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Just Killing Time

Just Killing Time artwork

THE SWINE FLU FIASCO - Who Pays When the Vaccine Hurts?

Nov 3, 202648 minAudio
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πŸ’‰ Episode 43: The Swine Flu Fiasco (1976), the pandemic that never came. One Army recruit died. The U.S. government vaccinated tens of millions of Americans. The predicted pandemic never arrived. Reports of a rare paralysis did. 😳 It starts on Monday, February 7, 1977, when CDC director Dr. David Sencer is told his career is over in front of cameras nobody meant to invite. Then we rewind eleven months to find out how it happened. βͺ πŸ”Ž IN THIS EPISODE β€’ Fort Dix, New Jersey, a bet between two doctors, and Private David Lewis πŸͺ– β€’ Sencer's "action memo": 213 million people, $134 million, and no exit planπŸ“„ β€’ The Cabinet Room, where President Ford asks for a show of hands πŸ–οΈ β€’ "This is not a problem": the liability warning that was ignored, the insurers who refused, and the Swine Flu Act (Public Law 94-380) βš–οΈ β€’ Pittsburgh, nine states pause, and the arithmetic of coincidence πŸ“‰ β€’ Guillain-BarrΓ© syndrome (GEE-yan bah-RAY) and the December 16 decision to stop πŸ”¦ β€’ Claims, lawsuits, and the court ruling that the government had a duty to warn πŸ›οΈ β€’ The 1977 "Russian flu" and the unproven lab-origin hypothesis πŸ§ͺ ⚠️ This story has been told for fifty years as a punchline, and the numbers drift. Where sources disagree, I say so. Where I could not confirm a detail, I say that plainly. My opinions are labeled as mine. πŸ—£οΈ "We felt we were sitting on a bomb." "Sencer was canned for doing his job." "When lives are at stake, it is better to err on the side of overreaction than underreaction." ❓ QUICK ANSWERS Did the 1976 swine flu pandemic happen? No. According to the official history, the virus was found at Fort Dix: one death, 13 hospitalized, and up to 500 recruits possibly infected. A later study counted more than 200. Who was David Sencer? CDC director from 1966 to 1977, removed in February 1977 and later New York City's health commissioner. What was the Swine Flu Act? Public Law 94-380, signed August 12, 1976, which let people sue the government instead of vaccine makers after insurers refused coverage. How many people got Guillain-BarrΓ© syndrome? The 1979 Schonberger study counted 1,098 cases during the vaccination period, 532 of them in vaccinated people, an attributable risk just under 1 per 100,000. The 2003 Institute of Medicine review found a small increased risk. Death counts vary by source and I could not confirm one, so I say that on the mic. How many claims were filed? As of October 2, 1980, 3,965 claims and 1,384 lawsuits, with about $13.2 million paid, per a GAO summary. 🧠 Why it matters: the 1976 program shaped the vaccine injury compensation systems we still have, including the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 and the PREP Act. Government failure is not always a villain in a dark room. Sometimes it is a plan with no off-ramp and a risk handed to the public. πŸ”” Follow the show for two new true crime, conspiracy and hidden history episodes every week, and leave a review to help other curious listeners find us. πŸ“š SOURCES β€’ Neustadt & Fineberg, The Swine Flu Affair (1978, HEW) β€’ Sencer & Millar, "Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination Program," Emerging Infectious Diseases, Jan. 2006 β€’ CDC summaries of the 1976 program and Petty v. United States β€’ U.S. GAO claims figures via GlobalSecurity.org β€’ Schonberger et al., 1979, Guillain-BarrΓ© syndrome and the National Influenza Immunization Program β€’ Institute of Medicine, 2003, vaccine safety review β€’ Rozo & Gronvall, mBio, 2015, the 1977 H1N1 strain β€’ Burke & Schleunes, 2024 β€’ Congressional Research Service overview of vaccine injury compensation β€’ New York Times, Feb. 13 and 20, 1976 πŸŽ™οΈ Just Killing Time with Elizabeth Stanton: truth, crime, conspiracy and a little hidden history sprinkled in. #SwineFlu #CDC #VaccineHistory #HiddenHistory #TrueCrime #Conspiracy #JustKillingTime

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00It is Monday, February 7, 1977. That's the day my husband was born on the day and year, to be precise. It's now Washington, D.C., like Ben said, February 7, 1977. And we're on the eighth floor of the new headquarters of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. An all-day meeting is underway. The question on the table Should the government release a stockpile of flu vaccine that has been locked away since mid-December?

