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The OpenSourceMalware Show

The OpenSourceMalware Show artwork

React2STEAL hits Node.js/React shops, MSFT official agent-framework compromised

Nov 18, 202642 minAudio

This week we talked about: React2STEAL: An automated hacking framework runs entirely on GitHub Actions inside 45 compromised GitHub repositories. It scans for React2Shell and commits stolen credentials back to those public repos. The repo owners aren’t the targets. Their accounts are being used as attacker infrastructure, and one target list alone held 18 million host names. We walk through how the pipeline works, why its overlap with wfx-loot, PolinRider, and GhostAction likely points to a shared pool of compromised accounts, and the signs that an LLM wrote the code. We also get into the disclosure dilemma: GitHub only lets you report a repo’s owner, not the repo itself, and reporting gets the whole account banned. Microsoft agent-framework compromise: Two trojanized releases of Microsoft’s official agent-framework package on PyPI went through Microsoft’s release pipeline and malware scan and came out clean. Anyone who installed or built with versions 1.26.1 or 1.26.2 should audit their Azure and CI/CD access. The .pth infostealer targeted Azure managed identities, GitHub Actions OIDC tokens, and local cloud credentials. We break down research suggesting the attacker got into Microsoft’s internal ESRP release system, and why sending stolen data to webhook[.]site made this a near miss. Resources (blog) React2STEAL Uses GitHub Actions to Exploit React2Shell (blog) Official Microsoft agent-framework PyPI package compromised (X) Rami's research on the agent-framework compromise timeline

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

Jenn GileHello. It is Wednesday, November 18th or Thursday, November 19th, if you happen to be on the other side of the international dateline. My name is Jen Guile. I have Paul McCarty with me. We're the co-founders and co-hosts of this show. And we have quite a roundup of things to talk about today. Uh it's only like Wednesday afternoon here in uh the Pacific Northwest and it's like I feel like it's been a week. You know, those pictures of like tired pet cats and stuff.

Jenn GileLike that's that's who I am right now. How are you doing, Paul?

Paul McCartyYeah, kind of same. You know, I think you and I are typically like, you know, moving from one attack to another. I think the problem lately has been that we have so many attacks happening that you're you're kind of working on multiple things at once, which is always difficult. Um

Jenn Gileyeah,

Paul McCartybut you know, it's it is what it is.

Jenn GileIt is the life. Uh I have made it. So life with

Paul McCartychildren.

Jenn GileUh because you and I are developing a reputation of, oh great, when Paul and Jen join the chat. Sorry, I've got a cat back here who's being quite the pest. All right. You know, when Paul and Jen join the chat, bad news is gonna be shared. So uh it's my commitment now in our communities that uh you also get a cat picture if I'm gonna give you bad news. So now I need to make sure I'm routinely taking pictures of the cat. He's a pretty cute little thing, though. So I just want to

Paul McCartygive a

Jenn Gileoh

Paul McCartysorry, I wouldn't I wouldn't just YOLO this. I just want to give a shout out. Uh, this is my first, I'm down in Sydney today, well, yesterday and today, um, and uh here for RuCon, which is put on by Google, which has been an amazing um CTI and incident response type conference. But I got the shirt on. You can't see it. But anyhow, I got the shirt on. Just want to give a shout out to them. I'm I'm really enjoying this one.

Jenn GileAwesome. Yeah, I definitely have FOMO for more than one reason. Like being in Australia sounds great. Going to Rucon sounds great.

Paul McCartyIt's pretty good.

Jenn GileOkay. We've got three topics. We're gonna try to stick to them today. The first is React to Steel, uh, a campaign that we just discovered in the last 24 hours. The second that we'll get into is um trojanized releases of Microsoft's official agent framework on PyPy uh came out this week. So we're gonna talk about that. And then a little uh research project that I started my week out with. But let's start with React to Steel.

Jenn GileSo kind of rewinding, I got a DM yesterday on LinkedIn from um a CTI lead. Uh her name's Karina Rihanyo, and she had found a set of GitHub repositories that were scanning for apps vulnerable to a couple of CVEs related to React, specifically React, you shall being one of the CVEs, as well as um uh Node.js.

