Skip to content
PodSubs
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEvents
More
BlogPodCred
Menu
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEventsBlogPodCredNetworksSign in
Join nowSign in
  • Shows
  • People
  • Jobs
  • News
  • More
    • Guests
    • Events
    • Blog
    • PodCred
    • Networks
    Join nowSign in

The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership. artwork

How do you defend an island nation when 40% of your trade flows through contested waters?

May 13, 20261 hr 22 minAudio
ShareXLinkedInFacebookWhatsAppEmail

Forty percent of Australian trade flows through the South China Sea - and if conflict erupts near Taiwan, that route becomes uninsurable overnight. Maritime strategist Mark Bailey argues that Western continentalism has left island nations dangerously unprepared for the Indo-Pacific's return to its ancient strategic shape, where China and India once again compete for influence over Southeast Asia. This keynote address traces how Beijing treats the South China Sea as sovereign territory to be garrisoned, why Tokyo has quietly reorganised its navy for convoy escort, and what the Taiping Rebellion's 20-80 million dead reveal about Chinese internal fractures. This is a special seminar presentation in conjunction with the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower Seminar Series, "Firepower: Lessons from World War II" Our presenter is Dr Mark Bailey, presenting our keynote presentation. Key learnings: • Why Japan restructured its fleet into three convoy escort groups anticipating wartime shipping protection • How Chinese hybrid warfare operates through United Front university networks, cyber intrusions, and fentanyl exports killing 80,000 Americans yearly • What Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review shares with Corbett's maritime principles Full show notes and transcript: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Support the podcast: https://www.patreon.com/principlesofwar More episodes: https://theprinciplesofwar.com/ Follow on X: https://x.com/surprisepodcast Subscribe for more Professional Military Education content.

Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.

Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

This is a special presentation from the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's first seminar in the Firepower Lessons from the Second World War seminar series. This is the keynote presentation by Dr. Mark Johnston: Corbett and the Indo-Pacific. Even here in Australia, we have a real issue with understanding how big the theatre is. We look at Mercator maps and they're Atlantic centric and we think the world looks like that.

It doesn't. And anyone who's been at sea knows that. So the first thing I said to this particular audience is you do this sort of thing to say during. During Exercise Kangaroo 93, there was a battalion AO which was the size of Belgium and Holland put together. And they go what? They say, yeah, yeah, that was a battalion AO. And it takes them a while to get used to this issue of scale. And it's important for us too. This region is enormous.

And the other thing that we really need to understand is that there's nothing new under the sun. You know how we've got the iron highway going from southern tip of India, Cape Comorin over to the Straits of Malacca and that's a major trade route. The oil flows on that and the Chinese are dependent on that for 50% of their of their oil supply. Yeah, it's been around for a while. That's the same route in 1025 where the Chola invaded Srivijaya. The Chola Empire was on the southern coast, southeast coast of India and they sent 25,000 men and I think 100 elephants across that sea route from Nagapattinam to invade the Srivijayan main trading port on the Malacca Strait at Suvarnadvipa.

So again, there's not much new under the sun. People have been doing this for an awful long time. The other interesting thing to show about this particular one is that that's the main trade route which also continues up the Red Sea and up into the Persian Gulf between the Song Dynasty and this is 1025 and Europe. Sound familiar? So the strategic environment really hasn't changed. So where are we today? Okay, let's run through this quickly. 1820 to 1914 really kicked in. Around 1850. You have the first globalization.

Why is there no British watchmaking industry? There's a non sequitur if you ever heard one, because the best watches in the world in 1913 were made in Britain, not Switzerland. But all of the British Army's artillery fuzes were made by Krupp because it was a globalised world and they made the best kit and they made it in quantity and they made it cheaply and they were really close and the stuff was really reliable. Oops, we're at war with the Germans. So how do you now start to make artillery fuzes in Britain?

Any guesses? Yeah, watchmakers, because they're used to working with very fine tolerance, small bits of brass and all that sort of thing. So they grabbed every watchmaker in Britain, conscripted the lot, and put them into manufacturing and training people to manufacture fuzes for artillery shells. And that killed the entire industry. The Swiss spotted the gap in the market, moved in, and we all know the consequences of that. So you get these echo effects through history from long ago events. And one of the things you'll find if you talk to an Indonesian is that, oh yeah, they remember this.

It was only a thousand years ago, and you talk to a Javanese. The Chinese invasion of Java in the. In the 13th century. That was yesterday. They haven't forgotten and they know that it all came by sea. 1960 to pretty much 2020. You get the second globalization. And we have the same thing. Now. Here's an interesting point. Australian industry was developed between 1919 and 1939 with extreme success. Why? Because the world wasn't globalized that had broken up.

