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Tech Talks With Kinsoft

Tech Talks With Kinsoft artwork

Stake - A Breach at the Broker Behind the Broker, and the Closed Accounts Still on File

Oct 6, 202621 minAudio

Got something to say to this podcast? Send a voicemail, and you might hear yourself on the next episode! Sydney-based investing platform Stake has told customers that a breach at its US broker partner, DriveWealth, exposed personal and account information that Stake shares with DriveWealth to open US trading accounts. Stake's own systems, app and website were not affected. Revolut and New Zealand's Hatch customers were caught up in the same incident. Timeline. 4-5 September (US) - unauthorised access to DriveWealth's network via what DriveWealth calls a "sophisticated social engineering campaign"; contained 5 September per DriveWealth's notice to the California Attorney-General. 21 September - Stake publishes its incident page and notifies the OAIC and NZ's Privacy Commissioner. 22 September - Hatch notifies customers. 24 September - Revolut and DriveWealth email affected Revolut customers. 25 September - Stake emails customers (per Australian media reports). 28 September - DriveWealth's investigation and document review concludes. What was exposed (Stake customers; varies by person). Name, email, phone and postal address; W-8/W-9 tax status and country of taxation; DriveWealth account number (same as the Stake Wall St account number); aggregate portfolio value, cash balance and buying power snapshots. Not exposed, per Stake: Stake logins and passwords; tax file numbers and government ID numbers; bank account details; identity documents; individual holdings and trading history. No unauthorised trades, transfers or withdrawals. Inactive and closed accounts were included because DriveWealth must retain records for as long as the law requires. The number of affected Stake customers has not been disclosed; no group has claimed the attack; no CVE is involved. Lessons. Map where your customers' data goes beyond your own systems - your vendor's vendor is your risk. Check supplier contracts for a duty to report cyber incidents promptly (the Queensland Audit Office found only 2 of 36 contracts reviewed had one). Apply retention rules: records kept past their purpose are records you can lose, and the OAIC's Latitude investigation is examining exactly that. Under the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, a breach at a supplier can still be your obligation to assess and notify. Warn customers specifically about what a scam using the leaked data would look like, and recommend authenticator-app 2FA. Visit www.kinsoft.com.au to talk through your security and IT needs. Sources: Stake incident page (hellostake.com); DriveWealth notice to the California Attorney-General; Hatch help centre; Cyber Daily; The West Australian; Nine.com.au; The Register; The Next Web; Finance Magnates; SecurityBrief NZ; Queensland Audit Office; OAIC.

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I want you to think about the last time you signed up for a financial product online. Right, which for most of us is pretty often these days. Yeah, exactly. Maybe it was a sleek new trading app, or a high -yield savings account, or one of those platforms for transferring currency overseas. You tap a few buttons, you check a box that says you agree to the terms and conditions, which no one reads, and you hand over your name, your home address, and your tax details. All in a matter of seconds. Right. And in your mind, you've established a relationship with exactly one company.

But here is the million -dollar question. How many companies actually got that data? Well, I mean, it's an illusion, right? That one -to -one relationship? Yeah. When you hit submit, your personal information doesn't just sit in a single database. It gets fragmented. cascades across an entire ecosystem of third -party vendors, compliance checkers, infrastructure providers. And that hidden ecosystem is the exact focus of today's Deep Dive. We are analyzing a massive data breach involving a company that you have

probably never even heard of. I'd be surprised as many people outside the industry have. Right. They are called DriveWealth, but... While their name might not ring a bell, they sit right behind some incredibly popular financial platforms. I'm talking about brands like Stake, Revolut, and Hatch. Some heavy hitters in the fintech space. Definitely. So we are going to explore what happens when the vendor behind the vendor gets compromised and what that actually means for your personal information. It's a fascinating chain reaction. It really is. To put this in

