CCT 379: Five Agencies, One Freezer, And A Controller Nobody Owned (Domain 4)
43 minAudio
Send us Fan Mail CISSP Domain 4.1 - apply secure design principles in network architectures, built on a joint federal warning about internet-reachable refrigeration controllers. Start free: https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/free-cissp-self-study (360 practice questions, a Domain 1 diagnostic, and weekly questions by email) In early November, five US federal agencies put their names on one joint fact sheet. CISA, the FBI, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and the Department of Transportation. Four sectors named: Healthcare and Public Health, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation Systems. And what they are warning about is the box that keeps the freezer cold at your grocery store WHAT THE DOCUMENT SAYS Actors are targeting electronic temperature controllers and commercial refrigeration controllers - the ones in retail grocery stores and cold storage facilities. Three ways in, and the agencies name all three: authentication bypass, arbitrary code injection, and weak configurations. Once they are in, they can remotely alter settings and force those units into continuous heating and defrost cycles. The agencies list what that could do. It could affect the service life of the system. It could create a fire hazard. It could cause loss of inventory. And it could indirectly harm consumers, if products are consumed after they were stored at an unsafe temperature. A freezer, run backwards, is a fire hazard and a public health problem. THE SECOND EFFECT, AND THE BEST PHRASE IN THE DOCUMENT There is one more consequence on their list: loss of visibility into current temperatures. Their phrase for it is a denial-of-view condition. Think about what that means. The actors do not have to change a single setting. They only have to take away your ability to see. And now the temperature log - the compliance record, the thing you would hand an inspector - is reporting a number that is not true, or is not reporting at all. You cannot manage what you cannot observe, and an attacker who understands that does not need to break anything. WHAT THE DOCUMENT IS NOT This is a warning, not a breach report. There is no victim, no company, no country, no count, and no date of an incident, because the document is not about one event. The verb throughout is "could" - the agencies are describing capability, not casualties. Press coverage of this fact sheet carries figures the government document does not: store counts, countries, temperatures. None of them are asserted in this episode. If you want them, they belong to the outlets that published them. WHY THESE CONTROLLERS ARE CONNECTED AT ALL The device is not a toy. The fact sheet lists exactly what it is for: automated and remote monitoring of temperatures, continuous temperature logging, defrost cycle management, and energy optimization. Four jobs, and every one of them is a business function. The logging is a compliance record. The defrost management keeps the coils from icing over. The energy optimization is somebody's utility bill. Look at the first one again. REMOTE monitoring. That is not laziness. If you are running a lot of stores, you are not sending a person around to read a thermometer. Remote monitoring is the entire reason the thing was bought. So it got connected. And the question nobody asked at the time was: connected to what? Now look at the three vectors again. Authentication bypass. Arbitrary code injection. Weak configurations. Not one of them is exotic. They are the three oldest doors in the building, and they work here because this class of device spent twenty years being designed for a network nobody outside the building could reach. WHY THIS IS A DOMAIN 4.1 EPISODE Eight mitigations on the agencies' list. The first two are not about the device at all. Number one: do not expose control system devices - and they call out controller panels specifically - to the internet. If remote access is necessary, protect it with a firewall or an edge device and keep that updated. Number two: create a dedicated OT virtual local area network, an OT VLAN, to separate those devices from the business network. Neither of those is a patch and neither one is a product. They are design decisions, and somebody made them, or didn't make them, probably years ago. THE MANAGER'S TAKEAWAY Ask who owns that controller. Here is how it usually goes. Facilities bought it. A vendor installed it. The vendor needed remote access to support it, so somebody in IT opened a path, and it was a Tuesday and it worked. It is not in the asset inventory. It has never been in a vulnerability scan scope. And it has an address somebody can reach from the other side of the world. Reachable is a design decision. It is not an accident. The only real question is whether the person who made it was in security. IN THE TRAINING BLOCK • What 4.1 actually asks: physical, logical and micro-segmentation in ISC2's own wording; edge networks; traffic flows, north-south and east-west. Domain 4 is 13% of the exam. • Why a VLAN is a configuration rather than a wall. • North-south and east-west: a boundary is structurally unable to see traffic that never crosses it, and in a flat network nothing else is looking either. That is the argument for micro-segmentation. • Three questions to ask about any connection: what can reach it, what it can reach, who decided. • Six shapes of remote access and how each one quietly widens. • Denial of view, four ways - dark, stale, lying, and the record that inherits all three • The management plane: in-band reaches a device over the network it serves, out-of-band over a path that does not depend on it - and that only matters on the one day you need it. Plus edge networks, where peering is a commercial agreement that creates a route. FOUR PRACTICE QUESTIONS, with the traps taken apart. Question two is the one that gets people. CHAPTERS 0:00 Five agencies, one fact sheet, one freezer 1:45 The whole thing in thirty seconds 3:33 What these controllers actually do 4:51 Three ways in, and what they have in common 5:25 What they can do once they are there 6:00 Denial of view 6:58 The manager's takeaway 8:19 Who owns that controller 9:15 Free Essentials, Accelerator, Pro and the Cohort 11:30 What Domain 4 actually asks 16:34 Three kinds of segmentation 18:19 North-south, east-west 21:44 Every remote path is a design decision 25:13 Denial of view, four ways 28:18 Question 1 31:19 Question 2 - the one that gets people 34:43 Question 3 37:58 Question 4 41:09 The pattern across all four LINKS Free CISSP Essentials: https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/free-cissp-self-study All episodes and the written walkthrough: https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/podcast CISSP Sprint Cohort: https://www.cisspcybertraining.com/cohort-sprint-pag SOURCE - the joint fact sheet itself, TLP:CLEAR, 5 November 2026: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/us-government-partners-urge-hardening-industrial-refrigeration-and-cold-chain-monitoring-systems Gain exclusive access to 360 FREE CISSP Practice Questions at FreeCISSPQuestions.com and have them delivered directly to your inbox! Don’t miss this valuable opportunity to strengthen your CISSP exam preparation and boost your chances of certification success. Join now and start your journey toward CISSP mastery today!