We were trading in currency blocks. We were inside the sterling block. And if you wanted to buy stuff from the Americans out of the dollar block, you had to trade with them to earn the dollars. And they didn't want to do that because they've got their own currency block going on. I think that's the world we may be heading back towards. Certainly the second globalization is in diabolical trouble. And where you really see that is in the global maritime industry. So looking at all of this, if you want to understand this, you've got to really take a multidisciplinary approach.

So. So what all these first five points have in common is that they all occurred within the maritime strategic framework explored by Sir Julian Corbett. I'm going to mention him. He's a British sea power philosopher. Probably the most important of them, he and the American, Alfred Thayer Mahan. There's really no daylight between them, as Kevin McCranie's recent book shows. And I'm stating these as assumptions or stating these assumptions because they're simply not widely known, even in Australia, which is an island nation.

So post World War II, we've had a massive rise of continentalism. And I said, that's kind of natural even here in Australia. Look around the walls. We're in an RSL. All of these photos on the walls are from World War I. Why? Because what. What percentage of our population deployed in France? Something like 5%. So every family had someone there, every family lost someone. It's all army oriented. So we changed to a very continentalist, a continentalist focus because the popular experience was an army one.

Perfectly natural. But we're an island. And this is now. This has been and is now continues to be a problem. The other thing, which point seven there. What we're seeing re-emerging in Asia is the end of the European interregnum. The ancient shape, the ancient strategic structure of Asia has re-emerged, there's no doubt about it. And to the, to everyone from South Asia through Southeast Asia to North Asia, the historians and the naval people that I speak to fairly frequently go, yeah, it's good to be back to normal because this is the way it's been for the last 4,000 years.

Except for that chunk where those pesky Europeans turned up and kicked over everybody's apple carts. I'll show you the same map in a moment. We're an island. The, the island nations are different. The world is an ocean. That world ocean is both the protection for us and a highway to us. We want to make sure that it stays being a highway for commerce and not for anything else. And we are losing a lot of the international maritime commons. Now, how many people in the Australian public understand that photograph?

That's Prelude. That's US$16 billion on the hoof. That is the largest object ever made by the human race. And it's a ship fully loaded. She's over 600,000 tonnes. That little tiny tanker alongside, that's the Gallina. She's 111,459 gross registered tonnes. She's 290 metres long. Prelude is a floating liquid natural gas platform. Unique. Underneath that.

She's connected up in the bow here, there's a turret. So slots in, literally clicks in and the ship swivels around it. All the risers from the gas field come up to that turret. That turret weighs 35,000 tonnes. When the gas arrives on board, it's a couple of hundred degrees and it's moving around about 200 miles an hour. And it's full of sand and full of all sorts of nasty stuff. Get it? They cool it. That's a whole floating, that structure on top, that's a liquid natural gas train.

So that's turning the methane from the natural, from the natural gas coming up from the sea floor into cryogenic liquid, which is then pumped on board that ship. I watched the development of this, it took them 12 years. It cost them billions. That's in Australia's offshore estate. Have a look at where it is. That's Darwin. It's there. There is a thing called Ichthys which is a. Japanese, Japanese. Japanese bought the entire gas field. The company that bought it is owned is called INPEX. They are owned by the five big Japanese energy retailers, so domestic energy suppliers.

That's an 890 kilometre 42 inch pipeline. So the scale of investment here and the scale of our offshore estate is enormous. That offshore industry provides secure supply. I mentioned that before to Japan by the way. That makes us and the Japanese natural strategic allies, not partners allies. They are utterly dependent on us for coal and liquid natural gas that power their entire economy. Oh, and uranium. So that makes us very natural strategic partners indeed.

Allies. I'm very glad for example that the government's decision was to go for Japanese frigates. That's going to be really tough to do. The Japanese haven't exported anything for a very long time. That's not going to be easy. But the strategic message it sends greatly decreases the chance of conflict. So I've mentioned that particular point before, that Navy's second order effects of commercial use of the sea. So an island's the point point of all of this. An island nation's views on national military capability should be almost purely Corbettian.

That includes the army. I was there in the experimentation which I will not discuss as most of it was classified. When army was given long range fires, they weren't given long range fires to take out land targets, they were given long range fires to take out military targets, to take out naval targets, maritime targets. And one of the side discussions which I can mention because it was not classified in any way, shape or form was there was an artillery guy there, he said yeah, long range, we do long range, dude. The M777 reaches out to 56 kilometres. At which point the giggling started because another guy, army, an army colonel who ran DGED at that particular time, said right now at a zero.

And he went oh, now triple it. Oh that's short range. And he went I think I'm starting to understand the depth of the issue. Oh and by the way, you got to shoot at mobile targets. You need a very extensive kill chain to engage those targets. And, and those targets ideally should be engaged from the continent of Australia off the Chinese coast. At which point things got very interesting and the conversations became even more interesting. So what I'm trying to get at here is that final point, if you think continentally.

