To support our work, please consider joining our Substack (https://havivgur.substack.com/), or Buy Me a Coffee (https://buymeacoffee.com/havivrettiggur). We have merch! Find our awesome new shirts, mugs and hats at https://shop.askhavivanything.com. And be sure to check us out on Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/haviv.rettig.gur/) and TikTok (https://www.tiktok.com/@haviv.rettig.gur). -- Netanyahu was vulnerable. His opponents mobilized their voters and delivered huge increases in turnout. But no side secured a governing majority. What happened? We dig into the election numbers, the cracks in Netanyahu’s coalition, and the opposition’s failure to turn his weaknesses into victory. -- This episode was sponsored anonymously in appreciation of Haviv’s “tireless commitment” to history, analysis, and a wide-ranging selection of guests. The sponsor called our community an “essential forum for diaspora audiences seeking to understand Israel and for Israelis engaging with the concerns and perspective of Jewish communities around the world.” Thank you for sponsoring this episode. -- If you like what we do here, please consider joining our Patreon community at https://www.patreon.com/c/AskHavivAnything or our Substack at https://havivgur.substack.com/. You can also Buy Me a Coffee at https://buymeacoffee.com/havivrettiggur. It helps us keep the lights on. Patreon and Substack are also the platforms where you can ask the questions that guide the topics we cover on the podcast, join our great discussions where listeners share news and valuable resources, and take part in our monthly livestreams where Haviv answers your questions live. If you would like to sponsor an episode, please email us at haviv@askhavivanything.com. Musical intro by Adam Ben Amitai. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit havivgur.substack.com/subscribe
Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.
Transcript
From the show. Tap a time to play from there.
SPEAKER_00Hi, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Ask Habiv Anything. This is going to be a short dive into some of the lessons from the election that just happened on Tuesday. What do we know? What does it all mean? We're going to be talking about some numbers. Stay with me. Or fast forward through the numbers to the conclusions, whatever works for you. But here's the bottom line. Netanyahu was deeply vulnerable in this election. He lost more than his supporters pretend. We can show that in the data, and we're about to do that. And Eisenkot and his allies completely failed to capitalize on those vulnerabilities.
SPEAKER_00They lost more than they are willing to acknowledge. And that tells us something about what happens next. Thank you. Of Jewish communities around the world.
SPEAKER_00Thank you so much to that sponsor. If you want to sponsor an episode, get in touch with us. I'd also love to invite you to join our Patreon community, our Substack community. That's where we have conversations and ask the questions that guide the topics we talk about. It's also where you get to take part in monthly live streams where I answer your questions live, fulfilling the brand promise of Ask Haviv Anything. And also, I don't know if you can tell if you're listening in audio, but you on YouTube who can see the video can see that I'm wearing our first ever merch shirt. Ask Haviv anything with a tagline chosen in collaboration with our listeners.
SPEAKER_00Get the microphone out of the way. Know your story. In the show notes, you're going to find links to the merch, which includes a mug and a hat, to the Patreon community and to the Substack. Thank you so much for being part of this. Any part of this you take part in helps us keep the lights on, it helps us bring you more content, and it helps this community grow. So let's get into it. Netanyahu went into this race with so much in his favor, things that are fundamental, and so fundamental we often don't think about them.
SPEAKER_00For example, first-time Israeli voters lean to the right, according to polls. The new generation of voters who turned 18 over the last four years, they tend to be right-wingers. That's true because of higher birth rates among Haredi Israelis and religious Zionist Israelis, and because young people tended to move to the right after October 7. About 600,000 new voters joined the rolls since 2022. Just cohort replacement should have given Likud maybe 100,000 new votes
SPEAKER_00over what it got in 2022. And there's another thing going for Netanyahu. We've had four years of relatively high emigration of opposition voters. That emigration has been reported on again and again. All kinds of numbers have been thrown around depending on how much panic people want to cause. 40,000 and 200,000. Some of those numbers are fudged or talking about confused things. We know that there are tens of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians with some relation to Israelis or some Jew in the family who use their right
SPEAKER_00of return into Israel for a passport that they then use to move on to the rest of the world. They are tens of thousands of that immigration. But we also know that there are tens of thousands of Israelis leaving who are Leaving because of the politics, leaving because of their sense that the country is turning religious, right wing, leaving because they're disgusted or they feel they're being squeezed out. Some of them are just people who relocated their business just to keep their business running with constant wars,
SPEAKER_00not shutting down travel and hurting investment and sending their employees off to fight in the wars. There are tens of thousands of these emigrants, of these new expats, and they're heavily concentrated, according to the best studies we have, among secular, high-income professionals, tech workers, doctors, the more recent immigrants from the FSU, not just from the war years, but really anything post-2015, who tend to vote anti-Netanyahu, for example, for Avigdor Liberman's Israel Beitenu party.