SPEAKER_00The man making the scientific presentation is David Senser. He has run the Centers for Disease Control for 10 years now. And while he talks an aid to the new Secretary of Health, Ben Heinmann gets word that a wire service is already reporting that Sensor is on his way out. There is a complication. Television cameras. The new secretary, Joseph Califano, has ruled them out.

SPEAKER_00But the ABC Network pulled, well, they never got the message. And its crew had already set up. So Califano, he pulls Censer aside, and the two men stand along the wall and talk for a long time, out of your shop, of course. But in view of everyone. At the end of the day, Califano holds an impromptu press conference and he compliments Sensor's service, says he wants a director of his own choosing, and adds, Sensor's been at the CDC for 16 years and director for 10 years.

SPEAKER_00I think it's important that institutions be rejuvenated and revitalized. The network commentators that night all ran with the same assumption that the deed was done right there against the wall to show how far the news secretary stood from the swine flu program. The official history puts it in three words. Censor the human sacrifice. The CDC people in the room were, quote, appalled, and one leading epidologist told the authors Senser was canned for doing his job.

SPEAKER_00But according to that same history, it was not staged. The decision to replace Senser had been made at the end of January. On Friday, February 4th, the under-secretary, Hale Champion, had called Senser to Washington and told him he would be replaced in due course. And promised confidentiality. Now Senser warned him that Hugh leaped like a sieve, and it did. The authors blamed one thing, and they said, quote, insufficient planning in the Secretary's entourage.

SPEAKER_00So what did Sensor do to earn it? He recommended vaccinating every man and woman and child in the United States against a flu that, by that Monday, had not turned up anywhere outside a single army base. Now, to understand how a hero's memo ended in a firing on camera, we go back 11 months. A freezing military base in New Jersey.

SPEAKER_00A young private who should have been staying in bed, and a bet between two doctors. This is just clean time. I'm Elizabeth Stanton, your nightlight for the stories that keep us up at night. This is a podcast about truth, crime, conspiracies, and a little hidden history sprinkled in. One note before we go in, the story has been told for 50 years, mostly as a punchline, and details drift from one retelling to the next, where sources disrate I'll tell you.

SPEAKER_00And where I couldn't find a reliable answer, I'll say so plainly. So it's January 1976 and was brutally cold on the East Coast. At Fort Dix, New Jersey, a training center for Army recruits. Several thousand new men had arrived right after the New Year's, and the base was packed, indoors in the cold. By mid month, a lot of them were reporting respiratory illnesses. And after a county medical meeting, the state's chief epidemiologist, Dr.

SPEAKER_00Martin Goldfeld, made a bet with the senior army doctor at the base. Goldfeld, he bet it was influenza. The army doctor figured adenovirus, which, by the way, I just recently had adenavirus and it knocked me on my keister for over two weeks. It was no joke. Highly, do not recommend. Do not get adenavirus. So the army doctor figured it was adenavirus, a common Burk Barracks bug, which that's terrible.

SPEAKER_00The throat cultures went to the state lab, and the official history gives the result in four words. He lost. Four words. He lost. Okay, my writing was not great. I meant two words. Go with me on this. Mostly it was the ordinary Victoria strain, but a few cultures the lab could not identify. Goldfield, but he sent them to the Federal Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, in the history's words, with foreboding.

SPEAKER_00Then a young recruit named David Lewis died. The sources disagree here. The official chronology says it was February 4th, after leaving his sick bed for a forced five-mile night march. Pri Private David Lewis collapsed and died. And popular accounts say a 50-mile hike. And a few say he was 18, most say he was 19. It doesn't matter. I'm going with the official chronology. What nobody disputes is he was sick and he was told to rest, and he fell in with his unit anyway.

