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Volts

Volts artwork

This oil shock won't be like the others

Jun 5, 202626 minAudio

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit www.volts.wtf Why is the latest fossil fuel crisis pushing the world toward rapid electrification instead of a drilling boom? To find out, I chat with Tim Sahay and Kate Mackenzie, hosts of the Polycrisis newsletter and podcast, about the concept of “polycrisis” and the global rise of manufacturing-heavy electrostates. We examine the massive global diffusion of cheap electrotech and discuss why American climate wonks need to look past domestic policy and start paying attention to international macroeconomics.

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hello everyone greetings this is Volts for June 5th 2026 this oil shock won't be like the others I'm your host David Roberts most clean energy journalism in the US

SPEAKER_01including Volts is focused on domestic policy and technology That certainly provides plenty of drama these days, but it can sometimes obscure the fact that the clean energy transition is a global phenomenon that is shaping not just energy supply, but geopolitics. It is all bound up with trade, economics, colonialism, and of course the physical systems shaped by climate change. It is shifting alliances, threatening hegemonies,

and reordering international relations. That is the argument that Tim Sahai and Kate McKenzie develop in their newsletter

SPEAKER_01and podcast, The Poly Crisis. The central through line of their work is that we are moving from a world organized around petrostates, countries that derive power from controlling oil, to one organized around electrostates, where power comes from manufacturing capacity and grid systems. The U.S., in their telling, is very much on the wrong side of that shift. I'm not perverse enough to call it lucky, but at the very least it was telling that just as they launched

their pod,

SPEAKER_01the Iran war broke out and the Strait of Hormuz closed. We are now living through a live test case of their thesis. Their prediction is that this fossil fuel crisis is different from the previous ones because now there are alternatives and the crisis is going to push everyone toward them. We will see about that. Tim is a researcher at John Hopkins who advises governments on green industrial policy Kate is a former Financial Times journalist and Bloomberg Green columnist We

are going to talk all about the various crises that add up to the poly and dig into

SPEAKER_01how this perspective can inform the domestic energy conversation All right, then with no further ado, Tim Sahai, Kate McKenzie, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming. Hi, thank you. Huge pleasure to be here. Let's start with just what's a polycrisis. I think, as far as I know, Adam Tooze coined that word.

SPEAKER_01I'm curious, like if that is the origin, where you found it and sort of like what it means, what it's trying to convey.

SPEAKER_00The funniest sort of joke that somebody made to me on Twitter, if all shit is fucked up, it's probably going to cause a crisis.

SPEAKER_02Can you have swearing on this?

SPEAKER_00Sure, why not?

SPEAKER_02I know you're American.

SPEAKER_00And I was just like, a lot of things are effed up. Well, what's effed up? I mean, pick your poison, right? Like we have rising oligarchy, we have wars, we just came out of a pandemic. You know, there is no normal. We're never going back to normal. We have sort of created a world that just systemically, endogenously from within it produces huge mega crises, right? And, you know, everyone's got their favorite ones, as I said, but they basically originate some things in geopolitics,

SPEAKER_00you know, something to do with the empire being extended, overextended, you know, the U.S. military sort of not being able to win a war since again, pick your date, you know.

SPEAKER_01World War II, I believe, was the last one.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, so you know, but so the U.S. military is sort of like the position of the West, which is anchored by American sort of military dominance is sort of no more. It has met a lot of its sort of competitors, whether they're Russia, whether they're China, and guess what? Whether it's Iran, a small, scrappy country like Iran could still basically fight the American military to a standstill. So that's one source of crisis. The other one is our ecological crises, right? Like this is a crisis that's just accelerating. This year is going to be this dramatic El Niño,

which may or may not cause food shortages and fertilizer shortages already with the

SPEAKER_00war. So, you know, that's another source of crises. And then we I really think that the rise of right wing populism or whatever you want to call it is really located in a deep systemic sort of inequality crisis. And that's a surging oligarchies across the world. The US is just the most extreme case. of a, you know, almost of a takeover of an oligarchy in the hands of Trump and his cronies. But, you know, this is as anyone honest enough would say, well, that's been sort of rising systematically for 20, 30 years.