SPEAKER_00This emigration is probably a couple of Knesset seats, even when you factor in the tens of thousands of expats who came to Israel just to vote last week. And then there are the people who died. There are probably 200,000 Israelis who died a natural death in the last four years. And polls of Israelis 75 and older tell us that they're disproportionately secular Ashkenazi and opposition voters. So you have hundreds of thousands of new right-wing young people,
SPEAKER_00some not entirely known number, tens of thousands of opposition voters who left the country, and the death of a lot of leftists through the natural cycles of nature. All of them advantage Netanyahu. It's a total advantage of hundreds of thousands just in demographic realities. And yet Likud's total votes... Between 2022 and 2026, in actual vote numbers, grew by just 52,000, by 4.7% of the 2022 total.
SPEAKER_00And the whole Netanyahu bloc, all of the right-wing parties together that form his coalition, grew by just over 90,000, about 4%. That's a lot less than the total increase in votes of 19%. It's less than the demographic renewal of Likud-leaning demographics of that whole section of Israeli society. In fact, with just 20.5% of valid votes, Netanyahu just performed worse than any Likud leader in Likud's history
SPEAKER_00since it won its first election in 1977. That's with the exception of a unique one-off crash of Likud's parliamentary position in 2006 down to 12 seats. But that was part of a split in Likud with Likud and Kadima, complicated, unique, one-off. Everything returned to the mean afterwards. Since 1977, 20.5%, which Netanyahu just won of the valid votes for his party, is the worst showing for Likud ever.
SPEAKER_00Netanyahu's coalition even lost ground in the Jewish vote. It's not just about the surge of Arab turnout, which is the excuse given for Likud underperforming. There's the fascinating story of Shas and its very bad, no good election day. On election day, the Shas Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party fell from 11 seats in the Knesset to six. From 8.25% of the vote to 5.25% of the vote.
SPEAKER_00And in real numbers, it dropped from 400,000 votes in 2022 to 300,000, just under 300,000 votes this time around. And that's despite a very quick demographic growth among its voter base, which should have added 10% to its rolls had it maintained the same percentage just of its own, you know, loyal voter base. Schatz's voters are mostly ultra-Orthodox, and they average between four and six children per woman,
SPEAKER_00something that secular voters, opposition voters, on average, don't reach half of. They average about 2.3, roughly, per woman. So it's not right to think of Schatz's drop from 400,000 to 300,000 as a 100,000-vote drop, because the reasonable expectation just from demographic growth would have been about 440,000, maybe. It's a gigantic fall. And a couple of Shas officials have actually said something along these lines, that even though they lost a quarter of the number they had in 2022,
SPEAKER_00they actually probably lost about a third of their voter base. Where did that voter base go? We're starting to get some signals, some glimmers, of a kind of change in Haredi society, of a sense of disillusionment. And we saw it in this crash of Shas. It begins in Shas. The Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, who are most ashamed on this question of not serving in the military, not participating in the draft over the course of three years of war,
SPEAKER_00the Haredim who feel it the most when their fellow Israelis, including fellow right-wing religious Israelis, serve hundreds of days of reserve duty, sacrifice so much, while their community insists on not serving in principle, The ones who feel it the most are the ones who have family members who do serve, who have families that cross the divide from kind of traditional all the way to religious Zionist all the way to ultra-Orthodox.
SPEAKER_00And the families that cross those divides tend to be Sephardi. And so the Sephardi Haredi party Shas experienced this crash in a way that the Ashkenazi Haredi party, or the alliance of different parties, United Torah Judaism, of Ashkenazi Haredim, didn't experience it. Those are the parts of the Shas electorate, the ones with those family members, who probably turned their backs on the party. That's how Shas, people are talking about it right now in the press, who punished Shas' leaders for rejecting any compromise on the question
SPEAKER_00of national service. And it left a third of Chasse's electorate, a pretty loyal electorate in recent elections, completely dislodged and disloyal. There are some indications that most of them probably moved to Likud. That's traditionally where Shas voters go when they leave Shas. There's a former Shas M.K. Gal Guetta who said that on television, a former advisor to Shas leader Ari Aderi, Barak Seri, who said that in interviews to the press. It's something that's being sort of understood as probably where they went. We don't have hard data that tells us,
SPEAKER_00which you can only really poll, exactly who voted Shas and now switched to voting Likud. But most of them seem to have gone to Likud. It's interesting that the Shafs voters didn't go to the new Haredi parties, like Hatsibura Haredi, the Haredi public, which is a political party that wants a strong and very self-confident Haredism that nevertheless supports national service. And it's not exactly clear why those new Haredi parties failed so badly. Tzibur Haredi, I think, got around 10,000 votes.
