.
SPEAKER_01And they found that in their test in 2004 that in the cassette form it burned seven times as fiercely, released, I think, ten times as much heat, three times as much smoke, it couldn't achieve the lowest of the low standards available in Europe and would would effectively have been regulated out of the market instantly. But Arconic never released that test, they were able to get a class B result with the riveted form, and so they continued to market their product as class B, and they did that in the UK and across Europe.
SPEAKER_01So the industry might have known that ACM was dangerous because there were other fires, but this information about that when it's bent into a cassette panel, it's particularly violently combustible, was just not known. With the same result, nonetheless, it was sold for use across the UK, like I said, across Europe. Arconic also had a more fire-resistant version where effectively you blend the polyethylene core with some mineral, and so that means that there's just less of it, so it's going to burn less fiercely.
SPEAKER_01But it was slightly cheaper to do the polyethylene.
SPEAKER_00Well, I was going to say there are three main types of ACM, aren't there? Yeah. One of which is non-combustible completely.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. One of which would have an entirely mineral core, the non-combustible one. The sort of FR, as it's called, has a blend of polyethylene and some mineral. That one can burn, it can fail fire tests, but it sure as hell performs better than the pure polyethylene. And then you have pure polyethylene. Pure polyethylene always, I think, and this price varies obviously depending on material prices and markets and all that sort of thing. I think at the time of Gremfell it was something like two or three pounds per square meter cheaper. So the saving is minimal to go to that more combustible product.
SPEAKER_01But Arconic marketed the cheaper one because they knew that once it came down to sort of value engineering questions and public procurement and all of that sort of stuff, the cheapest one would give them an advantage over their competitors.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, because initially, I think I'm right in saying it comes out of the inquiry, the architect Studio E had wanted to use zinc cladding on the block before it was switched. And the cassette panels were insisted upon by the um Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Planning Committee. They didn't like the idea of the rivet.
SPEAKER_01Yep, that's right. I should say, I mean, it is fair to say that in that discussion about cassettes, nobody had any idea really until the Grandfield Tower inquiry revealed it about that additional fire risk with cassettes. Sure. They would have saved more money by using riveted panels, and that's what the contractors wanted to do purely because it would have saved them more money, but because of these, I think, slightly trivial concerns, really, certainly for the people who lived in the building, about the sort of smooth and rust-free nature of the external facade, they went for cassettes. Um, the choice about using the ACM rather than the zinc, you're right, the Architect Studio E had originally specified a zinc panel, I think, which was sort of a combination of zinc and aluminium and completely non-combustible.
SPEAKER_01However, what I would say about that, the architects didn't make that decision because of fire safety concerns. They made that decision purely on aesthetics. The architects didn't even really know what the relevant standards were for fire safety. The guy, according to his evidence, just looked at the product he thought looked best. He didn't do that kind of investigation. He offered ACM as an alternative in his specification. And when Ryden, the main contractor, came on board, there was the classic value engineering exercise.
SPEAKER_01They'd bid a very low price for the contract, and then they were asked to go even further by stripping out as much cost as they possibly could. And yeah, they removed the zinc cladding and replaced it with ATM. So we got there via a combination of penny pinching and a sort of uh preoccupation with aesthetics on the part of the planning committee left us with the most dangerous type of cladding in its most dangerous form.
SPEAKER_00I mean, there's a moment where the kind of deadly relationship between materials, function, and aesthetics in this particular disaster becomes very clear. Most of the cladding fires before Grenfell went up the building in a straight line, stopped and burned themselves out. This blaze wrapped itself around the building, and that was down to an aesthetic decision, creating what is described as a crown at the building's top that was made entirely of ACM.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, that's right. So when the planning committee saw the original designs for the building, they felt that it kind of lacked flourish, it lacked flair. And so the architect went away and put a crown on the building. They sort of look like it's quite hard to describe, they sort of look like half an aeroplane wing on each facade almost. And it served no purpose, it had no insulating value, it did nothing for the building, it just was just there to kind of add to the aesthetic nature of the design. But those panels at the top, the sort of half aeroplane wings, were made from ACM, and so when the fire went up the building and reached the top, it ignited those panels and then it took them around the building at the top.