Jenn GileAnd she looked at them and she said, I think there's something here, but I'm not a GitHub expert. Hey, can you take a look at it, validate that I'm seeing what I'm seeing? Let me know what else you find. Um, the short version is yeah, we were able to completely validate what she found and also build on it. And it turns out that what she saw some signs for was actually a very sophisticated end-to-end automating, automated framework that the attacker built using GitHub Actions.

Jenn GileBasically, they feed domains into it, they get domain lists, and out the other side, credentials come out, and there's very little that they need to do. So we named it React to Steel on a little play of React to Shell, since that's the main flaw that it exploits in order to find the credentials. Um, you know, validated again everything that Karina found, as well as uh expanding the data set. So in total, we found 45 repositories that are um undoubtedly victims themselves of stolen credentials that are being used as like public, both dumps as well as to run the attack.

Jenn Gile45 doesn't sound like a lot, but in a single repo, uh one of the target lists alone held 18 million unique host names. So I think one of the takeaways for me was just the sheer scale that this automated hacking campaign um came up with, with a relatively small number of stolen GitHub repositories. And I'm saying stolen because I think that's what happened. I don't think the the host um organizations or owners are involved in this.

Jenn GileUm it steals uh all kinds of credentials, stripe keys. It looks for a whole bunch of AI uh provider keys, no surprise there. Um, steals full config files, AWS credentials. Um, the timeline goes back to about mid-September of when they started running their pipeline, but the repos themselves um were created sometime between October uh 22nd and I think it was November 14th.

Jenn GileAnd a weird overlap that Paul, you and I should definitely talk about here is on some, not all, or I guess I should say many, not all of the um repositories, there was also a WFX loot branch. And as far as I could tell, and I think you agree, this was coincidental. This is not evidence the same, it doesn't shift us either direction that the same threat actor is running um React to steal as WFX loot.

Jenn GileUh, it reads a little bit more like a whole bunch of threat actors right now, maybe have their hands on a whole bunch of leaked, you know, credentials in some ways. You and I were talking the other day, you suggested maybe there's like a leaky OAuth uh app out there somewhere that's letting a ton of people get compromised in one of the repos that I found. Um they had also been previously compromised by both uh Paul and Writer and Ghost Action, which we already have documented are separate campaigns.

Jenn GileSo I think that kind of does push this toward probably separate actors. And this is just a shared pool of compromised accounts. So uh there's so much to talk about here. We haven't even talked about how the malware works, um, but I'll pause there.

Paul McCartyYeah, I think that last point you were talking about is really important to kind of double-click on here, which is this like attribution and the overlap. I think that on one hand, we know that there's just this constant supply of credentials. In fact, this attack itself is creating more stolen credentials, right? Um, you know, team. Yeah, we found more than a

Jenn Gilethousand that were stolen and leaked in these repos.

Paul McCartyTeam PCP you know famously had something like seven gigabytes worth of credentials. Um so you know, I think that what I'm trying to get at here, Jen, is that there might be just some totally you know unrelated overlap. For example, DPRK Pawn Rider and Ghost Action and the Um WK loot

Jenn GileWFX.

Paul McCartyThank you, Jesus. I can't keep them all straight. Um, probably not related. None of those three are probably related to each other, even though all three of them are touching some of these same repositories. Um, that is separate from this other thing that you and it and you and I probably need to spend some more time thinking about and talking about, which is is there a relationship between WFX loot and this React to Steel? And there's more evidence that might be the case. Now, just in the last like 10 minutes before that we jumped on here, I was taking a look and I've got some interesting little tidbits here.

Jenn GileYeah,

Paul McCartylay it on me.

Jenn GileI haven't heard

Paul McCartyabout well, well, the first thing is that the comments are in Arabic. So basically, in the loot, the JSON loot, the comments are in Arabic. Um, and obviously that would point to somebody that's natively um speaking Arabic in that part of the world, although that's not necessarily a you know a done deal. But there's not any evidence that the um uh I want to get it right, WFX loot uh threat actor ever used um Arabic in their their payloads or any of their the art of artifacts, doesn't preclude it, but because we didn't see it there, but we see it here, you know, that makes me think maybe they're not the same actor, even though there is a significant amount of overlap here.