perspective, imagine ordering delivery from your absolute favorite local restaurant. You love their branding. You trust their quality. You've been eating there for years. Yeah. You know what you're getting. Exactly. But you are completely unaware that, like, a year ago, they quietly outsourced all their food prep to a massive ghost kitchen all the way across town. Right. You place your order on the restaurant's slick app, but the ghost kitchen is actually the one handling your food. Handling the actual raw ingredients, yeah. Then you wake up and read the news that the ghost kitchen just got robbed. You didn't

even know they existed. But because they had your order details and your address, suddenly you are very much involved in the fallout. That's a great way to look at it. The modern financial product is really just a stack of companies and your data flows down through all of them. So we really need to understand how these companies are structurally connected before we can make sense of how this breach unfolded. Let's look at Stake as our primary example here. Sure. Stake is a massively popular Sydney -based online investing platform. They have around half a million customers

worldwide, and they built their whole brand on letting Australians easily buy U .S. shares right from their phones. Right. They made it very accessible. Yeah. The interface is beautiful. It feels totally seamless. But Stake isn't actually a registered U .S. broker. No, far from it. I mean, becoming a registered broker dealer in the United States involves a staggering amount of regulatory compliance. Like mountains of paperwork. Mountains, massive capital requirements, highly complex infrastructure. For a fintech startup in Sydney, building a Wall Street clearinghouse from scratch simply doesn't

make sense. So what do they do instead? So they utilize what we call a brokerage as a service model. They partner with a New York -based broker dealer called DriveWealth. DriveWealth is the plumbing hidden behind the drywall. The plumbing. Yeah. They execute the trades. They hold the assets and they actually clear the transactions on the American side. The broker behind the broker. So when you open that stake account in Australia or, you know, a hatch account in New Zealand, your details are actively flowing down the API chain to drive wealth so they can legally open

your account in New York. Exactly. Which brings us to the timeline of the incident. And this is where things get a bit messy. According to the public notices. Unknown attackers breached DriveWell's network on Friday, September 4th and Saturday, September 5th, 2026. Right. A weekend attack. Very common. DriveWell's internal security teams managed to contain the compromise by that Saturday. But Stake didn't publish an incident page until Monday, September 21st. Hatch told its customers on the 22nd. Revolut emailed people

on the 24th. And Stake's direct emails to their customers didn't go out until Friday the 25th. That is a significant delay. It's a near three week gap. Why does it take so long to tell a user their data is gone? Well, it highlights the agonizingly complex chain of communication in business to business breaches. When containment happens on the 5th, the real work is actually just starting. Really? Oh, absolutely. The primary vendor, DriveWealth in this case, has to bring

in external forensic teams to analyze server logs. They have to determine the actual blast radius of the attack. To see what got hit. Yes. They have to figure out exactly which files were accessed. And once they map that out, they realize they have compromised data belonging to dozens of different corporate partners globally. Wow. So they can't just send out a mass email. Not at all. They have to notify the legal teams at stake at Revolut. And then what? Those companies have to figure it out on their end. Exactly. Then those secondary companies have to conduct

their own internal audits. They have to coordinate with regulators in their respective jurisdictions like Australia, the UK, New Zealand, and carefully draft public communications that won't trigger a massive panic. So the communication lag isn't necessarily a cover -up? No, it's mostly a byproduct of a deeply entangled supply chain trying to untangle a forensic mess. Okay, let's unpack this because the nature of the breach itself is what I find most confusing. How so? Well, Tribewell's notice to the California Attorney General described it as a sophisticated social

engineering campaign. Right. The reports explicitly state there was no CVE, meaning the hackers didn't exploit some undocumented software flaw or zero -day vulnerability in the code. No technical exploit, yeah. And no criminal ransomware group has stepped up to claim the attack on the dark web. I'm having trouble picturing this. Are we talking about a simple phishing email? Or does this just mean someone with high -level access got sweet -talked on the phone into handing over the keys? The term sweet -talked dramatically

