Welcome to The Low Down, the best show on the internet for hackers The Low Down is presented by Maze. LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/mazehq/ X: https://twitter.com/Maze_Security Follow Us! https://www.instagram.com/lowdown.pod This week we're diving into massive identity verification breaches, the arrest of Team PCP supply chain attackers, and the certified pre owned router epidemic that's turning your home network into a botnet. Today we're talking about: ID Scan Breach: 153 Million Driver's Licenses Leaked Breaking down the massive data breach exposing 153 million driver's licenses, 10 million identification cards, 3 million travel documents, and 579,000 medical cards from ID scan dot net. How Brian Krebs traced his own leaked license back to a Hertz rental car transaction and marijuana dispensary visits at DEF CON. Why third party identity verification services create single points of failure when companies like Target, FedEx, GameStop, and hotels all use the same scanning infrastructure. The Identity Verification Debate: Privacy vs Security Examining the cultural backdrop of identity verification laws spreading across Europe and the UK's push to de anonymize internet activity in the name of protecting children. Why Discord now requires ID verification for adult content servers and Pornhub refuses to comply by shutting off access to entire states. The fundamental problem of companies being entrusted with sensitive documents they aren't equipped to secure and how driver's licenses are becoming the new social security numbers in account recovery flows. McKesson Healthcare Breach: 284 Million Patient Records Stolen Shiny Hunters claims responsibility for compromising McKesson, the pharmaceutical giant responsible for a third of all US drug transactions with 403 billion in annual revenue. Deep dive into Shiny Hunters' sophisticated MO combining social engineering over phone and text, fake company Okta logins using Evil Nginx proxies, and specialized teams ready to exfiltrate OAuth tokens at machine speed across geographically distributed locations. Team PCP Arrested: The Supply Chain Attackers Roll Up Australian authorities arrest the Team PCP threat actors behind massive NPM supply chain attacks including the Mini Shaihalud worm, LightLLM compromise, and Trivi security tool breach. How Flare's OSINT investigation traced the DeadcatX3 alias across GitHub, HackerOne, Hugging Face, and eBay to reveal real identity Ruben Thompson through catastrophic OPSEC failures. Why some in the security community are defending Team PCP as hackers of old exposing systemic flaws rather than profiting from stolen credentials. The Hacker Culture Divide: Altruism vs Cybercrime Exploring the thinning veil between career cybersecurity and hacker culture as the Free Team PCP movement emerges. Examining whether Team PCP was following the old school ethos of hacking to expose vulnerabilities without profiting versus crossing into criminal territory. Why they slurped up AWS credentials, Kubernetes secrets, and crypto wallet keys but never used them beyond NPM and GitHub propagation. The philosophical question of whether demonstrating supply chain fragility justifies the method. Meter AI Safety Org Compromised: The Irony of Expertise The nonprofit AI safety organization called in to analyze the Hugging Face OpenAI incident suffers their own breach with 600,000 dollars in API usage stolen. Why calling in Meter instead of actual incident response firms like Unit 42, CrowdStrike, or Mandiant represents the sidelining of cybersecurity expertise in AI safety conversations. Breaking down the vibe coded app with fail open vulnerability that silently disabled authentication and exposed agent orchestration dashboards to the public internet. NVIDIA Acquires Hugging Face: The 13 Billion Dollar Question NVIDIA purchases Hugging Face for 13 billion dollars as founders walk away with 3 billion each. Revisiting the conspiracy theory about potential collusion between OpenAI and Hugging Face to reposition OpenAI as the premier cyber model provider. The surge protector plugged into itself problem of Jensen Wong, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Oracle passing the same 100 million between multi trillion dollar valuations. Info Stealers Target Claude API Tokens Popular info stealer malware including Vidar, Luma C2, Steal C, and Redline add new functionality specifically for hijacking Claude sessions to rack up API usage bills. Why stealing AI tokens is more creative than crypto mining and represents a new monetization model for compromised systems. Nigerian Sextortion Rings: From Scams to Suicides 404 Media investigation follows cyber sleuths who flew to Nigeria to track down sextortion scammers targeting teenage victims with compromising photos leading to extortion and suicide. How the same tactics used by threat actor groups like The Comm and Shiny Hunters to recruit young males into cybercrime through blackmail. Breaking down
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Transcript
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Identity verification is to make us all more secure, Matt. I mean, all we have to do is upload our driver's license to apple.com or clubpenguin.com so that they can verify that I am not a child. I have so many thoughts about it. So many thoughts about this. Guess who also has been throwing around the same $100 million for the last two years? Jensen Wong, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Oracle, bro.
The surge protector plugged into itself of the investment of like all of their valuations and like all the money being passed between these like multi-trillion dollar companies is very like, what the hell? Good morning, hackers. Welcome to The Lowdown presented by Mays, the best podcast on the internet for hackers, for those most amongst us. Matt, I heard you were sitting out there in the hot Texas sun. What's it like sitting out in 102 degree heat in September? How you doing?
Dude, why do child's soccer leagues start in August in Texas? I have no idea why. We should be starting at Halloween. Like, this is crazy. It's torture. Have you ever watched Parks and Rec? I love Parks and Rec. One of my favorite shows. You know when they go camping and Tom Aziz Ansari's character Tom like rolls up with like the entire SkyMall magazine. Treat yourself. Yeah. 100% dude. Yeah. And it's like, what is it? Is that DJ Roomba is like Premiere? DJ Roomba. Yes. Oh, I forgot about that.
He's got a Roomba going around his tent and he's got like every luxury amenity possible in his tent. He's got like a margarita machine and like the, like the fun ice maker and like this big bed and couch and flat screen and all that. This is me at the side of soccer games. Now I went to one soccer game and just sweat and burnt my ass up because it's like 1130 in the morning and there's no shadows anywhere. And I was like, I felt like a rookie. I was like, what am I doing? What kind of like soccer parent am I in Texas?
not bringing my own shade. So I like, while I was sitting there, like filled my cart and I was like, I never again. And what's crazy is you're like, you're experienced too, bro. You're, you're a pale pasty East coast. You're just like me. You should know better. You should know that you and I are allergic to the sun, bro. You got to bring that umbrella. I know. I know I'm like a UV shirt wearing, like, you know, that kind of dad at the beach. Yeah. I, uh, I tend to avoid the day star for sure. But, uh, yeah, I brought like one water bottle and like a camp chair and I was like, I'm an idiot.
Right. And so, Uh, yeah, that did not happen this week. This week I rolled up with like a wagon that I bought to bring all of the stuff with me. I have like battery powered fans. I've got like special cooling towels that like you just wet and they evaporate faster or something. It's, it's like magic. I don't understand how they work. I thought I was buying them to like freeze them. And then like, you just wet them and they get really cold. I don't know. Like they're, they're called like chili frogs or something. I don't know. Not sponsored, but chili frog hit me up. But yeah.
let us know if you want to tap into that six cyber security market with your cooling evaporative sponge towels or whatever outside time we uh we have to listen if your ac goes out you never know right as i sit here literally under a blanket because i was telling you my my studio has the ac cranking because it's 100 degrees outside and i'm freezing in my little shorts under here insane dude Yeah, man. Yeah. It's kind of, kind of fun. The other, my other fun thing is I bought a car from the 1900s. Vintage.
Good job. 19, uh, 1900s, uh, the late 19 hundreds. I'll go with that. But yeah, I got like the, the no door Jeep action going on, which, uh, is, is, it makes me slightly cooler rolling up to the soccer games in an, in an old Jeep, even though then I get the wagon with my shades out and prove that I'm actually a loser, but yeah. Oh, and a father. You know, those words may be interchangeable, but, you know, it's all good. Whatever. I got the high socks and the new balance. We're good. There you go. You're good to go.
And the cargo shorts, potentially, I'm sure. You know, they can carry anything except for conversation with a female, but that's not important right now. I kicked my cargo shorts habit. You all memed me out of it. So funny. I didn't know this was a bit, but now it is. That's incredible. You know what else is a bit, Matt? Not the sponsor of today's video. They'll be later in the video. You know what else is a bit? What kind of perfect transition are you about to lay down? You know, identity verification is to make us all more secure, Matt.