SPEAKER_01One expert described it as effectively a fuse. There was a particularly tragic consequence of that, which is that during the fire, in part because the stairwell was compromised early, because people didn't have evacuation plans, they had mobility issues, and also because they say that they were told to go up, a lot of people fled upwards rather than going down and escaping the building. People from upper floors went up to the top. And because the crown took the fire around the building at the top, that meant that those flats where so many people were sheltering were some of the first to be affected by the fire.
SPEAKER_01And so people in those flats that there was very little time in which they could have been rescued and they lost their chance to escape very, very fast. So yeah, that crown at the top of the building had disastrous consequences.
SPEAKER_00And behind the cladding panels was ton upon ton of combustible foam. As you pointed out, with increased awareness of climate change insulation is a big business nowadays. I mean, I remember writing a piece for the ROBA Journal back in 2007, discovering there are two sides of the industry that really don't get on. What was used in Grenville?
SPEAKER_01So you're right, there is this industry rivalry between the mineral wall and the plastic insulation manufacturers. Grenville is plastic. It was Celitex RS5000 for the majority of the facade, and it was a little bit of Kingsbank K-15, which came along as a result of a product substitution. Architectural expert to the inquiry has shown that they wanted to achieve very high U-values. Sure, your listeners will be familiar with. They wanted to insulate the building very, very well, and they felt the design team that they could only do that with plastic.
SPEAKER_01But it has been demonstrated by the um inquiry's architectural expert that that could have been achieved with mineral wall insulation. The sort of role the insulation products played in the fire is quite hotly contested, and that's going to be one of the areas where the inquiry reports are going to have to make some findings. The expert evidence is that because that ACM panel burns so ferociously, the contribution of the insulation to the rapid spread of the fire was actually quite minimal. Nonetheless, there's another expert who talked more about smoke and the production of smoke because a really important element of turning this into such a high fatality tragedy was the speed with which smoke spread around the building in the early stages of the fire.
SPEAKER_01And the insulation is said to have contributed approximately the same amount of smoke as the cladding. And also Celatex releases the Celatex products made from a plastic called polyesocyanurate, which releases cyanide when it burns, as well as the kind of normal products of combustion. And you know, smoke is deadly. If it's got carbon monoxide in it, it's going to suffocate and kill you eventually. But smoke with cyanide means people collapse even faster. So the exact contribution of the insulation to the deaths and to the blaze is something the inquiry report is going to have to figure out.
SPEAKER_01But what we have seen from the evidence is that there was some pretty poor practice from those insulation manufacturers in getting their products onto the market.
SPEAKER_00Everybody, it seems to me, when you read your book and various other outlets that I've read, it seems everybody's involved. Everybody has their finger in the pie. There's a lot of buck passing going on.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, well, um the barrister who represents the inquiry described it quite famously now as a merry-go-round of buck passing. Um and in his closing statement, which was only a couple of weeks ago, he produced the diagram of where the organisations are passing blame to and where it's being passed back. And I mean, honestly, I think it's the best description I've read of it is it's like iron filings round a series of magnets. It's just an impossibly complicated graph. I mean, like the cladding manufacturers say that you know they sold a product that the UK regulations apparently permitted that building designers then incorporate it into their designs without the necessary checks.
SPEAKER_01And uh the insulation manufacturers say, well, actually it was the combustible cladding that caused the fire, so our product doesn't matter, it was irrelevant. And then the manufacturers of the products say, uh, sorry, the contractors say we took on good faith the fact that we were sold these products, we had no idea. And at every stage, and it it gets even more granular than that within the supply chain where the architects point to the subcontractors, the subcontractors point back to the architects, the league contractor points to both of them, and everyone points at building control.
SPEAKER_01And really, you have all of these organizations who minimise their own failings and point to the failings of others. And Grunfield is very, very, very complicated because there are so many people involved, and all of them, I think, share some of the blame, and none of them hold all of it, and so it opens the door to that possibility. It's a real task the inquiry report has is clearly identifying the key failures which cause the deaths and where blame lies and who is to blame for what.
SPEAKER_01Because nobody's to blame for everything, but I think most of them are to blame for something, and I think that's what the inquiry report really needs to tell us definitively.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, yeah. I mean, there are a number of themes running through your book, and therefore the disaster. There is a sense of British exceptionalism, for example, which manifests itself in lower building regulations, as you've mentioned. The fact that Britain is one of only two countries in the world, along with South Korea, not to require a second staircase in any buildings. In the US and Ireland, there must be a second staircase for all blocks over four stories, apparently. And then there's the issue of austerity, which you've touched upon, but maybe we can talk a little bit more upon. How did Cameron's government policy of swinging efficiencies or cuts in public services affect Grenfell?
