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Masked Actors

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MuddyWater: Expanding an Espionage Operation

Sep 30, 202643 minAudio
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Send us Fan Mail Successful espionage usually relies on patience. Nation-state actors quietly infiltrate targets, maintain access for years, and gather intelligence without attracting attention. But one threat actor has spent nearly a decade rewriting that playbook. MuddyWater has built its reputation on aggressive and continuous retooling. With ties to Iran, the group’s ambitions have only grown bolder in the past year, setting its sight on rapid expansion and relentless technical evolution. Hosts Gary Ruddell and former INTERPOL Cybercrime Director Craig Jones sit down with cybersecurity journalist Ravie Lakshmanan, who has spent years tracking the group[s evolution. Together, they explore the driving forces behind MuddyWater’s rapid expansion and evolution, discuss why state linked actors remain so difficult to disrupt, and how we can defend against an adversary that never stands still. By understanding who these actors are and how they operate, you can better anticipate threats and protect yourself in an increasingly hostile digital world. Subscribe to learn more about Group-IB's Top 10 Masked Actors - and stay one step ahead in the fight against cybercrime. FOLLOW GROUP-IB Group-IB Threat Intelligence on X: https://www.x.com/GroupIB_TI Group-IB on X: https://www.x.com/GroupIB Group-IB on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/group-ib Group-IB on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groupibHQ/ Group-IB on Instagram: ...

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

Gary RuddellEspionage is, by its very nature, secretive. Usually we don't get to know what happens in real life behind the aliases and codenames. It's what draws us to spy narratives, a peek behind the curtain, a look at the murky underworld of international intelligence hiding just beneath the surface of our daily lives. We like the stories because in reality, good espionage doesn't even leave a ripple to suggest what's happening just out of sight. But is that still true?

Gary RuddellSince 2017, there's one group changing the narrative online. With ties to Iran, this cyber criminal group prioritizes chaos over subtlety, aggression over secrecy. They hit organizations hard and retool before defenders can keep up, funneling key intelligence back and moving on to new methods while targets are still reeling in the aftermath. And they're codenamed Muddy Water. Muddy Water isn't a new threat. The group has been one of the most persistently active Iranian-linked threat actors for nearly a decade, from at least 2017.

Gary RuddellIn the first season, we talked about how, alongside fellow Iranian advanced persistent threat group Oilrig, Muddy Water was operating sophisticated fishing and social engineering campaigns for the purposes of disrupting state adversaries. Since then, they haven't slowed down. Between October 2025 and March 2026 alone, Group IB documented at least three high-profile Muddy Water campaigns. And someone who has written extensively about the group's evolution is joining Craig and I as this episode's guest, Ravi Lakshmanan.

Gary RuddellHe's a cybersecurity journalist and open source intelligence specialist with a background spanning both computer science and journalism. His extensive work has appeared in publications including The Hacker News, The Next Web, and Financial Planning, where he's published his findings on Muddy Water and its operations. Ravi, thanks for joining us. Tell us a bit about yourself.

SPEAKER_02Well, hello everyone. I've started my career as a software developer. I've been working in the fintech space for about seven years, and then I decided to switch tracks and then I decided to pursue journalism. And uh here I am. I've been focusing on uh uh nation state activity as well as cybercrime as part of my work at the Hatha News. Prior to joining the publication, I've been also focusing on uh uh misinformation and disinformation research on social media, and I've also worked at other publications in the tech and the financial states.

SPEAKER_00Ravi, from my point of view, it's uh great to see you again. You've uh reported extensively on some of my operations that we used to carry out in the United Kingdom when I was uh leading the regional crime unit. Uh so uh thanks very much for the support you gave us uh in publicizing some of our great work there.

Gary RuddellSure. Yeah, great enough. Thank you. Now, if you weren't here in season one, we have spoken about muddy water before, but a lot has changed since then. They've continued to grow and retool and expand globally. Group IB's research assesses with high confidence links between Muddy Water and Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security. And researchers found evidence of the group operating between 300 to 500 high-value targets. Ravi, for anybody who hasn't heard about Muddy Water, can you give a recap about Muddy Water's motivations, please?