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SPEAKER_00Welcome to the CISSP Cyber Training Podcast. Where we provide you the training and tools you need to pass the CISSP exam first time. Hi, my name is Sean Gerber. I'm your host of the Action Active Formative Podcast. Join me each week as I provide the information you need to pass the CISSP exam and grow your cyber checker to knowledge. Alright, let's get started.
SPEAKER_01Good morning, everybody. It's Sean Gerber with CISSP Cyber Training, and hope you all are having a beautifully blessed day. Today is Monday. And what do we do on Mondays? Yes, Mondays we do all kinds of fun stuff, basically going over the various articles that we've seen in the news, some incidents that have occurred, along with some training that is tied to that specifically, followed by some CISSP questions. So I know you all are out there studying for the exam. You're now rolling into the holiday season and you're going, oh man, I don't want to study.
SPEAKER_01Well, that's probably not the right attitude to have. And the reason is because now is probably the best time to study. If you would dedicate a little bit of time while you're at home over the holidays, you actually could go into 2027 and be in a great position to pass the CISSP exam. So it's again, I'm just saying, probably a good time to start thinking about it if you haven't done so already. Today we're gonna be covering domain 4.1, and we're applying secure design principles to network architectures. And we've talked about this in various other podcasts, but this article that I saw came up is kind of driving home the OT space, actually the operational technology space.
SPEAKER_01And we talked about that a little bit a couple weeks ago, I think, but we're gonna come into this again, and that was over domain two, if I'm not mistaken. But we are gonna get into domain four. Specifically around OT. Now, what exactly is going on? Well, in November, there were five federal agencies that put out a joint facts sheet. Not one, but five. CISA, FBI, HHS, and the Agricultural and Department of Transportation. All of them put out a statement saying, Oh, Houston, we may have a challenge.
SPEAKER_01And so that is what ended up occurring. And so, because of that, that's what they're saying is that it's all about the freezers at your grocery store keeping things cold. And you're going, why would anybody want to hack those? Well, and you know, and I was thinking that too, because I've dealt with OT space when I taught at Wichita State College. Uh, we talk about physical systems, all of those things are an important part. But when they talked about the overall refrigeration and the freezer system, I was kind of going, okay, well, that could cost you some money if you lose your meat. But what else is the big deal?
SPEAKER_01And well, yeah, I didn't think about the medical side, right? So you have all of that medical stuff that's in refrigeration or some sort of freezer type activities or freezer assets, and you're gonna let what happens if something happens to it? Yeah, a lot of bad stuff could happen. It could get stuff bad, it can end up melting it, it can do, you know, all the things that you want. Something that you want staying cold is no longer staying cold, that can be a problem, especially in the medical side if something that you're actually putting in your body has got a problem if it if it gets warm. So last week we talked about building where nobody attacked anything, right?
SPEAKER_01We said that that was actually last week, and there were no bad guys and girls in that story whatsoever. This week there are, and we're gonna go after something that nobody in your organization thinks about is a computer. And we've talked about this briefly, but we're gonna kind of dig a little bit deeper into this. And at the end, we've got four CISSP questions that are gonna go, and then question number two might be a little bit problematic. You may have a challenge with that one, and we'll get into that one just a little bit too. So make sure you stick around for all of the episode because we will have all of those aspects covered.
SPEAKER_01Okay, so as you can see in on the slide deck, actually on the slide deck, but on the screen, I have basically CISA's, the CISA's website. And on their website, they talk about U.S. government partners' urge hardening of industrial refrigeration and cold chain monitoring systems. So again, there, like I said, there were five different ones that came out with this. So I just pulled up CIS so that you have that. But I would go out and Google it and see what you can find. But the whole thing that I'm gonna talk about here is we'll we'll kind of cover it and then we're gonna come back to it.
SPEAKER_01So there were five U.S. agencies that say someone is going after electronic temperature controllers and the commercial refrigeration controllers. The ones you find in retail grocery stores, cold storage facilities. And what they're saying is that there's three ways in. There's authentication bypass, arbitrary code injection, and weak configurations. And so you're asking yourself, well, these refrigeration things, it's just a refrigerator. You plug them in and they run, right? Well, we've talked about this, but I know programmable logic controllers or even small Raspberry Pi controllers are running many of these so that they can be remotely monitored and changed.