SPEAKER_00It might be a Sephardi-Ashkenazi divide, but it might also be that the military service issue in Haredi society is ultimately, at its deepest core, a question of separatism from Israeli society or integration from broader Israeli Jewish society. If you choose to accept national service as an ideal, an ethic, a responsibility, you kind of fundamentally turn yourself toward an identification more as an Israeli.
SPEAKER_00And you're less likely to vote for another Haredi party who has this nuanced take that supports national service while still being removed sociologically as a Haredi community. In other words, you're going to pick Likud or Haredi. Gadi Eisenkot's party, or Otzma Yehudit on the far right. As far as we can tell, that's what happened to a couple of percentage points of missing United Torah Judaism votes. They grew by 12%, which is a great showing, but their demographics grew by about 15%.
SPEAKER_00So there's a couple of missing votes there from just demographic renewal. And those numbers are missing, and the missing votes are concentrated in places where there are large Chabad communities. In other words, the Chabad Hasidic movement, which leans very right, appears to be shifting from Haredi politics, United Torah Judaism, to far-right politics, Otsma Yehudit, where the question of national service is certainly pro-national service. And that brings us back to Netanyahu's vulnerability,
SPEAKER_00to the possibility that as many as 100,000 Shas voters may have moved to Likud. That's another advantage Netanyahu should have enjoyed on election day. That has to be factored in to determining whether or not there was a success or a failure. The increase from Shas should have been at least as high as Likud's total net vote increase of about 52,000 and may have been twice as high. Put it all together, the new young voters, the dying leftists, the new expats.
SPEAKER_00The Shas boost, the fact that Likud probably cannibalized more votes from within Netanyahu's coalition, the total net gain of the religious Zionist parties and the far right of religious Zionism and Zehut and Utsma Yehudit shrank by one seed from the last election. All of that put together, and Likud and the coalition should have grown by probably a quarter million for Likud if it had held on to anything approaching the vote share of 2022,
SPEAKER_00and twice that for the coalition. In 2022, in the last election, Netanyahu's people made a point of saying that they may not have won the overall popular vote when they formed the coalition. They only got about 48.5% of it, but they won the Jewish popular vote. And that's a sign of their legitimacy, they said. 54.2% of the vote if you exclude the Arab party votes from the count. Well, this time, even with the Arab turnout, which was enormous and dropped everybody's shares down,
SPEAKER_00obviously, when you remove the Arab party votes, Likud's share is 49.4%. And again, that's a five-point drop. Now, I can already hear Netanyahu's defenders chafing and chomping at the bit. I get it. You're right. This time, they're saying,
SPEAKER_00and I'm going to get emails about this, this time Netanyahu lost votes to the threshold. What does that mean? If any political party in an election in Israel doesn't clear three and a quarter percent of the total valid votes, all its votes are canceled, thrown out. In the 2022 election, that gave Netanyahu the victory. The votes that fell under the threshold came almost entirely from the left. Right? Meretz and Balad. This time around...
SPEAKER_00That happened to the right. Netanyahu's supporters are arguing this, and they have a very good point. Ofer Winter's Amcha Yisrael party failed to clear the threshold. It got about 95,000 votes. That's 95,000 votes lost to the political right. Almost two Knesset seats. And when we're talking about Likud being short 250,000, let's say, well, isn't that a big part of the gap? And Yozende's reservists party. They got something like 150,000 votes. They didn't make it past the threshold.
