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Kültürkampf

Kültürkampf artwork

The Ramadan Offensive

Feb 26, 202616 minAudio
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This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit kulturkampftr.substack.com Hi folks, This doesn’t happen often, but we have another podcast episode for you already! It’s just Nick and I for this one. We figured there were some culture war type issues that had built up, both in Turkish and transatlantic politics, and we lined them up and talked about them over a short episode. * Erdoğan’s Ramadan culture war offensive: the preside…

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SPEAKER_01Hello, listeners. We're back with another episode of The Pod. With me, as always, is Nick. Good to be here. Yeah, and it's just the two of us today.

SPEAKER_00I figured there was so much to talk about. We'd just talk about it.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, yeah. We used to do more of these. We've been having on some guests in the last few weeks, and we thought we'd do one of these episodes. Where should we start? All right, so we figure we might start with something that we've been writing about on Kuterkamp, and that's been kind of hot online as well, on Twitter, on like Turkish Twitter, but also maybe Western Twitter as well, which is Ramadan and the sort of new debate that it brought over religiosity,

SPEAKER_01specifically in Turkey. But I think maybe we could even have a broader discussion about that, of the Islamic world. And what happened was that for a while now, there's been more and more research in Turkey about how the country is actually becoming more secular. And there's several layers to this. Quite a few people have been arguing that countries just become more secular as they become more urban, as they become more capitalist, as income levels go up, education, all sorts of things.

So really this old fashioned vision of historical progression that people really

SPEAKER_00believed in 50, 60 years ago, and then was so widely discredited in academic literature because it wasn't happening the way people predicted in the same simplistic way people predicted that And now, yeah, as you're saying, it might actually be that there's some truth to that whole.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, yeah. It also depends on how you slice it, right? What is secularism? What's becoming more secular? When people become more secular, does it necessarily mean that they become less religious? Which definition are we operating? And obviously, a lot of people talk past each other on these things. Especially in Twitter, I assume. Yeah. Yeah. Pretty convoluted. But broadly, I think the people arguing that Turkey is becoming more secular have been more dominant than Turkish public discourse.

And most people sort of across the country kind of assume now that that is now the

SPEAKER_01main argument to argue against, right? That's the mainstream wisdom. And it's clear to me, at least, that this Ramadan, the Islamists in Turkey, especially so the Islamists around the Akhbari Palace, but also wider circles of Islamists, right? Because when we talk of Islamists in Turkey, we're actually talking about different groups, right? We're talking about the people actually running the country. We're talking about the sort of more pan-Islamists, the anti-nationalist Islamists, right?

But the people running the country have romantic nationalists who happen to have

SPEAKER_01some Islamist sort of theme sprinkled in at various points. So there's different groups of Islamists arguing about this, but they've kind of come together, it seems, online at least, to do several things. A, to argue that Turkey's actually not becoming more secular, that the Islamist project is succeeding, and B, that it shouldn't kind of become more secular, right? And do you think they really believe that it's not becoming more secular?

SPEAKER_00Is it they are kind of worried about that themselves a little bit? And so the pushback is as much trying to convince themselves as it is convince the...

SPEAKER_01I think both things are going on. I think you're right. Like, when the AK Party first came to power in the 2000s, people used to talk about the end of the moderns. You remember this. The worried moderns. That meant that because there was now a visible sort of Islamist movement power emerging in the big cities and Islamists were rising in the country's sort of ladder of status.

SPEAKER_01The moderns, the secular people, the Kemalists were very worried. They were worried that Islamism would engulf the country's institutions, etc. And now people have kind of flipped this to say that actually the Islamists are worried, right? They're concerned. They feel like they're losing grip of the situation.

SPEAKER_00What I was saying earlier, too, so much of the academic discourse around the rise of the AKP was like, you know, you dumb old-fashioned positivists, you really thought secularism was tied to modernity and democracy and all that good stuff. AKP is proving how wrong you are. And now, like, right, exactly. It looks like the trends of history might be moving in the other direction and actually disproving a lot of that. You know, religion is actually perfectly compatible, like not our particular version of religion and Islamist version of religion is totally compatible with modernity.

