Amadeus - Stolen Credentials, Three Years of Airline Reservations, and the Passengers Who Never Dealt With Amadeus
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Got something to say to this podcast? Send a voicemail, and you might hear yourself on the next episode! G'day and welcome to Tech Talks with Kinsoft. Today we look at the Amadeus incident, in which unauthorised access to the travel technology provider's reservation systems exposed passenger records from several airlines. Japan Airlines says around 92,000 customers are involved. All Nippon Airways says about 37,800 customers who booked between 10 August 2023 and 23 September 2026 may have been affected. Cathay Pacific reports about 53,000 bookings. Korean Air, Asiana Airlines and Condor also reported exposed information. Most records involve names, booking codes and flight details; a smaller group, around 2,000 at JAL and 1,700 at ANA, also had items such as passport numbers and contact details. The airlines say credit card details were not involved. Korean Air and Asiana say the investigation points to unauthorised use of access credentials tied to an Amadeus system account. ANA says Amadeus detected the access on 24 September but did not tell ANA at that time. How the credentials were obtained has not been disclosed, and no attacker has been named. We walk through the timeline, what was and was not exposed, and the lessons for any organisation that depends on a supplier holding its customers' data. Visit www.kinsoft.com.au to talk through your security and IT needs. Sources: Japan Airlines and ANA statements via TRAICY; Korean Air notice; The Korea Times; Escudo Digital; Bloomberg via The Star; eSecurity Planet.
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I want you to picture the international departure terminal for a second. Always a stressful place. Right. So you walk up to the counter, you slide your passport across the desk to the agent, and they pull up your itinerary. Standard routine. Exactly. And you bought that ticket directly from the airline's website, right? You handed them your name, your date of birth, your document numbers. All the highly sensitive stuff. Yeah. And naturally, you assume that the airline, like the actual brand painted on the side of the plane, is the entity locking all of that information
away in their own, you know, proprietary digital vault. Which makes total sense from a consumer perspective. Right. But what if the airline you're flying with isn't actually the one storing your data? What if that vault belongs to a third party you have, like, literally never even heard of? It really shatters this illusion we have of the monolithic corporate brand. Completely. I mean, we inherently trust the logo on our boarding pass, but the underlying digital architecture, the actual routing of your personal data is this wildly fragmented ecosystem. We are interacting
with supply chains, not single entities. And that hidden supply chain is our target for today. So welcome to this deep dive. Glad to be here. Our source material today is a newly released, really comprehensive tech and security analysis detailing a massive ongoing global data breach. Yeah, it's a big one. Huge. And our mission today is to unpack the Amadeus airline reservation incident. We're going to map out the anatomy of the supply chain breach, investigate the frankly bizarre timeline of how the airlines actually
found out about the intrusion, and extract the real world lessons for both the corporations involved and for everyday travelers like you. Because there are definitely lessons here for everyone. Exactly. I'm thrilled to have our resident expert here to help decode the forensics of this because, I mean, the technical implications here are massive. They really are. It is. A phenomenal case study. We are looking at a masterclass in how interconnected B2B integrations create these systemic vulnerabilities. Right. It just completely redefines where a company's attack surface actually
begins and ends. Okay, let's unpack this. Because to start mapping this attack surface, we have to completely detach our focus from the consumer -facing airlines, right? We do. The entity that actually suffered the initial breach is the Amadeus IT Group. which is a Spanish travel technology provider. Right. And for those who aren't familiar, you never interact with Amadeus directly. I mean, I had never heard of them before this. Most people haven't. But they operate the back -end reservation, ticketing, and check -in systems for just a staggering
number of major global carriers. Yeah, they're what the industry calls a global distribution system or a GDS. Okay, a GDS. Right. If you think about the sheer logistical nightmare of coordinating global air travel, it's immense. I can't even imagine. Right. You're synchronizing seat availability across code shares. You're processing travel agent requests, updating gate systems in real time. Airlines realized decades ago that building proprietary systems for all of that was wildly inefficient. Makes sense. Why build your own global network if you can just rent one? Exactly.
So they outsource the nervous system. Amadeus is essentially the central router for global travel data. Okay. They do all the heavy lifting of data aggregation. So the airlines can just focus on, well, aviation. Flying the planes. Right. But what's fascinating here is when you aggregate that much data from that many competitors into a single node, you create a terrifyingly high value target for threat actors. Yeah. I mean, the blast radius certainly proves your point there. Oh, definitely. Based on the reports, the compromised systems impact Japan Airlines,
all Nippon Airways, so ANA, Cathay Pacific, Korean Air, Asiana, and Condor. That is a substantial cross -section of global aviation. It really is. All routing through one compromised vendor. And the running total of exposed passenger records for just JAL, ANA, and Cathay is sitting at roughly 183 ,000. That's a huge number. But when I was reviewing the breakdown of what data was actually exposed, I noticed a really strange discrepancy.