SPEAKER_00Isn't that our gap in right-wing votes right there? Quarter million? They were under the threshold. That's it, right? Nothing to explain. Unfortunately, no. Yes, those parties ran and failed to clear the threshold, and their total votes are about 250,000. But were they all Likud voters? Who were they actually? Hendel's Reservists Party, which championed the rights of military reservists, including universal service, breaking the dependence on the Haredi coalition,
SPEAKER_00moving a lot of the welfare stipends given to yeshiva students over to reservists. Is that a party of voters who were voting Netanyahu or for Netanyahu's bloc? And Yoaz Hendel ran with a guy named Zalicha, who was head of a basically social democratic economic party. And with Einat Wilf, friend of the podcast, a hawk, certainly, when it comes to the war, a champion of Zionism, but also an emphatic secularist,
SPEAKER_00a former Labour Party activist, a member of Knesset. You're telling me that Hendel, Zalicha, and Wilf's party, that all of their votes came from Netanyahu's Likud? Or from the rest of the bloc, where the shortfall is even bigger than just the shortfall for Likud? From Swatrich voters, or Bengvir voters, or Shas voters? That's the argument? I'm going to hazard a guess that Handel probably took as many votes from the Eisenkot camp, and maybe even more votes from the Eisenkot camp, from the secularist camp,
SPEAKER_00from the center-right part of that side of the political aisle, than from Netanyahu. And if that's true, it only adds to the scale of the setback that Netanyahu's numbers represent on election day. Now, none of that can be said for Amcha Yisrael, for Ofer Winter's party. The 100,000 votes that Winter took were emphatically right-wing, mostly religious. But here's the thing. Why would a right-wing religious voter vote for Ofer Winter in the first place?
SPEAKER_00Why not vote for the Religious Zionism Party or Likud or the Ultra-Orthodox or the far-right in Netanyahu's coalition? What was Amcha Yisrael selling? What was its appeal? What was its campaigns? And the answer is that it was an explicitly anti-Netanyahu party that also explicitly promised to back Netanyahu for prime minister. Really, literally, what was won't be again was Winter's favorite line during the election campaign.
SPEAKER_00The party was just telling people, yeah, we will recommend Netanyahu for prime minister because we can't trust the left. We don't believe in what the left believes in, but we're going to vote for a commission of inquiry on day one into the war. And Netanyahu's absolute red line will be violated by that. And we're going to condition our support for the coalition on universal service. Meaning we will stand against any kind of coalition that would actually bring Netanyahu back to power, that Netanyahu could actually stomach. You want a different, fundamentally different politics while staying on the right?
SPEAKER_00Vote for us. It's... It's a group who wouldn't go with the left but vowed to raise the banner of rebellion on the right against the politics that keep Netanyahu in power. Winter's voters are exactly the disillusioned, the disgusted right-wing voter who couldn't bring themselves to side with the secularists or with the leftists. But couldn't vote for this version of the right. They are voters Netanyahu pushed away.
SPEAKER_00What drew them to Winter as opposed to the parties around Netanyahu, despite Netanyahu's campaign against Winter, was that they were a rebellion against Netanyahu, although within the right. They don't disagree with Netanyahu on fundamental principles, but on his choices, on his behavior, on his compromises. That's exactly the disillusionment we're measuring here. These are the votes that Netanyahu lost to his banner, and he lost them fair and square. They couldn't bring themselves to vote for him.
SPEAKER_00That's also, by the way, true of the Likudniks who moved from Netanyahu to Hendel, for example, who risked voting for a new party that was only polling right around the threshold because of their disgust with the old ones. Netanyahu lost a lot of voters. It goes beyond Arab turnout. It goes beyond any measure you can come up with to excuse it. And he lost them fair and square because they were disillusioned and disgusted by the coalition.
SPEAKER_00They went to the rebellious parties or stayed home. All of that is to say Netanyahu was dramatically vulnerable. Three years of war, October 7th, The deep sense of inequality in the draft as the burden of the draft becomes very significant for hundreds of thousands of Israeli households. All of it laid at Netanyahu's feet. And that brings us to the failure of Eisenkot, of Bennett, of Lapid, of Lieberman, of the leaders of the opposition.
SPEAKER_00Here's the thing. The opposition leaders did very well. The Jewish-led opposition parties grew their real votes by 18%. That's 1.82 million in 2022 to 2.15 million this year. That's in real votes. They did well in turnout also. In percentage turnout. Tel Aviv was up 5.8 points. The same in Hercelia. Ramadan was up 6 points. These are major strongholds for opposition voters.