SPEAKER_00And it's not just the US, it's everywhere. And then the last sort of crises that we think of, so there's imperial, ecological, economic, And the last crisis that we think of is not sort of a crisis, but like every crisis is a moment of opportunity for someone. And I think most of us in the US are really, we think of the shock doctrine, right? We think of bad people leaping onto a That is our experience. That's our experience, right? Because anyone who is entrenched and in power can seize upon

crises and manipulate

SPEAKER_00it and push it towards their desired objectives. But the world is a big place. And there's lots of such actors. And it's not clear to me that only the baddies win. And in particular, what we really want to stress upon is this is a moment of opening for many people in the world. It's a moment of opening, particularly for middle powers, you know, your Canadas and your Australias and so on. It's a moment of opening for a lot of Global South countries that had been hemmed in by a dollar order that was unjust and hierarchical.

And now, you know, the IMF and the World Bank, like they seem to have less firepower.

SPEAKER_01They seem to have sort of less power.

SPEAKER_00ability to coerce countries as they may have done in their heyday. And the opening also for a gigantic force multiplier force actor in the world in the name of China, which is leading this electrotech revolution. And, you know, for mostly its own reasons, decided to get off fossil fuels in a very serious way 10, 20 years ago, and is now, you know, selling the means of resilience to so many countries around the world.

SPEAKER_01We're going to get to all that stuff, but I guess the one bit of pushback I have is it's certainly hard to argue that everything is effed up. That seems evident. What I'm wondering is, has there ever been a time in world history when everything was not effed up? When you could not teleport back to any given year and find someone saying... man everything seems effed up and list you know a bunch of things that are effed up like is there something unique about our moment that makes it

different from you know like I don't know you go back to the 1960s in America you know like leaders are getting assassinated you know there's coups overseas like things always kind of seem like they're effed up yeah but is there an argument that they're more effed up

SPEAKER_02now than usual well I think this is what got me. I don't know about you, Tim, but I mean, this is one of the things that got me interested and really engaged in climate change like 15 years ago is like it is something different, right? It is unique. It's unprecedented. It's mostly irreversible. So, yeah, I mean, I think that's a familiar thought to anyone that's engaged in climate change. It does seem like the special sauce for our poly crisis is something that's irreversible, right?

SPEAKER_01Something that's inexorable and irreversible. happening in the background.

SPEAKER_02Tim's reasons for optimism are quite interesting, I think, to unpack and have influenced me a lot. But some of these things have been better in the past. I mean, there was, you know, in the West, in the global North, there were some, you know, progressive movements in the 60s, 70s, 80s that we recently, I think both of us, read a book called Counter-Revolution by an Australian academic that sort of chronicles how that was dismantled, I guess, the sort of progressive movements of the 70s. And, you know, there was also... There was a lot of, like, global South solidarity movements in the post-World War II,

SPEAKER_02and a lot of that was kind of eroded by the high interest rates, really, thanks to the US of the early 80s. So there was a couple of things that were, I'd say, like, oh, I don't know if there were more glimmers of hope, but I remain optimistic. It does seem like the post-World War II era was, like, a multi-decade period of relative... obviously relative you know and like relative progressive advance but I sometimes worry that that period that we all sort of like made our

benchmark of normal was in fact itself a weird anomaly and that in fact polycrisis is the normal is a much more familiar state of the world in some sense like we kind of held it together for

SPEAKER_01a while and now it's falling back apart

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I mean, I also kind of like the kind of the critique of polycrisis that it's just a bunch of people in the global north, particularly liberals that are currently out of power and kind of hapless and helpless. And, you know, everything just feels, you know. F'd up. And that's because you don't have any control and agency. Like, you know, you may not have felt this way four or five years ago if you were running in a half-decent social democratic government and you could do something about it. And so I really think anytime you're confronted with a position of sort of powerlessness,

which liberals in particular are on the back foot in many parts of the rich world,

SPEAKER_00you know, you will feel a sense of lack of agency.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, you know, they always say that the loss of privilege feels like oppression maybe the international equivalent is the loss of hegemony feels like polycrisis feels like everything is flying apart part of the kind of the critique that established your whole thing is that you guys feel like um kind of mainstream climate and energy coverage in the U.S. has some blind spots. And I just wondered if you sort of like to describe those or maybe like call out some names or outlets that you're talking about.

