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The Hivemind

The Hivemind artwork

Behind the Curve: The Hack, DeFi Governance, and the Future of AMMs

Jan 30, 20241 hr 22 minAudio
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Jose, Yan, Duncan, and Ceteris chat about the Curve hack, trading around the hack, views on the future of CRV and veCRV governance, and comparing AMMs, CEXs, and order books. Disclosures: Nothing said on The Hivemind is a recommendation to buy or sell securities or tokens. The podcast is strictly for informational purposes only, and any views expressed by anyone on the show are solely our opinions, not financial advice. Jose, Yan, Duncan, Ceteris, and our guests may advise or hold positions in the companies, funds, or projects discussed. Delphi's transparency page can be viewed here. Get a 20% discount on a premium Delphi PRO or PRO+ for listening to this episode! Follow the links below or use the codes on checkout: 20% off Delphi PRO annual Code: PODCASTPRO Direct Link: https://delphi.link/podcastpro 20% off Delphi PRO+ annual Code: PODCASTTEAMS Direct Link: https://delphi.link/podcastteams Follow Delphi Digital Website: https://members.delphidigital.io/home Twitter: https://twitter.com/Delphi_Digital YouTube: https://youtube.com/@Delphi_Digital

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_01Disclosure Nothing said on the Hive Mind is a recommendation to buy or sell securities or tokens. The podcast is strictly for informational purposes only, and any views expressed by anyone on the show are solely our opinions, not financial advice. Jose, Jan, Duncan, Cederis, and our guests may advise or hold positions in the companies, funds, or projects discussed. Delphi's transparency page can be viewed in the description. Now on to our show.

SPEAKER_02We have Jan Lieberman, managing partner of Delphi Ventures, and Ventures Associate Duncan, also known as Flood Capital on Twitter, prodigious shitcoin scavenger and investor. I lead Delphi Labs, our protocol RD arm, focused on incubating and accelerating new Web3 primitives. It's been a hectic week in crypto, and we're going to be digging into the curve stuff, discussing what this means for AMMs. So let's start with the curve war. So a quick summary. I think we'll go chronologically from the beginning of this. Obviously, most people have been focused on this week, but this actually has like a pretty rich history.

SPEAKER_02So going all the way back August 2020, the Curve token was deployed. October 2020, a few months later, the Curve team made a proposal to add curve as collateral to Ave V2, which actually passed as the first Ave V2 governance proposal. And by December, Michael was already levering up against this curve on Ave. And the debt pretty much kept going up over time. Throughout 2021, he kept borrowing. And then in August 2022, the Oracle risk was first identified.

SPEAKER_02I think the first report on it was Vault Capital. Shout out one true Kirk who did some great coverage on this. And then within a few months, Ave Eisenberg, the infamous Avi Eisenberg, had exploited Mango using uh the same sort of sort of Oracle manipulation attack. And then in November, he tried the same thing on Ave. At the time, Michael released the curved stablecoin white paper and kind of avoided calamity. Ave only contracted about 2 million in bad debt, which was covered from Treasury.

SPEAKER_02And then later Ave went to, you know, got arrested and things looked like they're okay. Until December 2022, January 2023, the risk parameters on Ave were updated. They reduced the curve LTV, made it unborrowable. When Gauntlet also warned about the high curve concentration and suggested further reductions. Later, six months later, June 2023, Gauntlet proposed to freeze curve collateral and set the LTV to zero. This was rejected by governance. So Michael continued to borrow, but he shifted a lot of that to other platforms like Frax, Magic Internet Money, Abracadabra, and Inverse.

SPEAKER_02And so this brings us to this week. Starting, I guess, August 1st, July 31st. I think Jan, you wanna you wanna take it from here, cover what happened this week?

SPEAKER_03Yeah, absolutely. So he he's sitting on 47% at the time of circulating supply that he's borrowed against as collateral. And now you have this scenario where there's a hack, and and and so you kind of have this domino effect initially. You know, the concern is what happens with the stolen curve that he can dump on the market. Then more secondary, you have you know, a lot of the AUM off of the exchange itself is is is stolen, so there's a loss in fundamental value to the token, and then also you have the the confidence loss, and and so all of that kind of together sets off this this this domino effect that that you know we're all too familiar with now in crypto, and and so you know you had it with Luna, you had it with FTX, and and and these issues create a massive loss of confidence.

SPEAKER_03And and so as a result, you have all these lending protocols going to PvP mode, where Ave has the largest bag, but Frax and Abercanabra are a bit more nimble. And so what ends up happening there is they start charging massive interest rates based on you, uh or rather, they start increasing the interest rate that he has to pay based on the level of utilization that exists in that pool, and and those rates will only grow as the utilization stays elevated. And so now you have this ticking time bomb where you know everyone is is afraid of of what would happen if if he doesn't have the liquidity to repay, and you have a lot of this forced selling and kind of the knock-on effects across the space.

SPEAKER_03And you know, initially I think the the fears were really warranted, but I think if you kind of look a bit deeper, it ended up being a bit overblown, and we and we had you know some kind of we had varying opinions across the space as a nothing burger. Yeah, absolutely. And so so yeah, I think you know, if you think about it, it's that that domino meme where the first one falls and the last one is is like is the damage.

SPEAKER_03And and I think the the major distinction that has to be made is the size of the as a relative size of the immediate liability relative to that next domino, right? And so if you look at previous examples with like Luna and N FTX, that immediate liability that had to be satisfied was gargantuan, and and it was not that much different than like the next liability. Whereas here, you know, you have this immediate liability that's that's not small, but it's not that large.

SPEAKER_03Whereas the the larger liability, you know, everyone is is talking about is DeFi in trouble. What happens if if kind of curve goes to zero? You have a lot of these protocols that have accumulated large bags of of CRV, and and you know, to a varying degree, a lot of their value proposition was based upon the future value of curve and being able to kind of direct these emissions. And so it it really boiled down to the immediate liability relative to the liability that needed to be avoided, which was the massive downfall of curve.

SPEAKER_04And and so that's yeah, even more like I guess like zooming in, like what actually so the hack happened, curve I think dropped from like 70 cents to 60 cents, and then people started talking about obviously this massive borrow position, 48% of the circulating supply borrowed across like you know, four different lending platforms. And what like really triggered people's fears, because his liquidation was around you know 35 cents, was that like Frax Lend had a fixed kind of a system where the interest rate would adjust as people withdraw borrow from the pool.

SPEAKER_04So like as the pool capacity drops, then the fracks interest rate goes up, and it goes up uh like exponentially basically. So what happened is like the fracks rate went from like 10% to like 130% kind of in one day and or in 24 hours, and that was gonna continue to step up all the way to 10,000%, which would have basically liquidated the founder's collateral on fracts, then probably like the fear was a cascading liquidation across yeah, in in like three or four days.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, and it would like be increasing the bad debt for the protocol too.

SPEAKER_04Like so that borrow, that like one position would have kind of triggered a liquidation of that curve collateral, which then could have spiraled to the bigger lending markets like like Ave, right? So that was kind of the trigger, and a bunch of people were freaking out. But really, in order to like not have that interest rate go up, it only would take a few million dollars worth of collateral to kind of like free up the pool, right? He'd only borrowed 17 million on FRACs, and so you know, I like once he once he could pay that off, then like the immediate pressure of like that cascading liquidation faded pretty quickly, and curve you know bounced from 50 cents to 60 cents as soon as he started paying off that that loan, and kind of a lot of like the fear-mongering, I feel like, as Jan was mentioning, where it could spiral, like if there if fracks went under, then MIM and Inverse and potentially Ave, there could be like you know effects across all of DeFi, but that was the real trigger.

SPEAKER_04And you know, as Jan was saying, like compared to something with Luna, where that was on the scale of billions of dollars, this was on the scale of like a few million. And the amount of kind of protocol value that could be lost across, you know, Ave, curve, convex, spell, fracks, you know, is probably closer to the billions of dollars of equity value that could be put at risk. So, you know, thinking that like the the plant protection team between all of these protocols wasn't gonna come together and pay off a few million dollars to stop this interest rate from ramping up exponentially, I thought was like pretty pretty clear, but obviously, you know, people are freaking out.

SPEAKER_00Yeah.