I mean, all we have to do is upload our driver's license to Apple.com or, you know, ClubPenguin.com so that they can verify that I am not a child. Matt, what are your thoughts on this? I have so many thoughts about it. So many thoughts about this. If the, like, several of you watching have ever watched my YouTube channel, I know the millions of you, like, in line to watch Low Levels channel. But, you know, several of you watch my channel. I've made tons of videos about this, right? Not to, like, self-disparage myself. But, no, I've, like, I've talked about this a lot because...
it's such a hot button for me because the like guys of it is like to save the children. Right. And this is why it really bugs me. Okay. There's tobacco, right? Like we're talking about it today because there's a massive breach going on right now of a big database full of driver's licenses. Okay. The reason we don't do a lot of like, I call it breach porn content. You and I don't really do like make a video every time there's a big breach because we could do that literally every week. It's like an easy button. For the record, people watching this may be like, isn't that literally low levels whole channel?
I do vulnerabilities. Those are way more fun. Shut up. Anyway, continue. Okay. I like to do, not that I never do breaches, but like some people it's literally like every breach, like your Gmail account, like, you know, whatever. And I call that breach porn. I try to not do it, especially if there's not like a lesson to be learned from it. And I think that's yours, right? With the vulnerabilities, it's like, let's look at the code. Why is this vulnerable? What can we learn from it? What could have been done in development to prevent this called a shift left, right? Like to make it not possible. Like that's my whole career, right?
Yeah. Or like, hey, what do you have to go do right now with this piece of information that I'm giving you in a timely manner? Right. And so like breaches tend to not really fall into those buckets if it's just like, well, another retailer I used lost my email address this week. And it's like, OK, like my email address is public now. Right. So I don't really do this a whole lot. But this one. We're going to talk about two today and they're both kind of ridiculous. This one is specifically a hot button for me because like you can't ignore the cultural backdrop going on right now of all of these identity verification laws being pushed forward.
Right. It's massive in Europe right now. Like the UK is like the champion of trying to de-anonymize your activity on the Internet in the name of something of your safety. Right. of the children's safety. But like it's because a bunch of corporations do business in the EU and want to follow those rules. We're seeing it. We're seeing the ripple effects. I talked recently about discord was like one of the bigger ones where discord is going to require identity verification to access certain discords that they consider adult material.
Mm hmm. I think one of the reasons that we don't hear a lot of people speaking up against this is because like who wants to be on the side of like not protect the children. Yeah, right. Right. That's a common tactic in like a lot of political bills, right? Like they'll take this bill. There's a bunch of like chaff stuffed into it. They'll name it something very innocent and kind of opaque. And then if you oppose that, oh, well, you're a communist or like you're a homophobe. Like on either side, this is very common tactic. A hundred percent. And so this one, it's like, Oh, what?
Like you want like see Sam to be out there and like be whatever. And it's like, no, of course I don't. Right. Like, you know, and so like that's, that's the part of why it's so hard to oppose this, but like pause for a second, right? Breathe, take the emotion out of it. Like take the, save the children out of it. Who is determining what is adult material? Like, where is that line drawn? Right. Is that, The regulators, is that the 85 year old congressperson asleep at the wheel?
Is that like now on discord? Like, are you now saying discord? You have to self police when you do this or don't. That's like one whole conversation kind of out of scope of like what we're going to talk about here today. But like, it's just part of it. The other part is what we're talking about today. And it's why companies like Pornhub are refusing to play this game. Anytime a state enacts one of these laws, Pornhub just shuts off access to that state. They're like, no, we don't want to collect everyone's driver's license for this reason.
We are an adult film website. Why should we have to be entrusted with the security of a very, very sensitive document? Right. Let's correlate all of the traffic to our site to this specific non-anonymized UUID that correlates to a guy and his address. Like, OK, maybe we don't do that. Yeah. So to kind of set the stage for like the cybersecurity edge of this, right, why are we talking about license plates and saving the children? The FBI probes a service selling 153 million driver's licenses.
A new identity theft service launched on the dark web has been caught selling digital scans of 153 million driver's licenses. The one literally on the website here is... Who is this? Was it Peter? Pete, Peter Hegseth, potentially a name you've heard. Now is this identity theft organization going out and going to Pete Hegseth house and taking his ID from his wallet and scanning it and uploading it? Probably not. Right. It is likely that this cyber crime activity group,
is just penetrating a variety of companies or likely their third party providers that get your license because you're required to upload it. Right. This incident ties to one. So this is, uh, there is a, there Brian Krebs, who wrote the article that we're reading, the journalist, he found, he got tipped off on this because his driver's license is part of it. And so he started digging into like, well, where is the source of this big treasure trove of information that I'm part of this? Um, data breach, this data leak, the pile is so well organized.
It's like timestamped and everything. There's all sorts of information. All of the driver's licenses are in like triplicate front and back because they have the basic image and then they have ultraviolet and infrared scans and the barcode and like all of this stuff. Right. And the schema even says if the barcode is included and like all of this different stuff, you know, you can search this, you know, very well. This like Nexus is the service that they're selling access to that, that Krebs went in and looked.
So he went and found his own. He also found his family. It was timestamped to a day that he was traveling, but then he remembered. So he was like, Oh, maybe it's TSA, right? Like, Oh, you're now you're handing over your driver's license, TSA. Then he remembered that he used his passport. at the airport that day and not his driver's license. And his mother's information was also in here and she was traveling with him that day. And it was timestamped to the same day. And they realized that they rented a car and they hand, they both handed their driver's license over to Hertz. So that seems to be one of the biggest sources of this.
So everyone's like, okay, did Hertz get breached? It's like, well, no, then a security researcher goes through it and realizes that his ID is in there, but it's timestamped to DEF CON. And it's timestamped to DEF CON because he went to a marijuana dispensary in the hotel that he was staying at. And if you've ever gone to a marijuana dispensary legally, they... take your ID and they don't just look at it. They're not just age identifying you. They put it in like a machine. They take a picture of both sides and they, they have to like look up in a database if you're legally allowed to be a customer of theirs.
Right. And they store this information that like you were a customer of theirs. And so they're like, wait a second. So it's not Hertz. It's not this dispensary. Turns out they're all using a similar third party thing. Like you just said. This one was called ID scan at ID scan dot net. And this one is kind of different than like the discord and all this stuff that we're talking about before the adult websites, because it's not like a digital verification service. It's all in person scans.
So this is these are all like companies that use ID scan. are like if you had to show your ID to do something like, like transaction hurt, of course. Like, what are we going to tell people? Don't give the rental car company proof that you're allowed to drive a car. Of course, they're going to take your driver's license, right? So that sucks. But then like hotels, Target, FedEx, Motorola, Jack Henry, waste management, GameStop, like all these major, major vendors. So now you have like most of the continent.
has given their ID over to one of these companies. It's not just driver's licenses, by the way. That's the headline, and that's obviously the big one and the big number, but they also have medical cards, travel documents, other government IDs, 10 million other identification cards, 500,000-some-odd medical cards. There's a bunch of other different stuff here, employment authorizations. So this ID scan does more than just this driver's license scanning, even though that's like the lion's share of this data. It kind of goes back to like we make this point a lot that a lot of the solutions to these problems like aren't technical.
They're political. Like the listener to this might be like, why? You would think Hertz, a company whose job primarily is to take and scan driver's licenses, would have a secure driver's license storage solution. Well, sure. But then if you consider like, you know, the budget incentives and the profit incentives of that company – If a third party service offers the ability to do this for you, you're going to use that service. You're not going to justify standing up the infrastructure and team and security for a third party. You're just going to use a third party. But what do you not have control over with this third party?
Their security posture, obviously. And so because of that, you have this kind of ironic thing where it's like the service that I'm required to give my driver's license to ultimately loses my driver's license. Yeah. And this is just like one pillar of why I'm anti this whole wave of ID verification, right? Is just like proof after proof after proof that the companies that we're handing this to just aren't equipped to actually store this stuff securely. We have no details of like how this breach actually happened yet, by the way. Right. Like,
Uh, we don't know who, no one's like, no one's like stood up and claimed, uh, like, oh yeah, this was shiny hunters. And like, they got in via vishing or whatever. Right. Which we're going to talk about another one later, but like, uh, we don't know how they got this, but obviously they had like full access because this isn't like a few things. This is massive, massive data leak that took. Many like this compromise was happened over days, if not weeks. Yeah. Right. To actually even get all this data out in such a way that all of these different data fields are like searchable and indexable and all this kind of stuff.
This is a complete compromise. This isn't like, oh, we got a little bit of it. Yeah, so it says it has 10 million identification cards, 3 million travel documents, and 579,000 medical cards revealing the information of over 170 million people in North America. Yeah, 150 million. This was tipped off to Krebs on security because someone saw this being posted on a Russian cyber security – or excuse me, a cyber crime form known as exploit. Yeah. Yeah, and they looked him up.