SPEAKER_02Sure. Uh, as you rightly pointed out at the start of the conversation, Muddy Water has been uh active in the threat landscape since about 2017. Uh, they are assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's uh Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Uh they are primarily an advanced persistent threat group, which means uh they are heavily focused on cyber espionage and uh they heavily focus on government and defense entities in the Middle East.

SPEAKER_02Although in recent years, uh they have also geographically expanded their targeting um and they have also expanded their tooling. Uh that's just a gist of the threat group that I can say for now. Yeah.

Gary RuddellRavi, what makes them uniquely dangerous?

SPEAKER_02One of the factors that I would say is that they have been shifting from their established freightcraft. You know, uh when they started off, uh they seemed pretty basic, all things considered, when you or when you compare it with other advanced persistent threat groups uh from Russia or North Korea uh or China for that matter, uh they heavily relied on uh you know basic partial uh partial scripts and uh you know legitimate remote access software as a way to maintain persistent access to their uh you know target networks and all of that.

SPEAKER_02But of late, as I mentioned, uh they have been shifting away from this established pattern. Uh, I think as defenders have increasingly uh you know monitored abuse of such tools like uh you know Anydesk or uh uh ConnectWise or whatever, uh, they have been moving away from those tools to custom-made malware. Uh so that has been happening at an aggressive and a rapid pace in the last two years. So I think that makes them uh a thread group to actively watch out for.

Gary RuddellAnd Craig, how significant would you say their geographic expansion has been?

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think that's pretty significant actually. Sort of saw them first, probably on what 2017. Historically, they almost focus exclusively on the Middle East region and sort of North Africa. But I think we can see from their recent campaigns, they've scaled from that sort of regional spy tool, looking at governments, government entities, and others as well, to more into that global initial access. So a lot more about an intelligence aggregator, so really drawing intelligence in.

SPEAKER_00And this is we've seen this in some of the group IB research, over 113 countries, 14 regions, and that's been expanding aggressively across Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, and that sort of follows the geopolitics as well. So as we see most geopolitics reshaping, we've seen you know a lot more aggression then from the Iranians from Muddy Water in this space. And I think some of the significance about this is that strategic access for higher-tier Iranian threat actors.

SPEAKER_00So rather than just doing the full executing full end-to-end intrusion, they're looking at how do they get into those targets, such as in South Korea, electronics manufacturers, Latin America's financial institutions, really seeing what data they can pull out there as well, and then they'll move that on to another group who may look at putting and deploying destructive wiper. And I think not just this group, we're seeing that attacking the supply chain as well. So we've got these groups now saying, okay, well, where is vulnerabilities in the countries?

SPEAKER_00How can we cause the biggest disruption effectively? And I think as Ravi said as well, they're sort of obfuscating um their tradecraft behind cybercrime as well. And we've seen the sort of cybercrime coming out through this group as well. So it's not always a historic, advanced, persistent threat and APT, but they're also looking and hiding it as cybercrime as well. So this is where it gets difficult sometimes for law enforcement. We're investigating these crimes, is then we have that crossover between state actors, but then state actors that are sort of hiding behind that cybercrime arena as well.

SPEAKER_00So it makes it quite difficult for, well, previously for mere law enforcement, and we had to work very closely with uh our other government agencies to work out who was actually behind these attacks as well, and especially as governments then moved around the sort of naming and shaming of some of these actors because they're in hard-to-reach jurisdictions. So, how do we bring the weight of our intelligence and actually bring out a name who's doing it? But we've got to do it at a high level of confidence as well.

Gary RuddellI looked at the numbers and there was over 2,000 network indicators and I think 1,500 or more malware samples associated with muddy water. I think in the past they relied a lot on spearfishing and hijacking of legitimate tools and were reasonably predictable, but there's been a shift. So, like, what would you describe as being changed in 2026, Ravi?

SPEAKER_02Uh the main thing has been the focus on custom malware development, uh, where, as you rightly mentioned, they were focusing on legitimate tools to blend in with uh you know network uh activity and avoid detection. Uh now they've been more and more focusing on developing their own malware strains, and that too now across different programming languages like Rust, uh Python, and Node.js, uh, which means they are actively branching out and developing a cross-platform malware toolset uh that can perhaps target different systems.