SPEAKER_01You can remotely change the settings, force those units into continuous heating or defrost cycles. All of those aspects can be done remotely in many of these refrigeration systems because what they do. They put a Raspberry Pi in there and they rock and roll. And that's really realistically what it is. So these agencies list now what that could affect. And it affects the service life of the system, right? So if somebody's put them in hot, put them in cold, put them in hot, put them in cold, it can cause a problem with the system itself and it causes it to fail. It can also cause a fire hazard, right?
SPEAKER_01That can be an issue as well. And then you lose your potential inventory for all the freezer aspects in this. And if you're dealing with the medical supplies, how does that impact the overall aspects related to the medical technology that's there? So again, storing something at the wrong temperature has down effects. And so all the other thing is I just got done smoking some pork shoulder, or they call it pork butt, and I just ended up heaping the temperature at a certain temperature to make sure that when I feed it to my children and my wife, then nobody gets sick, right?
SPEAKER_01The goal is you want to have it at you cook it to a certain temperature so it kills off all the bacteria. Well, what happens if your stuff is freezing and then thawing? And then what happens if it thaws enough and then doesn't heat back up fast enough or cool back enough? So you all kinds of aspects can really cause detrimental facts to this. So I need you to hear what this is, what's going on here. Nobody was named. There is no company, there's no count, no date, but there's five specific agencies telling you that there's something potentially coming. And we saw this address recently in the overall uh air traffic control debacle that just occurred a couple days ago.
SPEAKER_01And I was just reading an article that there were two, possibly, routers that cause this whole problem. Now, what do we talk about in CISP cyber training? Resilience. Yes. Well, here's another part of this. I'm not saying these are routers, but if somebody is actively going out and trying to test these systems and trying to access them, they obviously see there's a need. And so if there's five agencies in the US government that are saying, watch out, here it comes, yeah, you all better pay attention and watch out because it's probably on its way. So these are all aspects that are sitting on your network.
SPEAKER_01And these are all pieces that you may have within your company, but in reality, they could be talking to the internet and you don't even know it. So let's kind of go into what these things actually do. Now, these start with a device because this device is not a toy. Now, if you looked at the there's a podcast out there called Security Now with Steve Gibson. I love the podcast, highly recommend it. If you're listening to this one, go check it out. It's a great podcast. But one thing that Steve Gibson has always said is that we treat these computers in the past when they first came out as a toy.
SPEAKER_01I had an Apple IIe, it was cool, it was a bit of a toy, right? Yeah. But thing is now, these things are not toys because they run so many things within your companies. So an electronic temperature controller in a grocery store or a cold storage facility is doing the real work. And this is the aspects around it. There's automation, there's remote monitoring. All of those pieces are all set up specifically within these types of refrigeration units. So there's all these jobs that every one of them has a specific business function.
SPEAKER_01Now, the logging of this is a compliance record. The defrost management is what keeps the coils and the icing from icing over. The energy optimization is something that deals with on a utility bill. All of those things are being managed by these remote systems. So you need to really understand how this all plays into it. So remote monitoring is a big factor. And it's not just somebody being lazy. If you're running a lot of stores, you are not sending a person around to read the thermometer in every one of those locations. Remote monitoring is the whole reason that you bought whatever you bought, because in most cases you're like, I don't have time to go check on this.
SPEAKER_01So let's hook it up to the internet, and I now can have access. So what do you do? You get it connected, and then once you set it, nobody asks any more questions. And then people say, Well, that thing's connected, and you go connected to what? Right? That's the thing. So when it comes right down to it, is you have to have a plan. Now, in this situation, they had three different ways. They had authentication bypass, arbitrary code injections, injections, and weak configurations. None of these things are exotic. These are not zero days that are out there. There's some of the three of the oldest doors in the building, and we've talked about these numerous times at CISSB Cyber Training.
SPEAKER_01But the reason I say that is when I was in the red teams, we would go after these older systems because why? If they were networkly network connected to the uh your network area network as well as the internet, they brought on all kinds of issues and all kinds of things that you could be focused on. So it's really cool how this plays out. But again, these are not exotic by any stretch of the imagination. So what is the big deal? You're going, okay, it's a refrigeration unit. We talked a little bit about the health aspects of it.
SPEAKER_01But these remote actors, what they can do is they can alter settings and force units into continuous heating or defrost cycles, which you're going, a big yawn, right? What so what? Well, and it can cost the service life of the system. Okay, so what? Fire hazard. Okay, that's a problem, right? Potentially, and then potentially indirectly harm the consumers if this is unsafe for unsafe storage. But the point of it is that everything is tied to these systems. There are freezers out there that are all network connected.
SPEAKER_01I mean, just for put it in perspective, I run a Kona Ice business. I've got a freezer. What does that freezer? It doesn't have anything that, if it went bad, it would hurt my inventory. Nobody would die from it, but it would affect my potential inventory. Now, mine's not network network connected, so no works trying to get to it. But the point of it is that it could cause an impact, especially small businesses. Well, put it in also perspective, many of the small businesses, I have a friend of mine that's got a cookie business, and they had their freezer go out. It cost them close to$30,000 in inventory gone.