SPEAKER_01In several different ways, I think. Take the example of building control. In the UK, when you finish a construction, well, when you start a construction product, you have to apply to building control inspectors who work for the local council, or you can go to a private company if you prefer, for oversight to make sure that the work you're doing complies with the rules. They sign it off at the end of the project, you provide a completion certificate. And at RBKC, it was the local authority which oversaw the Grenfell Tower job. Their team have been cut, I think, from 12 members of staff down to around four.
SPEAKER_01They used to have a special projects team who oversaw the more complicated jobs and that was disbanded because they were losing this expertise. People were just getting better wages in the private sector, they were actively reducing the budget. And so you ended up in a position where Grenfield Tower was assessed and signed off by an inspector who had no experience of high-rise buildings before, who had 130 other projects on his plate, and who made a series of important and quite basic errors. He didn't have the knowledge that he needed to deal with that job. And we'd got rid of that knowledge from the public realm in order to save money.
SPEAKER_01And that's happened across the country. The cuts to building control in RBKC are by no means unique. There were implications for the fire service, less so on the night, and there's a lot of focus on the night. I don't know whether more fire engines and more firefighters would have really made a difference at Granfell. And there have been cuts to both of those numbers in the years before. But I think where austerity really bit for the London Fire Brigade was they didn't have any money or time to invest in training, to invest in planning their strategies for high-rise buildings, to invest in enforcement of fire safety rules because they're the enforcing authority as well as the one that fights the fires.
SPEAKER_01They didn't have the money to upgrade their equipment. So at Lacnell House, their radios failed because they didn't work too well inside a big concrete building. And at Grenfell they failed again for the same reason and they they just weren't upgraded during that time. So the fire brigade just never developed, it should have. The fire brigade that arrived in 2009 at Lacnel House should not have been the same. And actually, by 2017, they were in a worse position. And really, they should have had investment over those years to improve, to get better, to get better equipment, to get better training, to get better insight.
SPEAKER_01Don't always be on a skeleton rotor where staff can't take a day out to learn how to deal with a call coming in from a resident in a burning building who doesn't speak English as a first language. But everything was cut to the bone and everything was put under pressure. It meant that kind of strategic where do we need to change question was never being asked. They were just how do we get through the next month? How do we get fire engines out to fires? And the local authority as well, the decision not to replace the self-closing devices on fire doors in Grenfield Towers is a crucial element of this blaze, again, being not just a clouding fire on the outside of the building but one which killed lots of people inside it, was a financial decision.
SPEAKER_01And in some ways, austerity might be a bit of an excuse for RBKC there because they certainly found lots of money for other things. But in an environment where central government is cutting funding and um pulling back from investment in local government, you're gonna see local government do the same. And you know, there's a direct link there to the fire at Grenfell. I mean, even sprinklers, for example, we were told 2013 by the Lacanel House Coroner that social housing blocks needed sprinklers. Now that was never going to happen in an environment where the government was cutting back on state spending.
SPEAKER_01It would have cost something like a billion pounds to retrofit them, which one in the context of spending of a government of the size of the UK over a period of kind of five or six years is absolutely not that much money. And two, the amount that we're spending post-Grenfell to fix these issues absolutely dwarfs that 10, 20 times over.
SPEAKER_00Another thing that comes up through the book is this relationship between state and big business, the fact that people appear to be quite an abstract notion when it comes to making policy and profit.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. Eddie Dafon, who's a survivor of the fire and uh who authored a resident's blog, which warned of health and safety and fire issues beforehand, he uses a phrase called institutional indifference. And Richard Millett, who's the the barrister who leads the inquiry, sort of put it in a slightly different way, but sort of saying the same thing, I think, where he ended his speech about how one of the key findings from the evidence at the inquiry is that people don't seem to connect the things that they're doing in boardrooms and on building sites and when they're writing policy documents and specifications to human beings.