SPEAKER_02I think the main risk left chose like the main risk. I don't have an opposing view on this. I just wanted to go through the I just wanted to go, like what do you guys want to talk about before you give your opposing view, like what would have happened if if Ave actually got liquidated, like some of this some of this bad debt stuff. Go ahead.

SPEAKER_00I mean, so the real risk, like this would have been fairly contained regardless. But when you're looking through the worst case scenarios, like who's gonna be holding the bag at the end? And it would have been Ave because they would have been the last to liquidate, he could have kept moving like his collateral layer paying off the loans of the other protocols that like interest rate was increasing quicker. And then why the Ave situation was a bit scary is because their safety module is essentially all denominated in Ave.

SPEAKER_02And so I think there's like 20 million bucks of Ethan there or something.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, but it's in a balanced liquidity pool, so that that value actually declines as people try to front run this. And you kind of see like when when equity is your only backstop, people will front run that pretty quickly. So you can't like assume that you know there's 300 million there, 30% they would use in a shortfall. So that's like 90 mil. But like we know how these are like 100 ball assets, and it's pretty easy to see a scenario where you know Ave actually does get stick stuck with some bad debt, and then people kind of like front run that, and Ave has to deal with it.

SPEAKER_00But even in that scenario, like it still would have been contained to Ave in a sense.

SPEAKER_03Like the reason why I didn't think there was gonna be like a lot of bad debt to Ave was you know, if it just back of the envelope, Matt, the effective price he needed was 20 cents, right? And that means you're selling from 40 down to 20. So you can your average price you go over the back of the envelope, Matt's like just yeah.

SPEAKER_04I think we should clarify the borrow because we didn't talk about the amount. So basically we said 48% of the circulating supply, that was around 400 million curve. Let's say so. After the hack, you know, people were panicked, curve dropped from 70 cents to 60 cents. So at 60 cents, 400 million curve is around 240 million dollars. And his total borrow across all these lending markets was around like 85 million. Uh and then Yon, yeah, take it away.

SPEAKER_03So if you yeah, if you're thinking about like the effective price you need for every curve you sell at 40 cents, you you can sell one curve at a cent, right? And then you're you're getting that effective 20 cents. So even if it cascaded all the way down, you had plenty of people that were setting up with stink bids where like I I just don't see a scenario where there was even gonna be bad debt because I think you also have kind of the the opportunistic bidders in in the Justin Sons who have their own stable coin and and and you know see the value of owning this curve to to to kind of increase the liquidity of their protocol.

SPEAKER_03Can you explain the bad debt thing though?

SPEAKER_02Like what's the yeah, because I don't I don't think everyone will follow that, like the collateral amount and then like why 20 cents is the price.

SPEAKER_03Right. So so bad debt is basically when you when the final effective value of your collateral, right? And that's why the a very important factor of collaterals it's liquidity. In in the scenario where you need to do a fire sale of the collateral, the bad bad debt is basically the the scenario where the amount of resulting stables you have from selling the collateral is less than the liability that the individual owes. So as long as you can sell the collateral for at least what the value of the liability is, there is no bad debt.

SPEAKER_03And when you can't, that's that's what leads to bad debt, which is absorbed by the protocols themselves, which is why you kind of saw this PvP scenario among the lending markets to be you always want to be the first one to panic. And so if they can kind of move the debt onto someone else's books, they don't have the risk of that scenario.

SPEAKER_04And the maths, like the 20 cents, yeah, so 400 million point two is 80, and his borrow was around 85 million, so so that was around his his average that he needed to get out at. Uh so he had quite a bit of buffer room, but like I said, like like the PvP that started to kick off. So obviously, you know, I was speaking about fracks before that interest rate started to increase exponentially, and then there was kind of reports from another smaller lending protocol relative to Ave, like Abracadabra, who has their own stable coin.

SPEAKER_04They basically someone posted a proposal on their form where they said, like, we need to get out of this, and we're basically uh suggesting they crank up the interest rate to I think at the current like level of debt and utilization and everything would have been off the bat a thousand percent. So obviously, you know, you have fracks increasing the interest rate, and then Mim says, like, fuck, if this is like we need to protect our stablecoin holders, we're gonna go increase the interest rate. And then obviously, there was now Ave's worried about him basically refying his his Frax and Abracadabra loans on Ave because Ave has has a lower rate, and so it basically gets very PvP between the different lending protocols and like especially the smaller ones that you know he had like a less than$20 million borrow on Frax and MIMS, so and I think around$10 million on Inverse.

SPEAKER_04So those ones are a lot easier to get out versus like you know ABA, he had a I think at the peak, like maybe a$60 million borrow or$50 million borrow. So they kind of started fighting amongst each other. And you know, why we were joking around earlier is because when this was like live happening, I think like Jan and I were you know saying this isn't gonna be a big deal. Like people were comparing it to Luna, but in reality, like this is on the scale of like tens of millions with you know billions of dollars of equity at risk across all these different DeFi protocols, and a lot of these founders are pretty flush with cash, and you know, you have entities like Justin Sun, who's like billions of dollars on chain to to kind of like make a deal with.

SPEAKER_04You know, he's an editor. Cedarist is over there freaking. I was not freaking out with freaking out fire selling everything. I'm just trying to think of like Bud posting on Twitter from his napper ganger all.

SPEAKER_00I was just trying to think like what's the worst possible outcome here? And it was pretty clear to me that it was like Abe lenders and maybe stakers take a hit, and that was it. And so even in the worst case, like it's not like if you don't have like any exposure to that, I guess.

SPEAKER_02It's like not something that necessarily because I think yeah, you still thought the risk was, and and I did too, like uh higher than these guys are giving you credit for at the time, like higher than a than a nothing burger, and like what was it that kind of made you think that?

SPEAKER_00Well, like these guys are thinking about it from a very rational point of view, and when things start to collapse, there is no rationality in markets. And so if if like you got like the hacker right away started selling curve, and I know he didn't have a big amount, he has like four million or something, but then everybody else starts like following this, and then everybody else starts like selling curve. Yes, like a buyer's gonna come in at some point for that, but there's no reason to like jump in front of that knife when the market is like panicking in the situation.

SPEAKER_04I think our point is there was a reason because you have literally like half of DeFi intertwined into this, yeah. But they can still it's only a few million dollars like you know, to actually like make this problem go away. And we saw the max panic, like when it's not a few million dollars, it's like per person in mid-Ambers.

SPEAKER_03It's like per per per entity across the space. You know, everyone chipped in. Aave threw in a couple mil, everyone started buying a little bit.

SPEAKER_04Your excellence threw in a bunch of so but basically what happened is like as soon as his fracks interest rate started going up from 10 to 130 percent, people started freaking out and extrapolating, okay, like in three days this is gonna be a 10,000 percent, this guy's gonna be liquidated, it's gonna cause a huge cascade. I think like 12 a.m. curve it dropped from like 60 cents to 50 cents, like max panic, the fracture was going up, and funding on Binance annualized was negative 440%. So, like when you talk about how much the market's panicking, right, people are paying 440% on an annualized basis to go short this thing that's already down 40% in two days.

SPEAKER_04And like that was like kind of peak fear when in reality, if you look, okay, like the immediate trigger to cause this liquidation cascade is the frack slem position. And in order for the interest rate to stop going up, it does only take a few million dollars, right? It only takes like five, like maybe like five, six million to either pay that down or have enough like utilization in the pool to to kind of like not have the rate exponentially increase. And like Hasaka tweeted it out as well. He's like curve founder, um, you know, locks up all his curve, buys a$60 million mansion in Australia, and then makes all of DeFi plunge protection team his position is uh next level genius.

SPEAKER_04So, yeah.

SPEAKER_02Alright. I don't want to spend uh too much longer on this side of things, but one of the things that people were saying after this was just that this shows like how broken DeFi is, and like we needed like backroom deals to to save curb and like these money markets, the risk management sucks, the governance sucks. What are you guys' takes on this?

SPEAKER_00I think risk management has yeah, generally been poor. Like, I guess what's disappointing about this is that this literally happened to on Solana with Solend back in November where the Solend whale had like this massive borough that made up a big portion of the protocol. And and I mean people knew about this for a while and just kind of like let it just like didn't take it seriously, I guess. Because listen, like zero-day exploits are exploits, they're gonna they're gonna happen, and nobody thought that curve, like the idea that curve could be exploited was not really in the calculus for a lot of this.