His source looked Krebs up. Krebs was in it, and they were like, hey, yo, Krebs, you're in this. Matt, I have a question for you, though, a bit of a maybe black pill question, or I don't know what pill color this is correct. But so if you consider, like, the Internet of the early 2000s, where you can kind of do whatever you want, there really was no identity. There was, like, arguably true anonymity to a certain extent on the Internet back then, true in quotes. But now, and why was that, right? I think because so much of real life was not on the internet, that was possible.
Like, you had an entire life outside of the internet, and the internet didn't really, like, matter to you. As life is becoming more digital, right, and, like, more and more of what we do is required to be online, right? Do you think a future exists where online anonymity is like not possible at all? Where like everything requires digital ID to make a Gmail account. Yeah, I think you kind of already have to like have an account that is linked to a real ID. Like does every service go that way as the world becomes more online? And what do we do from a security standpoint there?
What does that what does it look like? Yeah, I've opined on this. It's weird. We're pointed in the wrong direction, I can tell you that. Because a lot of what's driving the direction we're pointed in is like data brokers and advertisers and like all this kind of stuff, people that want to be able to have control over information flow or have access to like your behavior on the internet for various reasons are, is like why we're pointed in this direction. Right. Like, and so I think a lot of it has to do with a consent, you know, like, yeah, like we've talked about this a lot, right?
Like we could go full tinfoil body, like privacy, like pilled and you, at that point, you're like really not participating in modern society. Right. There's like concessions that we all make to like chip away at our privacy, even though you and I are cybersecurity like expert. I hate calling myself an expert, but like you and I are cybersecurity experts. I'm a guy that likes computers. My title here is a computer enjoyer. Yes. Same. I don't enjoy them. They're actually the cause of most of my problems. But here we are. But yeah, like I'd say I'm a privacy advocate, cybersecurity guy.
And there are concessions that we make to like just, okay, yeah, we're like because we want to own iPhones and text each other with blue bubbles, right? Like there are things that like that comes along with. Yeah. So there's that. But we know what we're getting into to those degrees. We're also two heterosexual white males. And our identity on the internet isn't exactly something that people can come after us for just existing. Yeah, we don't live really in like, call it contested PvP territory.
Right. There's entire groups of people that just their identity is the thing that they would like no one to know about as they go and like try to participate in these, like you said, increasingly digital communities, right? If you're... like a part of a group that's maybe certain political movements are pointed squarely at you, and you can only safely find your community in certain online forums, maybe you don't want to, like...
inextricably tie your government ID to that online communication, which will eventually be leaked, either leaked via hack, or as we see time and time again, data brokers buy access to that information, or law enforcement misuses their access to this, as we've covered how many stories of law enforcement using these databases to stalk women or whatever it is, right? Yeah. Um, that's, that's why I'm just against these kinds of data piles continuing to get bigger and bigger and tying to more and more of our online behavior.
Yeah. Yeah, it is interesting. Like I just, I see this trend where everything more and more requires me to have two factor with my driver's license and my passport. Like, I don't know what I was doing before, but like, it's, Hey, like get your phone out and take a video of you going left, right up, you know, up down. Even me doing on camera right now, it's probably a bad idea. I could just use that to like impersonate me. Oh. Oh, we're screwed, man. But whatever. You know, there's literally thousands of hours of me on YouTube doing this already. You know, my question is just like, you know, when I was younger, I would play on like Habbo Hotel.
Right. And I'd make an anonymous account and I'd play Habbo Hotel. But when like, are my kids going to have that same luxury? You know what I mean? I don't think the answer is yes, unfortunately. You bring up a good point because like, why are we talking about this breach? Like we said at the beginning of this segment, like we don't really talk about a lot of breaches. Why is this one such a hot topic? A, everything I'm talking about. B, the repercussions of this particular data being stolen is exactly what you're talking about. Because a lot of online accounts now, if you try to recover an account, you forgot a password. It's not just like, what's the street you grew up on?
Isn't the way you get back into your Google account, right? Thank goodness, right? block at the bottom of the get access to your world. A lot of it is your driver's license nowadays, right? And so now if someone can print physical copies of this using all the information, including barcodes, valid barcodes of your driver's license, can they compromise the account recovery flows of your accounts? You and I are at higher risk of this being very public people.
I think YouTube is probably one of the ones that we probably need to worry about here. Uh, you know, I don't, I don't really know. Right. Um, that I, I hate that this is like the bottom Django block for a lot of things. You know, it's funny here. Krebs has been dealing with this kind of stuff for a while and his, I think it was his PayPal account got stolen over and over and over again, because if you contacted customer support that you lost access to your PayPal account. Uh, And the main question that they would ask was your social security number. Cribs' social security number was part of a data leak so long ago, it's basically public at this point.
And people just kept stealing it. And he was like begging PayPal. He's like, please, I cannot rotate my social security number. It is public. Like, what can I do to stop this from continuing to happen? And I think driver's licenses are kind of the next iteration of that. I think a lot about solutions to this problem works. I mean, effectively what we've done is we as a society have created like a symmetric key for authentication algorithm. Like what is a symmetric key, right? It's ownership of your thing. It's my social. It's my driver's license, whatever. The question then becomes like, okay, is there a way to implement like an asymmetric algorithm that we all abide by as a society?
The problem with that, though, is all asymmetric algorithms require a root of trust, right? So like if, for example, I were issued a private key and a public key at birth. The person issuing that, the government, would then now have the ability to arbitrarily issue IDs and make up fake people or speak on your behalf. But the problem, I guess, they kind of already have that power. It also introduces a really weird problem where... You know, you're like issued an idea at birth, which is like a big topic of conversation, like the tinfoil hat government takeover New World Order community.
So I don't know. But I mean, that at least like would solve the problem of like if my if a signature of mine gets leaked, it's not my private key. Right. It's a it's an it's evidence through a public key. Yeah, this one's hard. This one's rough. I think a lot of hardware off solutions are really helpful here, right? It's like, oh, he issued at birth, not an ad, but you know, hit me up. Maybe not issued at birth, right? But like, you know, in terms of account recovery flows being tied to like hardware that you have along with like you have to layer this, right?
I've been in charge of this. I've like I ran security for a fintech company and it was kind of like, oh, crap, how do we? handle a lot of this account recovery stuff. And like the chain gets weaker, right? If like, oh, you know, you ask them for some bit and they don't have it, right? It's like, oh, okay, well, what's the next thing? What's the next thing? You know, and that's why a lot of these companies are going to these ID scan.nets and saying, will you verify that that person is who they say they are as part of my process?
And then I'll give them access to whatever it is that I'll give them access to, right? I think there are some companies that are doing better at this than others. And I don't hate the identity verification space in general. I think there's a lot of value there. Like we said, consensual, like, hey, I'm doing something like, you know, you're going to a marijuana dispensary, you're handing over your ID, you know what you're getting into, you know why you have to do that, right? Going to a discord? Sure. Yeah. Or whatever the hotel thing that you game that you play is. You know what I mean? It's a very, very different experience.
Yeah. Activities that were otherwise recreational now require significant risk to my life. You know what I mean? That should not be the case. And ripple effects, right? If you identify yourself on one website, like, can you then identify other behavior across the web that becomes de-anonymized no matter what you're doing? The other, like, repercussion here is that we're now seeing bills be proposed to make VPNs illegal because they're avoiding the identity verification things. Right. It's like, oh, well, my state doesn't let me access Pornhub. So I got a VPN to the state over in order to get, you know, the videos that I want.
And now they're like, well, now we're going to make VPNs illegal. It's like that. That's not how that works. You can't make network tunnels illegal. I say like, bro, do you are you trying to make data modulation illegal? Like, are you trying to make math illegal? Like, what are you talking about? Yeah, yeah. And every time we say that, there's always people in the comments like, there is math that is illegal. And it's like, OK, OK, OK. Wait, no, hold on. Elaborate, commenters and Matt. What math is illegal? Explain. Like, I know, like, crypto is like military grade weaponry or something from, like, export control standpoint. But also, like... China uses AES256.