SPEAKER_02Uh one uh major campaign that Group IB itself has exposed earlier this year was the operation Ola Lampo, uh, where you know the group has uh you know deployed multiple backdoors and downloaded malware, which the group wasn't doing before. Uh one of the backdoors is called MCAR, which seems to have incorporated some signs of artificial intelligence into it, uh, as well as it also has capabilities to run commands on the compromise system and allow the tractors to maintain persistent access.

SPEAKER_02So the group has been evolving considerably uh since 2025, uh you know, incorporating varied tactics like AI, uh developing their own malware and augmenting it with artificial intelligence. Uh plus, as Trey pointed out, uh they've also been uh incorporating uh cybercrime tools into their uh arsenal. Like, for example, they have uh used this botnet called Dindor, uh, which is commercially available and is now being used uh in attacks across North America um and other regions, so which implies they are looking to uh obfuscate their own tracks uh while complicating attribution efforts.

SPEAKER_00Ravi, just in what you mentioned there, I think some of the group IB research came up as well. We have a lot of hype around AI at the moment and who and how it's being used. I think some of the group IB research came up. They were looking at sort of AI, let's call it AI assisted code generation. Have you got any sort of commentary you want to make on that as well? Because obviously you've seen the research, but obviously from your background and what what you're seeing as well, be interested to hear your sort of views on that.

SPEAKER_02Sure. Uh from the perspective of Muddy Water, what has been observed is fairly, I would say, basic at this point. It's not to the extent as what uh major front frontier AI labs have exposed in recent months. Uh but that said, uh it also shows that they're experimenting with the two technology. Uh one uh aspect that I've seen in the past couple of months is that uh the Muddy Water Group appears to be uh looking to use AI as a tool to develop uh custom file transfer and remote execution tools uh while claiming to be you know some sort of a student working on a final university project.

SPEAKER_02So it looks like they are trying to circumvent AI guardrails and then you know uh get their AI to kind of work for them. So it is still in its infancy, but I'm sure it'll evolve over time.

Gary RuddellAre they aiming to disrupt services or steal data or gain long-term access to organizations? What's their objective here, Robbie?

SPEAKER_02The main objective, again, is to maintain persistent access. Uh most of the instances that uh we've encountered so far in the past two years have revolved around you know deploying backdoors or you know, even legitimate tools for that matter. It's not like they've completely gotten rid of deploying Connect-Wise or Nadesk on compromised networks. They still do that, but the extent to which they do that has considerably declined. Uh so the goal is still espionage and you know data exploitation, uh, while maintaining uh access for exponential periods of time.

Gary RuddellThat's really interesting. Thanks. Yeah, in January, and you mentioned this earlier, Group IB observed Operation Olalampo, which is a mouthful uh muddy water campaign that targeted organizations and individuals, mostly in the Middle East, North Africa region using classic malicious office documents. Craig, what first made Operation Olalampo stand out from previous campaigns from them?

SPEAKER_00So I think we touched on this a bit already. Um we sort of saw a bit of an evolution here in that sort of command and control C2 infrastructure, and then there's an evidence of AI-assisted malware development. So, three points to this is you've sort of got that telegram telegram-based C2 communication. Um, so that was first time we see Muddy Walton using that telegram bot as command and control, and this was leveraged uh through the sort of char custom uh rust back door.

SPEAKER_00Um, that AI assisted code generation. I think Ravi's already alluded to this. It I think it's it's basic, but again, this is where you have not just cyber criminals looking to see how they can use AI. You know, you've got some of these uh advanced persistent threat actors and groups looking to use that, and then there's some new custom malware strains. And muddy water historically has used uh tried and tested, but here they were looking to use some more remote monitoring tools effectively, and these haven't been seen before, but again, there's fairly high confidence that can be linked back to muddy water.

SPEAKER_00So I think it it it's a combination of factors here which sort of stood out as different from what they'd done historically, and that maybe with a sort of a different priority within that sort of directing agency within Iran, um, looking at them to do more persistent work, different types of work as well. So, yeah, it it was it was different this time round.

Gary RuddellAnd why do you think organizations in that region were the primary focus of this campaign?

SPEAKER_00So I think you know that that goes back to the geopolitics of this. You know, we saw a lot of change in the region, and we've got that ongoing peace with the US, with Iran at the moment, the involvement with those Middle Eastern countries and also North Acting North uh African countries as well. Um, so you know, it's that what what's what's the motivations behind this? So we've got that state intelligence gathering and espionage. So when countries are at a heightened level of dispute with each other, you know, you are going to see more spying going on.