SPEAKER_00By his choice or theirs, I'm not sure which. And he did not make it. The history puts it in one sentence. A recruit refusing hospitalization went on an overnight hike and died. And on the evening of February 12th, the head of CDC's virus lab, Dr. Walter Daldle, fun word, reported the result in four cases, including the man who died. The unknown virus was swine flu.

SPEAKER_00The history said it caused more concern than surprise. And here is why. This was the family of virus believed at the time to have caused the 1918 pandemic. The 1978 history puts the 1918 toll at some 20 million dead worldwide and 500,000 in the United States. Modern estimates run 50 million or more, but 20 million is what the people in the story were working with.

SPEAKER_00Nobody under 50 would have had any immunity. And the most respective flow experts of the day were convinced a pandemic was due. Good God, that sounds just like Bill Clayton's, doesn't it? The same week, Dr. Edwin Kilborne published an op-ed in the New York Times headlines flew to the starboard, man the harpoons, filled with vaccine, get the captain hurry. That was the title. He argued that pandemics had arrived about every 11 years, and history quotes him.

SPEAKER_00A perhaps simplistic reading of this immediate past tells us that 11 plus 1968 is 1979. And he called the pattern simplistic himself and he still urged everyone to plan without delay. On February 19th, the CDC held a press conference. According to the official chronology, the prepared remarks made no reference to the 1918. But reporters asked, and the connection went out over the wires.

SPEAKER_00On February 20th, the New York Times ran it on page one. And the U.S. calls flu alert on possible return of epidemic virus. NBC showed still photographs from 1918 of people in gauze mats. The history's answered to CDC staff who complained the press harp on 1918 too early without it. The Fort Dicks findings were, well, scarcely news at all.

SPEAKER_00Meanwhile, the investigation was telling a different story from the headlines. At Fort Dix, the victorious strain turned out to be dominant. Army estimated from blood tests that as many as 500 recruits might have been infected with swine flu. A later study counted more than 200. I can't tell you which one is right. And the sources I found just, well, they don't reconcile them. 13 men were hospitalized and one died. Every case of swine flu tested in parsari.

SPEAKER_00Every case of flu. There you go. Tested in the surrounding towns was the ordinary strain. Not one spine flu case turned up elsewhere in New Jersey or at any other army camp or anywhere the World Health Organization could find. The history sums it up. One death, 136 men, and up to 500 recruits who and barely caught and resisted the disease, all in one army camp.

SPEAKER_00Frank Tomp, who headed the Fort Dix virus investigation, said years later he had shown pretty clearly that the virus didn't go anywhere but Fort Dix and then disappeared. But nobody knew that. And the next flu season was only months away, and vaccine makers had a deadline, and the man at the center of the story was about to make a decision. Now David Sensor had joined the U.S. Public Health Service in 1955 and had become director of the CDC in 1966, the longest tenure in the agency's history.

SPEAKER_00And the history's authors described him in words that might have been a compliment. An able, Willy autocrat with a devoted staff. And the CDC was wholly his. On March 9th, Sensor spent the day in huddles with his lab staff. Dattle told the authors where the science stood. It was clear we could not say the virus would spread, but it was clear that there had been human-to-human spread at Fort Dix. An epidemic spreading into a pandemic, he said, had to be anticipated as a possibility.

SPEAKER_00And then the staff talked about themselves. One told the authors there was nothing in this for CDC except trouble. Recommend vaccinating everyone and no pandemic comes, and they would be accused of quote unquote crying rule. Recommend nothing and the pandemic comes, and millions would be angry. It was a no-win situation, and the staffer said, we saw that, we talked about it, and in the end, the logic of their profession won.

SPEAKER_00Prevention was their ethics. On March 10th, Censors Advisory Committee, ACIP, ASIP, there you go, met in an open meeting that hardly any press attended. They agreed a pandemic was possible. Privately, members told the authors that they put the bonds somewhere between 2 and 20%. Personal judgments and not scientific books. One summed up the movie.

SPEAKER_00If we believe in prevention, we have no alternative. Dr. Raoul Stellones at the University of Texas explained why he leaned in. He said, This was an opportunity to try to pay something back to society for the good life I've had as a public health doctor. The lone voice of caution was Dr. Russell Alexander of the University of Washington. He said, You should be conservative about putting foreign material into the human body.