SPEAKER_00And listen, if this exploit, like stakeeth pool is on a different Viper compiler version, like what happens if what happens if staked eeth was on this compiler version too? It would have been probably a different story. It's like a massive pool.

SPEAKER_02Apologies for those wondering why everyone's laughing. Uh Duncan Shitcoin Scavenger is sending hilarious memes to Setteris on the side. As he tends to do. We should put the meme up so people can see it. Maybe you can describe it, Duncan, what you intended to convey with this with this meme.

SPEAKER_04I don't think I can describe it correctly. I'm just making fun of Setters because of uh you know how worried he was over the situation.

SPEAKER_03And yeah, I don't think this is actually a failure of DeFi, right? I think part of what contributed to this is the borrowed position that he had was overshadowed by the the vast amount of TBL on Ave and these other protocols, and so it just didn't really seem as material of a risk. And then you know, as as markets kind of pulled back and and and TBL decreased, he only increased the amount of curve he was borrowing against. And and so I think that that that's part of what contributed to this specific risk being overlooked.

SPEAKER_03And and I think, you know, while you I think what's what's impressive is that you know in in traditional markets in in 08, you needed the Fed to come in and and fix the problems of the banking system and and therefore risk management, whereas there is no Fed here, and and so this was a problem that was able to be solved internally, which I actually treat as bullish and adds to kind of the resiliency uh of the ecosystem and and definitely something that I think people will learn from, and and I think you'll see a lot, a lot of improvement across like the risk parameter space when it comes to these lending markets.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think people are thinking a lot more about like actual liquidity and like they have these liquidity oracles that people are starting to take into account now, you know, taking into account what can actually be liquidated, uh, doing these like dynamic updates. I saw something yesterday where Mango, who got exploited last year, someone deposited like a massive position of B Soul, and so they automatically adjusted like the LTB on that on that asset, taking to account like the on-chain.

SPEAKER_04liquidity and so you'll see you'll see stuff like that but that's cool and I think yeah I think go ahead yeah so basically like also curves a unique situation right because like as Jose said like this started happening like three years ago where he started getting these borrows in line and then also curved tokenomics are and we'll we'll touch on that more I think in a minute but basically like they have a 40% allocation to the the founding team members and then there's also like a big token so like basically Michael the the founder of CRURD had about 25% of the total CRV supply but you know I think around 60% was locked right so it makes him have this like massive position relative to to the liquidity and yeah what should have happened here is not necessarily like a failure on like a smart contract level or DeFi level but like this just wasn't properly managed over the course of the bull market right you know Kerr was trading at like like upwards of two dollars when when the market was in a better state and so him borrowing against that is an extremely low LTV and the market uh like Ave just didn't really adjust his position down for kind of the deterioration liquidity was was a lot different right and but that's the thing Ave V3 already kind of solves this with like deposit caps and the isolated pools like everyone who was on Ave V2 kind of had like themselves to blame for this for not just like upgrading you know migrating pools over to Ave V3 which has been possible for for over a year.

SPEAKER_02And I think also like Gauntlet and and some of these risk orgs had been pointing this out for a while too that had been discussed in governance like I don't know I I think overall it was a pretty good showing for the for the money markets and in risk protocols especially when you compare it with what happened in 2022 where we were scrambling around for months wondering which of the centralized lenders were just zombies that had blown up but weren't telling anyone right yeah that's another great point like this is all handled very quickly and transparently and I think just one last point that like kind of added fuel to the fire on on the FUD just on the liquidity point is like one of the pools that was effective was actually like the curve liquidity during the hack.

SPEAKER_04So like the on-chain liquidity for CRV was really bad. And I think like a lot of people like spreading FUD like CERES were like posting these screenshots of like this terrible curve liquidity it's like oh if like five million dollars of the curve is sold on chain like it's gonna wick down to 20 cents. But in reality like you know the Binance pair had like hundreds of millions of dollars on on the perp at least in trading volume when this was happening and there's a lot more liquidity kind of not really seen directly on chain. So I think that was like another big thing that that contributed to the FUD. But it's interesting like how lending protocols in the future are going to move forward balancing okay like on-chain liquidity with sex liquidity and like managing those positions in real time as market conditions change.

SPEAKER_04Because obviously like Michael was you know depositing more curve and borrowing against it as it went up and then you know we had Bitcoin drawdown from 70 000 to 15000 some of these alts draw down much harder so like obviously that's an insane drawdown even if you were like levered at like a five 10% LTV at the top that could end up being pr pretty risky as as the market draws down like 60-70% yeah cool I think we can move on to V Crv so this is something that we have some strong takes on in here.

SPEAKER_02I think it's it's a model that Jan and I are are pretty bullish on and I think it played a pretty important role in why curve why so many different players and DAOs and projects were actually incentivized to save curve in a way that I think they wouldn't be were it not for the token model. So I think Jan maybe you start by like introducing like the high level of how VECR V works and why you like it as a token model and and then I think uh Cedarus and Duncan are going to jump in and and fud it.

SPEAKER_03Yeah so like there's a lot of nuance to to the to the model so there's no need to kind of go into that that detail but just at a high level the idea is you lock up curve for a varying amount of time you know as as far as four years and and the longer you lock the more voting weight you have and what you're voting on is what pools the future CRV emissions go to. So the idea is the more you own the more you can incentivize liquidity or or yields to a particular pool and there's protocols that are very reliant on it in a in a first degree manner where they're like like FRAX where they own a bunch and are and are adding liquidity and directing emissions to their stablecoin pool to increase the the liquidity there.

SPEAKER_03And then there's kind of the second order owners like a convex which are more so kind of monetizing the ability to direct those emissions. And so what the what what this creates is is a lot of long-term alignment which is ultimately what you really want with a lot of these protocols. So I think one major criticism that's that's often I think there there's there are easy ways to criticize VE CR V or VE models in general but I think the appropriate lens to think through them is not on an absolute basis but relative to what else exists.

SPEAKER_03And I think that's kind of the big mistake that a lot of critics make when it comes to this is you know we're we're comparing this to existing models rather than you know what are the ultimate flaws of this model. And I I agree there are ways that this can be improved but the point is you know the goal with ownership and and in in these tokens and the ability to direct these emissions is that you want to give the most to the people with the most long-term alignment because naturally they're going to be as incentivized to ensure that everything goes as well as possible for this protocol.

SPEAKER_03And I think this was evidence of that right if if you had a scenario where it was just like a pure ex sushi model where you stake and you just get fees everyone would have abandoned it would have been you know the second there would have been concern there would have been a mass run for the doors and and the the person who ran first would win and everyone else would be stuck holding the bag and I think the scenario would have played out a lot more differently. And so whereas here you have these protocols that effectively own a lot of this governance token and their value comes from the future emission of that token.

SPEAKER_03And so it's in their best interest to ensure that that that curve survives because the value of of the amount they can direct is a lot more than the cost that they'll have to pay to make sure that they can still that this survives right and that was always kind of the the calculus was you have these protocols we would have massive bags massive vested interests both in the present and in the future of this surviving and so for them it's just a small kind of expense to pay to ensure the the kind of survival of this protocol. And so that's a product of the VE design where these guys are locked for typically two three four years and are are vested and have a vested interest in in in really ensuring this goes well.

SPEAKER_04Yeah I think that's definitely probably too much credit to give to this situation. Like I don't think I think if there was no VE, this still would have been fine. Like if you look at this so basically what we didn't touch on is how Michael actually ended up like the situation's fine now he I think everyone agrees on this call he's gonna be fine there's not going to be any bad debt. Basically what he did was when curve was trading between like 50 to 60 cents is he was he sold a bunch OTC to like kind of different parties some of them which which you know Jan mentioned had this long-term interest in in curve but a lot of them I don't think would have fall fallen into that like V CRV or like CVX bucket where they can can direct future emissions I think a lot of them were more related to you know just like general health of DeFi like you still had all the lending protocols like Ave Frax Frax was double incentivized because like they have a stable coin and they own a lot of convex and curve but they had the Frax Lend that was at risk then also Abercadabra at inverse.

SPEAKER_04So I still think even without the V curve especially when you look at the list of OTC bidders they he would have been able to get out of the situation. Maybe it wouldn't have been as guaranteed you know definitely curve convex and frax specifically those three were really on the hook if curve were to go down so those three were extremely incentivized. But I still think it would have been fine in in a more broad sense that's probably giving it a a bit too much credit in my view.