If you think you can defend Australia by poking rifles over sand dunes, then you're a continentalist and you're also a bit of an idiot because you can't defend that thing by poking your rifle over a sand dune 250 km away. Oh, by the way, that's what pays in a country's bills, exports. Our LNG trade is a massive value added trade critical to our allies and the income it provides. The Australian government funds everything. So this is why I sort of have an issue with continentalists.

This map again I use this one and again absolutely blows the Europeans away and the Americans as well when you show this sort of thing. This is the strategic shape of ancient Asia. Two major civilizations, one here around the plain of the Ganges. Might be the Mughal, might be the Vijayanagara, I think they were, could be anybody. That is the eastern arc, if you the western arc or the edge of arc of the major Asian civilization. China is the next one.

And Southeast Asia literally historically has weathervaned between those two civilizations as they wax and wane in their internal strength for the last 4,000 years. So the Southeast Asians are quite happy to see this re-emerge because they understand it at the cellular level. For us however, it's different. And one of the things that we've got to understand is that yes, we're an island, but we're also attached to Asia by this archipelago that comes out from the mainland. That's a filigree of channels.

You can move through that like rain through a grate. It's a highway to us, it's a barrier for us. And also this is now the planetary demographic and industrial heartland. That's never had happened before. What really upsets the Europeans when you see this is they're down here and they're kind of irrelevant down there in the corner and really small. And that really rocks them because naturally if you're a European, you think Europe's the center of the universe. Sorry, it isn't.

But that's our strategic reality. That's the world we live in. Now I've mentioned the whole idea of lenses. We've seen this one before. That's the People's Republic of China's view of the world. In April 2019, there was a China masterclass seminar conference held in Canberra, another one held here in Melbourne. I attended the Canberra one and they actually belled the cat at that one and actually named the People's Republic as Australia's major strategic threat. They didn't do it quite this way.

I was given this by the late Admiral James Goldrick, a friend of mine. But what you're seeing in this PRC view of the world is profoundly continental. Chinese writings are full of things like the South China Sea is blue soil. We own it. To prove we own it, we're building forts on it. Well, that's an extremely. You can't get much more continentalist in your approach than that. There's a patch of ocean owner own it and build fortresses all over it as if it was on the Silk Road crossing the Taklamakan. So this loose, this use of terms like blue national soil, liquid land, it signals an intent to control parts of the sea exactly as if they were sovereign land territory.

And they see no difference between Xinjiang Province and the South China Sea. That's very plain in their writings and in conversations with. They're entitled to those views, of course. This is the response, this is a strategic response that we've seen the Chinese, the Chinese Communist Party develop over the last 30 years. The rear area there, well that's your secure rear area. That's where your population is. That's where the ethnic Han live. Then you've got close, which you need to dominate and that's inside those white lines. And obviously that's the nine-dash line near you.

Just you dispute that and you drive foreign powers out of it. For the Japanese, we can dominate them, but the Americans, anybody else, no, that's our patch. You stay out of it. And we've seen that implemented in policy and in deployments over the last 30 years. By the way, that second line there, the second island chain, the Southeast Asians are very, very aware that they don't mention the second part of it. They know it exists. It does exist in some Chinese writings, but they're perfectly aware in Jakarta and in KL that that second line exists in Chinese thinking.

Now we've had a stagnation in Western thinking really since the 1950s. And it started, it really occurred around the rim of the Atlantic Ocean. It deepened into joint operations. Joint operations are fine. However, they, they impose certain constraints on your thinking. Go ask the Duke of Medina Sidonia about that because his joint operation to invade, to invade Tudor Elizabethan England did not really work. What's been new is the spread of army door army oriented thinking into maritime strategy.

That spread of continentalism I talked about this is leached over. And this is where the term sea blindness came from. That was actually invented by the Indians, by the way, the Indian Navy talking to their own government. So it's affected us in many ways. Mostly because during the Cold War, we were a backwater. I remember sitting there and saying, oh, some new piece of Soviet kit's come out. Fantastic. We just have to wait a couple of years. The Americans will tell us all about it because it will be fielded somewhere in Europe. By the 90s, that was changing and changing very rapidly. The newest and best opposition kit, if you wanted to call it that way, wasn't being fielded in the Atlantic.

It was being fielded by the Chinese in the Pacific, as they bought this stuff from the Russians, who were totally skint at that time. So during that time, we've also seen regional conflicts, and these were limited conflicts, conflicts, Vietnam War being the classic one, fought really within with existing orders of battle. The Vietnamese were a bit different to that. The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 ended the long cycle of wars in the region.

