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Kültürkampf

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Discussing Northern Syria with Alexander McKeever

Feb 1, 202630 minAudio
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SPEAKER_03Hello, listeners. We're back with another episode of the Killer Kumpf podcast. With me, as always, is Nick Danforth.

SPEAKER_00Hello, everybody.

SPEAKER_03Yeah, and joining us today is Alexander McKeever, who is a Damascus-based researcher with a focus on northeastern Syria and Syrian-Kurdish politics. And he is the author of, and you might have heard of this, Substack. It's called This Week in Northern Syria, the newsletter. I mean, it's a really great newsletter, and I kind of think of it as like a cousin newsletter to Kulturkamp because of this

SPEAKER_03sort of overlap. Alex and I have been texting on sort of what goes on in northern Syria and, you know, exchange opinions. I'm in this comment section sometimes, and he's in line. So, Alex, yeah, it's really great to have you on.

SPEAKER_01Well, that's an honor that you consider them Cousin Substacks. I'm a big fan of CloserConf, both the newsletter, the podcast. I think I've been subscribed to the newsletter probably, I don't know, two, three years, a long time. Paid subscriber for a while. So, yeah, great to be here.

SPEAKER_03Yeah. Thank you. Thank you for coming. Really appreciate it. And if you're listening to this, you're not a paid subscriber yet, We really appreciate the paid tier because it helps us do this full time, right? To Kitterkamp and also to Alexis. Let's start with the news in the last few weeks. You follow northern Syria very, very closely. I mean... In your newsletter,

SPEAKER_03you often have a lot of detail, like what happened every week, blow by blow. You follow pretty much everything one can follow online, it seems to me, and beyond oftentimes. So I'm going to ask you something kind of unfair, which is to synthesize a lot of stuff that's been going on in the last few weeks.

SPEAKER_01Okay. Well, I guess a good starting place is the March 10th agreement that was signed between Ahmad al-Shahra, the president of Syria since the fall of the regime, the former regime, and the SDF commander Mazum Avdi. And this was sort of a tentative integration, you know, memorandum of understanding that was orchestrated in a large part by the United States. But for the last, you know,

SPEAKER_01nine, 10 months since this was signed, basically no progress has been made. There was sort of a subsidiary agreement in Aleppo City in April. There was like some back and forth. The oil trade opened up. There was school certificate exams that were held. But that was all sort of in the first couple of months after the agreement. And then starting in the summer, especially sort of related to the Sueda events, when the government tried to take Sueda by force,

SPEAKER_01pro-government forces killed a lot of Jewish civilians, and Israel got involved and things had sort of stalemated since then. That's really when the talks broke down. One of the clauses in the March 10th agreement was that the integration needs to take place by the end of the year. I forget the exact word, but something along those lines. So the new year came about. There was no progress. There was a meeting, I think, in the week before or something.

SPEAKER_01And... Yeah, so for a couple of days, everyone was kind of wondering, what's the framework now? What's going to happen? And then on January 4th, so four days later, Mazum Abdi went to Damascus, had a meeting with, I think, Tom Barak, the ambassador to Turkey, U.S. special envoy to Syria, was present as well. And apparently this went horribly. It was about five hours or something.

SPEAKER_01And the SDF side says that at a certain point, the foreign minister who, you know, related to Turkey, has a degree, I forget from where, in Turkey, he's considered quite close to Turkey, sort of left the room, came back, at least according to the SDF narration of this, and sort of like said it was over, the negotiations that day. And then the following day, the Syrian government, I forget exactly who, probably Shabani, I'm not sure who else,

SPEAKER_01was in Paris for these talks with the Israelis. And then the following day is when the first military offensive this year between the government and the SDF took place. This is the Aleppo city enclave, Sheikh Maksud, which was controlled by the SDF. A little complicated, the SDF formally left in April, May, but controlled by the Kurdish movement, essentially, and had been under their control for years.

And so, yeah, starting on January 6th, the government launched an offensive.