SPEAKER_00You're also looking at that initial access broker piece, which we've mentioned before. So they're looking to say, okay, what what how can we get into these environments? How can we map them out? But as Ravi said quite often, they they want to remain there as a persistent threat as well. But here, what they're doing as well is using you know cyber as a tool to sort of destructive, destructively wipe um some of the infrastructure that is being used in the country. We saw this coming out through the Middle East, and then also on the back of that, you've got that commercial and technology FEP still ongoing as well.

SPEAKER_00So it's like anything, you know, the the levels have been raised, and you know, we've seen what's been going on in that physical sense with the drone attacks, and this is combined in that hybrid attack that is happening out in the Middle East, in particular at this moment in time.

Gary RuddellRavi, the fishing documents themselves impersonated legitimate organizations and business processes, what does that tell us about how Muddy Water is approaching attacks?

SPEAKER_02It shows that Muddy Water is actively, you know, uh tailoring its attacks to focus on the organizations it's interested in. Uh, that's classic sphere phishing because you know, uh, if uh a threat actor is looking to target a particular organization or looking to harvest certain information, they want uh the newers or the decoys to be as convincing and purchaser to the recipient who's receiving it. Uh so the choice of the lures uh reflect uh that the threat actors are actively looking at, you know, um making sure that uh the yeures are very personalized and tailored to the recipients who receive it.

Gary RuddellUh one of the things most intriguing uh was the evidence suggesting that AI assisted development is taking place. And this is something we've seen in wider campaigns. How should defenders adapt if state groups routinely use AI to accelerate malware development?

SPEAKER_02I think the core focus here I think should be on uh adversarial simulation and retaining. Uh, because I think as threat actors uh you know incorporate more and more AI into their uh you know tradecraft, uh the speed at which the cyber attacks can be pulled off is also accelerating. And it's also you know, uh shortening uh the window with which, for example, if threat actors are looking at exploiting a security vulnerability, uh, you know, the that window is now shrinking much more than before.

SPEAKER_02Uh you know, you just have to have a public disclosure of a vulnerability right now, and then within an hour's uh few hours, you can be sure that somebody is exploiting it already. Uh so that requires uh you know a rigorous uh attack service management, uh enforcing zero trust controls and uh you know participating in you know real-time threat intelligence sharing and uh participant collaboration.

SPEAKER_00I think Ravi and Gary, what what we've seen here is almost the reverse. So previously, when cybercrime came along, it was on the back of those tools that have been basically developed by governments effectively, and they were used at a government level, a state-to-state level type attack. And then the cyber criminality came along after that. And exactly to your point there, you know, you look at the attack service, you look at the vulnerabilities. I think this time we're almost seeing the governments and private sector stroke cyber criminals all coming along on this journey together.

SPEAKER_00So it's almost a rush to the front here. So you've got those frontier models that are you know throwing up all these vulnerabilities. So you're seeing the quick identification of vulnerabilities, you're then seeing almost like that commoditization and factorization of them. So, how how can we either mend this or actually how can we take advantage of it? And whether it's a state act or a cyber criminal, we're in a different space this time. It really is that sort of pedaling really, really fast to try and stay up. Whereas last time we we we had a bit of a gap.

SPEAKER_00And I think this is where we are at the moment now, the next sort of we weren't having these conversations a year ago, six months ago, but we're having these conversations now, and certainly from a law enforcement point of view where we're looking to protect communities, you know, that that worries me quite a lot effectively about how can we do this as the private sector, as the government, and also working with researchers and academia, and also, you know, the you know, the private cybersecurity companies such as Group IB and others who who can shine a light on that and share that information really, really quickly.

SPEAKER_00It comes to your last point about that information sharing as quickly as possible.

Gary RuddellYeah, Group IB spotted three totally new malware variants over a six-month period from Muddy Water, which really tells you, you know, how fast they're moving, and that that line between commercial cybercrime and traditional espionage is definitely being blurred. Craig, from an investigative standpoint, what makes tracking and disrupting actually a nation-state actor like Muddy Water more complex when it's this fast?