SPEAKER_00And turnout is a percentage of total eligible population, meaning turnout is above and beyond demographic growth. Now, these cities are not uniformly opposition voting. Tel Aviv has a Likud base as well in the southern neighborhoods. Herzliya has a western neighborhood that's mostly Yemeni and historically votes Likud. But they're nevertheless overwhelmingly either secular or leftist. And they all increased across the board. The turnout increase for the opposition parties was larger than the turnout increase
SPEAKER_00for Netanyahu's allies and coalition. When you factor in the Arab surge in turnout, you actually see the difference most clearly. The Jewish opposition party's total share of the vote stayed steady. It dropped less than half a percentage point, from 38.2 to 37.8. Netanyahu's camp's share fell six points. In other words, they did well on election day. They got out the vote, they increased their share,
SPEAKER_00they did it against all the demographic advantages that the right religious coalition has that we listed earlier. And yet, when you think of the advantages they had going for them, there's one very smart analyst, Ariel Schnebel of the right-wing newspaper Macquarie Shon, who laid out the case that the opposition just lost. It's part of a column in which he actually presents the very complicated argument that the data supports pretty much every takeaway, that every side won and every side lost,
SPEAKER_00then it's kind of a Rorschach election where everybody sees in it what they want. But here's his, which is an interesting column and I urge people to read it, but here's his case that Eisenhower nevertheless in an important sense lost. He writes, since the political upheaval in 1977, he I'll just add, that's the first time the left lost an election and Likud came to power. Since that political upheaval, the center-left camp has never had more favorable conditions. Everything lined up against the right. A poorly planned judicial reform that was almost entirely blocked following protests and unrest.
SPEAKER_00A horrific massacre seared into the national consciousness as the worst day since the state's founding. Three years of never-ending war, despite repeated declarations by Netanyahu that we were, quote, a step from total victory. Including, by the way, Netanyahu explicitly saying on TV, we're just weeks away from victory in Gaza. That was at the very least a year ago. Add to that all the scandals, the latest being Qatargate, all the fallout. And Schnebel writes, the palpable discontent among many Netanyahu bloc voters with senior figures
SPEAKER_00and ministers who had lost all restraint in their behavior, in their politics. I would just say, I think he means they lost all shame. That's a lot of populism in the outgoing coalition and in Likud's ranks. And you have, he writes, with all of that, the perfect recipe for a resounding historic political turnaround. You just have to put it in the oven and wait till it's done. He's being euphemistic. In other words, it's in the bag. And instead, Schnebel writes,
SPEAKER_00the bloc secured just 48 seats, light years away from being able to form a government without the Arab parties. Even the possibility of forming a government just with Ra'am, which has happened in the past, is a tenuous proposition in terms of public acceptance. Ra'am's leader just a couple days ago wouldn't call Hamas a terror group in an interview. Even that is out of reach. Worse still, he says, Netanyahu's camp won five more seats than Eisenkot's camp. Put all that together, that's not a defeat, that's a complete failure.
SPEAKER_00Eizenkut did well, but not remotely as well as he needed to do. And with all the vulnerabilities that Netanyahu had going into this election, no one in the opposition could make good on them. If, as you hear from many opposition voters, secular, liberal Israel's very existence is at stake, if this government is a danger to democracy, As so many felt when they marched against the judicial plans of the government. If Netanyahu's endless promises of victory really are as hollow as
SPEAKER_00the Eisenkot camp's voters generally say, if they genuinely believe that he's on trial for corruption because he's deeply corrupt, then a six-point jump in turnout in Hiltzeliah is chump change. It's not showing up. It's not urgency. Arab voters showed what urgency looks like. With organized crime driving an insane wave of murders in their streets. With a minister of police, Benkville, set explicitly against them, publicly and openly, with a sense that they're under siege.
SPEAKER_00They turned out in massive numbers. Where did the Tel Aviv turnout go? It might be a leadership problem. The bloc that opposes Netanyahu ran with four different leaders, Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, and Lieberman. None of them could make any inroads into the identitarian wall that holds together the other side. As we pointed out in this podcast before, studies have shown that the single characteristic of the voters that most correlates
SPEAKER_00for whether a voter voted coalition or opposition in 2022 was how religious the voter is. It's a secular opposition and a religious coalition. Well, then that's the challenge. Make inroads into a more religiously identified, also a little bit more Sephardi, also a little bit poorer on average, coalition. The messaging of the opposition led by Eisenkot was vague. There was constant infighting. They were constantly trying to outflank each other.
SPEAKER_00And they were completely failing to outflank Netanyahu. Including from the only side where Netanyahu has ever been vulnerable, which is the hawkish side. They should have spent four years being more hawkish. They should have spent three years capitalizing on October 7 politically. Netanyahu certainly used October 7 in political ways. That can sound strange to foreign audiences to talk about having to be more belligerent or hawkish or aggressive than Netanyahu. Many foreign audiences, most foreign audiences probably think of Netanyahu as Attila the Hunn.