SPEAKER_01It took them about five days. They took over this enclave. There was a negotiated withdrawal for some of the fighters who were still left. And then they turned their attention to eastern Aleppo, where there was parts of eastern Aleppo that were under SDF control, parts that are on the western bank of the Euphrates. And this sort of snowballed into them moving into Raqqa. And then on March 18th, which was really the pivotal day, at this point,

SPEAKER_01the government controlled the entire West Bank of the Euphrates. And then early in the morning on the 18th, it seems to be, I mean, it's a little hazy still, but you had tribal fighters is what they're called, but essentially pro-government members of different tribes in the area. Both cross the river, people kicking up arms inside SDF areas, and then people defecting from the SDF. all members of the main tribes in these areas in both Derizor and Ruqa.

And this essentially, these tribes made up the local manpower for the SDF in these areas.

SPEAKER_01So their defection sealed the deal. The whatever core elements of the SDF that were in these areas withdrew pretty quickly, Derizor completely in a couple hours. In Raqqa, they actually held up in a prison for a couple of days. That's a complicated story. But... There was an agreement signed on the 18th between Abdi and Ahmed Ashara that was signed remotely. Abdi wasn't in Damascus.

But it basically represented the SDF conceding all the government's main demands and even more because so much of the power balance swung towards the government.

SPEAKER_01Then Abdi the next day goes to Damascus. Another meeting happens. It goes poorly again. Things break down. There's clashes that break out. At this point, the area of control, basically the SDF, is largely relegated to the Kurdish areas that are both around the city of Kobani and then also along the border in northern Hasekei province.

SPEAKER_03Right. Those are the majority Kurdish population areas, right?

SPEAKER_01Yeah, those as well as Afrin. Then some neighborhoods in Aleppo, some neighborhoods in Damascus. But yeah, those are the bulk. Geographically, that is the real... So basically, March 10th, 2025...

SPEAKER_03Both sides make an agreement saying that, okay, there's going to be some kind of unitary government, but we haven't really figured out how SDF fits into the picture of a unified Syria. But we are going to figure it out in less than a year. And then they can't, right? They can't come to an agreement. And then it's just a matter of force. Who's got superior force? Who's got superior power? Obviously.

SPEAKER_03And who's got the United States on their side? And Damascus has both, it seems. That's a gross simplification, it feels like, but not, you know, I think you could do worse.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. Yeah. I think over the course of the year, Damascus gained the United States on its side, more or less. And this is something that I think the SDF really failed to foresee is just how quick the U.S. would embrace Damascus. I think the SDF also thought that Damascus would have a much harder time, you know, sort of establishing hegemony over the areas under its control today and thought

that the new regime would falter and the SDF would be able to continue maintaining

SPEAKER_01its one quarter of the country.

SPEAKER_00I mean, there's been a hugely politicized debate over who is at fault for the failure of the integration agreement, and it I mean, obviously, a lot of people's position seems to reflect who they think was the more virtuous actor here who they think should have compromised. I suppose the other way of living at it is given the result of the fighting. You know, the SDF, as you point out, should have known it had more need to compromise. But to the extent there is any validity in asking, like, who is stubborn, who is blocking negotiations?

SPEAKER_00Is that a fair question? Do you have a take on that?

SPEAKER_01So, yeah, as you said, both sides, the entire time I've been accusing the other obstructing of delaying. I mean, the negotiation positions are basically the government wanted highly centralized control over all of Syria, which... To be fair to it, it doesn't treat the ICF any different than it treats the former opposition actors, than it treats members of civil society. When it comes to very specific portfolios that it uses the most

substantial,

SPEAKER_01whether it's military, security, foreign policy, economy, the circle of power is quite small around Sharoah, around some of the other figures around him. So, um, yeah, I mean, that's how this, uh, regime is building the new state. And then the SDF was essentially trying to, um, guarantee its survival, not just as a military force,

SPEAKER_01but more importantly, the, uh, what's, what's called is still called the Democratic Katana's administration of North and East Syria, the Danis, um, They were in talks, but I think at the end of the day, That's, you know, these two goals are these two positions aren't reconcilable. Centralization versus maintaining a separate entity in the East. I think both, you know, obviously with the negotiations,

it's all closed door.