Paul McCartyWhich uh I mean, I have I don't know the numbers. What do you think is the overlap between WFX and

Jenn Gileuh you know I didn't put a percentage on it, but it was something like maybe two-thirds of the repos that I looked at had overlap. Um

Paul McCartyI mean, let's just stop and like think about this. No, it's significant number

Jenn Gileand uh candidly, it was one of those, you know, at first glance, okay was one feeding the other kind of question. And then when I looked at it, looked at the timeline, it seems separate. Um WFX ran from November 10th to 12th. Got a needy cat here. He's been fed, I swear.

Jenn GileUh it ran 10th to 12th. Um React is still still running to be clear, started somewhere back around mid-September. Um, I dated back uh some validation inside the code rather than the repos where it was um talking about perplexity tokens and being validated on a specific date, which is an interesting thing to commit to your public repos. Uh side note, we should talk about the role of AI.

Jenn GileUm but yeah, that dates back to mid-September. And then the actual repo creation came in three waves. Let me double check my dates on that because I don't want to say the wrong thing, but they were kind of lumpy, like it wasn't really clear why. Let's see here. The first wave was October 22nd,

Paul McCarty22nd. And

Jenn Gilein less than 10 minutes, they shipped 26 repos. It could be more. Some of the ones that we found were unpublished by the time we got to look at them, so we couldn't date everything. Um, and then on November 11th, so pretty decent gap, they published eight repositories within a minute, 26 seconds apart. Uh the day after WFX loot began.

Jenn GileAnd then on November 14th, so what, four days ago, they published another five, about 90 seconds apart. Those are staged only. So no results, no WFX loot probes. I did also in five of the repos find a totally unrelated um workflow that I couldn't trace to anything.

Paul McCartyInteresting.

Jenn GileYeah, it's it's one of those crazy campaigns where you think you got to the heart of it and then you're like, what is this? Where did this come from? What are you doing? And

Paul McCartythen there's a whole pivot into something that's bigger than

Jenn Gilethat.

Paul McCartyYeah,

Jenn Gileand then there's a whole

Paul McCartymaybe not bigger in this case, but um uh a couple things I was gonna say. I think um uh so in terms of the in my experience, when you're doing this kind of big um like these big waves, right? So basically the first one was the first one that you and I know about was in October, October 22nd, although it started back in September.

Jenn GileYeah, you

Paul McCartyknow,

Jenn Gilethey collect a lot of sure it could have started earlier and they just shut down the repos. We don't know.

Paul McCartyCorrect. Um, yeah, and you know, the the 40 some that we're looking at might be just a small number of you know what are still there that maybe the the victims realize down the paths or whatever it was. Who knows? But um the point I was gonna make though is that um oh someone else can they the um it's important, um, it's right there. The oh you just collect all this data and they're just all this text, and it's unstructured.

Paul McCartyA lot of it's supposed to be JSON, but they've it's not proper JSON, and so they won't be able to parse it well. They'll have to create special tools that go through each one of these files, you know, process it into proper JSON so they can then extract using JQ and do all the other things, and there's a lot of duplication, they're doing they're writing, you know. So obviously, this is just like a throw stuff in the wall kind of thing, and there's a lot of de-duplication they'll have to go through. So it's not surprising that we're seeing these big waves and then a big period of inact inactivity.

Paul McCartyWe've seen we saw even saw this with Team PCP and others when they just collect all this stuff, they have to just then sit there and like it's not really counting your loot, it's more like processing. Yeah, figuring out what you know, 10% is actually something you can attack somebody with, and the other 90% you can just throw away, right? Um, so I think there's a lot of that. Um, and I did notice that there's a difference in the payload. So the the Python, the actual fast, what is it? Fast, not fast

Jenn Gileopy, something like that. Yeah,

Paul McCartythat changed in the last wave, and they added some additional kind of X fill and some other kind of components too as well. So um, you know, this threat actor is evolving, um, and which we see all the time now. You know, you were talking about this in one of your other posts about the fact that you're we we're seeing threat actors, especially these vibe-coding threat actors, evolving and iterating in public, which is great for us because it gives us great, you know, in insight into their process and their maturity and everything else. Um, but yeah, let's talk about let's let's segue into the payload here and

Jenn Gileyeah, I've got the um little like mock-up of a GitHub repo up on my screen so I can talk through it. I think what was so interesting to me was to like poke around the repos themselves because it looks very much like, oh, here's a kit. Like this is everything you need. Uh it's end-to-end, it runs automated, like props to them. It's good work. Um, so it starts with a bunch of TXT files that list the hosts that are gonna run in each scan.