I don't know what to tell you. You know what I mean? Like, yeah, yeah, yeah. No, they're just like, there is like, I forget the acronym. There's an acronym of like, you know, fair use of like certain things. And like there are crypto things in there. Anyway, like we said, we don't really talk about a lot of breaches, but there's another one that's like equally as massive this week. And it would kind of be irresponsible for us to like not mention both of these really quick. So like this one, we probably have like less to talk about or more to talk about, but we're already kind of like a good chunk into this episode. But McKesson was breached. We both read this and thought it was McKenzie, which is not.
I thought it was for like half an hour. Yeah, we're not. We literally both had that same reaction. So McKesson's like a massive health care provider. What was the number that we read while we were researching this? Like a third of all pharmaceutical transactions? Yeah, they did $403 billion in revenue last year, March to date. And yeah, they are responsible for a third of the pharmaceuticals in the U.S. So we don't have a lot of info about this breach from McKesson, which sucks. Like, I wish there would be a little bit more transparent at this point because we're a few weeks past the breach now.
But 284 million patients data records are stolen. We don't know. Again, we don't know, like, what in the what what is a medical record. Right. Right. We're getting this from the 8K filing that the SEC requires companies that discover a data breach to file within like 48 hours. That's like all we have, right? But Shiny Hunters has raised their hand and claimed responsibility for this one. And Shiny Hunters is a pretty vocal threat cybercrime group.
that does talk about like what they do and how and whatever their MO is one of the things that I scream from the rooftops is like you should be focusing on threat actors MO is because they're telling you exactly how they're going to do it I guarantee that this breach if it's shiny hunters is going to look exactly like a bunch of the other breaches that we've seen over the last couple of years out of this group, right? There's going to be some social engineering likely over the phone, but they also do text phishing. And they're really big fans of creating fake company websites that look like your company Octa login.
They use a tool called Evil Engine X. That's how I pronounce it. I don't know how you pronounce it. Engine X, for sure. Yeah, yeah. Well, evil, it's spelled evil jinx. And if you say evil jinx, I don't trust. I'm doing Nginx all day. All day. Evil Nginx, which literally, so like literally they don't even clone your login page. It is your login page. Like this evil Nginx is like a proxy that you can host another company's Okta login on your domain. uh steal the creds through it and it also helps the evil engine x has tools built into it to help uh grab two-factor and like replay two-factor stuff through it as well they're very very very very good at this part okay they like blast the company with this fake login page they get a few successes that's all they need uh they grab an octa sso login and
And they're in. And if you guys have ever used Okta, you log in, it's just a bunch of SaaS portals. And the one login just gets you access to all of that. They at machine speed pass the OAuth tokens off of all. They click everything instantly and they get all the OAuth tokens. They pass them to their team. They have a team of people ready for this success to actually occur. And they have people specialized in certain SAS services to start exfiltrating data from that OAuth token that they get to different parts of the world.
So you can't even really do a lot of the geo stuff that you're meant to do. They're very, very good. I've seen I've seen the behind. I've been the incident responder on these types of attacks. I thought you were going to say that I've been in the cyber crime room where it's happening. I'm like. What was that, Matt? Hello? Excuse me, Brian Krebs, FBI. Right, right, right. Right here. R slash FBI open up. He's wearing the shirt. He's got it. He's a hacker. Oh, my God. The world of commercialized cybercrime as a service is so impressive to me, though.
The fact that a team of people where there was probably a job posting on some dark web commercial, cybercrime form it's like yeah we're looking for like a a slack oauth api expert to act as our cybercrime and agree in some guy got hired to do that getting paid in monero you know what i mean it just it's it's not quite job boards but it is almost universally gaming forums and discords talked about this last time yeah how like gaming forums and gaming discords are like just the the cesspool that creates these cybercrime organizations
They find each other, they identify their skill sets. They like, and then they want to show off to each other. So they develop new skill sets to be able to show off. They do like little things. And then it turns into like organized crime. It's like you do these little hits to prove that you have the skills so that you get called called on when this campaign fires off against McKesson. Right. And then they literally have people playing the roles. They have people that are the callers. that are good at the social engineering on the phone. A lot of them are women. Guess why? Like, you know, and so, yeah, it's like they have specialized.
They're very Liam Neeson. I have a special set of skills developed over a long career. Yeah, we'll transition into this here in a minute, but I mean, like, same thing. If you look at Team PCP, right, they got rolled up recently, and, like, a lot of their activity was related to gaming and was related to Discord activity. Let's go right into it. Let's go right into it. Because, like, I don't have a ton to talk about this McKesson one, except for, like, I wish we had more to talk about on it. We have some threat intel about some of the domains that were used in the attack, not from Shiny Hunters, not from McKesson, just from, like, threat intel groups that, like, saw... these domains get spun up and are like, oh yeah, McKesson.claims, because Shiny Hunters just hacked ReliaQuest, a cybersecurity company, and they used ReliaQuest.claims or something, I think.
And so they were like, oh, this is their new naming scheme in MO. Again, why I think it's such a priority to focus on these behaviors so that you can realize, hey, my detection engineer should probably have someone looking for my company.claims in registrar information and put the guards up, right? Before we dive into Team PCP and their roll-up, we should dive into a message from today's sponsor. Hey hackers, before we keep going, I want to take a quick break and say a quick thank you to our sponsors. Today's Lowdown episode is sponsored by our friends over at Maze. Maze has spent the last couple of years using AI to find and remediate vulnerabilities in the cloud.
And now they've released Maze Code, AI agents that find and deeply investigate vulnerabilities in your code. Now we all know the deal. Software composition analysis tools and SaaS toolings are all historically really bad at just making more noise. They find issues that may not actually be real and just create a lot of problems for your engineers to deal with that don't solve real security vulnerabilities. I get it. We've been there. Maze code is a really cool tool because Maze code actually knows how your code works. MazeCode investigates every finding with the context of how your code is actually deployed.
Sure, you're using a version of libxml2 that's vulnerable, but the actual code path to hit that vulnerability is not exposed in your Docker image. MazeCode can find that and won't show you that that vulnerability is a big deal. Every vulnerability that MazeCode reports comes with evidence that it's real and a way to fix it. Check out Maze at go.lowdownpod.com slash maze. That's go.lowdownpod.com slash maze. Thanks again, Mays. Let's keep going. And we're back. Yeah, we're going to transition into talking about Team PCP.
Matt, Team PCP got rolled up. Isn't that crazy? They got arrested finally after, it feels like years, but in cybersecurity time, really just months of supply chain attacks, dude. It's pretty fucking nuts. This is a, this is a crazy one. I've seen some breakdowns. I think you're going to go into the breakdown for me. I've also seen some people rallied to the defensive team PCP, which I want to talk about, but first go into who are they? What's going on? We've talked a lot about supply chain stuff on both of our channels for the past year, crazy year. We're coming up on a year of a shy halut isms.
So yeah, they started in late 2025. And I was like, oh, like that was only a couple of months ago. No, dude, it's like it's September. So about a year ago, Team BCP kind of like they showed up. Now, when I first started talking about this, I mistakenly said that they were like always in supply chain land. Not true. So Team PCP started to arise around the time that other threat actors were kind of kicking off these, like, supply chain attacks, right? They were getting into, you know, maintainers of large NPM repos. They were installing worms into, like, post-install scripts.
And those were going out and, like, shy-looting the entire Internet. Around that time, Team PCP got really into this thing where they were attacking vulnerable instances of like CICD, right? So for example, when you're on GitHub, right, if you submit a pull request to a repo, if the repo is not set up properly, if it uses the wrong kind of pull request, you can get a CICD action to fire on behalf of the maintainer of the repo with your data in the pull request.
And so... If, for example, like a bash script runs that uses data from your pull request, you can use that to compromise a CI CD instance. Okay, so they're really big with that. And then GitHub locked down a lot of the things that they were popping. And so after that, they shifted in early 2026 to the supply chain side, right? They kind of got on the Shai Halud train and they're responsible for at the time, the compromise of a lot of packages. through the mini Shaihalud worm, and then a variety of other CICD pipeline-type things, big ones being LightLLM. And then there was one security tool they actually popped.
I forget what the name of it was. Trivi. Yeah, Trivi. They popped the Trivi tooling. Now, those guys, Guy, I guess, singular, maybe two, have been rolled up. They got arrested. So earlier this year, Flare, a sponsor of my channel but not on the podcast, was talking purely about cool research. They did some de-anonymization foo to figure out who this person was and eventually get them arrested. And – Like the research is cool. I love what they did, but like the OPSEC failure of this guy was actually so simple. It's like a little disappointing. You're like, come on, bro. Like really?