SPEAKER_03And anyways he ended up selling around 20 to 30 million US and just in response to that I think just just what I paid on the debt I think it might have still played out in a similar way but I think you can't change the VE model and then only think of this event in a silo because without this VE model I think you'd have a lot less of this sticky liquidity in the first place right and so if the liquidity itself to begin with is a lot more fluid there's also less incentive in order to kind of save this uh protocol in general right it if if if VE wasn't around I think there would be more curved competitors because the liquidity would be more fluid and so you have to kind of incorporate that into the thought process of saving it.

SPEAKER_04And and and it makes it more worth to save.

SPEAKER_03Right because there would be less copycats because too many people are bought into the curve because of the VE model.

SPEAKER_00At the end of the day though like these protocols still need another buyer to value curve because even someone like Yarn who who did an OTC deal here to like help save it they need curve to work because they sell curve like yes they have their curve lock token but a lot of their protocols are farming curve right and so that's like where I with the so with the VE locking model I agree to an extent that it makes people long term aligned to the because they have like this sunk cost and they have put so much into the protocol but I don't think it makes people make decisions with like a long-term viewpoint because a four-year lock token is this is essentially like perpetually relocked which means that it's it like its present value is essentially zero.

SPEAKER_00And so what that does is it gets a voter to vote for pools and emissions that is going to give them like the maximum amount of value today, right? And so they don't actually vote on pools on what is going to be like the best long-term interest of the protocol. They're voting on how can they get as much of like the curve back and that sunk cost as quickly as possible. And so that's where I think the long-term alignment doesn't necessarily add up in the VE curve model.

SPEAKER_04But yeah I mean listen there's there's a whole ecosystem like what like what they're I guess what would be incentivize them to like why is directing emissions to their own pool different than like what's best for for the health of the protocol. And also in case we everyone's not like super clear just like one more time so you take curve you can lock it for up to four years. The longer you get the lock the higher like boost percentage you get in terms of like your voting power and then your voting power determines the future emissions of curve.

SPEAKER_04So it's kind of like as Cedar says you put on these these handcuffs where you're always incentivized to be locking for the four years and relocking for the four years so you get you know the maximum amount of voting power and the emissions go for a long time like another 20 30 years maybe even longer. I I can't exactly remember but like basically like essentially in our minds like forever the the emissions go on. So you just keep on directing rewards back to your pool. But I don't really understand your point Cetteris on you know directing emissions back to your own pool versus a pool that would be better for for the health of the protocol.

SPEAKER_00Can you explain on that well it's not necessarily your own pool like for DAOs it makes sense that they're going to vote for their own pools. Yeah I guess taking the center is doing a specific thing or just yeah I mean I guess my point is like take two protocols that are coming to launch their like stable coin on curve and one of them it's obvious that it's like a pure shit coin but they're paying a lot of incentives and there's another one that is like legitimate project that you want to be integrated in curve for a long time and like you are going to vote for probably the other one to instead of taking like the long term view and then LPs might go to the other another protocol in the meantime and then you lose out on that like staple in curve over the long term.

SPEAKER_00And so that's kind of my point about that.

SPEAKER_02I I also think there are like bugs in the curve and like the there's sort of problems with the current like V CRV status quo that aren't to do with the V CRV design but are just like path dependent based on like what happened with Convex and stuff like how much voting power Convex managed to accumulate with a single gauge and stuff like that. But ultimately the the main reason I like the V token models and the reason I think it worked well here is because like most token models like Xsushi I guess is is the good counter like you can just hold it as an investor and and you have the same exact benefit as if you're an LP as if you're as if you're like a value ad.

SPEAKER_04Xsushi is shit.

SPEAKER_02Like you need to compare it to something actually good.

SPEAKER_00Once upon a time it wasn't shit. I mean the biggest problem with that is that is like there's also no point in paying out all the rewards in my opinion. Like I don't think you should be paying out all the rewards for stakers of a token.

SPEAKER_02So the reason I like the V models in general is because they incentivize um like participants in the protocol they're like you're more incentivized to hold it if you're a participant in the protocol than if you're just a random investor, right? Which is also why like one of the things that I think kind of duncan you don't like about it. It is like not good to hold if you're just an investor. It naturally benefits LPs because as an LP you get the boosties or it naturally benefits protocols because you can direct like especially for stablecoin protocols because you can direct the flow of incentives to your pools.

SPEAKER_02Huh? Yeah I mean the basically if you have if you're both an LP and you have like your curve locked you get a higher share of the emissions that go to that pool effectively which means that LPs that also own curve are benefited over LPs that don't have any curve. Right? And like contrasting this to the to the X Sushi model which is like the unlocked version it's like I think it's a lot better.

SPEAKER_02And you can kind of see it in the in the cap table effectively of curve where it's mainly owned by its LPs which also means that liquidity is sticky like Jan said or it's owned by protocols who who want to own it to direct incentives to their to their pools. Yeah.

SPEAKER_04Yeah so on the counter v curve stuff so I've written three reports on curve and convex like probably like 20 pages each I spent way too much of my life looking into this and way too many headaches because the system is like very circular ultimately so starting off I think curve has lost a ton of its value post Terra and post youth withdrawals because basically like the beauty of curve like in like when the curve wars was a really big narrative and when convex was ripping and when when Terra was around and maybe I'll just give a little bit of color on curve and convex if for those who don't know.

SPEAKER_04So basically like we talked about curve and then this VE curve which is basically where you lock it for a certain amount of years. Convex is a protocol that launched where basically said okay if you deposit your your LP so your like stable coin liquidity pool like you know USD USDT die pool in curve or in convex we will then put it into curve give you the max boosties which is what Jose was talking about where if you hold a certain amount of v curve then you can get up to 2.5 times in emissions. So we'll do that for you and then we'll also give you like your your your liquid rewards and we'll relock we'll give you your rewards in a liquid staking derivative token which is like CVX CRV and we'll relock like all of all of the CRV plus like a fee we take.

SPEAKER_04So basically they kind of game the the curve system and ended up like getting a ton of TVL basically like all of deposits and curve were through convex and they ended up getting around 50% of the VE curve supply which basically then led to this where you could take the CVX and then like use that CVX to like control the underlying VE curve and direct emissions to your pool. So basically during Terra when Terra was big and like the algo stables were bigger like Fract was still like 85% collateralized and then you also had Lido pre uh Steet withdrawals you had these three like pretty big protocols especially Luna and Lido literally is going maximum amount of money they could get into buying curve or CVX or bribing CVX holders which is basically that's just the lingo but it's basically paying CVX holders to to direct emissions to to their pools.

SPEAKER_04And for Terra right like since there is no one to one US dollar backing you had essentially an infinite bid from like you know a multi-billion dollar protocol to direct um to direct uh emissions to to their pool and now that that's all gone like there's no reason why you want infinite liquidity and I think that it's basically lowered it and also Steve or like ETH withdrawals are alive so there's no real reason you want infinite liquidity anymore.

SPEAKER_04Like that is kind of gone.

SPEAKER_02And so that's stable coins constantly launching like Go is launching and like CRVUSD and and there's gonna be more and more like stable coins launching like USDE and it's zero sum right like you're you want to have more liquidity compared to your competitors so like the the you want to own a share of supply it's only it's only relative when it's an algo like USDC like you can just go fucking redeem it.

SPEAKER_04You don't need billions of dollars of on-chain liquidity right you there's there becomes a point where it's diminishing returns right like for these smaller ones you get a few percent of liquidity relative to your market cap and you have a redemption mechanism that that works is like you just need enough liquidity to kind of handle day-to-day actions and a market maker to come in and arm the peg like there is no infinite bid anymore I think the demand for curve is like completely destroyed after ETH withdrawals and and Terra going down unless there's going to be situations like that in the future and I think like we're probably gonna stay away from algo stables for a while.

SPEAKER_04But yeah I think that the demand is completely destroyed and that's just from the protocol point of view. But then from an investor point of view it's like why the hell would you lock up your tokens in crypto like 100 vol asset for four years it makes zero sense. And that's the only way as a curve holder you're participating in fees and bribes for future emissions. So like if you're bullish on curve as a protocol the best way to get exposure is through convex because that's a liquid token emissions are basically down and you essentially control a bunch of the curve future emissions but I think like the investment case and the bull case for curve and convex is diminished incredibly because Luna, Lido, and Frax are are done like infinitely bidding yeah I've always I've always looked at convex as kind of like evidence that the curve model is wrong.