Jenn GileAnd each file has something like 20,000 hosts in it. And then there's a GitHub Actions workflow, scan.yaml, that kicks off and it runs every step, you know, through the process using, you know, GitHub as its infrastructure. So this is not running on, you know, the developer's machine who is getting hit. It's not running on uh the victim developer's machine.

Jenn GileIt then um pre-filters out any host that's not running Next.js. So that's pretty telling, right? Uh any hosts that pass the filter, it splits into some parallel scans, and then um it's running through a series of three exploits in a row. And like if you hit the first one, then it doesn't do the second and the third. So first it looks to see can I exploit React2 shell?

Jenn GileIf yes, continues, runs the payload. If no, then it looks for a second CVE, it's an X.js middleware bypass. And then again, if no, it moves on to an AWS metadata request. And if it's able to hit you on the React to shell, then it exfiltrates a whole bunch of stuff. It copies your environment variables, uh, it takes your config files and your.env files, it finds your cloud credentials, it tests stolen AI keys, and it's doing this in like a fairly clever way to make sure that you're not seeing big usage spikes when those keys are being tested.

Jenn GileSo it's like keeping it low and under the radar. And then it saves it all in uh as a JSON, as you mentioned, uh zips it and it commits it back to the repo where the original host list lives. It also does have a telegram component, but it's not turned on. So not totally sure what's going on there. Um, we've seen this commit stolen goods to public repos move several times over the last 12 to 18 months.

Jenn GileSo this is not new, this is not a mistake, this is an intentional thing that they've chosen to do. Uh there's several reasons it could be. I mean, it could be because it gives you plausible deniability if you go and use those credentials that you know you can say, Oh, I'm not the threat actor, I just found this on

Paul McCartyGitHub. I'm not doing anything illegal. I just I didn't steal them, I just got them off of GitHub.

Jenn GileUsing

Paul McCartythem is the illegal

Jenn Gilething.

Paul McCartyYou're still doing

Jenn Gilean illegal thing. Yeah. Um, you know, it could be two illegal,

Paul McCartythere's one illegal.

Jenn GileYeah, it could be a fallback mechanism. You know, you often they have two things that are expelling. In this case, I don't know why they didn't turn on the telegram thing. Like maybe it got built in going back to the thing we haven't talked about yet, the role of AI here. Maybe the you know, harness that they were using thought, oh, we see telegram used a lot. Like, let's build that in. And then the yeah,

Paul McCartydidn't turn

Jenn Gileit on.

Paul McCartyI as to zoom out to like 40,000 foot, I just want to make this observation. I am kind of both with this attack and with the next one we're gonna talk about, the Microsoft Agent Framework one. I'm just embarrassed for threat actors with the world over with how crap some of these are. Like, just like, come on, like, oh my god. So

Jenn Gilewell, I did make a list of all the things that I thought could indicate use of an LLM because people are gonna ask us. And so I think it's worth like having that conversation. And this is not like, oh, you're incompetent because you used an LLM. To be clear, all of the things that I'm gonna list are things that an experienced developer also might do. So, you know, the LLM learn from somewhere, but also some of these are maybe you wouldn't do it. So, one of the things that's notable throughout all of the code, especially in Fast Recon, uh, is it refers to the operator in like the third person?

Jenn GilePeople don't call themselves an operator in their own code. Like that's that's it seems unlikely. So probably their coding agent is referring to the person operating it and like recording an instruction. Would you agree with that, Reed?

Paul McCartyYeah, totally. For sure.

Jenn GileUm, let's see here. Oh yeah. Uh another thing that I think you'll get a kick out of is there's a redaction um of a telegram config name uh in one of the files, but then a few lines below the real token sits in plain text. Um we've seen that behavior before from LLMs, right?

Paul McCartyYep.

Jenn GileLike probably the LLM hard coded it after the operator told them not to.

Paul McCartyYeah. Well, the operator's probably not even,

Jenn Gileyou

Paul McCartyknow.

Jenn GileMaybe he isn't even thinking about it. Who knows?

Paul McCartyYeah.