SPEAKER_00But over the course of the war, he has repeatedly promised much more than he delivered. He has huge support among Israelis for his policies on Iran. But he has promised victory there that doesn't seem to be coming. He promised victory in Gaza repeatedly, countlessly, including impending and imminent victories. He's brought vast costs to Gazans, to Israelis. And Hamas still stubbornly clings to power there.
SPEAKER_00And over the course of the war, there were many months, repeatedly, again and again, where he seemed to dither, where the strategy wasn't clear, where the grand strategy pivoted from a raiding war to an occupation to a negotiation, months and months wasted without any IDF actions or advances. And the opposition never capitalized on any of it. Where was the campaign? Banging on about those promises, explaining what could have been done better. The campaign that said we would have done it faster and harder.
SPEAKER_00We would have fought the information war where Hamas was absolutely showing up to the fight and Israel never did. There are economic elements to the Iran war that Netanyahu has avoided. Maybe we should have bombed the energy infrastructure in Iran. We could do more than Trump allows us to do. That's a political campaign. It's clear. It's consistent. It makes a case voters can understand. It robs Netanyahu of his one counter-argument to the failures of October 7. Netanyahu used the Trump endorsement a week before the election.
SPEAKER_00He gave a statement to Israelis after Trump endorsed him where he said, basically, I'm paraphrasing, we have a two-year window. In this two-year window before Trump is gone and the next American president is quite likely to not be in our camp on our side, This is our chance to win against Iran, to secure for Israel a long-term safety from the eliminationist plans that that regime has for us. The opposition didn't leap into that conversation and point to every failure that Netanyahu has had as a military leader and declared that it would do it harder,
SPEAKER_00would fight harder, would coordinate with Trump harder. Be there, be present, be loud, be part of the narrative, set the narrative. In other words, it didn't do what Netanyahu would have done. Imagine the last three years of war. Every decision, every action, every cost, every consequence, every failure, every success. All of it identical. With the only exception that Eisenkot was Prime Minister for those three years. And Netanyahu was opposition leader, now running to replace him.
SPEAKER_00What would Netanyahu's campaign have looked like? What would he have said? What would he have accused? What would he have demanded? How would he have shaped the narrative? If you can picture that, and people with some experience in Israeli politics can picture it, that's the failure on the opposition side. Netanyahu's office has already declared that these elections were stolen elections, quote. In those words, literally. Why? Because of the vote-buying scandal among ROM voters
SPEAKER_00whose scale we have no actual information about. It's not at all clear if it's big or small. It looks like it might have been a fairly small operation, but that's just what the police have so far done in terms of arrests. Maybe it turns out to be much bigger. I kind of hope it turns out to be very big. Because the bigger the scandal... The less I have to carry around the thought in my head that my prime minister is trying to invalidate a free and fair election because he didn't win clean and easy at the ballot box. Which sucks.
SPEAKER_00But that's who he is. This is a man who changed our basic laws in 2020 and created new structures of government. The parity government. Look it up. As part of a grand cheating of the opposition leader Gantz. Out of a rotation agreement the two men signed. He wasn't lying to guns. He was lying to us Israelis. He said on national television, there'll be no tricks, no schticks. We can do a unity government. I promise. I'll change the laws to make sure I can't lie to you. That was literally the message.
SPEAKER_00And it was a lie. He will lie and he will cheat. Every voter of his knows it. None of them deny it. He will lie and he will cheat to his coalition partners and to the public. He won't take responsibility for his failures. He'll push himself into every photo op taking credit for everything that this nation and this country has ever achieved, whether he had a hand in it or not. And I'm not critiquing him. That's my point. This is praise. He's out to win.
SPEAKER_00I have literally heard his advisors chuckling about his opponents being too embarrassed, too decent to behave in the same way. Where is the hunger for victory? Where's the understanding of how political narratives are shaped and how identities are formed? Netanyahu has it. Netanyahu embodies it. His opponents don't. The opposition parties refused to occupy the political space actually open to them
SPEAKER_00where Netanyahu was vulnerable. Nobody actually quite knows what an Eisenhower government wants, what it would stand for, what it would be doing. I don't think people know today. Besides temporarily pushing off some of the problematic aspects of another Netanyahu term, is that enough to bring out the votes? Just pushing off for one election cycle another Netanyahu term? Is that enough to draw votes from Netanyahu's own camp? Because you're going to deliver what they actually want among the hundreds
SPEAKER_00of thousands of disillusioned Netanyahu voters? Is that enough to break the identitarian wall of religious Sephardi that keeps them loyal? Is that enough to reshape politics in a way the opposition has to actually reshape politics if it ever hopes to win in the future? When you understand what needs to be done, you understand the scale of the failure. And that same political gentlemanliness is kind of now the main event as we pivot from the election to the coalition negotiations.