You're talking about the segmentation of the data payload. Yes, exactly. Let's look at Japan Airlines, for example. They had about 92 ,000 customers affected. Right. But for 90 ,000 of those, the exposed data was restricted to basic stuff. You know, reservation codes, names, flight dates. The standard telemetry. Right. However, for a much smaller subset, like about 2 ,000 JAL customers, the exposure escalated to highly sensitive identifiers. The really bad stuff. Yeah, we're talking passport numbers, nationalities,
frequent flyer IDs. And ANA showed a nearly identical ratio, like 37 ,000 affected, but only 1 ,700 had their passports exposed. And Cathay Pacific mirrored this as well. Right. So why is there such a massive gap between the basic records and the sensitive records if they are all just sitting in the same Amadeus system? Well, it actually reveals how Amadeus structures its relational databases and handles its API calls. Okay, break that down for me. Sure. So not every data packet transmitted between the airline and the GDS requires
the full passenger payload. Meaning they don't send everything all the time. Exactly. If you are just querying seat availability or, say, updating a minor route change, the system only needs the basic alphanumeric reservation code in your name. Oh, I see. Yeah. The fact that passport data was only present in a fraction of the records suggests they use a segmented storage architecture. Okay, so they keep the sensitive stuff walled off. Right. The system likely isolates highly sensitive identity documents, and it only pulls them into the active environment
when they're specifically required. Like when you're actually going through customs or checking in. Exactly. It's an architectural safeguard, even if in this case it was an imperfect one. Well, that makes sense. The API isn't just constantly fetching your passport number to see if your flight is delayed by 10 minutes. Thankfully, no. And speaking of architectural safeguards, there is one massive silver lining here. Across the board, credit card numbers and passwords were unequivocally safe. Yes, that is a huge point to highlight. Astiana Airlines specifically noted in their disclosure that payment information
wasn't affected because they run that through a completely separate transaction system. Which is best practice. Right. To me, this is like handing your keys to a valet at a fancy restaurant, but without telling you, the restaurant outsources their parking to a massive third -party lot three towns over. Oh, I like this analogy. Right. And that third -party lot is the one that gets robbed. They break into the car, they see your registration, but thankfully your wallet and your credit cards were locked in an entirely separate specialized safe back at the restaurant. That analogy works perfectly here, particularly when you map it
to compliance frameworks. Okay, how so? Well, what Astiani and the others have done is physically and logically decouple their payment card industry, or PCI, environments from their operational reservation environments. Ah, so keeping the money totally separate from the bookings. Exactly. In enterprise architecture, payment gateways are subject to incredibly strict audited compliance standards. Right, because of all the financial regulations. Yeah. So by routing the payment through a totally isolated encrypted channel, that never even touches
the Amadeus reservation system. They essentially firewall their most critical financial liability. Well, thank goodness for that. Yeah. But it begs the question, if the payment systems were so well segmented and locked down, how did the attackers actually get inside Amadeus to view the passports and flight manifests in the first place? That is the million dollar question. Right. Because according to the forensic updates relayed by Korean Air and Asiana, the root cause points to the, quote, unauthorized use of access credentials assigned to an account within the Amadeus system.
And this is where we have to read between the lines a bit, because Amadeus hasn't published a really deep dive technical postmortem yet. Right. We are still waiting on the full autopsy. Yeah. But unauthorized use of access credentials in a B2B supply chain context is actually incredibly revealing. How so? It usually means this wasn't some sophisticated zero -day exploit breaking the cryptography of the platform itself. Oh, so they didn't hack their way in through a firewall. Right. And the source material is very careful
to point out that there is zero confirmation of social engineering either. Okay, so we aren't necessarily talking about an Amadeus employee getting tricked by a phishing email and handing over their password. Exactly. In these massive interconnected cloud environments, quote -unquote credentials often refer to non -human identities. Wait, non -human identities? Like bots. Sort of? We're likely looking at a compromised API token. Or a stale service account that just wasn't properly decommissioned. Oh, like a digital key
left under the mat. Yes. Or perhaps a third -party integration key that lacked multi -factor authentication. Threat actors constantly scan GitHub repositories or dark web forums for these orphaned enterprise keys. Wow. So they just find the key and walk in. Exactly. Once they have a valid token... They don't need to break down the front door. They literally just walk in through the service entrance holding a clipboard. Which explains the distinct lack of noise, because we don't have any ransomware groups on the dark web claiming responsibility or threatening to leak the data.