Jenn GileUh there's some very like obvious stuff that people have been talking about for a while. A lot of the code has emojis in it, which not saying people don't do that, but it's like it could not be more classic. Oh, AI wrote this and then put an emoji for each, you know, found keys, there's a key. Alerts, there's a little alert symbol. Like that's the kind of thing that you tend to see AI written code commonly have.

Jenn GileSo those are just some of the examples.

Paul McCartyWith especially when you're using an agent out of the box and you haven't built any harness, you haven't tuned it, customized it, and you haven't tuned it. Like, I mean, I don't we we don't get we don't have emojis in anything that uh any of the code that we generate because I've explicitly told it to never do that again and don't be over the top with your comments and all those things. But if you're if you're a threat actor new, you know, you don't have any of those things in place, and so you give away some of these tells. But I think there's a lot of interesting things about this um attack that that are worth noting.

Paul McCartyAnd I've been describing it as RTEX like. And I know that you have not wanted to use the R-Text word because there's zero evidence this has anything to do with actual RTX. But the point I was trying to make was that this is similar to R-Tex and Cairns. And it turns out the the next one we're going to talk about, the Microsoft Agent Framework, is actually a Cairn, right? So like it's not R-Text, it's Cairn. But the point is that this is a fully fledged end-to-end attack harness built in GitHub Actions.

Paul McCartyAnd I think that's really worth noting because in this particular instance that we're talking about, this is just this kind of crappy React to Shell version of it, right? But you know, in a week or two weeks, we're gonna see the same thing built to be somewhere

Jenn Gileelse, yeah.

Paul McCartyYeah, it's gonna be a proper harness to you know, you just add whatever CVE or whatever misconfig you want, and it just away it goes. And why not? I also do want to point out that uh while there are some the problem with um of delaying or pausing or slowing down code inside of a GitHub action is you actually pay by the number of GitHub minutes. And when you slow it down, the whole thing takes longer. And these are used to be when I was doing red teaming in the CI way back in the day, like these are things that I had to think about.

Paul McCartyAnd a really good example is like the clearly, this list of uh domains has been generated by you know Subfinder and um AMAS and mass can and other tools like that. I haven't tested this, but I would suspect that all of those domains actually resolve on our live, and that if they don't, then the threat actor is even dumber than

Jenn Gilewasting their money, yeah.

Paul McCartyYeah, like they're just wasting you know time. You would assume that they have pre-packaged all this stuff using those tools like like AMAS and whatnot, got them all ready to go, and then you stick them in the hopper. Because what you don't want to do is you don't want there to be any of these kind of anomalous um domains that kind of get stuck for the for the actions. You want it all to be just kick out the JSON and away you go. Um the parsing the JSON, as I mentioned earlier, is difficult right now. It's just it's kooky and it's not it's not real JSON.

Paul McCartyYou know, they're all.txt files, but it's supposed to be in JSON format, even though it doesn't parse correctly. So, you know, we still have to kind of figure out what's the the the blast radius for this and you know see what number of actual AWS keys and I saw at least one SSH key um in one of the files I was looking at. So this will probably be big and it's affecting some big orgs. And um, you know, this is the first of these like GitHub action automated scanners, I'm sure.

Paul McCartyIt's just it's just from that perspective, I love it because it's it's innovative in that way. Then the rest of it's it's like a lot of these things we say. There's like one part of it that's really kind of like unique, and you're like, oh, that's good, and then the rest of it is absolutely shizzle, like it's just crap.

Jenn GileYeah, I think a thing to reiterate, because we haven't really said it out loud, is this is not a situation of malicious GitHub actions. This is not a situation of uh malware being planted on the like host machine. So no one's hacking developers here and like scanning their code. This is kind of a novel way to use malicious open source in that there are no open source apps here, you know, if sorry, uh libraries.

Jenn GileYou know, it's not a uh compromised library, it's a bunch of compromised GitHub accounts that are being used as attacker infrastructure automation.

Paul McCartyWell, I would disagree with the your there is

Jenn Gilemalware in the repos, to be clear.

Paul McCartyYeah, yeah, yeah. The malicious, the malicious actions that they put in there. So in it, you know, obviously they have to run these actions from these compromised repos, and that means they have to push the workflow files into the to the GitHub repo in addition, and then they write, you know, the all the X fill creds, the loot. Yeah, I guess to be

Jenn Gileclear, what's unique here is it's not targeting the developer whose repo it sits in.