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think if I just back up to my the previous comment I made about the timeline here. So when you look around cybercrime when it first started, um, you know, you had governments and states that have got very good apparatus in there to detect, and they were doing it on a state-to-state level. So high-end capabilities, only available at a government level because of the cost involved in it, and then we saw that evolution. As we go into those investigations now, they are so rapid and so fast, and trying to see who is behind these attacks can be really challenging because you've got law enforcement doing an investigation, and depending which country you're in, for example, different law enforcement agencies have different remit.

SPEAKER_00So let's take the FBI in the US, for example, they've got a dual remit. They look at state actors and they look at cyber criminals, and there's lots of other different agencies in the US. So you've got different teams, but they're in the same organisation looking at what's going on. And they're able to share that information internally very, very easily. When you look at other countries, is you've got a real clear delineation between state uh actors and investigations and law enforcement investigations.

SPEAKER_00So you have to have a lot of deconfliction that comes into the trust side of it as well. So, who's cleared for what information? Um, because you know, you don't want some information getting out there or wrong attribution or something like that. Um, one of the ways we did this in the UK, we had a really good system for doing an assessment. So when we identified a new threat actor or a new crime type, we got all the parties around the table. Um, and that was done over a period of time.

SPEAKER_00We had to almost relearn how to communicate, and then there was a clear ownership and prioritization. So a lot of countries are going through that process now. Then you look at organizations such as Five Eyes. So, how do Five Eyes work together? So those countries trust each other, they might work together on cybercrime, but also state actors. Then you might have Europol that would work just on the European ones. So, again, what you're trying to do is de-conflict all the time. And this is where it's really challenging in that cybercrime space because when you're studying investigation in a local basis, when there was a burglary, well, that's you know, that's our bread and butter from law enforcement.

SPEAKER_00All of a sudden we're in this different space. And I think Interpol, our mandate there was only to investigate crime. So anything political, military, racist, or religious in our constitution for 196 countries, if it came back to something of one of those four, we would then not support our member countries in doing that investigation. In fact, if they had information on our tools and platforms, we would say take it off. So we would keep it really, really clearly on cybercrime.

SPEAKER_00So prevention, detection, investigation, and disruption. But until you could do that clear attribution, Rabbi's nodding his head here, because sometimes you didn't know who was who was behind it. But once we had that clear attribution at Interpol, we would then take that information off, and that happened a couple of times whilst I was at Interpol, although we did have an interesting one with the FBI um naming some Iranian cyber criminals back in 2022, um, which was quite an interesting one for us to deal with as Interpol, but also how the FBI dealt with it as well.

SPEAKER_00I think Rabbi, you've seen some other examples of this potentially.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, absolutely. Uh one of the main things that I've observed is that uh these threat actors have you know infinite amount of resources, right? So they have the capability to come up with uh you know advanced tool sets and they also practice advanced operational security, which makes it uh a lot more uh difficult to track them, attribute these attacks to a specific threat actor, uh, and all of that. So uh it is a challenging uh aspect, but at the same time, I think it requires uh a stronger private sector, public sector collaboration to kind of uh you know share threat intelligence and you know uh unmask these threat actors and disrupt them.

Gary RuddellRavi, does the fact that the group is state sponsored and has state resources impact our ability as an industry to respond?

SPEAKER_02Yes, it does to some extent. Uh because, you know, for example, uh a threat actor like Muddy Water is now actively evolving as a tool set uh which shows a sign of maturation and uh sophistication that the group has not exhibited in the past. Uh so that uh also puts us in a sort of uh you know uh in an unpredictable state where we don't know what this threat actor is going to come up with next because they are constantly switching up things, they are coming up with new malware families. Uh every new campaign these days uh from the Muddy Water Threat Actor has involved a different malware family, so which makes it a lot more uh you know challenging uh to track uh threat actors like them.

SPEAKER_02Um but at the same time, as Craig pointed out, uh, you know, law enforcement agencies uh you know have also have different jurisdictions and they operate at different levels across different countries, uh, which is what I think uh makes it a lot more challenging and it requires heightened collaboration uh to you know tackle the threat.

Gary RuddellAnd just following on from that, Ravi, they've hijacked trusted communications channels that we all rely on every day. How do investigators hunt adversaries who are hiding in plain sight using legitimate tools, tools that you know we all use day in, day out on all of our devices?