Right, which is highly unusual. Yeah, in today's threat landscape, these groups essentially operate PR departments to extort their victims. They absolutely do. So the silence is weird. Well, it tells us a lot about the threat actor's profile. You see, Amadeus responded by invalidating the credentials, resetting passwords, and deploying enhanced monitoring. Standard cleanup. Right. But crucially, they reported zero evidence of ransomware deployment, no data tampering, and no data deletion. And the airline services didn't go offline either. Exactly. The system stayed
online. This wasn't a smash and grab extortion play. This was quiet, stealthy data extraction. Wow. The attacker logged in with a legitimate key. executed queries to scrape the database, and basically attempted to leave the infrastructure completely intact to prolong their access. Or just avoid triggering any automated alarms, I guess. Exactly. But the alarms were triggered eventually, which brings us to the part of the report that initially gave me some serious pause. The timeline. Yes, the timeline. When you look at the time window of the compromised records,
Japan Airlines states that the data accessed in the Amadeus system covers the period from August 10th, 2023 to September 23rd, 2026. Right. Cathay Pacific and ANA report nearly identical ranges. Wait a second. Are we saying attackers were lurking inside this system with continuous access for over three years? Okay. I know how bad that looks. It is a very natural assumption to make when reading these disclosures. I mean, three years is an eternity in cybersecurity. It is, but it's a critical misunderstanding of how data scraping actually works. That date range,
August 2023 to September 2026, does not represent the dwell time of the attacker inside the network. Okay. Then what exactly do those dates signify, if not the duration of the intrusion? They represent the retention window of the database tables that the compromised credentials had permissions to query. Oh. Okay, I think I follow. Let me break it down. When an attacker gains access via an API token, they typically run automated scripts to scrape literally everything that token can see. Right, they just grab it all. Yeah. So if
the database holds historical flight records going back to 2023 and future bookings stretching all the way into 2026, the script grabs it all in one go. Ah, I see. The actual intrusion might have only lasted a few hours. Or maybe a few days before Amadeus detected the anomalous query volume and killed the session. So the dates just indicate the age of the data that was exfiltrated, not the length of time the hacker was sitting there watching the system. Exactly. Investigators still haven't established the exact timing of the hack, but it certainly wasn't a continuous
three -year lurk. That makes vastly more sense. The attacker just vacuumed up the specific database partitions they had access to, which happened to contain a three -year rolling window of passenger records. That's it. Okay, that significantly lowers my panic level regarding Amadeus' internal security monitoring. Good. But if we shift our focus to their communication protocols, this is where the systemic failures really become glaring. Oh, absolutely. The communication was a mess. It really was. Here's where it gets really
interesting. The timeline of detection and notification is just bizarre. Let's hear it. According to ANA's official public notice, Amadeus actually detected the unauthorized access on September 24. Right. Yet the airlines themselves were completely oblivious for weeks. It wasn't until October 16 that ANA actually had to approach Amadeus and ask if their systems were affected. Yes. And the only reason ANA asked was because they were hearing industry rumors from other carriers on the platform. Unbelievable. This is like a building manager knowing the security gate has
been broken for a month, but not telling the tenants until one of them notices their neighbor's door is kicked in and asks about it. That is exactly what happened. And if we connect this to the bigger picture, it exposes a massive vulnerability in how service level agreements for SLAs are drafted in these venture contracts. How so? Well, this is the inherent friction of shared multi -tenant cloud environments. When a massive vendor like Amadeus detects anomalous activity, like a spike in data leaving a specific account, their first priority is containment and internal log
parsing. Figuring out what happened. Right. They have to forensically reconstruct exactly which data partitions were touched. And in a database shared by dozens of global airlines, isolating the specific victims takes significant time. Sure. I understand that forensic log parsing isn't instantaneous. No, it's not. But Amadeus' silence went far beyond a reasonable investigation period. Amadeus finally gave formal notifications weeks later. Korean and Asiana on the night of October 20, JAL around October 23, and Cathay
on October 28. Right. And legally, they were likely operating within their contractual rights. Wait, really? How is that legal? In many enterprise agreements, the supplier is only required to notify the client, quote, Without undue delay. Without undue delay. That phrase seems like a legal gray area big enough to fly a commercial jet through. It absolutely is. From the supplier's legal perspective, notifying clients before the forensic report is finalized might cause unnecessary panic. And therefore, waiting isn't an undue
delay. Oh, wow. But from the airline's perspective, those weeks of silence are paralyzing. The airline holds the ultimate legal obligation to protect its passengers and report breaches to regulators. Right. It's their customers. Exactly. But they can't trigger their own incident response playbooks. They can't prep their customer support teams or lockdown systems because their supplier is hoarding the telemetry. The vendor knows the house is on fire, but the homeowner is left completely in the dark. Exactly. It paralyzes the customer's ability to protect their own passengers. And we are seeing the direct result of that bottleneck