Paul McCartyThat's that's a good point. It's just using them as like a proxy to like distribute their. And I think that's the word you and I really like this idea of distributed, like centralized, but distributed. Sorry, that's an oxymoron, but but this distributed nature of it. Because, for example, they chunk up something that you wrote, you you know, your your initial blog post that you sent over to me, the draft, you know, highlighted well, which is that it's chunking up the host list to multiple victims, right?

Paul McCartySo it's not duplicating. And there is some duplication going on, don't get me wrong, because

Jenn Gilethe

Paul McCartythreat actor is moving too quickly, but um, that kind of sharding or chunking um is smart because the the attack infrastructure using GitHub Actions benefits from this ability to kind of spread it out across all of these accounts, and also try to keep them below any like overage, right? If you put it all on this one, it's quickly gonna go over.

Jenn GileI mean, it's almost like they built their own microservices, it's distributed computing.

Paul McCartyWell, I mean, this is living off the GitHub Actions, right? Living off the CI, right? We wait, me and Francois are gonna coin yet another. I can't even remember what the last one

Jenn Gilesomething, yeah.

Paul McCartyWhat was the one Brett from Okta? I coined one with Brett from what it was. Yeah,

Jenn Gilethe other thing that I want to say is this is like a truly challenging thing to figure out what to do in terms of responsible disclosure and what we should do about the repositories. Because again, the way GitHub structures this is you can't report a single repo as malicious. You have to report the owner. These owners, as far as I can tell, are not threat actors. If I report them, they're just gonna get their accounts killed. And from what we've seen, there will be no appeal process, no reactivation process unless they have inside connections.

Jenn GileNormally, based on that, I don't report them. But normally they're hosting malware, they're not actually attacking and they're not actually holding on to X-filled stolen data. And so that's a real like it's 45. Yeah, it's like 45 organizations that could get shut down if we report this. It's I will probably report them because the other end of it is there's a lot of leaked stuff out on these repos, and nothing we can do about the repos.

Paul McCartyThis is uh during every one of our uh open source malware shows. This is my I'm talking to you, Microsoft. Sorry, GitHub slash Microsoft. And here I get really close. Um people are like, whoa, Paul. Um GitHub, this is a bad response to victims. So basically, you are killing victims' accounts entirely when all you could do is just remove a repository. And by the way, we know that you can just remove a repository because we've seen you do it in the past, right? Like that you can automate just truncating that repository from that account.

Paul McCartyYou don't have to kill the whole account. And if you look at the account, you can realize this is a relatively semi-active or sometimes very active real GitHub user. So just truncate the thing. Now, their response might be, well, we don't know the the user might still be compromised, pawn rider, you know, pats or whatever. Well, yeah, just kill their pats too. Like you don't have to kill the account. I just think that's such an over. I don't know, it just it seems

Jenn Gileit's a really binary response to something that's not a binary problem. Like good or bad is not what applies here. It's sure the repo itself is bad, but that doesn't make a statement about the owner.

Paul McCartyWell, we're at we're at minute uh 30. We should probably move on to the next one.

Jenn GileUm, okay. So

Paul McCartymuch more to say about React to Steel, but

Jenn Gileso much more. So while I was working on React to Steel yesterday, of course, you DM'd me and said, hold on. Um something's going down over in PyPy. Uh we've discovered trojanized releases of two versions of Microsoft's agent framework. So this is the official Microsoft published agent framework on PyPy. It was versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2. They came out very close to each other. And um I think correct me if I'm wrong, dot two came out before dot one.

Jenn GileUm, no, okay, other way around. You're thinking

Paul McCartythat you there is there is a recent thing that you and I were looking at that they didn't. But that wasn't this one.

Jenn GileOkay, not this one. Uh, but PyPy had quarantined one of them and then quarantined the other, and then ended up because it was very clear that the threat actors still had access, um, shutting down, you know, freezing Microsoft's ability to publish on PyPy, which is good for them. I'm sure that was not an easy decision for them to make. Um, but anybody who uh installed or built with these versions um is in for you know exposed credentials, they should be auditing Azure and CI C D access.