SPEAKER_00I see it as like value leakage from the curve token to another token that like didn't need to exist why would you why would you own curve if you could own convex especially after like that's true.

SPEAKER_02But I think it's path dependent like I don't I don't think like there there are ways to avoid convexes happening right like convex had the monopoly for a while and they managed to like get a bunch of of curve supply like new protocols that implement the model can take measures for that for that not to happen. I think there's designs out there that can you have multiple convexes.

SPEAKER_00I guess it's like do you think like has there been another one of these like long for your vote locking tokens I know Velodrome has had some success success on Optimism but like do you think curve success of this model is just the fact that it was first and it got all the mind share and it got so many protocols dependent on it or actually the token model because like I don't think someone can make and I don't think someone can vampire curve with the same token model either um I'm saying like the the the main thing with the V model and yeah there are other examples like Bellodrome is one Balancer I think has had like good success moving over to this model and and mainly like what are you comparing it to uh that's the ultimate thing.

SPEAKER_02Okay.

SPEAKER_04But yeah but but why would you launch as a VE token model now? Because like you don't have this infinite demand anymore like for for liquidity it's just not there. I don't think anyone's gonna be able to replicate the success that curves had. It's very I think unique. I think you if you launch a VE token today I do not think it would do well.

SPEAKER_00I think you'd be way better off going for some sort of soft lock or something VE models doing well though right like the the the there are like what market cap is Vel Velodrome but velodrome you can still sell you can still sell because it's you get like an NFT of your lock. So it's like semi liquid it's pretty illiquid but you could you could theoretically sell Velodrome is what's the ticker?

SPEAKER_03That's the and balancer I guess move to a V to a VE model. I think the degree of the lock is also important. The the longer the longer you make it the more you skew towards being a a protocol acquired kind of token versus a user acquired token. Like four years I think is too long. Whereas but it doesn't matter

SPEAKER_04It doesn't even get the infinite lock. It does. No, it doesn't.

SPEAKER_03Yeah, because like it's a lot it's a lot easier to speculate on a one in a one or one and a half year lock versus a four-year lock, right? The concern is who locks for four years on an asset with this volatility because you you you can't realize positions or realize gains.

SPEAKER_04And I think part of it even on the year lock, like the game theory is to keep unlocking so your max voting power and you can keep on, or else you're just like you're not like you you have a massive sacrifice waiting for the one year unlock. If you wanted to implement something like that, you just have like the rage quit mechanic, which we've talked about at length, where it's like, okay, you're locked for a year. If you want to unlock day one, like then there's some sort of like right, I guess like linear.

SPEAKER_03Rage quit is an improvement to the V model. So like you're still building on the V primitive and iterating on it.

SPEAKER_04Yeah, okay, sure. But it's basically the soft lock. What I'm arguing for is a soft lock, which is just better. And the rage quit basically makes it a soft lock.

SPEAKER_03Soft lock with penalties, which effectively is still like a I mean, soft depends on the on the penalty.

SPEAKER_02Right. Like it could be pretty hard depending on what you set the penalty at. I mean, I think we're splitting hairs here on the model. Uh overall, I I think yeah. I I was gonna say most of us agree that like people who luck should probably have uh more upside and more say, but maybe maybe we don't. But but anyway, I think we can move on to to AMMs here. So like the curve debate I think brings brings us up to the four. You know, Duncan, you've obviously shown you're pretty bearish curve and like curve and maybe balance are arguably the last true remaining AMMs in the true sense of like automated, like four passive LPs.

SPEAKER_02And trading volumes right now are down across the board, but like spot in especially is down and has generally moved away from AMMs, right? It's increasingly dominated by intense, by like the one inches and cow swaps and obviously uniswap X as well of this world, which are which are kind of like just a front end for professional market makers and centralized exchange liquidity. So do you guys think this is a one-way trend? Like, are AMMs dead, basically, is the question.

SPEAKER_00I think for liquid tokens, it's pretty clear. And I think Uniswap X is kind of an admission of this that they are going to start using fillers, which are essentially professional market makers, to use this RFQ model where users will come in and they'll get this uh quote from a market maker who's essentially just using centralized exchanges, and then who's gonna fill them on the other side of the order? And then AMMs in this model are basically gonna be used as like toxic exhaust for these fillers to basically just arbitrage all the time.

SPEAKER_00And so I think like the the a big theme from ECC was this whole move to off-chain execution, on-chain settlement. And it's not just something you're seeing with Uniswap, we see it everywhere. That's kind of like what Intense is too. Because I think users they they don't care about centralization when it comes to execution of like a trade they're making, they just want the best price, but they still want the settlement guarantees of whatever layer they choose to like hold their assets on and like the self-custody aspect of it.

SPEAKER_00So it's just since price discovery occurs off-chain for these liquid assets, AMMs are always gonna be like slower and armed against, and so yeah. It's like a pretty clear trend for the liquid stuff that AMMs are kind of gonna be going away.

SPEAKER_03Yeah, no, it's uh it's definitely an uphill battle. You know, in initially the whole value prop here was you know, with an AMM, you're kind of bringing together two users, one that's providing liquidity and and one that's looking to trade. And and it's clear that you know the the the value on the liquidity side is certainly there, particularly in the absence of centralized exchanges.

SPEAKER_03But the the the value prop on the sorry, the value on the trading side is certainly there, but the value on the liquidity side is tough. You know a model that we we've been constructive on is the is the kind of the curve v2 model. So I guess zooming out, you know, AMMs are automated market makers. I think what there's been a kind of a split where some are automated in the sense that you said it and forget it, and then others are are very still manual.

SPEAKER_03Like a Univ3, there's you're not it's not an automated market maker. It's the same kind of interaction from the trading perspective, but from the LP, it's it's effectively uh an order book. So I think you know, trying to right at the expense or and and in exchange for their inability to to do a lot of this automated market making, right? The idea is I'm gonna earn less because I have to do less. And so trying to kind of find models that that potentially can provide that that sweet spot, that middle ground, where they're obviously not going to be getting the same level of yield as a professional doing this as a full-time job, but they can still earn yield on idle capital in a way that's not incredibly toxic, is is kind of the end goal.

SPEAKER_03And so I think like curve v2 is an interesting one. Basically, what they kind of do is it's automated in the sense that uh you have concentrated liquidity that moves. So concentrated liquidity basically means there's there's amplified liquidity around a certain point. Uh XYK, the original was was pretty spread out. So you had a lot of kind of useless liquidity on the tails and a lot less in the in the middle around the the kind of the midprice. So what V2 does is it basically amplifies around the midprice by taking an exponential moving average, which basically just means it it weights the most recent data, the the heaviest, around the ratio of the assets.

SPEAKER_03So basically, you know, there's rarely price discovery on AMMs, which is uh effectively the issue that that creates toxic flow. But the idea is as external prices move, the AMM can follow but and and add a lot more liquidity. So the whole idea is it creates capital efficiency, right? The issue with a lot of these models is you can't get enough utility on this underlying capital without there being some type of leverage. And and we can kind of go into how different models are are offering leverage to some degree, but this is one of them, right?

SPEAKER_03It's it's able to concentrate the liquidity in one area such that you can generate a lot better trading execution with less underlying capital. And if you can do that, you can leave it leads to higher yields. And so I I like, you know, I think you you know you've been on the forefront for a lot of this stuff in terms of kind of thinking about how these improvements can also happen on the MEV side, uh, aside from just like the protocol design side.

SPEAKER_04I think a good way to think about it is like an order book. If you think about like the depth of an order book, right? It's like a lot of liquidity and like lots of bids and ads are centered around the current trading price. And then as you get further away from the price, you know, the liquidity typically tends to thin out. And then when the price moves there, it obviously like adjusts dynamically with the price. So like in Univ2, like you know, the bids would be all the same up to infinity and all the same, like down to zero. Whereas something like curve v2 would would concentrate the bids in the ass closer to the mark price, similar to how like a market maker would operate.

SPEAKER_04And it also has things like dynamic fees, so like as volatility increases, spreads widen as volatility comes down, spreads come down. Yeah, so just a little bit of like I think that's a good way to visualize it if people aren't familiar with kind of like the different AMM curves.