SPEAKER_01Now, if you're a business that's not making a lot of money, you lose$30,000. That's a huge, huge hit. So again, this is a big deal. It really is. And if they can get access to freezers, what else can they get access to? So again, important part. So the the when it comes right down to this is that they didn't have to do anything around it other than some small changes. The aspect you have to ask yourself as well is is there some sort of compliance aspect in this compliance record of some kind? Many of these systems have no logging and monitoring that's available.
SPEAKER_01All they are is they're turn on, turn off, and they they can maybe see the configuration systems you can set in remotely, but in reality they have nothing to it. So, how does this play into everything that I'm talking about here? When I was in Red Teams and also when I was a CISO, we had multiple situations where there were remote systems that were running very complex uh aspects of our environment that could cause all kinds of damage to a company and to the environment as far as people go. And these systems, as hardened as they were, in many cases weren't a whole lot different than this refrigeration system.
SPEAKER_01You can look through all the different types of articles that are out there, and time and time again, you will see this happening. We mentioned it before in the fish tank in Las Vegas in a casino that actually ended up getting access to casino's network because of a fish tank. So, yes, this is all out there. So when we throw this down and take this into the manager's perspective, let's look at it from that aspect and that angle. Neither one of these, what I'm talking about from a manager point of view, is patch your freezer. So when I'm gonna get into you're like, well, why not I patch my freezer?
SPEAKER_01Well, that's that's really not what's important. So we first need to go and read the mitigation, number one and number two, because they're not about the device. Number one says from a mitigation standpoint, do not expose control system devices, and what they specifically call out are the controller panels to the internet. Back in the red team days, I would go to a location, and guess what? Some person had a system that was not meant to be connected to the internet, but they put in a go to my PC type PC in place, and then they would connect into that.
SPEAKER_01And that's just a terrible idea. But they did it because simple fact is they had some sort of internet connectivity they wanted to do to help make their job easier. And when in number one, they're saying if you need some level of remote access, put it behind a firewall or an edge device that keeps this thing updated and does the monitoring for it. Don't just do go to my PC and stick it to the internet. Number two of the things that mitigation aspects they talk about is they say create a dedicated OT virtual local area network, an OT VLAN, right?
SPEAKER_01We talk about this as well. If you have a virtual local area network, it is a segregated network. It separates the businesses from or the network from your business network. So OT network stays on one side, your business network stays on another. That's pretty much it. That is what they're talking about. None of these talk about patch, none of them talk about the product. They are design decisions. And somebody made them, or in the case of many of these, they didn't make them. They just kind of threw the system in place, and it was probably done multiple years ago, potentially even a decade ago.
SPEAKER_01So this is an important part for you to really think about as you're going in to take your exam. You need to ask yourself, again, like we talk about with all these things, who owns that controller? Who is ultimately responsible for it? So I'll tell you how it usually goes. Facilities bought it, right? They thought it was the best thing since sliced bread. They are gonna use it in their environment and they buy it. They then say, hey, vendor X, come and install this for us because we don't know what to do. So they allow vendor X in.
SPEAKER_01And then what ends up happening is vendor X on Friday afternoon at 3 p.m. says, Hey, by the way, I need remote access. Well, hey, it's going to the weekend. Uh, we gotta go. Well, I need remote access. Okay, fine, you got it. We'll take care of this on Monday. You're good to go. Let's take care of it on Monday. We'll be fine. Well, what ends up happening is, yeah, you guessed it. Monday comes, Monday goes, and everybody forgets about the remote access they gave back that team to. So now you have a third party that has access into your environment and you forgot about it.
SPEAKER_01So it's reachable by a design decision. This was not an accident. The real question comes into is the person who made the disc call made this overall decision, was it security or was it somebody else? So yeah, these things happen. They truly do, right? See it all the time. So again, coming back to this whole point, U.S. government partners urge hardening of industrial refrigeration and cold chain monitoring systems. So here's the bottom line put it in an OT. If it's an OT environment, put it on a VLAN to watch your access and who's gaining access control to it.
SPEAKER_01And you should have some level of edge device in front of it to do some level of monitoring and as far as access controls. Basic things right there. So key points. Now, let's roll into what we're gonna talk about today in our training. Okay, so before we do, I wanted to get in just a real quick shout out on some of the things that are going on. Today is November 16th. My cohort starts tomorrow. The the cutoff is tonight at midnight. I have a 7 a.m. and a 7 p.m., and I've only got a few slots left.
SPEAKER_01If you are interested in getting your CISSP, this basically the first part of 27, so you are in a position to be able to financially get to a potentially better job as well as get this exercise done, this test done, then now is the time to take advantage of it. Otherwise, you'll have to wait till January 19th when my next cohort starts. But I want to quick give a just some test one testimonial from somebody that took this from me. Jay, uh, and Jay's an awesome dude. I won't go into his last name and everything because I want to try to keep that more or less that's their own business.
SPEAKER_01But this is a key part he called out. He gave me a deadline I needed, right? That was the part. The eight-week sprint was exactly what I needed to help me get over that I will take it someday soon. Rut that he was in. So I'm just trying to tell you if you are listening to this and that is you, now's the time to take it. Let's get this done. And unfortunately, you can keep telling yourself over and over again that I'll get to it eventually, I'll get to it eventually. Just get it done. Let's go get part of the cohort and it will help you get this thing done. And in the next eight to ten weeks, you'll be taking your exam and you will be in a much better position than you are right now.