Jenn GileUm it had a dot PTH info stealer targeting Azure managed identities, GitHub Actions OIDC tokens. Gosh, GitHub Actions. Everyone wants you. Uh local cloud creds. So uh we very quickly got out, you know, an advisory to our customers, posted on social to try to get the word out. Uh and then you and I went our separate ways because we both had long days ahead of us. So tell me what I've missed in the last 24 hours.

Paul McCartySure. Yeah, yeah. So first I found out about this um when Rami shouted out in one of our groups that um that it was the agent framework was malicious. Um and I went and checked my our unreviewed queue, and we had a unreviewed um so I reviewed it, made sure I added some um uh you know indicator data and some other stuff. And so we had a we had the first blog post in the the and it was in OSM really, really quickly, and a lot of people commented on that, right?

Paul McCartyWhich is great, and that's how the system is supposed to work, right? Like this is why we share information amongst ourselves. Um but I think the important thing is that um a maintain uh uh someone from the PiPie team, I was in contact with them, and they were in the process of quarantining dot one, and then all of a sudden dot two popped into existence. I was like, hey mate, there's another one malicious, and oh yeah, I see that

unknownone

Paul McCartytoo. We'll quarantine that one too as well. And so both of them were online very long. I I asked I asked my agent to tell me how long they were online for. I mean, I didn't I forgot to go and look before this, but it wasn't pretty much. Uh it was

Jenn Gilepretty short. I know I documented it, I don't remember it off the top of my head.

Paul McCartyIt it was very, very short, which is great. Um, now unfortunately, I I I do know of at least one state organization that downloaded. I don't know if they actually were you know what happened then, but but somebody reached out to me and said they they did download it. But um, I think that's all fascinating, and it's fascinating that it was Microsoft, and it turns out that Wiz did an Rami from Wiz did an amazing um deep dive, and it it turns out it was somebody compromised ESRP, which is their internal Microsoft's internal kind of release and build process.

Paul McCartyIn fact, I think that's what the last three um letters of the acronym uh acronym are for. We still don't know why, how, sorry, how exactly, but the important thing to understand here is that um as part of that ASR ESRP process, there's like a there's a validation and a malware scan, and it got through all of that just fine, right? It did, and and if you look at Rami's, I don't want to take anything away from his his yeah,

Jenn GileI shared his in the chat, and I'll make sure to share um that out in the resources afterwards.

Paul McCartyThe threat actor tried publishing and then hit an IP restriction, which is really interesting. So ESRP had an IP restriction, and so basically then the threat actor within four minutes, so it couldn't have been that hard, but within four minutes, the the threat actor then found Microsoft IP space, probably by you know using the the cloud console or just spinning up a VM. If they could do that in four minutes, I'd be impressed. But anyhow, they used Microsoft IP space and then they were able to publish successfully. It went through the malware scan, came out clean, and was published.

Paul McCartyAnd so, you know, I'm sorry, but I like I said this last week or the week before that. Whatever malware analysis engine you're using in Microsoft and GitHub and NPM, it's not good enough. Like it just isn't full stop. Please fix it, it doesn't work.

Jenn GileUm, and

Paul McCartywe're seeing that all over the place. It's you know, flagging things as malicious that aren't, and it's missing things entirely, and it's just it's not well built. So I would

Jenn Gilehave hoped that something like an IP mismatch would have gotten flagged by some kind of automation, even though they came around with the right, you know. I I would hope that that would be an early like warning sign somewhere of like, hey, was this somebody logged in from the wrong computer, or is this a threat actor?

Paul McCartyWell, let's just imagine in the best world there was a detection. And Jen, there probably was somewhere, right? But the problem is

Jenn Gileit probably did not go to the right place.

Paul McCartyWell, and actioning something like that takes a while. You got to figure out well, all right, is one of my developers on what what what where is this IP from? Is it from Russia? Is it from you know North Korea? Is it from France? Okay, is one of my developers on vacation? You know, do are they are we allowed to push without the the corporate VPN? All these things. I'm just making this all up right now. But

Jenn Gileoh yeah, to be fair, it's not like it's an easy fix.

Paul McCartyYeah, exactly. There's a lot that you have to kind of work through before you you get involved and you stop them from pushing. But in the meanwhile, they went and found a really quick bypass, which was just find some Microsoft IP space, which I still I want to drill into this and figure out more about this, but um, and then they could successfully publish. So happy days for them. Um now let's talk about how terrible this is like Francois, me and a bunch of other people, like we were just and you and I like all right, threat actor. I'm talking to you. This is the part of the show where I talk to you, Threat Actor.