SPEAKER_01They don't link the failure of their you know architectural practice or construction company to really check the fire safety rules to human beings who will later down the line be reliant on those protections to save their lives, and yet all of those things have a consequence. That's what Grenville shows us. Every poor decision, every relaxation of the regulations, every decision to prioritize economics over safety ultimately had a consequence in the 72 people who died at Granville Tower. You know, what Richard Millett's message was that's one of the lessons for people is to hold that in mind.
SPEAKER_01All of your if you work in a built environment, you you were building things which if they ever collapse, they'll collapse down on human beings. And if they catch fire and people can't get out, it's someone's mum, someone's sister, someone's son who's gonna suffer. And so I think bringing that kind of sense of humanity back into not just the construction industry but social housing and government, um, because Grenville shows that it's been so lacking, is one of the real important lessons from this, I think.
SPEAKER_00There's class and race too, Peter. I mean, when I was last in the area, one of my memories was a large handmade sign saying simply, why do we, the working classes, have to suffer again? You asked the question in the book to what extent did the ethnic makeup of the tower affect the treatment of the residents?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, I mean, uh Granfell Tower was majority black and minority ethnic origin. Um, as I said slightly earlier, lots of Muslim people in the tower, people from all over the world, really. And there's some very practical things about how race impacted on this. I mean, like the fact that it was harder for people who had English as a second language to communicate with the fire brigade. It was harder for them to raise complaints and raise concerns in the years before the fire, the information wasn't translated into their own language and that sort of thing.
SPEAKER_01And and then there's broader, more kind of societal questions really as to why is it that first of all, why is it that public housing ends up with a disproportionate number of black minority ethnic people? Because if we're saying public housing is for people who can't afford to house themselves through the market, why is it that the economy reaches a position where that's disproportionately people who are um not white? That points to economic discrimination in in just the way our economy is set up. And also, if then people who are on lower incomes and of different races tend to live in public housing at a higher rate and public housing is not properly maintained and is less safe than private housing, then that is discrimination because you are saying that people of a different race and of a lower income group are more likely to live in an unsafe home and are more likely to die as a result of that.
SPEAKER_01And so those questions are really there at Grantfall. And it's not just before the fire is after it as well. I mean, one of the most shocking documents that came out of the inquiry was this Metropolitan Police Risk Assessment, which referred to the fact that they bluntly said that because this has happened during Ramadan and many of the victims are Muslims, we expect the imminent outbreak of unrest. Um, and when you hear about the way the police treated the community and the residents in the aftermath of that fire, you get a really strong sense that they didn't approach it as a humanitarian operation, as a traumatized community that needed the protection of the state.
SPEAKER_01They treated it as a public order operation. They were there because they thought people were going to start rioting and they wanted to stop them. They came in to intimidate the community, threatening people with arrest. There's reports of armed police patrolling the streets, you know, what are they there for? Who are those guns there for? So race infects every aspect of this story, really. This is something which happened to a community which was predominantly not white. You know, the question has been asked by bereaved and survivors could this sort of disaster, the way it happened and the way its aftermath played out, could it have ever happened to a white community?
SPEAKER_01And I think the answer is no, it would have been different. And so race plays a huge role in in this story.
SPEAKER_00So there are historic and systemic issues, there are practical issues. I mean you've talked about the lack of self-closing fire doors. And then there are things that happened on the night. One of the things that comes out of the book is the London Fire Brigade comes in for quite a lot of criticism. It seems to me you're careful to praise the bravery of the firefighters who went in under what must have been appalling conditions, vision basically nil, heat unbelievably fierce. They must have seen some utterly appalling things. That said, you do take issue with what the sociologist Dave Bajant described as the highly male-gendered need to get into the fire, comparing it to a tower block in Milan, and the way that was treated, where essentially everyone was evacuated and the tower was allowed to burn down.
SPEAKER_00There are problems with communication, as you pointed out, a lack of training, and crucially the stay-put policy, where residents were told to stay in their flats as the fire kind of raged around them. So why did they have the stay put policy? To the layperson, it seems completely counterintuitive.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. There's quite a long history to that. Arguably goes right back to the sort of Great Fire of London, really, where fire spread from house to house to house throughout the city. And as a result, one thing that fire codes have always tried to do in the UK is stop the spread of fire from property to property. When we started building upwards in the post-war era, really, that was brought into the idea of building a block of flats. Rather than saying that this building is one fire risk, it was supposed to work that each flat was its own individual compartment where if a fire started it would not spread to the flat.
