This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit kulturkampftr.substack.com Hi folks, It’s been a hell of a week. I’m working on a couple of essays exploring the Turkish angle of this Israeli-American war on Iran. Today, however, we’re back with another episode of the podcast. Our guest is Karabekir Akkoyunlu, who is a research associate at SOAS, University …
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SPEAKER_01Hello, listeners. We're back with another episode of the podcast. With me, as always, is Nick. Hello. And with us today is Karabekir Akkoinlu, who is a research associate in politics and international studies at SOAS, University of London. And Karabekir has written a book entitled Guardianship and Democracy in Iran and Turkey. It came out in 2024, but it's particularly relevant today.
SPEAKER_01And I'm told that a softcover has recently been published. So be on the lookout for that. Karavika, thank you so much for coming on. Thank you for having me. So, I mean, when we scheduled this podcast recording, and we are recording on Wednesday, we intended to discuss the book first and then expand to current events. But, you know, given circumstances, we thought we'd just get started on sort of delving into some
of these big issues.
SPEAKER_01Not getting lost in the nitty-gritty, but thinking about perhaps the kind of deeper issues in play. Because a war like this really can stress test some of these issues, right? I mean, you write in your book about all, like, you know, the things like, you know, the nature of sovereignty in Turkey and Iran and how societies relate to their states. And all this stuff can be quite abstract. But in a war,
it seems to me, it becomes very, very relevant very quickly.
SPEAKER_01And so I wanted to get started on some of those things, particularly the relationship to the state, right? And some of the core differences between Turkey and Iran, because you make this point of Iran being... Kind of like China in the way that it's not just a nation state, but a kind of civilization unto itself, which I believe is present in the literature. One particular sentence struck out to me.
If Iranian national identity derives its key references from geographic space,
SPEAKER_01language and culture, rather than government institutions, Turkish national identity is very much built around the idea of the state. The notion of de Littenberg Yase, the continuity of the state being a very central theme in Turkish politics. And in Iran, it's a bit more different. It's a bit more cultural, right?
SPEAKER_02Right. Yes. And this is one of the interesting contrasts that I try to ease in the beginning of the book and at the risk of engaging with some essentialism. I want to avoid that. But when we're talking about the spirit of a nation, we want to avoid those kind of invocations. So I try to make it as... grounded in social, cultural, and political discourse as possible. And I thought about it and looked at the references to
political authority and how
SPEAKER_02they're similar and different in two polities in Turkey and Iran. Now, in the Turkish case, as you also said, the state really looms large. Devlet is an abstract entity. It is considered in the nationalist imagination on and together with the people, but often exalted above it as well. And that sort of applies across the board, both in terms of discourse, but also practice. The state veneration is visible from, you know,
SPEAKER_02across the spectrum from the Kemalist secular political camp to the more conservative or Islamic or nationalist camps. There are sort of few exceptions in mainstream Turkish politics that takes a critical stance towards the state. And unsurprisingly, they're often viewed as a threat to the state, whether it's the Kurds or leftists, although even some of the leftists are quite pro-state as well. And then there are historical reasons for this. I mean, the notion of Turkey, Turkey, is a modern construct that is built very much in the hems of
state and the state.
SPEAKER_02And it is, I mean, if we're talking about some sort of continuity from the Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, The main continuity is the institutional one. Yes, the state has changed skin and cover an ideological garment, but as far as institutional continuity goes, it's been there. And so I think both in the way officials and state rhetoric itself legitimize itself, but also to an extent it's been internalized in society, there's this notion that
SPEAKER_02Without the devlets, the order will collapse. And therefore, our existence, stable existence, is predicated upon its continuity. There is a saying that is often invoked in modern Turkish discourse, especially by one, going back to an Ottoman thinker, that says in Turkish, insani yeşat ki devlet yeşat. And that translates to, let the people live so that the state lives. Or state survives.
The end being the survival of the state rather than the survival of the people.
SPEAKER_02Exactly. And this is often invoked unironically as a sort of to show the humanitarian aspect of Turkish statement, Mike said. That type of state veneration in popular and official discourse does not fully translate to the Iranian case. Being Iranian is not, first and foremost, associated with living under a particular state. It is, as I wrote in the book and you just cited,
SPEAKER_02first and foremost associated with this attachment to a geography, its culture, its language. And on this geography... Very different political regimes and governments come and go, different conquerors of different backgrounds, foreign sources. They don't necessarily represent what is Iran, but they become part of this wider entity, this more complex entity of Iran. Once you conceptualize national identity on the basis of geography,
SPEAKER_02culture, and language, and political authority is seen as fleeting and often foreign, that gives rise to a conceptualization of state and society as not joint to one another as in the Turkish case, but inherently antagonistic to one another. Foreign occupation, foreign invasion, foreign influence on the nation is this recurring theme. So, and we, okay, these are all abstractions, but we see their direct political implications in both Turkish
politics today,
SPEAKER_02but very much, of course, in the Iranian politics as this notion of what the Iranian people are going to react to a foreign, you know, invasion of their own country, will they rise up? Or would they see that as another foreign tyrannical act? So all of these, again, link back to this idea of Iran being a nation defined upon cultural geography and language rather than political authority, and that it will prevail beyond the Islamic world.