SPEAKER_00That's always true, he said, especially when you're talking about 200 million bodies. I have to stop right there. Dr. Russell Alexander makes a lot of sense to me personally. I think you should be considered conservative about putting a foreign material into your human body. And that's because I believe God designed us perfectly. And I think injecting yourself with something that uh is new is typically not a good idea.

SPEAKER_00That's just me talking. Back to the story, Alexander also asked one question. He said, at what point do you stop making vaccine and start stockpiling it instead? And New York Times reporter Harold Schmeck, who sat in and told the authors, Alexander asked it seriously and quote, it was not answered. The authors say the question was never joined because censor chose not to join it from the chair. The minutes report only that vaccine production must proceed and were planned for administering it to be deployed.

SPEAKER_00Oh, here's the deal. I this is my opinion, and I'm gonna circle it in red. A scientist calmly asked, how will we know when to stop? And the answer was nothing. And then there was no off-ramp built into this plan. And when a plan has no exit and a lot of momentum, it just doesn't get reconsidered. It gets defended. And the other thing is, who's profiting from this?

SPEAKER_00Always follow the money. If you want to know whether something's good for you or not, follow the money, see who profits from it. If the government is recommending something, follow the money and see who can whose campaigns were benefited from it. I I just I am so mad because I gave up cable years ago and went to streaming services, and now all my streaming services have commercials. And isn't it interesting that all the commercials right now because of the election, there's a lot of political ads, but I digress.

SPEAKER_00Isn't it interesting that most of the ads we see are for prescription medications of some sort or vaccines? And I think that that, if you have to advertise it, it may be not the solution for what you need when you go to the doctor. And that's my opinion. I also think that because of FAIRS, which is the vaccine inverse reaction, um, these companies cannot be sued.

SPEAKER_00I think that's a problem too. All right, back to the story. I'm gonna get out of my soapbox, I think, a lot during this. Then Sensor wrote the memo, nine pages of it, which everyone called his action memorandum, and it was addressed to the Secretary of Health, but written to travel to the White House, and the authors say it was designed at once to say it and to sell it. That's their words, no mine. And laid out four options do nothing, a minimal response, a government-run program, or a combined public-private approach, which was the one censor wanted.

SPEAKER_00The first three were framed to be rejected. Under Do Nothing, the memo said the administration can tolerate unnecessary health expenditures better than unnecessary death and illnesses. So they've already made up their mind. We're gonna do do nothing. The goal was to immunize 213 million people in three months. The price? And Senser himself warned it was a leap into the dark with no precedents nor mechanisms in place.

SPEAKER_00The authors were fair about his motives. Senser, they write, said, may have played the hero in his own mind. If so, he was, but the first who did. His colleagues think of him as in the CDC staff words, a quote unquote, a physician with a conscience. Well, that's very nice. The people that get their paychecks from him, that's what they called him. What the memo left out had been sitting in a drawer at Hugh since before Ford Dix.

SPEAKER_00In January 1976, weeks before Lewis died, Sensor's agency had proposed legislation to compensate people injured by a vaccine that was FDA approved and given as the government recommended. The logic, Sensor and his CDC colleague wrote 30 years later, vaccination protects the whole community. So when someone is harmed, taking part in that public benefit, society owes that person.

SPEAKER_00The proposal came back from the Surgeon General's office with a handwritten note. And this is what it said. This is not a problem. It was a problem, though, and it was about to begin, become the biggest one in the story. On Monday, March 15th, Sensor took the memo to Washington and met the Secretary of Health, F. David Matthews. And Matthews, he asked the Assistant Secretary's deputy, Dr.

SPEAKER_00James Dixon, a simple question. What's the probability? The answer was one word, unknown. Dixon later recalled that from the look on Matthew's face, you could take it for granted that this decision was going to be made. And you can't argue with unknown. If the chance is 2%, people can weigh it. If it's unknown, no number makes inaction defensible. In the words of one person in that circle, no politician can later face the voters and say, the probability was so low that we decided not to try.

SPEAKER_00And Matthews put it plainly, so it was inevitable. That same morning, Matthews wrote to the budget director, James Lynn, ACIP had been thinking two to maybe 20%. And here's what the Secretary of Health wrote. He said, quote, there is evidence that there will be a major flu epidemic this coming fall. The indication is that we will see a return of the 1918 flu virus that is the most virulent form of flu.