SPEAKER_01Upstairs, downstairs, next door, it would just stay within that flat. That was the objective of the building codes that initially kind of governed the construction of fire eyes buildings. A very admirable thing to try and achieve, I think. Like it if that works, great, fantastic. It saves everyone from even the inconvenience of having to walk out of the building every time the fire alarm goes off. And it's a wonderful idea. The problem is that it's reliant on not just the building being built perfectly to begin with, but it being maintained in that state.
SPEAKER_01And over time, that is just going to deteriorate. It is, you know, as you run cables through and replace the gas pipes and all of the bits of a building that have to come out over time and be replaced, you're going to start knocking holes through to do that, and the fire doors are going to deteriorate, and maybe someone's going to add some combustible plastic to the outside of the walls. And all of these kind of ways in which fire might stop being something which affects one flat and starts being something which affects a whole building were obvious enough that we should have been thinking about a really serious plan B for what to do if that idea of compartmentation fails.
SPEAKER_01How do you get people out? And the London Fire Brigade just never, ever, ever wanted to go down that road. I don't actually think the inquiry really got to the heart of why not. There was a huge institutional resistance to the extent that after Lacknall, the London Fire Brigade was asked to draft new guidance and they just wouldn't put in the need to evacuate buildings. I think in some ways the LFB kind of believed that it's too hard, it's not something that's possible, especially given that there's only one staircase, and they think that if they start talking about evacuation plans, there might be a kind of it's a slightly misguided intention, but I think they kind of feel like if they just hold the line and say everything has to be stay put, then building owners will react to that and say, Well, I better make sure my building's safe.
SPEAKER_01And that obviously doesn't happen.
SPEAKER_00Yeah.
SPEAKER_01But that sort of logic seemed to be held by some people within the organisation. One of the things that really comes across with a lot of organizations at Grenfell is this attachment to the status quo, this sort of belief that this is the way we've done it, and this is the way everyone else does it, in this country at least, and that is how, therefore, the only thing that's possible. We're not going to change. It's too complicated, it's too expensive. The London Fire Brigade was described as quite a conservative institution. The managers were sort of promoted up from watch level and then promoted those coming up behind them.
SPEAKER_01Didn't have much by kind of way of external voices coming in and saying maybe in a city with thousands and thousands of tower blocks, we need to think about this differently.
SPEAKER_00It does also beg the question why the stay put wasn't revoked sooner on the evening when they realised it wasn't working.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, certainly. Firefighters are taught to follow policy. You know, they are taught to be policy, and it's important that they do because you don't want freelancing, you don't want people. Just kind of going off and doing their own thing at an incident like that. You want rigour and discipline.
SPEAKER_00Well, no, that was really interesting. This notion of you don't want the person next to you. You need to know exactly what they're going to be doing, which I think is impossibly underappreciated by people in that situation.
SPEAKER_01And so it's drilled in don't improvise, don't make it up as you go along, you follow the policy. And Michael Dowden was never given an alternative policy to follow. He didn't have any training that prepared him for what to do once fire started spreading up the outside of the building. He was just told over and over again, if it's a fire at a high rise, stay put. And so that's what he did. It had terrible consequences. But could Michael Dowden have really improvised something? And I've heard it asked if he did, and four or five people died as a result of the fact that it was a big fire.
SPEAKER_01He's not going to be the guy who saved 65 lives by evacuating a building. He's going to be the guy that killed four people by not following policy. Michael Dowden was left in charge of that fire for too long. He was relatively junior. He was the manager at North Kensington Fire Station. More senior officers came to the scene. And they really should, I think they really should have reversed that policy. They should have understood what the stay put policy was based on. That idea that fire stays within an individual flat. It was obvious to anyone who looked at Grenfield Tower that that had failed.
SPEAKER_01And they should, as a result, have started much more quickly to actively start working out how they were going to get those people trapped in the building out of it, and started telling the call handlers to give that advice clearly, you need to be out of this building. It is now dangerous for you to stay there. They didn't do that, and they were heavily criticized for not doing that in the first phase report, which is criticism, frankly, I agree with. I think some of that comes down to individual failure on the night, and some of it comes down to this institutional failure to kind of imagine a disaster like Grenfell, or even one far less bad than Grenfell, but that needed the evacuation of a high rise and to plan for it.