understates the psychological manipulation involved in modern social engineering. Really? Oh, it's that intense. Oof. Attackers aren't just sending poorly spelled emails from foreign princes anymore. They are exploiting the fact that the weakest link in any enterprise security architecture isn't the firewall. It's the people. It's the human being managing it. Walk me through how that actually works, because if a financial institution has two -factor authentication, VPNs, and zero -trust security models, how does a phone call bypass all of that? Okay, so attackers will meticulously

research an organization's hierarchy using platforms like LinkedIn. Oh, wow. They look for new hires in the IT or HR departments, people who are still trying to be helpful and might not know all the internal protocols yet. So they target the new guy. Exactly. The attacker will spoof an internal phone number so the caller ID looks completely legitimate. They'll call that employee late on a Friday afternoon, perhaps posing as a senior executive who is locked out of their account. Oh, man. And they say they urgently need to execute a critical task before the weekend. So they manufacture

a crisis. They manufacture urgency and they leverage corporate authority. Or conversely, the attacker poses as the IT help desk calling the employee. Saying something's wrong with their computer. Yes, claiming there is suspicious activity on the employee's workstation and insisting they need the employee to read back a one -time passcode to secure the system. And people fall for that. They do. Once the employee hands over that code, the attacker defeats the two -factor authentication and just walks right through the front door. That is wild. They didn't hack the software. They hacked the human's natural inclination to

trust authority and resolve a crisis. That is terrifying. Mostly because it's so incredibly difficult to defend against. And it naturally leads to the next big question. Once these attackers bypassed the human element and got inside Tribe Wealth's environment, what did they actually get? Right, the data itself. Yeah. The list of what was stolen is highly specific. For state customers, the attackers took names, email addresses, phone numbers, and postal addresses. Standard PII, yeah. Right. But they also took the W -8

or W -9 tax status, which is that required IRS paperwork for foreign investors. They got the DriveWealth account numbers, which correlate directly to the Stake Wall Street account numbers. And perhaps most concerning, they got portfolio snapshots. Meaning they saw the aggregate portfolio value, the cash balance, and the purchasing power at that exact moment in time. So they know exactly how much money a specific user has in play. Exactly. Now, Stake was very clear about what was not taken. The attackers did not get Stake logins

or passwords. They didn't get bank account routing details, government ID numbers, or full trading histories. That's a crucial distinction. Yeah. And there have been no unauthorized trades, transfers, or withdrawals reported. Stake also heavily emphasized that their own systems, their primary app, and their internal website were completely unaffected. The incident was entirely contained within DriveWealth's environment. Which is a technically accurate defense, but frankly, it offers very little comfort to the end user. Not at all. Stakes perimeter security could be flawless, but to make the product

function, the data still had to leave their fortress. It reminds me of a burglar breaking into your house. You've got this incredibly secure safe in the wall, and the burglar doesn't even try to crack it. Right. They ignore the jewelry. They leave the expensive TV on the wall. Instead, they just walk into your home office, open a filing cabinet, and steal your bank statements and your personal address book. They aren't trying to rob you today. No, they are gathering the intelligence required to run a highly personalized long con on you tomorrow. If we connect this to the bigger picture, you have perfectly described

why this specific data haul is so alarming. Because of what they can do with it later. Exactly. In cybersecurity circles, this particular combination of stolen data, contact info, administrative tax details, and exact financial balances is referred to as a scammer's starter kit. A scammer's starter kit. Because it allows them to manufacture an incredibly convincing illusion of legitimacy. Right. Think about how a typical scam call operates. Usually it's a numbers game. They call thousands of people with a generic script hoping someone

bites. Right. The whole your car warranty has expired routine. Exactly. But with this data, the attack is spear phishing. Imagine your phone rings. The caller ID is spoofed to read stake fraud prevention. The person on the line is calm, professional, and speaks with total authority. Okay. They know your full name and your home address. They casually mention your W -8 tax status, which immediately implies they have deep administrative access to your account. Yeah, that would definitely catch me off guard. And