SPEAKER_00In 1918, a half a million people died. And the projections are that this virus will kill one million Americans in 1976. One million. Will the authors noticed. Note the escalation, they write. Since an ACIP meeting five days earlier, they asked whether Sensor's case had moved him, whether he had thought it through, or whether he was impressing the budget director. Perhaps they conclude some of each.

SPEAKER_00On Monday, March 22nd, the president sat down with his advisors in the Oval Office. Ford was in a brutal primary fight with Ronald Reagan, and his advisors told him it was a no-win position. Ron recalled the argument. He said, if there was no pandemic, a lot of people would have sore arms in October. And if there was a pandemic, no matter how much we'd done, it wouldn't be enough. Another remembered thinking and maybe say, there is no way to go back on Sitzer's menu.

SPEAKER_00Memo. If we tried to do that, it would leak and the memos, well, it's a gun to our head. And notice what Ford was not told. The authors list six troubles. Here was their list. Serious side effects, children's dosages, liability insurance, expert opinion, the public health service's public relations, and his own credibility. Everyone turned out to be real.

SPEAKER_00Signs of each were visible to anyone who dug, yet no one dug. Ford, well he saw simply, as he told the authors later, I think you ought to gamble on the sign of caution. And I would always rather be ahead of the curve than behind it. But he wanted to hear from scientists first. So Jonas Sulk, who developed the first polio vaccine, and Albert Sabin, who developed the second, were invited. The two were personal and professional innovative.

SPEAKER_00Me. And the staffer who invited them thought that was the point. If these two agreed, no one could say the president had been misled. On Wednesday, March 24th, at 3 30 in the afternoon, Ford met the experts in the cabinet room. Censored briefed. SOC then purged mass immunization. And the authors say aides in the back row sighed with relief. Staben he then followed, and then Maurice Heilman, uh Hilleman, is her name.

SPEAKER_00And Merck, so that's the pharmaceutical company, they also agreed. Most of the people the authors interviewed felt the whole thing was quote unquote programmed and a staged set with the decision already taken. They had reason. Delones said the authors that night before, and Censor had called them to tell him when to speak and what the president was going to ask. So they knew the questions had we talked.

SPEAKER_00At some point Ford asked for a show of hands. Who wants to proceed? All hands went up. And then he asked if anyone objected. And the author's right, a long silence ensued. One expert in the room told them later, I regretted not having spoken up and said, Mr President, this may not be proper for me to say, but I believe we should not go ahead with demonization until we are sure this is a real threat.

SPEAKER_00And the authors add four words or more because I can't count anymore. However that may be, it wasn't said. Ford then went to the press room with Sol and Sabin on either side of him and announced the largest peacetime vaccination program in American history. He said, I have been advised, he said, that there is a very real possibility that unless we take effective counteractions, there could be an epidemic of this dangerous disease next fall and winter here in the United States.

SPEAKER_00Let me state clearly at this time, no one knows exactly how serious this threat could be. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to take a chance with the help of our nation. And then he proceeded to ask Congress for$135 million. That night on CBS, Robert Pierpoint reported that doctors had told CBS News the program was premature and unwise.

SPEAKER_00But President Ford and others were endorsing the program, and those who oppose it privately are afraid to say so in public. Wow. And then the easy version of this story was that it was an election year stumped. Yeah, that just doesn't hold up. The authors looked harder than any when they wrote in the foreword, one thing we are convinced the program was not, whatever the contemporary notions from the outside, it wasn't party politics. President Ford wanted to protect public health.

SPEAKER_00And here, my opinion is that finding, well, it doesn't let anybody off the hook. It makes it worse. If the politicians were pushing and the scientists privately had doubts, and nobody in the cabinet room had the gall and the nerve and the bravery to say out loud, well, then you have something a little more unsettling than a conspiracy. You have a room full of people who each thought somebody else had the facts, and the hands went up because the hands were supposed to go.