SPEAKER_00Yeah. I think though for like the liquid pairs, it's not all doom and gloom. Like, I think you're gonna see a big shift to these I mean, viaware AMMs. And a good way to visualize this is skip. So they've made like these protocol-owned builders, which essentially what it does is at the beginning of every block there's an auction, which is they call top of block auction. And what that means is like the first transaction in that block is an auction. So if you consider like ETH is trading on a centralized exchange and a DEX, and they're both at 2000, and then it goes up to like 2200 on a centralized exchange, that next block on a DEX is going to be very valuable because you can basically arbitrage it to death, right?

SPEAKER_00And so how it works today in like Uniswap pools is, and for like context of readers, this C5 DeFi arbitrage, uh not readers, listeners, this C5 DeFi arbitrage is like a massive portion of MEV. It's a massive portion of the actual value that is extracted from blockchains. Uh, some people make a joke that like Uniswap LPs are the security budget of Ethereum L1, which is kind of true. Um, and so what normally happens is a price changes on a centralized exchange, the stale prices on DEXs get arbitraged at the expense of LPs, and then like you go on.

SPEAKER_00And that value is split between the arbitrager and the proposer, and the LP kind of gets left holding the bag. But if you have like one of these top of block auctions, then when you have that same situation where price rises to like$2,200 on centralized exchange and it's still$2,000 on a DEX, you can actually auction off like the first transaction in that block. And so the LPs can actually now like capture that because arbitragers are going to bid that up pretty close to that$200 delta.

SPEAKER_00And so that's kind of where I see a lot of these designs going with Uniswap v4, they've added the ability to do hooks, which you'll you'll see a lot of experimentation here. And that's kind of like the only way I think AMMs on liquid bears will stay around. And like to Jan's point, it doesn't have to be as efficient as professional market making, but it needs to be like kind of close. And I think doing these auctions, um, especially if you get them at like a smart contract level, will do a lot to help that because there are benefits of having a lot of passive liquidity.

SPEAKER_00You kind of saw like when Solano went down with the Alameda thing, their whole ecosystem was based on order book DEXs. And when you lose a massive market maker on an order book DEX, you lose like all of your TVL, which basically impacts the entire DeFi ecosystem. And so having retail liquidity provisioning across like an entire protocol is very valuable. And so I I think it's something that we'll see more people trying to like figure out this next leg because this leg is clearly going to off-chain systems and RFQs and getting away from LPing on the liquidity.

SPEAKER_02Yeah, so to summarize, I guess what what what both you guys are saying, it's like AMMs are gonna get better, right? They're gonna get they're gonna integrate with with stuff that allows them to internalize MEV, the algorithms are gonna improve, they're gonna they're gonna be more concentrated, they're gonna implement variable fees, they're gonna have higher yield. And they already have kind of billions of dollars of liquidity sitting in these like pretty inefficient XYK pools. So if they can improve, so it seems like there's product market fit, and if they can improve, there'll still be a role for them, although it won't be like the decks, right? It won't be like where everything trades, but there's gonna be a role for them certainly on the long tail and potentially with with uh with some of the more liquid assets too, if if they can like make these improvements.

SPEAKER_04So yeah, I'm pretty I'm like really bearish AMMs for for most things. So I guess like the points you guys make seemed like everyone was aligned that they're bad for price discovery, right? And the way I explain this is like how the hell are a few lines of code gonna compete with like jump and all the market makers on Binance or whatever, finding out the true price, like they just can't. Like, I don't care how complicated the code gets, like, you're just not gonna be able to compete with that. And as you make the stuff more expensive, it gets more gas intensive.

SPEAKER_04And when you're talking about and like, yeah, and then just like gas is a whole other issue, and is like how quickly can you open and close orders? It's just like, yes, maybe they're gonna be able to figure out some of the MEV stuff, but you're never going to be able to do as efficient price discovery as you can on an order book. I just think that's pretty impossible. But I think we we all agree on that. But just clearing that up. The second one where I think we maybe don't agree on is I think it's terrible for a passive LP or an unsophisticated LP, uh even like on a yield adjusted basis, like in a risk-adjusted basis against like other other forms of yield.

SPEAKER_04I still think it's really bad. So I don't disagree with that we're talking about what I don't disagree with that. Okay, well, I don't disagree with that. Why you would do it is good to earn some yield.

SPEAKER_03Yeah, but you No, I was saying I think there's a world where if they keep improving and there's there's a market fit for uh a smaller amount of it, I I think so. I don't think it's ever gonna be the prime liquidity venue, and I don't think it's ever gonna be better yield than what somebody can get with a professional market maker, but I I do think there is a world where if the models continue to improve, you you can rationalize doing it. I'm not saying that it exists.

SPEAKER_02I think XYK is XYK is terrible, but like curve v2, obviously, if you read our research report from a year ago, I think we were involved in it, is is a lot better, and I think they're gonna it's rational to say that they're gonna get better still.

SPEAKER_04But like also like even curve v2, right? Like a lot of those pools are incentivized, and I don't think it's a better yield than like if you're actually searching for yield on assets, I think you can definitely find it in in a better way somewhere else, leave the market making up to the professionals. And I guess like one of the models, but I do agree with the long tail stuff. I think like one of the great things about AMM is anyone can spin up a pool and raise capital, and that's like one of the great things about crypto. Like, it cuts like anyone with an idea can go out and raise money very quickly and try and pursue it and like build a community and all these things.

SPEAKER_04I think that's probably like the the greatest thing about crypto is like anyone anyone can make a hairless token, or anyone can make a meme coin. But if like I think that's probably like the the biggest use for AMMs. I also think on the long tail fees, like if you're gonna do a Univ2 should be much higher. And I think like it I know it wasn't directly on the AMM, but even like Unibot kind of showed this, like with a 5% buy-sell tax. I thought that was a really good idea, especially for like a completely bootstrap project. I'm pretty sure, or I've heard, I don't know if that's true, but 100% of the Unibot tokens were deployed in the LP in the beginning, so it was a fair launch.

SPEAKER_04Like, I think that makes a lot of sense. Um but wait, wait, does the does the tax go to LPs or token holders? I thought it went to token holders. But I'm saying like something like that. But like if you're an LP, you are a token holder. So you know, anyways. So I didn't own any mod, but I thought that was a clever idea, even though it kind of messed with me in the beginning, because 80% of the revenue is from this fucking buy-sell tax.

SPEAKER_00And so what happens when that goes to like centralized exchange liquidity, right?

SPEAKER_04Yeah, exactly. It's gonna disappear, but it like bootstrapped them enough where they generated like a lot of runway and in treasury for for the team in the beginning, where it was a really good you know capital raising uh tool for them. But okay, what I would prefer more, and I was like really big on GMX when when it first launched on Arbitrum in September and wrote about it in October, November. But basically, I think relative, especially when you're talking about more liquid tokens, and the Oracle model is like way better than AMMs because you're essentially pulling, you're letting like the market make like the simplest way to explain it is you have a pool of capital, let's say it's Bitcoin and USDC, you're letting the market makers figure out the correct price on Binance, and then you're just copying it from them.

SPEAKER_04And with things like GMX V2, like obviously for BTC, like GMX allows you to like ape in like$20 million long on leverage with only 10 BIPS fee, which is is quite high, but no slippage. And then obviously the Oracle model like kind of runs into more trouble as you get down like the liquidity curve. It's like I couldn't be aping 20 million into some like you know low cap coin with no slippage, it would completely break the market and there'd be room for exploits and kind of the bad debt stuff we were talking about previously.

SPEAKER_04But what's really interesting in GMX V2 is they're kind of like I think improvements to the Oracle model are going to quickly outpace and be better for LPs than improvements to the AMM model, right? So that's the argument I'd make. I think the Oracle model is just superior in almost any way to the AMM model when you're talking about liquid coins. When you're talking about long tails, I think AMM is better. But for instance, in V2, they have you know longer tail coins, and how it works is Chainlink's developed a new high-speed Oracle, like in kind of synergy with GMX, to basically go get the price.

SPEAKER_04So a trader execute or a trader submits a trade with like certain certain slippage tolerances, Chainlink goes, pings the price from Binance, a bunch of other exchanges, pulls it back, also grabs the order book depth data and other like kind of proxies.