SPEAKER_00Again, it might be that that confidence was misplaced.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. Yeah. And like, you can see that people from that era are kind of confused about it as well. Right. Because for a while they were arguing, well, you know, we like secularism. We're going to continue the sort of secularist tradition of Turkey. And that, as they say, like Islam doesn't really contradict that or Islamism, our version of Islamism doesn't really contradict that. At the same time, You know, they're trying to do this two-faced thing where, like, to the Islamist base, they're like, yes, we're trying to Islamize the country.

SPEAKER_01And to everybody else, including the Western world, they're like, no, no, this is just secularism, right? Well, I guess when it's going well, you can imagine those going hand in hand.

SPEAKER_00You think, okay, like, secularism is this artificial imposition that's stopping people's... Or like old-fashioned, you know, heavy-handed Turkish secularism is stopping people's natural... inclination to be good pious muslims so we take off that heavy-handed pressure and then in a free you know truly liberal secular society their natural religiosity blossoms but then of course you try some mix of that combined with your own heavy-handed religiosity and it doesn't work and people you know actually get more secular or just don't buy into your particular version of religion and then you think oh shit actually you know maybe people maybe we were

wrong people weren't

SPEAKER_00naturally religious the way we wanted them to be And then at that point, the two projects don't seem to line up quite as well.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, yeah. And I think the way they're trying to push through that is now to focus on kids. I think that's been their conclusion. Okay, with young adults and adults, there's nothing you can really do. But the president wants a more religious generation. He's adamant about this. So the way we can somehow deliver on this is by just focusing on schools and kids and that. stuff.

SPEAKER_00And what's the story with that? Because again, some of the stuff I was seeing on social media, I mean, it made it look like the government was getting more heavy-handed and really pressuring kids on religiosity.

SPEAKER_01It seems to be the directive. I think like the mid-level guys actually running the Ministry of Education and Dianet, they're in a real bind, right? Because they have to, because the palace wants them to deliver on this stuff, right? Yeah. Like, okay, you need to push back against secularization. We're really worried about this. You have to show that you're actually working on this problem, this huge problem. So what they're doing is they're doing a lot of these programs in schools,

right?

SPEAKER_01But then the more they do these... the more pushback they get from the population in general, which probably hurts the cause in the long run. But they have to do something. They can't just sit there and be like, we need a better example set at the top. Because honestly, that's what I think would probably have to happen. If you want to push back against secularization in Turkey, if you... want to restore the authority of religion.

SPEAKER_01That's the kind of thing you'd have to do. But even then, it'd be very difficult. But they can't. So the way they're moving, I think, is just making things worse. Or, I mean, maybe if I'm wrong, I'd be wrong in the sense that it could be that really focusing on kids and really brainwashing them hard might yield results.

SPEAKER_00I'm curious. The other... Twitter post you had that got a lot of attention was about the rise of cultural Muslims and how that category either existed or didn't exist. I'm curious if you think that's tied into this, that as, you know, in some ways, as Turkey's public identity gets more explicitly religious, if that interacts with people's feeling of or if that interacts with the way people feel about personal religiosity. And that maybe, you know, if the government moves more towards having the religious identity at the public level,

SPEAKER_00that actually makes people feel more comfortable necessarily. And, you know, maybe makes them even more resistant to the government trying to push a kind of personal piety or personal religiosity on that individual or social level.

SPEAKER_01I mean, actually, I haven't put this on Twitter. That's the article you're talking about, the Qtukamp piece that I wrote on Cultural Muslims. That's now the most shared piece on Qtukamp. Actually, on purpose, I didn't want to put it on Twitter because it would just be too controversial.

SPEAKER_00But a lot of people are sharing it on Twitter.

SPEAKER_01I guess that's where I saw it. Yeah, maybe. Yeah, because I don't want to get into Turkish Twitter with those terms. And then because it can get very ugly very quickly. I mean, the way I think of it is the cultural Muslim especially is more of a Western thing, I think. Because for a long time, we were talking about ex-Muslims, for example. Those are the categories, right, of like sort of quasi outside people who are Muslim but don't practice, right? They can be ex-Muslim, right? And ex-Muslims are generally,

they kind of, they have on purpose left the religion.