Can I ask a question about that in terms of where you think this difference comes from?
SPEAKER_00Because I was just to throw out an idea. I mean, obviously, this idea of the veneration of the state is always talked about in an authoritarian context in Turkey. But looking at the comparison, I know we talked about this in a previous podcast about how you couldn't compare Turkey and Iran. Then I waded into it then, and I'm going to do it again here. Yeah. arguably it's the fact that you have had some continuous successful democracy in Turkey that's actually made the association of the state and the people more viable, whereas it seems like some of what you're getting in Iran now
is the fact that you
SPEAKER_00had back-to-back, long-running, deeply oppressive regimes that a lot of Iranians have hated. I guess I'm asking, to what extent is the phenomenon you describe, is the different perceptions of identity in the two countries now in part a product of that unique history that Iran has had over the Shah's regime and then the Islamic Republic?
SPEAKER_02Yeah, I think the answer to your question is rooted in modern history rather than ancient history, as the nationalist myths in both sides would refer to go back to. But I would go further back then, you know, 20th century experiments with democracy and to the beginning of modernization attempts in the two polities. And the Ottoman... process project of modernization, which starts in the 19th century in earnest, is, in comparison to the Iranian one, is a lot more intense,
SPEAKER_02serious, and ultimately more successful. At the time when Iran was still a decentralized and largely tribal entity, the Ottoman Empire was in the process of institutionalization, centralization, and bureaucratization. So for that reason, for instance, in the book, I do not compare Reza Asha, the founder of the dynasty, immediately with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is obviously his contemporary and their ideological similarities, but rather to the Ottoman sultans Mahmoud II and Abdul Hamid II,
SPEAKER_02the first state builders, if you're looking at these authoritarian state builders, of the Ottoman Empire, modernizers, who laid the groundwork on which Republican state building followed. So Iranian state building is much more delayed. And even when it happens under Reza Shah, who is really the first centralizer in Iran, Before him, the Qajar state was a very weak central state and very much influenced by the authority of tribal leaders,
SPEAKER_02aristocrats, if you will. And that changed under Reza Shah. But even when that changed... state was not institutionalized in a type of bureaucratic way, but rather under the iron fist of the strongman. And that was followed by his son's regime, who continued to build this central state apparatus, turn it into a behemoth. But he did that, of course, also with not necessarily with social support,
SPEAKER_02connections with society, different social actors who've always been there and influential, but rather with the help of a windfall cash from oil. I mean, that takes us to Iran's character as a rentier state, which, as we know, is not conducive to democracy. So yes, I mean, to come to your point, You're right. In the case of Turkey, that long process of continuous modernization and relatively successful modernization perhaps created an environment in which procedural democracy could
SPEAKER_02take root. And that creates some sort of also affinity between these large portions of society with the political authority because they feel it does, in a sense, represent them. Whereas in the case of Iran, social forces have always been present, but they have not necessarily been integrated into the state apparatus as stakeholders. They were seen in antagonistic light and often engaged in a conflict with the political authorities.
SPEAKER_01So I want to get to today, right? Because one of the backbone of your book, I thought, was actually very useful. I often find that social science isn't always very useful. I'm more of a history, political ideas kind of guy. But this, I like very much this idea that both of these states... had twin pillars. One pillar was guardianship, one pillar was democracy, right? And guardianship means, in Turkey's case, the sort of secular Kemalist establishment,
the military structure that would set the parameters for democratic discussion. And in Iran's case, it's the Vala Atifaki, literally the guardianship that
SPEAKER_01designs or sets the parameters for democracy to take place, right? And obviously, you make the point that in the 2000s, both systems kind of went into crisis in the sense that in Turkey, we did away with guardianship mostly, right? The Islamists came to power and they were able to, with the aid of liberals, and we could talk about that more, but overcome guardianship and then have some sort of populist democracy that many of us would argue
would erode democracy, right?