then the psychological kicker. They quote your exact portfolio value and cash balance down to the cent. If someone calls me and knows exactly how much uninvested cash is sitting in my brokerage account, My brain is hardwired to assume they must be an official representative. Like, how else could they possibly know that? You fall into the trap of established trust. And once they have you believing they are legitimate, they introduce the threat. Ah. They tell you your account has been compromised by hackers, which is a brutal irony, and that you need to

take immediate action to protect your assets. Right, they create that panic again. They might instruct you to transfer your funds to a quote -unquote safe holding account they control. Or they might ask you to verify a security code they just texted you. But that text message is actually them trying to trigger a password reset on your real account. Precisely. And they just need you to read the code out loud so they can finalize the takeover. Which is why Stake's specific warning to their customers following this breach is just... So vital. We have to relay this directly to you listening right now. It's the most important

takeaway. Stake explicitly stated, quote, we will never ask for your password, PIN, or one -time codes. And we will never ask you to move your money to keep it safe, unquote. Furthermore, they are strongly advocating for users to switch to an authenticator app for two -factor authentication. rather than relying on SMS text messages. Which is fantastic advice. SMS is incredibly vulnerable to interception or SIM swapping attacks. An authenticator app generates the codes locally on your device,

making it significantly harder for a remote social engineer to compromise. When a company's data leaks, telling the customer exactly what a fake phone call will sound like is the absolute best piece of practical mitigation they can offer. So here's where it gets really interesting. And honestly, for a lot of people, deeply infuriating. Oh, I know where you're going with this. The scariest part of this breach isn't just the specific data that was taken. It's whose data was taken. Stake admitted in their incident report that DriveWealth is required by law to retain customer

records for an extended period. Yes. This means that even if a user's account was entirely inactive, their information was still caught up in the breach database. The persistence of historic data is a massive issue. Revolut actually faced a very similar situation in this same breach. Really? Yeah. They stated publicly that they had actually stopped sending Australian customer data to DriveWealth by the middle of last year as they transitioned away from that specific vendor relationship. But the historic records were still sitting on DriveWealth servers. Exactly.

Wait, so I can try out a new fintech app, decide the interface isn't for me, delete the app from my phone. formally request to close my account, and my personal data is still legally trapped in a database on another continent that I didn't even know existed in the first place? That is the reality, yes. How is that justifiable? Well, this raises an important question, and it highlights a massive unresolved clash between two entirely different regulatory frameworks. Okay. On one

side, you have strict financial record -keeping laws, anti -money laundering regulations, and counterterrorism financing laws. frequently referred to as AML and CTF, require financial institutions to hold on to customer records for years. For how long? Sometimes up to seven years after an account is formally closed. Wow. Why do they need it for that long? Because financial crimes aren't always discovered immediately. If investigators uncover an international money laundering syndicate, they need to trace the layered transactions back through time. Right. That makes sense. DriveWealth,

as a regulated entity, has... Absolutely no choice but to comply with those retention laws. If they delete the data, they face massive federal fines. But on the other side of the ring, you have privacy and data minimization principles. Exactly. The golden rule of data privacy is that every record you keep past its active functional purpose is a record you will eventually lose. It's just a matter of time. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner the OAIC is aggressively policing this tension right now. For context

they recently launched an investigation into Latitude Financial following their massive data breach. Oh I remember that one. They are specifically focusing on whether that company took reasonable steps to destroy or de -identify personal information that was no longer actively required for business purposes. It just feels like an impossible paradox for these companies. Like the anti -money laundering laws demand that they stockpile the data to prevent financial crime. But stockpiling that data creates a massive, irresistible honeypot for cyber criminals to exploit. It is a systemic vulnerability built

directly into the fabric of modern finance. And it fundamentally changes how consumers need to think about their digital footprint. In what way? You aren't just trusting a brand with your data for the duration of your usage. You are implicitly trusting them and their entire web of unseen vendors for as long as the law mandates the data must exist. Which transitions us perfectly into the broader business implications of all this. The supply chain domino effect. It's a huge problem. We mentioned earlier that one single incident at one shared provider ended up hitting