SPEAKER_01As well as it relates to the CISSP. So again, that's the Sprint cohort. I have my accelerator program. If you want to do self-study, if you want to do self-study with me specifically, that's my pro program. I have an office hour, so it's actually going to be tonight, and that is going to be tied to the overall uh pro edition as well. If none of those things are something you're interested in, not a big deal. You can start with my free CISSP essentials, and that's all the free stuff that I've got. You can go check that out. And when you're ready, you can look at it at that time. But those are the things, four tiers that I have: the CISSP essentials, the accelerator, the pro, and the sprint cohort.
SPEAKER_01Okay, so let's get into what we're gonna finish talking about today. So when we get into domain four, it's actually asking you a lot of different things in this. So now if we're dealing with communication and network security, it's 13% of the CISSP exam. Now, 4.1 is not a list of protocols that you need to memorize, which we go into a lot in our cohorts, but there's different protocols out there. It asks the thing that what is the thing it is connected to, and what is it able to reach, and whether the decision that somebody made to put it in place had that decision rights to do that.
SPEAKER_01So we got five different areas. Physical segmentation. So you're talking in band, out of band, and air gapped. So in band means it's in the line, out of band means you're dealing with something such as the Purdue model, and then air gapped is where it's physically separated completely. Those are different types of things you need to consider. Physical segmentation is an important part. Logical separation is where you have VLAN and the rest. It's maybe on the same wire and you have enforced boundaries, but this is where most of the real world and the real work potentially happens, is in the logical segmentation.
SPEAKER_01This is where you'll set up these VLANs and you may limit what kind of activity can occur. Micro segmentation, this is the overlays and the encapsulation. This is where you have distributed firewalls, IDS, IPSs. Zero trust will sit in the micro segmentation. And that's an important piece that you will deal with in any sort of my network that may have some sort of segmentation in it. You have edge networks. These are ingress and egress peering areas. These are what crosses your boundary, and then you need to know from these edge networks what comes in and what goes out.
SPEAKER_01An important part, you should have limitations on these edge networks on what can be brought in and what can leave your organization. And then traffic flows. Your traffic either north, south, which in and out, or east and west is more of your lateral aspects. Most architectures will watch one of these and then they mainly many times assume the other. It's does many people do not watch both east and west traffic and north and south traffic. So every one of these is about placement. It's about where do you put the device, not the specific device in mind, it's where do you specifically put it?
SPEAKER_01How does a controller, which we talked about in that article, how does that end up being reachable? Well, it has a job, right? Many of these controllers have some job at all that they're dealing with monitoring, they're doing logging, they're doing, in this case, they might have done defrost cycle management, potentially optimization for energy to save yourself some money. They all have some job in place. Many of these things are, like I said, they're a Raspberry Pi or an Adrenos system. Um, they are very, very small, very, very compact systems that are running microcomputer aspects on these physical devices.
SPEAKER_01So, again, remote is the part. What much of the need is that they have to have the access to remotely connect to these. If you have, let's say, 20 different franchises and each of these different stores that you have a franchise with, um, they all have these freezers. Well, you don't have time to go around and drive around and make sure they're right. You're also going to be uh inspected by the Department of Agriculture. They're gonna come and look and see, are you doing what you should be doing? It would be nice to have all of this located on your phone. So you go, oh yeah, this thing's these are all the temperatures are good.
SPEAKER_01Oh, wait, one's flagging that it's too hot. Go get it. Let's go take care of it. You can save yourself inventory, save yourself time. It's a huge win. But like anything else, is it better, best protected? Right? So the business case is genuine. It is something that they are struggling with. But then who has the support to reach it? Many of the vendors maintain the equipment, so the vendor will need in. And so now are you gonna do that? How do you let the vendor into your organization? So, in many ways, like I said before, we talked about at the beginning, you have someone comes and knocks on your door on a Friday afternoon, or maybe even a Tuesday afternoon, doesn't matter.
SPEAKER_01But the point is that you get busy, and as you get busy, you say, fine, fine, just go do it, and then I will cle clean it up later. But then what happens is once you get done, your later shows up, what do you do? Something else comes and takes your time away. Just like getting ready to study for the CISSP. Because guess what will happen? You'll be going, I'm gonna dedicate time. I'm gonna dedicate time. And then what do you do? You don't dedicate the time. So again, always need to focus on this. So not one of these decisions that we talk about is wrong on its own. The architecture is what it's added up to, and nobody has well maybe potentially owns what that architecture looks like.
SPEAKER_01So each of those things are a piece from being reachable to architecture aspects and the support piece of this. But the question is, just like we talk about with AI governance, or really any governments, who is ultimately accountable? So what did the action the five agencies actually say? So they're focused, the bad guys and girls are focusing on retail grocery and cold storage. There's four sectors healthcare, public health, chemical, food and agriculture, and transportation. They're what they're doing is they're going by and they're trying to paste in login attempts of default credentials that may be out there, which we talk about.
SPEAKER_01The fact is that admin admin on many routers. Many of these systems are old. They may run code on a controller just to see what it does. They may look for weak configurations, right? Shift with the settings it had, the air quotes admin admin, and try to use those. And then from there, they've tried to go in and remotely access the settings. In the case of the article, was around forcing continuous heating into frost cycles to make it go and crump. We did this in a many days or many years ago in the red team space. We would actually go after a generator.