This is what we're doing. So Matt, what happened? What did we get into? Yeah, it really just turned into a shared username across multiple accounts. Like you said, Flare does some pretty cool stuff. Dark web monitoring, like Telegram chat monitoring of threat actors, stuff like this. But yeah, this one was just like a specific account name. DeadcatX3, I think was one of the aliases. PCPCATX3. Team PCP, there was like a cat theme to a lot of this. And they were able to link some account activity from this like dead cat X3, which was like a GitHub account also to some like telegram handles that were like earlier telegram handles.
It wasn't like the craziest like web that they had to even follow, but then they like stacked evidence, right? I think the one that was like the domino was... was DeadcatX3 on HackerOne, the bug bounty website, was like the one that was like, oh, wait, what's that? They have skills in cybersecurity and this is the username. And then they tied it to a hugging face profile. They tied it to a few different things. And then they were able to, I think through HackerOne, get the person's real name.
Yeah, so it's like somehow like even more egregious than that. So this guy used the alias Deadcat3 all over the Internet, right? So it's on Twitter. It's on eBay. It's on Scratch, like the programming website, right, for like drag and drop programming. It's also on Hugging Face, right? Okay, so Team PCP being overtly associated to this handle Deadcat3. If you go to the Hugging Face profile of this account, DeadCat3, inside of one of the projects there, was literally the domain used in the mini ShyHaludWormC2.
So like, okay, cool. So we've now associated this to DeadCat3. Awesome. Now, if we also go to the HackerOne profile of DeadCat3... Their name is Ruben Thompson. It's right there on the profile. That is his real life name. That is not an alias. And then so flare inside their system, they have a bunch of email addresses and other information collected from their monitoring of the dark web. And so they were able to associate Ruben Thompson's, email address from his school in Australia to another one of his aliases, surfing up eight at gmail.com, which then just associated him to a variety of real life platforms.
Like his real LinkedIn, his real Twitter, his real Gmail, his real Tik TOK, et cetera. There's some other, uh, like follow on stuff about like the, his steam activity and his partner and how they rolled up his partner too. I think because like the, the partner was the one that was maintaining the get the, the Twitter that was very popular for a while. Then they also got arrested, but it's just pretty interesting that we talk a lot about like privacy hat people and like people who want to be like super duper anonymous. Yeah. And you would think like a cyber crime group, granted, they're on the younger side.
They're like probably like, you know, late teens, early 20s because they're in college, I believe. You would think that they would have a little bit of a better of an opsec posture. But in this scenario, Homie just overtly associated his hacker handle to his real name all over the place, which is kind of funny. I think the steam account even like shared a cat profile picture. Yes. Some of them. So, um, the, the other bits, right. I think they wound up actually like turning themselves in when they kind of realized that they were cooked. Like as part of this investigation, there's a few like interesting bits besides just like hacker got arrested.
Lol. Right. I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, Well, first of all, a lot of people are coming to the defense of Team PCP. Yeah, elaborate on that. That's very confusing. Yeah, so, like, there's this... I mean, this was, like, when I was getting into cybersecurity in the early 2000s. There was this, like, very much thinner line between the industry and, like, cybercrime. Yeah. Like, DEF CON itself was very associated with, like... bad hacker-ing, like, you know what I mean? Like, back in the day. Dude, my first DEF CON was 2013, and back then you could buy, like, a burner laptop in, like, a rogue cell tower for, like, a couple hundred bucks, like, at the vendors' area.
That was, like, the vibe back then. Right, and, like, security research wasn't, like... hard, you know? So like literally if you were hacking, you were like succeeding. So it was like, well, what are you doing? Right. What are you stealing? Like, what are you finding issues with, you know, jackpotting ATMs, like getting free cell phone minutes, like whatever, right. There was like this culture, the hacker culture, like of the industry at the time, because that was the industry. There wasn't like this corporate side of cybersecurity that we have now. Right. So like the attitude of a lot of like,
big hacks that went on and then people getting arrested was like, why was the company that vulnerable? Right. There was like this whole, the hack, the only way that this company finally listened was when they lost the information. Right. Or they, the bottom line got hurt. They lost the money. Right. They got sued, whatever it was. But it was like altruism to a point, right? It's like you're making this value judgment that like, yeah, the bottom line fell out, but you're making the rest of the world safer as a result. You're raising awareness.
You're hurting profit for the sake of saving profit later, right, if you could want to call it that. Right. But it was like tied to hacker culture, right? It was like I'm doing this because I can and I shouldn't be able to. And like, therefore, you are making all of the users of your service or company or whatever less safe. And like me doing this and taking the fall for it is actually making like my comrades in arms, the fellow users of your service, more safe in the future. Not trying to save the company's profits or whatever.
Not safe profits. You know, like a net positive or profits is wrong. Yes. This was like. This is the cybersecurity that I came up in, right? Now it's like much harder to hack like into just like any company ever, right? And cybersecurity teams exist at most of these companies where they didn't in the past. Usually it was like an IT guy that had cybersecurity as like a responsibility, right? Like way back when. And like, there's an industry here. And so there's like a further rift between like the career cybersecurity and like the hacker culture cybersecurity.
And so like this incident was like one of the first times that I've seen that like veil start to thin again. Right. And I started to see people on Twitter that like, I know, you know, in person being like free team PCP. They did nothing wrong because they just pointed out. This glaring flaw in the house of cards that is us all sharing JavaScript code on NPM. People have been screaming about this weakness forever. Companies exist specifically to try to scan your supply chain for vulnerabilities, but it all hinges upon the maintainers of those pieces of code that wind up at NPM.
Their account's not getting compromised. And so the defense of it is, hey, you all finally woke up to how weak this whole system is. Right. I'm not saying I agree with it, but like. Yeah. No, I'm thinking about that. And like to a point, I agree. Right. So like I am. I am not from the exact same era as you, but I got into cybersecurity around the same time. Hey, come on. We've been very public about our ages. Fuck off, Matt. I graduated college in 2016. I got started with all this stuff in 2013 when I was in college, interning at various places, right?
And so, like, I'm aware of that. I'm aware of that culture. I agree with that culture. And so with Team PCP, I think I would agree if they hadn't been, like – actively slurping up credentials now to be fair like they served up they slurped up credentials they were caught doing that but i'm not sure if i actually ever heard of them like selling them or using them they didn't you could argue they only slurped those up to propagate their access to further their point so i mean i i see the other side of this for sure i've been saying that since these incidents have been going on is i am waiting for the other shoe to drop right because i didn't
I still don't know if they were doing it to be the hackers of old and show the flaw in the system and not actually profit from it. I don't know that. I don't know these guys. I don't know their manifesto. But I've been saying that about all of these incidents is the list of secrets that they steal— and they stole during all of the Shaihaloom versions, Shaihalood versions were massive. They weren't just GitHub and NPM secrets that allowed them to propagate, right?
There was AWS creds, Kubernetes creds, crypto wallet, like the things, all the environment variables on every box they got on, right? And I said, we never saw anything but NPM and GitHub creds get used. as part of these attacks, which I was always like, what is going on? They're sitting on a treasure trove of information that could be used to do some other seriously nefarious stuff on prod systems. These NBM developers have day jobs, right? And like their dev boxes got compromised.
You've got to imagine their cloud keys and everything that were part of those same boxes were also compromised and nothing ever happened. So this is when people are like, hey, they did nothing wrong. Right. And, and then other people are like, ha ha lol hackers, like, you know, improve your opsec, like get screwed. I can see it too. I can see it too. It just feels hackery of old to me. Right. Like, you know, I remember some of the really big hacks back in the day, like the TJ max had like some really, really big ones that like the person didn't profit.
They, but they went down for it. They went to jail, but they did it because they could. And that was the only way to get the company to like, listen, listen, during the thing. It feels like that. It feels like that to me. It's kind of weird. Wasn't there one instance of this supply chain attack leading to a downstream app getting a exploit thrower cooked into it? Wasn't there one instance of that? But I don't know if it was Team PCP. Again, there were a variety of actors in the supply chain space at the beginning of this year. Yeah, North Korea copied their playbook pretty instantly.