Vietnam's no longer not a sea power. That particular conflict in 1979, why did the Vietnamese fight it? Has anyone talked to the Vietnamese and asked them about that? So we're friends with the Chinese helping us against the French and helping us against the Americans. 1975, Tank 862 drives through the gates of the Doc Lap Palace in Saigon. The war's over. 1979, they deliberately pick a fight with the Chinese. So I asked some of their scholars about it, retired generals, in fact, and said, why'd you do that?

And they said, oh, look, we know the Chinese really, really, really, really well. And I said, yeah, I know the war of the Trung sisters and all of that. You wore them for a thousand years in that case. He went, oh, you know, a bit of history. Fantastic. He said, look, basically the Politburo sat down in 77, and so we need to pick a fight with them. And so they literally went up and started poking them until the Chinese hit back in 1979, they budgeted about 35,000 dead, the Vietnamese. That was deliberate policy and actually said, why? He said, because if we've lived next to these guys for a very long time and we know that they treat you far better if they know you are their enemy, then they will ever treat you if you think they are your friend.

I've never forgotten those words. He was very precise in that wording. So this is a different environment, this is a different world, okay? This is the stated intent of the current leader of the People's Republic of China. It's in their policy documents. It's in multiple public statements. And it's to be achieved by 2049, because that is the 100th anniversary of the victory over the Kuomintang and the mainland. And it's said many times, this is what they want.

And it was Hong Kong that threw a spanner into the works here. So still got the rear area. This is national territory, notice includes Taiwan. And this is dominated as the South China Sea is dominated now. So there'll be Chinese garrison forces either deployed or deployable to there. And this near area is where they will be doing disputation operations. This cannot be understood through a European or an Atlantic lens. This is an Asian form of imperialism. It is not direct imperial control.

The Chinese Empire never worked that way. If you go and look at how they treated the suzerain nations down here, you simply acknowledged cultural and racial superiority of the Song Empire or whatever empire it was, and you sent them annual tribute and you accorded your foreign policy to what they wanted. So it wasn't. It's a very Asian form, a very North Asian form of imperial control. But make no mistake, it's imperial control. And that would be a 2049 Chinese empire.

I honestly don't think it's going to happen. So, by the way, as the Vietnamese said, when I sort of asked them about this, they said, yeah, look, it might work for. It's just not going to work for us. No, really, really not going to work for us. We don't do that sort of thing. I do like the Vietnamese. They're an interesting people. April 2019, ASPI, at that conference I mentioned, they belled the cat. They put this up on the screen. Now, that was a really interesting conference. It was aimed at EL1s, EL2s, so the worker bees at the senior level in the public service in Canberra, there was an audible gasp of shock when they put this up.

I know, I was there. And what this does is it says, here are the island chains. Geez, that looks familiar. It was very clever of ASPI to aim this at the level of government they pitched it to, because all of these EL2s, for example, went back to their EL1s and said, you really need to read this, you need to understand this and you need to pass this up the SES chain. So that got immense traction inside Canberra and it really was the start of the Australian strategic reset.

Now, I don't know if people read strategic policy documents, they are kind of boring and hard to read, but if you read the September 2022 National Defence Strategy of Japan, it's pure. Sir Julian Corbett, if you read the 2023 Strategic Defence Review of Australia and the 2024 National Defence Strategy and the new 2025 Defence of Japan reassessment. All of them are Corbettian. They're all based on sea power.

And that's why the Japanese Land Self-Defense Force, what do they call their army? Let's talk Japanese Army, Ground Self-Defense Force. They're doing exactly what we're doing. They're getting into long range fires. There are one brigade of Marines now. They don't call them that. They're getting into. They call them Marines now. Hadn't picked up on that one. I have to talk to Captain Yoshiwagata about that one. They're really focusing on littoral operations outside the Japanese archipelago down into the Ryukyus.

That's different. They've never done that before. With the new Japanese government, we're seeing a radical change in what they do. So this is the result of a hard eyed, realistic assessment of strategic reality by Australia, by Japan and also by South Korea. They're doing some really interesting things. So lest I be accused of historical determinism, I do like to say that this is, this originates with ASPI, not with me. And I don't think ASPI is into historical determinism either.

But that coherence, that threat axis, that's very parallel to what we saw developing in the 1930s. What happens if we get a conflict? What you're seeing on here is again a false colour image of AIS tracks. So there's merchant ships reporting their positions over a year. Again, notice the extent of the fishing fleets. This is getting ridiculous. So if we have a conflict originating in or around Taiwan, you will not be able to get insurance if you want to transit the South China Sea.

That, by the way, is 40% of Australian trade. It's going to have to go somewhere else. And we're looking at that in the Naval Studies Group and trying to determine, and in maritime trade operations and trying to determine the effects of that. So for example, if I've got critical cargoes from down here, which are liquid natural gas heading up for Japan, they can no longer transit the South China Sea. If the ship has got the draft shallow enough to go through the Torres Strait, maybe they can go through here. That's roughly the range of threat from mainland China for weapons being used against critical merchant ships.