SPEAKER_00And the wheels, well, they were already in motion on a problem none of those hands had been asked about. Somewhere in offices that had nothing to do with the cabinet room, insurance executives were watching the evening news. And let's go find out what they decided. Remember that January proposal that was waived away with this is not a problem? According to the official history, Ford was never warned about liability before he made his announcement.

SPEAKER_00He stood in the press room and he promised a vaccine for every American without telling him the companies who would make it right refused to. The reason is simple. A vaccine goes to millions of healthy people and a tiny rate, well, that's according to the experts or the people profiting from it. You know, they call it a tiny rate. Bad reactions means a lot of lawsuits. And normally the companies handle that with insurance.

SPEAKER_00And in 1976, insurers said no. The government's answer was a bill. The federal government would stand behind the manufacturers, and people who said that they were hurt would sue the United States instead of the companies. The official history records that Congressman Henry Waxman put a word on the table. He said blackmail. I'm paraphrasing that exchange because I have the history's account and not the hearing transcript, so treat the wording and call it as unconfer.

SPEAKER_00Then in the first week of August, a mysterious pneumonia killed American Legion members who had gathered at a Philadelphia hotel. Nobody knew what it was. The history's authors write that censor it once put a gun to Ford's head, and now the events did the same to Congress. Voting against a flu program that week, well, that was going to be a hard vote to cast. On August 12th, 76, Ford signed the Swine Flu Act, Public Law 94-380.

SPEAKER_00The government barred the companies from profiting on the swine flu vaccine. And the sources I found put the insurance premiums at stake in about$8.5 million. So, Sensor and his co-author Miller, Willie wrote in 2006, the government quickly capitulated to industry's demand for identification. And Sensor said the insurer's ultimatum blared, there's something wrong with this vaccine.

SPEAKER_00So this is my opinion, and this is the part of the story that is gonna make you pretty angry. Nobody tells it. Whether or not the vaccine turned out to be dangerous, the deal left the companies with no profit but also no risk and left the public carrying it. Ask why the people who knew the odds best wouldn't insure it, and the government would.

SPEAKER_00Between October 11th and the 14th, three people over 70, each with a heart condition, died after getting the vaccine at the same clinic. The reports linked all three to the same batch from the manufacturer Park Davis. And the county coroner, Dr. Cyril Wecht went public. He said, I don't he didn't, I don't have his exact quote, so I'll say he was alarmed and said so on cameras.

SPEAKER_00And I think that's very important to know. Nine states, well, they suspended the shots, and the CDC's running count of people who had died after being vaccinated reached 33, and then 41. And the word that matters is after. It was a count on what was recorded, not a finding of what caused it. Dr. Donald Millar of the CDC made the point that explained it. Among Americans aged 70 to 74, roughly 10 to 12 per 100,000 die every day, with or without a shot.

SPEAKER_00Vaccinate a huge number of elderly people in a short time, and some will die within hours or days of the shot by pure coincidence. So he just chalked it up to a coinkity. On October 14th, Ford, he rolled up his sleeve on television and got the shot himself. Doesn't that sound like modern day history? Don't we know another president that allegedly got the shot and the boosters on camera?

SPEAKER_00Interesting. And a question was growing. Where was the plume? There was no pandemic. A swine flu case turned up in Concordia, Missouri. In a person investigators could not directly connect to pigs, but it did not become an epidemic. The virus that started all of this had, as Frank Topp said, simply disappeared. And the campaign continued anyway.

SPEAKER_00And that's the part that makes me mad. By late fall, doctors were reporting a rare nerve disorder called Glaine Baer Bar syndrome. Sorry. I don't know how to pronounce it. Glain Bear Bar Guillon Barray. Maybe it's that. This is important. Okay? It's spelled G-U-I-L-L-A-I-N-B-A-R-R-E.

SPEAKER_00It's a syndrome in people who had been recently vaccinated. And according to the official history, one Minnesota doctor had first learned at the possibility of risk from a cassette tape. And I don't have any more detail than that. Denton Peterson, whose name appears in the history, described the feeling at the agency. He said, We felt we were sitting on a bomb. So let's just leave the nightlight on for the next part. I'm gonna butcher the name again.