SPEAKER_02I would say it's a lot more challenging because when today's abuse legitimate platforms, whether be it iMessage or Telegram, uh or even services that are used within enterprise environments, because it's it makes it harder to detect uh legitimate activity as opposed to malicious activity. Uh but I think that's where uh it is important for these platform providers as well uh to you know identify patterns of misuse and you know flag them as and when they appear.

SPEAKER_02Like for example, Telegram has to uh take action as and when you know Telegram groups or channels are being misused for uh distributing malware or you know, uh propagating all sites of all sorts of cybercrime tools. So yeah.

SPEAKER_00And I think Rabbi's put it, you know, the the the use of platforms, you know, these are platforms that are there to communicate. So Sarah, for our day-to-day use, such as we're communicating on a mobile on a on a platform, effectively. Um so what we have then is law enforcement has always had that challenge about, you know, well, we need access, we need access to it, we need the information. And yeah, that might have been true in the old days when we could put a surveillance team on someone and follow them and see who they're talking to, or we might be able to put an intercept on a line or something like that.

SPEAKER_00It's a lot harder with technology now because that technology is sold on trust. It's around we are a trusted platform, you know, your communication is gonna be private. If you think law enforcement is going to be able to break into it and monitor you, then you know the criminals may or may not use it or decide to do something else. So that's that balancing act we've always had to find within law enforcement. As the technology changes, how do we utilize that technology in order to we've got to maintain privacy, we've got to maintain trust as well.

SPEAKER_00And like I said earlier, we're it's not just in our single place of work we're doing this, this is internationally. So when you look at the geopolitics that come into it as well, some countries may agree, some countries won't. But actually, when you look at the technology companies behind these platforms, they're totally international, they're global. So again, they've got their rules and regulations of A News internally, but also they have to maintain and stick to the legislation in the countries where they're operating as well. So trying to deconflict all of that can be challenging for all of us.

Gary RuddellRub your crystal ball for us. Uh, where are they gonna go next?

SPEAKER_02Well, I think they've already branched out to North America. I think uh that that was something that was surprising to me because I think they've not targeted uh North America uh from what I've reported so far. Uh, but the fact that they have branched out to uh you know uh the continent and coupled with that, they've also started to incorporate cybercrime tools in those attacks shows that they are looking to you know hide behind conventional commodity malware to kind of cover their tracks and ensure that you know they stay under the redoubt.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I mean this this is where organizations such as I served at Interpol as their director of cybercrime are absolutely key in this as institutions in the first instance. So it's around that coordination. So looking at those high priority cybercrime cases, and we did it through prevention, detection, investigation, disruption. And Interpol's role very much was to work with their member countries, 196 of them, to help facilitate those operations. But we also did that with the private sector.

SPEAKER_00So the private sector, such as group IB, would provide us with key information which would not necessarily be available to law enforcement, and we would do that with other private entities as well. So we had Fortinet, Palo Alto, and others as well. So we'd aggregate those data sets, we'd then spin up operations, but in order to do that, we needed to make sure we had our countries on our networks and systems which are secure. So you know, I came from a UK where we had very secure systems and networks, which we just took for granted.

SPEAKER_00Yet when I wanted to work with Africa, you know, I was expected to communicate with an officer on their Gmail account. Well, I don't know if that's a police officer or not. So what we did then was we we created our sort of cyber tools. We had our capabilities and capacity one, which was the sharing non-operational information, and then we'd have one for operational information as well. But we'd bring not just the member countries on there, we'd bring the private sector on there. And this comes back into that sort of privacy and trust point of view.

SPEAKER_00We could only bring the countries and the private sector in there when everybody agreed to it. If they didn't agree to share that information, and we didn't agree to share that data with a certain country, we couldn't bring them onto that platform or necessarily share that data with them. So we had to do a lot of work around saying, look, we're here to reduce the global impact of cybercrime and protect communities to a safer world. It's simple. It is just crime. The vulnerabilities and weaknesses that any threat actor, and I I caveat any threat actor here by criminal states, you know, anybody can can go after that.

SPEAKER_00So if we do the prevention piece first, that that helps all of us. And again, that's where the private sector come into this because they help identify. But I think, you know, just the last example I'll give is the sort of Africa desk that we set up. So 2019, sat in a classroom in Naira, with 12 countries, their cyber heads. They they really were struggling. So we got some funding from the UK government, we set up the Africa Joint Operations Against Cybercrime, we then built out operations there, and we did that by training.