So essentially once you hit that kind of a line off Japan, you're going to have to convoy. Anyone notice what happened over the last two years to the Japanese Navy? It's been converted essentially, or changed into three convoy escort groups. Each based around a carrier with a fourth one in reserve. So they're expecting this. And we know through conversations at various events that this is exactly what they're planning. And the South Koreans are the same. So they're planning for this and they're adjusting their military forces for it. And that's one reason why they've got that brigade of Marines now, because they need to get those guys out onto the islands out there to make sure they stay under allied control.

Has anyone seen what's happened to the old B-29 base from 1944? 45 at Tinian one has. The Americans have rebuilt it. They're also rebuilding the old World War II base at Wake. Even us, we're doing some upgrades up at Lorengau, for example, in the Admiralties, upgrading the facilities there. But this is happening all across the Pacific in order to disperse assets away from nice, big concentrated base where all the B-52s or all the B-2s or whatever are, which can be flattened by one salvo of missiles.

So there's a lot of dispersion going on. I've covered this one, so I won't really run through that. What I really want to talk about is this. Read it. CSBA 2019, Professor Ross Babbage, first class intellect, wrote that. Stealing a March. It's two volumes. They're only about 70 pages each. The second volume is just examples of where Chinese hybrid warfare has been employed, effectively starting, by the way, with Tibet in the 1950s. They've been doing this a long time. Free download from the CSBA website.

Ross Babbage ran it. It's essential reading along your timeline here. You conduct political warfare. I've mentioned the United Front. They are in every Australian university. The bulk of Chinese students who come out here are tasked by the UF. The. They don't have a choice. It's not their fault. They are what we call in the trade, a suborned asset. And they've got no choice but to gather information, which is what they're here to do. That also goes up to and includes things like, remember it was six years ago, just before the election, there was a major attack on Parliament House out of China.

Like major cyber attack. That sort of thing happens all the time. By the way, direct interference in Australian domestic politics by the People's Republic. All part of this here come here goes into the economic space as well. So this is political, this is economic. Very effective. Out in the Pacific there, Chinese transnational organized crime, they have a thing called the patriotic criminal. So let's say you run a major tong. I'm the CCP. You come to me and say, listen, I've got a new way of making fentanyl in bulk.

I can make tons of the stuff and it really, really addictive and it kills an awful lot of young military age men. And I say, fine, you and I are going to work together. You're going to make this stuff in this factory in Guangdong or wherever the heck in China. And then you, I will help you get as much of that stuff into the United States as humanly possible. Every single year for the last decade, the United States has lost 80,000 dead due to fentanyl. It's one of the reasons that their current administration closed the border.

Yes, it was to stop migration, illegal immigrants and all that sort of stuff, but the main one was to stop this attack. And it is an attack in this space. TikTok. Anyone here ever looked at TikTok? I don't. Inside China, it's purely educational. Outside China, it's employed as a weapon of some form in that. To disable the education of Western, Western kids. And again, I'm not conspiracy theory. You're nodding. I know you've read the same stuff.

Yeah, and it's, it's a part of this deliberate strategy. It's aimed to weaken potential enemies, not necessarily to destroy them, but if you weaken them enough, they can't operate against you inside that the area where they don't want you to operate this bit. Last resort. And really, when you start to put this out as a pyramid and start to map the actual operations, that's a vanishingly small part. One or two percent of all of this, most of it's taking place in this space. Grey zone warfare, for example, simply part of that illegal fishing operation, part of hybrid warfare.

You get used to having Chinese ships right off your EEZ, and some of them are signals intelligence collectors and some of them are maritime militia establishing a military presence. So the region knows this and they're all responding to it. Have a look at the way the Indonesians have started responding over the last 15 years to illegal Chinese fishing inside their EEZ. They no longer arrest them, warn them off or whatever. They seize them, they put them straight in jail and they burn the boats without compensation because they understand what's going on.

They've seen it before. They're going back to an old structure they're very well aware of. So. So continuing our old perceptions from the Cold War is now becoming strategically dangerous for us. Final slide. Really, this is kind of where we are now, it took a long time to develop this particular one. What are you looking at? I've got to explain this, this gray box, that's what the West assumed back in the 80s. We assumed the Chinese were going to become like a gigantic Singapore, that it was all going to be peaceful expansion, peaceful trade and we could get on with these people.