SPEAKER_00Guillain Bey Ray is a condition in which the body's bone immune system attacks the nerves. It tends to begin as weakness for tingling in the feet and ranks, and in some people it climbs and it spreads upward into paralysis, including the muscles that control breathing. Many recover slowly over months, and some do not fully recover at all.

SPEAKER_00And some die. Imagine walking into a clinic to protect your family, and a short while later you cannot move your legs, or you cannot remember to breathe. On December 16, 1976, Sensor reached Dr. Theodore Cooper, the Assistant Secretary for Health, who was having lunch in the White House staff mess. Cooper called Jonas Sowell, who was in Paris and then went to the president.

SPEAKER_00Ford, the history says, heard them out, sighed, and agreed. The program was suspended. Cooper's reasons, as recorded, were quote, safety, credibility, and the practice of good medicine. Now, how many people were harmed? This is where the legend and the record part weighs. Lawrence Schoenberger and colleagues counted 1,098 Golane Bear Golan Bar cases during the vaccination period in 1979.

SPEAKER_00532 of them in vaccinated people, an attributable risk just under that one case per 100,000 people vaccinated. In 2003, the Institute of Medicine reviewed the evidence and found a small increased risk. That's what they said. The number of day deaths is shakier, though. Reports range from about 25 to 32, and I could not find a confirmed count tying those deaths to the vaccine.

SPEAKER_00And the sources don't agree. Some will give you a number and pretend it's going to be solid. Real people were fruit. And the government's own scientists later found a small but real increase in risk. And the exact human toll is something I couldn't pin down. So a risk of one out of a hundred thousand, maybe it sounds tiny to you, but in a real pandemic, they're saying, oh, it might well be worth taking.

SPEAKER_00And that's the whole argument for the program. But there was no pandemic. And when you ask people to accept even a small risk to defend against a threat that never shows up, you go then the truth about that risk. And I have to think about COVID and about the argument that if you don't get vaccinated, you are killing your neighbors. And I it makes me sick because that was the messaging at the time.

SPEAKER_00And they're like, the unvaccinated are filthy, they're disease spreading, and they're murderers. And if they come to the hospital with COVID, we should let them die because they chose not to be vaccinated. And how many people have forgotten that? I know I haven't. I have not forgotten that people wished death and hoped and prayed and cheered for death, including politicians, celebrities, and your neighbor next door wished death on you if you chose not to be vaccinated.

SPEAKER_00And if anything about this podcast resonates with you, is that you should question the government and you should question their motives because they love to experiment on the public for fun. They will in just inject you with syphilis just to see what happens and to watch you die and study you. They'll inject it into the base of your brain, they'll inject it in your eyes, they'll inject it into your urethra, your vagina, your anus, and just to see what happens.

SPEAKER_00And that is not all the atrocities that they have committed over the years, but that is just an example of it. And so I think that if you choose to be vaccinated, you should be informed, which these people clearly were not.

SPEAKER_00To all the people who shamed those out in the world, I can tell you, I personally was treated like I had cooties. And grown men treated me like I was the bogey monster because I chose not to vaccinate myself or my children, and they treated me like dirt. And I think that's a nice word because they didn't treat me like dirt, they treated me like absolute feces.

SPEAKER_00So let's get back to the story of the 1976 flea swine and see if I can't stay off my soapbox for just a dang minute. Now, more than 40 million Americans were vaccinated, and Sensor put the figure at 45 million in 10 weeks. The flu, the program was built for Will had never arrived, and then came the claims. The government had taken the legal risk on itself, and people lined up to click as they should.

SPEAKER_00Okay. There I am again. As of October 2nd, 1980, according to the Global Security Summary of the Government's accounting, there were 3,965 claims and 1,384 lawsuits with about$13.2 million paid. Only 27 claims of this kind unrelated to swine flu have ever been filed since 1963. On December 31st, 1980, in Petty versus United States, a federal court in the Northern District of Iowa held the government and had a duty to warn and awarded about$212,000, according to the CDC summary.

SPEAKER_00And I couldn't find a clean accounting of how the other cases fare. So I don't know whether the system worked or failed in general. The idea of, though, of federal compensation for vaccine injuries did not die. A congressional research survey overview traces a line from the swine flu episode to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 and the PrEP Act, which covers countermeasures in a declared emergency.