And what I'm talking about actually was crypto mining too. So that makes complete sense. Yeah, North Korea copied this exact playbook during this wave and did it themselves. So yeah, I'm not coming to the full defense. Obviously, this approach is on the other side of legal. You know what I mean? And caused a ton of... dollars time incident response lawyers like i mean a ton but the other thing that's kind of interesting is i think one of the two that was arrested got arrested just for like by association yeah it seems like two guys went down and one didn't do any of the hacking and so like
I don't know. Obviously we don't have all the details of like the legal stuff going on in Australia, uh, of all of this. But I think one of them was just like in the discord telegram and like ran the Twitter account or something like that. Right. Like you mentioned. So like, if talking about this stuff is illegal, you and I are screwed too, you know? Right. Better not travel to Australia anytime soon. But either way, it's a really cool... John Hammond, friend of the show, has a really cool video talking about the investigation here and how they kind of peeled it back.
If you're interested in OSINT techniques that were kind of used to tie this stuff together. even though we're kind of laughing at the simplicity of some of it, it's still, it's still very valid and worked. Right. And so like the work itself is cool. I enjoy that because like the hard part with this stuff is having all of the data and aggregating it all and doing the de-anonymization chaining. The funny part is like bro was committing one of the world's largest cyber crime networks. He was, he was running that network. He was doing gigantic spy chain attacks, comma, and also didn't exercise basic OPSEC.
You know what I mean? It's just the juxtaposition of those two things is very funny to me. I find that. This is like Allison Nixon. We brought her up a few times on the show. She tracks the scattered spider threat actor group. And she she spoke recently and we talked about like a LinkedIn post of hers that kind of like alludes to. there isn't like a point in time where you can choose now I'm going to do OPSEC. Right. Right. This was the windows GDID thing. Right. It was basically like, Oh, well now I'm going to take this seriously. And it's like, there's always breadcrumbs like to your past, like your old gaming handles or something.
Right. That like, you know, they're going to be able to tie it's just whether or not law enforcement cares enough. And obviously team PCP was disruptive enough for law enforcement to care enough. Right. Totally agree. All right. This next one I threw on here is from, is about this meter company that I didn't hear about until like 16 hours ago. And I wish I didn't know about them. It was just kind of a pain. Did you read about this? So there's two sides to this, to this story. Meter M E T R is a nonprofit like nonprofit,
nonpartisan, like third party AI safety organization. For the audio listeners, he's putting this in air quotes, by the way. So listen with caution. Big thick air quotes. Right, right, right. Of them not being partisan, right? Unbiased, right? They've come out and said that they don't get paid, but they receive free usage of the AI platforms as part of their services, right? Which is being paid in my opinion. Anyway. Um, they, uh, were the ones, they, they do a lot of AI safety, like benchmarking and stuff and evaluation and stuff like that.
But they were the ones that were actually called in to analyze the hugging face, open AI incident. They were the third party called, right? So friend of the show, Zach Corman, uh, made a video recently. We'll link it. Um, yeah. that talks about why wasn't cybersecurity called? Because Meter is not a cybersecurity company. We couldn't find anyone on staff that actually has a cybersecurity background at all there. So they kind of publicly are talking about the Hugging Face incident, and they're talking about it via the lens of the transcripts
of the agent prompts and responses, I would say chat, but it's not the agents are talking to themselves, right? It's not like chat.com, right? It's, it's like going on beyond the scenes and agents are talking to agents and prompts and response. But just those transcripts of the agents, like prompts and responses is all that was evaluated. Turns out, If you had someone that was actually a cyber incident responder, they'd be like, how about the logs, please? Show logs, please. Hello. Yeah. What? Like, this is just what the layer at the chat and prompt level has chose to surface here.
This isn't universal output of like what actually happened on these boxes. Yeah. network logs, server logs, like anything, like what commands were being run. Like it's not universal that every command that an agent runs like winds up back in the prompt, right? Like that's just not how these things work. So Zach, kind of makes the big point of like, hey, the cybersecurity industry is like increasingly being sidelined in a lot of these main like major AI safety conversations by the frontier AI companies.
Sam Altman is the one writing these letters saying like, it's time to take cybersecurity seriously. Oh, really, Sam? Oh, really, Sam, what the hell have I been doing my whole career, right? Like, yeah, no, we've all been saying this since the get that we should be taking cybersecurity seriously. And especially with the AI amplification of speed and capability and all this kind of stuff going on right now. Why are they the ones that are like have the megaphone about the cybersecurity issue instead of like pulling in? I don't know, Unit 42 from Palo or CrowdStrike or Mandiant or like any of these like.
Actual, this is what they do for a living type people to come and analyze this actual incident. There's a second part of this, and then I'll throw it over to you. In the wake of this, and probably maybe because of all the attention to Meter, they were actually compromised this week. And their API meter was compromised this week. And their API key was stolen, and the attackers racked up $600,000 worth of API usage to some of the AI models that, again, they get for free, right?
So I don't know if this was actually a bill because they get some access to tokens for their services. But they had a massive cybersecurity incident. And the line, we don't have a ton of details about the incident, but we do have... that it was a vibe coded app that suffered from a fail open vulnerability that silently disabled authentication, causing the agent orchestration dashboard to be exposed to the public Internet for several days. And then you went to go click on this while you were getting ready for the show. And it seems like a lot of their transcript viewer API stuff is still just down right now because of this.
Right. Yeah, it's not great. So what else about this one? What's your thoughts about Meter, them looking into this, the hugging face incident? What are you seeing here? I feel a bunch of ways about this. I saw Guillermo, I forget his first name, but the CEO of Ursel effectively make a tweet that he's like, with AI, we should no longer assume that vulnerabilities can occur. We should assume that everything is vulnerable. And what do we do now? And I'm like, brother, that has been the posture, the mental posture of every cybersecurity person for the last like 10 or 15 years.
Ever. Ever. Like, again, I've only been in this for the last 10 or so years. But like, it's this whole thing where it's like, I find it very frustrating. But at the same time, this is just how economics works. security is a cost center until it is not right. No one gives a fuck about it until it becomes this big public ordeal. And then the people with the loudest megaphones that tend to not be security people are the ones that bring attention to it. Right. That has been my shtick. That is kind of like the whole point of my YouTube channel is not that vulnerabilities can occur.
It's that everything is vulnerable all the time, always right now. What are the, mental attitudes, risk models, and postures you should have such that when a vulnerability is published, you know what to do about it, right? And I think, again, AI is just making this more obvious, okay? So, like, this is not a new thing. This is just things that we're now hearing about more publicly because Sam and Guillermo and others are talking about it. It's everything but more so, right? You're injecting steroids into the problem, right? Exactly. I also like, again, for the audio listeners, I can air quote the CEO of Rissell, Guillermo, whatever his name is.
I can air quote the hell out of his expertise on this topic. They had a security incident this year. He tweeted about it and was like, this was some AI-powered super hacker that broke in or whatever. It was one of his developers installed a Chrome extension. Yeah, and it got like, I think so as well. Yeah. No, no off token or whatever. Right. There was no AI super hacker. And this was the CEO's actual public statement about it. Right. Right. So there's that. Okay. Now you kind of went into you. You may have triggered a tin hat conspiracy theory. Okay. So listen, you mentioned hugging face.
All right. When we first went into this conversation about the hugging face incident, this may have been like four or five podcasts ago. I talked a little bit about was there collusion Russia gate? No, I'm kidding. Was there collusion? Did open AI and hugging face potentially collaborate to say reposition open AI mentally in either our heads or the defense department's heads as a capable cyber model? Now, your response, rightfully so, was Ed. Come on. the PR blunder that would be for Hugging Face, why would they possibly take on the revenue damages that would incur to that company?
I'm ready. I'm ready for a butt. I'm ready for a butt. Matt, guess who just bought Hugging Face? fucking Jensen Wong and friends. NVIDIA just purchased Hugging Face, dude. Guess who also has been throwing around the same $100 million for the last two years? Jensen Wong, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Oracle, bro. So, of course, if they're sharing revenue, they're going to share damages. And if this repositions OpenAI as, like, the cybersecurity model for, like, to kick Mythos out of the reins of that, of course they would do this.
Now, I'm not saying... We didn't go to the moon. I think we went to the moon, right? However, there was economic incentive to get the Russians to spend money on a space program that wouldn't work to collapse the Soviet economy. Okay? That's all I'm going to say about it. Matt, respond. I'm just asking questions. I'm just asking questions. Those are the rules. That's how we have to do it now. What's that Tucker impression? I don't know the Tucker quote. You always bring up Tucker, and I'm not a Tucker listener, by the way.