three major brands across three different countries. Stake in Australia, Revolut globally, and Hatch in New Zealand. None of those three consumer -facing brands were attacked directly. But all of them had to wake up, manage the fallout, brief their national regulators, and deal with furious customers. It is the harsh reality of the modern vendor ecosystem. I mean, the phrase supply chain risk. Sounds incredibly dry and academic until your company is the one dealing with the brand damage. Seriously. And what is truly alarming

is how poorly prepared most standard business contracts are for this exact scenario. Are you referencing the recent Queensland audit office report? Yes. The QAO published a fascinating audit on third party cyber risk. They reviewed 36 different third party vendor contracts used by government and corporate entities. OK. Out of those 36. How many do you think actually required the third -party vendor to legally report their cybersecurity incidents and vulnerabilities back to the primary company? The number is staggeringly

low. Out of 36 contracts, it was two. Two? Two contracts actually forced the vendor to pick up the phone and say, hey, we got hacked. Your customer's data might be compromised. It's a massive contractual blind spot. Companies are rushing to outsource their core operations to... payroll providers, practice management systems, CRM platforms, because it's cheaper and faster. Of course. But they aren't writing in the rigorous legal clauses that guarantee they will be notified when things go wrong at those providers. The vendors often dictate the boilerplate terms of

service, and the primary companies just accept the risk. So what does this all mean for the company whose logo is actually glowing on your phone screen? Let's say you hire a general contractor to come and completely redo the roof of your house. Okay. That general contractor realizes they are overbooked, so they secretly hire a terrible, unqualified subcontractor to do the actual labor. The subcontractor is up on your roof, slips and drops a heavy hammer straight through your neighbor's incredibly expensive stained glass window. Ouch. Well, the neighbor doesn't care that a subcontractor dropped the

hammer. Right. They don't even know who the subcontractor is. Exactly. The neighbor is going to march across the lawn and yell at you. You hired the general contractor. It was your roof. You are the face of the disaster. And in the eyes of privacy law, that is exactly how data breaches work. To their credit, Stake did the right thing here. They didn't just sit back and wait for DriveWealth to deal with the Australian regulators. No, they didn't. Stake proactively notified the OAIC themselves. Under Australia's notifiable data breaches scheme, if your organization is covered by the Privacy

Act and personal information you are responsible for is exposed, you have an obligation to assess the harm and report it within a strict 30 -day window. Even if the actual exposure happened on a server in New York that you don't own. Stating it happened at our vendor is necessary context for the regulatory notification, but it is absolutely not an exemption from it. Right. You can't just pass the buck. The legal obligation, the potential regulatory fines, and most importantly, the severe reputational damage stays securely anchored to

the front -facing brand. The customer placed their trust in stake, not drive wealth. Therefore, stake has to own the communication and the cleanup. And as we've discussed, they did step up and own it. They were highly transparent in their incident reporting about what was taken, what wasn't, and the mechanics of how it happened. They handled it well, given the circumstances. But zooming out, this entire situation really peels back the curtain on how modern digital services actually function. When you use a financial app today, your data is embarking on a journey

down a deep, hidden stack of interconnected vendors, brokers, and cloud infrastructure providers. It really is an ecosystem. Stake handled this specific incident well, but it leaves us looking at a terrifying lack of visibility for the average user who just wants to buy a few shares of stock. It forces a profound re -evaluation of how we view our digital lives. Definitely. Consider this. If our digital identities are constantly being fragmented and dispersed across dozens of invisible vendors, and those hidden vendors

are legally mandated by the government to keep our ghost data for years after we leave their platforms, is the concept of deleting your account actually a complete illusion? Who really owns your digital footprint if you can never truly erase it? That is a deeply unsettling thought to leave on. The Ghost Kitchen might keep your recipe. your address, and your order history forever, even if you never order from the restaurant again. Thank you all for joining us on this deep dive. Take a moment to check your app permissions, maybe download that authenticator app. Stay curious,

and we will catch you next time.

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