SPEAKER_00Back to that conference room on February 7th, 1977, and the man standing against a wall with the secretary who'd already made up his mind. The meeting that day was about whether to release the stockpile locked away since December. And I did not find a reliable account of what that room decided or what Sensor said when he walked out. If you do know, and you can point me to the source, I'll gladly add it. What I do know is that people who studied it wrote, Californo, new to all of it, wrote in his introduction to the official history, he said, I knew so little that it was difficult even to determine the questions to ask.

SPEAKER_00Sensor was replaced by Dr. Sorry, not a doctor. He was not a doctor. That's I misspoke. He was replaced by William Foggy, F-O-E-G-E Fogue in May of 77, and he later served as New York City's health commissioner. He died May 2nd, 2011, and in 2006 he still defended the logic. He said, When lives are at stake, it is better to err on the side of the reaction than under reaction.

SPEAKER_00Even the history's authors who were not gentle called the program in some terms a qualified success. One more chapter. In 1977, a year after the scare, a new H1N1 flu began circulating, with early reports from northern China and the Soviet Union. It became known as the Russian flu. And as scientists found it was genetically almost unindistinguishable from strains that had gone extinct around 1957 and genetically unrelated to the pork dix virus.

SPEAKER_00The pandemic everyone feared in 1976 did not come from four digs. A different virus arrived the next year, and it looked like a ghost. So how does the virus come back from 20 years of extinction? A 2015 in bio paper by Roso and Gromball says the origin cannot be conclusively determined, and they lean toward an escape from a vaccine trial involving Chinese soldiers over a single lab incident or accident, I mean.

SPEAKER_00So here's where the evidence stops. A lab or vaccine trial escape is a hypothetical. It's one the researchers I read find most plausible on this, but it's not been proven, and I will present it as proven. So back to where we began, that conference room in front of cameras, nobody meant to invite. Dr. Sensor lost his job. And as far as I can tell from the record, he tried to do what he thought would save lives.

SPEAKER_00He was also the man whose memo put on a plan in front of a president, a memo the history says was written to sell. And wasn't left out and who ended up carrying the risk? You've now heard. A young private went on an overheight march and he did not come back. And that's terrible. The only deaths tied to the swine flu virus in the sources I read is that one soldier. The Ned Bar people paralyzed after the shot? Well, that's not a number that's very easy to count.

SPEAKER_00So tell me, Time Killers, did any of your family members or grandparents get the swine flu shot in 1976? Or did they decide not to? So I'd love to hear your stories on that. And I think that this is such an interesting podcast because, of course, it relates to our modern history of the COVID pandemic. And you have to look at, like, for example, Dr.

SPEAKER_00Fauci, who is one of the most, in my opinion, the most evil men to ever exist. And I'm not even just talking about the COVID. I'm talking about the aim. If you want to go down a rabbit hole, look at what COVID or what Fauci did during the AIDS pandemic. It's disgusting. And then watch how he has no problem. If you do any sort of research on him, and I warn you, if you have a tender heart, you might not want to go down that rabbit hole.

SPEAKER_00Because the things that he did to just the beagle dogs alone will make your stomach sit. And these are the people that are making life and death decisions for you, the American person, or I guess the worldwide people too. And I think that people that don't have a conscience shouldn't make decisions for you if they have no morality themselves. And when you follow the money, like I said, that's so important.

SPEAKER_00Make your decisions based on following the money. This is the same government that does not encourages you to eat crap and not eat healthy food and exercise and take care of yourself. These this is the same government that changed the food pyramid so that it would benefit their benefactors in for you to eat sugary processed BS that should never be allowed to be on our shelves either.

SPEAKER_00It's so interesting. The same cereal in your cereal box is not allowed in Europe because of the red dye 40 and all the other bullshit that's in it. The stuff that will give you cancer and kill you. Europe says no. And we here in America, we get that product put into our children. This makes me want to keep the night light on.

SPEAKER_00Thank you for killing time with feed tonight. And I will keep the light on.

SPEAKER_01Alexa, what is a chemtrail? Chemtrail. Trails left by aircraft are actually chemical or biological agents deliberately sprayed at high altitudes for a purpose undisclosed to the general public in clandestine programs directed by government officials.

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