SPEAKER_02Go into the details of the of the design here. I don't know. Like I I agree with you. I I think I think people get your point of the Oracle model is gonna improve, get faster, quicker than AMM algorithms and MEV integrations are gonna get better. Chris John, do you have a response to that?

SPEAKER_03Yeah, no, I'm I'm I'm certainly bullish on it as well. I think it it points to a larger issue that I was kind of hinting at earlier with the idea that you really need leverage on the underlying capital in order for there to be.

SPEAKER_02But does that mean just like price discovery just moves off-chain? Like literally, we just assume that Binance, like all the professional centralized market makers, will find price discovery on a centralized exchange, and then on-chain just literally like copies those prices over. And isn't that well?

SPEAKER_03I think that I think it just goes to wherever there's the most liquidity. Yeah, I think that that like and and so it's a function of that, and then you know, whatever that is. And so whether it's an on-chain order book eventually on the highly performant chain or something off-chain, like a like a centralized exchange.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I guess I guess the the question this gets down to is like obviously if you have an Oracle-based model, you'll never have price discovery there. And so is price discovery basically doomed to be off-chain? Is there anything because then if price discovery is always gonna be off-chain, then I agree that you want to get the on-chain model or whatever the you're using to basically get that as close as possible to the off-chain price?

SPEAKER_04But I definitely think it's heading that way right now, it's pretty clearly heading that way. Larry, liquidity, like wherever there's the most liquidity, is gonna be where price discovery happens. I think that's kind of you can't really argue against that right now. Like maybe I don't know, Setter, if you're big in a Solana or some L2 or L3 or ZK chain can figure out how to do a perform an order book on chain. And I think that could definitely be the future, but like as we've seen with even incumbents, just like on like Uniswap or Binance, like those are the like not Binance wasn't a first mover, but it's kind of cemented its position at like 70-80% market share, and it's just like very hard to move that rock.

SPEAKER_04Obviously, Binance has its own regulatory issues right now, but even something like Uniswap, right? Like Uniswap has cemented itself on-chain as the biggest AMM, and it's very difficult to move that rock. So I think liquidity is gonna be a big hurdle to overcome. But like maybe in a few years, if we figure out a perform an on-chain order book, then it's possible. But I think definitely right now where stuff's going is is the most liquidity for sure. It's gonna be like Oracles right now are way better.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, it's gonna be it's gonna be tough to ever. I mean, just like it's just basic like physics. Like if you want to synchronize global state around the world versus some centralized exchange, have this global consensus, it's always gonna be slower, right? I think we're on-chain order books, like some of the ones on Solana can can thrive, is just with like the composability of them, but that's kind of a different topic than being the place for price discovery.

SPEAKER_03Uh I think in the end though, like on the passive side, it all really boils down to kind of yield and and exposure, right? So, like what why would there be a a growth of like what is this passive liquidity going to chase? It's it's gonna be yield, but so you know, kind of going with the Oracle model, it you do have a different exposure, at least with current models, where you know, for example, like GLP was a zero-to-one innovation, but it it didn't really address a lot of the concerns that allowed for this Oracle-based liquidity to scale massively, right?

SPEAKER_03So the the whole benefit is if you can have an underlying pool of capital that everyone is trading against, with GLP, you're borrowing from it and and you have imbalance issues, and that's why you saw it, you know, massively it gained a lot of momentum when it launched over the in in 2022 summer because that was a massive bear market where market participants naturally skew long and and they get destroyed in CHOP, and that's kind of what that environment was. Then you saw GLP participants get get demolished in 2023 when it was up only because again, everyone skews long.

SPEAKER_03And so they kind of gave up a lot of the profits that that they that they previously had. And so what that shows is they're like what you need both to address this this kind of counterpart issue where you know you're the pool that people trade against. If you can balance that pool, you can actually scale the liquidity a lot better. Whereas, you know, if if you have 40 million of longs and 20 million of shorts, the pool is exposed to a 20 million long position. But if you have 40 million in both, the pool isn't really exposed to anything, and you can allow for there to be more open interest built up against that same underlying pool of capital.

SPEAKER_03And so that's kind of you know what we're seeing some of these models shift to.

SPEAKER_02Everyone agree that AMMs are really good for the long tail, right? But we're also seeing an increasing trend of like long tail tokens to some extent, like the likes of like Suey, Aptos, uh, WorldCoin, and others, like do these coordinated launches on finance, right? With with the same playbook where you release very little of the float, uh, a lot of it is controlled by market makers, and then you have these games being played, which which kind of guarantee you like a lot of volume on launch and also like a pretty high FDV.

SPEAKER_02And I think it's kind of hard to argue that this hasn't been from the perspective of the project, not necessarily the the community, but the project, a really successful like launch strategy, right? Like you people anchor to this higher FDV, you have a lot of volume, it looks like a uh a real val, even if it goes down from there, then it looks cheap at half, which is still an incredibly high valve. And I think we've seen projects that go this route generally attract much higher fluid diluted valuations than those who launch like on-chain on an AMM. It's like, yeah, what do you guys think of that?

SPEAKER_00Yeah, no, it's I mean it works, people are gonna keep doing it. I mean, yeah, basically it works like it. We haven't really seen one that hasn't been successful yet. You kind of just restrict volume to a small amount of supply. Uh it's kind of like we saw Apdos go from like to like$18 earlier in the year. You get these like short-term gains to kind of spur up interest.

SPEAKER_00But yeah, I mean, I don't know. It's obviously not an ideal model for someone that wants to like actually get into the project. You have no opportunity to buy tokens at like a decent price.

SPEAKER_03Yeah, I mean, I I think it's the playbook, right? We've we've seen it time and time again. You need you have to get into the most users, you have massively incentivized market makers with with strikes that that that you know make them a lot of money when these prices are hit. You need to kind of anchor public perception to a high watermark number. And then you get memes created around it. Like even Aptos, like you had uh, you know, I know uh what do you call it? Like upbit was really driving a lot of the price, and apparently the meme there was APT for like apartment where like this thing would pump enough that you can just buy yourself an apartment, just like silly stuff like that ends up driving so much of the the volume and and the value, which is unfortunately the playbook that that really works.

SPEAKER_04Yeah, I think it's important to consider it like who like benefits from this. So obviously, this is like mash, I think it's extremely predatory from the teams who do it, but like obviously if they're gonna use it as a distribution and like capital raising mechanism, makes a lot of sense from their point of view. But like the playbook essentially is like you launch the few percent float, you know, you have market makers who are incentivized to keep the price extremely high. Like we saw WorldCoin launch at like a 32 billion FTV, which is which is massive. And you know, all of the points that that you guys have already said, but basically who ends up holding the bag here is retail.

SPEAKER_04So that's why I think like almost there should be, I don't want to say like regulation around the amount of float that can launch, but like just like accepted like number, like amount of float that that tokens need uh to be launched. And I think in the long term, like maybe in the short term, this is beneficial for these projects. And I know like you guys are talking about how Arbitrum and Opera or Optimism and Arbitrum did it, and they you know are still successful, but they have like you know, pretty, really strong market positions. When you talk about something like Aptos or WorldCoin, like obviously I don't know the future of WorldCoin, but like something like Aptos doing it, I think it's extremely like predatory.

SPEAKER_04And we saw this on Solana where in the long term I think it can really wreck you because like all of the Solana eco coins followed this playbook where essentially they would launch with like one to three percent float, extremely high FDV, way overinflated. The VCs would go and short the perps and just like collect a ton of money, and everyone would and like the only people who are better off were the VCs and the team, and basically all retail got screwed, and those projects are now like extremely tainted. And any project who does that, I feel like long term, unless they really deliver on and like actually fill into that valuation, kind of gets yeah, it also depends on the degree of that.

SPEAKER_03Like I think a three percent is is certainly obviously like gonna be predatory, but I think you know, if you're doing low double digits, like Aptos, I think is around 20% circulating, which is is you know considerably less predatory, and and I think it gives people more confidence in this being a more realistic price. Obviously, I'm not like bullish on the price of Aptos from here, but I I think it's there's a degree to to to the to like the the the scamminess of the circulating supply, right?

SPEAKER_03Like if you're doing low single digits, that's just tough to justify any kind of real valuation there. But I I you know the the counter is that you know the projects that haven't done it, and as Zay's mentioned some others that like that have certainly underperformed one.