SPEAKER_00Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman have been pressuring Eisenkot for a few days to hold a vote to replace the Knesset Speaker. The opposition plus the Arab parties have a parliamentary majority. In the Knesset they can do what they want, whether or not they can form a coalition government. The Knesset speaker right now is Likud's Amir al-Khana, and they would replace him with an opposition member of Knesset. And that would massively increase the opposition's control of the entire parliamentary schedule of something called the V'adam Isadere, the organizing committee, which sets the whole schedule of everything that's about to happen during
SPEAKER_00the coalition negotiations, etc. It would make it easier to pass legislation. It would make it harder for Netanyahu, for example, to engineer the dissolution of the Knesset to a second run-on election just to prevent Eisenkot from forming a coalition. It would improve the opposition's leverage in any unity talks with Likud. And it took Eisenkot a long time to say he's on board. Days. He seems to be looking for unity. And seeming to be looking for unity is a great way not to get it.
SPEAKER_00He seems to be afraid of a run-on election. The opposition parties are more afraid of a second election than Netanyahu is. Netanyahu underperformed. He thinks he can do better. The Arabs overperformed. He thinks they might do worse. But if Netanyahu knows that he can afford a second election more than they can, that's what he's going to shoot for. All he has to do is keep disrupting everything, preventing Eisenkot from having a coalition. He doesn't actually have to have one himself. Why did he declare that the scandal about vote buying in Ra'am is a stolen election?
SPEAKER_00That's a very dramatic thing to say. He declared it because he wants to turn the entire Arab turnout success into an illegitimate political event that makes it harder for Eisenkot to depend on those votes. Obviously, that's what he's doing. Disrupt, hold the line, delay by absolutely any means possible. Netanyahu probably wants a unity government with Netanyahu at the lead and Eisenkot as a significant member. Why not? It increases his leverage against the far right, against every coalition partner.
SPEAKER_00It makes it a little easier to interact with the Trump administration and the world generally. But Netanyahu is also willing to go to another election. If the Arab parties can't repeat Tuesday's achievement, and it's quite likely they would not repeat it quite as well. He remains caretaker, prime minister in the interim. He and police minister Benkvir will do everything they can to depress the Arab turnout in the meanwhile. And all of that positions them closer to 61 seats and gives Netanyahu another six months in power.
SPEAKER_00What's the plan on the opposition side to deal with that, with those two options that Netanyahu has? Unity with him in charge or sitting it out for a second election? The opposition has options. It's entirely possible that Arab turnout is stickier than Netanyahu calculates. Every effort by Netanyahu to depress Arab turnout in the last six races drove higher Arab turnout. We've seen that repeatedly. Arab political leaders are pretty notoriously historically terrible at bringing out
SPEAKER_00the Arab vote. The Arab street does not connect with the ideological vocabulary of the Arab political leadership. That changed a little bit with Mansour Abbas and Ra'am because they started talking about cooperation with mainstream Jewish politics, sitting in a coalition, bringing budgets to their communities, bringing bureaucratic attention to their communities the way the Haredim do. Anti-Arab campaigns have generally been more successful than Arab political parties
SPEAKER_00in driving the Arab vote. So maybe the Arab vote is stickier. It can repeat itself. And any Netanyahu Ben Gvir attempt to depress it is exactly what will bring it out again. Also, if the Arab turnout is high enough to deny Netanyahu 61 seats, but not quite as high as it is now, that would probably be an advantage to the opposition. If the opposition, for example, manages to come within Ra'am size distance of a majority,
SPEAKER_00Ra'am becomes a much more palatable ally than the joint list. Ra'am is limited. It can't say everything. There are limitations on what Mansur Abbas can say. But he doesn't fundamentally, in principle, oppose a Jewish state, unlike Balad or Hadash. There's wiggle room there, it's happened before, that there isn't with the rest of the joint list, just in terms of ideological radicalism, in terms of what the voter can swallow.