No, me neither, but there was a really good SNL impression by him recently, but he was famously like... I'm not saying this is it. I'm just asking questions. Right. Yeah. There's a really good SNL impression. He goes, those are the rules. Like that's what, that's the way it is now. I can't, I can't do the impression. Uh, I still don't think so. Obviously there is like the surge protector plugged into itself of the investment of like all of their valuations and like all the money being passed between these like multi-trillion dollar companies is very like, what the hell?
Like, right. What did you say? Like, really? Literally when I saw the article that Nvidia bought Hugging Face, I'm like, brother, no way. What? Also for like big bucks, right? Like $13 billion or something like that. I saw the breakdown of all the investors and what they were going to make on their investment for Hugging Face. And then the founders, the founder, I think it's two or three founders walked away with $3 billion. founders still weren't even diluted enough. They got 3 billion. Yeah. Yeah. That's a, that's a real number.
That's a real number. Hey, uh, NVIDIA podcasting is the net is the future of media, by the way. Um, YouTube channels on this particular topic. Listen, if, if, if low level and I show up, fully decked out in NVIDIA swag one week, and we get fully AI pilled, just know what happened. We're not above the... I will buy a NASCAR car, and I will put the NVIDIA logo on the windshield for $3 billion. Are you kidding? Come on, brother. Let's go.
I have a number. I have a number and it's way less than $3 billion. That's so funny. That's so funny. I am not from Zim Money. Yeah, you can hit the Matt becomes post economic button. And this all turns into a very, very different channel. And there is no pile of YouTube comments that will turn me otherwise. Matt disappears from the face of the earth. Yeah. So no, no, no, no. Like they're, they're probably buying me for, for this. But I all of a sudden get a whole lot less critical of AI. So speaking of being critical of AI, there's we've been a lot, like we had a lot of stories to cover today.
So I've been trying to lump them in our, in our show notes here. And this one, not quite related, but like, So Meter had their token stolen and a bunch of people hijacked their usage in the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Turns out other people are doing that now as well, to the point where it's a new main use case for info stealer malware, like big popular info stealer malware that you and I have talked about for years as part of this. Tons of cybersecurity instruments, uh, info stealer malware that you've heard the name of probably Luma and some of these other ones.
They now have new major functionality just for stealing your Claude session in order to rack up usage on your Claude account. Um, it's like a new behavior that we're seeing out of Vidar, Luma C2, Steel C, Redline and other popular info stealers. Oh, it's so dumb. I don't get it. Like, sure, you got me. You know what I mean? Like, you made me spend some money. It's more creative than crypto mining. So I applaud it. Thank you. Thank you for doing something that isn't mining like 17 cents of Monero before I boot you off of my crappy laptop.
That's right. Should we talk about, guys, I think we're going to go long today. Let's just go long today. We're going to go long. We have a lot to talk about. What year is it? Every time you and I think about the old days, we've talked about this. We were like, you think about 2009, I think about 2003, and that's almost our exact age difference. Yeah, 2009 was when I peaked. I was in high school. I was playing Wrath of the Lich King every day with my friends after benching 135 in my friend's basement. Like, it's just where I peaked, bro. You know what? Post-economic, that's what we're going to do again. Okay, by the way, we're going to do a whole lot less sponsor ads.
We're going to do a whole lot more Wrath of the Lich King streams. Let's go. Um, so, uh, what's old is new again. Nigerians are like the Kings of scams right now. I mean, it was like a meme forever, right? The Nigerian Prince, the Nigerian princes. Yes. Oh my God. And is like, is ready to like, you know, whatever. Nigeria is still like King of scam central. And we're seeing a bunch of it this week in like really serious ways. We'll, should I start with the more serious or the less serious one? Uh, let's go less serious and ramp up.
Okay, less serious is 404 Media did a cool story about how some cyber sleuths actually tracked down some of these scammers to Nigeria. And they actually got on a plane to Nigeria to like try to track them down for a YouTube video. We are such rookie bullshit YouTubers. Why does anyone watch us when there's people flying to freaking Nigeria to like meta Ray-Ban knock on doors of Nigeria scammers? What are we doing? We are lazy. But that's what happened. And they did it in like really stupid, silly OPSEC failure ways as well.
I like the YouTube thumbnail of this. I was just going to comment on the thumbnail. Oh, my God, it's perfect. The YouTube thumbnail. This guy, the hacker, has like a multi-monitor setup, but there's CRT monitors. Yes. It's like this old CRT monitor with a face with a Facebook thing. It's obviously AI generated thumbnail, but it's super funny. Yeah. So they, they track them down the old fashioned way, sending them like setting traps, making fake profiles that like align with their right targets. So like young, young people that might fall into a scheme that,
The scheme here, it just happens over and over again. And you're going to see where the ramp up to the more serious gets on the next story is they get, they trick young guys into like getting into like a romantic type text message relationship with them to get them to send compromising photos of themselves or videos of themselves. And all those industry dick pics. explicit tag. Hey, cooling towels sponsor. You want to be on part of this podcast?
No, we're going to get like Carhartt sock sponsorships. Oh my God. So the, they immediately flip the script and extort the young individual who just sent the compromising photos to, you know, pay them or they're going to leak all this stuff. Right. So this is really, uh, it's kind of a plague against like teenage people who are falling for this. It really, really messes up a lot of their lives. Yeah. So like trigger warning suicide, right?
Like this is like a real issue. And we're going to get to that in a sec. There's like a tail end of the story, but these people set up these fake lore profiles. They get, uh, They get into these text messages with the scammers, and then they just do the old-fashioned send them a website that gets their IP address. And then that got a certain bit of information about their IP and general location. But then they... the people that they had hook, line, and sinker, they started sending further and further lures on WhatsApp.
And some of them were even some of the stuff that we were talking about earlier, like identity, fake identity verification type stuff to like access certain bits of information and got them to do the face scan thing and the ID scan thing to get information about these scammers. And they went and tried to confront them. Spoiler on the video, they didn't actually get like to confront any of these people face to face. These people obviously avoided the crap out of them. Didn't like come to the door and talk to them. The, uh, the more serious tail end of this is that, uh, yes, the, in some of the more extreme cases of this, they call it sextortion, right?
Extortion via like sex crimes type stuff. Uh, a lot of these kids are killing themselves. And a few of these Nigerians actually got extradited. Thank God. Yes, this is not Team PCP. No one is coming to the defense of these type people. And so these people got extorted, extradited, I'm sorry. They got extradited to the U.S. to face prison time for these deaths as responsible for these deaths. The other reason that this is an interesting topic to talk about, besides just like Nigerian scam stuff, is the major threat actor groups that we talk a lot about, the Calm, Shiny Hunters, whatever.
This is also part of their MO. This is also how they recruit young males to their thing. Instead of extorting money out of them, they'll extort cybercrime out of them. Um, they'll, this is like one of the ways that they'll like, there's a lot of infighting on these threat actor groups. Like they'll, they do a lot of physical violence. Nowadays they'll actually show up. They call it bricking. They'll throw bricks through people's windows. Uh, they'll try to beat people up and threaten them, uh, with violence to, for, to unlock their crypto wallets to like drain people.
There's a lot of like really, and it's the same groups, the same groups that are doing the cyber attacks that we're talking about also do this other stuff. Um, And there are some particularly more violent subgroups in the comm. One's called like 764 or 754. I can't remember off the top of my head. But they're big on this. They're big on sextortion. One group that, again, to bring up Allison Nixon, because she's just the goat in tracking these guys down. I watched a presentation of hers at SleuthCon, a conference all about cybercrime. And she talked about how at one point...
They were sextorting one of these guys, their victims, right? Who was just another young kid in the gaming discord. And at the same time, they were like threatening his girlfriend's school. And like his school had to evacuate while they were like getting heard the girlfriend to self-harm while extorting. It was this massive campaign to just like mess with this kid. So these are like really, really not good people that we're talking about here. Yeah, and it's good to see finally in scenarios like that people actually getting extradited, going to jail, getting I mean, there's pictures of them getting rolled up literally at the airport, which is nice.
Yeah, it's good. Yeah. Nigeria. Luckily, there is extradition stuff going on here, right? It's not the Eastern European black hole that like we never, ever hear from these threat actors again. Yeah. all right, man, I've been yapping enough, like certified pre-owned section of the podcast. I just can't get enough of that term because we just keep talking about it. There's more and more stuff about routers and streaming devices and stuff coming with packages. What's going on now? And it keeps getting, it keeps getting worse, right? This is one of those things that you would think like as time goes on, vendor trust would go up.
users would pile more and more into a smaller set of vendors, and therefore they wouldn't buy these weird kind of like off-the-wall vendors. Okay. Now, on my YouTube channel, I talk a lot about vulnerabilities and backdoors. Okay. Now, to be very clear, those are separate things. I think we commonly clump together a vulnerability with a backdoor. I made a video about this recently, but I gave the example of like in 2024 – There's a Windows 11 vulnerability that because of an IPv6 fragmentation issue, you could get RCE in the Windows kernel, okay, remotely, like on-off, like really, really bad.