SPEAKER_01You there's been good reporting on it, but, you know, it's coming from either one side or the other. Just like the nature of these things. But I think that with the over the 10 months, like with the changing political context, either both sides were at different times being more obstructive. So overall, I think that the SDF saw time on its side for some reason.

I think part of this is that their strategy throughout the war, early on, mid-war, worked well. They saw that the Assad regime was weak and they could maintain their corner of Syria.

SPEAKER_01They had U.S. support. But it doesn't seem that they've really had any contingency for the scenario that actually happens. And they had been in negotiations with the Assad regime, actually. For years, Russia was trying to facilitate some sort of, I don't know, not normalization, but some sort of integration. But Assad is very stubborn. Yeah. And I think that the SDF at that point was correct in saying that they didn't have

SPEAKER_01to really engage. Like they'd go enter the talks, but they didn't have to concede anything really. But obviously the situation in the past year is quite different. I mean, Turkey and Saudi rallying around the new regime is vital. I think that also the Assad regime following in a period of regional detente, especially Turkey in the Gulf, was quite vital.

My approach to this was that countries like Turkey and rulers like Erdogan kind of

SPEAKER_03like strong central governments, right? And obviously, these countries have an outsized role in how Syria shapes up. They had a strong preference for a strong central state that didn't have to negotiate with especially a Kurdish entity that traces its roots to the PKK. So even if the SDF had made some kind of deal,

SPEAKER_03there would have been mounting pressure on that until it gave away, it seems to me. So I can see how they went for some kind of what might be characterized as a maximalist position of continuously saying no and distrusting Damascus. What probably surprised them was how quickly, as you said, the Americans switched sides.

Because the Americans also had that preference for that strong central state.

SPEAKER_03It seems to me.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, especially Trump. It's just how he wants to deal with business. It's how he deals with the region, Erdogan, MBS, etc. Yeah, no, I just thought about in your book when you talk about Turkey's sort of confusion dealing in Ukraine. Right, yeah, yeah.

SPEAKER_03That's what I think of when I think of this.

SPEAKER_01Yeah.

SPEAKER_03Yeah, because my argument there was Turkish officials, I found out, were very upset about corruption in Ukraine. They'd keep talking about how much of a problem that was. And that seemed very odd to me because, you know, Turkey does business all over the world. Turkey does business, you know, in Central Asia and Africa and all these places. And, you know, corruption, it's not even called corruption, right? It's just how you do business. Yeah. And in Ukraine,

I found maybe the problem was decentralization, like decentralized corruption.

SPEAKER_03Maybe that upset them very much. They'd come to an agreement in Kiev, and then they'd go out to make other deals, and then they'd have to keep going back to Kiev. I think it was that sort of a thing. and they really didn't want that. Here, I guess, the SDF or whatever, that would have been closed up geographically. Obviously, Turkey would have had immense leverage on them, but I don't think they wanted to deal with that,

SPEAKER_03and they didn't have to. They knew that if they exerted enough pressure, they could just pop it, which they'd have.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, though, I mean, we're still... Yeah, it's still takership. There's a new agreement... Yeah, I guess we're technically under the ceasefire that was an extension of initial four-day ceasefire. And yesterday there was talks apparently with Obdi and Zamascus again. Some progress, allegedly, but remains to be seen. It seems like the situation today has been calmer than recently.

SPEAKER_01Despite the ceasefire, there's a sort of constant fight on various fronts with both sides accusing each other. Um, and also just similar to the March 10th agreement, all these ceasefires are quite vague in terms of the various, uh, elements that are agreed to um excuse me um yeah which i don't know if that's um sort of a symptom of the the trump administration tom barack being the one that's uh facilitating these um these agreements basically don't have

any sort of implementation steps no real trust building there's sort of some vague uh points

SPEAKER_01that are put down and then nothing happens so

SPEAKER_00And that's what I'd say. I mean, there's been so much criticism of SDF for failing to anticipate the shift in American politics, which I do think writ large, I mean, is clearly fair. I mean, they did objectively fail to anticipate that. But then it's been really difficult to anticipate American politics. And I mean, I'm certainly on record. I know, Celine, this has come up in our discussions of getting this aspect of Trump wrong. I mean, I really thought on the Syria file, he'd be more receptive to pro-Israel voices in the United States.