Like what do you feel like the U.S. climate and energy conversation is missing?

SPEAKER_02I mean, there's obviously the rest of the world outside the U.S. would maybe be a good place to start with that.

SPEAKER_01The rest of the world, I'm not familiar. Can you?

SPEAKER_02Yeah, it's an interesting one. But I think it's not just the US. I think it's like generally the climate movement is, I mean, really since the start had this issue reconciling climate action and development. And it's funny, even though that tension is like at the heart of all of the UNFCCC, you know, all of the formal international climate negotiations, I think this idea of,

like, motivations, what is actually going to motivate climate action? You know, we obviously, like, thought it should be climate change, but turns out it hasn't been.

SPEAKER_00So then, you know, the idea of well-being, prosperity, jobs, you know, this was some of the disruptions. around the IRA, which I thought was super duper positive. Yeah, it is about industrial competitiveness. Yeah, it is about jobs. Yeah, it is about inequality and taxing the rich, you know. So all of these sort of aspects were very positive aspects where we were grounding action on climate on things that people actually want and care about and are politically sort of motivated by.

And for most of the world, that is this question of security and prosperity.

SPEAKER_00You know, one of the things that we're trying to do with the podcast is really explore this idea of how much does security fears sort of drive autonomy fears, drive climate action. And it doesn't have to be called climate action. It could be energy. It could be industry. It could be just a fear of some outsider screwing with you. And sort of like, you know, you might just be sitting in Europe and all of a sudden Russia invades Ukraine and, you know, your gas will shoot up through the roof. And you may never have, you know, you're Europe, you're rich,

SPEAKER_00you're well-educated, that you're a bunch of progressive governments in power, but you never really did much climate action. And then, you know, in the four years since 2022, Europe has dramatically accelerated its move towards electrification of end users, right? It actually put heat pumps and got rid of a lot of the gas that was being used to heat European homes. That was one of the main reasons why it was so dependent upon Russian gas. I don't know if you'd call this lucky for the climate movement or good for the climate movement.

SPEAKER_01I don't know how you'd phrase it exactly, but it does seem like those imperatives, the climate imperative... The economic security imperative The autonomy imperative The not letting Russia jerk you around imperative All those imperatives And the development imperative All seem to be basically pulling in the same direction at this point Which is clean energy, right? I mean, it's the same answer to all the questions in some sense it's like the opposite of this energy trilemma and you know I'm

still I'm amazed that we're still seeing energy trilemma being invoked as a as this you know really terrible conundrum spell out what the energy trilemma was for those who are not

SPEAKER_01familiar with the history of this discourse oh gosh yeah wow it's a really you know it's a it's very central to the energy discourse last 20 years or so isn't it but like it's the idea that you've got these three goals energy access cost and climate you know mitigation right and that you can't reconcile those three there's trade-offs between the three right and that's been central in the energy world not necessarily so much in the climate world but

SPEAKER_02you know this is what like the IEA the International Energy Agency talks about this a lot um has talked about it a lot but yeah like you say it's kind of seeming like these aren't trade-offs anymore they're largely complementary yeah but that mindset really lingers yeah I I see it all over the place even in domestic politics you now see now that affordability is the thing you see democratic

SPEAKER_01governors being like oh no no well we better roll back our clean energy initiatives and I'm like no no guys it's 2026 those are the same thing now like it's really interesting because this is you know this took place in Europe in 2022 right and to an extent it's true right the European Union they did go oh