There wasn't going to be a strategic threat. Well, that perception never really worked. Xi Jinping's dream, the desired end state here, that's really strong. So this line here, weak party control, Strong party control. This line, weaker economic growth down around 2% over there. Strong economic growth around 10% over here. I'll talk about this blue line in a second. So we, we assumed that China was going to have weak party control, a booming economy and become like a giant Singapore, lovely, peaceful world, globalised world, Yay.

We know that the Chinese intent, especially under Xi Jinping, was to have absolutely strong party control and a booming economy and really throw their weight around in the world over here. We start to get weak economic growth, crumbling communism. So Chinese civilisationally, the Chinese civilisationally do not respond to threats against the regime as Western empires and powers have ever done. We tend to respond on this line. Remember how when the Argentinian junta, who was getting into trouble in 1980, 81, 82, let's have a little war with the British, short victorious war, which will shore up the regime.

The Chinese have never done that. I've gone through their history, there's not a single example anywhere in the last 5,000 years the Chinese doing that. No, what they do is they do this, they get into repression in a really big way. The social credit score system in the People's Republic, extremely repressive. What happens then is as they screw down on all the problems inside China and I could be speaking of the Tang or the Ming or the Song, this is how it's operated.

As they screw down on it, the pressure builds and the pressure builds and the pressure builds and eventually there's a fracture and you get to this. And that's basically where the arc. Roughly since 2012, 2012, there were very strong economic growth, really strong party control, economic growth, I'm afraid Communists, terrible economic managers. It was getting. Things are turning pear shaped. By 2019, the collapse of the first big housing investment companies like Evergrande, those sort of things kicked off.

That's roughly where we were last year. And I think their economic growth at the moment is even worse. And the repression is getting worse. In many ways, a conflict over Taiwan would be less nasty than an internal fracture inside China. What was the last major internal fracture in China? Pardon? No, for that you're right. The Taiping. The Taiping Rebellion, now with the Taiping, the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace, started in southern China.

Why? Because they're not Han. They don't like the Han. They don't like being controlled from the north. The minimum casualty figure that we've been able to work out for the Taiping occurred at the same time as the U.S. Civil War, 1860 to 1865. Minimum casualties were probably 20 million dead. That's as many as died in World War I. Maximum casualties 80 million dead, probably somewhere around 30 or 40. 60 Million died in World War II. That happened in five years in China with a population of 500 million people. That's what an internal fracture looks like in China.

There's reports, for example, of a company based in Shanghai who sent them to Singapore. These paddle steamers are absolutely useless. Please send us up all the screw steamers that you've got. They went, why? And he said, well, there's so many corpses coming down the river that it chokes the paddle wheels after five miles. So that's what a major internal fracture inside China looks like. I think that's still reasonably valid. Certainly the internal repression inside China is increasing and certainly their economy is continuing to go further down the gurgler.

Intellectually lazy continentalist. Thinking. Thinking has pushed our governments into sea blindness right across the Western world. Even basic necessities such as war risk insurance and the need for naval coordination and guidance of shipping. The old Naval Control of Shipping is now a forgotten art in many ways. And all of these are issues which will have to be addressed immediately on the outbreak of any conflict. And by immediately I mean When World War I broke out, the British ultimatum expired at 2300 on the Sunday night.

The next day was a bank holiday. So at 2301 on that night, the British Parliament passed the war risk insurance scheme, because they knew very, very well that no merchant ship anywhere sails without insurance. And the next day they were actually handwriting these insurance policy on pieces of paper. One insurance office, which still preserves it from the Baltic Exchange, famously ran out of paper and was starting to. They tore off the wallpaper and tore it up into chunks to write insurance policies on the back of it.

So there's a whole bunch of issues buried in here which require urgent government attention the moment something really, really bad happens. Current CCP behaviour really shows us nothing's new, nothing's ever really changed. Corbett's principles haven't changed. And there's a very good reason indeed why Australia's last three defence white papers in the 2020 strategic update were fundamentally Corbettian and so were the Japanese ones. Army's role in that is absolutely critical because, as Corbett himself said, the sea in many ways doesn't matter because people live on the land and that's where you guys fight.

That's it. Good question. How long do you think until Xi loses the Mandate of Heaven? And how long is a piece of string? Right? Just wondering. And that's the killer question. And who knows? That's the China is hundreds of years of solid development and progress beating everyone else in the world, followed by anywhere from 10 to 100 years of total bloody inflow, isn't it? Yes, it is. I've forgotten who said it. I think it was when the company Enron collapsed and someone asked an American politician, how on earth did Enron go bankrupt?

And he went very, very slowly over a long period of time and really quickly snapped his fingers. And that's the sort of thing we'll see here. Countries are like companies, I guess, and things look fine on the outside, look at our own country, but there's all sorts of issues going on on the inside. So I was just going to ask, what's the impact of the population bomb and population falling in China on all that analysis? You just said the demographic situation in the People's Republic is cataclysmic.