SPEAKER_00And that would really shape his trajectory. And instead, he's been very, you know, very responsive to the Gulf, to Turkey. And that's, you know, that's clearly shaped the And that was, you know, that was hard to predict. There's also the internal element of it. I mean, there are still voices in Congress. We've seen Lindsey Graham treating about this very aggressively that are very sympathetic. There are voices in the evangelical pro-Israel world that are

very sympathetic.

SPEAKER_00And it's, you know, in part, this is all a little bit of a mystery about who's going to have Trump's ear at any given point. If, you know, Tom Barack could have been doing whatever he was doing. And if someone had gotten to Trump and he put out some tweet warning, shut up, you know, not to mess with the Kurds, things could have looked very different. And so. And maybe I'd say that more broadly, too, I mean, there was clearly a miscalculation on the SDS part in terms of where the balance of power lay,

SPEAKER_00how long they could maintain their position. But it's, you know, people make a lot of gambles, and when they don't turn out, you look really stupid. And when they do turn out, you know, you look fortuitous. I mean, also, there are plenty of people who are on record as saying Turkey's Syria policy was unsustainable from, you know, 2016 on, and that, you know, the situation in Idlib was untenable, and eventually Assad was going to overrun Idlib and crush HTS,

SPEAKER_00and You know, if it hadn't been for Russia invading Ukraine and Iran and Hezbollah getting destroyed by Israel, that could have been an accurate prediction. So it's only to say, yeah, even though it happened, you know, the world is has been chaotic of late.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. And I think, you know, if anyone else besides Trump as president, we probably still have Caesar Act sanctions on right now. Yeah. I mean, I guess in the lame duck month that the Biden administration was still around, they were reaching out. I think Amber and Zaman had interviewed whoever the ambassador was about those couple of weeks. Interesting. Yeah. But I mean,

SPEAKER_01you know, Kamala Harris, like meeting with Shara, like that would just be fodder for Fox News. Like only Trump could really do this so fast. I think he'd be one of the few people that's actually be interested in this because of how much he loves the Gulf.

SPEAKER_00It feels like everyone agreed, at least people I was talking to, that a smart policy for dealing with Shaddaa would be one that made it clear the U.S. was willing to do business, supported his success, was willing to lift sanctions. But make all that conditional on certain things like not massacring people in, you know, maintaining some sort of federal system in its. But with Trump, that kind of calibrated approach, like the one thing that's not an option is the calibrated approach. You could imagine Trump completely sanctions without any caveats.

SPEAKER_00You could imagine him maintaining sanctions and not giving a shit. But it's neither of which on their own are necessarily great strategies. And so, yeah, I mean, in a way, I'm glad they didn't maintain crippling sanctions in fresh Syria, even under Shara. But the flip side of them being so quick to lift them is that, I mean, it is noticeable, you know, again, who knows how much of the time was related to this, but it was after the Caesar sanctions were lifted that Shara

made this move in

SPEAKER_00northeast Syria. Again, Congress may reimpose some sanctions, but it's a different, it's always going to be harder to get them to act than it would have been to get them to not lift Caesar sanctions if there'd been massive backlash to what they were doing to the Kurds. So it's, yeah, whatever the, I mean, the sad thing is that a nuanced American Syria policy was not one of the options under Trump, and I think we're paying the price for that.