Paul McCartyLike you had published access to ESRP and you used webhook.site, like I just I am blown away by this. Like, why don't you

Jenn Gileexplain to the listeners why that's why you're judging?

Paul McCartyYeah, well, webhook.site is originally, you know, it's originally built for developers to be able to write things to you, typically JSON. There's a bunch of these different websites that let you do it, endpoint.io and others. Um, and uh basically webhook.site allows you to write a webhook to this thing. Now, here's the thing is webhook site is public. So when you use it for your X fill, other people can read it. If you're on the free account, you only get a hundred requests and then it cuts you off. You get a 400.

Jenn GileI saw X.

Paul McCartyAnd um, and it doesn't, and we've seen this other with other threat actors recently, too, as well. Even I think even one of the team PCP at one point, they used it as well, too.

Jenn GileA subscription,

Paul McCartyyes. So first it's public, so we all can see it. Second, it runs out really quickly. So, like Rami does an amazing job. He went through because it was he was able to grab this data before it stopped working, and he saw that there was of the the hundred potential requests that could have happened, only 17 were actually to to actual potential victims. And it looks like three people ran the payload, right? Three. You had published access to Microsoft's internal release and build system, and this I just

Jenn Gilethe

Paul McCartyproblem is this is gonna send a message to development teams all over the world like, oh, these threat actors are idiots, you know, we don't have to worry about this, you know, because this Muppet wrote to webhook webhook.site. I mean, this is like you to go to amateur D level and you go down from that. Um, so um, you know, this is a a near miss because the threat actor didn't know what they were doing. Um, but to drill out from that, a threat actor getting access, and we still don't know how, to Microsoft's internal release and build system.

Paul McCartyI mean, that's that's

Jenn Gilesubstantial, yeah.

Paul McCartyThat's a big deal. And we need to like

Jenn GileI'm gonna say it, given we haven't even debriefed on how cursor shared what happened. That was the other thing I was gonna ask so, very, very much in brief, uh cursor was uh exploited two weeks ago uh to publish a trojanized CLAD code through their own internal OpenVSX marketplace mirror. It was through a third-party um tool that they use that had access to a token, so on and so on.

Jenn GileSo I don't know if Microsoft will be as transparent uh in their reporting. I think it could go either way, but I'm gonna call it now. It wouldn't surprise me if it turned out to be something third party.

Paul McCartyYeah, I think in this case it's gonna be more like a developer. I think that if this is AI related, this is more like a developer, an internal developer at Microsoft did something dumb and exposed something. I think they

Jenn Gileexposed a key.

Paul McCartyYeah, a key or you know, some something else. Um or they installed a VS Code extension, a malicious VS Code extension, which oh that sounds familiar. Now remember too that Mike the GitHub lost 3,800, 3,800 repos not too long ago, right? So I um I I don't feel like you know software engineering is perhaps following best practices inside of I mean it's easy for me to throw stones because I don't know, and and I'm I get that, but like, you know, if it turns out that this is a Microsoft employee that somehow, you know, exposed access to Microsoft's internal ESRP, you know, system and the and this Muppet of a threat actor came along and used it, it's just like chef kiss.

Jenn GileWell, I think that's a good note to end on. We're about 41 minutes in. Uh enjoy the rest of your trip. And

Paul McCartymy talk is today at 1 30. So I'm gonna

Jenn Gilego.

Paul McCartyWhat's your what's

Jenn Gileyour talk on?

Paul McCartyUh innovation TPRK. It's actually a TLP red talk. So, but I can't say the name. It's um it's uh innovation, DPRK is innovation for contagious interview and pollen writer. So yeah.

Jenn GileYeah, interesting. Well, anybody who's there, hopefully they uh get to attend and let us know what they thought. Uh, I just want to again say a special thank you to Karina, the community member, who came to us with those suspicious repos. If you ever find anything weird, feel free to reach out on socials. We both are pretty responsive. And uh this is how together we find these things and hopefully stop them.

Paul McCartyFor sure. Yeah,

Jenn Gileall right. Good work, have a good one.

Paul McCartyThanks everybody. Appreciate you listening. Cheers.

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