SPEAKER_02you know we're gonna you know roll back some of our climate oriented regulations and so forth yeah I mean it's kind of a lot of that stuff I don't think was really fundamental the things that they rolled back some of the finance stuff for example which I am you know like not a big believer in the effectiveness of those things anyway but then you know like the specter or like the image of that being the response has is still it's like haunting us again today it's like oh there's going to be a backlash there's going to be you know crisis and cost of living therefore we're going

to have to cut

SPEAKER_02Climate goals. And look, the bit of truth in that, though, is that, you know, this is where, you know, we intersect with like just macroeconomics. Like you do get governments, you do get all this pressure to like adopt austerity and, you know, which is a whole other thing. It's kind of worth spelling out since we asked about what are the blind spots of

SPEAKER_00people like us, you know, people broadly interested in climate and energy, wonks, etc. Right? Like, what were our blind spots in the 2020s? And there's like two very specific ones that I thought really shaped, for example, the IRAs kind of blind spots. One was interest rates and inflation. Like none of us were really thinking too hard about macroeconomics. Okay. And so when inflation like shot up for a variety of reasons, the supply shock reasons of the Ukraine war, demand shock reasons of,

SPEAKER_00you know, huge stimulus in US, Europe, et cetera, after the pandemic. So you had inflation and we particularly on the climate movement, you know, weren't really paying attention to macroeconomics, right? We basically said, spend big, spend big on important things that matter. and, you know, transform this energy economic system that we have towards, you know, something cleaner and greener and more jobs and et cetera. And everything else was sort of sought out. But then, you know, the entire crushing of the Build Back Better agenda into the IRA, a much

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I'm sorry. Spend, you know, and huge stimulus bills the way we did for that sort of golden period between 2019 and 2022, where the United States governments under Trump and Biden ended up spending about four and a half, five trillion dollars of spending on public spending between

the unemployment and

SPEAKER_00stimulus. The Trump recovery, the Biden recovery, the IRA, AIDA, etc., etc. So we really have to think about what does climate action look like under a much more constrained macroeconomic situation of higher interest rates, higher inflation. I'll push back just slightly on that in just one respect because I've watched

SPEAKER_01numerous cycles of this. So like I watched... You know, in the early 2000s, the long work of pulling everyone together in the climate movement and the sort of democratic side, the centrists, the climate people around this country. carbon pricing bill you know other stuff too but carbon pricing and then more or less all the sudden carbon pricing became you know verboten and the economy was it was a bad match for the economy but the time it takes to pull

that coalition together and pull that policy thinking and pull all that stuff together it takes a long time it can't just pivot so like all the sudden climate taxing was out and big spending was in and it was just like we couldn't pivot fast enough so then like

SPEAKER_01Ten more years of pulling the coalition together, pulling the policy together around big spending, and then all of a sudden, when we're finally ready to do it, the economy pivots some other way, and now big spending is out and inflation is in, and you just can't pivot the entire movement on a dime in response to year-by-year events. There's a time mismatch on these things. I think this is where the climate movement could be a bit better informed by

heterodox economics or a bit less kind of beholden to orthodox macroeconomics and you know this is you're right like we are kind of fighting last battle like I got

SPEAKER_02very the point at which I got very involved in Climate 2014, particularly I came in on this theme of financial climate risk and then the role of financial regulators and how climate risk would affect financial stability and so forth. All this work then went on subsequent years, you know, I was involved in doing something helping long but none of it was looking at inflation and there's a lot a lot of it was around central banks right as financial regulators or as guardians of financial stability and yet like

the actual core thing that almost every well every independent central bank does in the world is monetary policy and that wasn't like no one was looking at that before 2022 it was

SPEAKER_02a real shame Tim has like really direct experience of that like public spending wave of coalition building that you just talked about and yeah like it's bloody hard work isn't it Tim from what I can see now we're all going to try to like re you know get back together pull the coalition back together find some new strategy and like you know what I mean it's it's starting to feel slightly Sisyphean so I want to ask

SPEAKER_01about this it's kind of the the one of the central framing through all your work. And this is, you know, these are popular terms now as petrostates and electrostates. I want to start with sort of the U.S. You know, because the U.S. gets classified as a petrostate because it is the largest oil producer in the world for obvious reasons. But, you know, as Adam Tooze and others have said recently, it's a little more complicated than that. We are a big oil exporter, but we are also a big oil importer. We are kind of a petrostate and an electrostate uncomfortably

shoved in the same

SPEAKER_01room together at odds with one another. So I guess I just wonder, like, Does calling the U.S. a petrostate illuminate anything? What do you get out of that? What does that predict for you? What does that tell you?