SPEAKER_00But when we gave training, we made sure there's an operational outcome on the end of it, i.e., look, we've got a bunch of compromised servers in this country, and the law of force said, well, what's that got to do with us? And we saw actually, that's breaking the law in your country, or it's against terms and conditions. And with the private sector, we'll provide that data set to them. They would then take the executive action, and we built those operations out, and you see some fantastic operations through the last few years with Interpol and you know, Group IB and others. Yeah, there was a lot out there in the press.

SPEAKER_00We've replicated that now in Southeast Asia, we've replicated that in the Americas region. We also have the Europol. So it really does come back to that strong collaboration. And then the final point I'll make is the United Nations. So the work that's undergone at the United Nations, a new cybercrime convention. Countries are currently ratifying their own countries, and what that means is then it gives a framework for state to state to share information and data. But again, we've got to all make sure we're talking the same language because sometimes a cybercrime in this country may not be a cybercrime in that country.

SPEAKER_00So again, trying to level up that playing field, but it comes back to that cooperation, it comes back to that coordination, and it comes back to communication as well.

Gary RuddellRavi, you've written previously about how threat actors increasingly exploit human trust, not just technology. And we've certainly seen Muddy Water do that. For example, in the recent research that Group IB did on the click-fix technique where the victims get tricked into pasting malicious PowerShell scripts to fix fake system errors. Why are advanced APTs like Muddy Water so reliant on human-centric deception? You know, what makes that such an attractive route for them?

SPEAKER_02Humans have always been, I think, the weakest link in cybersecurity historically. So I think it's easy for a redactor to, you know, convince a person uh to take unauthorized actions under the you know a pretext of urgency or something like that. So uh it's ultimately human psychology, right? Like, you know, suddenly you get a message saying uh, you know, some amount of money has been redacted from your account or something like that, and suddenly you are like, oh, I have to now quickly go and check what this email is talking about. So I'm going to click that link.

SPEAKER_02And you know, at that particular instant, your mind is not thinking too much. So you are incentivized into clicking that link, and that may have serious repercussions. Uh, so I think threat actors capitalize on these behaviors that uh you know that we all exhibit from time to time uh to kind of you know take advantage and trigger these malicious behaviors within you know uh the corporate environments. And that makes it even more uh you know uh significant because it's not like you know, of course, you know, it's your personal computer, you click on a link and then you get infected by a malware that is one thing, but then uh you know you are working uh in your in an enterprise setup, and then you know you click on a similar link.

SPEAKER_02What ends up happening is that you may uh compromise the entire network in the process without you even realizing it. And a lot of attacks happen that way. And uh it is uh you know, it is an easy way for threat actors to bypass a lot of the guard rates. For example, the click fix method uh has become one of the most popular social engineering methods out there at the moment. It is because uh the threat threat actors don't have to convince you to click on a link, uh, they don't have to uh trick you into opening an attachment or anything of that sort.

SPEAKER_02All they have to do is serve you a page uh that tells you that you know uh you have to complete a CAPTCHA like verification, and then you'll be able to see what you are expected to see next. And in the process, there they ask you to just copy and paste a command. And what ends up happening is that you're compromising your own system in the process. Uh so in this situation, uh the threat actor is not doing anything at all. They're just serving a page to you, and you just do it because those are the instructions that are given to you on the page.

SPEAKER_02Uh, so that uh you know shifts the you know, what do you say, uh the way the attacks happen. Previously, it required users to click on a link or open an attachment or you know perform some sort of an action to trigger this sort of an attack. Uh, but now it has become that much more easier. So uh this makes it a lot more easier for traductors to you know get away in the right.

SPEAKER_00And I think like like say Rabbi, sometimes it's it's that ordinary thing. So, you know, you might not think about doing that. Likewise, you get a new bank card through the post with your name on there, and your bank card was coming up for renewal, but there's a QR code which you've then got to scan to activate it. And actually, that's been sent out by an organized crime group because your details have been compromised at some point. They've got the details of your card and they've got that expiry date. So again, they're looking to see how they can use that.