SPEAKER_00A lower Arab turnout that makes the opposition's life easier, as long as it's still high enough to deny Netanyahu 61, is a win. Bennett and Lieberman seem to understand that they can't sit with Arab parties. Maybe I'm probably not, definitely not the rest of them. The ideological gaps are too immense, but there is a lot of wiggle room. They have a lot of cards to play. They know Netanyahu well,
SPEAKER_00and they're trying to push Eisenkot to a more confrontational political strategy to be as cutthroat as Netanyahu himself. Including a willingness to risk a second election. Or what's the point? You're buying yourself, what, two years? Two years isn't the point. The point is being able to fundamentally change the direction of things if you disagree with where things are going. That fight over whether the opposition is going to be aggressive, Netanyahu-like, or passive,
SPEAKER_00easily spun, Gantz-like, That fight is happening right now, and we're watching Eisenko try to find his footing and figure out what he wants and how he's going to get there. So what just happened? Everybody lost. Victory goes to the one who can best capitalize on the other guy's loss, is probably the best description of this election. And that means that the money is still on Netanyahu. He's the better player at this game.
SPEAKER_00The opposition hasn't yet shown that it knows how to take advantage of Netanyahu's vulnerabilities. And they're significant. As long as that's the opposition, the advantage will remain with Netanyahu. We're going to soon learn whether Eisenkot understands the game, whether he understands that the only way to launch serious unity talks that don't just sideline and erase him is to demonstrate that he has other options. If he wants real unity talks with Netanyahu, he had better be able to deliver parliamentary wins with the Arab parties.
SPEAKER_00He'd better be able to have something to hold over Netanyahu. Netanyahu himself, by the way, has done that countless times in the past, and now will pretend to be horrified about it. He'll also try to turn that kind of cooperation into his campaign for a second round. And campaign for a second election, preparing that campaign visibly, It's another necessary element of any strategy that wants to deal with Netanyahu as an equal. Netanyahu is already doing it. In other words, the election is over, but the campaign isn't.
SPEAKER_00The campaign is never over. That's how it's done, at least if you want to win. You never stop hitting at Netanyahu's vulnerabilities, at his promises of victory, at his compromises to the Haredi parties on equal service. You never let up. And you don't come to Netanyahu with overtures. You come with leverage. That's how Netanyahu comes to the opposition. Every ounce of leverage you can muster at every turn. Netanyahu is already doing that to Isinkot.
SPEAKER_00If the Arab leaders understand all these dynamics, they will understand that's also a good opening for them to make good on their own community's needs. They can win a lot. A lot of the things they promised to deliver for their communities, they can win for them without taking the step they themselves don't want to take. And certainly the Jewish majority parties want even less, which is to give them a seat in the cabinet where they get to vote on a war with Iran or even just a parliamentary coalition that's going to vote on defense budgets. That's stuff that doesn't entirely interest the Arab community.
SPEAKER_00They really are focused on themselves and their needs. And they can win a lot. A lot more than they realize, I think. Or a lot more than they're used to demanding. Just by being a vote the coalition needs. The election is over. And the battle over what it means has just begun. We know what Netanyahu wants. We know how he plans to get it. We know that in the opposition, some opposition leaders are thinking clearly, they understand what's possible.
SPEAKER_00It's not yet clear that Eisenkot is among them. They have a weaker hand than Netanyahu, but mostly they're just worse players. And we're going to be learning fairly soon whether they have a strategy for deepening Netanyahu's shortfall in the case of another election, for denying him a majority going forward, for building and using the kind of leverage that makes unity talks possible, fruitful. Or not. Whoever wins that game has won the election.
We have merch! Find our awesome new shirts, mugs and hats at https://shop.askhavivanything.com. To support our work, please consider joining our Substack (https://havivgur.substack.com/), or Buy Me a Coffee...
We have merch! Find our awesome new shirts, mugs and hats at https://shop.askhavivanything.com. To support our work, please consider joining our Substack (https://havivgur.substack.com/), or Buy Me a Coffee...
We have merch! Find our awesome new shirts, mugs and hats at https://shop.askhavivanything.com. To support our work, please consider joining our Substack (https://havivgur.substack.com/), or Buy Me a Coffee...
A note from Haviv to our viewers: Please excuse the video troubles. Elizabeth’s connectivity was limited for the first half hour or so of the conversation. But the audio came through perfectly and we didn’t want to...
To support our work, please consider joining our Patreon community (https://www.patreon.com/c/AskHavivAnything), Substack (https://havivgur.substack.com/), or Buy Me a Coffee (https://buymeacoffee.com/havivrettiggur)....