SPEAKER_01We've remotely connected to this generator and we would make cycles with the generator. Very small, subtle changes in the overall oscilloscopes, or I should say the oscillations of that generator. But what did it do after a period of time? That generator went and just blew itself up. So little things like that, these are they're not designed to have fluctuations in these generators. Same concept. These freezers are not designed to go from heat to cold, heat to coal.
SPEAKER_01That is not a thing. They don't like that. They were very, very uh temperamental when it comes to something like that. So it can cause all kinds of issues from we talked about inventory loss, but the main one is harm to consumers, and this could come from fire hazards in many other ways. So, again, a very important part that it's like there's no victim, there's no company, there's no country that is involved in any of this. They don't even have a number. But when five agencies are telling you that there's they're concerned about it, that tells you something is close. So there are three kinds of segmentation.
SPEAKER_01So we have physical, logical, micro, and air gapped, right? So the the physical is separate hardware. You got specific hardware that is there specifically for you. That isn't, it's not micro or it's not any sort of virtual machine, it's an actual hardware that's designed. Logical is it's all on the same uh wire, and this is where you're dealing with configurations such as VLANs and subnets, configurations that are set up specifically to route the traffic. Micro, this is where you're dealing with overlays, encapsulation, firewalls, IDS IPSs, all of those aspects run into that.
SPEAKER_01This is where the zero trust model works the best. And then air gap. There should be no path at all. And I will say that I've seen some that are air quotes air gapped. And what they do allow is outbound traffic, but they don't allow any sort of inbound traffic. So what I'm saying is that if you're dealing with something that is there air gapped and you're allowing traffic, it's really not air gapped because people have said that. I've talked to folks that have said, well, the system is air gapped. And I go, okay, well, let me walk me through how what is a network connectivity.
SPEAKER_01And they go, well, there is no network connectivity because it's air gapped. I said, okay, sure. So you're not getting any updates into it. Nope, no updates. How are you telling as far as monitoring the system and how it's operating? Well, we do have a heartbeat monitor that goes on for these systems. And I said, Oh, how's that happening? So, yeah, it's not air gapped. So, give point, air gap means no path at all. It means you take one system, you take what's in there, and then you move it over and you try to put it into the other system. Okay, so I mentioned a little bit about north-south-east-west. So, what is that?
SPEAKER_01So, north-south traffic is traffic that's crossing your boundary, in from the internet, out to it. That is north-south. Can your clients reach the servers? Can the users reach the data center? That is in and out. So, this is where basically the information gets inspected. You get TLS inspection, IPSs, egress filtering. This is on your north-south traffic. Your east-west traffic is traffic between things that are already inside your network, server to server, east and west, workload to workload, east and west. Potentially, if you have networks connecting your stores, store to store.
SPEAKER_01Things never cross the boundary, they never go out, they all stay within your company. That is east-west traffic. So, this is why micro-segmentation is a 4.1 bullet completely, because it the perimeter puts one checkpoint on north-south path. Micro segmentation puts checkpoints on the east-west pass. And it's I've seen this done and deployed very well. It works great, but you have to have the design decisions to go and do something like that. It is not an easy thing to do. Now, one key point when you're talking about architecture and north-south, an attacker goes in, gets into your organization, comes in south, right?
SPEAKER_01So you north is going out, south is coming in. The thing that happens so often, and why micro-segmentation is an important part of this, is because once somebody gets into your environment, when we did this as a hacker, we would get into an environment and I could run east-west, I could run lateral wherever I wanted to, and no one would ever see me. This is where microsegmentation is so important because in your dealing with east-west traffic, there can be checkpoints in there and there can be sort of logging and monitoring that's set up specifically for that east-west traffic.
SPEAKER_01Because what happened is in the past is once you get inside the organization, going east and west and doing that connectivity can get very problematic. So many companies choose not to do it. There are three questions about any connection that you need to ask yourself. What can it what can reach it? So what can touch it? What can it reach? What can it touch? And then who made that decision? Who's deciding for this specific aspect? So what I ask is that when you're going and talking to your folks today at some point, and you're a system that you feel is critical, ask these three questions.
SPEAKER_01What can reach it? Who can talk to it? Two, what can it reach? What can it talk to? Or three, and then three is who decide to allow it to do those things. If you can document all that and know all that, that's a great place to start. Many people struggle in this area. So every remote path into an organization is a design decision. And everybody, there needs to be someone who's making that decision. So vendor support, who's allowing a vendor into your company? Again, they have had situations where VPNs are allowed to a third party to VPN into your network so that they can manage these systems.
SPEAKER_01Is there a jump box? Is there a system where they jump specifically to this host? They log in, and from that host, they can log and go throughout the entire organization. Is there a site-to-site VPN, which I kind of just mentioned? Is there a vendor cloud portal? They go into the vendor cloud and they can then touch your system from this portal as well. Or do they have access to firewalls and edge devices? I've seen this with managed service providers having access to those types of systems. And then are there IP allow lists that are specifically set up? Name sources only. Many times IP allow listing is not done because you you got to keep that list up and accountable.