SPEAKER_02Yeah, I'm quite interested in this because I believe technically a petrostate really is a state that is highly dependent on petroleum rents right so oil and gas rents and the US doesn't fit that definition yeah it's a pretty small part of our over our huge economy exactly but it's a big part of the political economy Yes. So, and I think like some of the contradiction comes to the fact that the U.S. is just such a huge consumer of these forms of energy,

SPEAKER_02right? And like driving and just, you know, the domestic consumption is really big and it's not energy independent. If anyone, you know, you start looking around at how the industry actually works and the composition of refineries and so forth.

SPEAKER_01I mean, if we ever thought that oil production was going to get us energy independence, surely events have happened.

SPEAKER_02Yeah.

SPEAKER_01Have set everyone straight on that by now, surely. But it does seem like, you know, as you say, the political economy, it does seem like the right petro state is their self-image, right? Is their image of the country or almost like their aspiration. It's almost like what the U.S. is trying to do now. And this is sort of the narrative war. You know, Ted Furtick was on your pod and talking about this. It's like, There's a narrative war right now where the U.S. is trying to basically convince the world that decarbonization

is silly and woke

SPEAKER_01and it's not really going to happen and you need to build LNG terminals. And I just wonder, the U.S. is obviously very powerful and influential, but how much power do we have just through narrative? In other words, do you think that's going to work? Is anybody buying it?

SPEAKER_00I mean, even the oil companies in the U.S. are not buying it during a war where oil prices have shot up, right? So that's just like, awesome, great. Like, you guys don't want to drill more? You know, the Dallas Fed conducts surveys. They ask the companies, how much do you think U.S. oil production is going to go up next year in a condition of higher oil prices? And what do these lads say? Yeah, you know what? Maybe 0.1, 0.2 million barrels a day is how much we will increase. We are currently at 13.8 million barrels a day of production.

SPEAKER_00And they're like maybe a teensy-weensy bit. And you ask them, why don't you want to drill more? I thought you guys were fossil fuel kings and energy dominant and all of that. And they basically said, have you seen the oil futures? You know, war's going to be over. Things will go back down to normal. Or they'll say something like, you know what, I'm kind of terrified about the future of demand. Like demand's been kind of slowing down. Like EV sales have been picking up all over the world. But particularly since 2018, we've had peak internal combustion engine The last year in which we had more and more and more sales of

combustion engine was 2018. Since 2018, we've gone down from 100 million cars over the world sold to like something like 70. So it's been a very dramatic reduction in internal combustion engine and increase

SPEAKER_00in hybrids and EVs, right? So a lot of the people looking at the future of demand in a serious way, you know, these are modelers at the IEA, for example, the US government is It's basically like telling them, don't print these numbers. Like these numbers are kind of terrifying. And what do you mean that it's going to go down? We need to project a narrative, which may not be real, as you pointed out, but the narrative is important because for investors, having a sense of what the future looks like, the most certainty you have towards something is exactly why

you make long-term

SPEAKER_00investment decisions now. It really seems like Trump, though, like not to psychologize, but it really seems like Trump

SPEAKER_01just thinks there are narratives. It's not clear to me that he's cognizant of a physical world beyond that. He just thinks the IEA is full of liberals who are telling the liberal story and they should be telling his story instead. He really just seems to think he can jawbone and bully everyone to do that. And he has forced some countries to start accepting more LNG imports. He's had some effect. I mean, he's using American market power in the world, which is a giant consumer market.

And everybody wants to sell to Americans because we are rich and we buy a lot of things. And, you know, the Europeans and the East Asians don't consume everything that they make.

SPEAKER_00You know, they need an export market. And that's for internal reasons of their inequality, domestic political economy, consumption repression, you know, the German model or the liberal model, etc.

SPEAKER_01And that's the end of the free preview. If you'd like to hear more, become a paid subscriber at volts.wtf. Thank you.

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