SPEAKER_00And as humans, you know, we we are programmed to follow instructions, you know, whether at work, whether at home, you know, an instruction comes in quite often we will follow it because, you know, well, that that's that's what we do effectively. Um, I wouldn't say the human's always the weakest link. I think there's the technology in there with the vulnerability as well, but you know, that urgency when you when you you know, oh you've got to do this now, you won't have access to this, or you need access to that, or oh, actually your banks be compromised, you know, you go and check. So it's playing out on those vulnerabilities on the human-centric side as well, is something that threat actors take advantage of.

Gary RuddellNow, considering everything we've spoken about, how do you train organizations to defend against attacks from groups like Muddy Water?

SPEAKER_02Uh, from my from what I can gather, uh, it has to take steps to have zero trust controls in place, uh, given that the threat actor has a history of abusing legitimate tools in its attacks and as well as you know, custom malware as well. Uh, you know, uh the focus has to be on implementing necessary access controls and uh tightening the supply chain security uh and ensuring that you know there are no possible avenues through which um you know malware can come into your network.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think I I I would keep it at the people, processing technology, those three trusted parts effectively, and just apply that in that cyberspace. You know, when we're when we're talking about advanced persistent threat actors, state actors, it's really, really challenging for small and median enterprises, individuals to fully protect themselves from that. So, you know, we we can fall back on the on the on the basic uh basic stuff, you know, patching, antivirus, etc. etc. etc. But this is where you come into that risk-based approach.

SPEAKER_00So, you know, a large government entity, you you're you're gonna be attacked. So what do you do? What do you put in place? You know, you have to pay for security effectively. And this is why we have such you know a huge cybersecurity industry, or whether we call it AI industry now, but we've got such a huge industry here. Um, you know, in order to have something secure, you realistically, you know, you are gonna have to pay for it. This is the cost of doing business in the 21st century, effectively. So, you know, at that level, you've got to get the best people, the best advice.

SPEAKER_00That's what you need. And then you take that tiered approach further down as well. But like Rabbi says, you know, don't trust. You know, I I just really the amount of text, spam emails, etc. I've got different accounts I use for different things as well. I just accept someone's gonna come after me at some point and at some stage. Ravi done the same for you, I suspect, at different times as well. But you know, when we're talking about these groups, that is what they do 24-7, 365 days a year, effectively, and they've got that level of say that that that level of structure behind them, but also that technology behind them as well.

SPEAKER_00So I'm not saying it's hopeless, far from it. I really am not saying it's hopeless, but again, we've got to be cognizant of that fact. We need to be aware of that, and we apply the same things that we do when we walk down a street late at night. Do you know what street you're walking down, who you're gonna be talking to? Do you get your uh your iPhone out? Do you have your Rolex watch on things like that as well? You know, you you are gonna be a target uh in the online and offline world as well.

Gary RuddellYeah, people forget that this is their job. Like North Korea has more hackers hacking for it than most businesses in the world have employees. They've got more people trying to hack than you have, trying to make cakes or whatever it is that your industry does, you know.

SPEAKER_00And again, looking at North Korea, you know, they're they're looking at the financial side of this as well. So, how do they make money from this? So you've got the state actors doing the state on state activity, the network intrusion, the IP theft, etc. etc. But also they want the money, you know, so they're going after that side of it. And again, that's the volume side of it's the scale of that is is is really, really big. But then people like Muddy Water, that group, they're really focused on specific tasks effectively set for them by their government.

SPEAKER_00They have a priority list, don't they?

Gary RuddellThey certainly do. Well, look, Ravi, it has been fantastic speaking with you. I look forward to catching up with you again soon. You've been a pleasure of a guest, and I do read your material that you put out on the Hacker News, so don't stop writing.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, it's been great. I mean, I've had uh a wonderful opportunity talking to you guys as well, and it's been uh lovely talking about threat actor and evolving tactics and you know getting to know the law enforcement side of things as well. So uh it gives us a different perspective as to how these threats are being tackled from the other side. So yeah, it was a great conversation.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, thanks, Ravi. Keep shining a light on it or get that torch on it and shine a light on it.

SPEAKER_02Definitely.

Gary RuddellYour data is valuable and it's under attack. But for every threat actor working in the shadows, there's someone who's made it their life's work to understand them and stop them. Who are these people protecting our most valuable data from falling into their wrong hands? Who are the defenders?

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