SPEAKER_01So it can be a bit of a challenge. But again, each of these remote paths is a design decision. And somebody had to make the decision, but I highly recommend I would highly doubt that people have actually gone and wrote down the actual who made that decision. In so many cases, they don't do it. They just say, yeah, go do it. And this gets done, and nobody actually ever knows who made that decision and when they made that decision. Okay, so as we're talking about remote access, there are some key points to think of. There's four main things I want you to take home. Denial of view is a key factor.
SPEAKER_01So what is this? The view goes dark. It's classic availability. Somebody notices within minutes a blank screen, it just goes dark, right? You have this view, you're using some sort of uh internet lights out, ILO type of activity, and you know what? It goes dark. The view goes stale, right? This is harder to understand because you know you have a view, but you know that the view's not being updated. So the view goes dark, the view goes stale, or the view lies to you. So a bad actor will put in uh inerrant values, and the screen is up, you're thinking, oh, we're good, but it's actually lying to you.
SPEAKER_01And then there is a potential aspect of all three could occur. And you have to ask yourself, do you have the compliance capabilities in place to know if that happens as well? So you you gotta know the telemetry, you've got to know where it's going, so and understanding what is going on within your environment, and there needs to be some level of uh compromise and understanding of those logs. So there's five main takeaways I want you to think about. One, reachable is a design decision, just kind of we talked about. If you are allowing remote access, it's somebody made the design decision for that.
SPEAKER_01Controls on a box are not layers. So you can put one device and have multiple controls on this, but that's not a layer. You still take that one box out, that was one layer. Segmentation is a configuration. So you have VLANs, these are maintained by people and remade every time the network changes. So you have to have a configuration plan and policy in place to deal with this. Visibility is a target. A loss of view, an impact of its own, that can be a big factor as well.
SPEAKER_01So do you lose it? Is it lying to you? Or what are the different visibility pieces? And then the fifth one, you cannot place what you never listed. So nobody makes a placement decision about a device that is not on a list. If it gets connected by whomever it's working, that's a decision. So you just get a device and you put that on a network, you better have a decision on who did it and you better document what that device is and what it's actually doing. So the big takeaway, the last big takeaway from this is that nothing on that we just talked about here is about a refrigeration controller.
SPEAKER_01You need to go in today or tomorrow and talk to your facilities management people and ask them what do they have in place and what is the design of their networks. This deals with building management, badge readers, camera recorders, room schedulers, all of those things. Because I almost can guarantee you that some of them, if not most of them, were just kind of thrown together to keep them moving. And there's probably very little understanding of the network and how they're all segmented and connected. Okay, question one. The manufacturer runs a fiber link between two of its buildings.
SPEAKER_01The route crosses a public right-of-way, and the conduit is under the company's control, is not under the company's control. The link itself is not encrypted. The security team asks whether it should be. The network team's position is that the link is private and that the fiber rather than the copper, and that the fiber is immune to electromagnetic interference and cannot realistically be tapped. Which response is most accurate? Again, so we've got a manufacturer that runs fiber between two buildings. The route, the route crosses public right of way, and the conduit is not under the company's control.
SPEAKER_01So whoever owns the right of way, probably the city, and the link itself is not encrypted. So the team asks, should it be? Then a security team. The network team's position is that now it's private. It's fiber, so we don't need copper, and the fiber's immune to EMI, so it can't be realistically tapped. Which response is the most accurate? A the EMI point is correct, so the remaining exposure is physical damage to the conduit. B, securing the conduit is the right compensating control for link and the company owns. C, fiber can be can be tapped without cutting it, and the root is not the company's.
SPEAKER_01C. Encryption is at the application layer, already covers the services using the link. So which one is most accurate? And the answer is C. Fiber can be tapped without cutting it, and the root is not the company's. So again, it's an important part. This the overall folks on the security team would be coming back saying, hey guys, you're in the network team. You're saying that it's not, it's it's nothing's gonna happen to it, but it's in a public right of way. And yes, fiber can be tapped without having to cut it.
SPEAKER_01And if even if you do cut it, you know, that might be a bit of an outage, but if you cut it quickly and fix it, it could also go back and things are good. So the trap is a, right? It's about fiber. People think fiber, fiber is un can't mess with it. So the EMI is correct. So the remaining exposure to the physical damage to the conduit. And no, that's that is true. It's true about the parser part of this, but it's about the wrong properties specifically. The EMI describes noise, not who's able to read the traffic. And as we talked about, you can mend it and you can read it.
SPEAKER_01So it's an important piece of that. Next question. An actor reaches the monitoring, reaches the monitoring interface of a cold storage facility controller. The post-incident review establishes that no setup was altered, no set point was altered, no temperature was changed, and no product was lost. For nine days, a facility's monitoring dashboard displayed values the actor supplied. The temperature log the facility retains for the regulatory inspection was generated from that dashboard. Which description of the security impact is most accurate?
SPEAKER_01Okay, so you have a threat actor, attaches the monitoring interface for a cold storage facility controller. The post instance reviews that there was no set point change, no temperature change, no product was lost, but for nine days the facility monitoring dashboard displayed values the actor supplied. So again, the temperature log the facility retains for regulatory inspection was generated from that dashboard. So which was most correct? A an integrity failure in the monitoring record, which the facility relied on as evidence, B a denial of certain denial of view condition, which the availability failure affecting the monitoring function.