Now, some people in the industry may call it a backdoor. Well, for that to truly be a backdoor by the definition of a backdoor… There would have to be intent by Microsoft to leave that vulnerability there to enable some third-party actor, intelligence agency, whatever, to use that vulnerability to get into Windows, okay? And while that may be the case in some scenarios, I think generally it is truly just a issue that Microsoft had where they left bad code in. Shit happens, right? Their fuzzers missed it, whatever. I wrote some of those fuzzers. It's easy to do. Okay. Okay. The definition of a backdoor is manufacturer leaves in functionality such that third-party actor can get in in the future with secret knowledge that the consumer doesn't know about.
Okay. Made a video on this and this Tenda AC 1200, right? Literally predictable password on this for the root account that you can use. That's a function of the MAC address. MAC address being generally either publicly available or brute forceable. You can use that to tell it to the device, right? Literally a backdoor. The threat model here, though, is to be able to use this backdoor, they have to be in my home. It'd be on the Wi-Fi network, on this router. Not really that big of a deal. Not great. Not good. Not bad, obviously. The story we're talking about today, guys, is... I don't know if you've been on Amazon recently.
You probably have if you're in the U.S. There's this weird trend where, like, these... No name manufacturers of electronics, networking devices in particular, are showing up on Amazon. OK, and so this researcher, I think he's actually literally the CTO of Volncheck, bought this AX3000 dual SIM 5G Wi-Fi 6 router. Say that five times fast from this company called ZBT Link. OK, ZBT Link is a no name, literally like a Spotify or a Shopify dropshipper from Shanghai, China.
He ripped off the firmware of this device and sure as shit, there was a binary there that wasn't just like a hard coded password backdoor for someone to log into the device. The device had a piece of malware in it that was actively beaconing out to Alibaba cloud that would allow Alibaba to get a shell on the device. This thing beaconed out every 35 seconds. And, And it'd be one thing to be like, oh, sorry, we left in this debug manufacturer, like, you know, user assistance backdoor. They literally renamed the binary inside the firmware image K-worker, which means they were trying to conceal the fact this binary was there and running as a kernel thread.
Right. So they not only left in the malware. Right. tried to conceal it as a kernel thread. And then if you actually go to the ZBT link website right now for a video, I was trying to reverse engineer the firmware to like pull this thing out and show, show my viewers. If you go to the firmware download website right now for ZBT link, let me see if I can find it. They said, oh, sorry, we're aware of the of the backdoor found in our firmware. Actually, it was a debug instance to only help out consumers with their consent if they needed it are bad on that.
And so they tried to disable firmware downloads for further analysis of the researchers. Turns out their actual website, the Shopify front end, still has the firmware downloads. You can download it and go look right now. And Volncheck has the research to like the links to go and download this firmware. And so in making this video, this article came out like August 5th of this year. I literally all I did was I clicked on the dude's name who wrote this article. Like I said before, what's his name? It's I'm pulling it up as we go through. Jacob Baines, right? CTO of Volncheck. If you go to his Twitter right now, literally four days ago, he bought a different Amazon router looking for the same backdoor, the presumption being that the dropshipper is doing, like, nefarious installs on all these models.
He found a different variant of backdoor that was also beaconing out on the Baba Cloud. Okay, cool. So what is kind of the takeaway here? I try to have takeaways for all my little, like, rants and stories, both in the podcast on YouTube. Guys, please, for the love of God, don't buy routers off Amazon. Go to Best Buy. Buy a reputable manufacturer. Like, I'm not sponsored by these guys, but, like, I don't know, Netgear, Ubiquiti, Asus, maybe, right? Not TP-Link, not Tenda. Because I think we're kind of starting to see the supply chain world, not only in, like, NPM cargo land go up, but also, like...
you buy a router from enemy of nation, you might get some extra features in there too. It's just kind of like an egregious, like, holy shit. This is like, like worst case scenario from both a complicity standpoint and also like functionality standpoint. Yeah, there seems to be a lot of this, not even just like the no name routers. Obviously, we talked about even like LG TVs apps that you install, like would get you as part of like residential proxies services. They had to like purge all that, like 43% of all the apps in the freaking LG TV store.
I mean, that's ridiculous, right? I love how we're calling it residential proxy now, like by reflex to botnet guys. Not that you, not for you, but I'm saying like, no, you're right. Five years ago, we would have called that a botnet. You know what I mean? No, it is like, you're right. It's so normalized that it like turned into like a business or whatever that you can buy these residential proxy services. You're right. Like they're just getting added to a botnet. There's another one literally just came out. yesterday from ours talking about this is like another pile of devices off of Amazon, I guess, that do this, where it's these devices that are offering like free streaming services.
Yeah. Like, so it's like, oh, this one is called a Superbox S7 Pro. How are they not getting sued to oblivion for the S7? Isn't that a isn't that an Android phone? S7? Yeah, the Samsung S7, I think. Yeah, right. Like, how are they not getting sued to crap about that? But anyway, I mean, same thing. This thing like is offering you free Netflix, basically, if you buy this thing. And all it is. That's it. There's no legitimate purpose here. It's just a device that you're bringing home and it's certified, like certified pre-owned.
It's just got malware on it. As soon as you go into it, have you looked at this one? No, I'm just pulling this up now. This one's new to me. Yeah, no. So it's like, again, it's just these like stupid Android boxes, right? That you're getting that are just sideloaded with all sorts of crap on them. And that's it. It's just malware. Like there's no, there's no legitimate purpose. So, I mean, like we could literally have, it feels like we have a reoccurring segment on the show now about this because it's just so prevalent right now. So please, I mean, please, if you're listening, right.
Just like, yeah, like low level said, buy reputable stuff. If you do buy reputable stuff that has app stores like LG, don't install apps from no name developers that are like a random game on your TV or something like that, right? Like go ahead and also buy yourself an Apple TV. It's worth every dollar. So worth it. Oh my God. Like the responsiveness of a, of a T like of a outside like device, like an Apple TV versus the built-in smart TV crap. I wish I could buy an LG TV or a Samsung TV with no operating system whatsoever.
Just give me like the raw hardware of that thing and let me use my freaking Apple. But yeah, this stuff is just all over the place. Never ends, man. We decided to not talk about it. I just want to mention it really quick. We've talked about this a ton, this J frog artifactory volumes that were like kind of in the wake of a lot of the the AI hugging face incident stuff that they were part of that whole conversation. There's been a bunch of exploits either from that or around that that are now being actively exploited in the wild.
We don't do breached porn. We kind of do vuln porn. I definitely talk about vulns that are actively exploited. This is like, hey, what's your priority? Priority is, do I have this vuln that's currently being weaponized? And the JFrog Artifactory one is, we had a good laugh about it. during the show notes that like who the hell is putting artifactory on the internet and it's like oh too many people is the answer right just like the water plants with their plcs and stuff like this get your stuff off the internet yeah it's like guys all because your device has authentication right like i get it like ssh you have to ssh into this box you have to put the username and password to get into artifactory sure you're making a lot of assumptions about the remaining attacks be a
the implementation of that auth and B the remaining attack surface. You now have to manage if you just don't do any kind of network filtering, right? Like if you just allow anyone to touch this thing, even though you do have a username and password, it doesn't mean that, you know, there's not other stuff to be worried about. Yeah. Please get your artifactories off the internet and your PLCs also. And if you're worried about your volumes as in development, check out me as our sponsor. Sponsor updates podcast. Hey, sign us off, Matt. That was great. Thanks for watching, guys. Pro podcaster.
Guys, hey, we're coming up. Actually, this is episode 11. So, you know, podcast is well underway. We really appreciate the support, guys. We're having a good time doing this. You know, it's just been a super, super fun time. And we're looking forward to, you know, keeping this train rolling. So if you enjoy this, best way to help us out, A, Go check out Maze. Seriously, they are a great company. We love working with those guys. And then B, go tell your friends. Go tell your friends to go tell their friends. And then get that machine rolling and listen to us on Spotify with a five-star review. Appreciate it, guys. We'll see you in the next one. Peace.
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