SPEAKER_00We talked about the fire and you've alluded to what happened in the aftermath, which is, I mean, is also equally shocking, really. I mean, uh one of the statistics that came out was by the first anniversary of the disaster, 60 households remained homeless. Yeah. You've been in contact with the community since, Peter. Is there long-term physical and mental health issues that have cropped up as a result?
SPEAKER_01Oh, absolutely. And and not just from people who lost relatives and people who died in a fire, and our whole community is traumatized. If you think what happened, I mean children went to school with kids in a tower who who then suddenly never came back. And not only that, their school was right at the base of the building. And so they woke up in the middle of the night, saw it burning sort of the panels raining down and setting fire to things on the ground outside, and they saw people fleeing and screaming for their family, and then they lived for the next year or so underneath this burnt-out shell, which was horrible to look at.
SPEAKER_01In some ways, you don't want it to be sanitised at all. But for for somebody who lives right next door to it and whose young children live right next door to it, and then obviously it's still there. The question of what happens to it is going to be very, very difficult. And then the for the people who did survive, I mean, the the relatives struggling to find news about what happened to loved ones, some of them finding out that their children died from BBC news reports instead of being informed by the police or the council, being dispersed around London into these hotels and just left there, really. I mean, no one even checking to see whether they had food to eat.
SPEAKER_01I think one thing people forget about any domestic fire is that you flee the building in a massive hurry. You don't stop to put shoes on or pick up bank cards or identifying documents or anything, any pictures of your children or the ashes of your parents or anything like that. You just go because you're you're in an emergency. What you don't realize is when you leave the building, that's the last time you ever set foot in it. And all of the possessions that you left behind you and all of the memories that you left behind you are gone. And it's such a debilitating and alienating feeling. You feel like I've heard not just from residents of Grandforth Tower, but other buildings that are burnt down, you just feel like you've been reset to zero.
SPEAKER_01You don't even know who you are. I mean, imagine if today you suddenly learned that not just you could never go into your house again, but all of the possessions, all of the things in your house were gone, reduced to ash, and you'd never see any of them again. And now you've got to live in a hotel and start from scratch. It's a very difficult thing to deal with. And unfortunately, the disaster response failed to treat them with compassion and you know, and and get them. There was a there was an idea that people from Grenfell Tower, because Grenfell Tower was rubbish, they'd accept anywhere.
SPEAKER_01That was sort of the attitude that the council took to it. And so they bought up flats without checking with people whether that it's the kind of thing they wanted. And it turns out actually it's six miles from where the kid goes to school, it's on the seventh floor, so their traumatised 11-year-old is never going to set foot in a high-rise building again, and it's not adapted for the the disability needs of their elderly relative. And so they they say, No, I can't live there. And then the council sort of get cross with them because they're turning down offers and they're like, Well, this is a you know, we spend a million pounds on this flat. How could you possibly say no? But they didn't put people at the heart of that process.
SPEAKER_01They didn't sit down with the community and actually say to them, What do you need? They tried to impose on them, and it was a community that'd just been imposed on too much, frankly.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, yeah, yeah. And obviously in the aftermath of Grenfell, the fact that so many buildings we covered in ACM and other flammable materials became a national scandal. Is the government getting to grips with this, in your view?
SPEAKER_01Um, so the one very small area where they have made progress is taking ACM cladding off high-rise buildings. They're getting there with that. I mean, five and a half years is far too long to still be only just nearing the end of that, but they are nearing the end of it. The problem is that this scandal goes much wider than that. It's about medium-rise buildings, it's about low-rise buildings, it's about all kinds of different cladding materials, all of which are combustible, all of which have a kind of similar story to ACM in terms of low standards, ignored fire tests, etc.
SPEAKER_01etc. And uh the people who live in those buildings have been through the absolute ringer, frankly. I mean, the starting point was that they would have to pay to take the cladding off, which would have bankrupted en masse something like 500,000 people. We've steadily moved to a position where yes, they've got legal protection, they don't they won't have necessarily or most of them to pay for the cladding removal, but it's entirely unclear who will, and so the cladding's not being removed. They've had to pay for waking watch patrols, they've had to live in these buildings, you know. The mental health strain of going to sleep knowing that something combustible is on the outside of your walls, and perhaps you're disabled and you're going to struggle to get out, but there's nothing really in place to make that possible is intense, and the mental health strain has been huge.