SPEAKER_01C a confidentiality failure since the actor obtained operational temperature data from the facility, or D, no material impact since no setting was altered and no product was lost. Okay, so what do you think? And the answer is A. An integrity failure in the monitoring record, which a facility relied upon as evidence. Okay, so the dashboard was never unavailable. It was up, it was responsive, it was answering. The values that were there were not from those folks.
SPEAKER_01So again, that was the problem. Data was present, but the wrong is the integrity failure. That is the issue that comes into play. The trap is B, a denial of view condition, right? The phrase is real, but it fits a different pattern. This is where the view goes dark, and that did not change in this situation. Here the view stayed up and answered. Present, but the wrong numbers were involved, so it was an integrity aspect. But that is where the trap was. It'd be very easy to bite off on the denial of view condition.
SPEAKER_01Next question. You are reviewing a site-to-site VIPsec tunnel established three years ago with a part supplier. The ciphers are current, the certificates rotate on schedule, and the supplier passed its most recent third-party assessment. Yay for them. The tunnel's policy permits the supplier's network to address any host on the compute corporate network. Not so good. The engineers use it to reach two application servers. So again, the policy says you can touch anything you want, but realistically, there's only two application servers they need to touch.
SPEAKER_01So which action most directly addresses the finding? Rewrite the tunnel policy so it permits those two servers and nothing else. B replace the tunnel with a zero trust broker that authorize each request on its own. C inspect the decrypted traffic at the tunnel termination point with an IDS IPS, or D. Rescope the supplier's assessment so it covers the connection and not only their controls. Okay, so which one, which action most directly addresses the finding? And the answer is A.
SPEAKER_01Rewrite the tunnel policy so it permits those two servers and nothing else. So again, that's the big challenge here. If you go back to the question, you're reviewing a site-to-site VPN that was set up three years ago, okay, but they are set up so that they have access to the entire network address, any host on a corporate network, but they're only trying to get two application servers. So from a managerial perspective, what would you do? You would change it so that it only affects those two servers and reduce the access to anything else.
SPEAKER_01It's over permissions, right? Big time over permissions in this situation. So the trap is B. Replace it with a zero trust broker. Will it work? Yes. Is it better architecture? You bet. It's also a better program and response. It however it solves more than what was asked and therefore gets into what they call scope creep. What they ask is what action most directly, most directly addresses the finding. So again, replacing the tunnel to a zero trust broker would be important, but it would not be the most direct way to address the finding.
SPEAKER_01Doing a in a tunnel policy would affect that specifically. Question four. A plant requirement states that the network switches must remain manageable when the production network is unavailable or compromised. The team's design puts switch management on a dedicated VLAN, reachable only from the IT help desk subnet. The switches, the management VLAN, and the help desk subnet all run on the same physical switches and the same cabling. The team describes this as an out-of-band management. You are asked to sign off when the design meets the requirements.
SPEAKER_01What is the most accurate assessment? Okay, so you have a plant requirement that says network switches must remain manageable when the production network is unavailable. The team's design puts this management on a dedicated VLAN. What does this do? A, it meets it because the manager traffic is carried on a VLAN of its own. B, it meets it through microsegmentation rather than separate physical paths. C, it does not meet it until it access lists restrict the VLAN to the help desk. D, it does not meet it because the management path depends on network being managed specifically.
SPEAKER_01And the answer is D, it does not meet it. The management path depends on the network being managed. So you need to understand the requirement rather than the label. It asks for management that still works when the production network does not. So every part of the design runs on that network's own switches and cabling. So that's a big factor. It does not meet it. So an actor on the help desk subnet is admitted admitted by design, and the actor who owns the switches never needed the VLAN at all. So it's an important piece of all this.
SPEAKER_01Now, the trap. Management has a VLAN of its own, so the requirement is met. This is how a great many networks get described, right? In good faith. The separation is real. It's got its own VLAN, its own addresses, but what happens? It's basically separating the traffic is not being separated between them. So it's an important part. Separating traffic is not separating paths. So again, you may separate the traffic specifically, but the paths are still there. The requirement asks what survives, what is not necessarily clean or tidy.
SPEAKER_01So the point is that when you're dealing with this overall paths, how do you ensure that they don't, you don't have issues with them? Okay, that's all I've got for you today. Again, CISSP Cyber Training, these are the different aspects I've got for you. Last shout out, cohort closes today. Today at midnight is when it's closing, and we'll start our new cohort tomorrow. If you want to get your CISSP done in the next eight weeks, let's get to it. And I've got just a few more slots left, just a couple, and then it'll be done until January.
SPEAKER_01All right, thank you all so much for your time, and we'll catch you on the flip side. See ya. Thanks so much for joining me today on my podcast. If you like what you heard, please leave a review on iTunes as I would greatly appreciate your feedback. Also, check out my videos that are on YouTube and just head to my channel at CISSP Cyber Training, and you will find a plethora or a conocopia of content to help you pass the CISSP exam the first time. Lastly, head to CISSP Cyber Training and sign up for 360 free CISSP questions to help you in your CISSP journey.
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