right now. The public disclosures to the actual passengers only trickled out this very week. JAL published their notice on Wednesday, October 28. ANA on Thursday, October 29, and Cathay Pacific just today, Friday, October 30. Weeks after the fact. Amadeus knew on September 24. The airlines couldn't warn the public because they didn't have the actionable intelligence from their own vendor. It's a huge failing. So what does this all mean? If I am a listener who flew one of these routes in the last three years, what is the actual threat model for me? Right, let's
talk about the real world impact. We know credit cards are safe, so they aren't going to just drain my bank account. What is the attacker actually doing with a database of 183 ,000 reservation codes and flight dates? The immediate threat isn't credit card fraud. It's highly targeted phishing or what we call business email compromise and spear phishing. OK. When threat actors acquire what we call PNR data, passenger name records, they aren't just getting an email address. They are acquiring context. Right. They know your
full name. your exact travel dates, your routing, and your legitimate booking confirmation code. Which completely bypasses our normal cognitive friction. I mean, we are all trained to spot generic phishing now. Exactly. If I get an email saying, you know, your account has been suspended, I just ignore it. We all do. But if I receive an email that addresses me by name. cites my upcoming Japan Airlines flight to Tokyo, includes my actual six -digit alphanumeric confirmation code, and tells me there is an issue with my seating assignment that requires immediate re
-verification. I mean, I am clicking that link. Most people would. The psychological manipulation is incredibly high because they possess verified insider intelligence. Yeah, they have the real details. Precisely. They leverage the legitimacy of the stolen data to create incredibly convincing fake emails. phone calls, or spoofed websites. And from there, they harvest your actual passwords or your credit card details. That's terrifying. It is. This affects anyone who flew these carriers, particularly routes to or through Japan and Korea,
or anyone who booked via travel agents using these systems. Both JAL and Korean Air have issued warnings about this exact scenario. So the tactical advice for you, the listener, is to operate with a zero -trust mindset regarding your travel itineraries right now. Absolutely zero trust. If you receive an unsolicited alert about a booking, even if it contains perfectly accurate details about your flight, do not interact with the links or the phone numbers provided in that message. Close the communication, open your browser, and log directly into the airline's official app or website
to verify the status. That is the only safe way to handle it. But beyond the individual traveler, what are the architectural takeaways for the corporations operating within this ecosystem? How do they prevent the next Amadeus? Well, the analysis highlights several structural mandates. Number one, privileged accounts at suppliers need serious protection. Privileged access from vendor accounts must be treated with the same paranoia as internal admin accounts. Enterprises must enforce rigid multi -factor authentication and aggressive monitoring on any API or service
account. And number two has to be tearing up those vague SLAs. Exactly. The era of without undue delay is over. Vendor contracts must mandate specific defined notification windows like 24 or 48 hours and named contacts for when things go wrong. My favorite takeaway from the report, though, is the whole paradox of data minimization. Yes. Because the entire travel industry is built on aggregating data, right, to create these seamless experiences. Right. They want everything to be smooth. But if a specific data field isn't functionally
necessary for the middleman, it just shouldn't be transmitted. If Amadeus doesn't strictly require a passport number to process a basic domestic transfer, the airline shouldn't be sending it to their servers. You can't leak what you don't store. It's the ultimate defensive principle. And finally, companies must have a clear customer message prepared. Rapid and transparent communication is the only way to mitigate downstream damage. So summarizing this entire journey, we are looking at one. Critical, invisible back -end supplier. An intrusion facilitated by a single set of compromised
credentials. Likely an API token. Right. A data retention window exposing historical records stretching back three years. Impacting over 183 ,000 passengers across top -tier global airlines. Yeah. And a fractured, delayed notification process that left those airlines blind for nearly a month. Which brings us to a much larger systemic question. This raises an important question the tech industry has largely ignored. What's that? Well, as global
industries like aviation, finance, logistics move toward these hyper -efficient centralized tech ecosystems. Right, where a single company handles the logistics for dozens of global competitors. Exactly. Does this aggregation of data inherently create a too -big -to -secure single point of failure? We've optimized for convenience, but have we accidentally built a master key? For bad actors. Well, it is the ultimate modern tradeoff, isn't it? The pursuit of global digital efficiency versus the reality of concentrated systemic risk.
Something to really think about. Definitely. So the next time you slide your passport across the counter and the agent types in your booking code, you might want to consider the vast and visible network of third party servers sitting behind that terminal. And who exactly might be querying your data in the dark? Thank you for joining us for this deep dive. Stay vigilant, verify your travel alerts directly, and we will catch you next time.
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