SPEAKER_01I think we saw numbers, I think uh I'm quoting these off the top of my head, so they might be slightly out, but not far. I think something like 85% of people living in those buildings said their mental health had seriously deteriorated as a result. Bear in mind that this took in the pandemic as well. So not only were you in this dangerous building, you were there all the time. I think something something crazy like one in five were having suicidal thoughts and thinking of self-harm and that kind of thing. I mean, people have lost marriages, they've lost jobs, you know, relationships have broken down. It's it's people have been unable to move, so they've passed up on the chance to start a family because they're in a one-bedroom flat and they plan to move to a two-bedroom house and have a kid, and now that time's gone for them because of how long this has taken.
SPEAKER_01It's been a really bad story, and sort of every time you go through another layer of the onion, it gets a bit worse, really.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, yeah. I mean, Peter, our our time is pretty much up, so I'm gonna let you go and do some more journalism. But you wrote near the end of the book, kind of in conclusion, because I'm trying to find something positive, I suspect, but the world that gave us the Grenfell Tower looks irredeemably dishonest, but there were extraordinary stories of humanity and decency that came out of the disaster, weren't there, that you point out in the book.
SPEAKER_01There were, there were, and I think that is something to hold on to, you know. I think the the fact is, sort of like as a passing anecdote, I mean, one of the days of covering the inquiry, and I was I was really kind of miserable about the sort of the unpleasant nature of human beings to other human beings. And on my way home, I saw someone get knocked off a motorbike, and within seconds, they were surrounded by people who were giving first aids, giving them a bit of water to drink, phoning an ambulance, the ambulance was there in minutes, the paramedics were wonderful.
SPEAKER_01And you do forget that Grenfell kind of challenges us in this way, and that we can be very compassionate to people on an individual level, and the community at Grenfell Tower are an extraordinarily powerful example of that. Uh the way they've supported each other powerfully fight for their neighbours before the fire, and during the fire, they'd stop, people would stop and help risk their own life to help someone they barely knew on crutches down the stairs and out of the building, and afterwards, all of this solidarity, all of this support, that is still part of human nature.
SPEAKER_01And I think the question is why, when we can produce communities like that, do we also produce structures and institutions which create things like Grenfell? And that's a imponderable question, really. But I think that it's easy to lose sight when you look at something as miserable as this as the fact that on a basic community-based humanitarian level, we're capable of kind of great acts of bravery and good, as well as the callousness and evil that can also infect uh uh you know larger institutions. And yeah, that was a kind of parting thought which I left with in the book.
SPEAKER_00We're recording this in December. This is your Christmas message. Christmas message. Peter, thank you so much for your time. I mean uh show me the bodies. It's uh hugely important, difficult, devastating, but vital book, and I think you've done a wonderful job. Thank you.
SPEAKER_01Thank you, thank you for having me on.
SPEAKER_00Show me the bodies, how we let Grenfell happen is available now. As ever, there are images from the interviews on our Instagram page, materialmatters.design, and you can find all the podcasts that I've done, sign up to our newsletter and lots of other stuff at materialmatters.design. And finally, this is really important too, if you've enjoyed listening and want to see this podcast flourish, then please rate and review on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to this from. And it would make me incredibly happy if you went to my Patreon page and made a pledge at patreon.com forward slash material matters.
SPEAKER_00For as little as two pounds fifty a month, you can receive exclusive posts, blogs and thoughts from yours truly, as well as getting access to each episode before it's published to the wider world. Material matters is a completely independent concern, and any help you can offer would be hugely appreciated. Ultimately you'll be helping to take the message to the importance of materials, skill, craft and design to a whole new audience. So that's it for twenty twenty two. What a year. We've produced eighteen episodes of the podcast and launched the new fair. We'll return next year with the fair's dates confirmed for the twentieth to twenty third of September at Barch House Oxo Tower Wharf again.
SPEAKER_00My thanks go to my business partner, William Knight, without whom the fair wouldn't have happened, and my sound editor Sam Ryan for all his hours of sterling work. My name is Grant Gibson, and I'm looking forward to seeing you in two thousand and twenty three. Have a great Christmas, everyone.
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