SPEAKER_01They don't want to be associated with the religion. They're technically apostates in Islam, right? So the relationship they have to muslim communities at large can be very awkward right and then there's like secular muslims and secular muslims are just people who don't practice they they kind of adhere to things but it's it's like in turkey secular muslims can still be religious sometimes they just don't think that islam should be like pervasive across the public sphere um

SPEAKER_01There's some division of mosque and state there. And then cultural Muslims, to me, and I'm still trying to work this out, are people who are kind of epistemically, they're now sort of atheists, right? They don't really believe in revelation, right? They don't act in their private lives as if revelation was true. So there's separation there. But they can sometimes still be practicing. They have this need to remain part of the Muslim social sphere, right?

SPEAKER_01Very broadly defined. And the political profile there is very different too. I don't think in a country like Turkey, we have a lot of cultural Muslims. There's lots of secular Muslimness, right? Which is very much in tune with the Yanafi Maturidi tradition, the mainstream tradition in Turkey. But cultural Islam, I think, is more prevalent in the West, where people are born into Muslim families, Muslim backgrounds, and then they sort of phase out of the religion.

SPEAKER_01But politically, they're still on the left. So it kind of follows the Jewish experience and the Catholic experience, in my thinking.

SPEAKER_00But I guess that's where I'm trying to get at. And maybe this doesn't. I'm thinking through this as I speak here. So who knows? You know, you think about Turkish history and, you know, at the time Turkey was becoming more, you know, politically secular. It was operating in a context in which everyone was culturally Muslim. I mean, in the sense of like whether their beliefs were, you know, deeply pious or whether they were atheists, they were operating in a social context in which it was impossible not to be. you know, culturally Muslim.

SPEAKER_00Like you just, that was your identity. That was how other people from outside of Turkey saw your identity. Those were your cultural reference points. You know, you knew the prayers because you grew up with the prayers. That was kind of baked in. And it was only, it feels like both then you had a younger generation.

SPEAKER_01So your legal status was also... Right. Legal status, your status in terms of your relationship with the state, your economic interactions, that was all colored by that, wasn't it?

SPEAKER_00Right. It was so built in as a social identity in a way that, you know, no matter how secular you tried to define yourself in a political context, that it never brought that social identity into question. And it seems like maybe as, you know, you got into the 80s and 90s, you got a more, you know, I'll use the term westernized just to keep it simple here, generation of people, both maybe some of them actually felt like that cultural, you know, you have people who genuinely grew up not knowing kind of the

cultural side of

SPEAKER_00Islam, not knowing the prayers, not having interacted in You know, that kind of cultural sense. And at the same time, you then had the Islamists very much defining those people as others, you know, saying often unfairly, you know, these people are hyper westernized. They've lost touch with their roots. They've lost touch with their identity. They're not really Muslims. And it was only in that context, the idea of this category of people in Turkey who were seen as this internal other, were seen as being out of touch with their faith and identity,

SPEAKER_00that that somehow got enough purchase, both maybe because there was some historical truth to the way these people's identities were evolving, but also because of this kind of right-wing antagonistic political commentary. It was sort of in that context that the Islamist claims to cultural authenticity made sense, you know, and that then, you know, for better or worse, you know, Erdogan has so successfully rebranded the country in a, you know, sort of stamped Muslim on it that, you know, people, I don't know, that it's,

SPEAKER_00you know, the people now feel like, Or the people are sort of realizing or the people are kind of pushing back against that kind of aggressive Islamist narrative and saying, you know, yeah, actually, like, look, you know, I grew up Muslim. I can be as kind of religious or not religious as I want. This is still an important part of my identity. And I don't particularly want like the hyper Islamists or a particular sort of cliched, stereotypical, not that representative version of secularists telling me that, you know,

SPEAKER_00the way I'm doing this, the way I'm living my culture is wrong.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. Have you been watching Onan Pamuk's Netflix special? I've been thinking about that. Because I hadn't read the book. I hadn't read Museum of Innocence. I read some of his older stuff, like Snow, when I was a student. But I haven't read Museum of Innocence. And my wife and I, we've been watching the first few episodes of the Netflix thing. Yeah, I just finished three last night. To listen to the rest of this episode, as well as many like it, please consider becoming a paid subscriber to Kutu Kompf.

SPEAKER_00This one.

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