SPEAKER_01In Iran, in the 2000s, you had that pressure with the Green Revolution and all that, the Green Movement, but it didn't work. The Guardians were able to sort of suppress and kill their way out of it, really, right? Which gets us here, where you... have so much bottom-up pressure in Iran that the country is weakened, and now it's open to outside interference.
SPEAKER_02Well, maybe you can say, how come the outcomes were so different, but then ultimately, if this guardianship also collapses, collapses it through a different path. But let me sort of try to unpack why those experiences in the 2000s. Let me just start from there, okay? Yeah. So to understand the trajectory, the political trajectory of the two tutelary hydrant regimes in the 2000s and where they ended up, I think it's important to sort of understand what guests, as you've laid out, what the tutelary hydrant regime stands for.
SPEAKER_02But So what they share, Turkish and Iranian cases, but also in what ways they're different, because that also leads to the sort of divergent paths that the two regimes take. So yes, a tutelary hydro regime is one that combines a guardianship element with a democratic element. But not all tutelary hydrant regimes are architecturally or institutionally the same. There are degrees or balances of power that might be different in terms of how guardianship is legitimized,
SPEAKER_02the kind of popular backing for it, and the international geopolitical constellation around it. So in the case of Turkey, guardianship was constructed in a more ad hoc manner during the Cold War as the military gradually expanded its institutional power and veto powers. It was not necessarily a direct... explicit design of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He appointed a sort of role for the revolutionary cadres to
serve as the tutors of
SPEAKER_02the population and lead them to as he said, the contemporary civilization, but there wasn't an institutional blueprint as in the case of Iran under Baleak-e-Faki, of which institutions will play what role. So it evolved in a more spontaneous manner in response to the geopolitical conditions of the time. And when those geopolitical conditions changed after the Cold War, one of the underpinning reasons for the continuity of guardianship disappeared. And so...
SPEAKER_02There are three differences, I think, in the way Turkish and Iranian guardianship and democracy have worked out. There are three causes or three sort of factors to look at. One of them is this difference in foundational legitimacy. The Turkish guardianship was not designed as a permanent fixture on society. It was meant to disappear once society was mature enough to rule itself. And that argument was used by those who said,
well, the military has outstayed its welcome.
SPEAKER_02Now it's time to step on to a consolidated democracy, which was an argument that leftists, liberals, you and the Islamists had used and gathered around. in taking on the military and military's constitutional powers or constitutional legitimacy as guardians was also on shaky grounds in the case of iran you have a very explicit guardianship institutions blessed by khomeini with their powers explicitly stated in the constitution their course of apparatus
very much explicit as well what we call the deep state in turkey was not deep in iran because it did
SPEAKER_02not have to be deep it could could be visible. It was the visible face of the Iranian states, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps or the Basij Militia. They were inconstitutionally enshrined. So that gives greater space for maneuver and action and ability for sociopolitical intervention to the Iranian guardians, which was missing from the Turkish government. A second role, as I mentioned, is this geopolitical sort of difference. The fact that the Turkish system of guardianship, especially the military, was embedded very much in the Western establishment,
SPEAKER_02the NATO network, but also Turkey becoming very much integrated to the global economy, meant that its sort of national sovereignty was relatively reduced. And national guardianship relies upon national sovereignty. And the military found that the sort of international backing for it disappeared when the geopolitical context was different in the early 2000s. And that's when a lot of generals, including former NATO representatives and NATO secretary,
SPEAKER_02sort of... Turkish NATO representatives turned completely to the Eurasianist direction and said that in order to survive, we need to cut our ties loose from the West. They tried to do that. It didn't work out. And Turkey's integration into the West allowed for that internal change to happen. In contrast, Iran's isolation from global economy and Western institutions
until now allowed for
SPEAKER_02that hardline guardianship system to survive, to survive and become even more hardliner because they survive on the basis of resistance and resistance to this sort of global edifice that is bent on seeing its collapse. And so in a sense, And that alignment actually undermined reformists in Iran who were trying to establish bridges with, say, the West or the region. But these institutional links that existed in Turkey did not
exist in Iran.
SPEAKER_02And so it was harder for Iranian reformists to push the kind of pushed through the kind of change that Turkish reformers were able to enact. And it was easier for Iranian hardliners and guardians to suppress these without the kind of consequences that the Turkish military or Turkish economy would face. But ironically, of course, so in a sense, Turkey's integration into the Western establishment, let's say, for lack of a better terminology, brought about the gradual dismemberment of Kemalist tutelage,
SPEAKER_02which used to uphold it earlier on, and for a while allowed the endurance of the Iranian system in resistance and opposition to that Western system. But now, if we're seeing that opposition come down to a type of existential war, that same opposition will also spell the end of the Iranian guardianship in a very sort of a much more violent man.
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