SPEAKER_04Yeah, but I think it's a the fundamentals play a big role, right? Like we talked about this before. Like I know I keep on bringing up GMX, I think it's a good example for for a lot of these things that was done right, like on-chain, but like they launched, I think they only raised 250k, and they launched a basically a one, two million dollar market cap, and they were the best performing coin in 2022, got all the way up to like over a billion dollar market cap because they had a product that that worked, returned cash flows to to holders or value accrual to holders in some form, and you know it filled into that very nicely.

SPEAKER_04Didn't have the Binance Launchpad. I think the Binance Launchpad makes a lot of sense if you need like really big distribution because you're like an L1 or something and you want to raise a ton of money, but like I don't really know if it's the play for everyone, and also not everyone can do it, right? Like you're talking about a small subset of extremely well-funded teams that like have the relationships to launch, and I don't think your investors are better off.

SPEAKER_02If if finance if like on-chain like AMMs and and uh and on-chain solutions eventually had the same reach and distribution that centralized exchanges have, which I I get is is is a big assumption, but like uh yeah, I think we're we're all in this because we think that will someday happen. Do you think you could recreate the same thing? Like, do you think launching on an AMM, because you know you said AMMs are good for the long tail of tokens, do you think launching on an AMM could ever like rival what's done with uh as in so I on an AMM and I mean with no like private market maker deals?

SPEAKER_02So literally just public kind of launch, like public yield farming incentives. Could you recreate like the the impact of a launch on a centralized exchange with uh centralized market makers?

SPEAKER_03Not to the same degree. I think you can I think what what what helps if you're trying to launch within it via AMM is if you have a lot of protocol-owned liquidity and they're listing it, right? And so you have these different LBP type bootstrapping mechanisms that can raise some capital and allow the protocols to then seed liquidity naturally, because then you have a scenario where they as LPs aren't really concerned about you know the underperformance of a buy and hold. They're the main value prop for them is to provide deep liquidity on-chain early on at reasonable prices and to let you know early participants buy in.

SPEAKER_03And so it it's it's the mismatch where the LPs don't care about getting the best liquidity providing experience, they're just trying to actually provide liquidity, and and so that that happens when it's the protocol itself kind of launching that liquidity. I think in those scenarios, it definitely makes sense.

SPEAKER_00I mean realistically, the safest way to launch an L1 is an ICO, like the fairest way, not safest. Like, and if we and like I mean, how would you do the you're not gonna do the on an AMM on Ethereum or something? It's not yeah, yeah.

SPEAKER_04No, I agree. That's what I mean. Like things that need distribution, I think it makes a lot of sense to do on SX. I need like a bridge.

SPEAKER_02Like AMMs, you still have a lot of, as you mentioned, like the GMXs of this world, the the bulbs, the the like a lot of tokens are are still finding price discovery on-chain, but like if it's it's only useful for long tail, and for long tail, it doesn't have big backers and uh who can who can kind of get them on Binance, and then even that that long tail, once it hits a certain threshold, ends up moving price discovery to centralized exchanges, you know, like what's happened to GMX even to Binance, like doesn't that leave a very small TAM for AMMs?

SPEAKER_04Yeah, I think it's definitely smaller because obviously these bigger pairs are getting way more trading volume, but I think it's an it's an extremely important tool to facilitate like crypto, right? Like GMX thing is I keep on going back to it, but it's like you know, two guys started it and it's now a billion-dollar protocol. Like they didn't they raise like 250k on chain and they launched and they bootstrapped it from like the ground, no VC funding, nothing into a billion dollar protocol. And I think that's like literally like the dream like for like crypto and like you know, optimal case scenario. You have an idea for a protocol or something, you raise a little bit of money on chain, you deploy it, and you have you know something that aligns you know your LPs, your investors, your your users, or you know, however the product is structured.

SPEAKER_04And crypto is like a really good distribution and fundraising mechanism, and also like awareness mechanism and like a way to kind of like account for value.

SPEAKER_00And that's like the real like importance of AMMs in in my because it if it's GM No, but like GMX relies on off-chain infrastructure. So that was a point.

SPEAKER_04I know, but it's like that's not like I'm not talking about the actual protocol, I'm just talking about the idea of like, you know, you can have like me and you, Cetters, could go if we knew how to code, we could go out and build a project and deploy it and raise money, and you know, it could be something big like what one day, and like that's just really not feasible without crypto and this you know AMM structure, especially like you know, working with people online that you don't know, having different legal contracts in different countries, like you know, you can have it your equity split in a smart contract. Like there's so many benefits for small, I guess like small businesses or small protocols to like bootstrap with crypto, and that I think is like extremely value for AMMs, but like I never think they're gonna be the main place for liquidity.

SPEAKER_04So I definitely don't want to understate the importance of them.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think we'll see, we'll see. It we're going to this off-chain model, but people will start to see more of these, as I said, like MEP aware AMMs kind of come back. And so I'll be keeping an eye on those. And then of course, if any order books, any like on-chain order books, which is mostly Solana right now. Yeah, it's hard to see like pure price discovery though on the most liquid assets being on-chain anytime soon.

SPEAKER_02Cool. Well, we've been going for a while. Ended on somewhat of an inspiring note that at least AMMs can can facilitate long term. Yeah, do you like guys? This is freedom. Freedom. Yeah, it's just Gensler would kind of disagree with you there.

SPEAKER_04Uh it's a global technology. Gensler can't rule the world.

SPEAKER_02Yeah. He can try, it's it seems like. But uh, but yeah, like I agree. I do think uh for me AMMs are gonna keep improving and they're gonna compete with other passive like yield sources on the LP side, I think. I I don't know, I think a world where only professional market makers use order books and then all retail is just like lending to them on Maple or something or on money markets, it's kind of like pretty depressing.

SPEAKER_04And I hope there's like yeah, but you could do that in an on-chain way, right? Like if there's a perform an on-chain order book and then you have maple or whatever landing to these people and you can like watch the wallets and like there's some sort of clawback if they start to fall into liquidation, like you can give them up to like 10x leverage or something. That's doable on-chain in the future.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, yeah. Just the point of yield though, there is gonna be a lot more yield opportunities coming up, especially with like the LST narrative, the restaking narrative, and that's like single-sided yield, right? And that's at the end of the day what people want. So I think AMMs also have a bit of a headwind from that aspect that there's gonna be a lot more, yeah, there's gonna be a lot more like yield like when people want yield, they want to keep accumulating the same asset, they don't want to be taking this price for. Well, that's the other thing, right?

SPEAKER_03It's it's it's yield on on it's yield, but it it it really varies depending on what you prefer your underlying to be. So, like, you know, you can you the yield you can you want to justify on a volatile asset versus the yield you want to justify on stables that you know if you sit in them long enough where you're the counterparty to either trading or gambling, you will win over a long enough period. And so it it I think that's the the other element, right? It's it's are you getting yield on a volatile basket or a stable one?

SPEAKER_03And oftentimes, like yield on a volatile basket is just going to be is is kind of you know not super relevant because the volatility will will dwarf the the yield you're getting, anyways.

SPEAKER_04Yeah, and I definitely think that the on the yield conversation, it's super important where we are in the market right now. It's like things are pretty slow, trading volumes are really down. Like, whereas, you know, like just like the yield, the the matrix of yield opportunities, et cetera, something is gonna change drastically once the market is like more back and more in full swing. And like the trading yields are gonna go up a lot. And like a lot of these like staking yields, right? Like ETH, like a lot, like a massive portion of the staking yield is fixed, right? And actually goes down as more ETH staked. A small amount is to do with fees, but like when you're talking about volumes 10xing, right?

SPEAKER_04You know, I think there's a lot of opportunity for the yield that I'm talking about, but like stable denominated yield or gambling denominated yield, or like volumes way up, and yeah, a lot of that will go back to stakers still though.

SPEAKER_00A lot of that ends up as MEV, which goes back to stakers too, though. Not not with the Oracle model.

SPEAKER_02All right. Alright, guys. This was this was an awesome conversation. Really appreciate everyone tuning in to the first episode of the Hive Mind. Let us know what you think in the in the comments or on Twitter, and I think we're gonna be doing these every two weeks or whenever we have something to talk about. And yeah, hope you enjoyed.

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