If there's a word worse than that, please use it. For a start, they lost 100 million people, as in during their census, they went, oh, we kind of undercounted the last census. Oh, by how many? 100 Million people in what age cohort? 20 To 30. Well, hang on a minute. That means that none of their official figures are correct. There's a lot of energy studies out there at the moment estimating that the actual population of China is not 1.4 billion, but maybe 1.1 plus the one child policy was disastrously successful.

So this is a population which is getting old much faster than they're getting rich. Thirdly, the reason that Samsung, great example, Samsung, has moved all of their businesses out of China. The last one was the Ningbo shipyard, I think about 18 months ago. Now, you've got to understand that was one of the biggest shipyards on the planet, stretched for about 10 miles along the banks of the river. They moved it to Vietnam. Why? Because Chinese labor costs were too expensive. Yeah, Think about that for a moment. So they've got all sorts of demographic problems.

They've been lying through their teeth about their demographic situation. They're short 35 or 40 million women in the marital age cohort between 20 and 30 because under the one child policy, they were killing them. So there's a major problem there because there's 20 or 30 million young Chinese who will not get married, men who will never be able to find a wife. And that's a big thing in China. The education disaster, where they downgraded 50 or 60 million education degrees from being a university to being essentially the equivalent here of a TAFE.

Huge social hit. You're seeing the whole lying flat thing in China amongst the young now where they say, don't work just to the absolute minimum needed to keep body and soul together and just lay back and chill and enjoy yourself. Birth rates, the Chinese government, the Politburo and the September 2024 Party Congress, they said young women aren't having enough children. Okay, that's bad, right? Ho. By the time she turns 23, a young Chinese woman is to have had three kids passed to acclamation. And people like me sort of sat back and went, how?

How are you going to do that? How are you going to force young women to have three children by the time they're 23 years old? So they set up a ministry and their original thought was, well, you simply force them. And they realized, oh, that probably won't work. So now they're offering a whole range of economic and education and other incentives. But this is a government which created a problem, realized that it created a problem, and said, well, okay, we can't admit we created that because that would be admitting the party's wrong.

Therefore, we'll create an even bigger problem in order to try and solve the problem that we created. And we can't admit responsibility for any of it. Using the same bureaucrats, no less, who are part of the one child program. Sure, yes. So the same people who tore apart villages and families are now trying to push. And what I've been. Sorry, what I've been hearing is that young women in that age bracket don't. Want to get married. Young kids don't want to get married in general because of what they saw. Happen to their family. Correct. And so this is a civilisation in very, very deep troubles.

First of all, Mark, as more or less full time China watcher, I loved your presentation. I thought it was fantastic. So thanks very much. Sorry about that. I would just add a word of caution to the kind of macroeconomic picture of China. In a sense, it's a very lopsided economy. But at the end of last year China posted a 1.2 trillion US dollar trade merchandise trade surplus which is unprecedented. It's now a third of world manufacturing, it's the standalone manufacturing juggernaut and of course wars are fought on the factory floor as much as they are on the sea, in the air and on land.

And so it's a very dangerous period. And if you look at shipbuilding, they went into that in 2003 under Jiang Zemin they threw US$91 billion at it. Today 55% of world's new ship tonnage and over 60% of the new order book. So they are still a force to be reckoned with of a size and scale that's unprecedented and they need to be very very much respected for that capacity. Oh absolutely no argument on any of that. However, what we are now seeing is some very interesting cracks in the foundations.

For example in 1913 the Imperial German government did a little study and they said oops, 19% of our calories are imported from overseas and critically 47% of the edible oils were imported from overseas. And that report said to the Imperial German government if a war breaks out in Europe then you must end it within 12 months because otherwise Germany will collapse. The Chinese currently import over 30% of their calories including nearly half their protein.

They import 50% of their energy. The greatest number of tankers in the Persian Gulf head towards China. They cannot they coastal coal fired power stations and, and they're building a new one every two weeks by the way the HELE ones, the high efficiency low emission ones along the coast by emissions I mean low sulphides, they cannot operate on any but Australian coal. So they've built a number of issues into their economy whereby they cannot withstand blockade, they cannot withstand a blockade.

That country would come apart within 12 months if they tried. And don't forget the riots we've been seeing. If the Chinese Communist Party runs everything and we're all local villages and we have a real problem with. Oh let's see, what was the latest one I read about? One of the teachers beat a student to death. 12 Year old girl I think it was. Memory serves, the locals weren't terribly impressed. The CCP swept it all under the rug. The locals rioted, murdered every CCP member they could find and burnt down the local party headquarters. There's a lot of that so that there are issues inside that juggernaut.