SPEAKER_03I mean, for the record, what I hear when I listen to some journalists, I believe, are very deeply in sync with the Turkish policymaking elite, is that some kind of rapprochement between Turkey and the United States was already in motion during Biden, and that Trump just supercharged that significantly but that it's

something like what we're seeing now between Turkey and the US would have happened which is not to say that

SPEAKER_03this would have happened in Syria Syria could have been a different thing altogether but that's what they're arguing interesting yeah

SPEAKER_01Yeah, I mean, I don't know. At the end of the day, though, also the U.S. policy was, from the beginning, didn't really have an end goal in sight. You know, it's purely focused on the Islamic State, I guess. probably some sort of like uh spooky background stuff about iran um uh the so-called land bridge or whatever um but overall uh you know it's we're kind of as

you know seeing us as an american uh we're kind of just there because we're there

SPEAKER_01like um And I think, you know, for whatever reason, the SDF never, or at least doesn't appear to have internalized that the U.S. continuously refused to recognize the Autonomous Administration. All the dealings were through either the SDF or, well, the internal security forces, which are technically part of the Autonomous Administration. But anyway, yeah, it was all security-focused and...

SPEAKER_01Outside Observer, it seemed quite clear that the U.S. was not trying to get involved in writing the Syrian Constitution, was not going to repeat the Kurdistan region experience.

SPEAKER_03I mean, I wonder, because we think of the SDF and the senior countries of the PKK the way we think of other kinds of decision makers, right? Sometimes we think of them the way we think of people in Iran or people in Turkey. But these guys, it's not like they've been outside of... their social circle and physically really outside of, you know,

Turkey and Kande much. It's not like, these are not people who've had a traditional education, right?

SPEAKER_03They've gone through this indoctrination phase. of the PKK's ideology. But they didn't go to university in the United States, for example, the way that a lot of Turkish diplomats do. They don't experience the world really beyond their world of pretty intense left-wing Kurdish resistance to centralized authorities in the Middle East.

SPEAKER_03So maybe it shouldn't be this surprising that they weren't really able to anticipate how the United States would act in this sort of thing. I mean, they probably thought of these things through the lens of the personal conversations and connections they had with the people who were dealing with them. Probably like, you know, probably CIA and, you know, the Pentagon, right?

SPEAKER_03And those are longstanding connections that were forged in war.

SPEAKER_00Sorry, I was just going to say, you know, right. I mean, this is why there were a lot of people in the U.S., yeah, in the military and Congress, all different communities who were deeply sympathetic. And so I could see if those were the people that you talked to, you could very much get the sense. And I think a lot of these people and a lot of the intermediaries with these people, unfortunately, had, you know, they were interested for their own often very sincere reasons, sometimes less, more self-interested. in convincing the SDF that they had America's support.

SPEAKER_00Because in part, I think that was they thought that by generating the sense the SDF had American support, it would become a self-fulfilling prophecy and I don't know. I mean, I think you saw the same thing play out in 2017 with the KRG independence referendum. It's just you had a lot of people in northern Iraq who'd spoken to people in the U.S. who were very sympathetic, who'd convinced them that or helped them convince themselves that the U.S. would ultimately intervene on their behalf. And that wasn't necessarily how it looked sitting in Washington.

SPEAKER_00But yeah, unfortunately, the information environment created that. I'd also say, in fairness to the Kurdish movement, I mean, you don't sustain a four-decade-long insurgency against a U.S.-backed NATO power by having a super-realistic sense of your prospects for success. I mean, here's a certain... The nature of these movements, you know, you have to be a true believer. And unfortunately, right, that makes it difficult to recognize when it's not going to

work out.

SPEAKER_00Also, yeah, one session on the table... Yeah, exactly. And I'm still going to say, like, I mean, from the beginning of Biden's administration, you know, I was writing that the U.S. presence in Syria was unsustainable and that the U.S. should work to figure out a responsible way to wind it down in 2020. And four years later, you know, I felt kind of stupid. I mean, there was maybe a sense in which, as unsustainable as this was, the longer it seemed to somehow... just carry on,

SPEAKER_00the easier it was to think maybe, you know, it was going to be possible to escape the laws of geopolitics for the future.

SPEAKER_02To listen to the rest of this episode, as well as many like it, please consider becoming a paid subscriber to Kulturkampf.

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