But yes, it is a very large, very powerful, very industrially prosperous nation but. It's got real problems about the Sino-Vietnamese War. Could you go back into that and just explain what you said about Vietnamese generals saying that they provoked the war. And the Vietnamese Politburo saying. They provoked the war. What was it to do with the Khmer Rouge, for example? That was a very Vietnamese. The way it was explained to me. I can only say that it was explained to me by two Vietnamese scholars. And they said, we do not like the Chinese.

We really don't like the Han. And that's mostly because they invaded them and occupied them for about a thousand years. Hence the war of the Trung sisters and all of that. And we're speaking here about the ethnic Vietnamese a thousand years ago in the Red River Valley, so up in the North. So their point of view, being Vietnamese. Is that you get treated by the Chinese much, much better. If they know that you hate them and that you regard the Chinese as your enemy. They treat you with a certain degree of care.

Whereas if they. If you are their friends, they treat you as if they're part of your empire. So they treat you as a power they control through that suzerainty arrangement. I mean, and you're pretty fine there. Provided you acknowledge their racial cultural superiority. And you give them tribute. And you accord your national policy to suit theirs. Then they pretty much left you alone. The Vietnamese are really. This is what they said. We Vietnamese are really bad at that.

We're really, really bad at telling the Chinese racially superior, no, not going to do it. So that's why they provoked that conflict. Because the Chinese are saying, oh, we've supported you all this time, therefore you are allies. Therefore we have this level of control over you. Look, anyone who thinks he can control the Vietnamese has got rocks in his head. Lovely people, lovely country. Just don't try and control it. Just they're Vietnamese. Let them do their Vietnamese thing, and you're fine. Nice place. Ladies and gentlemen, I think I'll draw the formalities of this evening to a close. You're still welcome to stay here for a little bit.

But before I do anything else, can I just echo what Michael has said? Thank you again, Mark, for your presentation. I think you'd agree, ladies and gentlemen, that this evening we've had two really great presentations from Mark, then from Peter, to really give us an idea of how that road to war really occurred. And that's why right from the street level and how Australia found itself in the 30s. And then how we started to terms with what men could do in the face of a threat, that was actually hands.

Then after that, the panel with Peter and Mark, joined by Jason gave us a very good insight into what that means. Some of the things that have changed, things that have remained and things that we. And then this keynote address, by going back to the podium a third time. Thank you very much. Is really that broader understanding why you do need to take these things? Not because we're looking for any sort of digression. Things may happen in the world. We don't. So, ladies and gentlemen, lovely to start off this first of the four seminars of 5th Army Western Second World War.

Thank you for joining us this evening. And we really look forward to seeing you either online or in our next three seminars. The first one, next one in Brisbane on 12 May, the one after that is in Adelaide. And finally October. Thank you very much.

Open the transcript file

Hosts and Guests

Nobody is credited on this episode yet.

Credit the people on this episode

Be the first to rate this episode

More episodes

All episodes
  1. 156 - Operation Ke: The pursuit and evacuation - How deception planning helped the Japanese Amry withdraw from Guadalcanal

    Oct 25, 202640 minAudio

    How did the Imperial Japanese Army evacuate 10,652 starving survivors from Guadalcanal without the Americans realising until it was over? This episode examines Operation KE's masterful deception - from the Emperor's...

    Credit the people on this episode

  2. 155 - Guadalcanal - Combat Innovation and leadership Lessons from Lawton Collins at the Battle of Mt Austen

    Oct 18, 202650 minAudio

    Major General J. Lawton Collins watched Captain Charles Davis earn the Medal of Honor from just 300 yards away - and that proximity defined his entire command philosophy. This episode examines the January 1943 reduction...

    Credit the people on this episode

  3. 154 - Guadalcanal's Battle of the Gifu - Cannabalism in the jungle

    Oct 11, 202634 minAudio

    The US Army's 132nd Infantry Regiment walked into one of the strongest Japanese defensive positions of the Guadalcanal campaign - and didn't know it until they'd already lost their battalion commander. This episode...

    Credit the people on this episode

  4. 153 - Guadalcanal - Battle of Mount Austen - Hyakutake vs Patch, intelligence failures, sabotage raids and crippling casualties.

    Sep 27, 202636 minAudio

    Major General Patch had a simple plan: send the fresh 132nd Infantry Regiment to clear a company of sick Japanese from Mount Austen before the January offensive. Intelligence estimated perhaps 100 defenders. The actual...

    Credit the people on this episode

  5. 152 - National Guard vs Imperial Japanese Army on Guardalcanal - Lessons Learnt for employing green troops at 5th Matanikau

    Jul 19, 202641 minAudio

    The US 182nd Infantry Regiment crossed the Matanikau on 18 November 1942 and within 48 hours all three companies of 1st Battalion had broken under Japanese mortar and flanking fire. This episode examines how green...

    Credit the people on this episode